Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989

ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Br. XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN and ROLANDO
GATMAITAN, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

One wonders why the respondent judge did not immediately grant the petitioner's
motion to quash the information on the obvious and valid ground that the facts charged
did not constitute an offense. This decisive act could have avoided the needless
molestation of one more citizen and cleared the clogged dockets of this Court of still
another of the prosecutions big and small so rampant during those days of martial law.
More importantly, it would have affirmed once again the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to which every one was entitled even under the 1973
Constitution.

This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the
now defunct Anti-Smuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo,
Manila, pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of
Customs of Manila on April 20, 1976. 1 The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly smuggled into the
country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong. These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure
proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges
thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts. Only a few items "of no commercial value" were ordered
confiscated. 2

While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976,
to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible therefore be
investigated. The letter follows in full: 3

ESTEBAN C. MANUEL
Attorney at Law
643 Carvajal Street
Binondo, Manila
 The Chairman
ASAC, Camp Aguinaldo
Quezon City

Sir:

This is in behalf of my clients, Mrs. Ng Woo Hay and her son, Mr. Lee Kee Ming, who sought my help in reporting to
your goodself their I complaint about certain acts committed by ASAC men which, from all appearances, constitute
criminal offenses. I am referring to the raid they conducted on April 21, 1976 at about 4:30 in the afternoon at Tokyo
Hotel, Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a "Warrant of Seizure and Detention" (seizure Identification No.
14922) issued by the Acting Collector of Customs on April 20, 1976. The raiding team, about 10 in number and headed
by one Amado enrol, took advantage of the fact that Mrs. Ng Woo Hay was alone in her hotel room. The ASAC agents,
despite Mrs. Ng's protest and claim of innocence, forced their way into the room and ransacked the place for alleged
untaxed goods. Not only did they take everything they could find in the room, but also forcibly took from her person the
wrist watch and jade bracelet (gold plated she was wearing at the time. They also forced open her handbag and
divested her of her wallet containing 70 Hongkong dollars, as well as her necklace and her son's wrist watch which she
had placed in said handbag. Mrs. Ng was also subjected to the indignities of being searched by a male person. After
emptying the room of its contents, the raiding team presented to her a carbon copy of a list purporting to show the
goods seized. The list, however, appears not only illegible but does not reflect all the goods that were taken away by
the ASAC agents. What is more, said men, likewise taking advantage of the absence of Mrs. Ng's son, owner of some
of the articles, falsified the signature of the latter by writing his name on the space designated as "owner", making it
appear that he (Lee Kee Ming) had acknowledged that the list covers all the items seized.

The documents and other papers presented to me by my clients reveal that the articles seized were declared at the
Manila International Airport upon arrival, and were properly appraised. The corresponding customs charges were
likewise paid. It is evident, therefore, that my clients were victims of foul play masterminded by no less than law
enforcers who prey on tourists, particularly Chinese, for obvious reasons.

I examined the records in the Bureau of Customs and found out that it was on the basis of an affidavit executed by
ASAC Agent Rolando Gatmaitan and the letter-request sent by the Vice-Chairman of ASAC Brig. Gen. Ramon Z.
Aguirre, to the Collector of Customs that prompted the latter to issue the warrant in question. In this connection, I must
state, with all frankness, that there was undue haste in the request for the issuance of the warrant, because it is
discernible from a mere reading of the affidavit that its contents are mere pro-forma and hearsay statements of the
abovenamed ASAC agent. It could not have, as it now appears, justified the drastic action sought to be accomplished.

Needless to state, the incident complained of not only has caused considerable damage to my clients but to our
country as well. It is for this reason that we demand for an immediate and full dress investigation of the ASAC officers
and men who took part in or caused the issuance of the warrant, as well as those who participated in the raid, with the
view of purging the government of undesirables; and that pending such investigation the said officers and men be
suspended from further performing their duties.

V
e
r
y
t
r
u
l
y
y
o
u
r
s
,

(SGD.)
ESTEBAN
C.
MANUEL

The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged were all exonerated in a decision dated August
25, 1976. 4 Not satisfied with what he later described as a "home town decision," the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a complaint for
robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. This was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest
fiscal who said that the case might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 5 The petitioner says he then went to Camp Aguinaldo
but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when lie was told that it would take about a year to complete the preliminary investigation
alone.6 The owners of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which the petitioner filed for them in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on June 7,1976. 7

Three days later, there appeared in the June 10, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the following report: 8

TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL

Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong, have filed a case for damages against a customs official
and 11 agents of the government's anti-smuggling action center ASAC in connection with a raid conducted in their hotel
rooms, more than a month ago.

The case was docketed in Manila's court of first instance (CFI) as Civil Case No. 102694.

The complaints also alleged they lost assorted materials amounting to P46,003.40.

Named respondents in the case were acting customs collector Ramon Z. Aguirre, Rolando Gatmaitan, Antonio
Baranda, Amado M. Tirol, Francisco C. Santos, Edsel Labayen, Jose Robles, Nestor Eusebio, Freddie Ocnila, Renato
Quiroz, Pedro Cunanan, Jr., and Enrique Perez, all of ASAC

The acting customs collector was impleaded in the case in his official capacity for having issued the warrant that led to
the criminal offenses complained of.

Aquirre, ASAC vice-chairman, was named as defendant for soliciting the issuance of a warrant of seizure and detention
reportedly on the basis of charges contained in an affidavit executed by Gatmaitan, another ASAC agent.

Esteban Manuel filed the case in behalf of the plaintiffs composed of Manila resident Ng Tee, and Hong Kong visitors
Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying and Lee Kee Ming who came to the Philippines to visit their relatives and friends.

The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace, bracelet and wrist watch. They
allegedly seized many articles valued at P27,000 which have remained unaccounted for in the list submitted by the
defendants as the inventory of the items confiscated.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. 9 A reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that
they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter
of April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin Today.

The subject of this petition is the order of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, 10 denying the motion to quash filed by the petitioner,
who had claimed that his letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a privileged communication; that the news report in
the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and
therefore also privileged. 11 His motion for reconsideration having been also denied in the order dated April 27,1977,12 he now seeks relief
from this Court against what he claims as the grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in sustaining the information.

It is perhaps indicative of the weakness of the respondents' position that when asked to comment on the petitioner's motion to quash, the city
fiscal never did so during a period of more than ninety days. 13 It was left to a private prosecutor to enter his own appearance thereafter,
presumably because the fiscal did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the case, and to file the comment for the private respondents
himself 14 Later, when the petitioner came to this Court and we required a comment from the Solicitor General, this official complied only
after asking for (and getting) twenty-six extensions for a total of nine months and seven days, and at that the comment was only a half-
hearted defense of the challenged orders. 15 Despite the petitioner's effective rebuttal in his reply, the Solicitor General did not ask for leave
to file a rejoinder as if he had lost all taste for combat notwithstanding the many points raised by the petitioner that had to be refuted.

Perhaps it was just as well. Like a good general, the Solicitor General probably understood that the battle was lost.

Indeed it was. In fact, it should never have commenced.

From the purely procedural perspective, there is much to fault about the information. The two Chinese clients who were impleaded with the
petitioner were charged with absolutely nothing, prompting the respondent judge to peremptorily dismiss the information as to them. 16
Worse, the information imputed to the remaining accused two different offenses, to wit, writing the allegedly libelous letter and causing the
publication of the allegedly libelous news report. This was not allowed under Rule 110, Section 12, of the Rules of Court, providing that "a
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses." 17 If libelous the letter and the news report constituted separate offenses that should have been charged in separate
informations. (However, not having been raised in the motion to quash, that ground was deemed waived under Rule 15, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court.) 18
From the viewpoint of substantive law, the charge is even more defective, if not ridiculous. Any one with an elementary I knowledge of
constitutional law and criminal law would have known that neither the letter nor the news account was libelous.

The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

Article 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when
they raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of
his legal duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to vindicate his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the
ASAC agents, he could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was
addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good
faith, the letter was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity.

As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen without any known ties to the newspapers, could have by
himself caused the publication of such an explosive item. There is no prima facie showing that, by some kind of influence he had over the
periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC agents. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an
advertisement. This looks instead to be the result of the resourcefulness of the newspaper in discovering matters of public interest for dutiful
disclosure to its readers. It should be presumed that the report was included in the issue as part of the newspaper's coverage of important
current events as selected by its editorial staff.

At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the abovequoted article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or remarks. This is also privileged. Moreover, it is not correct to say, as the Solicitor General does, that Article
354 is not applicable because the complaint reported as filed would not by itself alone constitute a judicial proceeding even before the issues
are joined and trial is begun. The doctrine he invokes is no longer controlling. The case of Choa Tek Hee v. Philippine Publishing Co., 19
which he dies, has been superseded by Cuenco v. Cuenco, 20 where the Court categorically held:

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in
court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by
the privilege. (Emphasis provided)

It may also be argued that the complaint, standing by itself, is a public record and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.

It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still actionable.
However, since what is presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof that
the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail.

We are not unmindful of the contention that the information should not be dismissed outright because the prosecution must first be given a
chance to introduce evidence to overcome the presumption. This is indeed the normal procedure. However, where it appears from the
allegations in the information itself that the accused acted in good faith and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations,
and in pertinent pleadings, there is no need to prolong the proceedings to the i prejudice of the defendant. The Court can and should dismiss
the charge without further ado, as we held in People v. Andres: 21

The prosecution claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the
trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant- appellee was prompted only by good motives
assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant- appellee's publication is a matter of
defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel (Lu Chu Sing, et al. vs. Lu Tiong Gui 76 Phil.
669).

When in the information itself it appears that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate
pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and
produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if, added to this, the questioned imputations
appear to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed
partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a
litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not
constitute an offense of libel.
 As has already been said by this Court: As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged
defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety. Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court committed a reversible error in this
case of finding that the allegations in the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication
justifying the dismissal of the case.

The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on the wider guarantee of freedom of expression as an institution of all
republican societies. This in turn is predicated on the proposition that the ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to involve himself in matters
that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform himself of such matters.

The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry that is always ready to participate in the discussion and resolution of public issues.
These issues include the conduct of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the performance of their assigned
powers, which after all come from the people themselves. Ever citizen has a right to expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust
reposed in them and the maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their functions. Every citizen has a right to complain and
criticize if this hope is betrayed.

It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not only a right but a responsibility of the highest order that should not be shirked for
fear of official reprisal or because of mere civic lethargy. Whenever the citizen discovers official anomaly, it is his duty to expose and
denounce it, that the culprits may be punished and the public service cleansed even as the rights violated are vindicated or redressed. It can
never be overstressed that indifference to ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration of corruption will breed more corruption.
The sins of the public service are imputable not only to those who actually commit them but also to those who by their silence or inaction
permit and encourage their commission.

The responsibility to review the conduct of the government functionaries is especially addressed to the lawyer because his training enables
him, better than most citizens, to determine if the law has been violated or irregularities have been committed, and to take the needed steps
to remedy the wrong and punish the guilty.

The respondents contend that the letter was written by the petitioner to influence the seizure proceedings which were then pending. Even
assuming that to be true, such purpose did not necessarily make the letter malicious, especially if it is considered that the complaint against
the ASAC agents could not be raised in the said proceedings. The ASAC Chairman, not the Collector of Customs, had jurisdiction to
discipline the agents.

It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice, that even after the seizure proceedings had been concluded in favor of the
petitioner's clients, he pursued their complaint against the ASAC agents in the fiscal's office in Manila and then with the military authorities in
Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing of the civil case for damages in the court of first instance of Manila.

It would be a sad day indeed if for denouncing venality in government, the citizen could be called to task and be himself punished on the
ground of malicious defamation. If every accuser were himself to be accused for discharging his duty as he sees it, then will the wrong-doer
have been granted in effect, and by this Court no less, an undeserved immunity for his misdeeds or omissions. The private individual would
be barred from complaining about public misconduct. Every criticism he makes would be tainted with malice and pronounced as criminal.
The next step may well be a conspiracy among those in the government to cover up each other's faults and to insulate themselves from the
legitimate efforts of the people to question their conduct.

The second exception is justified under the right of every citizen to be informed on matters of public interest, which, significantly, was first
recognized in the 1973 Constitution. Even if it were not, the right would still be embraced in the broader safeguard of freedom of expression,
for the simple reason that the right to speak intelligently on "matters that touch the existing order" necessarily imports the availability of
adequate official information on such matters. Surely, the exercise of such right cannot inspire belief if based only on conjectures and rumors
and half-truths because direct access to the facts is not allowed to the ordinary citizen.

This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass media, which have fortunately resumed their roles as an independent conduit
of information between the government and the people. It is the recognized duty of the media to report to the public what is going on in the
government, including the proceedings in any of its departments or agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or
confidentiality when disclosure may be prohibited.To protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law says that as long as the account is
a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made without any remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not
presumed. Its publication is encouraged rather than suppressed or punished.

This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on censorship in general as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
expression, Censorship presumes malice at the outset, It prevents inquiry into public affairs and curtails their disclosure and discussion,
leaving the people in the dark as to what is happening in the public service. By locking the public portals to the citizen, who can only guess at
the goings on in the forbidden precints, censorship separates the people from their government. This certainly should not be permitted. "A
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people," declared Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme
Court. "To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and
the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who had nothing
to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper. There is here a manifest effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in
accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed special privileges and perhaps also immunities during those oppressive times. The
non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of
expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism.

We are convinced that the information against the petitioner should never have been filed at all and that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information on the ground that the allegation petitions therein did not constitute
an offense. The petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks from those who in the guise of law and through the instrumentality of the trial court
would impose upon him this warrant tyranny.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, and April 27, 1977, are SET ASIDE
and Criminal Case No. Q-7045, in his court, is DISMISSED. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15742 January 31, 1961

MIGUEL TOLENTINO, plaintiff,

vs.
CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, defendant-appellee.

Miguel Tolentino in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Cirilo P. Baylosis in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

By resolution dated April 8, 1959, Court of Appeals certified to us Case No. CA-G.R. No.
19432-R, an appeal taken to it from the decision of April 19, 1956 of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas in its Civil Case No. 67, dismissing plaintiff's complaint for damages, with costs, on
the ground that the whole issue therein involved is one of law.

Devoid of unessentials, records disclose that in Civil Case No. 79 of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, entitled Jose Ruiz, et al. vs. Cirilo Baylosis, et al., for the annulment of certain
certificates of title and recovery of damages, herein appellant Miguel Tolentino appeared as
counsel for the plaintiffs, while appellee was the attorney of record for the defendants. In a
pleading captioned "Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" and filed in that case, appellee made the
following allegations:

"Paragraph 2

subpar. (b)That for the death of the said five plaintiffs, defendant has nothing to do nor
to answer or account for, but would rather state that the cause of their death may be due
 to the will of God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have suffered from their
leader and counsel, ....

subpar. (c)That on the basis of Atty. Miguel Tolentino (sic), a deceased plaintiff is
claiming from defendant an amount of P28,591 and giving allowance of another 2 who
may die, so he must be a wealth to anyone who has it; that when Atty. Tolentino made
this allegation, he must be certainly not of his usual mind, otherwise with his old age, and
long practice of law, he would not have dared to make such fictitious and malicious
claim, and knowingly that this Honorable Court is not the place for every exagerrated and
unreasonable demand in order to give trouble and worries to defendant;

subpar. (d), sub-sec.That the defendant for being the victorious party in the said case
and Atty. Miguel Tolentino, one of the losing counsels in said case, must be the one who
is still liable for the damages sustained by defendant;

"Paragraph 4

subpar. (c)Before the public, Attorney Tolentino cannot be judged as a prominent

attorney or a bright attorney for his several failures in the bar and his several losses of his
cases are not in his favor.

subpar. (d)Defendant had seen Atty. Tolentino appeared before the Honorable
Supreme Court on January 24, 1955 in a certain argument on certiorari case, entitled Luis
Baylosis, et al., petitioners vs. Agapito Alejar, et al., respondents, and in that argument
Atty. Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of knowledge of law and
unpreparedness. On that same moment he perspired much despite the fact that the
chamber was cool because of air conditioning. Again in the hearing of a certain
injunction case at Batangas, Batangas, before the Honorable Judge E. Soriano, Atty.
Tolentino lost against the fiscal and other lawyers. It is therefore the contention of the
defendant, that the caliber and standing of Atty. Miguel Tolentino is not the type of
attorney who can demand a professional service of ten thousand pesos, and in the honest
belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a counsel for just five hundred pesos in the event
that plaintiff wins this case, and that damages is allowed by the Honorable Court, which
of course is believed to be remote to happen before the Court.

Urging that the statements aforequoted are libelous and derogatory to his character and
reputation as a known lawyer, as a former high government official and employee, and as a
citizen of good standing in the community appellant initiated these proceedings and seeks to
recover from the appellee the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and moral damages.

Appellee does not deny having made the allegations complained of, but advances the defense
that said remarks were not libelous, and granting that they were, the same were privileged
communications. In fact, appelle asserts a counterclaim for P105,000.00, representing actual
damages and attorney's fees allegedly caused to him by appellant's own defamatory statements
levelled against his (appellee's) person.
Both complaint and counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court. However, only the plaintiff
appealed.

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the decisive issue calls only for a determination of
whether or not appellee's statements as above reproduced constitute a valid cause of action for
damages. This question was not, in our opinion, properly solved in the negative by the trial court.

It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from liability in
libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in
hand or subject of inquiry (see 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreno, et al., G.R. No. L-12545,
April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein). For, as aptly observed in one case,1 "while the
doctrine of priveleged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great
hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far
greater hardships."

And the test relevancy has been stated thus:

... As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory

matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the priveleged does
not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order
that matter alleged in pleading may be priveleged, it need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or
so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial.... (Ruling Case Law, vol. 17, p. 336, quoted with approval in
Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475, 481-482).

In the earliest of the leading cases on the subject the words used in determining the extent
of matter that may be absolutely privileged were "relevant" or "pertinent", but these
words have in a measure a technical meaning, and perhaps they are not the best words
that could be used. So some courts have preferred the use of the words "have in
reference", "having relation to the cause or subject matter", or "made with reference"; and
strict legal materiality or relevancy is not required to confer the privilege. There is
difficulty in determining in some cases what is relevant or pertinent and in deciding the
question the courts are liberal, and the privilege embraces anything that may possibly be
pertinent, or which has enough appearance in connection with the case so that a
reasonable man might think it relevant. All doubts should be resolved in favor of its
relevancy or pertinency, and for the purposes of relevancy the court will assume the
alleged slanderous charges to be true, however false they may have been in fact. (53
C.J.S., pp. 171-172).

Applying the above rule to the case at bar, there is little doubt but that the alleged defamatory
remarks of counsel herein complained of, in paragraph 4 of his reply(already quoted), can not be
the basis of an action for damages. It appears that, among the issues involved in Civil Case No.
79 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, was the propriety of recovering damages allegedly
cause by herein appellee, among others to the plaintiffs therein, including, but not limited to,
herein appellant's claim for attorney's fees. Thus, appellant himself had laid open the pertinency
not only of the amount of damages supposedly due to the plaintiffs, but, likewise, appellant's
own standing as a lawyer by reason of his claim for attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
Although the language used by the appellee in the paragraph referred to was undoubtedly strong,
it was made in legitimate defense of his own and his client's interests, and we cannot say that the
statements in his pleadings concerning appellant's standing and ability as counsel were irrelevant
or impertinent. Hence, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged.

However, the relevancy (and, therefore, the privileged character) of appellee's statements made
in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (b) and (c), of his "Reply to Answer on Counterclaim" is not as
apparent as those made by him in paragraph 4, heretofore discussed. The averments in
subparagraph (b) that the cause of death of plaintiffs' decedents

may be due to the will of God or due to the heavy expenses which they may have
suffered from their leader and counsel

were evidently a conjecture that had no place in a pleading, which is well understood to be
limited to statements of fact.

Equally irrelevant are the allegations complained of in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the
reply of appellee, in response to the counterclaim for damages. The averment that Attorney
Tolentino (appellant) was "not of his usual mind" in making the claim, "otherwise with his old
age and long practice of law, he would have not dared to make such fictitious and malicious
claim" is certainly not relevant or pertinent to the issue whether the damages asked were true or
untrue. These damages were asked for, not by the appellant, but by his clients; hence their
counsel's state of mind is not, and could not be a proper subject of inquiry.

As pointed out by the Court in Anonymous vs. Trenkman, et al., 48 Fed. (2d) 571, 574

The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts
and not the evidence by which they are to be proved.... If the pleader goes beyond the
requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.

Without this limitation to the immunity enjoyed by pleadings, the same could be easily diverted
from their original aim to succinctly inform the court of the issues in litigation, and perverted
into a vehicle for airing charges motivated by personal rancor. That such misuse of judicial
proceedings must be firmly and resolutely discouraged and curbed by Courts needs no
demonstration.

It appears, however, that the appellant herein was libeled by way of retaliation, because three
days previously, appellant Tolentino, in a counterclaim filed against appellee Baylosis, had
personally attacked the latter in the following passage (Rec. App., p. 46-57)
 Defendant Baylosis has been the Vice-President of the "Samahang Magbubukid." The
prevailing and tempting "motto" of this organization is that the tenant must not leave the
lands tilled by them because the same belong to them in their own right. It is highly
inconceivable now how could the defendant trample upon the only chance of the
plaintiffs to own the lands in question, in gross violation of the "motto" of his own
organization on which a Huk or PKM organization at that, according to this Honorable
Court in Crim. Case No. 10898, People vs. Ceferino Inciong, Cirilo P. Baylosis, et al., for
inciting to sedition and in Criminal Case No. 510, People vs. F. Buhay for libel.

Considering that it was appellant here who first libeled appellee, although the latter did not
appeal the dismissal of his own claim for damages; that appellant, therefore, did not really come
to court with clean hands; that no adequate evidence exists that appellant suffered material
damage; and that indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings
constitutes highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication
thereof be privileged, we find no reversible error in the dismissal of appellant's damage claim by
the Court below.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919, quoting from Abbot vs. National Bank of Commerce,
175 U. S. 409.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11268 January 28, 1961

CARLOS M. SISON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GONZALO D. DAVID, defendant-appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for plaintiff-appellee.
Jesus Ocampo and Gonzago D. David for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

In his amended complaint, herein plaintiff, Carlos Moran Sison, seeks to recover P50,000 by way
of damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, in addition to costs. Defendant Gonzalo D. David
answered admitting some allegations of the amended complaint, denying other allegations
thereof, alleging some special and affirmative defenses, and setting up a counter-claim. In due
course, on December 10, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Manila gave judgment for the
plaintiff in the sums of P5,000, as moral damages, and P1,000 as attorney's fees, besides the
costs. Subsequently, the court motu proprio rendered an amended decision, dated December 29,
1954, finding no merit in defendant's counterclaim and increasing the award in plaintiff's favor to
P15,000 as moral damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees, aside from costs. Defendant appealed
from this amended decision to the Court of Appeals, which, considering that the sum awarded in
said decision plus the amount claimed in the first three (3) causes of action set forth in
defendant's counterclaim aggregated P173,000.00, forwarded the records to this Court, pursuant
to section 17 of Republic Act No. 296. Although this Act was subsequently amended by
Republic Act No. 2613 to increase the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
insofar as civil cases decided by courts of first instance are concerned, to those in which the
value in controversy does not exceed P200,000.00, we retain such appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal, for the pertinent facts are not disputed, and the issues raised in the appeal hinge on the
conclusions deducible from said facts and the law applicable thereto (Section 17, subparagraph
(61, of Re. public Act No. 296). It appears that on December 20, 1938, Margarita David executed
a will constituting several legacies in favor of specified persons and naming her grandnieces
Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro and her sister Priscila de la Fuente de Sison hereafter
referred to as Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison, respectively as heirs of the residue of her estate,
subject however, to the condition that, if Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison should die leaving no
descendants, the properties inherited by these sisters shall pass one-half to the heirs of the father
of the testatrix and the other half to the heirs of her mother. Herein defendant Gonzalo H. David
is one of such heirs of the parents of Margarita David. On October 21 1939, Mrs. Teodoro and
Mrs. Sison were legally adopted by Margarita David as her children. Soon later, or on September
6, 1940, Margarita David, donated to said sisters practically the same properties bequeathed to
them in her aforementioned will. UPON the demise of Margarita David, in Manila, on February
24, 1941, Special Proceeding No. 58881 of the Court of First Instance of Manila was instituted
for the settlement of her estate, and Jose Teodoro, Sr., was originally appointed executor of the
aforementioned will, whereas Gonzalo D. David, who is a member of the Bar, acted as his
counsel. Subsequently, Mr. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison extrajudicially partitioned among
themselves the properties bequeathed and donated to them by Margarita David. Plaintiff herein,
Carlos Moran Sison, is the husband of Mrs. Sison. On or about May 9, 1950, defendant herein
caused to be annotated on the titles of several lands acquired by Mrs. Sison as above stated a
notice of adverse claim, for the fees of Jose Teodoro, Sr., as executor of the will of Margarita
David, and his (defendant's) fees as counsel for said executor. It turned, however, that on or
about February 28, 1949, said properties were assigned by Mrs. Sison to Priscila Estate, Inc. a
corporation organized on that date by her and plaintiff herein, aside from some nominal parties
in exchange for shares of stock thereof. Hence, on September 8, 1951, said corporation filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 99, an "Urgent
Petition Ex-Parte" to lift defendant's adverse claim, insofar as one of the abovementioned
properties that covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20338 of the office of the Register
of Deeds of Manila and located at the intersection of Sto. Cristo and M. de Santos streets, San
Nicolas, Manila upon the ground that said property belonged already to the corporation which
wanted to sell it, and that there were other properties of the estate of Margarita David which
sufficed to answer for said adverse claim. The motion was granted by an order of the same date,
"provided that should any objection be interposed later on", the movant "obligates itself to file
the corresponding bond to satisfy" what may be due to the adverse claimants. On September 26,
1951, defendant herein filed in said cadastral proceedings, on his behalf and that of Jose
Teodoro, Sr., a "Petition for Bond", praying that the sale of the property at Sto. Cristo street be
disapproved "and/or a bond of P12,000 be forthwith furnished" by the Priscila Estate, Inc. In
support of this petition, which led to the institution of the case at bar, defendant alleged, in
paragraphs 2 to 7 thereof :

2. That the movants herein object to the urgent petition ex-parte on the ground that the
property to be sold herein is one of the few properties inherited from Da. Margarita David
which is not encumbered, because practically all of the properties of the heiress Priscila
F. de Sison are mortgaged, and the Priscila Estate, Inc., is operating on an overdraft,
which is the reason why these properties are to be sold;

3. That the reason there is an overdraft is that new buildings or improvements have been
made as conjugal properties of Carlos Sison and Priscila de la Fuente, and now, the
paraphernal properties inherited from Da. Margarita David is being sold to pay for the
obligations of these conjugal properties;

4. That if the movants were informed or served copy of this petition to sell the property,
they would because it is in contravention of the provisions of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Da. Margarita David to the effect that if Priscila de la Fuente dies
without descendants, then the inheritance will go to Narcisa de la Fuente, and vice versa,
and if both of them die, then all the properties of the late Da. Margarita David will be
divided as follows: One-half of all the properties would go to the legatees on her father's
side and the other half of all the properties would go to the legatees on her mother's side;

5. That of course, the incidental remedy would be to show where the said properties or
the proceeds thereof went in case the above conditions should occur, and what properties
were acquired in lieu of the same, considering the earning of the properties and the
expenses therein;

6. That answering the statement of petitioner that there are other valuable properties of
the estate, still annotated with the adverse claim, it is respectfully offered that the said
properties are mortgaged and in case of foreclosure, the adverse claim is relegated to a
subsequent position as posterior to the mortgages inscribed on the back of the aforesaid
titles;
 7. That the properties mentioned in par. 4 of the ex parte petition, namely, One-half pro-
indiviso interest of the lands in OCT Nos. 21063, Pampanga, composed of 3 lots, are
assessed at P3,748.31, and 12861, Pampanga, composed of 2 lots, are assessed at
P1,614.39 and TCT No. 12829, Pampanga, composed of 2 parcels, are assessed at
P12,677.58, and the Manila property (land only) in TCT No. 60851, composed of 2 lots
in Tondo, are assessed at P846.00, so that all in all the said properties actually are
assessed at P9,020.14 plus P846.00 for Manila or P9,866.14, and are insufficient to meet
the P17,000.00 claim of the Estate of Sideco, the Executor's fee of P4,000.00 with
interest, and the attorney's fees of P5,000.00, which may still be increased on appeal.

Soon later, or on October 6, 1951, plaintiff commenced the present action. In his amended
complaint therein, he alleged that the averment in the above-quoted paragraph 2 was made with
malice and evident intent to put him in ridicule, for defendant knew him (plaintiff) to be the
president of Priscila Estate, Inc. and, by the statements contained in said paragraph, the
defendant, "in effect, implied with clear malevolence and malignity that plaintiff is incompetent
and unfit to manage the affairs of the Priscila Estate, Inc."; that in paragraph 3 of defendant's
petition for bond, he alleged that plaintiff "has been converting the paraphernal properties of his
wife into conjugal, thus clearly implying that he, the plaintiff, has been and still is, scheming to
enrich himself at the expense of his spouse", which allegation is "utterly false and completely
irrelevant and immaterial to the point at issue"; that the clear implication of the above-quoted
paragraph 4 is that the aforementioned urgent petition ex-parte of Priscila Estate, Inc. "was
inspired by the condemnable desire of the plaintiff as president of Priscila Estate, Inc., to avoid
the supposed fideicommissary provision of the Last Will and Testament of the late Margarita
David so that he could enrich himself at the expense of the relatives of Margarita David, who
might eventually inherit the properties of Priscila de la Fuente de Sison"; that the allegations in
said paragraph 4 were "irrelevant to the point raised" in defendant's "Petition for Bond"; that as a
lawyer, defendant knew that said allegations were "unfounded in law", the aforementioned
fideicommissary provision having been nullified and rendered inoperative when Margarita David
adopted Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison and, thereafter, donated to them "practically ill the
properties" disposed of in said will; that said allegations in defendant's "Petition for Bond" were
"clearly uncalled for and unnecessary"; and that, on account of the allegations made in the three
(3) paragraphs above mentioned, plaintiff "suffered, and is still suffering, from mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feeling, moral shock and social humiliation", for which he should be
indemnified in the sums stated at the beginning of this decision.

In his answer, defendant denied that his aforementioned allegations were tainted with malice and
the intent of slandering the plaintiff and averred that they were proper and necessary to protect
his interests and those of his client Jose Teodoro, Sr.; that the petition for bond, in which said
allegations were contained, is an absolutely privileged communication; and that plaintiff has no
cause of action against him, for the party in interest in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 99, in
which said petition had been filed, was Priscila Estate, Inc., not plaintiff herein.

Defendant further set a counterclaim, with four (4) causes of action. The first was bared upon the
fact that, in an "opposition" filed by the plaintiff, through his counsel, in the aforementioned
Special Proceeding No. 58881, on March 31, 1951, the following allegedly "impertinent "false"
and "scandalous" statements were "maliciously and illegally" made:
 "Why, if we do not watch out, some day we shall again be confronted with another
petition for additional counsel's fees by Gonzalo David for filing his present
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR COUNSEL'S FEES. And if this goes on, we might
hear the end of this Testate Estate but, surely, never the end of David's claim for
attorney's fees."

xxx xxx xxx

"Merely to read the foregoing relation of alleged legal services rendered by Gonzalo
David is to laugh. One gets the impression that David's time is more precious than gold
and that for him to merely read or receive anything pertaining to this Testate Estate must
cost some money. What a man!"

xxx xxx xxx

"This claim for associate attorney's fees is ridiculous. It betrays an unpardonable

ignorance of the law on the part of Attys. Gonzalo David and Jesus Ocampo who claim to
have 'a well-established law office in Escolta, Manila'.

"It might be purely coincidental, but the amount of ten (10%) percent being asked for by
Gonzalo David sounds very familiar. Is it possible that ten percenters have arrived even
in the halls of justice? Some people, it would seem, need the reminder that our courts
have no similarity whatsoever with the Import Control Administration."

By way of second cause of action, defendant asserted that, in a motion filed, on August 7, 1951,
in said special proceeding, plaintiff, through his counsel, made the following "malicious,
scurrilous, scandalous, false . . . and irrelevant" allegation:

"Surely, there must be a limit to judicial generosity, especially if such generosity would
inevitably jeopardize the interest of the heirs who are entitled to protection by this Court
from lawyers who already had been overpaid. If this present tendency continues, Gonzalo
David, the frustrated heir, might yet blossom into a forced one."

As third cause of action, defendant alleged that on September 28, 1951, plaintiff "without any
basis or reason, whatsoever, maliciously and illegally filed a criminal complaint for libel" against
the defendant in the office of the City Fiscal of Manila who dismissed the charge because it was
"wanting in basis, reason and merit."

In each one of the aforementioned three (3) causes of action, defendant alleged also, that, in
consequence of the plaintiff's acts therein described, he (defendant) has suffered and continues to
suffer from mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock and social humiliation, because of which he prayed for judgment against the plaintiff in
the sum of P50,000.00 for each cause of action.
Defendant's last cause of action is premised upon the allegation that, owing to the unjustified and
unjustifiable complaint filed in this case, he (defendant) had to avail himself of the services of
counsel at an expense of P10, 000.00, which plaintiff should be made to pay.

The amendment motu proprio made by the lower court on December 29, 1954, of its decision
dated December 10, 1954, is assailed by the defendant as a nullity, upon the ground that none of
the parties had filed any motion or petition therefor, and that said amendment did not involve a
correction of mere clerical mistakes, but a substantial modification, not only of the award for the
plaintiff, but, also, of the findings of fact and the reasons for said award. There is no merit in this
pretense, for the amended decision was rendered nineteen (19) days after the promulgation of the
original decision, or within the reglementary period to appeal therefrom, and before any appeal
had been taken by the parties herein, so that the lower we court still had jurisdiction and control
over the case. Moreover, said amendment is authorized by Rule 124, section 5, of the Rules of
Court, pursuant to which every court shall have power x x x to amend and control its processes
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice."

Defendant has made several assignments of error, contesting the propriety of the conclusions
made in the decisions appealed from on the merits of plaintiff's amended complaint and the
demerits of defendant's defenses. In this connection, we note that the lower court sustained the
former and rejected the latter, upon the ground that the allegations in defendant's petition for
bond "are based on malicious and unfounded grounds"; that said petition is a qualifiedly
privileged communication, because the privilege exists only if the allegations therein are
pertinent or relevant to the case; that said allegations "were impertinent and irrelevant to the
issue then under inquiry, for all he (defendant) wanted in said petition was the filing of a bond";
and that the defendant went out of his way; to harass and cause damage to the plaintiff, for the
former had caused his adverse claim to be annotated on property worth much more than the
amount of said claim, for which reason said annotation is "Presumed" to have been made it with
malice."

At the outset, it should be noted that the pertinency or relevancy essential to the privilege
enjoyed in judicial proceedings, does not make it a "qualified privilege" within the legal
connotation of the term. Otherwise, all privileged communications in judicial proceedings would
be qualified, and no communications therein would be absolutely privileged, for the exemption
attached to the privilege in said proceedings never extends to matters which are patently
unrelated to the subject of the inquiry. The terms "absolute privilege" and "qualified privilege"
have established technical meanings, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander.

In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum:

For the sake of clearness of application privileged communications are often divided into
two classes: Absolute privilege; and conditional or qualified privilege, the second
sometimes being called 'quasi privilege.' In cases of absolutely privileged
communications, the occasion is an absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of
conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie
presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former class the freedom from liability is
said to be absolute or without condition, regardless of the existence of express malice, as
 contrasted with such freedom in the latter class where it is said to be conditioned on the
want or absence of express malice. (53 C.J.S., 141- 142.)

An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by reason of the occasion on

which it is made, no remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for slander or
libel. It is well settled that the law recognizes this class of communications which is so
absolutely privileged that even the existence of express malice does not destroy the
privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, and some eminent judges, in
dealing with particular applications of the rule, have doubted or questioned the rationale
or principle of absolutely privileged communications. As to absolutely privileged
communications, a civil action for libel or slander is absolutely barred. (53 C.J.S., p.
142.) .

Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than does absolute privilege. It
relates more particularly to private interests, and comprehends communications made in
good faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds for believing them
to be true, on a subject matter in which the author of the communication has an interest,
or in respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private, either legal, judicial,
political, moral, or social, made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.
Briefly stated, a qualifiedly privileged communication is a defamatory communication
made on what is called an occasion of privilege without actual malice, and as to such
communications there is no civil liability, regardless of whether or not the
communication is libelous per se or libelous per quod. (53 C.J.S., pp. 143-144.)

In the case of communications qualifiedly privileged, there must be both an occasion of

privilege and the use of that occasion in good faith. (53 C.J.S., p. 145.)

To the same effect is the American Jurisprudence, from which we quote:

On the ground of public policy, the law recognizes certain communications as privileged
and, as such, not within the rules imposing liability for defamation. A privileged
communication or statement, in the law of libel and slander, is one which, except for the
occasion on which or the circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory and
actionable.

Privileged communications are divided into two general classes, namely: (1) those which
are absolutely privileged; and (2) those which are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged,
as defined in subsequent sections. (33 Am. Jur., p. 123.)

An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the

occasion on which or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had
in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who claims to be injured
thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously. (33 Am.. Jur., pp. 123-
124.)
 A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where circumstances exist, or are
'reasonably believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty of making a
communication to a certain other person to whom he makes such communication in the
performance of such duty, or where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the
interests the person of society that he should tell third persons certain facts, which he in
good faith proceeds to do. This general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: A
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter
which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and although the duty is not a legal
one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The essential elements of
conditionally privileged communication may accordingly be enumerated as a good faith,
an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only. (33 Am. Jur., pp.
124-125.)

Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following language:

Absolute Privilege In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public

welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their
minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for words so
spoken are absolutely forbidden, even of it be alleged and proved that the words were
spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350, pp. 387388.)

In the less important matters, however, the interests and welfare of the public do not
demand that the speaker should be freed from all responsibility, but merely require that
he should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the common good. In these
cases the privilege is said not to be absolute but qualified; and a party defamed may
recover damages notwithstanding the privilege if he can prove that the words were not
used in good faith, but that the party availed himself of the occasion wilfully and
knowingly for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff. (Section 389, p. 415; italics
supplied.)

Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it is made, what
distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication from one which is only qualifiedly
privileged is, therefore, that the latter is actionable upon proof of "actual malice", whereas its
existence does not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided that, in the case of
judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in question are pertinent, relevant or related to or
connected with the subject matter of the communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a
few decisions have required probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute privilege, but such
decisions not only do not reflect the view of the clear weight of authority, but, also, have
acknowledged the wisdom of such view, although its non-application was sought to be justified
by the special conditions obtaining in each case (See Harshaw vs. Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411,
1413).
The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged communications is set forth in
the American Jurisprudence as follows:

"The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow and is practically limited to

legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of state, including, it is said,
communications made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of law, by or to
heads of executive departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors,
lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages." (33 Am. Jur., 123-124.)

It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged
(Newel on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 388, 391-392, 407; 53 C.J.S. 165, 167,
173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-12545 [April 30, 19591). As the
Supreme Court of Tennessee has put it:

"For reasons of public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, it appears to be the prevailing rule in the United States that statements made in a
pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and no action for libel may be founded
thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and
malicious such statements may be. 33 Am. Jur. 144, 145, Libel and Slander 149; 16 ALR
746, supplemented in 42 ALR 878 and 134 ALR 483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 Tenn.
621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d 820.)

Hence, the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely privileged, and no civil action
for libel or slander may arise therefrom, unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to the
subject matter thereof.

In this connection, the lower court appears to have labored under the impression that the only
remedy therein sought was "the filing of a bond". However, defendant specifically prayed in said
petition that the sale intended to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc. be disapproved "and/or the bond
of P12,000 be forthwith furnished by" said corporation. Moreover, the body of the petition
clearly indicates that said prayer for disapproval of the sale was merely a subtle and tactful way
of seeking a reconsideration of the order of September 8, 1951 granting plaintiff's urgent petition
ex-parte of the same day, copy of which was served on the defendant two days after the filing of
said urgent petition and the issuance of said order. Indeed, it is alleged in the petition for bond of
defendant herein and Jose Teodoro, Sr. that they "object to the urgent petition ex-parte on the
ground that the property to be sold herein is one of the few properties inherited from Da.
Margarita David, which is not encumbered." In other words, they were opposed to said urgent
petition, which was granted by the order of September 8, 1951, and hence, they wanted this order
reconsidered and set aside, and this would be the result, if the lower court disapproved the sale
contemplated by Priscila Estate, Inc. The filing of a bond was evidently intended to be pressed
only if the first part of the prayer was denied.

Now, the reasons adduced in support of the petition for disapproval of the sale and implied
reconsideration of the order of September 8, 1951, or for the filing of a bond, were: (1) that
practically all of the properties of Mrs. Sison were mortgaged; (2) that the Priscila Estate, Inc. (to
whom said properties had been assigned) is operating on an overdraft, and this is why said
properties are to be sold;(3) that said overdraft is due to new buildings or improvements x x
made as conjugal properties" of plaintiff herein and his wife; (4) that the paraphernal properties
inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita David are being sold to pay obligations of said conjugal
properties; and (5) that the sale contemplated to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc., will defeat the
fideicommissary provision in the last will and testament of the late Margarita David, to the effect
that the properties transmitted by her to Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison should, in the event of
their death without any surviving descendant, pass to the other persons indicated in said will.

Obviously, these allegations are, not only pertinent, but material to the relief prayed for by the
defendant. They indicate clearly that, unless the annotation of the adverse claim of Jose Teodoro,
Sr. and defendant herein is maintained or a bond is filed by the plaintiff, it will become harder
and still harder to trace the paraphernal properties of Mrs. Sison and because, even if traced,
there is a likelihood that said adverse claim may be defeated either by subsequent obligations
contracted by the conjugal partnership of Mr. & Mrs. Sison, or by Priscila Estate, Inc., or by
rights thereafter acquired by third parties acting in good faith and for value. Whether or not the
reasons given sufficed to justify the granting of the relief sought by the defendant and Jose
Teodoro, Sr. is of no moment. Nothing but relevancy to said relief was necessary for defendant's
petition to have the benefits of the absolute privilege conferred by judicial proceedings. Such
privilege is unaffected, either by actual malice or by factual or legal inaccuracies in the
utterances made in the course of said proceedings.1

At any rate, the allegations in question in defendant's petition for bond were neither malicious
nor unfounded. Thus, it is a fact that most, or at least, several of the most valuable properties
transmitted by Margarita David to Mrs. Sison were mortgaged. Those subsequently assigned by
Mrs. Sison to Priscila Estate, Inc. were encumbered altogether for P397,717.00. In order to
construct the Priscila Building No. 3 on a paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary
to borrow ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) from the RFC. The Priscila Estate, Inc., of
which plaintiff is the president began its operations with an overdraft line of P236,517.00. Most
of the paraphernal properties of Mrs. Sison were transferred to said corporation. In fact, the same
asked that the annotation, on the certificate of title of one of those properties, of the adverse
claims of the defendant and Jose Teodoro, Sr., be cancelled, upon the ground that said property
now belongs to the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison.

What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation, entitled C M S Estate, Inc., to
which some properties of Priscila Estate, Inc. (most of which had been originally inherited by
Mrs. Sison from Margarita David) were transferred. The C M S Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of
one million pesos (P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of the par value of P1,000 each, of
which 950 non-voting preferred shares, and 50 are common voting shares. All of these common
voting shares, in addition to 50 non-voting preferred shares, were subscribed by the plaintiff,
whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred shares and no common shares. Four (4) other
persons had each a nominal holding of one (1) non-voting preferred share. As the sole holder of
all the voting common shares, plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and permanent control over the
management of this new corporation. In fact, the letters "C M S", which are the initials of his
name, Carlos Moran Sison, appear in the corporate name "C M S Estate, Inc.," for the seeming
purpose of representing to the public that plaintiff was, for all intents and purposes, the
corporation itself.

Considering that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila Estate, Inc., most of the properties of
which had come from Margarita David, and the antagonism that had arisen between him and the
defendant in the course of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Margarita David
which antagonism was crystallized and sharpened in several litigations and many acrid, if not
virulent incidents between the same parties it is understandable, as well as natural and logical
for defendant to be apprehensive about the fate of his aforementioned adverse claim and that of
Jose Teodoro, Sr., if the order directing the cancel at on of the annotation thereof were not
reconsidered and set aside, or plaintiff were not required to file a bond for guaranty the payment
of said adverse claims.

The alleged gross disparity between the amount thereof and the value of said properties is
immaterial to the case at bar. To begin with, the properties were heavily encumbered. Besides,
the transfer thereof to Priscila Estate, Inc., the subsequent assignment of some to C M S Estate,
Inc. and, then, the sales that had been made and the one sought to be made in favor of third
persons, tended to place said properties beyond the reach of said claimants. Then too, bad faith
should not, and cannot be imputed to creditors, much less "presumed", merely because they seek
the maximum possible guaranties for the protection of their rights. At any rate, the alleged bad
faith in the annotation of the adverse claims does not warrant an inference of bad faith in the
allegations of the petition for bond.

The lower court erred, therefore, in rendering judgment for the plaintiff under his amended
complaint and said judgment should be reversed.

We will now consider defendant's Counterclaim. The first two (2) causes of action therein are
based upon allegations, made by counsel for the plaintiff, in pleadings filed in the course of
judicial proceedings, which, as such, are absolutely privileged. Considering that said allegations
although sarcastic, to the point of being, perhaps, unnecessarily pungent and harsh, as well as
tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice
were relevant to the subject-matter of the aforementioned pleadings, the causes of action
predicated thereon are necessarily untenable.

So is the third cause of action under defendant's counterclaim. The dismissal, by the office of the
City Fiscal of Manila, of the complaint for estafa therein filed by the plaintiff is insufficient to
warrant a judgment for damages in defendant's favor, there being no competent evidence that, in
filing said complaint, plaintiff had acted in bad faith, knowing that the charge was groundless.

As regards the fourth cause of action in said counter-claim, it should be noted that plaintiff is a
member of the bar. As such, he must have known that the petition for bond in question is an
absolutely privileged communication, and that the allegations therein made were pertinent and
relevant to the remedy sought in said petition. More important still, he knew that the basic facts
therein stated were true. Aside from this, some of the inferences drawn by him therefrom are
purely his, not necessarily deducible from said facts, and although he allegedly suffered injury to
his reputation in consequence thereof, there has been not even an attempt to prove that it had
adversely affected either his credit, or any of his business transactions, or his social or domestic
relations. In other words, aside from the fact that plaintiff's complaint is clearly unfounded, the
record strongly indicates that it was filed with a harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances
surrounding this case, plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation (Article 2208 [4], Civil Code of the Philippines).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint, as well as the first three causes of action in defendant's
counterclaim, and sentencing plaintiff to pay to the defendant, by way of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, the sum of P3,000, with interest thereon it the legal rate, from the date on
which this decision shall become final, aside from the costs. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Plaintiff-appellee seeks a reconsideration of the decision of this Court, promulgated on January 28, 1961, upon
several grounds. The first is to the effect

"That on page 18 of the Decision, it was erroneously stated P1,000,000.00 was borrowed from the RFC to
construct Priscila Building No. 3 when the undisputed fact was: only P100,000.00 was borrowed."

It is interesting to note that plaintiff has not cited any evidence of record in support of his claim. In fact the same is
refuted by his own testimony. We quote from pages 128-129 of the transcript of the stenographic notes:

"DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DOMINGUEZ .

Q. Will you please state, Mr. Sison, why 'Building Priscila 3' located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and
Ronquillo was your Conjugal property with your wife, Mrs. Sison?

A. It was conjugal property because when we decided to construct that building, we borrowed from the
RFC P1,000,000.00 and the condition of that loan was payment on installment plan of 120 installments.
The RFC gave us the loan and we constructed the building and the loan is being paid from the rentals of the
building, which, under the law, is conjugal."

The second ground refers to the following paragraph of our decision:

"What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation, entitled CMS Estate, Inc., to which some
properties of Priscila Estate, Inc. (most of which had been originally inherited by Mrs. Sison from
Margarita David) were transferred. The CMS Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of the par value of P1,000 each, of which 950 are non-voting
 preferred Shares, and 50 are common voting shares. All of these common voting shares, were subscribed
by the plaintiff, whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred shares and no common shares Four (4) other
persons had each a nominal holding of one (1) non-voting preferred share. As the sole holder of all the
voting common shares, plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and permanent control over the Management of
this new corporation. In fact the letters 'CMS', which are the initials of his name, Carlos Moran Sison
appear in the corporate name 'CMS Estate, Inc.,' for the seeming purpose of representing to the public that
plaintiff was, for all intents and purposes, the corporation itself." .

Plaintiff admits the facts set forth in this paragraph, but he alleges that the last sentence therein places him "unjustly
in bad light"; (1) because, in using his initials in the corporate name "C M S Estate, Inc." he was "just following the
trend of the time", as illustrated by the examples set by "Andres Soriano and Company", "Puyat Steel Company and
"Soriente-Santos Company"; and (2) because his alleged purpose in organizing "C M S Estate, Inc." was noble,
namely, to protect the interest of his wife and their seven (7) children should she contract a subsequent marriage
with an irresponsible man, in case plaintiff predeceased her.

It is obvious, however, that the corporate names, "Andres Soriano and Company", "Puyat Steel Company," and
"Soriente-Santos Company", indicate that the corporations concerned are owned and controlled by Soriano, Puyat
and Soriente-Santos, respectively.

As regards petitioner's alleged purpose in creating the "C M S Estate, Inc.," suffice it to say that:

(a) Said alleged purpose has no connection whatsoever with the choice of the corporate name.

(b) Said purpose does not appear in the record before us, no evidence having been introduced or offered in
connection therewith.

(c) The paragraph above-quoted merely tends to indicate that it was only natural for a creditor or claimant, like
defendants herein, to feel that, under the facts given, the properties of the estate of Margarita David were being
placed beyond his reach and under the complete control of plaintiff herein, who, he believes, was not friendly to
him.

The third ground of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration refers to the following paragraphs of our decision:

At any rate, the allegations in question in defendant's petition for bond were neither malicious nor
unfounded. Thus, it is a fact that most, or at least, several of the most valuable properties transmitted by
Margarita David to Mrs. Sison were mortgaged. Those subsequently assigned by Mrs. Sison to Priscila
Estate, Inc. were encumbered altogether for P397,717.00. In order to construct the Priscila Building No. 3
on a paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary to borrow ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) from the RFC. The Priscila Estate, Inc., of which plaintiff is the president, began its
operations with an overdraft line of P236,517.0. Most of the paraphernal properties of Mrs. Sison were
transferred to said corporation. In fact, the same asked that the annotation, on the certificate of title of one
of those properties, of the adverse claims of the defendant and Jose Teodoro, Sr., be cancelled, upon the
ground that said property now belongs to the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila Estate, Inc., most of the properties of which had
come from Margarita David, and the antagonism that had arisen between him and the defendant, in the
course of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Margarita David which antagonism was
crystallized and sharpened in several litigations and many acrid, if not virulent incidents between the same
parties it is understandable, a well as natural and logical for defendant to be apprehensive about the fate
of his aforementioned adverse claim and that of Jose Teodoro, Sr., if the order directing the cancellation of
the annotation thereof were not reconsidered and set aside, or plaintiff were not required to file a bond to
guaranty the payment of said adverse claims.
 The alleged gross disparity between the amount thereof and the value of said properties is immaterial to the
case at bar. To begin with, the properties were heavily encumbered. Besides, the transfer thereof to Priscila
Estate, Inc., the subsequent assignment of some to CMS Estate, Inc., and, then, the sales that had been
made and the one sought to be made in favor of third persons, tended to place said properties beyond the
reach of said claimants. Then too, bad faith should not, and cannot be imputed to creditors, much leas
'presumed', merely because they seek the maximum possible guaranties for the protection of their rights. At
any rate, the alleged bad faith in the annotation of the adverse claims does not warrant an inference of bad
faith in the allegations of the petition for bond. (Decision, pp. 18-21).

Plaintiff maintains that these paragraphs are irrelevant and inaccurate and should be deleted, because: (1) the amount
borrowed from the RFC was P100,000.00, not P1,000.000.00; (2) the properties in question were not heavily
encumbered; and (3) lack of malice on the part of the defendant was, according to our decision, unnecessary for the
enjoyment of the absolute privilege accorded to the communication upon which plaintiffs action is based.

As pointed out above, the first premise is belied by the plaintiffs own testimony. With respect to the second premise,
it should be noted that the immovables assigned to Priscila Estate, Inc., were originally subject to liabilities
aggregating P397,770.00. According to said testimony of the plaintiff, a P1,000,000.00 loan was secured from the
RFC, so that the aggregate encumbrance reached P1,397,770.00, which, by all standards, is a heavy one, even if we
assume that the assessed value of said immovables in 1956 were P1,661,000.00, as estimated by plaintiff in his brief,
without any evidence in support thereof. Besides, the communication complained of was filed five (5) years before,
and it is a matter, of which we may take judicial cognizance, that there has been a sharp increase in the value of real
estate in the City of Manila during the last decade. Again, although good faith on the part of the defendant was
unnecessary for his absolute privilege, his justification in making the allegations complained of is certainly material
to the determination of the question whether plaintiff had a seasonable ground to believe that he had a cause of
action against said defendant.

Lastly, plaintiff maintains that the following paragraph of our decision is "obviously unfair" and should be set aside:

As regards the fourth cause of action in said counterclaim, it should be noted that plaintiff is a member of
the bar. As such, he must have known that the petition for bond in question is an absolutely privileged
communication, and that the allegations therein made were pertinent and relevant to the remedy sought in
said petition. x x x In other words, aside from the fact that plaintiff's complaint is clearly unfounded, the
record strongly indicates that it was filed with a harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances
surrounding this case, plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation (Article 2208 [4), Civil Code of the Philippines). (Decision, pp. 21-22).

He says that the decision of the lower court in his favor proves that he was reasonably justified in believing that the
allegations complained of were irrelevant to the issues before said court. This conclusion does not necessarily follow
from the aforementioned premise. Otherwise, our statutes and Rules of Court would not have established the writ of
certiorari to nullify or modify, inter alia, judicial decisions or orders rendered or issued with grave abuse of
discretion. In the case at bar, the surrounding circumstances lead, to our mind, to the conclusion reached in the
paragraph above quoted, the opinion of the lower court to the contrary notwithstanding.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23908 October 29, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendant-appellee,
THOMAS H. GONZALES, intervenor.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellant.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Stating that it involves questions purely of law, the Court of Appeals certified this appeal to Us.

The prosecution at bar is for libel. An information, dated March 29, 1963, was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cagayan against Venancio H. Aquino, alleging: .

That on or about July 27, 1960, in the Municipality of Camalaniugan, Province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused Venancio H. Aquino,
being the counsel for Demetrio B. Encarnacion in Civil Case No. [N-] 151, for "Damages
for libel", in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, 7th Judicial District, Branch III, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent of
impeaching the personal worth, integrity, honor and reputation of the complaining
witness Thomas M. Gonzales, circulate and publish and/or caused to be circulated and
published his "Reply and Answer to Counterclaim" a copy of which was furnished and
received by the counsel of the complaining witness Thomas M. Gonzales at
Camalaniugan, Cagayan, on July 27, 1960, which the accused wrote, prepared and mailed
and/or caused to be written, prepared and mailed, containing highly libelous, derogatory
and scurrilous words and expressions among which are the following:

"To this, our applicable reply are the very words of the Honorable Supreme Court
to a party for shamelessly making untrue, libelous statements, to wit: "(This party)
appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to
falsehood or falsehoods, . . . as part of their systematic campaign of falsehoods,
and slanders directed against us, is an imposture that only ignorants, black hands
and others mental pachyderms (like him) can swallow."

. . . Defendant was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's reputation, the

malefactor who concocted the preposterous and malicious insinuations against the
plaintiff, so that, defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be wounded."
 knowing fully well that the aforesaid words and phrases to be inapplicable to and
inappropriate for the pleading of which they are made integral parts, and knowing
likewise the same to be immaterial, impertinent and irrelevant to the issues involved in
the aforementioned civil case, thus publicly and maliciously exposing the complaining
witness Thomas M. Gonzales to public ridicule, derision, mockery, scorn and contempt to
the irrepable damage and prejudice of the said complaining witness Thomas M. Gonzales
whom the aforequoted words and phrases were applied and referred to.

Aquino filed a motion to quash or amend the information, upon the ground that it was not
sufficiently intelligible. Said motion was denied by the court.

Subsequently, however, on September 28, 1963, Aquino filed a second motion to quash,
claiming that (1) the statements referred to are not defamatory; and (2) the statements, even if
defamatory, are absolutely privileged. Annexed thereto were copies of the Complaint, Answer
with Counterclaim, and the Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim, in Civil Case No. N-151 of
the Court of First Instance of Cavite.

After the Assistant Fiscal filed an answer to the motion, the court a quo, on October 15, 1963,
dismissed the case, upon the second ground of the motion to quash. Thus it ruled that statements
of the accused in the "Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim" filed in Civil Case No. N-151
constituted absolutely privileged matters, having been made in the course of judicial proceedings
and being relevant to the issues that arose in that aforestated case.

From the order of dismissal there was yet no arraignment and plea the prosecution has
appealed.

Appellant, through the Solicitor General, recognized the rule, as laid down in several decisions
of this Court, that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same
are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view
of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby
incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery
of damages.1 At issue here is the application of said rule, or whether the statements of Aquino,
quoted in the information, fall within the scope of this privilege.

As shown in the records before Us, the suit known as Civil Case No. N-151 was filed by Ex-
Judge Demetrio Encarnacion against Thomas Gonzales, to recover damages for allegedly false,
malicious and libelous statements contained in the defendant's letter to his (defendant's) sister,
dated September 3, 1958, shown and given to plaintiff in July of 1959, imputing that plaintiff
had been "separated from the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance by reason of his
supposedly dirty and indecent ways of dispensing human justice and of his (plaintiff's) having
been leading an immoral life." (Plaintiff's Complaint, par. 3, Annex A to Second Motion to
Quash.)

To plaintiff's Complaint alleging the above matters, Thomas Gonzales filed an Answer with
Counterclaim, putting up the defense that the letter referred to "was addressed to defendant's
sister, Mrs. Magdalena G. Manikan, mailed in a sealed envelope to her, and written with the
sincere desire to comply with an obligation, social and moral, and with the honest belief in the
truthfulness of the statements contained there"; and that "reference to the complainant, if any,
was merely incidental, devoid of any intent to libel". Thus, defendant further asked for P25,00,0
in moral damages, alleging that "by the unwarranted filing by the plaintiff, in bad faith, of the
aforesaid malicious and unfounded charges against the defendant, the latter suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock". (Defendant's Answer with
Counterclaim, pp. 1-2, Annex B to Second Motion to Quash.)

Then followed plaintiff's Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim, filed through counsel Venancio
H. Aquino, containing among others, the allegations subject matter of the present criminal
action. For convenience, said allegations are hereunder again quoted:

To this, our applicable Reply are the very words of our Honorable Supreme Court to a
party for shamelessly making untrue, libelous statements, to wit: "(This party) appears to
belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood or
falsehoods . . . as part of their systematic campaign of falsehood, and slanders directed
against us, is an imposture that only ignorants, blackhands and other mental pachyderms
(like him) can swallow."

. . . defendant was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's reputation, the malefactor who
concocted the preposterous and malicious insinuations against the plaintiff, so that,
defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be wounded;

From the pleadings thus filed in Civil Case No. N-151, the subject of inquiry readily discernible
is whether the defendant acted out of sheer malice with intent to cast dishonor upon the plaintiff;
or in good faith, pursuing a sense of social or moral duty. Since the plaintiff asserted the first
proposition, the allegations in his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim to the effect that
defendant's posture of innocence was a shameless pretense strongly or offensively worded
though it may be are pertinent and related to the subject of inquiry. Thus, in quoting from the
opinion of Justice Perfecto in the Sotto Case,2 said pleading may indeed have thereby called the
defendant "an imposture that only ignorants, blackhands and other mental pachyderms (like him)
can swallow." Yet this was responsive to defendant's allegations to the contrary, and pertained to
the subject of inquiry. The same is true with the assertion that defendant "was the impertinent
assaulter of plaintiff's reputation, the malefactor who concocted the preposterous and malicious
insinuations against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be wounded."

Appellant's brief would however dissect the quotation and separately analyze such terms as
"blackhands" and "pachyderms". It is argued that these are words having no bearing to the cause;
that "black hand"' according to Webster's New International Dictionary means "a lawless secret
society practising terrorism, extortion or other crimes" and "pachyderm" means "thick-skinned";
and that appellant cannot conceive of any situation whereby during the trial of the civil case the
defendant might be proved to be a "pachyderm" or a "blackhand" or even an "imposture" or
"ignorant" as these terms are used in the expressions in question.
First of all, in this regard it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally
considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic
intensity.3 Secondly, there is no such word as "blackhand"; Webter's New International
Dictionary gives "Black Hand" meaning, what the Solicitor General gave to "blackhand," that is,
a lawless secret society whose members engage in extortion, terrorism, and other crimes. A
person belonging to or associated with said society is not called "blackhand" as stated, there is
no such term but "blackhander" (See, Webster, New International Dictionary, 2nd. Ed., p.
280; Eric Partridge, A Dictionary of the Underworld, [1950] p. 44.)

"Now, We discussed this here because there was an obvious clerical error in the pleading in
quoting from Justice Perfecto, who used not "blackhand" but "blockhead" in the portion quoted.
Since there is no such word as "blackhand" (referring to an individual), and since reference to the
quotation from Justice Perfecto is made, the term used must be deemed, for our purposes,
"blockhead". And "blockhead" means a person deficient in understanding" (Webster, Ibid., 290).

As to the word "pachyderm," the same was qualified by the word "mental" so that it does not
refer to thickness of the physical skin. As appellee's brief points out, "mental pachyderm" refers
to a "distorted mind, a mind that is insensible, unfeeling, senseless, hardened, callous (Thesaurus
of Words and Phrases, par. 376, p. 121, copyright 1947)."4

It will thus be seen that whether or not the defendant is so deficient in knowledge ("ignorant")
and understanding ("blockhead") and possessed of an insensible, unfeeling and hardened mind,
as to indulge in a pretense of the kind that he is alleged to have made in his Answer with
Counterclaim, is a question that reasonably pertains to the subject of inquiry in the civil case,
namely, whether his claim of good faith in mentioning things defamatory to plaintiff is an
imposture or a truth.

As such, the allegations complained of herein cannot give rise to criminal or civil liability against
the advocate who made them. As this Court observed in Sison v. David, L-11268, January 28,
1961:

. . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the
public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the
public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors,
lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124.)

Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
justice. Since it appears from the information that the allegations complained of herein are
contained in an appropriate pleading, and since they pass the test of relevancy, it was no error for
the court a quo to sustain the privilege and to quash the information upon defendant's motion
(People v. Andres L-14458, April 29, 1960).

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from quashing the information in this case is hereby
affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., reserves his vote.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1
U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 743; Tupas vs. Parreo, L-12545, April 30, 1959; People vs.
Andres, L-14548, April 29, 1960; Sison vs. David, L-11268, January 28, 1961; Tolentino
v. Baylosis, L-15742, January 31, 1961; Gonzales v. Alvarez, L-19072, August 14, 1965.
2
82 Phil. 595, 607, 618.
3
U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743; Smith, Bell & Co. v. Ellis 48 Phil. 475, 482.
4
Appellee's brief, p. 27.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58681 May 31, 1982

ALFREDO P. MALIT, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, in
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Caloocan City, Branch IV,
respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of respondent Judge, dated
February 20, 1981, denying petitioner's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 126521,
entitled: "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Alfredo Malit", as well as the order of same
respondent, dated May 5, 1981, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth Fernandez in an
administrative case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on
January 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac Identified certain exhibits on the witness stand. On
cross-examination by herein petitioner, Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a
certain exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did not understand the
word "made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying that it means "prepared."
Notwithstanding, Dr. Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for
clarification. This prompted Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how did you become a Doctor."
As a consequence, Dr. Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander against herein
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office of Caloocan City.

On February 28, 1980, an information for unjust vexation docketed as Criminal Case
No. 126521 was filed by Special Counsel Apolinario A. Exevea which reads:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously vex and annoy one Corazon I. Macaspac, by
then and there uttering the following remarks directly addressed to the
latter:

I DOUBT HOW DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR to her great annoyance,

vexation and disgust.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. "

Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion for
reconsideration raising the ground that the court has no jurisdiction because the facts
charged in the information are privileged communication.

It is the position of petitioner that the statement "I doubt how did you become a doctor"
does not constitute an offense as it was uttered at the time he was conducting the
cross-examination of Dr. Macaspac; that utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings and motions belong to the class of
communication that are absolutely privileged.

On the other hand, respondents maintain that an order denying a motion to quash
cannot be the subject of certiorari which is a remedy to keep an inferior court within the
limits of its jurisdiction; that the delimitation of the correctness, if at all, should be
brought on appeal, after the trial of the raise and not in certiorari; that petitioner's
contention that the act complained of does not constitute an offense because it is
protected by the mantle of privilege is strictly a matter of defense.

Petitioner's contention should be sustained. Well settled is the rule that parties, counsel
and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise
defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the
statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.

Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial

proceedings are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the
cause in hand or subject of inquiry, the same may be considered
privileged communication and the counsel, parties, or witnesses therein
are exempt from liability. (See 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreo, et
al. G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein).
(Tolentino vs. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010)

And, as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory

matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege
does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety. (People
vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046).

In the case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you become a
doctor" when Dr. Macaspac would not answer the question as to who prepared the
document presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded the question by
saying that she did not understand the word "made."

Newel in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following
language:

Absolute Privilege.In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of

public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their
sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions
and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely
forbidden, even if it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken
falsely, knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350, pp. 387-388).

It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative
proceedings belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged.
Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice. As this Court observed in Sison vs. David (Supra):

... The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of
law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that
members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action
for the recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124)
Generally, certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial court. Interlocutory orders ordinarily should be reviewed when an appeal is taken
from the trial court's judgment. Not every procedural error or erroneous legal or factual
conclusion amounts to grave abuse of discretion. However, as this Court ruled in
Sanchez, et al vs. Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, et al., (L-27043, November 28, 1975), "when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower court acted capriciously
and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise
its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. "

WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders of February 20, 1981 and May 5, 1981 are
reversed and set aside. Respondent is hereby ordered to desist and refrain from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 126521.

SO ORDERED.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982

RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, OSCAR S. ATENCIO, and
POLICARPIO MAPUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, Presiding Judge, Branch VII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, ADEZ REALTY, INC., PILAR I. VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI,
PACITA JAVIER, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI,
and VICTORINO GASKELL, respondents.

Raymundo Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar S. Atencio for petitioners.

Senen S. Ceneza for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 in a motion to dismiss an

action for damages flied by petitioners as defendants failed to obtain an affirmative response from
respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima. Hence this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding,
assailing on jurisdictional grounds the order denying such motion. The alleged grievance of private
respondents 2 as plaintiffs in a case then pending before respondent Judge 3 arose from the first two
paragraphs of the answer of petitioners 4 as defendants, worded as follows: "[Defendant], through
counsel, by way of answer to the complaint, respectfully, represents: 1. The averments of plaintiff's
alleged due organization and existence (par. 1, Complaint) is denied it falsifies the fact of its creation
and operation as an instrument and front for illegal and oppressive usurious loan transactions; the
averments on defendant's personal circumstances (supra) are admitted, with the qualification that his
dealings with plaintiff were based on good faith and reliance on his part, but taken advantage of by
scheming plaintiff. 2. That averments on the alleged loan secured on 3 December 1971 in the sum of
P7,270.00 and accessory sums thereon, the supposed demands for payment and requests for
extensions, the alleged failure of defendant to pay (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, supra) are specifically denied as
fraudulent distortions of the facts and apparent disguises to confuse and conceal the true agreements
between the parties," 5 after which came the affirmative defenses. The privileged character of such words
employed in a pleading on a matter impressed with relevance, usury being the defense, is not difficult to
discern, if, as should be the case, there be recognition of the basic constitutional right of free expression.
So it would be in accordance with an unbroken line of decisions of this Tribunal. It does appear, therefore,
that petitioners are entitled to the remedies prayed for.

The facts are undisputed. This litigation had its origin in a suit for collection filed by plaintiff Adez Realty,
Inc., now one of the private respondents, seeking the payment of P7,270.00 with 12% interest and 25% of
such amount as liquidated damages. 6 The principal allegation was that plaintiff, now respondent, Adez
Realty, Inc. agreed to extend to the defendant, now petitioner, Policarpio Mapua and did deliver to him a
loam in the amount of P7,270.00 on the condition that failure to liquidate such loan on the date due would
result in paying not only the principal with interest but the equivalent to 25% as liquidated damages. 7 It
was then stated that defendant Mapua had not paid such overdue debt, hence the filing of this case for
collection. 8 The answer was filed with the alleged offending paragraphs thereof as duly noted at the
outset of this opinion. 9 Moreover, the affirmative defenses contained the following allegations: "3. The
transactions between plaintiff and defendant are in reality a loan of P5,000.00 secured way back in 1969
earning usurious interest at the rate of 5% monthly, or 60% per annum to the extent that defendant was
unable to pay said usurious interest and at the same time liquidate the principal amount of P5,000.00 by
December 3, 1971, such that 4. On 3 October 1971, plaintiff's jargon and double-talk caused defendant to
sign the alleged promissory note Annex A, Complaint, which plaintiff managed to facelift and veneer as
a lawful deed and agreement, but stripped of its gloss, it is null and void, for being contrary to the laws
policy against usury. 5. Considering the payments by defendant of 5% interest monthly on the principal
since 1969, or P250.00 monthly, until 3 December 1971, defendant had fully paid the principal
indebtedness. 10 The language employed in such answer resulted, as had been stated, in a complaint for
damages filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila before respondent Judge. 11 Then came the
motion to dismiss, which as set forth, was predicated on the matter complained of being absolutely
privileged. 12 When after an opposition to such motion 13 and a reply to such opposition 14 were submitted,
the lower court issued the order denying the motion to dismiss, 15 this petition was filed with this Court, a
motion for reconsideration having proved futile. 16

To repeat, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. "The prevailing rule," according to Justice Malcolm in the leading case of Santiago v. Calvo," 17 is that
parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or
relevant to the case." 18 Such doctrine was foreshadowed in the earlier case of Zurbito v. Bayot, 19
decided in 1911. In the language of Justice Johnson: "If the persons presenting the claim are, in the
opinion of those opposing it, attempting to have a claim allowed which should not be snowed, they have a
right to state their reasons therefor, even though such opposition may incidentally reflect upon the honor
and credit of the person presenting the claim." 20 A year after the Santiago ruling, a similar
pronouncement came from the pen of another eminent jurist, Justice Street in Baron v. David. 21 Thus: "It
is clear that with respect to these damages the cross-action cannot be maintained, for the reason that the
affidavit in question was used in course of a legal proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a legal remedy,
and it is, therefore, privileged." 22 The then Justice, now retired Chief Justice Concepcion in the leading
case of Sison v. David 23 restated the principle: "It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of
communications that are already absolutely privileged." 24 As so emphatically stressed by the late Chief
Justice Castro in Deles v. Aragona:" 25 The doctrine of privileged communication is not an Idle and empty principle. It has been
distilled from wisdom and experience." 26

2. It is undoubted likewise, as held in Tolentino v. Baylosis, Justice

J.B.L. Reyes being the ponente, 27 that as to the degree of relevancy
or pertinency necessary for the invocation of this absolute privilege,
"the courts favor a liberal rule." 28 He added: "The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to
the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be
legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of
the trial." 29 He likewise quoted from the aforesaid Santiago v. Calvo
decision: "For, as aptly observed in one case, 'while the doctrine of
privileged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may
lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the
present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships.'" 30 The
language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon in Dorado v.
Pilar 31 is apropos: "Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some
latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of causes they
uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some
infelicities of phrase." 32 It bears mentioning that in Deles, 33 such
sentiment was pharaphrased by Chief Justice Castro in this wise:
"Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients, they may be
pardoned some infelicities of language." 34

3. The language of this Court on the question of what pleadings enjoy absolute immunity is not swathed
in obscurity. Nor has there been only change of mind - far from it. This Court has consistently adhered to
what it had stated with clarity as far as 1911. If at all, the later decisions had been even more emphatic to
dissipate any lurking doubt that the rule of liberality so unequivocally set forth must be upheld. The
principle that calls for application is crystal-clear. The immunity parties and counsel enjoy is absolute
as long as the test of relevance is met. There is need, it would seem, to keep in mind that as Hokfeld
pointed out, the correlative of immunity is disability. Respondent Judge failed to heed such an imperative.
It ought to have granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners, to repeat, are entitled to the remedies sought.
So this Court has ruled in the aforecited cases of Zurbito and Baylosis as wen as People v. Andres. 35
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss is annulled.
Respondent Judge or whoever may be acting in his stead is prohibited from taking any further action in
Civil Case No. 94551 except to dismiss the same. To that extent, mandamus lies. No costs.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Guerrero, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

ESCOLIN, J., concurring:

I concur. The alleged defamatory statements in defendant's answer easily meet the test
of relevance.

Separate Opinions

ESCOLIN, J., concurring:

I concur. The alleged defamatory statements in defendant's answer easily meet the test
of relevance.

Footnotes
1 According to Article IV, Sec, 9 of the Constitution: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."

2 The private respondents are: Adez Realty, Inc., Pilar 1. Vda. de Zuzuarregui, Pacita Javier, Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr.,
Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Victorino Gaskell.

3 Civil Case No. 94551.

4 Petitioners Raymundo A. Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar A. Atencio were the counsel and Policarpio Mapua
was the defendant in the above case.

5 Answer, 1, Annex B to Petition.

6 Petition, Annex A. The other private respondents appear to be the incorporators of Adez Realty, Inc.

7 Ibid, par. 3.
8 Ibid, pars. 5-6.

9 Ibid, Annex B.

10 Ibid, Annex F.

11 Ibid, Annex C.

12 Ibid, Annex D.

13 Ibid, Annex E.

14 Ibid, Annex F.

15 Ibid, Annex G.

16 Ibid, Annex J.

17 48 Phil. 919 (1926).

18 Ibid, 923.

19 20 Phil. 219.

20 Ibid, 221.

21 51 Phil. 1 (1927).

22 Ibid, 11.

23 110 Phil. 662 (1961).

24 Ibid, 674. To support such formulation, he cited Newell on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp- 388, 391-392,
407 and Tupas v. Parreno, 105 Phil. 1304.

25 Adm. Case No. 598, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 633.

26 Ibid, 643.

27 110 Phil. 1010 (1961).

28 Ibid, 1313.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 104 Phil. 743 (1958).

32 Ibid, 748.

33 27 SCRA 633.

34 Ibid, 643.

35 107 Phil. 1046 (1960).

 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989

ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Br. XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN and ROLANDO
GATMAITAN, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

One wonders why the respondent judge did not immediately grant the petitioner's
motion to quash the information on the obvious and valid ground that the facts charged
did not constitute an offense. This decisive act could have avoided the needless
molestation of one more citizen and cleared the clogged dockets of this Court of still
another of the prosecutions big and small so rampant during those days of martial law.
More importantly, it would have affirmed once again the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to which every one was entitled even under the 1973
Constitution.

This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the
now defunct Anti-Smuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo,
Manila, pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of
Customs of Manila on April 20, 1976. 1 The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly smuggled into the
country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong. These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure
proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges
thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts. Only a few items "of no commercial value" were ordered
confiscated. 2

While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976,
to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible therefore be
investigated. The letter follows in full: 3

ESTEBAN C. MANUEL
Attorney at Law
643 Carvajal Street
Binondo, Manila

The Chairman
ASAC, Camp Aguinaldo
Quezon City

Sir:

This is in behalf of my clients, Mrs. Ng Woo Hay and her son, Mr. Lee Kee Ming, who sought my help in reporting to
your goodself their I complaint about certain acts committed by ASAC men which, from all appearances, constitute
criminal offenses. I am referring to the raid they conducted on April 21, 1976 at about 4:30 in the afternoon at Tokyo
Hotel, Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a "Warrant of Seizure and Detention" (seizure Identification No.
14922) issued by the Acting Collector of Customs on April 20, 1976. The raiding team, about 10 in number and headed
by one Amado enrol, took advantage of the fact that Mrs. Ng Woo Hay was alone in her hotel room. The ASAC agents,
despite Mrs. Ng's protest and claim of innocence, forced their way into the room and ransacked the place for alleged
untaxed goods. Not only did they take everything they could find in the room, but also forcibly took from her person the
wrist watch and jade bracelet (gold plated she was wearing at the time. They also forced open her handbag and
divested her of her wallet containing 70 Hongkong dollars, as well as her necklace and her son's wrist watch which she
had placed in said handbag. Mrs. Ng was also subjected to the indignities of being searched by a male person. After
emptying the room of its contents, the raiding team presented to her a carbon copy of a list purporting to show the
goods seized. The list, however, appears not only illegible but does not reflect all the goods that were taken away by
the ASAC agents. What is more, said men, likewise taking advantage of the absence of Mrs. Ng's son, owner of some
of the articles, falsified the signature of the latter by writing his name on the space designated as "owner", making it
appear that he (Lee Kee Ming) had acknowledged that the list covers all the items seized.

The documents and other papers presented to me by my clients reveal that the articles seized were declared at the
Manila International Airport upon arrival, and were properly appraised. The corresponding customs charges were
likewise paid. It is evident, therefore, that my clients were victims of foul play masterminded by no less than law
enforcers who prey on tourists, particularly Chinese, for obvious reasons.

I examined the records in the Bureau of Customs and found out that it was on the basis of an affidavit executed by
ASAC Agent Rolando Gatmaitan and the letter-request sent by the Vice-Chairman of ASAC Brig. Gen. Ramon Z.
Aguirre, to the Collector of Customs that prompted the latter to issue the warrant in question. In this connection, I must
state, with all frankness, that there was undue haste in the request for the issuance of the warrant, because it is
discernible from a mere reading of the affidavit that its contents are mere pro-forma and hearsay statements of the
abovenamed ASAC agent. It could not have, as it now appears, justified the drastic action sought to be accomplished.

Needless to state, the incident complained of not only has caused considerable damage to my clients but to our
country as well. It is for this reason that we demand for an immediate and full dress investigation of the ASAC officers
and men who took part in or caused the issuance of the warrant, as well as those who participated in the raid, with the
view of purging the government of undesirables; and that pending such investigation the said officers and men be
suspended from further performing their duties.

V
e
r
y
t
r
u
l
y
y
o
u
r
 s
,

(SGD.)
ESTEBAN
C.
MANUEL

The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged were all exonerated in a decision dated August
25, 1976. 4 Not satisfied with what he later described as a "home town decision," the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a complaint for
robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. This was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest
fiscal who said that the case might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 5 The petitioner says he then went to Camp Aguinaldo
but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when lie was told that it would take about a year to complete the preliminary investigation
alone.6 The owners of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which the petitioner filed for them in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on June 7,1976. 7

Three days later, there appeared in the June 10, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the following report: 8

TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL

Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong, have filed a case for damages against a customs official
and 11 agents of the government's anti-smuggling action center ASAC in connection with a raid conducted in their hotel
rooms, more than a month ago.

The case was docketed in Manila's court of first instance (CFI) as Civil Case No. 102694.

The complaints also alleged they lost assorted materials amounting to P46,003.40.

Named respondents in the case were acting customs collector Ramon Z. Aguirre, Rolando Gatmaitan, Antonio
Baranda, Amado M. Tirol, Francisco C. Santos, Edsel Labayen, Jose Robles, Nestor Eusebio, Freddie Ocnila, Renato
Quiroz, Pedro Cunanan, Jr., and Enrique Perez, all of ASAC

The acting customs collector was impleaded in the case in his official capacity for having issued the warrant that led to
the criminal offenses complained of.

Aquirre, ASAC vice-chairman, was named as defendant for soliciting the issuance of a warrant of seizure and detention
reportedly on the basis of charges contained in an affidavit executed by Gatmaitan, another ASAC agent.

Esteban Manuel filed the case in behalf of the plaintiffs composed of Manila resident Ng Tee, and Hong Kong visitors
Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying and Lee Kee Ming who came to the Philippines to visit their relatives and friends.

The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace, bracelet and wrist watch. They
allegedly seized many articles valued at P27,000 which have remained unaccounted for in the list submitted by the
defendants as the inventory of the items confiscated.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. 9 A reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that
they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter
of April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin Today.

The subject of this petition is the order of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, 10 denying the motion to quash filed by the petitioner,
who had claimed that his letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a privileged communication; that the news report in
the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and
therefore also privileged. 11 His motion for reconsideration having been also denied in the order dated April 27,1977,12 he now seeks relief
from this Court against what he claims as the grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in sustaining the information.

It is perhaps indicative of the weakness of the respondents' position that when asked to comment on the petitioner's motion to quash, the city
fiscal never did so during a period of more than ninety days. 13 It was left to a private prosecutor to enter his own appearance thereafter,
presumably because the fiscal did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the case, and to file the comment for the private respondents
himself 14 Later, when the petitioner came to this Court and we required a comment from the Solicitor General, this official complied only
after asking for (and getting) twenty-six extensions for a total of nine months and seven days, and at that the comment was only a half-
hearted defense of the challenged orders. 15 Despite the petitioner's effective rebuttal in his reply, the Solicitor General did not ask for leave
to file a rejoinder as if he had lost all taste for combat notwithstanding the many points raised by the petitioner that had to be refuted.

Perhaps it was just as well. Like a good general, the Solicitor General probably understood that the battle was lost.
Indeed it was. In fact, it should never have commenced.

From the purely procedural perspective, there is much to fault about the information. The two Chinese clients who were impleaded with the
petitioner were charged with absolutely nothing, prompting the respondent judge to peremptorily dismiss the information as to them. 16
Worse, the information imputed to the remaining accused two different offenses, to wit, writing the allegedly libelous letter and causing the
publication of the allegedly libelous news report. This was not allowed under Rule 110, Section 12, of the Rules of Court, providing that "a
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses." 17 If libelous the letter and the news report constituted separate offenses that should have been charged in separate
informations. (However, not having been raised in the motion to quash, that ground was deemed waived under Rule 15, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court.) 18

From the viewpoint of substantive law, the charge is even more defective, if not ridiculous. Any one with an elementary I knowledge of
constitutional law and criminal law would have known that neither the letter nor the news account was libelous.

The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

Article 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when
they raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of
his legal duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to vindicate his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the
ASAC agents, he could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was
addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good
faith, the letter was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity.

As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen without any known ties to the newspapers, could have by
himself caused the publication of such an explosive item. There is no prima facie showing that, by some kind of influence he had over the
periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC agents. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an
advertisement. This looks instead to be the result of the resourcefulness of the newspaper in discovering matters of public interest for dutiful
disclosure to its readers. It should be presumed that the report was included in the issue as part of the newspaper's coverage of important
current events as selected by its editorial staff.

At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the abovequoted article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or remarks. This is also privileged. Moreover, it is not correct to say, as the Solicitor General does, that Article
354 is not applicable because the complaint reported as filed would not by itself alone constitute a judicial proceeding even before the issues
are joined and trial is begun. The doctrine he invokes is no longer controlling. The case of Choa Tek Hee v. Philippine Publishing Co., 19
which he dies, has been superseded by Cuenco v. Cuenco, 20 where the Court categorically held:

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in
court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by
the privilege. (Emphasis provided)

It may also be argued that the complaint, standing by itself, is a public record and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.

It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still actionable.
However, since what is presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof that
the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail.

We are not unmindful of the contention that the information should not be dismissed outright because the prosecution must first be given a
chance to introduce evidence to overcome the presumption. This is indeed the normal procedure. However, where it appears from the
allegations in the information itself that the accused acted in good faith and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations,
and in pertinent pleadings, there is no need to prolong the proceedings to the i prejudice of the defendant. The Court can and should dismiss
the charge without further ado, as we held in People v. Andres: 21

The prosecution claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the
trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant- appellee was prompted only by good motives
assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant- appellee's publication is a matter of
 defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel (Lu Chu Sing, et al. vs. Lu Tiong Gui 76 Phil.
669).

When in the information itself it appears that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate
pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and
produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if, added to this, the questioned imputations
appear to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed
partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a
litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not
constitute an offense of libel.

As has already been said by this Court: As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged
defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety. Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court committed a reversible error in this
case of finding that the allegations in the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication
justifying the dismissal of the case.

The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on the wider guarantee of freedom of expression as an institution of all
republican societies. This in turn is predicated on the proposition that the ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to involve himself in matters
that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform himself of such matters.

The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry that is always ready to participate in the discussion and resolution of public issues.
These issues include the conduct of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the performance of their assigned
powers, which after all come from the people themselves. Ever citizen has a right to expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust
reposed in them and the maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their functions. Every citizen has a right to complain and
criticize if this hope is betrayed.

It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not only a right but a responsibility of the highest order that should not be shirked for
fear of official reprisal or because of mere civic lethargy. Whenever the citizen discovers official anomaly, it is his duty to expose and
denounce it, that the culprits may be punished and the public service cleansed even as the rights violated are vindicated or redressed. It can
never be overstressed that indifference to ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration of corruption will breed more corruption.
The sins of the public service are imputable not only to those who actually commit them but also to those who by their silence or inaction
permit and encourage their commission.

The responsibility to review the conduct of the government functionaries is especially addressed to the lawyer because his training enables
him, better than most citizens, to determine if the law has been violated or irregularities have been committed, and to take the needed steps
to remedy the wrong and punish the guilty.

The respondents contend that the letter was written by the petitioner to influence the seizure proceedings which were then pending. Even
assuming that to be true, such purpose did not necessarily make the letter malicious, especially if it is considered that the complaint against
the ASAC agents could not be raised in the said proceedings. The ASAC Chairman, not the Collector of Customs, had jurisdiction to
discipline the agents.

It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice, that even after the seizure proceedings had been concluded in favor of the
petitioner's clients, he pursued their complaint against the ASAC agents in the fiscal's office in Manila and then with the military authorities in
Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing of the civil case for damages in the court of first instance of Manila.

It would be a sad day indeed if for denouncing venality in government, the citizen could be called to task and be himself punished on the
ground of malicious defamation. If every accuser were himself to be accused for discharging his duty as he sees it, then will the wrong-doer
have been granted in effect, and by this Court no less, an undeserved immunity for his misdeeds or omissions. The private individual would
be barred from complaining about public misconduct. Every criticism he makes would be tainted with malice and pronounced as criminal.
The next step may well be a conspiracy among those in the government to cover up each other's faults and to insulate themselves from the
legitimate efforts of the people to question their conduct.

The second exception is justified under the right of every citizen to be informed on matters of public interest, which, significantly, was first
recognized in the 1973 Constitution. Even if it were not, the right would still be embraced in the broader safeguard of freedom of expression,
for the simple reason that the right to speak intelligently on "matters that touch the existing order" necessarily imports the availability of
adequate official information on such matters. Surely, the exercise of such right cannot inspire belief if based only on conjectures and rumors
and half-truths because direct access to the facts is not allowed to the ordinary citizen.

This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass media, which have fortunately resumed their roles as an independent conduit
of information between the government and the people. It is the recognized duty of the media to report to the public what is going on in the
government, including the proceedings in any of its departments or agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or
confidentiality when disclosure may be prohibited.To protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law says that as long as the account is
a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made without any remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not
presumed. Its publication is encouraged rather than suppressed or punished.
This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on censorship in general as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
expression, Censorship presumes malice at the outset, It prevents inquiry into public affairs and curtails their disclosure and discussion,
leaving the people in the dark as to what is happening in the public service. By locking the public portals to the citizen, who can only guess at
the goings on in the forbidden precints, censorship separates the people from their government. This certainly should not be permitted. "A
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people," declared Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme
Court. "To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and
the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who had nothing
to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper. There is here a manifest effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in
accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed special privileges and perhaps also immunities during those oppressive times. The
non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of
expression that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism.

We are convinced that the information against the petitioner should never have been filed at all and that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information on the ground that the allegation petitions therein did not constitute
an offense. The petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks from those who in the guise of law and through the instrumentality of the trial court
would impose upon him this warrant tyranny.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, and April 27, 1977, are SET ASIDE
and Criminal Case No. Q-7045, in his court, is DISMISSED. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

Contact Us
For comments, suggestions, queries and further information, contact our Action Center.

DepEd Action Center

DepEd Complex, Meralco Ave., Pasig City, Metro Manila

(02) 636 1663 | 633 1942 | (+63) 919 456 0027
action@deped.gov.ph

Name
Email *
Subject *
Type of Concern (Choose one) *
Query
Complaint/feedback
Suggestion
Request
Others (Please specify)
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24649 March 17, 1926

CALIXTO SANTIAGO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
RECAREDO M. A. CALVO, defendant-appellee.

Ramon Diokno and Marcelino Lontok for appellant.

Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This case is the sequel, or more properly speaking, the complement of disbarment proceedings
heretofore initiated by the plaintiff against the defendant. The principal question is whether a
complaint presented in the Supreme Court against a lawyer is or is not privileged, and whether
by reason of such complaint if found to be ungrounded, the lawyer has a right to damages.

It was on March 13, 1923, that Calixto Santiago filed charges in this court against Attorney
Recaredo Ma. Calvo, and supported the same by an affidavit. At the conclusion of a thorough
investigation of the charges, the court, speaking through the writer of this decision and with the
concurrence of all the other members of the court, completely vindicated Attorney Calvo, and
ordered "that the charges presented by complainant Calixto Santiago against Attorney Recaredo
M.a Calvo be dismissed without prejudice to the legal rights of either party." But with this
decision, the curtain was not to be drawn down on the drama acted by the parties.

Even before the decision in the case of unprofessional conduct was promulgated, Santiago had
begun action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from Calvo the value of a
promissory note, a complaint which was later amended to cover two promissory notes calling for
P2,000, and interest. To this complaint, the defendant interposed an answer with a special
defense, and also a counterclaim in which damages in the amount of P15,500 were asked. On
these issues, the judgment was that the plaintiff recover from the defendant on his cause of action
the sum of P1,774.34, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on P574.34 from March
20, 1923, and at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on P1,000 from January 11, 1924, and that the
defendant recover from the plaintiff the sum of P9,500, said amounts to be compensated one
against the other to the extent possible, without special pronouncement in regard to the costs. It is
from this judgment that the plaintiff has appealed, and here has specified seven errors which
raise two general issues.

In further explanation of the decision of the trial judge, it should be said that the plaintiff was
permitted to recover P1,000 on one promissory note since this note was not directly contested,
and on second promissory note, was permitted to recover P774.34, representing a liquidation,
including a deduction in the amount of P300 for professional services rendered Santiago by
Attorney Calvo. The first assignment of error challenges the correctness of this finding with
reference to professional fees. The plaintiff contends that out of friendship Attorney Calvo
performed legal services for him gratuitously, while Attorney Calvo contends that even P300 are
incommensurate with the work done. Suffice it to say that on this question of fact we rely on the
judgment of the trial court.

The six remaining assignments of error concern the allowance of P9,500 to the defendant on his
counterclaim. They raise the question stated at the outset of this decision, viz. whether a
complaint presented in the Supreme Court against the lawyer is or is not privileged, and whether
by reason of such complaint if found to be ungrounded, the lawyer has a right to damages.

The charges laid against Attorney Calvo in this court by the complainant Santiago were couched
in moderate language except as to the concluding portion. The complainant Santiago
undoubtedly overstepped the bounds of exactitude when he said "That I am firm in my belief that
these acts of the said attorney, committed with the utmost cold blood, are for the deliberate
purpose of evading payment, for any reason, of the said promissory note upon its maturity, on
account of its erasures and changes or on any other ground and taking advantage of his
knowledge of judicial procedure, being a practising lawyer, to involve me in litigation which,
though justice might be on my side, as I am sure it is, would foil the object of the promissory
note, thus causing me great damage in that I cannot dispose of my little savings when I need
them." On this and other allegations, Attorney Calvo plants his claim for damages, made up of
P1,500 to pay for the counsel in the disbarment proceedings and P8,000 to recompense him for
his mental sufferings and financial losses.

There are two ways to look at the legal aspects of the case. The first is to apply the rule of
qualified privilege in the law of libel. In this respect, the rule sanctioned in this jurisdiction is
this: A communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest of concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory
matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable. (U. S. vs. Bustos [1918], 37
Phil., 731; U. S. vs. Caete [1918], 38 Phil., 253.) The rule is moderated in one direction by the
observation that even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truth- fullness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may
still cover the mistake of the individual. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity (U. S. vs. Bustos,
supra). And the rule is expanded in another direction by the observation that the right must be
exercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting of
private spite. It is subject to the limitation and restriction that such complaints must be made in
good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice (U. S. vs. Caete, supra).

It is perhaps preferable, however, to consider proceedings for the disbarment of attorneys as

judicial proceedings. The rule then is well settled in the United States that parties, counsel and
witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory
published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant
to the case. (17 R. C. L., pp. 333 et seq.; Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. I, chap XXI;
Newel, Slander and Libel, pp. 513 et seq.)

The crux of the case is not if the charges of Santiago were true, but is if they were made in good
faith, and if the statements were pertinent or relevant to the case.

The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything
which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled
clients, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their
spleen on attorneys. Yet, as the United States Supreme Court once properly observed, while the
doctrine of privileged communications is "liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great
hardships," yet to "give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to
far greater hardships." (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce [1899], 175 U. S., 409.)

On the facts, sheltered as they are under the doctrine of privilege, we cannot say that the
complainant was not acting in good faith and did not state facts pertinent and relevant to the
issue, although later found not to be true, when he filed his charges in this court. Some latitude of
remark and observation must be allowed parties who are bold enough to hold attorneys as
officers of the court to their oaths.

Something is made of the fact that the attack on Attorney Calvo was made public through the
agency of The Philippines Herald. It is not shown, however, that Santiago had anything to do
with the imprudent publication of this matter. It is precisely to protect attorneys in their
profession that the Supreme Court has adopted a rule making charges preferred against them
confidential in nature until the final determination of the case. The rule is likewise protective of
the press for even a verbatim copy of the complaint against an attorney in a newspaper might be
actionable.

The ultimate outcome of the related cases between Santiago and Calvo is then this: Attorney
Calvo receives a full vindication of his good name from the court and recovers of Santiago the
fair value of professional services rendered him. Santiago on the other hand recovers from Calvo
the amount of the unpaid promissory notes, less a reduction on an accounting, and is not mulched
in damages because of having pressed charges for unprofessional conduct against Calvo. These
two old friends are consequently right back where they were on that afternoon of November,
1922, when in the office of Mr. Calvo they agreed to disagree.

In conformity with the foregoing pronouncements, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
the elimination of so much thereof as relates to the recovery by the defendant from the plaintiff
on his counterclaim, without any finding as to costs in this instance.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., dissenting in part:

I agree with everything said in the majority opinion, except as to the legal force and effect of the
language quoted from plaintiff's affidavit.

It must be admitted that the charge which the plaintiff filed against Calvo is not a love letter in
either form of substance. In legal effect, after reciting what the facts were, plaintiff says that the
acts were committed "with the utmost cold blood," "for the deliberate purpose of evading
payment" of a promissory note, "on account of its erasures and changes," "to involve me in
litigation," and "foil the object of the promissory note." That is a strong language, and breathes
hatred, malice and revenge, and charges Calvo with a preconceived, willful, and deliberate
attempt in cold blood by unlawful acts to rob and defraud the plaintiff.

This court, after a full investigation, found that the plaintiff's charges against Calvo were not
sustained, and fully exonorated him. Of course, the judgment of the lower court as to the amount
of his damages cannot be sustained. Be that as it may, in the very nature of things, Calvo was
damaged by reason of the charges made against him by the plaintiff, and was forced to defend
himself, for which, in my judgment, he should have at least P1,500.

Footnotes

Upon that point and that the extent, I dissent.

VILLAMOR, J., concurs.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, accused-appellee.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

R E S OL U T I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This appeal from an order quashing an information furnishes occasion to reiterate the
ambits of the well-established doctrine of privileged communications. The appeal was
certified to us by the Court of Appeals on a finding that it involves a pure question of
law.

In an Information filed on March 4, 1981, the City Fiscal's Office of Cebu City accused
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno of the crime of libel based on alleged defamatory statements
found in a pleading entitled "PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION
DATED MARCH 9TH" dated March 11, 1980 filed in Civil Case No. R-18181 entitled
"HEIRS OF ROBERTO CENIZA, ET AL. V. DANIELA CENIZA UROT" now pending
litigation before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial District.

On March 5, 1981, the accused filed a MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION. The main
thrust of the motion is that on the face itself of the information, it is obvious that the
allegedly libelous statements imputing that Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an irresponsible
person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster are
contained in a pleading filed in court and, therefore, covered by the DOCTRINE OF
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; hence, no civil or criminal liability
can arise therefrom.

A decision was rendered by the court a quo quashing the information and dismissing
the case for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the same
to us.

The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class
of communications that are absolutely privileged has been expressed in a long line of
cases (Us v. Salera, 32 Phil. 365; Us v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 732; Giler v. billiard, 43 Phil.
180; Santiago v. Calvo, 47 Phil. 919; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 7528, Dec. 18, 1957;
Tupas v. Parreno, 105 Phil. 1304; Unrep., April 30, 1959; Smith Bell and Co. v. Ellis, 48
Phil. 475; People v. Valerio Andres, 107 Phil. 1046: Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60;
Tolentino v. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555; Cuenco v.
Cuenco, 70 SCRA 235; Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448; PCIB v. Philnabank
Employees' Association, July 2, 1981, 105 SCRA 314), The doctrine of privileged
communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result it may in some instances afford
an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer (People v. Castelo, 4 SCRA
947). While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead to great hardships,
yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise to greater hardships. (Tolentino
v. Baylosis, supra). The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the
promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature,
judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and
exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or
an action for the recovery of damages (Deles v. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers,
most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be
pardoned some infelicities of language (Deles v. Aragona, supra).

The doctrine of privileged communication, moreover, is explicitly provided for in the

Revised Penal Code, as an exception to tile general principle that every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true, in the absence of "good
intention" and "justifiable motive" (Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).

However, this doctrine is not without qualification. Statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of
defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent, or
material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra; People
v. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555). A pleading must meet the
test of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous (Armovit v. Purisima, 118 SCRA
247).

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory

matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal (People v. Alvarez, supra; Malit v.
People, 114 SCRA 348). The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety (Malit v. People, supra). In order that a
matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to
the issues presented by the pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related thereto,
or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of the
inquiry in the course of the trial (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra; People v. Alvarez, supra).

It appears that in connection with the initial formal hearing of Civil Case No. R-18181 on
February 7, 1980, appellant Atty. Ceniza as counsel for the defendant, filed an Urgent
Motion to Transfer Hearing, receipt of notice of which was denied by herein appellee
Atty. Sesbreno, counsel for the plaintiff. Upon the latter's representation, the court a quo
granted the motion for postponement, ordering Atty. Ceniza, however, to reimburse
Atty. Sesbreno's clients for expenses incurred in attending the supposed hearing slated
that day. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Atty. Ceniza showing evidence of
receipt of notice of hearing by Atty. Sesbreno's office. The same was granted. The court
ordered Atty. Sesbreno to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt for
misrepresentation. Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a motion seeking
reconsideration with a counter-motion for contempt against the appellant for reneging
on his commitment to reimburse appellee's clients and for resorting to dilatory tactics.
To that, Atty. Ceniza, filed his "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Etc." charging
Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication, and "telling a barefaced and
documented lie." Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then filed his "REPLY" subject
matter of Ceniza's libel suit.

Applying the liberal rule to the case at bar and considering the incidents which preceded
it, we find appellee's alleged slanderous statements pertinent to the motion to cite
appellant Ceniza in contempt. Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the
pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense of
his own and of his client's interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged
and cannot be the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra).

However, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that, at times zeal in the

defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubts as to
the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar
engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from modifying (Narido v. Linsangan, 58
SCRA 85). Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother attorneys detract from
the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court
(Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293).

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between
clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor
toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel
should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the
personal history or the personal peculiarities and Idiosyncracies of counsel on the other
side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly
wrangling should also be carefully avoided (Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics).
Lawyers owe respect not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members
of the Bar.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language should likewise
be dignified (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice of language is a very important
requirement in the preparation of pleadings (Rule 8, Sec. 1; Rule 9, Sec. 5; Rule 7 Sec.
5, Revised Rules of Court). Appropriately, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Greater care and circumspetion must be exercised in the preparation of their pleadings
and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68
SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of practising attorneys Festin v.
Faderanga, 111 SCRA 1).

Time and again we have rebuked and punished lawyers for conduct showing them unfit
to practice law. The Supreme Court as guardian of the legal profession has ultimate
powers over attorneys. Its authority to discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional
prerogative to regulate the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage
therein 1 Section 5(5), Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re Cunanan, 94
Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate. the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions
(Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154: In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil.
573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon, G.R. No. AC-
1928 [IBP Adm. Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore, attorneys are the court's
constituency to aid in the administration of justice (Doge S. State, 39 NE 745). A lawyer
occupies what may be termed a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the
court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice
(Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851). Thus, only those complying with the strict standards of
legal practice are maintained in the roll of attorneys and those falling short thereof may
be disbarred.

Thus, both attorneys are advised accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Atty. Raul Sesbreno is
reprimanded and admonished to refrain from employing language unbecoming of a
member of the Bar and to extend courtesy and respect to his brothers in the profession
with a warning that any future infraction of a nature similar to that found in this case
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relota and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

MELQUIADES GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ENRIQUE H.R. ABILA, RESTITUTO CLEMENTE and MANUEL FRANCISCO,
defendants-appellees.
ESCOLIN, J.:

This is an appeal taken to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
order of dismissal having been made on the basis of the pleadings, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to Us as one involving purely a question of law.

On August 20, 1979, plaintiff-appellant filed an action for damages against defendants
Restituto Clemente, Manuel Fransisco and Atty. Enrique H.R. Abila in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal(Caloocan City), docketed as Civil Case No. C-7820. Basis of the
complaint was the answer filed by defendants Clemente and Francisco, through their
counsel and co-defendant Abila, in Civil Case No. C-6607, likewise an action for
damages instituted by plaintiff Gutierrez against Restituto Clemente, Manuel Francisco
and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliseo de Guzman, pending before Branch XII of the
same court.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants in the aforesaid answer wilfully,
maliciously and malevolently recited false, sham, redundant, scandalous, impertinent
and irrelevant statements which served no purpose than to put his character,
personality and reputation in an utterly bad light; that said act being contrary to Arts. 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Sec. 20 [f], Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, entitles him to moral damages of not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages
of P50,000.00, actual damages representing litigation expenses of P25,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P25,000.00.

The averments in question are underscored hereunder and reproduced in the context in
which they were made:

Par. 4. That they specifically deny the pretexts in par. 7 of the complaint
as purely gratuitous as it is the constitutional prerogative of any person in
this country to give any statement to the police if he so desires and it is
likewise defendants' privilege to file a charge directly with the Fiscal's
office, hence, such acts could not be malicious nor malevolent as wrongly
interpreted by plaintiff, but a proper exercise of a right. And for the plaintiff
to do such acts with a twisted color is indicative of a twisted mind' ...

Par. 5. That they specifically deny the prevarications of par. 8 of the

Complaint as purely a product of a highly preposterous thinking because
official relationship alone is no infallible indication of 'intimacy. influence
and association and understanding with each other' in the matter
concerning this case at bar, It is only a dirty-minded mind of plaintiff that
can concoct an equally dirty thinking;

Par. 6. That they specifically deny the assertions in par. 9 of the complaint
as gratuitous and highly derogatory to the name of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal hence false and contemptible; that therein contained
statements about 'collusion and conspiracy' is a mere unsavory conclusion
of the plaintiff without basis nor logic; that as per records the preliminary
investigation was conducted properly in accordance with the Rules and
P.D. 77; that they belle the presumptions that plaintiff was the one who
filed first the complaint considering that the I.S. No. of the plaintiff is I.S.
No. 73-7074 and filed only on November 21, 1973, as also admitted by the
plaintiff in par. 7 of his complaint; that they likewise agree that the charges
of plaintiff was a 'mere countercharge', as it truly was, and for plaintiff to
say otherwise is again a delimitation of a limited mind' ...

Par. 7. That they specifically deny the accusations in par. 10 and 11 of the
complaint as purely false, a devise of wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's
traits considering that he had been filing cases against defendants and his
family for the same alleged incident only stated and presented differently
although the allegations were the same even as this one now at bar, and
delving into hair-splitting of causes of action based on one and the same
incident, a particularity of an inventive mind dwelling on making 'mountains
out of a molehill that in justice to the other defendant, Provincial Fiscal
Eliseo C. de Guzman, it is of record that he conducted the preliminary
investigation in accordance with the prevailing policies of the New Society
and in accordance with the rules and of P.D. No. 77; that the filing of the
criminal case against plaintiff with the Municipal Court of Malabon was
with the conformity of the Provincial Fiscal, hence, not have been unjust,
malicious and with conspiracy, to think and to allude the way plaintiff did is
again characteristic of plaintiff's wicked twisted and ignominious mentality;

Par. 8. That they deny specifically the braggadocio in par. 12 of the

complaint [imagine bragging that his (plaintiff's) son is a supervisor of 16
schools in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.] for he cannot be a dignified
pater families, as plaintiff claim he is because he had been hailed to the
police station, the fiscal's office and the courts many times for crimes
which do not bespeak of a dignified person, much less a 'dignified pater
familias, which is indeed a big joke:

Par. 9. That they specifically deny the imputations in par. 18 of the

computation as the happenings recited therein are ordinary consequences
after a criminal complaint has been filed in the court where the accused
had to be arrested for jurisdictional purpose of the courts as required in
the Rules and other laws of this country; that as to his having been
'vindicated' when the criminal case was ordered dismissed, that was good
for him, an act which he should be thankful, instead of capitalizing on it for
vindictiveness and in procuring money from his neighbors under a
disguise of a court action, since such results are very ordinary in the
course of human relations.
Upon motion of the defendants on the ground that aforesaid statements, even if
defamatory, are absolutely privileged, the trial court dismissed the complaint.

From this order, plaintiff interpose this appeal.

The principal issue posed for determination is whether or not the statements
complained of are relevant and material and, therefore, absolutely privileged; and this
issue can be resolved on the basis of the aforequoted answer of the defendants and in
the light of the applicable jurisprudence on the matter.

Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American jurisprudence is the rule that for
reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of juridical proceedings,
including an kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions are absolutely privileged when
pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false or malicious such
utterances may be [Newel on Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed. pp. 368, 391-392, 407,
53 C.J.S. 165, 167, 173; 33 Am. Jur. 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno et al. L-
12545, April 30, 1959, cited in Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60].

In Anonymous vs. Trenkman et al [48 Fed. (2d] 571, 574], the Court defined the
restriction to the privilege enjoyed by pleadings thus:

The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of the
material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. ... If
the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an
irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.

The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to
individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a
cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified [15 ALR 748].

A most liberal view of the questioned statements casts as shadow as to their relevancy
and materiality to the issue involved in Civil Case No. C-6607, i.e., whether the said suit
for damages instituted by the plaintiff was meritorious or not. Defendants contend that
the filing of Civil Case No. C-6607 is but a part of the plaintiff's systematic scheme of
harrassing and pauperizing them, it appearing that plaintiff had previously instituted two
actions for damages against defendants Clemente and Francisco. Repeated litigations
between the same parties might indeed be tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is
not sufficient cause for calling another "dirty-minded", and of a "limited mind", "twisted
mind" or to characterize his act as a "devise of wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's
traits.

It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the
entire dimension of the defendants' answer, with almost every paragraph thereof
scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a
grave reflection upon the mental and moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and
they certainly achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and ill-will.
The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed in vituperative and
intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of
inquiry and have no place in a pleading. While indeed lawyers should be allowed some
latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold [Pilar vs.
Dorado, 104 Phil. 743], such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the
bounds of relevancy and propriety. Besides, the language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive [Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441).

If in truth, the suits for damages instituted by plaintiff spring from his malicious desire to
work undue hardship to the defendants, the latter are not without adequate recourse in
law; and if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will surely tilt in their
favor, for the courts are ever vigilant in the protection of a party's rights. Upon the other
hand, the courts will not favor a party who seeks to expose the adverse party's alleged
"dirty and twisted and" and wickedness" by an abuse of a privilege.

The defendants' answer in Civil Case No. C-6607 is quite complete and sufficient
without the derogatory statements in question, and their inclusion therein was clearly
made solely for the purpose of giving vent to their ill-feelings against the plaintiff, a
purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and the
records remanded to the court of origin for determination as to the amount of damages
to be awarded to the plaintiff- appellant. Costs against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Ericta, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

Without prejudging the merits of Civil Case No. C-7820, I believe that it should not be
dismissed outright. The plaintiff in the said case should be given a chance, to show that
the offensive and vitriolic expressions in defendants' answer are not relevant or
pertinent and, being libelous, are, therefore, actionable and not privileged.
The complaint in that case should be treated as a supplemental complaint in Civil Case
No. C-6607, where the alleged defamatory and abrasive answer, which provoked the
filing of that case, was filed.

"Supplemental complaint" because it is based on an event (the filing of the alleged

libelous answer) which supervened after the institution of Civil Case No. C-6607 with
which it is intertwined and whose ultimate disposition may depend on the outcome of
the main case, Civil Case No. C-6607. Lawyer Enrique H. R. Abila would be treated as
an additional defendant in that supplemental complaint.

The two related cases, which are pending in the same court, should be consolidated
and tried together. That is the practical or pragmatic thing to do.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

Without prejudging the merits of Civil Case No. C-7820, I believe that it should not be
dismissed outright. The plaintiff in the said case should be given a chance, to show that
the offensive and vitriolic expressions in defendants' answer are not relevant or
pertinent and, being libelous, are, therefore, actionable and not privileged.

The complaint in that case should be treated as a supplemental complaint in Civil Case
No. C-6607, where the alleged defamatory and abrasive answer, which provoked the
filing of that case, was filed.

"Supplemental complaint" because it is based on an event (the filing of the alleged

libelous answer) which supervened after the institution of Civil Case No. C-6607 with
which it is intertwined and whose ultimate disposition may depend on the outcome of
the main case, Civil Case No. C-6607. Lawyer Enrique H. R. Abila would be treated as
an additional defendant in that supplemental complaint.

The two related cases, which are pending in the same court, should be consolidated
and tried together. That is the practical or pragmatic thing to do.

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;