University of Utah

Nationalism, Liberalism, and Democracy

Author(s): Albert W. Dzur
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 2002), pp. 191-211
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 Nationalism, Liberalism,
and Democracy
ALBERT W DZUR, WESTERNMICHIGANUNIVERSITY

Liberal nationalism is an important recent development in political

theory that challengesliberalsto acknowledgethe significanceof nation-
ality in people'slives, and its role in the justificationand implementation
of liberal policies. If liberal nationalists are correct, national identity
serves basic human needs and is not only compatiblewith liberalideals
of equality and individuality,but must be fostered for these ideals to
flourish and for the liberal-democraticstate to function. In this article I
analyze the doctrine of liberal nationalism and argue that it actually
points to the significance of democraticaction, not national sentiment,
for liberal states. Civic ties between citizens engaged in the public
domain, such as those articulatedby contemporarydemocratictheorists,
have more relevancefor addressingthe functionalrequirementsof liberal
states than the bonds of national identity.

Liberal nationalist thinkers such as Yael Tamir, David Miller, Neil Mac-
Cormick, Avishai Margalit, and Joseph Raz attempt to reconcile the ideals of lib-
eralism with the facts of national affiliation. Their contemporary theoretical
project is significant because it draws attention to the importance of national
identity in people's lives and takes seriously the possibility that national identity
is not atavistic impulse, elite-manipulated desire, or short-sighted preference,
but something that serves basic human needs. It is true that some, very few, lib-
eral thinkers have considered national affiliation as a facet of legitimate gover-
nance. But these, like J. S. Mill in the 19th century and Isaiah Berlin in the 20th,
gave nationality only a grudging respect as a somewhat unfortunate fact of life
(Mill 1972; Berlin 1980). Liberal nationalists do more than point to the reality
of national identity; they attempt to justify national affiliations in the same way
all other liberal ideals are justified. They believe that without some understanding

NOTE: Much of the researchfor this articlewas done while I was a CommonwealthFellow in the
Humanitiesat the Universityof Kentucky I am gratefulfor the conducive environmentfor
applied political theory providedby WolfgangNatter,The Committeeon SocialTheory,and
the Departmentof PoliticalScience at the Universityof Kentucky.
PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 55, No. 1 (March2002): pp. 191-211

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of nationalismthat recognizes its basic importancein human lives, liberalismis

incomplete.
Liberalnationalists'argumentsare significant,too, because they point out
how a number of settled aspects of liberalismas a public philosophy may be
dependent on social ties like those of nationality Since liberalideals as partof an
action-orientedpolitical ideology come embodied in a nation-state,not merely a
state, this is one way liberalismmight be seen as alreadynationalistic.But liberal
nationalistsmake a more fundamentalargument:historicalties of nationalaffili-
ation explain liberal practices of citizenship and boundary-setting,as well as
practicesof redistributivejustice better than the voluntaristicmodel favoredby
liberaltheorists.Accordingto liberalnationalists,without some recognitionthat
nationalismplays a fundamental,not merely epiphenomenal,role in the consti-
tution of a just society and a democraticpolitical order,liberalismis incoherent.
In what follows we will see how successfully liberal nationalists recon-
struct both the idea of nationalityand the theory of liberalism. I focus on three
clusters of arguments put forward by liberal nationalists. They argue that
national affiliation is important to liberalism, first, because it plays a funda-
mental role in providing continuityand context in individual lives; second,
because it informs, motivates, and justifies egalitarian policies; and third,
because it provides a social frameworkfor the functioningof the liberal state,
and especially democratic institutions. I demonstrate that liberal nationalists
have not shown that the national idea renders liberalism more coherent and
complete by providing necessary context, motivation, and justification for lib-
eral values of individuality and equality As for whether the national idea is
required for democratic institutions, I argue that the public forums and wide-
spread participationstressed by contemporarydemocratic theorists have more
appeal as a social frameworkfor democracy.
Liberalnationalistsdiagnosean importantproblemfor liberaltheory:liberal
states requirestable social networks oriented towardcollective projectsin order
to secure and further key values of individualityand equality and to support
democraticinstitutions. But by prescribingnationalismthey offer a flawed solu-
tion. They see a sense of nationalidentity as supportingthe social networks that
make liberal democracieswork; such networks shore up egalitarianpolicy and
protect the rights of individuals,offercitizens a sense of belonging to something
larger and longer-lastingthan themselves, and contribute to the legitimacy of
politicalinstitutions.As I will show, however,even liberalnationaliststhemselves
recognizeanotherfactorsupportingthe social networksneeded in liberaldemoc-
racies:democraticaction. Read carefullyand critically,the normativeargument
of liberalnationalismis that liberaldemocraciesflourishnot when they are more
conscious of their nationality,but when they are more conscious of the impor-
tance of democraticparticipation.

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 andDemocracy
Liberalism,
Nationalism,

LIBERALNATIONALISM:
THE DEPENDENCEOF LIBERALDEMOCRACYON THE NATIONALIDEAL

There is no doubt that contemporarytheoristsof liberalnationalismare lib-

eral.At the heartof the normativetheory of liberalismas a public philosophy are
the core values of individualityand equality.Liberalshave disagreedabout what
these values entail, holding varyingviews on which subsidiaryvalues and sub-
stantivepolicies follow from them, but they are nonetheless centralto the liberal
doctrine. Following Will Kymlickawe can say that liberalismis grounded in a
"moralontology"that "recognizesonly individuals,each of whom is to be treated
with equal consideration"(1989:162). For liberalnationalistsnationalaffiliation
is a part of a justifiable social and political order because it furthersthese core
liberalvalues.1Their startingpoint is that the idea of nationalityis normatively
appealingif and only if it serves the needs of individuals,treatedas equals. From
there liberalnationalistsargue that the idea of nationalitydoes not conflict with
the "moralontology" of liberalism, and in fact is required for the successful
expression and implementation of the values of individuality and equality In
their view, though nationalismwithout liberalismis intolerable,liberalismwith-
out the social ties provided by nationalismis incoherentand incomplete.
Some terminologicalclarityis essential to understandingthe liberalnation-
alist position. "Nationality"or "thenational idea"is a general, and not necessar-
ily state-seeking,belief-structurethat includes the following features:
* socialboundedness-conationalsare relatedto each other in their public cul-
ture in a way that distinguishesthem from membersof other nations;
* horizontalequivalence-conationalsare relatedto each other simply because
of their individual connection to the nation;
* temporaldepth-conationals perceivetheir lives as relatedto the experiences
of past and futuregenerations;
* territorialrootedness-the historical experiences of conationals are tied to a
specific geographicallocation.2
Liberalnationalistsdifferon whether "nationality" necessarilyinvolves the quest
for state-sovereignty,but the possibilityof a non-state centeredculturalnational-
ism makes the terminologicaldistinction important.
The national idea can be expressed in "universalistic"or "particularistic"
ways. Liberalnationalistsonly endorse "universalistic" conceptionsof nationality,

These values are connected because equality pertains to individual citizens rather than lots or
groups or parties, and because individualitygrants each citizen an importanceequivalentto any
other citizen. Note that "individuality"
does not entail "individualism." The formeris a claim about
the moral status of the person, while the latteris a claim about psychologicalorientationor moti-
vation. For a discussion of individuality,equality and liberalism,see Johnston 1994: 17-27.
2 These categoriesare drawn from Calhoun (1997: 4-5) and Miller (1995: 23-24).

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which hold "theview that all people ought to be partialto their own nation and
conationals"and reject"particularistic" conceptions, which claim that only one's
own nation deserves such partiality(Hurka 1997: 145). Universalisticexpres-
sions of the nationalidea are "reiterative," meaningthat the good reasonsused to
justify one's own national affiliations must be applied to members of other
nations and their national ideas (Walzer1990). If formalor informalself-deter-
minationis good for one'sown nation, it must be presumedto be good for others'
nations (Tamir1993; Miller 1995; Margalitand Raz 1990).
Definitionsaside, liberalnationalistshave offeredthree clustersof arguments
thatattemptto show how universalisticexpressionsof nationalityarenot only com-
patiblewith liberalideals but requiredfor their successfulexpressionand imple-
mentation.The first cluster,which links nationalityto the value of individuality,
assertsthatnationalpoliticaland socialmovementscan and do servegenuineindi-
vidual interests,in self-determination, in a sense of self that can be identifiedwith
pastand futurecompatriots, and in a rangeof possiblelife-options.The secondclus-
ter, which links nationality equality,involves the claim that nationalaffiliation
to
providesthe motivationalstructurenecessaryfor the implementationof egalitarian
policies,such as measuresof redistributive justice. The thirdclustermaintainsthat
nationalaffiliationis necessaryfor the functioningof democraticinstitutionsand
practices,and in factperformssuch a role in practice-if not in theory.

Continuityand Context
Nationalityand IndividualWell-Being:
An analyticallyprimitivedefense of the connection between nationalityand
individualityis the self-determinationargumentthat nationalityfulfillsindividu-
als' interestsin perpetuatingtheir collectivity (Barry1983: 141). This is just to
restatethe traditionalliberalposition that claims of nation are not to be heeded
in liberalinstitutions unless they are made by individualsand are connected in
some way to individualinterests.For liberals"TheNation,""TheTradition,""Our
Community,"arenot entities that have valid claimsgoverninginstitutionsshould
accept, apart from claims issued by existent individuals who support them.
These entities are not without value, but for the institutionsof governmentto be
legitimatethe value they have must stem fromthe experiencesof individualswho
enjoy or depend upon them. Therefore, though tautologically true, the self-
determinationargumentbegs the question of how and why claims of nation are
connected to individualinterests.
The more primafacie plausibleway liberalnationalistsconnect nation to self
is through the idea that people can only flourish in social environmentsorgan-
ized-informally or formally-as nations. One side of the flourishingargument,
the continuitythesis,reflectson how the featuresof nationalitysuch as temporal
depth and territorialrootedness provide a sense of continuity and place that
people need to understand the significance of their lives. Neil MacCormick
(1982: 252) expressesthis sense well: "Consciousnessof belonging to a nation is

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Liberalism,
Nationalism.

one of the things which enablesus as individualsin some way in this earthlyexis-
tence to transcendthe limitationsof space, time, and mortality,and to participate
in that which had meaningbefore us and will continue to have meaningbeyond
us."YaelTamir(1993:85) arguesthat as members of a nation we see our actions
as "endowedwith [an] additionaldimension"as part of a historicaland ongoing
narrative,part of a "continuous creative effort whereby culture is made and
remade." This "additional dimension" is important because it matches our
actions to those of conationalsin a way that helps us see the value of our contri-
butions, and also because it fulfills our need to contribute to something larger
and longer lasting than our own lives.
Nationalityalso contributesto individual flourishingby providinga context
in which people can develop and choose their own life-plans. This side of the
flourishingargumentcan be called the contextthesis.Individualitymeans living
one's own life, but to do this one needs a range of possibilities that can only be
provided through the practices, traditions, and institutions of a stable social
order.AvishaiMargalitand Joseph Raz (1990:449) maintainthat social and pri-
vate relationships,careers,even the arts and sciences all "dependfor their exis-
tence on the sharingof patternsof expectations,on traditionspreservingimplicit
knowledge of how to do what, or tacit conventions regardingwhat is part of this
or that enterpriseand what is not, what is appropriateand what is not, what is
valuable and what is not." Not just any social or culturalbackgroundprovides
the context of choice requiredby the liberal value of individuality,however. In
keeping with the universalisticcharacterof their position, liberal nationalists
endorse only those expressionsof nationalitythat do not exploit, denigrate,per-
secute individuals-either conationalsor members of other nations (ibid.).
Any completeresponseto these claimswould take up a numberof issues that
I am going to neglect. It can be argued,for example, that the form of nationalism
described by liberal nationalistsis more liberal than nationalistand bears little
resemblanceto historicalmovementsexpressingthe idea of nationality(Levinson
1995).3 Their ideal-typiccharacterizationmisses the "actualsalty bite"of nation-
alist movementsand thereforemischaracterizesthe benefitsof nationalaffiliation,
which often stem from illiberal acts of violence and assertions of superiority
(Nairn 1997: 4). Further,by developing ethical argumentsdefending an ideal-
typic nationalismliberalnationalistsrun the risk of legitimatingthose contempo-
rarynationalismsthat are less than ideal. Under this critiqueany legitimationof
nationalismis dangerousso long as few active liberal-nationalistmovements are
in evidence. Such critiquesshould be takenseriously,but I want to focus in on the
normativequestion of how valuablenationalties are to individualflourishing.

3 Brian Barrynotes that in practice nationalism tends to dominate when it joins with liberalism:
"Everywherein the world nationalismcomes first and the other ideology occupies a subordinate
position, partiallydefining the content of the nationalideal"(1987: 354).

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Undoubtedly,nationalidentity contributesto individualwell-being by pro-

viding continuity with the past and future. For many,it is so much of a taken-
for-grantedexperience that national identity only becomes a topic of interest or
importancewhen some challenge to national symbols or doctrine is publicized.
Our question, though, is whether the specificsense of continuity produced by
nationalidentity is needed for individual flourishing.This complex psychologi-
cal issue cannot be assumed to be resolved simply because national identity is
present so pervasivelyin our backgroundsocial experience.There are good rea-
sons to doubt that nationalityis the only or the best source of such a sense of
continuity in modern liberaldemocracies.
Manyother sources of continuityare availableand are as significantto indi-
vidual flourishing as national affiliation. These include families, friendships,
neighborhood associations, community groups, workplace and professional
organizations,religious affiliationand church groups, political associations,and
many more sub- and supra-nationalsources of interconnectedness(Buchanan
1998: 302-03). Not only are these sources of connection and continuity some-
times more importantto our sense of well-being, but they often come in conflict
with our national identity. The multiple sources of connection and continuity
result in our seeing conationals as differentfrom us along a number of salient
dimensions-politics, religion, work-as they are similarto us.
A differentproblem with the liberal nationalistcontinuity thesis has to do
with the content or substance of national identification. National myths, the
main vehicles of our sense of continuity between past, present, and future gen-
erationsof conationalsareoften distortionsof objectivehistory (carefulfact-gath-
ering) and are also often exclusionary-depicting the heroism and achievements
of some groups rather than others.4 National myths can serve as sources of a
sense of continuity even if they are false, historicallyinaccurate,or exclusionary.
Because they are wary of such illiberal dimensions of mythmaking, liberal
nationalistsare carefulto argue that myths must be open to challenge by those
who wish to reinterpreton the grounds of objectivehistory or on the grounds of
a more inclusive presentand futurenationalorder.5But by qualifyingmythmak-
ing in this way liberalnationalistsraise doubts about nationalityas a privileged

4 Andrew Levine overstatesthe case when he rejects liberal nationalismbecause nationalismis an

irrationalbelief-structure(1998). My argumentis that liberalnationalists,because they are liberal
and motivated by values of individualityand equality,wish to reject irrationaland exclusionary
forms of nationalisticsolidarity.They thereforeemphasize democraticpracticeas a means of ren-
dering collective projects more rationaland inclusive. But this undercuts their argumentfor the
importanceof nationalaffiliationsince now democraticpracticeis playing the centralrole in bring-
ing distant individualstogether.
5 Thomas Hurka, for example, insists that "ifthe basis of national
partialityis objectiveratherthan
subjective,it must depend on the nation'sactual history ratherthan on beliefs about that history
that are all too often false"(1997: 153).

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 Nationalism, andDemocracy
Liberalism,

source of continuity for individuals.The logic of liberalnationalismpoints away

from symbols, images, and quasi-mythicalnarrative,and toward a collective
praxis, which Miller (1995: 39) describesas "openprocesses of debate and dis-
cussion to which everyone is potentially a contributor"and Tamir(1993: 89)
heralds as "a critical debate about the nature of the national culture."To avoid
the problem of irrationalityand exclusion liberal nationalistsend up endorsing
democraticaction, not national affiliation,as a normativelypreferablesource of
continuity in individuals'lives.
The reasonsabove for questioningthe continuitythesis also raise difficulties
for the context thesis, the argumentthat nationalaffiliationprovides the context
of valuableindividual choices. Clearly,persons discriminatedagainstor antago-
nized becauseof theirnationalidentityhave a reducedsphereof individualchoice
(Nathanson 1997: 180). But beyond such examples it is doubtful that national
affiliationis a significantor the best availablesource of context for individual
choice. Consider Margalitand Raz'ssix criteria or features of "encompassing
groups"that provide the sort of valuablecontext individualsrequireto flourish:
1. A common and pervasiveculture that defines life-activities;
2. A culture that marksits membersin significantway;
3. Mutualrecognitionbetween group members;
4. Groupmembershipthat is importantto the self-identificationof members;
5. Membershipthat is a matterof belonging not achievement;
6. Mutualrecognitionbased not on personalcontactbut by the possession and
recognitionof generalcharacteristics.
These criteriaare not specific to nationalorganizations,and indeed some do not
apply to multiculturalnation-states. Encompassinggroups are perhaps better
representedas culturalgroups or sharedsocial practicesratherthan nationalities,
for it is clear that most modern nation-statesare composed of many encompass-
ing groups not just one or a few. Context is not dependent upon nationalitybut
is often provided by cultural,social, regional, familial,religious and other sub-
and supra-nationalaffiliations.
In response to the historical fact that nationalistmovements often restrain
the choices of their members and encroach on those of non-members, liberal
nationalistsendorse as legitimateonly those expressionsof nationalidentity that
preserveand furthera wide range of social and culturaloptions for the greatest
possible number of individuals. But if the substance of the options often stems
from sub- and supra-national cultural and social sources, and if legitimate
options depend upon democraticprocesses, it is unclearjust what role national
affiliationplays in securingthe context of choice. By qualifyingthe context thesis
as they qualifythe continuitythesis, liberalnationalistsagaindowngradethe sig-
nificance of national affiliationas a source of social ties and individualchoice in
liberal states. The logic of liberal nationalism, read critically and carefully,

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suggests that democraticparticipation,not nationalism,is a bettersource of sup-

port for individualchoice.

Nationalityand Equality:Information,
Motivation,andJustification

In their second clusterof arguments,liberalnationalistshold that nationality

relatesto the liberalideal of equalitybecause the featuresof social boundedness
and horizontalequivalencehelp inform,motivate,and justifyegalitarianpolicies
such as redistributivetaxationand welfareprovision. First, because conationals
share a public cultureand languagethey will be betterinformedabout the needs
of the less well-offthan citizensof othercountries.This has to do with the uncon-
troversialfact that we are limitedin what we can know, and the social boundaries
of the nation rendermanageablewhat we must know to satisfyclaims of equality
It also relatesto the more controversialidea that differenthistoricalexperiences
and culturaldemands generatedifferentinterpretationsof what equalitymeans,
and thereforeconationalshave an interpretiveadvantageover outsiders in dis-
coveringhow to implementegalitarianmeasuresin their own polity.
A second proposed link between nationality and equality is the idea that
social and economic justice depend in practice on sentiments of fellow-feeling
that motivateindividual,group, or class contributionsto the less well-off. Liberal
nationalistsargue that nationalprojectsproduce the effect of relatingcitizens to
each other as equals, putting the egalitarianideal into practice by treating all
conationalsas equivalentin relationto the nation and its purposes. A nation is,
in BenedictAnderson'swords, an "imaginedcommunity"that links individuals
togetherthroughties of sentiment(1992). In termsof individualpsychology,lib-
eral nationalistsbelieve that we are more likely to help others we can identify
with, so that we share the sufferingof conationalsin a less diffusesense than we
would the sufferingsof strangers.Further,they hold that we feel less friction
between our social responsibilitiesand our personal interests because we see
conationalsas partof a collectivepurpose that we share.David Millerarguesthat
such motivationallogic is presupposedin liberaltheory,but rarelystated:"polit-
ical philosopherssuch as Rawls,who arguein defence of principlesof justice that
requireredistributionin favour of the worst-offmembers of society, tacitly pre-
suppose that these principlesareto operatein the context of a communitywhose
membersacknowledgeties of solidarity"(1995:93).
A more foundationalliberal nationalistargumentlinking nationalityto the
value of equalityholds that redistributivepolicy is justifiedby the gratitudeand
obligationswe owe to our nation, and thereforeto our conationals,ratherthan by
the principleof reciprocity-the pricewe pay forbenefitingfromcollectiveaction.
Reciprocity,or the principle of fair play, is a notoriously thin way to justify
demandsof redistributivejustice for reasonswe need only sketch:thereis no need
for the strongand healthyvoluntarilyto engage in collectiveaction with those-

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 Nationalism, andDemocracy
Liberalism,

such as the weak and unhealthy-who will benefit from the common good far
more than they will contributeto it (Cohen 1986). As Miller(1995: 72) argues,
"itis difficultto explainwhy statesshould provideopportunitiesand resourcesto
people with permanenthandicapsif one is simply followingthe logic of reciproc-
ity. It is because we have prior obligationsof nationalitythat include obligations
to providefor needs that arisein this way that the practiceof citizenshipproperly
includes redistributiveelements of the kind that we commonly find in contem-
porary states."Other liberal nationalistscharacterizethese prior obligations as
"dutiesof gratitudeto the nation-moral reasons,in acknowledgmentof the ben-
efits one has receivedthroughthe nation"that are owed directlyto the nation and
then indirectlyto fellow nationals(McMahan1997: 130).
Liberalnationalists believe that liberal egalitarianpolicy is legitimated by
associativeobligationsrooted in nationalexperienceratherthan voluntary,recip-
rocal relationshipsbetween individuals. To exemplify this point, they draw a
comparison and even make a connection between "specialduties"owed mem-
bers of familiesand the associativeobligationsof conationals(Hurka 1997). We
are concerned for the welfare of our family because of our shared history: no
other people have been throughas many of the same experiencesas our families.
Liberalnationalistsarguethat this is true, in a less powerfulbut still salient way,
of our relationwith conationalsas comparedwith members of other countries.
As Tamirargues, "The'others'whose welfarewe ought to consider are those we
care about, those who are relevant to our associativeidentity Communal soli-
daritycreatesa feeling, or an illusion, of closeness and sharedfate,which is a pre-
condition of distributivejustice. It endows particularisticrelations with moral
power, supporting the claim that 'charitybegins at home"'(1993: 121). Liberal
nationalistsimagine a series of concentriccircles delineatingspecial duties owed
to family members, associativeduties owed to fellow members of our collectiv-
ity, and generalhumanisticduties owed to all people (Tamir1993: 109).
Beforetakingup these claims about nationalityand equalityI want to notice
an ambiguityin the liberalnationalistposition that makes it a shifting targetof
analysis.Some liberalnationalistsbelieve that the nationalidea is action-oriented
and that the purpose of the nation, ultimately,is to form or build up a state.
Nationalism under this account is an ideology that motivates political action.
Other liberalnationalists,however,think that the nationalidea is less action-ori-
ented than expressiveof culturalidentity.In this latteraccount nationalismdoes
not requirea state, and in fact may even challengethe status of states. Now this
ambiguitymakes it difficultto addressclaims that connect liberalismto national-
ity.It is true thatreducingthe idea of nationalityto the culturalspherereduceslib-
eral anxietiesabout linking the coercivepowers of the state to particularisticand
quasi-mythicnationalsentiments.But at the same time strictlyculturalnational-
ism nullifies any linkagebetween nationalityand what we could call liberalstate
capacity-the politicalabilityto furtheregalitarianpolicy and supportdemocratic

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procedures.This is a serious ambiguityand something liberalnationalistsmust

address,but because I want to assess the normativeconnectionsbetween nation-
ality and equality I will assume that liberalnationalismexpressesan action-ori-
ented politicalideal that strivesto form or shore up a liberalnation-state.
Turningto the relationbetween nationalityand equality,we discover other
reasonsto question the linkagebetween liberalismand the expressionof nation-
ality Liberalequality finds strongersupport in social ties other than nationality,
something that liberal nationalistsare forced to admit at key junctures in their
arguments.To begin, the idea that national affiliationprovides a level of com-
municativecompetence requiredfor the perceptionof others as individualsand
as equals is simply a proceduralissue, having to do with the ease and availabil-
ity of informationand translation.But it is evident that we can improvethe gath-
ering, dissemination,and discussion of politicallyrelevantinformationwithout
relyingon nationalaffiliation.Boundariesareimportant,but they can be regional
or local ratherthan nationalboundaries.6The more significantargumentslink-
ing nationalityto equalityare the substantive-not procedural-arguments from
motivationand justification.
The relations of horizontal equivalence expressed in national symbols and
narrativesplace citizens in an equal position in terms of collective identity,but
such an achievement is quite differentthan the achievement of social or eco-
nomic equality Having the status of conational grants people access to some
goods, but not necessarilythose goods relevantto social and economic equality
To see fellow citizens as compatriotsmay lead one to extend to them a kind of
civic recognition-signs and gesturesof fellowshipand belonging, for example-
but this is differentfrom extending to them entitlementsto equal shares of the
"primarygoods"producedin society.
Even if rhetoricalpracticeslike declaringwar on poverty do prove useful in
harnessingnationalsentimentsto egalitarianpurposes,they areprecarious.What
such strategiesentail is using affectivereactionsto nationalmyth, symbol, narra-
tive-considered valuable in themselves by many people-toward other ends.
Put simply, liberal nationalistssee sentiments related to national affiliationas a
means to an egalitarianend, while conationalsthemselves see them as ends in
themselves.Thereis a loss of transparencyhere that raisesproblemsof manipu-
lation (Moore 1999). Such purelyinstrumentalnationalismmay be unstableas a
source of support for egalitarianpurposes since non-egalitarianelites can use
national myth, symbol, and narrativefor their own purposes (Weinstock 1996:
93). Even though they have been useful in the past, liberals requirea stronger
and more transparentground than ties of national sentiment for securing the
value of equalityin practice.

6 On the functionalimportanceof local ratherthan nationalboundariessee Dahbour 1998.

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Nationalism,

To justify egalitarian policy through the special duties of conationals,

through the overlappingcircles of sentiment and history,is to misconstrue the
meaning of equality.Issues of equality are distinct from issues of culturalmem-
bership. The liberalvalue of equality asks us to make sacrificesnot because we
feel an attachmentto our conationals, but because they have a right to equal
treatment(Ripstein1997: 215). This right is supported,moreover,not by myth,
symbol, and narrativebut by just institutionsthat enforcedemocraticallyformu-
lated and enacted law. Indeed, one can argue that egalitarianpolicy, from redis-
tributivetaxationto substantivewelfareprovision, does not stem from our sen-
timental affiliationwith conationals,but rathermakes up for our lack of such
affiliation(Weinstock1996: 93).
Liberalnationalistshave not shown that the nationalidea rendersliberalism
more complete by providingnecessarycontext, motivation,and justificationfor
liberal values of individualityand equality.Even their own positions indicate a
different source of context, motivation, and justification: democratic action.
Hence the importanceof their third cluster of argumentsthat attempt to show
how functional requirementsof liberal democracies depend upon the social
boundedness, horizontalequivalence,temporaldepth, and territorialrootedness
of national affiliation.

Nationalityand Democracy:PublicCulture,Boundaries,and SpecialObligations

The first two clusters of liberalnationalistargumentssought unsuccessfully
to demonstratehow the core liberalvalues of individualityand equalitynot only
do not conflict with nationalaffiliation,but actuallyrely in practiceon the social
networks solidified by ties of national sentiment. A third cluster, less directly
relatedto these two values, is deployed by liberalnationaliststo show that criti-
cal functionalrequirementsof liberal democraticstates depend on the underly-
ing social frameworkprovidedby nationality Though rarelytheorizedby liberal
thinkers, the nation is the locus of democraticpublic culture, and nationality
explains and justifies historicalsettlementson political boundariesand the spe-
cial obligationsof citizens.
Liberalnationalistsarguethat nationalaffiliationserves as a necessarysocial
frameworkfor democraticinstitutions by securing citizens' communicative com-
petence,by shoringup trustbetween groups that hold differingpoliticalinterests,
and by encouraging collectivesentiment.Communicative competence is the
simple idea that "fordemocraticpolitics to work, the citizens must be able to
communicate with each other"(Barry1983: 145). Such competence demands
the sort of "linguistichomogeneity"and "culturalsimilarity"national affiliation
provides, since "theability to interpretthe behaviorof other people depends on
a mass of shared understandings"(Barry 1983: 144-45). Trust, Miller (1995:
140) argues,is something that enables me to "supportyour just demand on this
occasion knowing that you will support my just demand at some future

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moment,"and is best understoodas a social relationthat "requiressolidaritynot

merelywithin groupsbut acrossthem, and this in turn depends upon a common
identificationof the kind that nationalityalone can provide."Collective senti-
ments are those that motivatecitizens to support and engage their politicalinsti-
tutions not merely to satisfy individual interestsbut also to further"the shared
pursuit of common interests"(Tamir1993: 115). Democraticinstitutions occu-
pying a public culture marked by an absence of communicativecompetence,
trust, or collective sentiment are greatlyweakened in their policy-makingabili-
ties and are unstable as a result (Barry1983).
Now liberalstates embody a varietyof democraticpracticesthat differqual-
itatively,from the "adversary" democracyof aggregativechoices, secret ballots,
and majorityrule, to the "unitary"democracyof transformativepractices,public
deliberation,and norms of consensus (Mansbridge1983). Let us assume, for the
sake of assessingthe liberalnationalistargument,that liberalvalues of individu-
ality and equality are furtheredby both adversaryand unitarydemocraticinsti-
tutions. As Jane Mansbridge(idem) has shown, in some contexts there are fun-
damentaldifferencesof interestthat are best protectedby adversaryinstitutions
and in some contexts there are commonaltiesthat can only be expressedin uni-
tary practices.Though adversarypracticesrequirerelativelylow levels of com-
municative competence, trust, and collective sentiment to function properly,
these culturalattributesare still necessary.It is difficultto see how secret ballots
could be recognizedas legitimate,for example, without some degree of trust in
those conducting them. Similarly,though it could be said that distrustbetween
citizens and between citizens and their representativesis at the heart of majority
rule, legitimatemajorityproceduresdepend upon a level of trust in the institu-
tions of democracythemselves and the widespreadcommunicativecompetence
to monitor the working of these institutions.7Unitaryproceduresrely even more
heavily on communicativecompetence, trust, and collective sentiment, as Miller
(1995: 98) points out: "to the extent that we aspire to a form of democracyin
which all citizens are at some level involved in discussions of public issues, we
must look to the conditions under which citizens can respectone another'sgood
faith in searchingfor grounds of agreement.Among large aggregatesof people,
only a common nationalitycan provide the sense of solidaritythat makes this
possible."Just as nationalgroupingsreinforcethe linguisticand culturalsimilar-
ity needed for communicativecompetence, the historicalexperiencesof national
projectsas common projectsand the perpetuationof collectiveidentity in narra-
tives of national pride build trust between citizens and also help focus their
vision on matters of collective interest. These are functional attributes of a
healthy and supportivedemocraticculture.

7For more on the necessity of a minimum level of trust for the basic functioningof adversarypro-
cedures, see the essays in Gambetta(1988) and Warren(1999).

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Liberalism,
Nationalism,

For liberalnationalists,viewing the liberalstate as a nation-statealso renders

more coherent the particularliberal state practices, if not the liberal theory, of
boundary-setting.Though, since Locke, liberaltheory holds that membershipin
liberal states is a matterof voluntaryindividual choice, in practiceliberal states
include and exclude people for reasonsof birth ratherthan choice. Liberalvalues
of individualityand equalitydo little to ground or legitimatethese practices,and
in fact say nothing at all about who should be treatedas equal individualsfrom
the standpointof the state. Voluntarychoice cannot legitimateboundary-setting,
even if voluntarismwere to be encouragedin common practice, for it provides
no principle for settling disputes between voluntary choosers over whom to
include and where to set boundaries(Barry1983: 128). A widely acknowledged
problemwith Lockeanconsent theory is that it applies only to those who bene-
fit from a particularscheme of social boundedness. If one's interests are served
by a particularscheme then, by force of reason, one would support it. But con-
sent theory is inadequatefor addressingconflicts of interest, as when a particu-
lar scheme serves the interestsof some ratherthan others, or when the question
is whether to broadenboundariesto include those not partyto an originalagree-
ment, or more fundamentallystill, when the question is whether to bring about
a scheme of bounded cooperationat all (Miller 1995: 61). For liberal national-
ists the key to resolvingthis theoreticallacuna is to view the liberalstate not "as
a gatheringof individuals striving to improve their lot, but ratheras a commu-
nity struggling to preserve its distinctive character.Assuming that individuals
have a right to preserve the uniqueness of their communal life, it would make
sense to place some restrictionson membership"(Tamir1993: 127).
Liberalnationalistsarguethatnationalityalso explainswhy citizensareunder
special,political,obligationsto one anotherthat extend beyond generalhumanis-
tic duties to respectothersas personswith basicrightsand needs. In practicecona-
tionals are held more responsiblefor each other than for people in general,their
responsibilitiesto conationalsusually take precedenceover generalhumanitarian
responsibilities,and theirpoliticalobligationsarisein a differentway than general
humanisticduties arise.Conationalsare"doublybound"becausethey owe human-
istic obligationsto each other as human beings as well as politicalor associative
obligationsto each other as members of a historicalcollective project (Dagger
1985: 443). Liberalnationalistsmaintainthat conationalshave a greatermoralsig-
nificancebecausethey have contributedto and participatedin collectiveprojects-
public goods like defense,economic infrastructure,disasterrelief-from which all
benefit.We place the preservationof theirbasic rightsand the satisfactionof their
basic needs at a higherprioritythan those of membersof other countries.Though
we have generalhumanisticduties by virtue of our bareexistence,we have politi-
cal obligationsby virtueof our social boundednessand territorialrootedness.
Liberaltheories of obligationemphasizeconsent and socialjustice. We have
alreadyseen that consent is an insufficienttheory of obligationfor liberalstates

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becausein practicefew actuallydo consentto politicalmembershipand, more fun-

damentally,becausesome wouldnot consentto much liberalpolicy thatbenefitsthe
less well-off.As with the problemof boundary-setting,consent cannot settle dis-
putes over the natureof obligation.Anotherway of legitimatingobligationsis to
see them as duties of socialjustice, deriveddirectlyfromthe liberalvalues of indi-
viduality and equality We owe allegianceto the state because it upholds these
values, and our duties to fellow citizensare derivedfromthis fact.Unlike consent
theory,this perspectiveovercomesthe dilemmaspresentedby the involuntaryand
contentiousnatureof politicalobligation.It is vulnerable,however,to the challenge
that it provestoo much. The idea thatwe are obligatedto a statebecauseit is just
under the definitionof liberalprinciplesmerelyleads to obligationsto "thefairest
of all states"not to our particularstate (Tamir1993: 134).
Liberalnationalists make a number of qualificationsto their advocacy of
nationality-basedboundary-settingand political obligations. They wish to dis-
tinguishtheiraccount fromthose thatprivilegebareconventions.First,they hold
that nationality does not legitimate all conventional determinationsof bound-
ariesand obligations,but if and only if those settlementsexpressnationalbound-
aries and associative duties tied to the national experience. Second, liberal
nationalistsmaintain that the characteristicsof national experience matter;we
have duties to our nation when it is a liberaland not illiberalnation, and we have
duties to our nation when it has actuallynot just mythicallyaccomplished col-
lective purposes. It mattersthat our state actuallytreatsand has treatedits citi-
zens as individuals and with equal respect (Hurka 1997: 152). This point
extends beyond the state'streatmentof its own citizens, for our obligationsto the
state are also jeopardizedby its unjust treatmentof other nations. Finally,liberal
nationalistsadmit that even though obligations to conationals take precedence
they ought not be seen to replaceor negate obligationsto people in general.
The argumentthat nationalityis necessaryfor the functioningof liberaldem-
ocraticstates because it providesa social frameworkfor democraticinstitutions,
and becauseit explainsandjustifiesboundariesand specialobligationsmay be, at
first glance, the strongestpillar of support for the theory of liberalnationalism.
Thereis no doubt thatcommunicativecompetence,trust,and collectivesentiment,
are needed for democraticinstitutionsto function.And the limits of currentjusti-
ficationsof boundariesand obligationsarereadilyapparent.Yetliberalnationalists
ignore the normativeand practicaldrawbacksof nationalaffiliationas a justifica-
tory device and social framework.Thereare other and betterways to justify bor-
ders and obligations,and otherand betterways to interpretthe meaning,sources,
and content of communicativecompetence,trust,and collectivesentiment.
For liberal nationalists, communicative competence, trust, and collective
sentiment all flow into democraticinstitutionsfrom a thrivingnationalcommu-
nity Fromtheir perspectivethe public culturedemocraticinstitutionsneed flour-
ishes when it is defined and grounded in particularnational communities. Yet

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Liberalism,
Nationalism,

this view underestimatesthe difficulty of forming national community ties in

socially stratified,economicallydifferentiated,and culturallyplural polities.
Becauseof such complexity many contemporarydemocratictheorists ques-
tion the assumptionthat communicativecompetence, trust, and collective senti-
ment are exogenous inputs to the political process, stemming from a social
frameworkthat exists as a supporting background to democratic institutions
(Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1990).8 Instead, such democratictheorists turn to the
democraticprocess itself; they see these functional attributesas endogenous to
democratic practices that encourage participationand rational reflection, and
discourage political inequalities and self-interestedbargaining(Bessette 1994;
Fishkin 1991, 1995; Mansbridge1988, 1992). The functionalattributesat risk
in complex polities are not to be produced by a nostalgic return to face-to-face
community or by assertions of mythical horizontal equivalence, but through
public deliberationmarked by political equality and reasonabledebate. Com-
municative competence and shared understanding,for example, can be facili-
tated by public forums that provide opportunitiesfor citizens to recognize dif-
ferent perspectives and to work out, together, mutually acceptable collective
decisions.9 Trust and collective sentiment are to be built up slowly over time
through widespread participationin such forums, reinforcedby norms of rea-
sonablenessand rules of political equality
Of course, public forums like those suggested by contemporarydemocratic
theory,even if widespread,would not be able to generatecommunicativecom-
petence, trust, and collective sentiment de nova. Still, national affiliationis nei-
ther the sole or most importantsource of these functionalattributes.In polities
marked by salient regional, economic, and cultural divisions communicative
competence, trust, and collective sentiment are all important requirementsfor
functioningdemocraticpractice,but in such polities it is also unlikely that reser-
voirs of collective sentiment stemming from historical experience in national
projectswill be sufficientto melioratedivisions. Contemporarydemocraticthe-
orists tend to see trust, communicativecompetence, and collective sentiment as
goals to be continuously promoted and advanced by a variety of collective
actions-including the actions of citizen volunteers, social movements, political
leaders, and members of government-rather than as scarce resources some

8
Contemporarydemocratictheoristslike JurgenHabermasagreewith liberalnationaliststhat public
culture is importantfor democraticpractices,but they reject the idea that public culture depends
upon a network of specificallynationalties and sentiments:"Thisconcept of popular sovereignty
does not refer to some substantivecollective will which would owe its identity to a prior homo-
geneity of descent or form of life. The consensus achieved in the course of argumentin an associ-
ation of free and equal citizens stems in the final instance froman identicallyappliedprocedurerec-
ognized by all"(Habermas1992: 4).
9 James Fishkin'sdeliberativepoll is one example of how such opportunitiesmight be made practi-
cal in complexpolities(1991, 1995). See Dahl 1997 formoreon how it could be implementedbroadly.

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states have by virtue of their national heritage.10This social "ontology"differs

from liberal nationalism in acknowledgingmultiple historical and sociological
sourcesof citizen competence, trust,and willingness to seek common goods. For
democratictheoriststhe dependablesource of these functionalattributesis not a
reservoirof national feeling, but the presence of public forums, and the contin-
ual commitment of community organizers,political leaders, and representatives
to encourageparticipationin them.
A final problemwith the liberalnationalistcharacterizationof the functional
requirementsof democracyhas to do with the rational content of the central
objects of collective identification.Liberalnationalistsstress the importanceof
symbols, myths, and narrativesto the generationof the sharedmeaningsthat aid
communicativecompetenceand the social ties that shore up trust and collective
sentiment.In modern polities, however,institutionalcommitmentsmay be better
objects of identification.Though beige in comparisonto the vividness of flags,
heroes, and battlescentralto nationalidentity,institutionalobjectsof civic affilia-
tion have real significancefor public culture.Manypeoples takejustifiablepride
in theirrule of law,legal systems, freeelections,economieswhere occupationsare
open to talents, and feel more than merely a threat to personal interestswhen
these institutionsbreak down or function in partial,discriminatoryways. As we
noted earlier,liberal nationalistswish to endorse only those nationalistmyths,
symbols, and discoursesthat are factualor could be assentedto by "allsections of
the community"(Miller1995: 40). Yetthis leads us to recognizethe centralityof
those political institutions,norms, and rules that are the primarysites of public
rational reflection and legitimation. Not only are these more fundamentalin
importancethan the discoursesthey legitimate,these institutionalobjectsof affil-
iation are themselves frequentlyand openly subjected to rationalreflectionand
legitimationin a way that historicalsymbols, myths, and narrativesare not.
Recognizingthe centralityof democraticpraxis ratherthan national senti-
ment as criticalto a flourishingpublic culturehelps us see why nationalitymay
be less centralto the problems of boundary-settingand special obligationsthan
liberalnationalistsbelieve. Though it is a political fact of life that states need to
set boundaries,it is not true that these must be groundedin a nationalidea. It is
possible-and may even be more normativelyappealing-to justify boundaries
and membershiprestrictionson the groundsof civic competenceand procedural
capabilityratherthan on the need to conserve a unique form of life-the justifi-
cation offeredby liberalnationalists.The relationbetween social boundariesand
efficacycannot defend present configurations,of course, but it is doubtful that
nationalclaims can provide a better defense of these. Nationalistjustificationsof

10 As Habermaswrites, "Thenation of citizens does not deriveits

identity fromsome common ethnic
and cultural properties,but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil
rights"(1992: 3).

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 Nationalism, andDemocracy
Liberalism,

boundaries are normativelyweak because of the manifold practicesof brutality

and discriminationthat occur in the nation-buildingprocess. For those excluded
and suppressed,or coercivelyincluded and suppressed,no narrativeof national
identity will justify their experience. Further,nationalistjustificationsof bound-
arieswould not persuadewould-be immigrantsexcluded on these grounds from
a prosperouscountry,and who would readilyagreeto sharenarrativesof national
pride as a small price to pay for inclusion. The functional requirementsof
democracyprovide a superiorjustificationbecause they form a more reasonable
standardthan the idea that "individualshave a right to preservethe uniqueness
of their communal life" (Tamir 1993: 127). Democratic overload can be dis-
cussed in rationallydebatableterms such as apathy,complexity,participation,and
transparency,providing those excluded or their representativessome chance of
arguingfor inclusion.
As for political obligations, democratic praxis again seems superior as a
mode of justification.We have special duties to each other as citizens because we
arejoined togetherin a common democraticproject. Our duties are defined not
historicallybut in an ongoing political practice that requires,at a minimum, a
commitment to democratic procedures and the institutions in which they are
housed. Going further, contemporary democratic theorists add deliberative
responsibilitiessuch as a willingness to put our argumentsin terms others could
possibly accept, openness to the reasonablepositions of others, and vigilance to
political inequality Comparedto obligationsgroundedin nationality,the obliga-
tions contemporarydemocratic theorists emphasize are more open-ended and
more closely tied to the functionalrequirementsof democraticinstitutions.Com-
munity activists, social movements, political leaders, government actors may
encouragewidespreadparticipation,but they areultimatelydependantupon cit-
izens themselves taking up responsibilitiesof promoting participation,rational
debate and political equality Democraticcitizens are obligatednot merely to co-
nationals,but to fellow democratsand to the mediatinginstitutionsand practices
that shore up democracy.

CONCLUSION

Now liberal nationalists can respond that the ties of citizenship and the
motivations resulting from the practice of participatorydemocraticpolitics are
insufficientto supply the functionaldemands of liberal-democraticinstitutions.
Some have raised doubts about democraticpraxis, arguingthat without a degree
of national affiliationeven democraticallyactive citizens would be motivatedby
a strict form of reciprocitywhere "eachwould expect to benefit from their asso-
ciation in proportion to his or her contribution"(Miller 1995, 72). Under this
view, states supportedonly by the social ties formedby democraticaction would
be minimal, night-watchmanstates at best. Liberalnationalistsdoubt that dem-
ocraticpracticeand commitmentto politicalinstitutionsalone could provide the

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reasonsand motivationscitizens need to make the personalsacrificesfor others

that liberalredistributivepolicies require.
We should concede that democraticpracticealone is not wholly adequateto
the task that it takesup; it is an overlyhopeful solution to structuralproblemsof
contemporarypolitical economy that include issues of scale, complexity,partici-
patoryinfrastructure, and asymmetrical efficacy.The scale and complexityof dem-
ocraticpolitics in modern states demand more empiricaland normativeinquiry
into representation,oversight,and the role of politicalparties.The contemporary
democraticideal of a participatoryand reflectivepublic culturehas less relevance
for federalthan for local or municipal politics, where people could conceivably
congregate."Worse,such expandeddemocraticpracticerequiresa complex par-
ticipatoryinfrastructure,such as day care, time off fromwork to participateand
to gain political knowledge, public spaces, and more sophisticatednetworks of
public information, all of which in turn requires a commitment to spend
resourcestowards democraticpracticeratherthan on other public goods. Even
worse, it is unlikely that democraticvigilanceconcerningpoliticalinequalitywill
satisfactorilycounterbalancethe degree of asymmetrybetween political actors
that is based on economic inequality.More adequate to that task are measures
designed to strengthenwhat is innocuouslycalled "civilsociety"but reallymeans
a healthy domain of organizeddisagreement:trade unions, community organi-
zations, underrepresentedinterest groups, and the like (Cohen and Rogers
1992). In short, democraticpracticemay be less a solution than a descriptionof
an ideal, something to spark debate in the public culture about the structural
changes requiredfor improvedfunctioningof liberal-democraticinstitutions.
Yet the structuralrepairscited above, along with the democraticpractices
and commitments advocated by contemporarydemocratic theorists, are more
normativelyappealingand may even be more practicalthan the ties of national
affiliation advocated by liberal nationalist thinkers. Indeed, national identity
often serves to distractattentionaway from the structuralrepairsneeded in lib-
eral-democraticinstitutions. Consider how the horizontal equivalence empha-
sized in nationalistrhetoricglosses over the asymmetriesof contemporarypolit-
ical economy:we are equals in the eyes of the nation, but very much unequal in
our ability to influence it. And consider how national associationalties, though
certainlyrelevantto the pursuit of some egalitarianpolicy, are really forged out
of consortia of smaller associationalties between religious groups, professional
associations,and single-issueadvocacyorganizations.If nationalaffiliationis the
answerto the question of how to justify and secureliberal-democraticvalues and
institutions,we need to take anotherlook at the way we asked the question.

For differentversions of how local democraticaction might ratchetup to promote public culture
at the nationallevel see Barber1984 and Elkin 1987.

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 Nationalism, andDemocracy
Liberalism,

Is there something missing from liberaltheories of the state that can be pro-
vided by closer attentionto the personal,social, and politicaluses of the national
idea? Afterrecognizingthat the benefits of national affiliationare more tenuous
and less closely connected to the values of equality and individualityor to the
functioning of democraticinstitutions than liberal nationalistssuggest, we have
found a differentanswer:democraticpractice.The argumentsof liberalnational-
ists arebetterseen as misplacedcalls for a more participatoryand deliberative,not
more nationalistic,liberaldemocracy.

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albert.dzur@wmich.edu

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