ADDRESS BY CNS AT THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF SHANGRI LA DIALOGUE 2009

MAJOR POWERS AND ASIAN SECURITY: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

Preamble

Dr John Chipman, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen…Good Morning.

1. It is a singular privilege to be able to share a few thoughts with you at

this 8th IISS Asia Summit, and I would like to thank the organisers for this

opportunity. Change is upon us in many parts of the world, but perhaps

nowhere more so than in the oceanic expanses and the littoral regions of the

Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

The Changed Security Environment

2. This changed security environment is characterised by two apparently

opposite strains. On the one hand, the individual security strategy of each

individual nation is increasingly enmeshed with that of the collective. On the

other hand, the quest for human security is coming into sharper focus. As

such, the term ‘security’ has now assumed increasingly dominant political,

economic, societal and environmental dimensions. Each jostles for space with

the traditional ‘military’ one. And yet, the two strains are linked, since human

security transcends both national borders and Westphalian constructs of

sovereignty.
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Cooperation or Conflict?

3. As a consequence of these changes, we stand today at a fork in our

journey through space and time. One path leads to ‘cooperation’ and the other

to ‘conflict’. As these paths meander along, they often run very close abreast

and sometimes even overlap. These proximities and overlaps bring many

questions in their wake. For instance, how can economic competition for finite

resources in geographically coincident areas be prevented from transforming

itself into conflict? What degree of relevance should we attach to a historical

review of Japan in the period leading up to the Second World War, vis-à-vis the

present-day competition for energy and minerals by major powers within the

Indian and the Pacific littoral? Does economic interdependence increase or

decrease the probability of armed conflict? The Liberal School argues that it

does, because nations would ‘rather trade than invade’. Yet, the Realist School

dismisses this theory by highlighting historical evidence of the First World War

when major European powers, particularly Great Britain and Germany, had

reached unprecedented levels of interdependence and yet went to war. Which is

truer of our region and our times? Is the form of government necessarily an

indicator of the external behaviour of a nation? These are some of the

questions that confront us, the answers to which will determine our future.

Scripting the Future of Asian Security

4. As I said a little while ago, the individual security strategy of each nation

is today increasingly enmeshed with that of the collective. It is here that the

role of major powers assumes importance. But first, let me broach yet another
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facet of change by suggesting that the expression ‘major power’ is no longer

limited to a single nation-State entity alone. ASEAN is a prime example of a

major power of the newer kind, as is the EU. In some cases, major military-

blocs, such as NATO, have either already taken over roles and functions that

were characteristically performed by individual nation-States, or show a

marked tendency to do so.

5. Today, we have come to live in an era characterised by the rise of

insidious and malignant forces which have redefined security responses the

world over. And here, I refer here to the rise of the malevolent non-State actor.

Even more ominously, the occasional coalescing of the ‘State’ with malevolent

‘non-State’ entities has created an evil-hybrid that we might describe as the

‘State-sponsored, non-State actor’. It is this hybrid that lies at the heart of our

current security dilemma, which for India has been made all the more pressing

by the tragic events in Mumbai in November of 2008. Should our ‘preventive’,

‘curative’ and ‘punitive’ security-efforts be directed principally towards the

State-sponsor or the non-State entity? How are the linkages between the two to

be laid bare for the world to see? These changes are altering the ‘geo-

strategies’ of our age, in a fundamental manner.

6. Can a contextually-specific case, therefore, be made out whereby

cooperation amongst nation-states is used to combat malevolent non-State

entities? Terrorists? Pirates? What then should be the legitimate and most

responsible role that major State-powers should play? What organisational

constructs would be the most apt for such a goal to be realised?

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7. Perhaps the foremost issue for any organisational construct that seeks to

address the demands of such a holistic security paradigm is ‘acceptability’. I

do believe that region-specific ‘acceptability’ is a sine qua non (Seenay-Kwaai-Non)

for any meaningful progress towards cooperation. The cultural and societal

context of Asia is very different from that of, say, the Americas or Europe.

Cultural sensitivities in Asia must be acknowledged, understood and respected.

This is a complex business, because Asia is heterogeneous in the extreme.

8. Newer powers, often imbued with both the exuberant energy and the

impatience of youth, need to resist the temptation of simply extrapolating what

possibly works for them upon the entirely different civilisational paradigm of

Asia. Regional issues are best tackled by regional sensitivity. This is precisely

why we look-upon regionally-focussed structures such as the Western Pacific

Naval Symposium and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium with so much hope

and expectation, even though these are navy-specific constructs.

9. Having said that, I must emphasise that for any security construct in Asia

to succeed, its architecture must be evolved in a manner that reduces friction,

and reassures smaller states of their rightful place within such a construct,

without prejudice to size, economic stature or any other consideration. The

onus for this clearly lies with the larger, economically stable and militarily

stronger states of the region.

10. Regional and extra-regional powers, whether established or emerging

ones, have a crucial role to play. No cooperative, consultative or constructive

endeavour can succeed in the face of opposition from major State-powers. Yet,
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no meaningful conflict can be waged against malignant non-State powers

without State-powers joining hands in cooperative endeavour. For major State-

powers, there is actually no choice but to support and participate in

cooperative, consultative and constructive endeavours to defeat such forces. As

Martin Luther King Jr had once said, and I quote: -

“We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now”

11. Asia today, is witnessing the historical and simultaneous rise of at least

four major powers namely, India, China, Japan and the ten countries of ASEAN.

These Asian powers are witnessing unprecedented economic activity, and, even

in these recessionary times, the economic performances of India, China and

Indonesia are indeed impressive. On the other hand, Asia is also the crucible

from which many of world’s most obscurantist and malevolent forces are taking

frightening form and substance. The challenge, therefore, is to keep the

engines of growth running through trade, commerce and every other form of

human endeavour, whilst at the same time keeping disruptive forces at bay.

Responses to Threats

12. This no mean challenge and no country, however large or powerful, has

the wherewithal to insulate itself from the omnipresent threats, of which

terrorism is the newest and most grotesque manifestation. Other universal

concerns that nation states face today include threats from nefarious traffickers

of drugs, arms, human beings, organised poachers, ships that clandestinely

discharge oil and toxic cargo into the sea or onto the shores of unsuspecting
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and ill-informed states, mercenaries and modern-day pirates. There are also

‘non-traditional security threats’, encompassing a wide range of potential

crises, including environmental degradation, infectious diseases and illegal

migration. While these challenges are not within the purview of more traditional

military concerns, they may nonetheless pose a challenge to national security

and regional stability. Put together, they constitute a deadly cocktail that then

constitutes a common challenge that can only be faced through common

resolve. This will require many overlapping and interlocking structures,

multiple opportunities and mechanisms for constructive engagement. It will

need a transformation in the way we think, and in the way we look at one

another. It would also require those nations which have the necessary resources

and the wherewithal to pick up the burden of public good in ensuring all forms

of security to life, trade and property to ensure the well-being of the region.

Concerted efforts at capability-enhancement and capacity-building of the

smaller countries of the region, through active assistance of larger neighbours

would be crucial to such efforts in the long term. Many of us, and that includes

India, have some ongoing programmes in this direction, but we could do with

some fillip here.

India’s Contribution to Regional Security

13. India is committed to building a secure environment in which trade and

economic development can proceed unhindered. We see the Indian Navy as a

significant, stabilising force in the Indian Ocean Region, that safeguards traffic

bound not only for our own ports, but also the flow of hydrocarbons and

strategically important cargo to and from the rest of the world across the
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strategic waterways close to our shores. As Asian economies, including that of

India, are expected to grow at higher than world averages in the decades to

come, so will our vulnerabilities that arise from the disruption of sea trade. And

so, safety of SLOCs will always remain a priority for India in the foreseeable

future. The Indian Navy has been a trend-setter in anti-piracy efforts off the

Gulf of Aden, and whilst there has been a reduction in piracy incidents, much

remains to be done to optimise global efforts in that fragile region.

14. Benign operations comprise one of the cornerstones of India’s regional

engagement. Tsunami relief operations in 2004, non-combatant evacuation

operations from Lebanon in 2006, and the more recent responses to Cyclones

Nargis and Sidr that struck Myanmar and Bangladesh respectively, as well as

medical relief to Sri Lanka in the wake of the recently unfolded humanitarian

crisis, are examples of our commitment to our neighbours and the safety of our

diaspora.

15. We have also been mindful of the need to assist our smaller neighbours

in helping themselves. Our capability-enhancement and capacity-building

initiatives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius have adequately

enabled them to deal with many of their security concerns. I am convinced that

as India grows in economic and military stature, it would have to take upon

itself, the role of further equipping its neighbours in ways that would not only

enhance their own security, but contribute positively to regional stability as

well. On the Navy-to-Navy level, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium or IONS,

which was launched in February last year, is a significant military construct to

bring together regional navies and aimed at addressing common concerns.

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Conclusion

16. Let me conclude, therefore, by stating quite emphatically that my vote,

whether for cooperation or conflict, would go quite definitely for the former.

The future of this planet hinges on how Asia conducts itself in world affairs in

the next few decades. Our rise to eminence, or fading away to insignificance,

would depend on whether we choose to cooperate with, or confront each other.

I firmly believe that there is room for everyone to grow without being

confrontationist in our approaches.

17. On this note, let me end with the words of Benjamin Franklin, and I

quote: -

“If we do not hang together, we will all hang separately”

18. Thank you for your attention.