00 Crimpro Bail Compiled Digests PDF

1
CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
FELICIANO VS. PASICOLAN

2 SCRA 888 (1961)
retains unless and until he is charged with a capital
This is a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.
Judge to decide on the merits of a motion filed by the petitioner in
which he asks that the Court fix at P10,000.000 the amount of the And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held:
bail for his liberty pending trial.
Heres what happened: xxx the right to bail only accrues when a person is
arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail
is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus,
Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When he `bail is the security required and given for the release of
found out that an Information had been filed and that a warrant a person who is in the custody of the law.'
of arrest had been issued against him, he went into hiding. His
lawyer, at the instance of his wife, fined a motion asking that the
Court fix the amount of the bond at P10K for the petitioners Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he
release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release
opposed the motion on the ground that the filing was premature pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free
because the petitioner had been arrested. The respondent Judge man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to
dismissed the motion on the ground that the petitioner does bail.
not have the right to ask for the court to admit him to bail
pending his arrest or surrender.
The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all

persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt
is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of
the Philippines, and that the words "all persons" used in said
constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "all
persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet
so charged with any criminal offense".
ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for
admission to bail.
HELD/RATIO: No.
There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by

petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is
subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to
bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of
his liberty.
In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this Court
held:
xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that

any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged
with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Of course, only those persons who have been
either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of
their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision. But in order that a person
can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not
necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From
the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or
restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he
2
MIRANDA VS. TULIAO

486 SCRA 377 (2006)
and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
(I am allowing you to hate me for this digest. Sobrang gulong- Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the
gulo ako. Ill just attach the original. The issue raised by the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise
petitioners kasi is not about bail, but the court discussed it in applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio.
such a way that bail got included. They contrasted. Basically,
it just says the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving
the accused when he/she submits motions, etc even if hes not to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against
detained. But the exception is the petition for admission to bail Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
the accused has to be held in detention in such case. Since Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint
were in a hurry, I think thats the only thing we need, or so I Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations
make myself believe.) for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court
took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
Facts: 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of
Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge
Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, but the venue cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding,
was later transferred to the RTC of Manila which convicted all of affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
that time, being at large. The case was appealed to the Supreme submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Court on automatic review where we accused therein was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Court: A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 over the person of the accused may be acquired either through
April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
Elizer Tuliao. processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the
sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
and SPO2 Maderal. petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial
relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
warrants of arrest.
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, person is required before the court can act on their motion to
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their
Reyes to the Department of Justice. person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
3
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between

custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication
of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody
of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one
can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own
will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an

accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.
. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of

the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the
bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for
the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the
other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to
persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a
person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of
arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the
Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can
easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable
cause after personally examining the records of the case.
4
CORTES VS CATRAL
279 SCRA 1 (1997)
ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would
FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for granting warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against
bail without hearing. respondent judge.
1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a HELD/RATIO: YES.

crime that is supposedly not bailable) without hearing.
Catral says:In one of them, the case was frustrated Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case.
homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of
200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak. the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive.
Case 08-866 for murder, the inquest judge issued a Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
recommended. When the case was elevated to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is
provincial prosecutor, the information made no required to take into account a number of factors such as the
mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is whether he is a fugitive from justice.
strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and
recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by
Respondent judge acting on the said recommendation death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is
and again guided by the provision of Section 9, mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or
Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into
evidence extant on the record approved the account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. A Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of
duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carraos strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused.
letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the
provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented
by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
granted bail to the accused without conducting any accused charged with murder, without having conducted
hearing. any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
2. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal accused is strong.
possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended
by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended
Catral says: bailbond recommended was 180K. accused the sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The
filed for reduction and there was no opposition from records do not reveal whether a hearing was actually conducted
prosecutor. on the application for bail although respondent judge implies that
3. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case there was one, stating that acting on this recommendation of the
was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge provincial prosecutor and taking into account the guidelines
Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94, the
this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of
Decierto. P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Catral says: he was acting on the recommendation of the Subsequently, counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motion
OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines for reduction of bail. The hearing of the motion was conducted
in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not having interposed
the fact that the evidence on record is merely any opposition, and submitting the resolution of the motion to
circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the the sound discretion of the court instead. Respondent judge then
commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of issued an order granting a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for
P14,800.00. accused Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as the evidence was not so
4. . Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong strong to warrant the fixation of said amount. The order
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a
Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban summary of the evidence for the prosecution.
appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the
sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral In another murder case, after conducting a preliminary
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that investigation, the inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest for
the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy the accused with no bail recommended. When the case was
Siribans house to get the envelop elevated to the Regional Trial Court, the information made no
mention of a bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel
5
filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.
accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence
and recommended the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of
judge, acting on said recommendation and again guided by the whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong
provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only
conjunction with the evidence extant on record, issued an order after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
granting bail to the accused in the sum of P200,000.00. Unable to the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since
post the said bond, accused through counsel filed a motion to evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
reduce bail. In the course of the hearing of the petition, the public produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
prosecutor manifested that he had no objection to the sum of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross
guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant examination and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal.
on record reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00 to
P50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor. Once again, the
order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the
bond of P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the evidence fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874,
presented by the prosecution. People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent
already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent
evidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even had
the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneously
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reiterate the
application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a
is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion
for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
6
PEOPLE VS. MANALLO

400 SCRA 129 (2003)
the prosecutions evidence but rather on the weakness of the
FACTS: Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine- evidence for the defense
year old daughter Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived in a
coconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. HELD/RATIO: NO. Even a cursory reading of the decision of the
Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the familys trial court will readily show that it convicted appellant of the
dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay reservoir. The route crime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. Loria-
to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long Florece and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution.
trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to negotiate the
grassy path from the reservoir to their house. The trial court considered appellants flight from the scene of the
crime, his having jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long
In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut years as evidence of his guilt for the crime charged
gatherer. Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce
once a week. BAIL-RELATED (copy-paste):
One day, in 1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record
clothes and to take a bath. On her way back home, Manallo its concern and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of
suddenly appeared from the bushes, grabbed her and raped her. the trial court in granting bail to appellant. It bears stressing that
Alex dressed up and warned her not to tell her parents, brothers he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to
and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he would kill them all. death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. Rosaldiza related to Procedure reads:
her mother what had happened to her.
SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. At the hearing of an
Medico-Legal. Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in
station and executed their respective sworn statements. An custody for the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion
information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing
City, charging Alex with rape. that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during
the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at
No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall
He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no specific date any witness for additional examination unless the witness is
and time for the hearing thereof. Upon the filing of said motion, dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.
the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and
fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00. On the same day, Alex posted (please see previous case for the duties of the trial court in
a property bond which was immediately approved by the resolving a motion or petition for bail)
court. Alex was forthwith released from detention.
In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8,
At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by 1992. There was no specific date and time for the hearing of said
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, motion. And yet, on the same day that the motion was filed,
1992. The prosecution prayed the trial court to cancel the bond of the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail
Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without bond for the provisional liberty of the appellant in the
due hearing. However, the trial court held in abeyance resolution amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefore
of the motion until after the prosecutor shall have presented its stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed
witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court stated that the the court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property
evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence bond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court granted
in Alexs petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, his motion for bail without even affording the prosecution a
1992, the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in
on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the hearing on opposition thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution
his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on thereof and even allowed the appellant to remain free on his
said date. The trial court issued and order for his arrest. bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution
However, Alex could no longer be found at his address. It was was deprived of its right to due process.
only six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was
arrested.
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to
temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect
He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were lovers. He the people and the peace of the community from dangerous
was found guilty. (short story version.) elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in
the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his
ISSUE (in the case): WON the trial court gravely erred in exercise of jurisdiction.
convicting accused-appellant not on the basis of the strength of
7
LAVIDES VS CA
G.R. 129670
February 1, 2000
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child only after the arraignment to enable this
abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction
deterrence and special protection against child abuse, over the accused;
exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its
violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.
warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to
appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed a
San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done
that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in prior to his arraignment.
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of petitioners activities. the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions to
reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered
whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order
were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial
III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner. conference was set on June 7, 1997.
petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground
of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes
Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which
Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged. makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of
his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and
nine more informations for child abuse were filed against that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held
petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by pursuant to such invalid condition.
three other minor children
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate
applications for bail in the nine cases. HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above- bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
entitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would
all the cases under the following conditions: then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second
place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
of appearance during the trial of these cases. presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.
He shall and must always be present at the Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of
hearings of these cases; the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"
while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
b) In the event that he shall not be able to arraignment is required
do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his
arrest shall be immediately issued and the to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
dated April 10, 1997 stands; and motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
8
undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997
that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that
he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in
accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the
trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall
proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia

allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain
stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation
of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the
accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages
of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived.
IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF

PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to
petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate from
the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition,
the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,
although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid,
his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are
valid.
9
SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

396 SCRA 443 (2003)
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
(YOU MAY HATE ME FOR THIS, TOO.) The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on
the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by
not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information
Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail,
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, the
for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The
former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and
prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the
several others.
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for
bail.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-
He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. (Andaming nyang
profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
finile. Ang hirap tuloy isummarize)
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and
support to research and advance studies of young Muslim Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a
educators and scientists. motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson. filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Accused by Singson. Informations filed.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the
nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
motion to fix bail.
petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was
set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners co- (I will not include the issues regarding the charging of more than
accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very one offense, etc. anymore. Bail na lang tayo)
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a
matter of right. ISSUES:
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted;
the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27,
2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
the petition for bail can and should be heard before
petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before
the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail. (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception and those of the other accused is mandatory;
of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25,
2001. (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime
of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings charged
on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-
examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to HELD/RATIO:
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of 1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite
the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is
Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
10
voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
arraignment before filing a petition for bail. criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted which are apparent in the face of the Information. An
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a
precluded from filing a motion to quash. general rule, before arraignment.
These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail when charged with an offense not punishable by death,
should at all times precede arraignment, because the reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when
rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of charged with an offense punishable by such penalties
his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
complaint or information is filed against him. The validity of the Information charging him with such
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the
case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash ground that the same does not charge any offense is
the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is
therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position become moot and academic.
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until 3. No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of
his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a
thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously
his constitutional right not to be put on trial except with the trial of the case against the other accused. The
upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
charge him with a crime and his right to bail. two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first with the trial against another accused is addressed to
arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with
to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
an application for bail in a case involving an offense It may be underscored that in the exercise of its
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if not only the convenience of the State, including the
the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled prosecution, but also that of the accused and the
to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and
he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to the right of accused to a speedy trial. The
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of
authorized under the circumstances. In fine, the the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in may echo the observation of the United States Supreme
ordering the arraignment of petitioner before Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. being afforded our historic individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal prosecutions.
2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists About them, this Court dares not become careless or
between an application of an accused for bail and his complacent when that fashion has become rampant
filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for over the earth.
the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his 4. No. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused
appearance before any court as required under the to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his
conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records.
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even
same time securing his appearance at the trial. As impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to
stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing
arrest or voluntary surrender. dates for petitioners application for bail but the same
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is were reset due to pending incidents raised in several
11
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be
resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail
hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not
push through due to the filing of this petition on June
29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners
application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to
the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is
also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the
following list of motions filed by him and by the
prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the

burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until

the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail
and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a
finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before
he may be granted bail.
12
PEOPLE V SAN DIEGO

CAPISTRANO, J.:
In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the information charged the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and
defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground,
Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as be allowed to stand.
principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of
armed men and craft or fraud.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that the
motions for bail of the defendants would be considered
in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary
proceeding.
In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution
had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved
the motions for bail granting the same despite the
objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still
had material witnesses to present.
The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for
each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt
was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes
very angry because in his motion for reconsideration of
the orders granting bail he used contumacious language
for which he was forthwith cited for contempt.
Fortunately, after the fiscal had submitted his answer
and explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood, did
not punish him for contempt on condition that the
contumacious words be deleted from his motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was deprived of

procedural due process- YES, HENCE THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS ARE NULL AND VOID
We are of the considered opinion that whether the

motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses
must be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it
would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or
whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong.
The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five
defendants are defective in form and substance because they do
not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
13
OCAMPO V BERNABE
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo Ocampo the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
to set aside an order issued by the Fourth Division of cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
the People's court denying his application for produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil.,
bail.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
library discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
Coprs of the Armed Forces of the United States and cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
confined in Muntinglupa Prisons since July 30, 1945, rebuttal.
and pursuant to Executive Order No. 6555 he was Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not
turned over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless
and later on filed with the Peoples Court his application the petitioner fails to object thereto.
for bail under Act No. 682. And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States.
At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor In some states of the American union, the burden of
stated that petitioner with having pointed out Placido showing that proof is evident or the presumption great,
Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that lies on the prosecution while in others on the petitioner,
reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. but the rule seems to be uniform to the effect that no
No evidence, however, was presented by the special matter which side bears the burden of proof, the
prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to evidence of guilt should be adduced before the court for
recite the contents of an affidavit which has no a proper determination of its probative force
referrence to count No. 4, and to state further that he In corpus Juris Secundum the rule is summarized as
had 27 more affidavits. follows:
Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital o Unless the presumption from an indictment
is not a evidence and that evidence cannot be for a capital offense is conclusive against
considered strong which has not been subjected to the accused which has been considered in section
test of cross-examination. 34 b(2) (b)the determination as to whether
He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges the proof is evident or the presumption great
preferred against him and stated that said charges are must, on an original application, be
mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad. determined from the evidence adduced on the
Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of application no matter which side bears the
the People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe, burden of proof. Where accused under a
Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order capital indictment bears the burden of proof
dated February 23, 1946, denying the application for he should offer the witnesses whose names
bail. are endorsed on the indictment, although he is
Hence, this petition for certiorari. not limited to such witnesses.
o The court should hear all material and
ISSUE: WON no proof was presented by the special relevant evidence offered by either party, such
prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is as the grand jury minutes, and should consider
strong, thus, the People's Court committed a grave the evidence as a whole. (8 C.J.S., section 46
abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail [b], p. 94.).
-YES. Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner to
begin the evidence, although it imposes upon him the
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons necessity of producing evidence upon which the state
(76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before conviction intended to rely for his conviction on the final trial. But
be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and the accused will not by this procedure be denied the
the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule, opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses.
therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not (Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. To the same effect, Rigdon
yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 So., 711; ex parte Nathan[Fla.];
provisional release on bail, the only exception being 50 so., 38." (39 L. R. A., New Series, pp. 752, 774, 775.).
where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of The evidence for the state, as well as that for the
guilt is found to be strong. accused, should be presented (1) by the petitioner in an
At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of application for bail. (Ex parte Tully [Fla.], 66 S., 296;
showing that the case falls within the exception is on Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 S., 711; Ex parte
the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. (2) But the petitioner, by proper
The determination of whether or not the evidence of procedure, may test the probative force of the
guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a testimony for the state in order to fully present his case
matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very for the purposes of the hearing. Ex parte Tully, supra; Ex
nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the parte Heffren, supra. (6 C.J., p. 984, fn. 50 [a], section
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since 214.).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
14
Where on a motion to admit to bail after the indictment,
the evidence of the witnesses who testified before the
grand jury does not make a prima facie case against the
accused, he is entitled to bail, and it is an error to refuse
bail upon the statement of the district attorney that he
has other evidence which he will not disclose for fear of
weakening the state's case. (In ex parte Reynald, 37
Texas, 1.)
And this is in conformity with the former rulings of this
Court. (MARCOS V. CRUZ AND HERRAS CASE)
True that in the same case of Herras Teehankee vs.
Director of Prisons, supra, we said that the hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court. By "summary hearing" we
meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of the evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court "does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for
or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted." (8 C. J. S., 93,94.)
The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of
the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing.
Objection has been made long ago to this method of
hearing wherein the regular trial is anticipated though
to a limited extent at least. but the objection was
dismissed.
It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of
the application for bail filed by the petitioner no proof
was offered by the prosecution to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong, the Fourth Division of the
People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the bail applied for.
15
SIAZON V JUDGE
MAKALINTAL, J.:
At the outset it should be mentioned that the instant petition outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
is formally defective in that the petitioner appears to be the therein offered and admitted.' (8 C.J.S. 93, 94.) T
State Prosecutor handling the case below instead of the The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
People of the Philippines, who should properly be court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
represented in this proceeding by the Solicitor General. has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
(BUT FOR SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE, THIS thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
INFIRMITY IS OVERLOOKED. SC PROCEEDS). witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the
At the outset, let it be stated that after the arraignment of the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
accused and before the commencement of the trial, the essential to the purposes of the hearing."
applications for bail, were heard We do not see that the addition of the provision Sec. 7, Rule
The Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on 114 has materially changed the nature of the hearing on a
the merits and of the applications for bail. On this same petition for bail to the extent of depriving the Court of its
occasion the Court also considered the motion filed by the discretion to confine the evidence to the extent necessary for
prosecution to discharge the defendant Angelico Najar. the proper determination of the question of whether or not
Without any objection on the part of the defense, said the evidence of guilt is strong. The only change that has been
motion to discharge was granted and accused Najar was introduced is that such evidence shall be considered
discharged to become state witness pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule automatically reproduced at the trial in order to avoid
119 of the Rules of Court. unnecessary repetition.
As the trial progressed, with the prosecution presenting The prosecution had had three months since the hearing
several witnesses whose testimonies have not established started until the questioned order was issued and had called
evidence directly linking the accused Escribano and Padilla 27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient corroborative basis for
to the conspiracy alleged in the informations in these cases, the testimony of its principal witness, Angelico Najar. The
the defense on August 2, 1971 filed an urgent motion for the plea that this witness will reveal the names of persons who
reconsideration of the order given in open Court ordering a have some knowledge of circumstances which tend to
joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the connect the two accused with thecrimes and who
applications for bail, to which the prosecution also filed its presumably will also be called to testify, and whose
opposition. willingness to do so may thereby be adversely influenced by
The Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that such revelation, does not appear to be convincing, since the
the applications for bail be first heard to which the record of the cases already contains the testimony which
prosecution gave its assent. Najar gave at the preliminary investigation, aside from his
three sworn statements consisting of 16 pages typed single-
ISSUE: whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail space in question and answer form. (TANGGAPIN NA KASI
is still summary in nature as it was under the old rule - YES NILA NA INSUFFICIENT NGA DAW)
The proviso that any witness may be recalled at the trial for
additional examination underscores, if anything, the
As a general proposition, all persons shall before conviction difference between the hearing for purposes of the petition
be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and for bail and the trial on the merits. This is as it should be,
the evidence of guilt is strong. because one has for its purpose, from the endpoint of the
At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of prosecution, to show that strong evidence of guilt exists
showing that the case falls within the exception is on the while the contemplates proof beyond reasonable doubt.
prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of
Court. T evidence and the order of presentation of the witness while
he determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be equated with
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in the very the purpose of the hearing, which is to determine whether
nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the the accused falls within the exception to the general rule that
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Neither he is constitutionally entitled to bail before conviction.
under the old nor under the new Rules is there any specific To allow the prosecution to conduct the hearing as if it were
provision defining what kind of hearing it should be, but in a full-dress trial on the merits who defeat the purpose of the
the two cases cited at the footnote hereof it was stated that proceeding.
the hearing should be summary or otherwise in the DISPOSITIVE: the petition is dismissed and the temporary
discretion of the court. restraining order issued by this Court is lifted, with
"By 'summary hearing,' this Court added, "we mean such instructions to the respondent Court to resume the hearing
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the forthwith for the presentation of Angelico Najar as witness
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the for the prosecution, without prejudice to said Court's
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the allowing, in the exercise of its discretion, the presentation of
weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, such other prosecution as it may deem advisable, in the
the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any interest of justice.
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the
16
MAMOLO V NARISIMA
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 16 May 1994 a criminal complaint for murder was for bail -x x x (w)hile the determination of whether or
filed against Antonio Balagot and Ariel Acha for the not evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant discretion, this discretion by the nature of things may
After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the requisite rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted
preliminary examination he issued the corresponding to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for
warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent bail of an accused who is in custody in a summary
Judge recommended no bail since murder is a capital proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the
offense and the evidence of guilt was strong. Acha was prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
later arrested while Balagot surrendered to the PC within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
Provincial Command in Cotabato. desire to introduce before the court may resolve the
Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a Petition motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied of
For Admission to Bail and set the same for hearing. At such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
the scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the procedural due process, and the order of the court
court that Balagot was ill and asked the court to granting bail should be considered void on that ground
dispense with the submission of his petition and, x x x (E)ven where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the hospital evidence in opposition to the application to grant and
(SPECIAL TREATMENT???). fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
MAMOLO:claims that despite the fact that respondent questions as would ascertain the strength of the states
Judge recommended no bail for both accused he evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail x x
nevertheless allowed Balagot to put a bail of
P150,000.00 without giving the prosecution the The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic,
opportunity to present its evidence to prove that the fundamental procedure cannot be lightly overlooked. As
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong. correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by
MAMOLO: also avers that on several occasions he saw respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law since
respondent Judge and counsel for accused Balagot it resulted in depriving the prosecution the time-tested
together and engaged in a series of private talks at a and enduring procedural due process.
nearby restaurant. It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit
In his Memorandum of 21 July 1995, approved by Court more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes
Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao, Deputy Court and procedural rules. For the role of judges in the
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found that administration of justice requires a continuous study of
respondent Judge disregarded procedural due process the law and jurisprudence. Indubitably, the industry of a
in granting bail to the accused. He opined that the judge in keeping abreast with the law and court rulings
prosecutions waiver to present evidence ought to have will enhance the faith of our people in the
prompted respondent Judge to ask the prosecution to administration of justice since litigants will be
present its witnesses at another date set for the purpose confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of
(of asking) clarificatory questions from which he may the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt of the their grasp of legal principles.
accused..
ISSUE: WON JUDGE NARISIMA ACTED
INAPPROPRIATELY IN RECOMMENDING THE BAIL
FOR BALAGOT?-YES
The procedure of conducting a hearing on the
application for admission to bail should provide the
basis for judges to determine whether the prosecutions
evidence is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while
respondent conducted a hearing on Balagots petition
for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the
prosecution to guide respondent in the proper
determination of the petition.
The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot
excuse respondents disregard of his peremptory duty.
It is worthy to note that in the resumption of the
hearing in the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the
prosecution prefaced its submission with a statement of
its serious vehement objection to the petition for bail.
Such manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of
the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition. In
Borinaga v. Tamin we delineated a clear guideline on
the exercise of judicial discretion in hearing petitions
17
PEOPLE V. TUPPAL
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant OTHER ISSUES
Saturnino Tuppal guilty of robbery with homicide and WON the evidence now on record is sufficient to hold
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. appellant Saturnino Tuppal guilty beyond
Appellants conviction stemmed from four charges filed reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
on August 21, 1992, by the Provincial Prosecutor of homicide- YES
Isabela The court a quo found the prosecutions evidence
Appellant remained at large for almost nine (9) years credible. It disbelieved appellants bare denials.
after the filing of the aforesaid cases. It was only on Eyewitness Florfina Solitos testimony on the hold-up
March 5, 1998 that appellant was arrested in Cainta, incident was replete with material details. She testified
Rizal and in connection with another case for robbery. that after being shot in the abdomen, she grappled with
Appellant was arraigned. Assisted by counsel, he appellant for possession of the gun. Meanwhile, co-
pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were then accused Danilo Tuppal dashed off with her bag and its
consolidated and trial ensued. contents, according to her. She also described the
The prosecutions evidence established that: firearm used in shooting her and killing her brother.
On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses These details could not have sprung from her
Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old imagination, but only from her vivid recollection of the
child, Efren, attended the wedding of Florfinas younger fatal incident implicating the appellant and his brothers
sister, Loida Atuan, at Barangay Banguro, Reina as the malefactors.
Mercedes, Isabela. At about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos Appellants defense of alibi is untenable.
accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfinas 26-year-
old brother, left the wedding reception. They had
barely traveled some 300 meters away and were in
front of the house of Felix Sacang, when they were WON the conspiracy among the accused was
waylaid by appellant and his four companions, now the established- YES
co-accused.After Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo After accused Ben Tuppal announced the hold-up, co-
Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfinas handbag accused Danilo Tuppal took Florfinas handbag
containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot containing P2,500.00. Appellant Saturnino Tuppal then
Florfina with a short firearm, hitting her in the shot Florfina with a handgun, hitting her on the left side
abdomen. Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina of her abdomen.
from further harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Their concerted action shows their unity of purpose
Bartolo, killing him on the spot. to rob the victim, at all cost. These concerted acts of
Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried appellant and his co-accused manifestly disclose
towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors concurrence of wills, unity of action, joint purpose and
gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her common design. Hence, although appellant did not
further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to himself shoot Bartolo Atuan, Jr., he is still liable for
be dead and fell to the ground. The ploy worked Bartolos death as principal because the existence of
because she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, Let us go, conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all.
she is already dead. The charges against appellant and his co-accused,
In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio constitute only one special indivisible or composite
Solito and his son Efren scampered towards the house crime as defined in Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
of Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both Code.
father and son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun the prosecution amply established the following
jammed and did not fire. elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of
In the present cases, appellant raised the defense of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence
denial and alibi. or intimidation against a person, (b) the property taken
belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by
CRIMPRO ISSUE: intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the
WON the fact that the trial court had held during the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime
bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was weak, of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed.
it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after
the trial.- NO
Said findings should not be construed as an immutable
evaluation of the prosecutions evidence.
It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution
evidence presented during bail hearings in capital
offenses is preliminary and intended only for the
purpose of granting or denying applications for the
provisional release of the accused.
18
DE LA CAMARA V ENAGE
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971
fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of
sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for the above order and the other incidents of the case,
certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate which, to his mind would disprove any charge that he
prohibiting excessive bail. was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed,
The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent. moreover, that the challenged order would find
Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order support in circulars of the Department of Justice
by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal
granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped of the petition for lack of merit.
from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot Respondent Judge submitted a supplemental answer
and academic. wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the
It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then
lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the
authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, to which
the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect petitioner countered in a pleading, and filed with this
be accorded to such a constitutional right. (I.E., Court the next day with this plea: "The undersigned
MASYADONG MAGANDA ANG PONENCIA KO PARA counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on
LANG MASAYANG! DI KO NAMAN KASALANAN NA behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for
NAKATAKAS SILA EH!- FERNANDO, HAHAHA) dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For,
Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition
and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who
wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration
Logging Co of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail."
Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with (HOW TOUCHING. BLEH)
the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated
murder and another for multiple murder against ISSUE: WON THE BAIL RECOMMENDED WAS
petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and EXCESSIVE AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION-
Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid YES
occurrence.
Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt
assertion that there was no evidence to link him with is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of
such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is
filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
evidence. not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a
Respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's person charged with a crime, especially so where his
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce
on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be
amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of thwarted
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this
information charging multiple murder and right to one charged with a capital offense when
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather
murder. than await the outcome of the proceeding against him
Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the with a death sentence, an ever-present threat,
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to
informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent be resisted.
Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.
property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a So the Constitution commands. It is understandable
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence becomes meaningless. It would have been more
this petition. forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found
in the fundamental law.
19
It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the
challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount
of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by
petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victims,
and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims,
is clearly violative of constitutional provision
.Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses
charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly
exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated
murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
Villaseor v. Abano: The guidelines in the fixing of bail
was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice
Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give
bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the
offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused
appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases." Respondent Judge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration
appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion,
indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the
required remedy."
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color
of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony
in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at
the same time being required to post such an exorbitant
sum.
It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left
resentment and bitterness in its wake. Petitioner's
subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he
is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent
Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this
Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his
inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged
reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were
charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such
a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano
opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No
doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so
would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of
words. Not only is the order complained of absolutely
bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face of
common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war
with the command of reason.
20
VILLASENOR v. ABANO
21 SCRA 321 (1967)
Sanchez, J; Sept. 29, 1967
Villasenor - he is a mere gov. employee, earning a salary of
FACTS P210 a month and the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
Reynaldo Villasenor was charged with murder of Police Sec. 12, Rule 114 provides that "the court may, upon good
Sergeant Madla before the CFI of Marinduque. He was cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the
admitted to a P60,000-bail which was reduced to P40,000. bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody
He posted a property bond and was set at provisional unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called
liberty. upon to furnish."
Before arraignment, Prov. Fiscal amended the information, We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to
charging the accused with Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a secure bail in a certain amount. This circumstance by itself
Person in Authority with Murder. does not make the amount excessive.
Aug. 7 - Judge Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenors bond Guidelines used by the courts in determining the amount of
and ordered his immediate arrest. bail
Sept. 9 - After hearing on Villasenors motion to reconsider, The purpose of bail as provided in the definition under
Judge Abano resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts Sec. 1, Rule 114 - the security required and given for the
ups a cash bond of P60,000. release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that
Sept. 15 - Villasenor asked the court that the original bond he will appear before any court in which his appearance
previously given be reinstated. Judge Abano resolved to fix may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
"the bond anew in real property in the amount of recognizance.
P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the The condition of bail as provided under Sec. 2, Rule 114
province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with - defendant shall answer the complaint or information
properties which "must be in the possession and ownership in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be
of said residents for five years." transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is
Villasenor filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for appealed to the Court of First Instance upon application
preliminary injunction seeking to set aside Judge Abanos supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will,
orders of Aug. 7, Sept. 9 and Sept. 15 and to reinstate the bail surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the
previously approved by Judbe Abano. He charges Judge appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to
Abano having acted without any or in excess of jurisdiction be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will
and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed appear in the court to which it may be remanded and
orders. submit himself to the orders and processes thereof.
The following principles should be considered in fixing
ISSUES: the amount of bail:
1. WON the P60k-bond fixed by Judge Abano transgress the the amount should be high enough to assure the
constitutional injunction that excessive bail shall not be presence of defendant when required but no higher
required. than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose
2. WON the requirement that the property bond be posted only the good of the public as well as the rights of the
by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying accused
therein collides with Sec. 9, Rule 1141. the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to
3. WON it is beyond the power of Judge Abano to require that freedom from unnecessary restraint before conviction
properties be offered as bond must be in possession and under the circumstances surrounding each particular
ownership of the sureties for at least five years. accused
Certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be
Note: summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give
*Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced with the bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) Penalty for the
order of Sept. 15, they became functus officio (retains no legal offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
authority because his or its duties and functions have been accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
completed) strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused
**This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different ROC. appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
HELD/RATIO arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
1. NO. The court has the power to grant bail in bailable appearance at trial in other cases
cases and the discretion to fix the amount thereof. In the The principal factor considered, to the determination
instant case, there is no abuse of discretion. of which most other factors are directed, is the
probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his
1 Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. The necessary qualifications flight to avoid punishment." Of importance then is the
of sureties to a bail bond shall be as follows: possible penalty that may be meted
(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault
freeholder within the Philippines. upon an agent of a person in authority with murder. A
complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the capital
21
punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to clarify that order.
Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18, We do say now that the order of September 15, 1964 is to be
1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to recommend bail at understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles
the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, from the requirement that properties to be offered as bond must
corresponding to the medium period of the penalty be "in the possession and ownership of the sureties for at least
prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances five years."
warrant a higher penalty DISPOSITION we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.
2. NO. The posture taken by respondent judge does not
offend the good sense of justice.
Judge Abano - it has been his experience that "it is hard to
send notices to people outside the province." He explains
that the usual procedure of his clerk of court is to send
notices by registered mail accompanied by return cards; that
when trial comes, the return cards in many instances have
not yet been received in court; that when the parties fail to
appear; there is no way of knowing whether the notices have
been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of
the bond and the arrest of the accused, because he is not
sure whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that
sending telegrams to people outside the province is costly,
and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses.
We read Sec. 9, Rule 114 to mean that the directive that
bondsmen be resident householders or freeholders in the
Philippines is but a minimum requirement. Reason for this is
that bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the
Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its
courts.
It is not intended to tie up the hands of a judge to approve
bail so long as it is offered by a resident householder or
freeholder within the Philippines. For a court has broad
powers essential to its judicial function.
Judge Abano only wanted to make sure that when the proper
time comes for the court to order the sureties to produce the
person of defendant, no undue delay will be incurred. If
bondsmen reside in far away places, even if within the
Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is
the insufficiency of the mails as an effective means of
communication. And then, there is the problem of complying
with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to
sureties is not served, no trial can be had.
Furthermore, reading of his petition fails of an averment that
the requisite exacted that bondsmen be residents of and
actually staying in Marinduque would cause him prejudice.
3. NO
Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23, 1964, of
the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, addressed, among others,
to Judges of First Instance. That circular recites that it had been
brought to the attention of the Department of Justice that in
certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious
landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The Secretary then
suggested that it may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds
real properties not covered by certificate of title unless they have
been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the person
offering them as bond for at least five (5) years.
Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in connection
with the posting of personal bail bonds and to protect the
interests of the Government. If the bondsman is not the owner,
bail fails of its purpose, prejudice to the government sets in.
We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of
properties in general. Failure of specificness on the part of Judge
Abana then could have been a case of oversight. To obviate
22
PEOPLE v. ASUNCION
161 SCRA 490
Padilla, J; May 24, 1988
ruled that a criminal liability was temporarily LIFTED for
FACTS mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition
Rolando Abadina (former colonel of AFP) was charged during the period covered, although such person is not
before the RTC with the offense of Violation of PD 1866 exempt from criminal liability filing within the period
[Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions] The provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is
information read that he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for the purpose of surrendering the same) or he commits
had in possession and under his custody firearms2, any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm
ammunitions and magazines without first securing the and ammunition.
necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. People vs. Lopez - It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA NO 4)
Upon Abanias motion, Judge Asuncion dismissed the excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to August 31,
Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient 1946, possession of firearms and ammunition so long as
facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose they were not used for any purpose other than self-
firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view of defense or carried for any purpose other than of
Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors surrendering them to the proper authorities. The
of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) Government does not dispute this interpretation.
months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 Although the law does not categorically state that
by Executive Order No. 222, within which to surrender the criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere
same to the proper authorities, without incurring any possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is
criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or the only construction compatible with the spirit and
ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purposes of the enactment as revealed by its context.
purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the People vs. Feliciano - SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized
commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation mere unlicensed possession of firearms and
in said information that the firearms and ammunition ammunition for the limited period specified in said law,
enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or
residence or used in the commission of some other crime. ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such firearm or
ammunition on the person, except to surrender them.
ISSUES The Court said:
1. WON judge erred in hooding that the possession of loose Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares:
firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on
covered by Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222. within one year from said date, and punished only (1)
2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof
information that the firearms and ammunition, subject on the person except for purpose of surrender.
matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested
accused or were used by him in the commission or another solely on unlicensed possession on or about November
offense 6, 1950.
3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution
may prove that the accused earned the firearms and 2. NO. It is necessary for the prosecution to allege in the
ammunition outside of his residence information that the firearms and ammunition, subject
matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of
HELD/RATIO: the accused or were used by him in the commission or
1. NO. EO No. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to another offense
RA Nos. 4 and 482. We will not give it a different Prosecution - these circumstances are not essential
meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
Prosecution - nothing is contained in said executive orders ammunition.
which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition People v. Lopez Under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of
without a permit; that said executive orders merely firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the
authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were
ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be
period without incurring criminal liability; and that illegal alleged and proved.
possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized People v. Austria - in order that an information charging
under Pres. Decree No. 1866 which was not repealed by said illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, under
Executive Order Nos. 107 and 222. Republic Act No. 482, may be deemed sufficient, it must
It may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or
107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed carrying it in his person at the time he was apprehended by
possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court had the authorities with said firearm.
2Sterling Assault Rifle, Armalite Rifle, Carbine, Cal 357 Revolver 3. NO. The information is fatally defective.
and Cal 45, Pistol
23
People v. Austria - the presentation of evidence cannot have
the effect of validating a void information, or proving an
offense which does not legally exist. The information was not
merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all.
Technically speaking, that information does not exist in
contemplation of law.
The Court is not unaware that accuse- Abadilla, rightly or
wrongly, is identified with the violent arm of the past
regime. To many, he is regarded with unusual ease and
facility as the "hit man" of that regime. The Court, however,
is not swayed by appellations or approbriums.
DISPOSITION the petition is DENIED. The orders appealed from

are hereby AFFIRMED.
24
GARCIA v. CA
266 SCRA 678
Davide, Jr., J; January 27, 1997
his view that the State is the offended party in
FACTS public offenses.
Jose Garcia filed with the QC Pros. Office an Affidavit of - People v. Alagao - that in resolving the motion to
Complaint charging his wife, Adela Santos alias Delia quash a criminal complaint or information, the
Sanots with Bigamy, violation of CA No. 142, as amended by facts alleged in the complaint or information
R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. Later, should be taken as they are. The information in
Santos informed Ass. City Pros. Cabanilla that he would limit this case mentioned that the bigamy was
his action to bigamy. discovered in 1989.
Ass. Pros. Cabanilla filed with the RTC of QC an information - The factual bases of the motion to quash, viz., the
charging Adela Santos with Bigamy allegedly committed as Garcias testimony in Civil Case and his complaint
follows : the above-named accused, being previously united filed with the CSC are not conclusive because the
in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without testimony is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible,
the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the while the complaint is vague.
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a - The prescriptive period was interrupted several
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and times by the Adela's numerous trips abroad.
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second (b) Counsel for Adela is barred from filing the motion to
marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] quash the information
discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the said - Counsel for Adela has already stated that he
offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the represent only Delia Garcia and not Adela Santos.
provisions of the Civil Code. Consequently, her counsel could not ask for the
Adela Santos filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of quash of the information in favour of Adela Santos
the offense as ground. She contended that by Garcias alias Delia Santos. The counsel should have sought
admission in his testimony in civil case and in his complaint a dismissal of the case in favour of Delia Garcia
filed with the Civil Service commission, Garcia discovered alone.
the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Since the CA concluded that Garcia discovered Adelas first marriage
penalty prescribed under Art. 329 of the RPC for the offense in 1974. Since the information was filed in court only on Jan.
of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive 8, 1992 or 18 years after the discovery of the offence, then
penalty under Art. 25 of the same Code, then said offense the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It
should prescribe in 15 years as provided in Art. 92 of the further held that the quash of an information based on
Code. prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after
TC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal arraignment and even on appeal, for under Art. 89(5) of RPC,
case. The complainant having discovered the first marriage the criminal liability of a person is totally extinguished by
of the accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of
was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense extinguishing criminal liability. Thus, prescription is not
charged has already prescribed when the information was deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defese.
filed in this case on November 15, 1991
Garcia moved for reconsideration arguing that Adelas many ISSUE
trips abroad suspended the running of the prescriptive 1. WON the prescription for Bigamy should have been counted
period. These trips were enumerated in the certification from the time the State discovered its commission.
issued by Ass. Commissioner Morals of BID. 2. WON a Motion to Quash cannot go beyond what is stated in
TC disallowed reconsideration of its order, finding no urgent the information
or justifiable reason to set it aside. The trial court held that 3. WON the factual bases of the Motion to Quash are not
trips of are not the kind of absence from the Philippines conclusive.
which will interrupt the period of prescription of the offense 4. WON, assuming the prescriptive period started in 1974, said
charged. period was interrupted several times.
Garcia appealed to CA. He contended that:
(a) TC erred in quashing the information on the ground of HELD/RATIO
prescription 1. NO. The prescription should have been counted from the
- Bigamy was a public offense; the offended party is time the offended party (first or second innocent spouse)
not the first or second (innocent) spouse but the discovered its commission.
State whose law was transgressed. Thus, the It is true that Bigamy is a public offense. However, Art. 91 of
prescriptive period of Bigamy should commence RPC makes no distinction between a public crime and a
from the day the State, being the offended party, private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by
discovered the offense, which in this case was on the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
Aug. 28, 1991 when he filed his complain before Art. 91 does not define the term offended party. We find its
the Pros. Office. He added that the interchanging definition in Sec. 12, Rule 110 as "the person against whom
use in Art. 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended or against whose property, the offense was committed."
party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports
25
It is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the
commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint3 filed
whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Art. 100 of the before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any
RPC, which expressly provides that "every person criminally event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." The private individual that the private respondent had been previously married.
to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
Garcia even admits that he is the offended party in the 4. NO
criminal case because the information therein describes him We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad
as the offended party who suffered damage and prejudice. did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91.
These trips were brief, and in every case Adela returned to
2. NO the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the
Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the Garcia discovered the offense and even if the aggregate
exceptions to the rule as provided in par. (f) and (h) of Sec. 2, number of days of these trips are considered, still the
and Sec. 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a) extinction of information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.
criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His claim that the
exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the DISPOSTION the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and
implied repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of
of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is AFFIRMED.
revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or
implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is
no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the
contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal
liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections
3,4, and 5 of the old Rule 117.
Sec. 2, Rule 117 - Form and contents. - The motion to quash
shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It
shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor
and the court shall consider no grounds other than those
stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be
based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of
criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among
the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new
Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the
information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds.
As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed
where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the
information do not constitute the offense charged.
As a general proposition the court held in People v. De la
Rosa that a motion to quash on the ground that the
allegations of the information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved
on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and
veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in
People v. Navarro, additional facts not alleged in the
information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution
may be invoked in support of the motion to quash.
3. NO
Garcia cannot be allowed to disown statements he made
under oath and in open court when it serves his
purpose. Besides, he never denied having given the pertinent
testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not
clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit
disclosed to him was that entered into by the private
respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to 3 These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in
whom the private respondent was first married; what is
the year 1974 where they separated from each other because of
relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a
her illicit relations with several men continued use of her alias
prior marriage contracted by the private respondent.
name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts; and
committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a
certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
26
LOPEZ v. CITY JUDGE

18 SCRA 616
Dizon, J; Oct. 29, 1966
information to the effect that the offense was committed
FACTS within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City
Petitioners Angelina Lopez, Aurora Villasor (heirs of Sps. 3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is
Manuel Mejia and Gloria Lazatin) and Roy Villasor proper
(administrator of the intestate estate of the said Sps.)
Petitioners, together with the other heirs of Sps. Mejia, HELD/RATIO
entered into a contract with Trinidad Lazatin for the 1. NO. It is settled law in criminal actions that the place
development and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belong to where the criminal offense was committed not only
said intestate estate. Lazatin transferred his rights under the determines the venue of the action but is an essential
contract to the Terra Development Corporation. element of jurisdiction. The City Court of Angeles has no
Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in jurisdiction over the offense charged.
CFI QC for the recission of said contract for alleged gross and Under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of
wilful violation of its terms. 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over
Lazatin and TDC filed with the Fiscals Office of the City of criminal offenses committed within their respective
Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged territorial jurisdiction.
violation Art. 172 in relation to those of Art. 171, par. 4, of Petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified
the RPC. document, in violation of the last paragraph of Art. 172 of
After conducting a preliminary examination, City Fiscal filed the RPC. The charge against them is that of having
an information charging petitioners with the crime of falsified a private.
falsification of a private document upon the allegation that US v. Infante - that the crime of falsification of a private
they made it appear in the contract mentioned that Aurora document defined and penalized by Art. 304 of the Penal
Villasor was the guardian of the minor George Mejia and Code (now par 2, Article 172 of the RPC) is consummated
that Angelina Lopez was similarly the guardian of the when such document is actually falsified with the intent to
minor Alexander Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is
that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
of the execution of the document. intended.
Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of The act of falsification the signing of the document and
Angeles reinvestigated the case to give them an opportunity the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed
to present exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
the reinvestigation the petitioners moved for the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private
dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for
Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense which it was intended, or was signed by the other
because the private document that contained the alleged contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the
false statement of fact was signed by them outside the City of Angeles is not essential element of the crime of
territorial limits of said city. (Makati and QC) falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way
Resolution of this motion to was delayed. The City Court had change the fact that the act of falsification charged was
set the criminal case for arraignment; petitioners secured committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City.
from said court several postponements of the arraignment.
In view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the 2. NO. The argument of the respondents refers to the now
motion to dismiss the case, petitioners with the City Court a obsolete demurrer to an information.
motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the
The complainants with the conformity of the City Fiscal demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the
filed an opposition thereto. City Judge denied said motion to face of the complaint or information but extends to issues
quash and reset the arraignment of all the defendants on arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the
March 5 of the same year. circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash,
Petitioners filed the present action for certiorari and Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or
prohibition. acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of
the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact
ISSUE in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required.
1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try and In the present case, the portion of the record of the
decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a private reinvestigation which was submitted to the respondent
document allegedly done by the parties named in the info judge for consideration in connection with the resolution of
even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in Makati the motion to quash shows beyond question that the offense
and QC, and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court charged was committed far beyond the territorial
2. WON the motion to quash was improper, and should not be jurisdiction of Angeles City.
allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners
necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the 3. YES
27
As a general rule, a court of equity will not issue a writ of
certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a
motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent
said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it
being the rule that upon such denial the defendant should
enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted,
raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his
motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions
however, this is no longer the hard and fast rule.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extra-ordinary
legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to
annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a
fair and orderly administration of justice.
DISPOSITION judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the

offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-
2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the
jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby
restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein.
28
UY v. CA
276 SCRA 371
Bellosillo, J; Jan. 28, 1997
Whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the
FACTS violations of the Bouncing Checks Law
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim
Shipping Company owned by the husband of Consolacion HELD/RATIO: NO
Leong. During Rosas employment, she was regarded by the It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired
Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. A few by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. She committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
helped her husband manage their lumber business. The within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosas allegedly committed therein by the accused. Furthermore,
lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
sums of money amounting to P500k were claimed to have determined by the allegations in the complaint or
given by Consolacion for the business; however because of information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
issued.Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was adduced during the trial show that the offense was
constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds contributed committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But, action for want of jurisdiction.
unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa
turned sour when the partnership documents were never The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be
processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of treated as separate offenses
her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks
purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Law are 2 different offenses having different elements and,
Consolacion filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the
the Bouncing Checks Law before the RTC of Manila. essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.
Dec. 10 an Information for and several other informations In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential
for violation of BP blg. 22 were filed against Rosa. The elements of the offense and have to be established with
offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly. satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. For violation of
RTC acquitted Rosa of estafa but convicted her of the charges the Bouncing Checks Law, the elements of deceit and
under BP Blg. 22. damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the
CA affirmed the decision elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and
Rosa - trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b)
offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. None of the essential elements the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance
constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
been committed in the City of Manila. The evidence drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored
Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
place of business of the alleged partnership was located in would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
(e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. payment.
Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said The records clearly indicate that business dealings were
evidence would only show that none of the essential conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila were given to Rosar; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by
People (1) Even if there is no showing of any evidence that the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for
the essential ingredients took place or the offense was violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain.
committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction
acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same over the violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 had been acquired. No
is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations proof has been offered that the checks were issued,
of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds
estafa case. (2)Knowledge on the part of the maker or occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.
itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within
one territory or another (3) respondent relies on the Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing offense however
doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel- it took some 5 years of It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing
trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction. offense and such being the case the theory is that a person
indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any
ISSUES jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed.
However that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact
29
that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in the
having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the present case. As soon as the accused discovered the
instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the
that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the
Manila. jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the
lower court.
Doctrine of Estoppel not applicable
Sec. 3, Rule 117provides that the accused may move to DISPOSITION REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to
quash the complaint or information on any of the following the filling of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court
grounds: (b) that the court trying the case has no of competent jurisdiction when warranted.
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the
accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8, Rule 113 it is provided that
the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged as provided for in
par. b Sec. 3, Rule 117.
Rosa timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a
memorandum before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter
in succeeding pleadings. Even if a party fails to file a motion
to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court
later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal.
Calimlim v. Ramirez Tijam v. Sibonghanoy4is an exception to the

general rule
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, the Court held that the ruling in the
Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further
that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of
the presence of laches. The Court said: A rule that had been
settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions
so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may
not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been
qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy.
It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case
had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine
had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-
honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
Instant case different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
4
It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be
raised for being barred by laches.
30
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO
279 SCRA 393
Panganiban, J
preliminary investigation from receipt of the copy of the
FACTS Order.
T/Sgt. Sanchez, PC Investigator filed a complaint for Prov. Pros. filed a motion to set aside the orders issued by
qualified theft directly with the RTC of Naga City against Judge Navarro stating (1) that she has no authority to
minor Carlos Barbosa. designate a particular prosecutor to handle the case; (2) that
PAO, as counsel for Barbosa, filed a Motion to Quash the the court will be acting without or with grave abuse of
Complaint on the ground that Sgt. Sanchez is not authorized discretion should it insists on Pros. Llaguno to conduct the
to file a complaint or information in Court. preliminary investigation; and (3) that the record of said
Judge Manio, Jr., as presiding judge of RTC and the pairing case be forwarded to the Prov. Pros. Office for it conduct the
judge of Judge Navarro, issued an order remanding the case preliminary investigation. A Supplemental Motion to
for preliminary investigation and assigned the adjudication withdraw the case was also filed so that the same may not
to Prosecutor Cajot. remain pending with the court while the case is under
Before Pros. Cajot could conduct the required preliminary preliminary investigation.
investigation, Sgt. Sanchez filed a motion to withdraw the Judge Navarro denied both motions on the grounds that: (1)
complaint with the Prosecution Office. the case of Abugotal v. Tiro which prohibits the courts from
Pros. Cajot issued an order and approved by the Prov. Pros., appointing a particular fiscal to conduct the required
granting the motion to withdraw the complaint and ordering preliminary investigation, is not in point as the said case
the release of the accused from detention. A copy of said refers to reinvestigation while the instant case refers to
order was furnished the RTC. preliminary investigation; and (2) the court is apprehensive
Judge Navarro ordered the Prov. Pros. and Pros. Cajot to that if the Motion to Amend Orders are granted, there is
explain why they encroached on the jurisdiction of the court nothing that will prevent the Prov. Pros. from implementing
over the case. the orders issued by Pros. Cajot and the latter will just act in
Pros. Cajot explained asserting the jurisdiction of the conformity with his previous action.
prosecutors office in the conduct of preliminary Prov. Pros. motion reconsideration was denied.
investigation and that when the court ordered the records of Petitioner filed the petition seeking the annulment of the
case be remanded to the Office of the Prosecutor to conduct assailed order of Judge Navarro.
the preliminary investigation, the court divested itself of its
control and jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE May a regional trial court judge name or designate a
Judge Navarro issued an order setting aside the order of particular assistant prosecutor to conduct the preliminary
Pros. Cajot and ordered Ass. Pros. Llaguno, who was investigation of the case?
appearing in her sala, to conduct the required preliminary
investigation. HELD/RATIO: NO
Pros. Llaguno file a motion for reconsideration taking In setting aside the order of Pros. Cajot which granted the
exception to the order on the ground that any resolution she withdrawal of the complaint, and subsequently ordering
may issue might run counter with the previous order of her Pros. Llaguno to conduct the required preliminary
superiors and thus render office policies disorganized, investigation, Judge Navarro clearly encroached on an
procedures disorderly and chaotic, resulting to the executive function.
embarrassment of the administration of Justice. Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial,
Pros. Cajot filed a motion for reconsideration alleging: (a) function. As the officer authorized to direct and control the
that he did not issue an order of dismissal but an order prosecution of all criminal actions, a prosecutor is primarily
granting the motion to withdraw. Therefore, there is no responsible for ascertaining whether there is sufficient
more complaint to speak of before the court; (b) the ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has
prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
the exclusive power and authority to dismiss the complaint thereof.
immediately if he finds no grounds to continue with the An RTC judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry, otherwise he files the Information if he finds cause investigation. This means that he cannot directly order an
to hold the respondent for trial; (c) the assistant prosecutor, particularly over the objections of the
finding/recommendation of the investigating prosecutor is latters superiors, to conduct a preliminary investigation. To
subject to review only by the Prov. Pros and the action of the allow him to do so is to authorize him to meddle in the
latter, by the Secretary of Justice; (d) when the Court executive and administrative functions of the provincial or
remanded the case to the Pros. Office for the required city prosecutor. There is a hierarchy of officials in the
preliminary investigation; the Court divested itself of its prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the
control and jurisdiction over the case; and (e) the filing of Secretary of Justice and his team of prosecutors. Mere
information is within the discretionary authority of the suspicion or belief that the said officials will not adequately
fiscal. perform their official duties is no reason for the judges
Judge Navarro denied both motions for reconsideration and interference in or disregard of such hierarchy.
reiterated its previous order to Pros. Llaguno to comply with Abugotal v. Tiro - Under Presidential Decree No. 77, the
the order of the court, granting her 15 days to conduct the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
31
murder charge filed against private respondents is vested in
the petitioner or his assistants. As chief of the office,
petitioner has the right to designate as in fact he did the
assistant fiscal who conducted the investigation. While it is
true that an assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an
information only in a case in which he himself conducted the
preliminary investigation, he may furthermore do so only
with the prior authority or approval of the city of provincial
fiscal or chief state prosecutor. These provisions of law
show in bold relief the degree of control over his assistants
that petitioner exercises as chief of the office. Where,
however, the interest of justice so requires and the court
orders a reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it,
the court cannot at the same time choose the fiscal who will
conduct the reinvestigation. This is a prerogative vested in
the city fiscal as head of office, and certainly beyond the
powers of the court to do
Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to
whether it is an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is a part
of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge.
It is true that after a case has already been filed in court and
the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over it, fiscals as a
rule are divested of the power to dismiss a criminal action
without the consent of the court. In the case at bench,
however, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the complaint filed directly before it by Sgt. Sanchez who
was not a prosecutor. Neither was he authorized by the
Provincial Prosecutor to file such case directly with the
respondent court.
We are not persuaded by Judge Navarros contention that
Abugotal applies only to reinvestigations, and not to
preliminary investigations. This distinction is insubstantial
and even tenuous. Both the preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation are conducted in the same manner and for
the same objective, that is, to determine whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
DISPOSITION the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

Orders of Respondent Judge Gloriosa S. Navarro are SET ASIDE
and ANNULLED.
32
People v. Moran
January 27, 1923
Araullo, C.J.
Therefore, as on March 9th of this year, 1922, when Act No.
Facts: 3030 went into effect, providing in its section 71 that offense
March 31, 1922 SC affirmed judgment of CFI of resulting from the violations thereof shall prescribe one year
Pangasinan convicting the accused herein for violation of the after their commission, the accused and the Attorney-
Election Law General had already filed their respective briefs in this court
May 2, 1922 accused filed a special motion, alleging that for the prosecution of the appeal taken from the judgment of
the crime has prescribed under the provision of Section the court below, and the hearing of the case had already
715 of Act 3030 (enacted March 9, 1922), thus praying for been held, this court itself, without the necessity of any
absolution motion of the accused, or of the Attorney-General, should
have declared the crime in question to have prescribed, in
Issue # 1: Whether or not the prescription provided in section 71 view of the provision of said section. Consequently, as this
of Act 3030 refers only to that act and not to any other. court had not up to that time made such pronouncement, the
accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they have done in
Held/Ratio: NO. their motion of May 2d of this year, that the offense having
Said act was amendatory to several provisions of the prescribed, they be absolved from the complaint. This duty is
Election law, as such Act 3030 rather than being an imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that the
integral part of the former election law is in conjunction offense appears to have prescribed under the provision of
with the latter the only Election Law in force the law. With particular reference to the present case, this
While it is true that Sec.72 provided that the act shall conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well as
take effect on the date of its approval (March 9, 1922), the spirit of the provisions of the Penal Code relative to
the meaning of such expression (effectivity) in prescription, and from that of section 71 of the aforesaid Act
connection with prescription is that prescription can No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed,
be invoked from that date, as was done by the the State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to punish
accused, and not that such provision may have a him, and if he has already been punished, it has no right to
retroactive effect from that same date. continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition
of the penalty. The plain precept contained in article 22 of
Issue #2 (more crimpro relevant): Whether or not such the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so
provisions may be applied retroactively in favor of the far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or
accused. misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence, would
be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not
Held/Ratio: YES. under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether
While it is a rule of general application that unless the or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
defense of prescription is pleaded in the trial court, it will be provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the
deemed to have been waived and cannot later be raised, yet penalty.
this rule is not of absolute application in criminal cases, for if Article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the
the prescription of the crime, as well as of the penalty provisions of some other penal law than the provisions of
whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the Penal Code are under consideration. In other words, the
the case here with regard to the former, be provided by provisions of article 22 can only be invoked with reference
statute after the termination of all the proceedings in the to some other penal law. It has no application to the
trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some
case has already been submitted for discussion and is other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature in
awaiting only the final judgment; and if the prescription of enacting article 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that
the crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the State article 22 should not be applicable to special laws.
to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question
that, once the State has lost or waived such right, the accused o It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the
may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that the Penal Code refers only to penalties and is not
same be dismissed and that he be absolved from the applicable to appeals and proceedings, because the
complaint. And not only that, the right to prosecute and prescription of the crime is intimately connected
punish the criminal having been lost by the prescription of with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed
the crime expressly provided by the statute, the State itself, by the law for the prescription depends upon the
the Government through the proper court, is in duty gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of
bound to make a pronouncement to that effect.6 Book I of the Penal Code, containing, as its heading
indicates, "General Provisions Regarding Felonies and
Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties,"
5 Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe without distinguishing between the penalties and the
one year after their commission.
6 Meaning, there is no need for an allegation by the accused as to decision absolving a defendant because of prescription. (US v.
the prescription of the crime, the Court may by itself render a Rama)
33
extinguishing of the criminal responsibility dealt with in
said Title VI of said Book, which title comes next to Title
V, treating of the penalties incurred by those who evade
service of sentence and those who, while serving
sentence, or after having been convicted by a final
judgment not yet served, commit some other crime.
o And aside from this intimate connection between the
prescription of the crime and that of the penalty, a
statute declaring the prescription of the crime has
no other object and purpose than to prevent or
annul the prosecution of the offender and, in the
last analysis, the imposition of the penalty.
Moreover, if the provisions relative to the prescription
of ownership and to the prescription of actions in civil
matters are part of the civil law, it cannot be denied that
the provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and
of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof.
SO, IS PRESCRIPTION SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL?
With regard to the question whether prescription must be

considered as a matter of procedural or formal law, or as
a substantive law for the purpose of the retroactivity of
laws, we must state, with reference to the present case,
that the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No.
3030 is of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far
as it gives a person accused of any of the crimes therein
referred to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished
after the lapse of the period of one year from the
commission of said crimes, within which the criminal
action must be commenced, and of a procedural or
adjective law in so far as it fixes the time within which
such action must necessarily be commenced in order that
the prosecution may be legal and the proper penalty may
lawfully be imposed. but however said provision may be
considered, the same must have a retroactive effect, as
will be seen later on.
34
People v. Salico
October 13, 1949
Feria, J.
Besides, under section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
Facts: the prosecution may appeal because the defendant
CFI of Occidental Negros dismissed the complaint for would not be placed in double jeopardy, not only when
homicide against defendant on the ground that it was not the defendant has not yet been placed in jeopardy in the
able to prove that the offense was committed within its court below, but also when, although a defendant had
territorial jurisdiction7 already been in former jeopardy, the appeal by the
Issue: Whether this appeal would place the defendant in double prosecution would no place him in danger again of
jeopardy. being convicted by the appellate court by the same
offense, because the question for the appellate court to
Held/Ratio: NO. decide is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
o For example, when after a judgment of conviction
1. By the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion rendered by the lower court had become final the
of the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy court reconsiders its decision and renders another
acquitting the defendant, in which the question
Section 9, Rule 1138 basically states that when a raised in the appeal is not the guilt or innocence of
defendant when a defendant has been convicted or the appellee, but the jurisdiction of the court to
acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or render the second judgment. Or, as in the present
otherwise terminated without his express consent, upon case, when the question involved in the appeal
a valid complaint or information by a court of is whether or not the lower court erred in
competent jurisdiction and after he has pleaded to the dismissing the case on the ground that the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or evidence for the prosecution does not show
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another that the place where the offense was committed
prosecution for the same offense. was within the territorial jurisdiction of the
But when the case id dismissed with the express consent court. This court by reversing the appealed
decision in such cases cannot convict the
of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense; because, his appellee, but only remand the case to the lower
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver court for further proceeding. The fact that the
of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason lower court has to proceed to the trial of the case
that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to against the defendant on the merits and may after
the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of the trial either acquit or convict him, would not
conviction against him. place the defendant in double jeopardy, because
the further proceeding by the court below is not a
Court cited: Ruling Case Law and American
new trial of a case against the defendant, but a
Jurisprudence; Carrol v. State; Craig v. US
mere continuation of the former trial in order that
the lower court may decide the case on the merits
2. The appeal by the prosecution in the present case would not
or the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
place the defendant in double jeopardy.
As a necessary corollary of the above conclusion that
3. Assuming arguendo that the defendant had been already in
the defendant not been in jeopardy in the court below,
jeopardy in the court below and would be placed in the
because the case was dismissed upon the defendant's
double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his
own motion, this appeal by the prosecution would not
constitutional right not to be put in danger of being
place the defendant in double jeopardy, since a person
convicted twice for the same offense.
who has not been once, cannot be put twice in jeopardy.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had been

7 As in, literally, they didnt know whether the municipality of already in jeopardy in the court below and that appeal
Victorias is within Negros Occ. stupid, much? would put him in double jeopardy, it is well settled in
8 Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. - When a this jurisdiction that the right of the defendant not to be
defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case put twice in jeopardy is deemed waived if not set up in
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the time as a defense or ground for a motion to dismiss. As
express consent of a defendant, by a court of competent the defendant has not set up said right or objected on
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other that ground to the appeal by the prosecution, this court
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a can not motu proprio dismiss the appeal, in the same
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the way that if the defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the conviction, waiving his right not to be put twice in
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, jeopardy, the appellate court can not motu proprio
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or dismiss the appeal. The provision of section 2, Rule 118,
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily can not be construed to mean that this Court can not
included in the offense charged in the complaint or information. entertain an appeal by the prosecution even if the
35
defendant has waived his right to object to the appeal
on the ground that it would place him in double
jeopardy; because the Congress has no power to make
the judgment of the Court of First Instance
unappealable by the mere fact that the defendant had
already been in jeopardy, inasmuch as section 2, Article
VIII, of the Constitution provides that the Congress may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its appellate
jurisdiction to review on appeal all final decisions and
orders of the inferior courts in all cases in which an
error or question of law is involved, as in the present
case.
Besides, section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court

provides that "when a defendant shall been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the defendant by a court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid complaint or information . . . and after the
defendant has pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, etc." It does not say that it shall be a bar if the
defendant sets up the defense of double jeopardy in the
same way that section 2 of Rule 118 does not provide
that the prosecution cannot appeal if the defendant set
up the defense of double jeopardy; and yet the
defendant shall have to set up that defense if prosecuted
again for the offense, for otherwise it is deemed waived
and the defendant may be prosecuted and convicted for
the same offense.
36
People v. City Court of Manila Br. VI

September 24. 1987
Padilla, J.
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
Facts: first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
2 informations were filed against Agapito Gonzales and the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
Roberto Pangilinan: the first for violation of Section 79, in second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
relation to Section 1110, of RA 3060, the 2nd for violation of offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
Art 201(3) of RPC11 commit the same or a frustration thereof
Judge, upon motion of accused to quash information, All these requisites do not exist in this case.
dismissed the 2nd information on the ground of double The two (2) informations with which the accused was
jeopardy. charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to
private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense
Issue: Whether or not the 2 information causes double jeopardy. defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the
Peoples contention: The accused could not exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board
invoke the constitutional guarantee against of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not
double jeopardy, when there had been no included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and
criminal proceedings in another case for the immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not
same offense. 1 The respondent, on the other constitute a jeopardy to each other.
hand, argues that conviction or acquittal in, or o the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The
dismissal or termination of a first case is not gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is
necessary, so long as he had been put in jeopardy the public exhibition of any motion picture which has
of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for
the same offense. Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be
indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously
Held/Ratio: NO. approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a
criminal offense. 3 On the other hand, the offense
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is
jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first the public showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
o The nature of both offenses also shows their essential
9 It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause difference. The crime punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a
to be exhibited in any motion picture theater or public place, or malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be
by television within the Philippines any motion picture, including proved because it is presumed, while the offense
trailers, stills, and other pictorial advertisements in connection punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is
with motion pictures, not duly passed by the Board; or to print or malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable
cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any ingredient.
theater, or public place or by television, a label or notice showing It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double
the same to have been previously passed by the said Board when jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
the same has not been previously authorized, except motion Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or
pictures imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels. and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
10 Any violation of Section seven of this Act shall be punished by conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
imprisonment of not less than six months but not more than two does not bar prosecution under the other. (People v.
years, or by a fine of not less than six hundred nor more than two Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 24).
thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. If the Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or
offender is an alien he shall be deported immediately. The license articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
to operate the movie theater or television shall also be revoked. jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
Any other kind of violation shall be punished by imprisonment of prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of from the same facts, if each crime involves some
not less than one hundred pesos nor more than three hundred important act which is not an essential element of the
pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. In case the violation other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472).
is committed by a corporation, partnership or association, the
liability shall devolve upon the president, manager,
administrator, or any office thereof responsible for the violation.
11 Those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other

place open to public view, shall exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts, or shows;
37
People v. Pineda
February 16, 1993
Melo, J.
dismissed or otherwise terminated without her
Facts: express consent, by a court of competent
Basically: Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information,
August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge
payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August (People of the Philippines versus Hon. Maximiano C.
17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992;
Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
stated that she owned the same lot and that it was as amended). In the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said
unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title that:
was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half
portion of the property to nine other persons. . . . according to a long line of cases, in order
Hence she was charged with estafa and falsification of public that a defendant may successfully allege
documents on 2 separate informations former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had
She moved to quash the information for falsification on the previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted,
ground that such was a necessary means to commit estafa, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the
and a separate conviction would constitute double jeopardy. offense charged, that is, that the former case
Judge Pineda granted said petition. against him for the same offense has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
Issue: Whether or not quashing the information was correct his express consent, by a court of competent
(whether or not there would be double jeopardy) jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant had
Held/Ratio: NO. pleaded to the charge.
1. Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed
necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of
and thus susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash
double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by
under Section 2 (e), Rule 117 vis-a-vis Section 12, Rule 110
a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case
(Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it
without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115
was serious error on the part of the magistrate below to
SCRA 586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990])
have appreciated this discourse in favor of private
respondent since this matter was not specifically raised in
the motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 (p. 16, Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book "Remedial Law" enumerates
Record). It was only in the motion for reconsideration where the elements constitutive of first jeopardy, to wit:
private respondent pleaded this additional ground after her
motion to quash was denied 1. Court of competent jurisdiction;
At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that 2. Valid complaint or information;
private respondent concocted the sinister scheme of 3. Arraignment
falsification in 1971 precisely to facilitate the 4. 4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; 853)
commission of estafa in 1973 such that both crimes 5. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
emanated from a single criminal impulse. Otherwise, an was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
unfounded verisimilitude of this nature will run afoul express consent of the accused (People vs. Declaro, G.R.
with what this Court already observed in People vs. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142; See also
Penas (68 Phil. 533 [1939]; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143; People vs. Gines,
Code, 1976 Ed., p. 574) to the effect that the eleven G.R. No. 83463, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 481; Que vs.
estafas through falsification which the same accused Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 [1989]; Caes vs. Intermediate
therein committed between November 24, 1936 and Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54; Lamera vs. Court of
January 3, 1937 including the falsification which he Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 [1991]). (Herrera, Remedial
committed on January 8, 1937 were considered distinct Law, 1992 Ed., Volume 4, p. 417).
offenses, not one complex crime, because they were
committed on different dates, not to mention the Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Herrera
discrepancy in places where they were accomplished. continues to submit the idea that:
It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have
shared the notion that private respondent is in danger
of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a The first jeopardy is said to have validly terminated upon
circumstance recognized under Section 2(h) Rule 117 of conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case or otherwise
the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash, terminated without the express consent of defendant
because this plea is understood to presuppose that (People vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA 150; People vs. Ledesma, 73
the other case against private respondent has been SCRA 77; People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; Buscayno vs. Military
38
Commission, 109 SCRA 273; People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA
319; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670,
September 12, 1987.) (Vide, at page 423).
2. At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite

recently in People vs. Asuncion, (G.R. Nos. 83837-42,
April 22, 1992), the ambiguity stirred by the imprecise
observation in People vs. City Court of Manila, a 1983
case, can now be considered modified in that a prior
conviction, or acquittal, or termination of the case
without the express acquiescence of the accused is still
required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate
a second prosecution.
39
People v. Mogol
Aguust 24, 1984
Guerrero, J.
The proceedings in the case, however, may not be
Facts: considered to have been rendered useless because by it
An information for serious physical injuries was filed against more than by a mere preliminary investigation, the court
accused Edgardo Caballas has arrived at a better supported finding that the proper
After arraignment (on which Caballas pled not guilty), complaint should have been for frustrated murder; that
prosecution motioned to amend the information from the crime of frustrated murder has been committed and
serious PI to frustrated murder Naturally, court denied that there is reason to believe that the accused Edgardo
However, after the submission of evidence by both Caballas might have been the one who had committed the
prosecution and defense, no decision on the merits was same.
rendered, basically because the court thought now that the
crime was indeed frustrated murder and not serious PI, to IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby
wit: dismissed to give way to the filing of a complaint for
frustrated murder. Since the proceedings from the
While considering the evidence of this case the court preliminary examination up to the conclusion of the trial
realized that the evidence on the injuries sustained by the hereof has amounted to a compliance with the
accused and the circumstances surrounding the infliction requirements of a preliminary investigation first and
thereof overwhelmingly point to the conclusion that the second stage, let the records hereof be forwarded to the
intention of the assailant was to inflict more than just Court of First Instance at Calauag, Quezon, under the
injuries. Hence, the court is restricted by what it considers jurisdiction of which court the case for frustrated murder
a legal obstacle to the validity of whatever judgement it pertains, through the office of the Provincial Fiscal so that
renders, because whether it be one of acquittal or the latter may act on this case and file the corresponding
conviction - it shall have so ordered on a case outside its complaint as above-recommended.
jurisdiction.
So, a new info/complaint for frustrated murder was filed
The evidence is positive and uncontradicted that the Issue: W/N the new info constitutes double jeopardy
person who inflicted the stab wounds on Ernesto
Sandoval had evidently not by accident but by design, Held/Ratio: NO.
walked with the victim from a certain point on Real
Street up to some 400 meters therefrom which is another In the case of Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950), this Court
spot on a quite unfrequented side street; that it was in held that:
that spot where the victim was stabbed four times, two of
which hit the victim - one, on the abdominal region and
another "penetrating and perforating the posterior ... the dismissal contemplated in the above-quoted
abdominal wall cutting the terminal portion of the 10th section of the rule (referring to Section 9. Rule 113 of
rib"; that this was at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the old Rules of Court, now Section 9, Rule 117 of the
December 1971, at which time it must have been dark Revised Rules of Court) is a definite or unconditional
already; that the victim was alone, and that the attack dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal
was sudden and treacherous. without prejudice as in the present case. In the absence
of any statutory provision to the contrary, we find no
reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice,
It has also been shown that the knife used by the assonant dismiss a criminal case provisionally, i.e., without
measures about 6 inches in length; that the victim was prejudice to reinstating it before the order become final
not able to walk by himself after having been stabbed but or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
that he had to be carried to the hospital and that while same offense. (Page 454.)
there, the victim almost lost consciousness. By the medical
certificate issued by a physician of the hospital
(Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, Lopez, Quezon) the The Jaca ruling was reiterated in People vs. Manlapas et
duration of treatment has been placed at 30 days. al., L-17993, August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 883, 887; Republic
vs. Agoncillo, et al., L-27257, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA
579, 587; and People vs. Hon. Surtida, et al., L-24420,
The Court believes that the foregoing evidence would January 26, 1972, 43 SCRA 29, 37. Moreover, as stated
support prima facie a complaint for the crime of in the aforementioned case of Republic vs. Agoncillo, et
frustrated murder and, as stated, prevents it from al. (supra, p. 588):
rendering judgment in this case. It cannot even rule that
the parties have waived the question of jurisdiction
having proceeded with the trial of the case up to its ... the authoritative pronouncement in the ... case of
termination as this would be legally erroneous. People vs. Obsania
(L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249), with Justice
Castro as ponente, had made clear beyond doubt that
40
for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of
the Constitution, it must have the effect of an acquittal
Thus: "The appealed order of dismissal in this case now
under consideration did not terminate the action on the
merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related
cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because
the failure to prosecute presupposed that the
Government did not have a case against the accused,
who in the first place, is presumed innocent."
There can be no question, as indeed it is quite clear, that

in the case at bar, the Order of dismissal issued by the
Municipal Court did not actually terminate or put an end
to the prosecution against herein private respondent for
the felonious act he was alleged to have committed. On
the contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order
expressly directed that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal could file a complaint for
frustrated murder.
In any case, the dismissal Order was NOT legal and valid.
o We hold and rule that respondent Judge erred in
dismissing the case for serious physical injuries "to give
way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder."
For it is the duty of the respondent Judge to render the
decision as the evidence presented warrant under the
information as filed for serious physical injuries, and
not dismiss the case on his Idea or belief that there was
evidence of intent to kill the intended victim. The Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order of
November 29, 1972 null and void.
o Since the order of dismissal was without authority
and, therefore, null and void, the proceedings before
the Municipal Court have not been lawfully
terminated, Accordingly, there is no second
proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy. A
continuation of the proceedings against the accused
for serious physical injuries is in order.
41
Esmea v. Pogoy
February 20, 1981
Aquino, J.
not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent
Facts: judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the
A grave coercion case was filed agains Esmea, et. al. for dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not
having allegedly forced Rev.Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw very clear that the petitioners consented to the
P5,000 because the priest lost it in a game of cards. dismissal of the case.
Because of many different reasons12, the hearing was reset o It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order
many times, until the respondent judge (siguro napikon) of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused
issued an order setting the trial for the last time on had already been arraigned to require the accused and
August 16, 1973 his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any
However, on said date, priest was allegedly sick, and again available part of the record to show the conformity of
motioned to reset the date. Counsel for accused opposed and the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional
invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial dismissal.
Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the o The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal
four accused who were present because it "has been that the accused and his counsel signified their assent
dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to
but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from
noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that attaching to the dismissal.
the complainant was really sick. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their
wenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not
filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent
motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case.
that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity
1979 to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed
them in jeopardy.
Issue: W/N the revival of the case would place the accused in Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy
double jeopardy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore,
consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in
Held/Ratio: YES. jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not
change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la
Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299)
In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to
valid complaint or information (b) before a court of
a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for
competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been
the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information.
postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the
When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or
court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and,
conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of
consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court
the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata
upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such
and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included
citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs.
therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980
Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717).
Ed., p. 240).
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused
Previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), previous conviction
because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the
(autrefois convict) or the dismissal or termination of the case
complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a
without his consent precludes his subsequent indictment for
dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
the same offense as defined in section 9
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Salcedo
In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were vs. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811;
placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the
Lagunilia vs. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020
grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would
citing People vs. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People vs.
Robles, 105 Phil. 1016. See Taladua vs. Ochotorena, L-25595,
12Original date: 10.04.1978 February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, L-
Reason # 1: priest requested reset on 12.13.78 28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa vs.
Reason # 2: accused not duly notified Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30,
Arraigned on 01.23.79 1971, 37 SCRA 437; People vs. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People
NO TRIAL priest absent vs. Abao 97 Phil. 28; People vs. Labatete, 107 Phil. 697)
BEST REASON OF ALL: FISCAL LOST RECORD OF CASE
*applause* -- hearing on 06.19.79 moved again.
<kaya ayun, napikon na si judge.>
42
People v. Villalon
December 21, 1990
Regalado, J.
Facts:
Federico de Guzman was charged with estafa through
falsification of public documents for allegedly forging the
signature of Carrera to make it appear that the former was
made the latters attorney-in-fact, and subsequently
mortgaging the parcel of land which Carrera owns.
De Guzman raised the issue of prescription he claims that
the crime has prescribed since more than 10 years has
elapsed from the time the crime was committed.
Judge Villalon dismissed the complaint on basis of
prescription
Issue: W/N this appeal by the people would constitute double

jeopardy.
Held/Ratio: NO. PP v. City Court of Manila

As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a
case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a
valid information shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the complaint or information
(Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the
prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant,
and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to
be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.
Irrele on issue of whether the charge of estafa thru

falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to
exist in fact and in law COURT: YES
The falsification of a public document may be a

means of committing estaga bacuase before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element
of the crime of the falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is caused
by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
public, official or commercial document, hence, the
falsification of said document is only a necessary meanse
to commit the estafa.
43
People vs. Lagui

171 SCRA 305
Hizon lent money to Sorriano who in turn issued a post
dated check to answer for the debt.
When they tried to encash the check, the account was
already closed.
He was charged with a violation under BP 22 and estafa
The RTC dismissed the BP 22 charge because the
information was fatally defective and convicted him of
the estafa charge
Upon appeal of the accused, the CA reversed the estafa
conviction
The people now is appealing the other case (BP 22)
saying that the info was not fatally defective.
W/N info was fatally defective? NO

3 Elements of BP 22
1. Issuance of check for account or for value
2. At time of issue, maker does not have sufficient funds or
credit
3. Subsequently dishonored.
The judge said that the information failed to allege that the
accused knew when he issued the check that the then did not
have sufficient funds in the bank; the information should have
allege that the accused knew that he would not have sufficient
funds in the bank to pay the check in full upon its presentment. ---
Wrong
The presence of the 1st and 3rd elements of the offense constitutes
prima facie evidene that the second element exists. (Look at Sec 2
of Law.)
W/N if it wasnt, can he still be convicted? NO
Decision cannot be annulled or set aside because it
amounted to a judgment of acquittal. It became final and
executory upon its promulgation. The state may not
appeal that decision for it would place the accused twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the offense in violation of
his constitutional rights against double jeopardy.
Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was
tried upon a valid and sufficient information and case
was dismissed by trial court (without his consent), he
has been placed in jeopardy for the offense charged so
re-assesing the evidence against him pursuant to the
appeal of the govt would put him in double jeopardy.
44
Galvez vs. CA
Oct. 24, 1994
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a
Galvez, the incumbent mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan candid presentation of their real position.
was charged with 3 infos for homicide and 2 infos for 2. the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial
frustrated homicide. court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion.
The prosecution filled a motion to defer arraingment to It is only an irregularity.Besides, when petitioners
review the evidence to determine the proper charges as were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a
well as change of venue because complainants fear for motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged
their safety and to prevent miscarriage of justice. procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of
Before their arraignment, petitioners filed a motion to dismissal, the same was thereby deemed cured.
withdraw informations, and subsequently filed 3. Sec 11 rule 119 governs the trial stage vs sec 10 rule
informations for murder and illegal possession of 114 governs procedural governance for prosecution of
firearms. offenses, from the filing of info to just before the trial.
They filed a motion to quash saying the court never 4. Sec 10 rule 114- The first paragraph provides the rule
acquired jurisdiction, which was denied and judge set for amendment of the information or complaint, while
arraignment. Assailed resolution. the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the
information or complaint. Under the second paragraph,
Which set of informations should Galvez be tried with? The 1 st or the court can order the filing of another information to
2nd? charge the proper offense, provided the accused would
Corollary issues: not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that
could only be true if the offense proved does not
necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the
1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original
offense charged in the original information.
informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no
notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of
Petition dismissed.
the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should
have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the
informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section
14 of Rule 110;
2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original

informations was immediately final and executory;
3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to

quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new
informations considering that (a) the designated public
prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the second set of
informations; and (b) the filing thereof constituted forum
shopping; and
4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994

in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.
1. considering that in the original cases before Branch 14

of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in
jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was
filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there
would be no imperative need for notice and hearing
thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein
accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations,
three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth,
an additional offense. Had these new informations not
been filed, there would obviously have been no cause
for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint
about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the
motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
45
People v. Pilpa
79 SCRA 82
Was charged with frustrated murder and pleaded Petition Granted, assailed order set aside.
not guilty
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss because
intent to kill was not alleged in the information
which initially was not objected to by the
accuseds lawyer but subsequently changed his
mind.
A second information was then filed and a motion
to quash from the defense claiming double
jeopardy.
Judge granted the motion and prosecution now
appeals.
Whether the second information would place the accused twice

in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of frustrated murder?
NO
Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked in cases of (a) previous
acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois
convict) of the same offense, or (c) when the case
against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In any of these three cases, in order that there be former
kill jeopardy, it is in the first case that (a) there was a
valid competent or information (b) before a court of
competent jurisdiction, (c) and that the had been and
had entered his plea. When these conditions or requotes
are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused,
or the dismissal or termination of the case without his
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,or for
carry offense which necessarily includes or is included
therein.
here is former jeopardy when in the first case there was
a valid COMPLAINT of information filed in a court of
competent jurisdiction and, after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or
the case against him was terminated without his
express consent
We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing
made by the counsel of the accused that he had no
objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent
to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to
an express consent to its termination within the
meaning of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not
thereafter revoke that conformity since the court
had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He
was bound by his counsel's assent to the dismissal
Later, the cases were revived. The accused contended
that the revival of the cases would place her in double
jeopardy. That contention was rejected because the
provisional dismissal did not place the in jeopardy.
There was no jeopardy in such dismissal because the
words "No objection" conveyed the Idea of full
concurrence with the dismissal and was equivalent to
saying "I agree."
46
People v. Obsania and second, such dismissal must not be on the
On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence merits and must not necessarily amount to an
of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely
victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita within the periphery of the said doctrines which
Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery our jurisprudence.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Petition granted, order set aside.
Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the
assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape
against the accused, embodying the allegations of the
above complaint, with an additional averment that the
offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and
forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that the complaint was fatally
defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that
the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which
averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and
ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure
of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege
that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd
designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the
case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant
appeal
W/N lewd designs should be alledged in complaint? NO
Rape does not require that specific

allegation.Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the
unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself
the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or
intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the
woman is under twelve years of age.
W/N there is double jeopardy? NO
In order that the protection against double

jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the
original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
The court then discusses a long history of
jurisprudence and somewhat seemingly conflicting
rulings that is too long to put in the digest. In the
end through the accused can be estopped or can
waive double jeopardy.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver
and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions:
first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by
the defendant personally or through his counsel;
47
Ada v. Virola
172 SCRA 336
Ada was initially charged under BP 22 for issuing 3 checks
that bounced
Before prosecution rested its case, he was also charged with
estafa, which Ada tried to object to but was arraigned
nevertheless.
After prosecution rested its case, he filed a motion to dismiss
the later cases saying it was violation is Double jeopardy
right.
W/N there is double jeopardy? NO
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double

jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof.
These requisites do not exist in the case at bar. The
prohibition is against a second jeopardy for the same
offense. The plea of double jeopardy applies where the
offenses in the two informations are the same in law
and in fact. It is not necessarily decisive that the two
offenses may have material facts in common, or that
they are similar, where they are not in fact the same.
The test is not whether the defendant has already been
tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in
jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may offend
against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision of law requires
proof of an additional fact or element while the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under
the other. In other words, where two different laws (or
articles of the same Code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
The 2 laws are distinct from each other. There is no
identity of offenses charged.
48
People v. Relova
148 SCRA 304
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
The Police, armed with a search warrant, conducted a search thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double
on private respondents properties and found out he was jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements
using devices to lower his electric bill. constituting the first offense need be present in the
He was charged in violation of ordinance 1 and pleaded not technical definition of the second offense. The law here
guilty. seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by
He filed a motion to dismiss saying the offense has already multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
prescribed which was granted. different from one another are nonetheless each
After 14 days, he was charged now under the RPC 309, theft constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
of electrical power. technical elements.
He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
This was granted by the trial court. Petition denied.
W/N Doulbe Jeopardy bars the RPC information? YES

The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that
it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The
first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general
rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution
is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition:
the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring
from the same act or set of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the
identity of the acts which the accused is said to have
committed and which are alleged to have given rise to
the two offenses: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute
or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to
be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of
offenses that must be shown need not be absolute
Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded
as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily
included in such first offense or where the second
49
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. MARIA DEL CARMEN et al.

PARAS J.
The defendants were prosecuted in the municipal court of
Manila for the crime of malicious mischief.
After presentation of evidence for the prosecution, the
municipal court dismissed the case on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove that the removal or destruction
of the property in question had been inspired by resentment,
rancor, or desires for revenge.
Subsequently, the same fiscal who filed the information in
the municipal court, filed the following information of
coercion in the court of First Instance of Manila against the
defendants.
Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy? Yes, the rule

against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same
offense it seems basic that an accused should be shielded
against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from
a single act.
Counsel for defendants filed a motion to nullify the second

information on the grounds of double jeopardy.
Contented for the appellant there is no double jeopardy
since the second information charges an offense different
from that included in the information filed in the municipal
court.
The rule against double jeopardy protecting the accused not
against the second punishment for the same act but against
being tried for the same offense.
A brief comparison of the two informations, the act
complained of in the case for coercion is the same act which
formed the basis of the information for malicious mischief.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for
the same offense it seems basic that an accused should be
shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made
out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission,
may give rise to several prosecutions depending upon the
ability of prosecuting officer to imagine as many offenses as
can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or
subtracting essential elements.
The case at bar is an occasion for reminding prosecuting
officers to be careful and comprehensive in criminal
investigations with the view to determining definitely,
before filing the necessary information, the offenses in fact
and in law committed, in order to avoid situations smacking
of persecutions.
50
CONRADO MELO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE
OF RIZAL
MORAN, C. J.
The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged on December 27, supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted changes the character of the offense and, together with the
upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to facts existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct
kill at the Court of First Instance of Rizal. offense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
On December 29, 1949, at 8 a.m., the accused pleaded not if indicted for the new offense.
guilty to the offense charged and at 10:15 p.m. of the same
day, Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on
January 3, 1950 and January 4, 1950 and amended
information was filed charging the accused with
consummated homicide.
The accused then filed a motion to nullify the amended
information claiming double jeopardy.
Motion was denied by the respondent court; hence, instant
petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from
further entertaining the amended information
Issue: Whether or not an accused who pleaded guilty to the

offense of frustrated homicide, upon death of the offended
party, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy, if the
information amended is to charge him with homicide? No,
because the petition is denied, and the respondent court may
proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended
information.
Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, under this provision, it

was proper for the court to dismiss the information and
order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper
offense was not charged in the former and it did not place
the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. Meaning when a person is charged with
an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot be charged with the same or
identical offense.
It is noticed that the protection of the constitutional
inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same
offense, the only exception, that if an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
Same offense, under the general rule, has always been
interpreted to mean not only that the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also the two offenses are identical.
There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other.
On the other hand, the rule of identity does not apply, when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was in
existent.
51
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO YORAC

FERNANDO, J.
or acquitted or the case against him terminated without his
A constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the express consent, or any attempt to commit the same or
same offense was the basis for a motion to nullify by the frustration thereof or for; any offense which necessarily
accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac. includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
He was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly the former complaint or information.
from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact
the offended party, for which he was previously tried and supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting
sentenced for slight physical injuries, his plea being one of in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new
guilt. and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in
The information for frustrated murder was based on the second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
second medical certificate given by the same physician
which was much more thorough the second time, to the Although there is the indispensable requirement of the
effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the
first ascertained. defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime
The lower court, presided by Honorable Judge Nestor B. imputed to him and together with the existing facts
Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact previously constituting a new and distinct offense.
that would negate the defense double jeopardy, sustained
the motion to quash in an order of June 21, 1968. The people
appealed.
The accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries
before the City Court of Bacolod. The accused plead guilty on
April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer ten
days of arresto menor.
On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed information at
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the
same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the act
upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968.
A motion to nullify was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968
on the ground that, having been previously convicted of
slight physical injuries and having already served the
penalty imposed on him for the same offense, the
prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act
committed against the same offended party, he would be
placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant, who had already been

convicted of slight physical injuries and had served sentence
therefore, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder
for the same act committed against the same person? No,
because there is no supervening fact that had occurred
which justifies the application, for which reason we are
constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. By
this, the motion to quash was granted and ordered the
dismissal of the case and immediate release of the appellee.
For double jeopardy not to exist, there is then the

indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact
which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible
changing the character of the crime imputed to him and
together with the facts existing previously constituting a
new and distinct offense.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.
A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, be judged
either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace,
in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an
appeal.
The Same offense, means another prosecution for the
offense charged after a defendant shall have been convicted
52
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, v. CITY COURT of MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO
GAPAY y MALLARES,
RELOVA J.
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then in
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, existent.
1972, of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the Accordingly, where the accused was charged with physical
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the
against respondent Francisco Gapa y Mallares on the ground charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
of double jeopardy. him twice in jeopardy.
Respondent court held that the private respondent having
been previously tried and convicted of serious physical As stated, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the
injuries thru reckless imprudence for the death of the victim information was filed, and the accused was arraigned two
would place the accused in double jeopardy. days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for
The case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1972. homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October 24,
On the following day, October 18, information was filed 1972, the accused- private respondent was already in
against respondent for serious physical injuries thru jeopardy.
reckless imprudence. On the same day, the victim Diolito de
la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on
the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one
month and one day of arresto mayor, and commenced
serving sentence.
On October 24, 1972, information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence was filed against respondent.
On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon
motion of respondent, issued and order dismissing the
homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not a person who has been prosecuted for

serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for
homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party
dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered? No, the
fact remains that the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on
October 18 one day after the accident and arrest of the
respondent Gapay and that on October 20 the accused was
arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus,
jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the
arraignment and conviction of the accused.
It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact

supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting
in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new
and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
However, article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the
negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury.
The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and
convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be
prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different
resulting injury.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with
an offense cannot be charge again with the same or identical
offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former.
However, it must be pointed that, the rule of identity does
not apply when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
53
GEORGE MANANTAN, v. THE COURT of APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS
QUISIMBING J.
Hence, petitioners acquittal was not precluded from looking
June 1, 1983, thee Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed into the question of petitioners negligence.
information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless In line with this, the petitioner insists that he was acquitted
imprudence resulting in homicide. on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. recklessly imprudent.
Petitioner was acquitted by the trial court of homicide He argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability
through reckless imprudence without ruling on his civil cannot be demanded and concludes that his acquittal bars
liability. any civil action.
On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgement in Criminal Respondents counter that the trial courts judgement shows
Case no. 066, the appellate court found the petitioner the judgement of acquittal did not clearly declare the non-
Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private existence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. They
respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas for a total argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on
of 174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. reasonable doubt.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate Inquiry by the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No.
court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt hence petitioners
Issues: Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge.
inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the
reckless imprudence? Did the court a quo err in finding that negligence of the accused presented itself before the court.
petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability? The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal based
Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for
to apply the Manchester Doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? the same act or omission lies.
Furthermore, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
Petitioner argues that the trial courts finding that he was made a mistake in awarding damages and indemnity, since
neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis of his private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing
acquittal and not reasonable doubt. Hence, upon finding him fees for their claims for damages when civil case was
liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not instituted with the criminal action.
only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in Private respondents argue that under the rules of court, the
double jeopardy. filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the
Preliminary, petitioners claim that the decision of the judgement.
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double At the time of the filing of information, the implied
jeopardy is misplaced. institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put governed by Rule 111, section 1 of the 1964, Rules of Court.
in jeopardy for the same offense. As pointed out by the respondents, under the said rule, it
For double jeopardy to exist elements are established. First was not required that the damages sought by the offended
is a jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. The party be stated in the complaint or information.
first jeopardy must have been terminated. Lastly, the second Thus, the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the
jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended
In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation
jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the of the filing fees.
jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such
However, petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. No. as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are
19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so
offense. alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgement.
Records clearly show that no second criminal offense was The rules of criminal procedure guarantee that filing fees for
being imputed to petitioner on appeal therefore there was the award of damages are first lien on the judgement, the
no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim of having effect of the enforcement of said lien must retro act to the
been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. institution of the criminal action.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different Therefore, we find no basis for petitioners allegations that
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of appellate court acquired no jurisdiction. The instant petition
the act of omission complained of. This closes the door to is dismissed for lack of merit.
civil liability. Second is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused, in this case if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempted from civil liability which may be proved by the
preponderance of evidence only.
54
SAMSON V. CA
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true
Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are unknown in payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks
two separate informations with the complex crime of estafa aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct
through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National intervention in the proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code).
Bank Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to
The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals the official duties of appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as
affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regard to a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain assert
guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence
was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to
of the two cases. cause damage is not required because what the law, seeks to
Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these
petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by him, as documents.
found by the Court of Appeals, do not constitute gross The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a
imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the offense
(falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
erred in denying his motion for new trial. established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is
Espiridion Lascao, father of the late Felipe Lascao, a lieutenant included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
of the USAFFE, who died during the last World War, and his defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
widow Rosanna Paras, are Felipe Lascano's only legitimate that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
surviving heirs, which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116. Rules of Court).
They filed their claim papers with the Red Cross Chapter in the As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense
Province of Sorsogon in the early part of 1946. charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of
On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
claimants who were with him at Camp Murphy . the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves,
They were successful in having the checks of the two claimants. when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
They went to Aristocrat restaurant and Samson went on to watch part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.).
a movie that night ( I know. Weird.). While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful
Just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,* G.R.
Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated
with the party which cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that
delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for conviction for the former can be had under an information
Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the
He found Espiridion too weak and too old to get out of the house theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the
and saw Rosalina (I think this should be Rosanna) in the school situation that obtains in the present case.
where she was teaching and confirmed that the old mans check The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification
was never claimed by them. was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this
deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by
ISSUE (CRIMPRO): WON Samson can be convicted of the crime appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him.
of estafa through falsification by imprudence despite the fact Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it
that the information filed against him charges only a willful would be incongrous to allege at the same time that it was
act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
imprudence on his part- YES incompatible with the concept of negligence.
Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a
sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and
ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all
proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons
claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him.
The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not
be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a
large amount if the funds belonged to appellant.
Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of
appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through
falsification of a mercantile document by reckless imprudence,
because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of
endorsing the respective checks by way of identification of the
signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their
55
STA. RITA V. CA
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section WON THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER IS
2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. SUFFICIENT- YES
1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against
The Information alleged that petitioner, "as President/General petitioner was sufficient as it clearly stated the designation of the
Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a compulsorily (sic) covered offense by the statute, i.e. violation of the Social Security Law, and
employer under the Social Security Law, as amended, did then the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense,
and there willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his contributions to the SSS. The
fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security System CA found that there is prima facie evidence to support the
contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for allegations in the Information and to warrant the prosecution of
its covered employees." petitioner.
Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case WON THE QUESTIONED MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT (DOLE-
The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the SSS) IS VALID- YES
criminal case filed against him. It ruled that the Memorandum of Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into between the Department of Labor and Agreement was approved by the Social Security Commission per
Employment ("DOLE") and the Social Security System ("SSS") the Commission's Resolution No. 437, dated 14 July 1988. Upon
extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement is not a rule or
Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the
foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered into by the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No.
Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission 1161, as amended, which reads as follows:
and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention o Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. For the attainment
of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended. of its main objectives as set forth in section two hereof, the
The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus o To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the
assailing the order of dismissal issued by the trial court. President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
Respondent appellate court granted the petition. carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the
thirty (30) days from the expiration of reglementary period understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court the other hand that the latter would include among the
granted the motion and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to file provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment required in
the petition with warning that no further extension will be given. case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for
Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS.
or four (4) days after the due date. Moreover, it failed to comply The Memorandum of Agreement is not an implementing rule or
with requirement no. 2 of Circular No. 1-88, as amended and regulation of the Social Security Commission which, under
Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of Section 4 (a) abovequoted, is subject to the approval of the
service of copies thereof to respondents. It was only on 14 July President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the participation of
1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform stipulation
service was belatedly submitted to this Court. in the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers
In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement related
Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on simply to the administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies
board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from of government.
the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof The Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into
WON THE PETITION MUST FAIL DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE between foreign shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the
WITH THE PROCEDURAL RULES YES instrument by which the former express their assent to the
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security Act. In
statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security
comply with the rules. 4 These rules, particularly the statutory System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in
requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary the contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer;
period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign
and for orderly discharge of judicial business. 5 Petitioner's shipowners/employers.
failure to seasonably file the Petition and its failure to comply It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies
with the aforequoted Circulars of the Court necessitate the denial had generally expressed their conformity to the inclusion of
of the Petition. Filipino seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act
Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of
complied with the Circulars, it would still have to be denied as Agreement.
petitioner has failed to show that respondent appellate court It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits
committed any reversible error in rendering the assailed of the Social Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign
decision. vessels, the individual employment agreements entered into with
the stipulation for such coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS
56
Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to the
constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor
whether "local or overseas."
(CRIMPRO) WON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE AGAINST STA. RITA CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY-
NO
The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the
criminal case against petitioner did not violate his right against
double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the
trial court had been effected at his own instance. 10 There are
only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach
notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for
dismissal is insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; and the
second is where the criminal proceedings have been
unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial. 11 Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is
no legal impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-
92-35426 against petitioner Sta. Rita. (AS IN ITO LANG ANG
DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT, ARGH.)
57
ANAMER SALAZAR V. PEOPLE

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against other hand, the action between the private complainant and the
herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.
Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the
petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the
complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the
Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal
Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from
that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the
next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two
dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
(Account Closed). The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is
The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the
Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.
Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a action, civil or criminal.
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt
not be guilty of the crime as charged. of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the
demurrer to evidence. prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its
TC: rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render
amount of the check as payment for her purchase. judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. the civil aspect thereof.
Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against
by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based
given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the
invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused
Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accused was acquitted. .
accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
ISSUE: WON SALAZAR SHOULD BE GRANTED THE PROCEDURAL renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
RELIEF IN RULE 33- YES prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. the period therefor.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he
of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The waives the same
dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of
punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission
58
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial
court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also
on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party,
said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for
the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due
process is thereby violated
The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence,
the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution.
59
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON.

MAY 28, 2002
On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among
II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with petition for prohibition with application for temporary
police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State
On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation.
Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving
(11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution and the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang
not a shootout. were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. The new
On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people,
investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-
allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with accused. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa
delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were L. Yadao.
arrested up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order
Avenue. enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or
On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members 101102 to 01-101112.
were arrested in Superville Subdivision. On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third
On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized
for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of 81689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases
ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same.
murder charges against the same officers and personnel. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed respondent
as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent ISSUE: whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven
Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving
Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang-
remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, NO (AT LEAST NOT YET)
1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty- Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be
six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this
downgraded from principal to accessory (TACKLED IN LACSON jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus,
V. EXEC. SEC.) there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the
Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to
Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has
respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, Leonora filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
Amora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the
Carmelita Elcamel and Rolando Siplon also executed their provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson
respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who
longer interested to prosecute these cases. moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause
Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their
including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical dismissal bears his express consent.
motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were
abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were
should the trial court find lack of probable cause. dismissed by then Judge Agnir.
The records of the case before us are not clear whether the The issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by
private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants at the RTC
22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by level.
respondent Lacson and the other accused. Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of
On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against
to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of
S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any
Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson
of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court
formed a panel to investigate the matter.. challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to
60
entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against
him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule
117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of
Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the
argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple
murder cases against him.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual
issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The
reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - -
whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir
dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received
by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity
of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must
be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said
timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It
can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of
cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various
requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule
117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-
filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson
should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the
prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the
opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence
or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of
the new rule depends.
DISPOSITIVE: case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City,
Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent
Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on
the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a
ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the
ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of
arrest against the respondent
61
PEOPLE V LACSON
APRIL 1, 2003
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily
the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
ISSUE: WON SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689- NO prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
Having invoked Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
Criminal Procedure before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled
establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is
namely: also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal
the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a
provisional dismissal of the case; new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The
dismissal of the case; accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of
dismissing the case provisionally; Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist
provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are the court in dispensing that justice.
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and
second paragraph of the new rule. second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were
The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar 99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not
him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for
an offense necessarily included therein. judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the prosecution witnesses.
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
provision should be construed to mean that the order of Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the provisional dismissal of the cases.
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of The respondents admissions made in the course of the
the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva admissions.
voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. 99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new
Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This
provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my the Court cannot and should not do.
conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no
accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon
provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before
provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice
the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case.
new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or
objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice
revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to
the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the
statute of limitations. hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either rule will become illusory
by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
62
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new
rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution,
the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations
for multiple murder against the respondent.
WON THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY- NO
The new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations
are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign
of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its
discretion
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is
akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given
right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-
bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It
is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case
against the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule,
the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or
waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may
be applied retroactively. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that:Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held
that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.
DISPOSITIVE: M.R. GRANTED; RTC DIRECTED TO FORTHWITH
PROCEED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASES
63
PEOPLE V. LACSON
OCTOBER 7, 2003
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. A statute
wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; (b) Motion for Reconsideration; (c) derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is
Oral Arguments to nullify or destroy the law. In Cometa v. Court of Appeals, this
RESPONDENT asserts that pursuant to a long line of Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute
jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read
penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied according to its spirit or intent." While we may not read into the
prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to
solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer
asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to
should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of give effect to the lawmakers will."
criminal law. The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on
included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of
of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
prospective application thereof would in effect give the inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of
petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases,
which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law. In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the
new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if
ISSUE: APPLICATION OF THE TIME-BAR RULE- PROSPECTIVE the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the
OR RETROACTIVE?- ONLY PROSPECTIVE. RAAR. very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal
be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of
justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
the accused only. present case as the respondent insists, considering that the
The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on
rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1,
for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to
offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the the victims of crimes and their heirs.
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and DISPOSITIVE: respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The
the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are
rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional
Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE
the accused and notice to the offended parties. the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court,
Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the
power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules
prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the
Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions
pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former
procedure shall apply.
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective
application only does not proscribe the prospective application
thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to
be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory
purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as
is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the
general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as
64
CONDRADA V. PEOPLE
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Petitioner was charged with rape. When he was arraigned on A.Whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 by
February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge the trial court in its Order of June 25, 1999 is permanent in
against him. character so as to operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for
On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial the crime charged- NO
hearing, the prosecution moved that the same be postponed due B.Whether or not the reinstatement of Criminal Case No.
to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The 10770 places the petitioner in double jeopardy.- NO
hearing was reset on April 29, 1999.
On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the
hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the
Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground that his right to conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case
speedy trial was being violated by such postponements. The trial due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal
court granted the prosecutions motion and reset the hearing on thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings,
May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to the in violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition or trial of
complainant and her witnesses be coursed through the National the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a
Bureau of Investigation which handled the investigation of the criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the
case. reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final
During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense
for another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the
temporary dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested Revised Rules of Court.
that it would not object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal
same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing ordered by the trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary
the case. dismissal of the case, and not a permanent dismissal on the
On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been
Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case No. 10770. violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. The trial
Appended to said motion was the affidavit of private complainant court apparently denied petitioners motion to have Criminal
that the subpoenae sent to her for the trial of the case did not Case No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy
reach her because in the meantime she had transferred her trial when despite said motion made in open court on April 29,
residence. 1999, it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on May
The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on 31, 1999. In subsequently granting petitioners request for the
June 25, 1999. dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial
Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the revival or court expressly stated that the same was subject to reinstatement
reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal.
September 29, 1999, the Court issued a resolution reinstating the Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal
said case and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary,
petitioner. without prejudice to the revival thereof within thirty days from
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution the date of dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the
insisting that the reinstatement of the case will place him in reinstatement thereof on June 25, 1999 did not place petitioner
double jeopardy. in double jeopardy.
On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an
motion for reconsideration of petitioner. Consequently, Criminal accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the
Case No. 10770 is still pending before the trial court. case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his
2000. He claims that Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be
because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 is permanent present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment,
in character, having been made in consideration of his right to (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the
speedy trial. arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the case (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
was dismissed not because petitioners right to speedy trial has termination of the case against him without his express consent.
been violated by the postponements of the trial on several However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and
instances, but because petitioner through counsel moved that the double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
case be dismissed at least even temporarily to which the public with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency
prosecutor interposed no objection. The Solicitor General points of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where
out that the prosecution moved for the postponement of the trial there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in
several times in good faith and for valid reasons. He likewise violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.
argues that the revival of the case does not place the petitioner Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the
twice in jeopardy for the same offense because the dismissal of reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier
the case on May 31, 1999 was made at petitioners instance. stated, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court
upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the
ISSUES: case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in
65
this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited
exceptions. The prosecution had not yet presented evidence at
the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as
previously explained, said dismissal was temporary in nature, as
the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the
date of dismissal

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1

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash)

FELICIANO VS. PASICOLAN

The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all

There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by

xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that

MIRANDA VS. TULIAO

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between

Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an

. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of

1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a HELD/RATIO: YES.

PEOPLE VS. MANALLO

Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia

IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the

Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until

PEOPLE V SAN DIEGO

ISSUE: WON the prosecution was deprived of

We are of the considered opinion that whether the

DISPOSITION the petition is DENIED. The orders appealed from

LOPEZ v. CITY JUDGE

DISPOSITION judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the

Calimlim v. Ramirez Tijam v. Sibonghanoy4is an exception to the

Instant case different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

DISPOSITION the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

SO, IS PRESCRIPTION SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL?

With regard to the question whether prescription must be

Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had been

Besides, section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court

People v. City Court of Manila Br. VI

11 Those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other

2. At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite

There can be no question, as indeed it is quite clear, that

Issue: W/N this appeal by the people would constitute double

Held/Ratio: NO. PP v. City Court of Manila

Irrele on issue of whether the charge of estafa thru

The falsification of a public document may be a

People vs. Lagui

W/N info was fatally defective? NO

2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original

3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to

4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994

1. considering that in the original cases before Branch 14

Whether the second information would place the accused twice

W/N lewd designs should be alledged in complaint? NO

Rape does not require that specific

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO

In order that the protection against double

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double

W/N Doulbe Jeopardy bars the RPC information? YES

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. MARIA DEL CARMEN et al.

Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy? Yes, the rule

Counsel for defendants filed a motion to nullify the second

Issue: Whether or not an accused who pleaded guilty to the

Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, under this provision, it

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO YORAC

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, who had already been

For double jeopardy not to exist, there is then the

Issue: Whether or not a person who has been prosecuted for

It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact

ANAMER SALAZAR V. PEOPLE