How the Indian Navy destroyed the Ghazi

The sinking of the Pakistan submarine Ghazi just before the 1971 War has
remained an enigma for 45 years.
As The Ghazi Attack releases nationwide on February 17, Rediff.com's Vipin
Vijayan dives deep into the naval mystery.

IMAGE: The USS Diablo (AGSS-479) that went to be rechristened as the PNS Ghazi.
Photograph: Lieutenant Commander Tomme J Lambertson (retd)/US Navy

The S-130 submarine was the crown jewel of the Pakistan navy.
Having spent nearly two decades scanning the depths for the US navy, the USS
Diablo had been falling off the radar with technologically superior machines
outpacing it. But it wasn't going to go down without a fight.

It would, in the course of time, script a most intriguing chapter in naval history.

By the time the Diablo (Spanish for devil) parked itself at Pearl Harbour, the curtain
had almost been pulled over World War II. It embarked on its first ever war patrol to
Saipan, which Japan considered its last line of defence at the time in August 1945,
but was diverted on course to the American naval base of Guam.

By the early 1960s, the Diablo had been relegated to the level of a research
submarine though it retained its combat potential.

Then the Kennedy administration gave it a new lease of life by upgrading its sonar,
replacing the old diesel auxiliary with an electrical plant, installing a new air-
conditioning unit. The boat though lost its deck guns in the process.

Around this time, the Pakistan navy had been lobbying hard with the US to bolster its
arsenal against India.

The Diablo was to join the Pakistan navy -- cleared for transfer on lease for four years
with the options of a renewal or purchase -- thus making it the first submarine to be
operated by a South Asian navy.

Its Mark-14 torpedoes on board were a threat to any warship in the region.

New Delhi had every reason to worry.

*******

IMAGE: The Ghazi returns to Karachi in 1970 from Golchuk, Turkey, after undergoing
an extended refit. Photograph: Kind courtesy pakdef.info
The PNS Ghazi sailed into Karachi on September 4, 1964, with Commander
Karamat Rahman Niazi as its commanding officer.

Prior to the hand over, Pakistan naval officers underwent training in submarine
operations on board the USS Angler.

The seven officers and 69 men on board the Ghazi kept shadowing Indian warships
in the Arabian Sea over the course of next few months.

And then, in September 1965, India and Pakistan went to war.

Through the duration of the war, the Ghazi silently moved in the depths
unchallenged.

Its target was India's aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant.

But with the Vikrant undergoing refits at the naval dockyard in Bombay,
the Ghazi had to contend with monitoring other Indian warships.

Yet the orders to unleash its firepower would not come through... not until the fag
end of the war.

Indian fighter jets had been buzzing over Karachi at will, guided by the radar station
at Dwarka in Jamnagar district, Gujarat.

The Pakistani war-room devised a plan that could signify a turning point in the war.

The plan was dual pronged -- one involving sending Pakistan naval ships to bombard
Dwarka, the other involving the Ghazi to take out Indian warships that would sail out
of Bombay to respond to the attack.

A fleet of seven ships -- the PNS Babur, PNS Khaibar, PNS Badr, PNS Jahangir,
PNS Alamgir, PNS Shah Jahan and the PNS Tipu Sultan -- bombarded Dwarka as
the Ghazi kept watch for Indian naval activity.

According to Pakistani records, the Ghazi sighted two Indian warships at periscope
depth in the third week of September.

Commander Niazi identified one of the targets as the INS Brahmaputra and ordered
torpedoes to be fired at the vessel. The Pakistanis claimed that three torpedoes
slammed into the Brahmaputra and caused extensive damage to it.

But Indian Navy records say the attack on the Brahmaputra did not happen.
The Ghazi returned home, claiming success; its commanding officer and crew were
bestowed with battle honours -- for an attack it never executed.

*******

IMAGE: The crew operating in the submarine's forward torpedo room. Photograph:
Kind courtesy Robert Hurst/USSDiablo.com

Following the 1965 war, US-imposed sanctions prevented the Ghazi from securing
the American spares it needed for repairs and refit.

Desperate for spares, Islamabad signed a pact with Turkey -- with the blessings of the
Americans nonetheless -- to refit and upgrade the boat's onboard equipment at a cost
of $1.5 million (the cost in 1967) at the Gulchuk shipyard.

After repairs, the Ghazi returned to Karachi in April 1970.

India and Pakistan were at loggerheads in 1971 after millions of refugees fled East
Pakistan for India to escape the Pakistan army's genocidal rampage in East Pakistan.

War was inevitable.

Naval planners relocated the Vikrant carrier group to the Eastern Naval Command in
Visakhapatnam.

Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan, who served as the general officer commanding,
East Pakistan during the 1965 war and later as the first commandant of the Pakistan
military academy, in his book Story of the Pakistan Army wrote, 'The navy ordered
the submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between November 14
and 22. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India, while
the Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating
the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in the
area.'

'Ghazi's deployment to the Bay of Bengal must be regarded as a measure taken to

rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military
realities.'

'Our response to Indian military deployments around East Pakistan was a series of
ad hoc measures, taken from time to time, as a reaction to the Indian build-up,' the
late major general wrote.

'Despatch of the Ghazi to India's eastern seaboard, not part of the original plans, was
one such step taken on the insistence of our military high command to reinforce the
Eastern Command. There was pressure on the Pakistan navy to extend the sphere of
its operations into the Bay of Bengal increased with the growth of Indian and Indian-
inspired naval activities in and/around East Pakistan.'

The Ghazi, under commander Zafar Muhammed Khan, set sail on November 14,
1971.

*******
IMAGE: The INS Vikrant sailing off the Bay of Bengal in 1973. Photograph: Kind
courtesy Indian Navy

Indian intelligence had anticipated the move.

It had tapped a submarine signal off the Sri Lankan coast around November 19.

With no other submarine in the Pakistani navy arsenal capable of undertaking a

voyage that long, it was abundantly clear that the Ghazi was out on the prowl.

The confirmation of the Ghazi threat came when a warship intercepted a signal
addressed to the naval authorities in Chittagong, East Pakistan, requesting
lubrication oil only used by submarines and minesweepers.

Vice Admiral Nilakanta Krishnan, then the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief,

Eastern Naval Command during the 1971 war, decided that the Ghazi threat had to
be dealt with once and for all.

'The problem of the Vikrant's security was a serious one and brought forth several
headaches.
'By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, by analyzing data such as
endurance, distance factors, base facilities, etc we had come to the definite
conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy the submarine Ghazi against us in
the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of destroying our aircraft carrier.'

'The threat from the Ghazi was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage
at the pre-emptive stage, the Vikrant's approximate position would become known
once she commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast.'

'We decided that in preparing our plan, we would rely much more on deception and
other measures against the Ghazi. We had to find some place to crouch in, to spring
into action at the shortest notice.'

'After embarking the remaining aircraft of Seahawks, Alizes and Alouettes, the fleet
left Madras on Saturday, November 13 for an unknown destination which I shall call
'Port X-Ray', for reasons of security.'

'Port X-Ray was a totally uninhabited place with no means of communication with
the outside world and it was well protected and in the form of a lagoon. Having sailed
the fleet away to safety, the major task was to deceive the enemy into thinking that
the Vikrant was where she was not and lure the Ghazi to where we could attack her.'

'I spoke to the naval officer-in-charge, Madras on the telephone and told him that
the Vikrant, now off Visakhapatnam, would be arriving at Madras and would require
an alongside berth, provisions and other logistic needs.'

The headquarters at Madras was bewildered that Vice Admiral Krishnan would
discuss such sensitive military matters on a civilian telephone line but nonetheless
carried out his orders.

Vice Admiral Krishnan was hoping that the Pakistanis had found a way to intercept
the call and presume that Vikrant was still anchored at Vizag.

The next move was to lay the trap.

The destroyer INS Rajput, commanded by Captain Inder Singh, was selected as the
decoy ship.

Vice Admiral Krishnan had briefed him about the mission and directed him to leave
Vizag harbour after refuelling with all navigational aids switched off.

The destroyer then began broadcasting a massive volume of encrypted radio traffic
like an aircraft carrier would.

The trick worked.

On November 25, naval intelligence intercepted a Pakistani navy message from a
submarine commodore in Karachi stating that the aircraft carrier was very much in
Visakhapatnam.

The next day, the Ghazi was to give its mission report to its naval HQ. But the radio
never buzzed.

*******

IMAGE: The crew of the PNS Ghazi at their stations. Photograph: Kind
courtesy pakdef.info

A week had passed, yet the Pakistani establishment received no news from
the Ghazi.

On December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched operation Chengiz Khan -- a large

preemptive airstrike from West Pakistan against targets in northwestern India.

The attack was thwarted by the alert Indian Air Force who had been preparing for a
sudden strike.

The war had begun, but the Ghazi had totally gone off the radar.

The news came on the intervening night of December 3-4.

In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan wrote, 'The Rajput sailed before midnight of 3/4
December and, on clearing harbour, proceeded along the narrow channel.'

'Having got clear, the commanding officer saw what he thought was a severe
disturbance in the water, about half a mile ahead. He rightly assumed that this might
be a submarine diving. He closed the spot at speed and dropped at the position two
charges.'

'It has been subsequently established that the position where the charges were
dropped was so close to the position of the wreck of the Ghazi that some damage to
the latter is a very high probability.'

'The Rajput, on completion of her mission, proceeded on her course in order to carry
out her main mission.'

'A little later, a very loud explosion was heard by the coast battery who reported the
same to the maritime operations room.'

'The time of this explosion was 0015 hours. The clock recovered from
the Ghazi showed that it had stopped functioning at the same time.'

'Several thousand people waiting to hear the prime minister's broadcast to the nation
also heard the explosion and many came out thinking that it was an earthquake.'

'As per our arrangement with them, some fishermen reported oil patches and some
flotsam.'

'The command diving team were rushed to the spot and commenced detailed
investigations.'

'The divers established that there was a definite submerged object some distance out
seawards, at a depth of 150 feet of water and that it was a probable submarine.'

'Even though there were a number of floating objects picked up, there was nothing to
indicate the identity of the submarine.'

'Everything had American markings. I told the Chief of the Naval Staff that
personally I was convinced that we had bagged the Ghazi.'

'By Sunday, December 5, we were able to establish from the silhouette and other
characteristics that the submarine was in fact the Ghazi.'

But there was no means of ingress into the submarine as all entry hatches from the
conning tower aft were tightly screwed down from the inside.
The Indian Navy released an official confirmation on December 9 that the Ghazi had
been destroyed.

*******

IMAGE: The wreck of the Ghazi and her 82 man crew lies off the Vizag coast.
Photograph: Kind courtesy Bharat Rakshak

The Pakistanis intercepted Captain Singh's relay message on December 4 to Vice

Admiral Krishnan stating that he had sunk a Pakistani submarine.

It, however, refused to believe that the pride of its navy had been sunk.
To this day, Pakistan believes the Ghazi strayed into a minefield it had itself laid two
days ago.

According to the Pakistani sequence of events, the Ghazi commenced laying a small
minefield east of Vizag harbour on December 2-3, 1971.

Then at daybreak on December 3, it headed out to deeper water to search for

the Vikrant.

Not finding it, the Ghazi returned to the Visakhapatnam harbour mouth area at
sunset to resume laying the minefield.

As the lights ashore were blacked out, the Ghazi may have misjudged her position
and doubled back into her own minefield around midnight; about 10 to 15 minutes
before the INS Rajput's depth charging.

To date, what really happened to the Ghazi remains a mystery.

Today, the submarine lies embedded in the Vizag seabed about 1.5 nautical miles
from the breakwaters.

Vice Admiral G M Hiranandani (retd), in his book Transition to Triumph,

summarises: 'The truth about the Ghazi, which remains on what the submarine
community calls the 'eternal parole', lies somewhere between the Indian and
Pakistani versions of the sinking but no one knows exactly where.'