boarder.
Wanting to finish her schooling and in need of money, Lourdes relented and moved in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO SALADINO Y
DINGLE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CONRADO SALADINO y Dingle was convicted of three (3) counts of rape and one (1)
attempted rape and sentenced to death.[1] He is now with us on automatic review.
Lourdes Relevo is the niece of accused-appellant Conrado Saladino. Her mother and
Conrado's wife Rosita are sisters. Lourdes calls him Kuya Conrad. The parents of Lourdes live
in Balayan, Batangas.
Sometime in 1995 Lourdes, then thirteen (13) years old, was sent by her parents to Manila
to live with Conrado and Rosita Saladino in Pasig City because her own parents could not afford
to send her to school. Rosita was a factory worker while Conrado was a money-changer in a bus
terminal. Rosita, whom Lourdes called Ate Rose, gave the young girl weekly allowance; in turn,
she helped out in the household chores.
The Saladinos lived in a small two-storey house in 126-D Pastor Compound, Rosario,
Pasig City, along with the spouses Zaldy and Corazon Cedeo and their three (3) children,
Estrella, Elizabeth and Evelyn, together with three (3) boarders whom Lourdes only knew
as Tita, Liza and Glenda. There were three (3) rooms separated only by curtains. Conrado,
Rosita and Lourdes slept in a small cramped room - the couple on a bed and Lourdes on a
mattress on the floor.
Sometime in September 1995 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening while Lourdes was
lying on her mattress resting and feeling sick, Conrado woke her up and asked her to transfer to
the bed as she might catch cold. Rosita was already dressed up because she was working in the
10:00 oclock PM to 6:00 oclock AM shift. Conrado conducted Rosita to the jeepney stop and
returned to their room about fifteen (15) minutes later. He laid down beside Lourdes. About
twenty-five (25) minutes later, he started fondling her breasts. He poked a kitchen knife at her
waist and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He dropped the knife, pinned down Lourdes
hands to her belly, and removed her shorts and panty with his hand that was free. He then
removed his own shorts and underwear, went on top of Lourdes, and inserted his penis inside
her vagina.[2] Lourdes struggled and Conrados penis slipped out several times, but he re-inserted
it everytime and resumed his bestial movements for about fifty (50) minutes according to
Lourdes. When she finally succeeded in pushing him away, he warned her not to tell anyone or
else he would kill her.
Lourdes confided the sexual assault to Rosita. But Rosita refused to believe her and even
said that her husband was not capable of doing such a dastardly act. Lourdes also told Corazon
Cedeo who reacted by asking the Saladinos to leave the house. It took the Saladinos almost a
year to find a house.
Meanwhile, Lourdes slept in the room of Corazon and Zaldy. The Saladino couple finally
transferred to 101-B Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City, leaving behind Lourdes
with the Cedeos. But Lourdes did not tell her mother, who was in Batangas, about the rape.
After some time, Rosita invited Lourdes to live with them in their new house. Rosita
assured her that the incident would not happen again because they had a
with the Saladinos again.
Despite Rositas assurances, things did not turn out well for Lourdes. On 17 December
1996 at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, while Lourdes was sleeping in the living room,
Conrado again held her at knifepoint and threatened her into silence.He removed her shorts and
panties, then his own shorts and underwear and had forced intercourse with her. Again, she cried
and struggled but her efforts were in vain.
Lourdes told Rosita about the new incident but Rosita, as in the past, refused to believe
her. She turned to Corazon who advised her to wait for her mother, who was spending Christmas
in Manila, before going to the police. When Lourdes and Rosita went to Batangas to fetch
Lourdes mother Elena Relevo, the complaining witness could not summon enough courage to
tell her mother about the rape. Elena stayed in Pasig City for eleven (11) days after which, on
28 December 1996, she, Lourdes, Rosita and Conrado went to Batangas to celebrate New Years
Eve.
On 1 January 1997 Lourdes, Conrado and Rosita returned to Manila. The following day
at 7:00 o'clock in the morning Conrado again raped Lourdes at knifepoint. On 3 January 1997
at about the same time the day before, he again poked a knife at her and proceeded to remove
her shorts and panties and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. This time, when Lourdes
saw him let go of the knife, she freed herself from his grasp and kicked him. Then she ran to the
bathroom and stayed there until he left the house.
Lourdes packed her clothes and went to Corazon Cedeos house. Finally, she gathered
enough strength to tell her mother about the sexual abuses, which prompted Elena to fetch her
and take her home to Batangas.
Elena had Lourdes examined by a doctor, who confirmed that Lourdes was no longer a
virgin. They then filed a case with the Pasig City Prosecutors office. Lourdes underwent another
physical examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. The examination by Dr.
Romeo Salen, Medico-Legal Officer, revealed that Lourdes had deep healed lacerations at 3:00
oclock and 9:00 oclock positions. Dr. Salen concluded that Lourdes was already in a non-virgin
state physically.[3]
Four (4) Informations for rape were filed against Conrado Saladino for the incidents in
September 1995, on 17 December 1996, 2 January 1997 and 3 January 1997. All four (4)
Informations similarly alleged that on the dates indicated accused-appellant with lewd design
and by means of force had sexual intercourse with Lourdes Relevo y Mendoza, against her will
and consent.
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant Conrado Saladino claimed that on the night
of the alleged first rape, he was drunk. After taking his wife to the jeepney stop, he went back
to his room where he saw Lourdes lying on bed. He then laid beside her. Being in an amorous
mood, he started fondling her breasts. According to him, he was not met with any
resistance. Emboldened, he proceeded to kiss her lips, breasts and private parts. He then took
off both their undergarments and went on top of her. He attempted to insert his penis into her
vagina but since he was drunk, he failed to achieve an erection. According to him, Lourdes was
fully aware of what was happening yet did not show any reaction.
Conrado also testified that the reason they left the old house was because they did not
have any privacy since the rooms were separated only by curtains that were fastened together
only by safety pins. Also, Corazon and Rosita had a misunderstanding over Rositas jewelry that
disappeared. After some time, Lourdes and one of the boarders in the old house, Glenda
Andrade, followed them to their new house. He tried to avoid any intimate contact with Lourdes
but he noticed that she was seducing him, parang tinutukso niya ako.[4] Unable to resist, he gave
in to fondling her at least once a week,[5] then kissed her everyday before going to work. But he
did not have sex with her because he was afraid she would get pregnant.He also testified that
Lourdes would get angry every time he refused to insert his penis into her vagina.
The trial court found accused-appellant Conrado Saladino guilty of rape in Crim. Cases
Nos. 112410-H, 112411-H and 112412-H. Taking into account the qualifying circumstance of
the minority of the victim and her relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted
Conrado Saladino three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. He was also sentenced to pay
the private complainant P150,000.000 as indemnity, and P90,000.00 as moral damages. The
trial court also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 112413-H
and sentenced him to serve an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, and to pay the offended party P50,000.00 in civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 for moral damages.
The complaining witness and accused-appellant presented conflicting versions. Lourdes
Relevo, on one hand, told a harrowing account of a young girl's life utterly destroyed because
of the satyrical urges of a man who was entrusted with her life and future. Accused-appellant,
on the other hand, painted a tale of consensual sex between an unwilling but weak male adult
and a young temptress.
Which of the two (2) conflicting narrations of what transpired between the parties deserves
greater weight and better entitled to full credence, is the crux of this controversy. Indeed, this
matter involves the assessment of credibility, a task best left to the trial court, which had the
advantage of observing the witnesses directly, picking up on the subtle nuances of human
behavior, and the emphasis, gesture and inflection of voice; and, of testing their credibility by
their demeanor on the stand.[6]We have often said that we will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.
In giving credence to the testimony of the private complainant, the lower court said -
The testimony of the Private Complainant, Lourdes Relevo, was candid, straightforward and
firm. She testified with spontaneity, only interrupted when she was overcome with emotion. She
cried when asked to recall details of the incidents when the Accused assaulted her virtue. She
remained steadfast and firm in her declarations notwithstanding humiliation and embarrassment,
especially when, upon cross examination, she was asked to narrate the lurid details of the sexual
acts committed upon her. On the witness stand, she pointed an accusing finger at the Accused,
her uncle, and in an avenging tone, reaffirmed her accusations against him.[7]
In contrast, the lower court observed that accused-appellant appeared evasive, answered
in a low voice, which was hardly audible. It also pointed out that Conrado appeared uncertain
when he admitted that he touched the breasts, kissed the lips and private parts of the private
complainant and laid on top of her, insinuating that she consented to this sexual activity. This
led the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant "did not have the demeanor of a man
unjustly accused of a serious offense."[8]
Such observations do not portend well for accused-appellant. In reviewing with utmost
scrutiny the records of this case, we fail to see any reason to disturb the findings of the court a
quo. The emotion displayed by private complainant thoroughly convinced the trial court that
her testimony was genuine. Even the transcripts of her direct and cross examinations would
point to no other conclusion. In her testimony, she revealed sordid details of the assault with
such clarity and lucidity that could only come from the victim of the malevolent act. When asked
questions designed to elicit conflicting answers, she stood her ground and answered the
questions in the manner of a person with nothing to tell but the truth.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely for a young girl like Lourdes to falsely accuse an uncle of a
heinous crime, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to the
humiliation of a public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation, unless motivated by
a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[9] In the absence of evidence
of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused, her testimony
deserves credence.[10]
On the other hand, accused-appellant's perverted version of the "sweetheart theory" is
uncorroborated, self-serving and deserves scant consideration from the Court. Save for his own
declaration, accused-appellant was unable to present anything else to prove that carnal
knowledge between him and Lourdes was consensual. Indeed, this Court finds it unlikely that a
young girl like Lourdes would consent to have sexual relations with a person she calls Kuya and
more than ten (10) years her senior, and an uncle-in-law in fact. There is no evidence on record
that she is a pervert, nymphomaniac, temptress or in any other condition that may justify such a
theory.
Contrary to accused appellant's assertions, the long delay in the filing of the charges is not
an indication of false accusation, since the delay was satisfactorily explained. After the first
incident, Lourdes confided to her aunt Rosita and to Corazon; however they refused to do
anything. Faced with two (2) prior rejections, it is understandable for a young girl like Lourdes
to remain silent rather than endure the humiliating experience of being rebuffed once again by
disbelieving adults.
It has also been held that there is no standard form of behavior when people, particularly
young girls, are confronted by shocking and frightful incidents such as rape.[11] A thirteen (13)-
year old girl who kept silent about being raped and becoming pregnant as a result thereof, is not
necessarily lying. It would not have been easy to speak of such a humiliating
occurrence. Besides, Lourdes also feared for her life and that of her family. Her assessment of
the threatened risk caused by accused-appellant might have been overestimated, but considering
her youth and inexperience, this fact alone does not render her testimony unreliable.
One cannot expect a thirteen (13)-year old girl to act like an adult or a mature and
experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat to her
life and complain immediately that she had been forcibly sexually assaulted. [12]
Accused-appellant assails the lower court in concluding that he used force and
intimidation. He insists that "the resistance of a woman in rape must be tenacious and
manifest. A mere verbal objection unaccompanied by physical resistance may amount to
consent."[13] He asserts that since there was no showing that he ever covered the mouth of the
victim during the alleged rape, her failure to shout for help to the other house occupants was an
indication that the intercourse was consensual.He also posits that if indeed Lourdes was raped,
she would not have agreed to transfer to the house of the person who abused her.
We do not agree. According to Lourdes, accused-appellant poked a knife at her waist
while threatening to kill her and her aunt if she resisted. That act of accused-appellant was more
than sufficient to subdue the victim and cow her into silence, because of the imminent danger
not only to her life but to her aunt as well. Under the circumstances, her failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of the accused-
appellant.[14] Also, we have held in People v. Grefiel[15] that "(i)ntimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim
does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused something would happen to her at that
moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident."
It might be that to the depraved mind of accused-appellant, the lack of resistance or
shouting on the part of his poor victim was a sign of consent, nay, even enjoyment. But in the
crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration is the state of mind of the victim and not
that of the perpetrator. From the point of view of the victim, the knife aimed at her waist was a
real threat to her life. Her failure to shout or offer resistance was not because she consented to
the deed but because shehonestly believed she would be killed if she shouted or resisted. Such
threat is sufficient intimidation as contemplated by our jurisprudence on rape. And be that as it
may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation
in the sexual act voluntary.[16]
Lourdes' transferring to the new residence of accused-appellant despite the rape does not
affect her credibility. It was established that she depended on accused-appellant and his wife
Rosita for support. Her return to the house of Conrado after she was raped was out of
necessity. If she did not do so, she would not have been able to continue her schooling in
Manila. Besides, she was assured by accused-appellant's wife, her very own aunt, that the
incident would not happen again.
In an attempt to discredit the private complainant, accused-appellant pointed out
supposed "inconsistencies" in her testimony, to wit: (a) Every time Lourdes testified she always
brought with her a copy of her complaint-affidavit; (b) Her claim in her complaint-affidavit that
accused-appellant removed her panties is inconsistent with her claim at the witness stand, where
she said that accused-appellant removed her shorts; (c) Her claim that accused-appellant held
her two (2) nipples while he was holding a knife is a physical impossibility; (d) Her testimony
that accused-appellant told her to be quiet or he would kill her and Rosita is contrary to what
she alleged in her complaint-affidavit that he would kill her Ate Rosita only; (e) Her statement
that accused-appellant held her two (2) hands with one hand while his other hand was removing
her shorts and panties is a physical impossibility; (f) Her claim that when she was first raped the
private parts of accused-appellant pumped her for more than fifty (50) minutes is physically
impossible; and, (g) Her testimony that in the first rape accused-appellant attempted to kiss her
on the lips and her cheeks but he failed is another impossibility considering that he was on top
of her and could have easily kissed her on the lips and cheeks.[17]
The crux of Lourdes' testimony was that accused-appellant had copulated with her, and
the act was accomplished through intimidation. The alleged "inconsistencies" raised by
accused-appellant are of minor significance and do not impinge upon her assertion that she was
raped. Errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting details
of a harrowing experience.[18] A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give
a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory. Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that
honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the
credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to the conscience and
numbing to the senses.[19]
However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos[20] the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being special
qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainants minority
and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both minority and relationship in the
four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was
subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the
Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accused-
appellants constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.[21] Thus, he can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper
penalty for rape in the attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for
consummated rape,[22] or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum imposable penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the
minimum from prision correccional.
In the three (3) cases of simple rape, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count is upheld, consistent with current jurisprudence.[23] The award of P30,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape is increased to P50,000.00 also consistent with
jurisprudence.[24] In addition, an award of P30,000.00 in exemplary damages is also imposed,
the relationship between the sex offender and his victim being aggravating. [25] In the case of
attempted rape the P30,000.00 award as moral damages is reduced to P15,000.00.[26] The award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is removed, there being no legal basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Cases Nos. 112410-H (G.R. No. 137481), 112411-H (G.R. No. 137482) and
112412-H (G.R. No. 137483) accused-appellant Conrado Saladino y Dingle is found guilty of
three (3) counts of Simple Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. He is also ordered to pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, another P50,000.00 for moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages, for
each count of rape.
2. In Crim. Case No. 112413-H (G.R. No. 138455), accused-appellant Conrado Saladino
y Dingle is found guilty of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as maximum. The accused-appellant is further ordered to
pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo moral damages of P15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant.
Manuel Roxas for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.
We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The
blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill,
thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared
that he had killed the complainant.
There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused rushed
upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing
a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and
two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had
theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with
being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such
at the time the crime here charged was committed.
That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of
which he should be convicted. It is contended, in the first place, that, if death has resulted, the
crime would not have been murder but homicide, and in the second place, that it is attempted
and not frustrated homicide.
As to the first contention, we are of the opinion that the crime committed would have been
murder if the girl had been killed. It is qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, the accused
making a sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a
terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo. Such an attack necessitates the finding that it
was made treacherously; and that being so the crime would have been qualified as murder if
death had resulted.
As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was frustrated and not
attempted murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as follows:
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
An attempted felony is defined thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily
desistance.
The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant
performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime
and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the
offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his
will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In
other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign
force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his
intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation
of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The
essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there
is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of
the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes
before the subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing
through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond
his control.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase
is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which
he has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where
he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause
outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the
reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David
(CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with
attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully
covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with
dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her
but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private
complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa,
Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some
detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ) along A.H.
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right
in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece
of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this
the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she
then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out
during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. His upper garment was
of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He
was wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo
Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room
going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate , was
friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto
kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at
1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a marking on
the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted letters the word
1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the
brand name Adidas (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room
306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking
permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G
Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] . S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the
security guards logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter
from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be
our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by
the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up, . He was able to fix the time of
CHITOs arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23)
when he let the latter in. . It was at around 3 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991
when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista
(Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat was shown by Bernard the
open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk
to CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not
being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None
was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401
to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning . They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon
of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and
Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people to look
for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking
with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search
the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid,
pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to
the investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to
CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom
(Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-
shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief
, three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the
handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs because CHITO had lent the very same one to him
. The t-shirt with CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the
handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what
consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared
to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time
Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 oclock that
afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom
where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 oclock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M.
Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted
laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted. Her Chemistry Report No.
C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above
stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis. pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou.
Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as
culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With Robert Chan and
Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity . MALOU, ,
was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong
tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at Dos
Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was
included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street,
North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool . Soon after, the four
(4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one
into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he
was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the
white t-shirt with the Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol
TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15),
CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December
13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19).
He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and
toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was
1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10)
minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie
window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes,
approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid.,
then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, , at last answered the
door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO
and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still
had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994,
p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up . He was already in his
school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked
the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had
happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not
able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36).
xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building . When
two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself.
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room
306.
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and
the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and
talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to
undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital .. At the hospital, CHITO and
Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip .
xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to CR No. 17271.
7 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to
9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999,
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, to wit:
were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask
CHITO if the items thereat were his.
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a
quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray
bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to
the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray SO ORDERED.11
bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in the early morning of December
13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 oclock in the morning Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed
to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December resolution of March 31, 1999.12
13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid).
He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.

Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners fraternity brothers, Alberto
Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
party held in Dr. Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from
the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were
one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants
and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room
310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M.
of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and
white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with
stripes after the dunking party held in her fathers house.8 Presented as defense expert witness
was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court
showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor
staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted
rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove
the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial
evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based
thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are
unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award
was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.

On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and
rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground
that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA
attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer
erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
the crime of attempted rape.
of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party
Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
plus reasonable Attorneys fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners acquittal, but not necessarily because
insolvency, and to pay the costs. there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who
pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act
of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last
seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. 13 In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will
be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in
question.
We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity
of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress
and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G
Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas"
shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of
December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel
of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt
satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin
short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time,
Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the
incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform,
a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that
part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malous face the piece of cloth
soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced
the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that
petitioners actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can
not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after
he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said,
adds that if petitioners intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim. 15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation
to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of
the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in
the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an
overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce
her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was
no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason
petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is
anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would
not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the
next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious.
Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His
sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the
intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her
guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the
rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute
for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. 21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted
rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 24 it
cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was
proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to
enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is
no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it
were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason
that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. 25 The
paramount question is whether the offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. 26 That Malou, after the incident
in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and
the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5.00 to 200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner,
however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of
arresto menor and to pay a fine of 200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner
actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. xxx.

Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:

xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged
locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude
that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises,
of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And
during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth
and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the
series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed,
they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring
G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930 accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence
of the circumstance of treachery.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The only debatable question, not referred to in the briefs, but which must be decided in order to
BASILIO BORINAGA, defendant-appellant. dispose of the appeal, is: Do the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within
the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code? Although no exact counterpart to the facts at bar has
Paulo Jaro for appellant. been found either in Spanish or Philippine jurisprudence, a majority of the court answer the
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. question propounded by stating that the crime committed was that of frustrated murder. This is
true notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured in the least.
MALCOM, J.:
The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution,
attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant
Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent
the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known
fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. (U. S. vs. Eduave [1917], 36 Phil., 209;
the morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried People vs. Mabugat [1926], 51 Phil., 967.)
to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about
two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay
the price agreed upon at that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned him that if No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to establish a lesser crime than
he did not pay, something would happen to him, to which Mooney answered that if they wanted that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life
to do something to him they should wait until after breakfast, Lawaan then left with his men, fully meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court.
and Mooney, after partaking of his morning meal, returned to his shop.
Based on foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs
On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua of this instance against the appellant.
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of the Perpetua, his back being to the window.
Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.lawphi1>net
with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair
on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow,
but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should
be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an
American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of
Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly
ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so
because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga,
frightening him away. Again the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed Separate Opinions
his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife
was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.

The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The defense was alibi, which was not given
credence. The accused was convicted as charged, by Judge Ortiz, who sentenced him to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties and the costs.
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
We dissent from the opinion of the majority in so far as it finds the defendant-appellant guilty
of the crime of frustrated murder instead of that of an attempt to commit murder.

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances Article 3 of the Penal Code provides as follows:
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More than mere
menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his
ART. 3. Frustrated felonies and attempts to commit felonies are punishable, as well
friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed
as those which are consummated.
treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for
 A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do no produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntary
desistance.
The pertinent facts as found by the court below and by this court are the following:
It is true that the frame of the back of the chair stood between the deadly knife and the back of
Mooney; but what it prevented was the wounding of said Mooney in the back and not his death,
had he been wounded. It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, after all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence
had been performed, that constitutes frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the
preventing of the performance of all the acts of execution which constitute the felony, as in the
present case. The interference of the frame of the back of the chair which prevented the
defendant-appellant from wounding Mooney in the back with a deadly knife, made his acts
constitute an attempt to commit murder; for he had commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and did not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony
by reason of a cause or accident other than his own voluntary desistance.

On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua The foregoing considerations force us to the conclusion that the facts alleged in the information
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the window. and proved during the trial are not sufficient to constitute the crime of frustrated murder, but
Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike simply the crime of an attempt to commit murder.
with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair
on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow,
but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should Johnson and Street, JJ., concur.
be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an
American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of
Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly
ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so
because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga,
frightening him away. Again that same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed
his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife
was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.

Since the facts constituting frustrated felony and those constituting an attempt to commit felony
are integral parts of those constituting consummated felony, it becomes important to know what
facts would have been necessary in order that the case at bar might have been a consummated
murder, so that we may determine whether the facts proved during the trial constitute frustrated
murder or simply an attempt to commit murder.

In order that the crime committed by the defendant-appellant might have been a consummated
murder it would have been necessary for him to have inflicted a deadly wound upon a vital spot
of the body of Mooney, with treachery, as a result of which he should have died.

Since according to the definition given by the Code a frustrated felony is committed "when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence,
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator" let us examine the facts of record to find out whether the said defendant-appellant
has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the murder of Mooney as a
consequence. The prisoner at bar, intending to kill Mooney, approached him stealthily from
behind and made movement with his right hand to strike him in the back with a deadly knife,
but the blow, instead of reaching the spot intended, landed on the frame of the back of the chair
on which Mooney was sitting at the time and did not cause the slightest physical injury on the
latter. The acts of execution performed by the defendant-appellant did not produce the death of
Mooney as a consequence nor could they have produced it because the blow did not reach his
body; therefore the culprit did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony. There was lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of
Mooney.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE KALALO, ET AL., defendants.
FELIPE KALALO, MARCELO KALALO, JUAN KALALO, and GREGORIO
RAMOS, appellants.
Meynardo M. Farol and Feliciano Gomez for appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Pea for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
On November 10, 1932, the herein appellants Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo, and
Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Court of First Instance of Batangas jointly with Alejandro
Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the
first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said three
cases were tried together and after the presentation of their respective evidence, the said court
acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the appellants
as follows:
In case No. 6858, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to
indemnify the heirs of the said deceased Marcelino Panaligan in the sum of P1,000, with the
costs.
In case No. 6859, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years, four months
and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to indemnify
the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the deceased Arcadio Holgado, in the sum of P1,000, with the
costs.
In the third case, that is, No. 6860, wherein the court a quo held that the crime committed was
simply that of discharge of firearm, not frustrated murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was
sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and to pay the
proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, as well as their
co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro Garcia, were acquitted
of the charges therein.
The accused in the aforesaid three cases appealed from their respective sentences assigning six
alleged errors as committed by the trial court, all of which may be discussed jointly in view of
the fact that they raise only one question, to wit: whether or not said sentences are in accordance
with law.
A careful study and examination of the evidence presented disclose the following facts: Prior to
October 1, 1932, the date of the commission of the three crimes alleged in the three informations
which gave rise to the aforesaid three cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the appellant Marcelo
Kalalo or Calalo and Isabela Holgado or Olgado, the latter being the sister of the deceased
Arcadio Holgado and a cousin of the other deceased Marcelino Panaligan, had a litigation over
a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang of the municipality of San Luis, Province
of Batangas. On September 28, 1931, and again on December 8th of the same year, Marcelo
Kalalo filed a complaint against the said woman in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. By
virtue of a motion filed by his opponent Isabela Holgado, his first complaint was dismissed on
December 7, 1931, and his second complaint was likewise dismissed on February 5, 1932.
Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in question during the agricultural years 1931 and 1932, but
when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon.
On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased,
decided to order the aforesaid land plowed, and employed several laborers for that purpose.
These men, together with Arcadio Holgado, went to the said land early that day, but Marcelo
Kalalo, who had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place accompanied by his brothers
Felipe and Juan Kalalo, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by Alejandro Garcia, who were
later followed by Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica, mother and aunt, respectively, of the
first three.
The first five were all armed with bolos. Upon their arrival at the said land, they ordered those
who were plowing it by request of Isabela and Arcadio Holgado, to stop, which they did in view
of the threatening attitude of those who gave them said order.1vvphi1.ne+
Shortly after nine o'clock on the morning of the same day, Isabela Holgado, Maria Gutierrez
and Hilarion Holgado arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Before the men resumed
their work, they were given their food and not long after they had finished eating, Marcelino
Panaligan, cousin of said Isabela and Arcadio, likewise arrived. Having been informed of the
cause of the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan ordered said Arcadio and the other
laborers to again hitch their respective carabaos to continue the work already began. At this
juncture, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio, while the appellants Felipe Kalalo,
Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos, in turn, approached Marcelino Panaligan. At a remark from
Fausta Abrenica, mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is detaining you?" they all
simultaneously struck with their bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing Arcadio Holgado,
while the appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed Marcelino
Panaligan, inflicting upon them the wounds enumerated and described in the medical certificates
Exhibits I and H. Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds
received by them in the presence of Isabela Holgado and Maria Gutierrez, not to mention the
accused. The plowmen hired by Arcadio and Isabela all ran away.
Arcadio Holgado's body bore the following six wounds, to wit:
1. A cut wound on the ulnar side of right arm near the wrist, cutting the ulnar bone
completely and, the radius partially.
2. A cut wound on the anterior upper portion of the left arm measuring about 7 cm.
long and 5 cm. wide extending to the bone and cutting the deltoid muscle across.
3. A penetrating wound on the left chest just below the clavicle going thru the first
intercostal space measuring about 8 cm. long and 2 cm wide.
4. A wound on the left side of the back about 20 cm. long following the 10th
intercostal space and injuring the lung, diaphragm, stomach and large intestine.
 5. A small superficial cut wound about 2 cm. long and cm. wide situated on the
inner side of the right scapula.
6. A superficial wound barely cutting the skin, about 4 cm. long in the lumbar region
just to the right of the spinal column. (Exhibit I.)
Marcelino Panaligan's body, in turn, bore the following fourteen wounds, to wit:
1. A penetrating cut wound in the epigastric region of the abdomen measuring about
7 cm. long and 3 cm. wide cutting the omentum and injuring the lower portion of the
stomach and a portion of the transverse colon, but no actual perforation of either one
of the two organs.
2. A cut wound on the head just above the forehead about 6 cm. long and 4 cm. wide
lifting a portion of scalp as a flap.
3. A cut wound on the left side of the head measuring about 7 cm. long and 2 cm.
wide.
4. A cut wound about 12 cm. long across the face just below the eyes extending from
one cheek bone to the other, perforating the left antrum and cutting the nasal bone.
5. A cut wound on the anterior portion of the left forearm extending to the bone with
a flap of skin and muscle which measures about 12 cm long and 6 cm. wide.
6. A cut wound across the dorsal side of the right hand about 5 cm. long and 2 cm.
wide cutting the bones of the hand.
7. A superficial wound about 6 cm. long and 4 cm. wide and 2 cm. deep situated in
the left axilla.
8. A cut wound about 6 cm. long and 2 cm. wide situated over the left scapula.
9. A cut wound on the right shoulder about 6 cm. long passing near the inner angle of
the scapula cutting the muscles of the shoulder.
10. A cut wound about 7 cm. long and 3 cm. wide situated near and almost parallel to
the inner border of the right scapula.
11. A wound on the back of the head, oval in shape, about 10 cm. long and 5 cm. wide
from which a flap of scalp was removed.
12. A wound across the back and left side of the neck about 12 cm. long and 7 cm.
deep cutting the vertebral column together with the great arteries and veins on the left
side of the neck.
13. A wound about 15 cm. long and 4 cm. wide on the left side of the back.
14. A small wound on the left thumb from which a portion of the bone and other
tissues were removed. (Exhibit H.)
The above detailed description of the wounds just enumerated discloses and there is nothing
of record to contradict it all of them were caused by a sharp instrument or instruments.
After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of Panaligans' body, the revolver which the
deceased carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing from the scene
inorder to save his own life.
The appellants attempted to prove that the fight, which resulted in the death of the two deceased,
was provoked by Marcelino Panaligan who fired a shot at Marcelo Kalalo upon seeing the
latter's determination to prevent Arcadio Holgado and his men from plowing the land in
question. No such firing, however, can be taken into consideration, in the first place, because of
the existence of competent evidence such as the testimony of Maria Gutierrez, who is a
disinterested witness, which corroborates that of Isabela Holgado in all its details, showing that
the said deceased was already lying prostrate and lifeless on the ground when the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo approached him to take his revolver for the purpose of using it, as he in fact did,
against Hilarion Holgado; in the second place, because the assault and aggression of the said
appellant were not directed against said Marcelino Panaligan but exclusively against Arcadio
Holgado, the evidence of record on this point being overwhelming, and if his claim were true,
he naturally should have directed his attack at the person who openly made an attempt against
his life; in the third place, because the evidence shows without question that Panaligan was an
expert shot with a revolver, and among the eight wounds that the appellant Marcelo Kalalo
received (Exhibit 3), not one appears to have been caused by bullet, and similarly, none of the
other appellants received any wound that might, in any way, suggest the possibility of having
been caused by bullet; and finally, because the fact that he and his co-appellants, together with
those who had been charged jointly with them, had gone to the place of the crime armed with
bolos, determined at any cost to prevent the Holgados from plowing the land in dispute, cannot
but disclose not only their determination to resort to violence or something worse, but that they
did not need any provocation in order to carry out their intent.
They likewise attempted to prove that the appellant Marcelo Kalalo alone fought against the
deceased Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado and inflicted upon them the wounds which
resulted in their death, said appellant testifying that he was compelled to do so in defense of his
own life because both of the deceased attacked him first, the former with a revolver, firing three
shots at him, and the latter with a bolo. For the same reasons hereinbefore stated, such defense
of the appellants cannot be given credit. One man alone could not have inflicted on the two
deceased their multiple wounds, particularly when it is borne in mind that one of them was better
armed, because he carried a revolver, and that he was furthermore an expert shot and scarcely
two arm-lengths from Kalalo, according to the latter's own testimony. The two witnesses for the
defense, who witnessed the crime very closely, refuted such allegation saying that Marcelo
Kalalo alone fought the deceased Arcadio Holgado and that the other three appellants went after
the other deceased. It is true that Arcadio Holgado also used his bolo to defend himself from
Marcelo Kalalo's aggression but it is no less true that five of the principal wounds of the other
deceased Marcelino Panaligan were inflicted on him from behind, inasmuch as according to
Exhibit H they were all found at the back of the head, on the neck and on his back. Neither is it
less true that all the wounds of the appellant Marcelo Kalalo were inflicted on him from the
front, which fact shows that it was not he alone who inflicted the wounds on the two deceased
because had he been alone Panaligan would not have exposed his back to be thus attacked from
behind, inasmuch as he was armed with a revolver, which circumstance undoubtedly allowed
him to keep at a distance from Kalalo; and in connection with the testimony of Isabela Holgado
and Maria Gutierrez, said circumstance shows furthermore that the three appellants Felipe
Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos attacked said Panaligan with their respective bolos at
the same time that Marcelo Kalalo attacked Arcadio Holgado, in order that all might act
simultaneously in conformity with the common intent of the four and of their coaccused to
eliminate through violence and at any cost, without much risk to them, all those who wanted to
plow the land which was the cause of the dispute between the two parties. And it is not strange
that the three appellants, who inflicted the wounds upon Marcelino Panaligan, should act as they
did, because they knew that the latter carried a revolver in a holster on his belt.
Although it may seem a repetition or redundancy, it should be stated that Marcelo Kalalo's
allegation that he acted in self-defense is absolutely unfounded on the ground that, were it true
that the deceased Marcelino Panaligan succeeded in using his revolver, he would have wounded
if not the said appellant, at least the other appellants.
The trial court has acted correctly in not giving credit to the testimony of the appellants Juan
and Felipe Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos that they proceeded to the scene of the crime completely
unarmed, with the exception that one of them had a brush in his hand and the other a plane, after
Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado had already expired, which is incredible and
improbable under the circumstances, knowing, as in fact they then knew, that their brother
Marcelo Kalalo had been attacked by armed men. This court cannot help but agree with the
decision of the lower court where it states:
It is improbable that after having been informed that their brother was engaged in a
fight, they went to the scene of the crime, one merely armed with a plane and the other
with a brush. It is improbable that Felipe Kalalo also went to that place simply to
follow Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos upon seeing them run unarmed in that
direction. These improbabilities of the defenses of the accused, in the face of the
positive and clear testimony of the eyewitnesses pointing to the said accused as the
aggressors of the deceased Marcelino Panaligan and Arcadio Holgado, cannot, of
course, prevail against nor detract from the weight of the evidence of the prosecution,
particularly taking into consideration the numerous wounds of each of the deceased
and the positions thereof, which show that the said deceased were attacked by several
persons and that those several persons were the defendants. Furthermore, the
established fact that after the commission of the crime the said defendants had been
in hiding in order to avoid arrest, is corroborative evidence of their guilt.
It certainly is a fact of record that the said three appellants Felipe Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and
Gregorio Ramos were not arrested until after several days, because they had been hiding or, at
least, absenting themselves from their homes.
That the four appellants should all be held liable for the death of the two deceased leaves no
room for doubt. All of them, in going to the land where the killing took place, were actuated by
the same motive which was to get rid of all those who might insist on plowing the land which
they believed belonged to one of them, that is, to Marcelo Kalalo, a fact naturally inferable from
the circumstance that all of them went there fully armed and that they simultaneously acted after
they had been instigated by their mother with the words hereinbefore stated, to wit: "What is
detaining you?"
The question now to be decided is whether the appellants are guilty of murder or of simple
homicide in each of cases G.R. No. L-39303 and G.R. No. L-39304. The Attorney-General
maintains that they are guilty of murder in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength in the commission of the acts to which the said two cases
particularly refer. The trial court was of the opinion that they are guilty of simple homicide but
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the
circumstance of "abuse of superior strength", if proven to have been presented, raises homicide
to the category of murder; but this court is of the opinion that said circumstance may not properly
be taken into consideration in the two cases at bar, either as a qualifying or as a generic
circumstance, if it is borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of them with a bolo,
and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and their strength
was almost balanced because there is no doubt but that, under circumstances similar to those of
the present case, a revolver is as effective as, if not more than three bolos. For this reason, this
court is of the opinion that the acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859 (G.R. Nos. L-39303
and 39304, respectively), merely constitute two homicides, with no modifying circumstance to
be taken into consideration because none has been proved.
As to case No. 6860 (G.R. No. 39305), the evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four
successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in
order to be out of reach of the appellants and their companions and save his own life. The fact
that the said appellant, not having contended himself with firing only once, fired said successive
shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the circumstance that immediately before doing so he and
his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and
brother-in-law, respectively, of the former, shows that he was then bent on killing said Hilarion
Holgado. He performed everything necessary on his pat to commit the crime that he determined
to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor
aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its
mark. The acts thus committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted
homicide with no modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration, because none has been
established.
Wherefore, the three appealed sentences are hereby modified as follows:
In case No. 6858, or G.R. No. 39303, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellants
is homicide and they hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marcelino Panaligan in the sum
of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings of both instances;
and by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the said penalty of reclusion
temporal is hereby fixed at nine years;
In case No. 6859, or G.R. No. 39304, the court likewise finds that the crime committed by the
appellants is homicide, and they are hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal each, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Arcadio Holgado
in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the proportionate part of the costs of both instances; and in
conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of the penalty of reclusion
temporal herein imposed upon them is hereby fixed at nine years;

In case No. 6860, or G.R. No. 39305, the court finds that the crime committed by the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo is attempted homicide, and he is hereby sentenced to two years, four months
and one day of prision correccional, it being understood that by virtue of the provisions of said
Act No. 4103, the minimum of this penalty is six months, and he is furthermore sentenced to
pay the costs of the appeal in this case.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby affirmed without
prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with one-half of the time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
So ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.


REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HONORABLE JUDGE JOHNSON BALLUTAY, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 25, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
HONORABLE JUDGE ADRIANO TUAZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY,
SPOUSES REYNALDO VENERACION and SUSAN VENERACION,
SPOUSES MAXIMO HIPOLITO and MANUELA DE LA PAZ and
GODOFREDO DE LA PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated September 7, 1995, and
resolution, dated January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court, Branches 25[1] and 28,[2] Cabanatuan City, finding private respondents
spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioners
rights as a builder in good faith.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister
Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an oral contract with petitioner
Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No.
1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The lot is
located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan City. At the time of the
sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents,
although the latter had already sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-Veneracion).[3]Private respondent
Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on October 22, 1981 and was issued TCT
No. T-40496 (Exh. 9).[4] When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents
De la Paz were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Pazes as a
family and not individually. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela De la
Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private
respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment. After giving
the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot after
securing a building permit from the City Engineers Office on April 23, 1981, with the written
consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la Paz (Exh. B/Exh, 1).[5] Petitioner likewise
began paying the real estate taxes on said property (Exh. D, D-1, D-2).[6] Construction on the
house was completed on October 6, 1981 (Exh. V).[7]Since then, petitioner and his family have
maintained their residence there.[8]
On January 31, 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private
respondents De la Paz executed two documents. The first document (Exh. A) read:
1-31-83
Ang halaga ng Lupa sa Villa Fe Subdivision na ipinagbili kay Fr. Dante Martinez ay P15,000.00
na pinangangako namin na ibibigay ang Deed of Sale sa ika-25 ng Febrero 1983.
[SGD.] METRING HIPOLITO
[SGD.] JOSE GODOFREDO DE LA
PAZ[9]
The second writing (Exh. O) read:
Cabanatuan City
March 19, 1986
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that Freddie dela Paz has agreed to sign tomorrow (March 20) the affidavit of
sale of lot located at Villa Fe Subdivision sold to Fr. Dante Martinez.
[Sgd.] Freddie dela Paz
FREDDIE DELA
PAZ[10]
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale they promised
to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase dated October 28,
1981 (Exh. 10),[11] private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to repurchase the
same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion for the
sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to petitioner.[12]
Reynaldo Veneracion had been a resident of Cabanatuan City since birth. He used to pass
along Maharlika Highway in going to the Municipal Hall or in going to and from Manila. Two
of the lots subject of the sale were located along Maharlika Highway, one of which was the lot
sold earlier by the De la Pazes to petitioner. The third lot (hereinafter referred to as the Melencio
lot) was occupied by private respondents De la Paz. Private respondents Veneracion never took
actual possession of any of these lots during the period of redemption, but all titles to the lots
were given to him.[13]
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondent Godofredo De la Paz
informed private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion that he was selling the three lots to another
person for P200,000.00. Indeed, private respondent Veneracion received a call from a Mr.
Tecson verifying if he had the titles to the properties, as private respondents De la Paz were
offering to sell the two lots along Maharlika Highway to him (Mr. Tecson) for P180,000.00 The
offer included the lot purchased by petitioner in February, 1981. Private respondent Veneracion
offered to purchase the same two lots from the De la Pazes for the same amount. The offer was
accepted by private respondents De la Paz. Accordingly, on June 2, 1983, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed over the two lots (Exh. I/Exh. 5-Veneracion).[14] Sometime in January, 1984,
private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes, petitioners neighbor,
who the owner of the building erected on the subject lot was. Reyes told him that it was Feliza
Martinez, petitioners mother, who was in possession of the property. Reynaldo Veneracion told
private respondent Godofredo about the matter and was assured that Godofredo would talk to
Feliza. Based on that assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots with the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan on March 5, 1984. The lot in dispute was registered under
TCT No. T-44612 (Exh. L/Exh. 4-Veneracion).[15]
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the
spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter (Exh. P/Exh. 6-Veneracion) from private respondent
Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of the land and demanding that
they vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon.[16] Petitioner, in turn,
demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private respondents De la Paz
and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the owner of the property as he had previously
purchased the same from private respondents De la Paz.[17]
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San Juan, Cabanatuan
City for conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement (Exh. M/Exh. 13). [18] As a
consequence, on May 12, 1986, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for
ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Cabanatuan City against petitioner and his
mother (Exh. 14).[19]
On the other hand, on June 10, 1986, petitioner caused a notice of lis pendens to be
recorded on TCT No. T-44612 with the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City (Exh. U).[20]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to have the case decided under the Rules
on Summary Procedure and defined the issues as follows:
1. Whether or not defendant (now petitioner) may be judicially ejected.
2. Whether or not the main issue in this case is ownership.
3. Whether or not damages may be awarded.[21]
On January 29, 1987, the trial court rendered its decision, pertinent portions of which are
quoted as follows:
With the foregoing findings of the Court, defendants [petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez and
his mother] are the rightful possessors and in good faith and in concept of owner, thus cannot
be ejected from the land in question. Since the main issue is ownership, the better remedy of the
plaintiff [herein private respondents Veneracion] is Accion Publiciana in the Regional Trial
Court, having jurisdiction to adjudicate on ownership.
Defendants counterclaim will not be acted upon it being more than P20,000.00 is beyond this
Courts power to adjudge.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing plaintiffs complaint and ordering
plaintiff to pay Attorneys fee of P5,000.00 and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On March 3, 1987, private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the
Regional Trial Court, but failed to pay the docket fee. On June 6, 1989, or over two years after
the filing of the notice of appeal, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of the Judgment,
alleging finality of judgment for failure of private respondents Veneracion to perfect their appeal
and failure to prosecute the appeal for an unreasonable length of time.
Upon objection of private respondents Veneracion, the trial court denied on June 28, 1989
the motion for execution and ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court. On July 11, 1989, petitioner appealed from this order. The appeal of
private respondents Veneracion from the decision of the MTC and the appeal of petitioner from
the order denying petitioners motion for execution were forwarded to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Cabanatuan City. The cases were thereafter consolidated under Civil Case No. 670-
AF.
On February 20, 1991, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding private
respondents Veneracion as the true owners of the lot in dispute by virtue of their prior
registration with the Register of Deeds, subject to petitioners rights as builder in good faith, and
ordering petitioner and his privies to vacate the lot after receipt of the cost of the construction
of the house, as well as to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. It,
however, failed to rule on petitioners appeal of the Municipal Trial Courts order denying their
Motion for Execution of Judgment.
Meanwhile, on May 30, 1986, while the ejectment case was pending before the Municipal
Trial Court, petitioner Martinez filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages against
the Veneracions and De la Pazes with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City.
On March 5, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision finding private respondents Veneracion
owners of the land in dispute, subject to the rights of petitioner as a builder in good faith, and
ordering private respondents De la Paz to pay petitioner the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and for private respondents to pay the costs of the
suit.
On March 20, 1991, petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
of the RTCs decision in Civil Case No. 670-AF (for ejectment). Likewise, on April 2, 1991,
petitioner appealed the trial courts decision in Civil Case No. 44-[AF]-8642-R (for annulment
of sale and damages) to the Court of Appeals. The cases were designated as CA G.R. SP. No.
24477 and CA G.R. CV No. 27791, respectively, and were subsequently consolidated. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decisions, without ruling on petitioners appeal from
the Municipal Trial Courts order denying his Motion for Execution of Judgment. It declared the
Veneracions to be owners of the lot in dispute as they were the first registrants in good faith, in
accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code. Petitioner Martinez failed to overcome the
presumption of good faith for the following reasons:
1. when private respondent Veneracion discovered the construction on the lot, he
immediately informed private respondent Godofredo about it and relied on the
latters assurance that he will take care of the matter.
2. the sale between petitioner Martinez and private respondents De la Paz was not
notarized, as required by Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code, thus it cannot
be said that the private respondents Veneracion had knowledge of the first
sale.[23]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated January
31, 1996.[24] Hence this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES JOHNSON BALLUTAY AND
ADRIANO TUAZON ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
 RESPONDENTS REYNALDO VENERACION AND WIFE ARE BUYERS
AND REGISTRANTS IN GOOD FAITH IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE.
II THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING AND
DECIDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASES OF SALVORO VS. TANEGA, ET
AL., G.R. NO. L 32988 AND IN ARCENAS VS. DEL ROSARIO, 67 PHIL
238, BY TOTALLY IGNORING THE SAID DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE ASSAILED DECISIONS OF THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS.
III THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CA G.R. SP. NO.
24477.
IV THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DENYING
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR REVIEW AFORECITED INEVITABLY
SANCTIONED AND/OR WOULD ALLOW A VIOLATION OF LAW AND
DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE
ADRIANO TUAZON WHEN THE LATTER RENDERED A DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 670-AF [ANNEX D] REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE SENDON DELIZO IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 9523 [ANNEX C] AND IN NOT RESOLVING IN THE SAME
CASE THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY DEFENDANTS ON THE ORDER
OF THE SAME COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION.
V THAT THE RESOLUTION [ANNEX B] (OF THE COURT OF APPEALS)
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [ANNEX
I] WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH SAID RESOLUTION WAS BASED, (IS ERRONEOUS).
These assignment of errors raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot
in dispute as to make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with Art.
1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of immovable property.
2. Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal is
not necessary for the perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has been
filed within such period.
3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of
a motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based.
First. It is apparent from the first and second assignment of errors that petitioner is
assailing the findings of fact and the appreciation of the evidence made by the trial courts and
later affirmed by the respondent court. While, as a general rule, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be
granted under certain exceptions, namely: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issue of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[25]
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents Veneracion are
the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Pazs
assurance that he would take care of the matter concerning petitioners occupancy of the disputed
lot as constituting good faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art.
1544 of the Civil Code provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale,
ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title. [26] The
requirement of the law, where title to the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-
fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be entitled to priority, the second
purchaser must not only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e.,
without knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be
ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land. [27]
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private respondent
Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days before the execution of the
first Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it
vacant.[28] However, this is belied by the testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then building
inspector of the Department of Public Works and Highways, that he conducted on October 6,
1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in the performance of his duties as a building
inspector to monitor the progress of the construction of the building subject of the building
permit issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 % completed
(Exh. V).[29] In the absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty.[30] Thus, as early as October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion
already knew that there was construction being made on the property they purchased.
2. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of sale between
the private respondents by considering their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. [31] More
specifically, it overlooked the fact that the first contract of sale between the private respondents
shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an equitable
mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and
(2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. [32] A contract of sale
with right to repurchase gives rise to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of
the following cases: (1) when the price of a sale with a right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon
or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser retains for himself a
part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that
the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.[33] In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall
be construed as an equitable mortgage.[34]
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents intended
the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale: (1) Private respondents
Veneracion never took actual possession of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz
remained in possession of the Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where they
resided; (3) During the period between the first sale and the second sale to private respondents
Veneracion, they never made any effort to take possession of the properties; and (4) when the
period of redemption had expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De
la Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for P200,000.00, they never
objected. To the contrary, they offered to purchase the two lots for P180,000.00 when they
found that a certain Mr. Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is
clear from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended the first sale to be
a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the parties, it
should be noted that this Court in several cases,[35] has ruled that a purchaser who is aware of
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim
that he acted in good faith. Private respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial
conference in the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner was already in
possession of the property in dispute at the time the second Deed of Sale was executed on June
1, 1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already occupants
on the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other than the vendors, in actual
possession of the disputed lot should have put private respondents on inquiry as to the nature of
petitioners right over the property. But he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his
right. He merely relied on the assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la Paz, who was
not even the owner of the lot in question, that he would take care of the matter. This does not
meet the standard of good faith.
3. The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to determine
private respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of petitioners ownership of the disputed lot
is erroneous.
Art. 1357[36] and Art. 1358,[37] in relation to Art. 1403(2)[38] of the Civil Code, requires
that the sale of real property must be in writing for it to be enforceable. It need not be
notarized. If the sale has not been put in writing, either of the contracting parties can compel the
other to observe such requirement.[39] This is what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded
that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor by private respondents De la Paz. There
is nothing in the above provisions which require that a contract of sale of realty must be executed
in a public document. In any event, it has been shown that private respondents Veneracion had
knowledge of facts which would put them on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners occupancy
of the disputed lot.
Second. Petitioner contends that the MTC in Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) erred in
denying petitioners Motion for Execution of the Judgment, which the latter filed on June 6,
1989, two years after private respondents Veneracion filed a notice of appeal with the MTC on
March 3, 1987 without paying the appellate docket fee. He avers that the trial courts denial of
his motion is contrary to this Courts ruling in the cases of Republic v. Director of
Lands,[40] and Aranas v. Endona[41] in which it was held that where the appellate docket fee is
not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the MTC becomes final and
unappealable as the payment of docket fee is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional
requirement.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of Lands deals with
the requirement for appeals from the Courts of First Instance, the Social Security Commission,
and the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Court of Appeals.The case of Aranas v. Endona, on
the other hand, was decided under the 1964 Rules of Court and prior to the enactment of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) and the issuance of its Interim Rules and
Guidelines by this Court on January 11, 1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter
at issue.
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[42] it was held that although an appeal
fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the municipal trial court to the regional
trial court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under 20 [43] and 23[44] of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only two
requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing of a notice of appeal within
the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Even in
the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts,[45] nothing is mentioned about the payment
of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket
fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal being discretionary
on the part of the appellate court.[46] Thus, private respondents Veneracions failure to pay the
appellate docket fee is not fatal to their appeal.
Third. Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion
for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not state the
legal basis thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the basis therefor. This requirement was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in
denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change
its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new.[47] Thus, its resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the petitioners.
Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have
been considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We find no
reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[48]
Attorneys fees should be awarded as petitioner was compelled to litigate to protect his
interest due to private respondents act or omission.[49]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and a new one is
RENDERED:
(1) declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo and
Manuela De la Paz in favor of private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion;

(2) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to execute a deed of absolute
sale in favor of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;

(3) ordering private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz to reimburse private
respondents spouses Veneracion the amount the latter may have paid to the former;

(4) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City to cancel TCT No. T-44612 and issue a
new one in the name of petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez; and

(5) ordering private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the sum of P20,000.00
as attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17666 June 30, 1966
ISIDORO MONDRAGON, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose Gaton for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and Solicitor N. P. Eduardo for respondent.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
The petitioner, Isidoro Mondragon, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of the
crime of frustrated homicide. After trial the Court of First Instance of Iloilo found him guilty of
the crime of attempted homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of from 4
months and 21 days of arresto mayor to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional,
with the accessory penalties of the law and the costs. Mondragon appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and the latter court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in all
its parts, with costs. This case is now before us on a petition for certiorari to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals. No brief for the respondent. The People of the Philippines, was filed
by the Solicitor General.
The pertinent portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which embody the findings of fact
and conclusion of said court, is as follows:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while complainant Serapion Nacionales was
opening the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to drain the water therein
and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout from afar telling him not to
open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again, "Don't
you dare open the dike." When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him.
Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he would plant the next
morning. Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow.
Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body.
Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and
forearm and between the middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant
retreated, and the complainant did not pursue him but went home instead. The following day,
the complainant was treated by Dr. Alfredo Jamandre, Municipal Health Officer of Miagao,
Iloilo, for the following lesions (Exhibit A):
"1. Incised wound about 2-1/2 inches long and 1/3 inches deep cutting diagonally
across the angle of the left jaw.
"2. Incised wound 1-1/2 inches long and cutting the bone underneath (3/4 centimeters
deep) below the right eye.
"3. Incised wound about 1 inch long at the lunar side of the left wrist.
"4. Incised wound about 3-1/2 inches long and 1/2 inch deep at the left side of the
lower part of the left arm.
"5. Incised wound about 1/2 inch long at the back of the left index, middle and ring
fingers.
"6. Incised wound about 1 inch long of the palmar side of the left thumb.
"Barring complication the above lesions may heal from 20 to 25 days."
xxx xxx xxx
Also upon the evidence, the offense committed is attempted homicide. Appellant's
intention to kill may be inferred from his admission made in court that he would do
everything he could to stop Nacionales from digging the canal because he needed the
water. However, it was established that the injuries received by the complainant were
not necessarily fatal as to cause the death of said complainant.
The issue raised by the petitioner in the present appeal is that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and not of the crime of less serious
physical injuries. It is the contention of the petitioner that the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals do not show that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party.1wph1.t
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner. We have carefully examined the record, and
We find that the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively
shown. The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner had the intention to kill the
offended party is simply the result of an inference from an answer made by the petitioner while
testifying in his own behalf. Thus in the decision appealed from, it stated:
x x x Appellant's intention to kill may be inferred from his admission made in Court
that he would do everything he could to stop Nacionales from digging the canal
because he needed the water.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals, in our opinion, do not establish the intent to kill on
the part of the petitioner. Rather, We gather that what happened was that the petitioner and the
offended party had a quarrel over the matter regarding the opening of the canal which would
drain the water away from the land of the petitioner, and because of this quarrel a fight between
them took place. The fight started with the petitioner first giving first blows to the offended
party and later he drew his bolo and inflicted on the offended party the injuries which the Court
of Appeals found to be not necessarily fatal and which were certified by a government medical
officer that they would heal in less than 30 days. The facts as found by the Court of Appeals
also show that the offended party drew his bolo and hit the petitioner on different parts of his
body, and that the petitioner retreated and did not insist on hitting the offended party with his
bolo. It may be assumed that the petitioner drew his bolo and hit the offended party with it only
when the offended party had shown a defiant attitude, considering that the offended party
himself had a bolo, as in fact the offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit the petitioner
with it, We consider that under the circumstances surrounding the fight between the petitioner
and the offended party the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party was not manifest.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case do
when the petitioner answered in the affirmative the question as to whether he would do not justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party. On the
everything that he could do to stop the offended party from digging the canal because he needed contrary, there are facts brought out by the decision appealed from which indicates that the
the water. We reproduce here the transcript of the pertinent testimony: petitioner had no intention to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on the offended party
by just giving him fist blows; the wounds inflicted on the offended party were of slight nature,
xxx xxx xxx indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went away
when the offended party started hitting him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the petitioner
had intended to kill the offended party he would have held his ground and kept on hitting the
ATTY. MORADA: offended party with his bolo to kill him.

Q In other words you want to tell us that you will do everything you could to stop The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries
Nacionales digging the canal, because you need water? suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30
days, We hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious
ATTY. CANTO: physical injuries.

I object to the question. It is misleading. The offense of less serious physical injuries, as defined in Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code, is punishable by arresto mayor or imprisonment of from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.
COURT: The facts as found by the Court of Appeals do not show any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that may be considered in the imposition of the penalty on the petitioner. We,
therefore, sentence the petitioner to suffer the penalty of three (3) months and fifteen (15) days
Witness may answer. of arresto mayor.

WITNESS: In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, modified in the sense that the petitioner is declared guilty of the offense of less serious
Yes, sir, because I need the water. physical injuries and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months and fifteen (15)
days of arresto mayor, with costs.
xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing statement or answer was made by the petitioner during the trial which took place
on January 14, 1959. The incident in question took place on July 11, 1954. The statement made
by the petitioner almost five years after the occurrence of the incident should not, in our opinion,
be considered as an accurate indication of what he had in his mind at the time of the incident.
Besides, that answer of the petitioner is not a categorical statement of an intention on his part to
kill the offended party. The term "will do everything" has a broad meaning and it should be
construed in a manner as to give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt as to what he really meant
to do. At least it cannot be said that when the petitioner answered "yes", when he was asked
whether he would do everything to stop Nacionales from digging the canal, the only way he had
in mind to stop Nacionales was to kill him. It must be noted that this answer of the petitioner
was made to a qualifying question propounded to him by the private prosecutor over the
objection of his counsel on the ground that the question was misleading. At most, that answer
of the petitioner may only be considered as an expression of opinion of what he would do under
a given circumstance.

The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved
with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference
of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488). 1

G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SY PIO, alias POLICARPIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Exequiel Zaballero, Jr. for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the defendant-
appellant herein Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz, guilty of frustrated murder against the
person of Tan Siong Kiap, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1
month, and 11 days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
to indemnify the offended party Tan Siong Kiap in the sum of P350, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but that court certified it to this Court under the provisions of section 17 (4) of Republic
Act No. 296, on the ground that the crime charged was committed on the same occasion that the
defendant-appellant had committed crime of murder, with which the defendant-appellant was
also charged.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that early in the morning of September 3, 1949, the
defendant-appellant entered the store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila. Once inside he
started firing a .45 caliber pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Tan
Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at Jose
Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is the idea?" Thereupon defendant-appellant turned
around and fired at him also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered the right
shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide. From there he
still heard gunshot fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards defendant-appellant
ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was treated. He
stayed there from September 3 to September 12, 1949, when he was released upon his request
and against the physician's advice. He was asked to return to the hospital for further treatment,
and he did so five times for a period of more than ten days. Thereafter his wound was completely
healed. He spent the sum of P300 for hospital and doctor's fees.
The defendant-appellant shot two other persons in the morning of September 3, 1949, before
shooting and wounding Tan Siong Kiap; one was Ong Pian and the other Jose Sy. On September
5 information was received by the Manila Police Department that defendant-appellant was in
custody of the Constabulary in Tarlac, so a captain of the Manila police by the name of Daniel
V. Lomotan proceeded to Tarlac. There he saw the defendant-appellant and had a conversation
with him. On this occasion defendant-appellant and had a conversation with him. On this
occasion defendant-appellant admitted to Lomotan that his victims were Tan Siong Kiap, Ong
Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary in Tarlac also delivered to Lomotan the pistol used by the
defendant-appellant, marked Exhibit C, and its magazine, Exhibit C-1, both of which the
Constabulary had confiscated from the defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant was
thereupon delivered to the custody of Lomotan, and the latter brought him to Manila, where his
statement was taken down in writing. This declaration was submitted at the time of the trial as
Exhibit D, and it contains all the details of the assaults that defendant-appellant 3 against the
persons of Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. This written statement was taken down on
a typewriter and afterwards signed by the defendant-appellant in both his Chinese and Filipino
names, the latter being Policarpio de la Cruz.
According to the declaration of the defendant-appellant, some months prior to September 3,
1949, he was employed as an attendant in a restaurant belonging to Ong Pian. Defendant-
appellant's wife by the name of Vicenta was also employed by Ong Pian's partner, Eng Cheng
Suy. Prior to September 3 the relatives of his wife had been asking the latter for help, because
her father was sick. Defendant-appellant asked money from Ong Pian, but the latter could only
give him P1. His wife was able to borrow P20 from her employer, and this was sent to his wife's
parents in Cebu. Afterwards defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work at the restaurant
of Ong Pian, and he became a peddler. Ong Pian presented a list of the sums that defendant-
appellant had borrowed from him, and these sums were deducted from the salary of his wife.
Defendant-appellant did not recognize these sums as his indebtedness, and so he resented Ong
Pian's conduct.
As to Tan Siong Kiap, the confession states that a few days before September 3, 1949,
defendant-appellant had been able to realize the sum of P70 from the sales of medicine that he
peddled. He laid his money in a place in his room, but the following morning he found that it
had disappeared from the place in which he had placed it. Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy, upon
the discovery of the loss of money, told defendant-appellant that he must have given the money
to his wife, and that nobody had stolen it. After this incident of the loss, the defendant-appellant
used to hear Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy and other Chinamen say that the money had not been
actually stolen, but that he lost it in gambling. Because of these accusations against him, he
nurtured resentment against both Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy.
So early in the morning of September 3, while a Chinaman by the name of Ngo Cho, who the
possessor of a caliber .45 pistol, was away from his room, defendant-appellant got his pistol and
tucked it in his belt. With this pistol he went to the restaurant at 822 Ongpin, and there shot Ong
Pian. After shooting him, he proceeded to 511 Misericordia, in store where Jose Sy and Tan
Siong Kiap were, and there he fired at them. Then he escaped to Legarda Street, in Sampaloc,
where he borrowed P1 from his relatives. From there he went to Malabon, to the house of his
mother, to whom he told he had killed two persons and from he asked money.
The foregoing is the substance of the written declaration made by the defendant-appellant in
Exhibit D on September 6, 1949. At the time of the trial, however, he disowned the confession
and explained that he signed it without having read its contents. He declared that it was not he
who shot the three victims, but it was one by the name of Chua Tone, with whom he had
previously connived to kill the three other victims. He introduced no witnesses, however, to
support his denial. Neither did he deny that he admitted before Captain Lomotan having killed
the three persons, or having been found in Tarlac in possession of the caliber .45 pistol, Exhibit
C, and its magazine, Exhibit C-1. In his cross-examination he admitted many of the incidents
mentioned in the confession, especially the cause of his resentment against his victims Ong Pian,
Jose Sy, and Tan Siong Kiap.
The trial court refused to believed his testimony, and therefore, found him guilty of the crime
charged.
On this appeal counsel for the defendant-appellant claims that the trial court erred in not finding
that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot accidentally from the same bullet that had been fired at
Jose Sy, and in finding that defendant-appellant has committed a crime distinct and separate
from that of murder for the slaying of Jose Sy. We find no merit in this contention. According
to the uncontradicted testimony of the offended party Tan Siong Kiap, when the latters saw
defendant-appellant firing shots he asked him why he was doing so, and the defendant-appellant,
instead of answering him, turned around and fired at him also. It is not true, therefore, that the
shot which hit him was fired at Sy.
It is also contended that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. We
also find no merit in this contention. The evidence submitted to prove the charge consists of:
the uncontradicted testimony of the victim himself; the admissions made verbally by the
defendant-appellant before Captain Lomotan in Tarlac; the fact that the defendant-appellant had
escaped and was found in Tarlac; his possession of the .45 caliber pistol coupled with the fact,
attested to by the testimony of the physician who examined and treated the wounds of Tan Siong
Kiap, that the wounds found in his person must have been caused by the caliber .45 bullet; and,
lastly, the confession of the defendant-appellant himself, Exhibit D, which he was not able to
impugn. As against this mass of evidence, defendant-appellant has only made a very
unbelievable story that it was not he but another that had committed the crime charged. His
admissions at the time of the trial regarding the incidents, as well as the cause of his having
assaulted his victims, coincide exactly with the reasons given in his written confession. This
shows that he had made the confession himself, for nobody but himself could have known the
facts therein stated. The claim that the offense has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
must be dismissed.
The defendant-appellant lastly claims that the lower court also erred in sentencing him to pay
an indemnity of P350. The offended party testified that he actually spent P300 for hospital and
doctor's fees, and that he was confined in the hospital for nine days. The above facts stand
uncontradicted. This assignment of error must also be dismissed.
It is lastly contended that the defendant-appellant should be found guilty only of less serious
physical injuries instead of the crime of frustrated murder as defendant-appellant admitted in
his confession in the open court that he had a grudge against the offended party, and that he
connived with another to kill the latter. The intent to kill is also evident from his conduct in
firing the shot directly at the body of the offended party.
But while intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound inflicted was not necessarily fatal,
because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the body. As a matter of fact, the medical
certification issued by the physician who examined the wound of the offended party at the time
he went to the hospital, states that the wound was to heal within a period of fourteen days, while
the offended party actually stayed in the hospital for nine days and continued receiving treatment
thereafter five time for the period of more than ten days, or a total of not more than thirty days.
The question that needs to be determined, therefore, is: Did the defendant-appellant perform all
the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim?
In the cases of U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil., 209, People vs. Dagman, 47 Phil., 768 and People vs.
Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433, this Court has held that it is not necessary that the accused actually
commit all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, but that it is
sufficient that he believes that he has committed all said acts. In the case of People vs.
Dagman, supra, the victim was first knocked down by a stone thrown at him, then attacked with
a lance, and then wounded by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused, but the victim upon
falling down feigned death, and the accused desisted from further continuing in the assault in
the belief that their victim was dead. And in the case of People vs. Borinaga, supra, the accused
stabbed his intended victim, but the knife with which he committed the aggression instead of
hitting the body of the victim, lodged in the back of the chair in which he was seated, although
the accused believed that he had already harmed him. In both these cases this Court held that of
the crime committed was that of frustrated murder, because the subjective phase of the acts
necessary to commit the offense had already passed; there was full and complete belief on the
part of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the
death of the intended victim.
In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit,
but he was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape, which
appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he
was not able to his his victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant
knew that he had not actually all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these
circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been
completed. And as it does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and
as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a reasonable doubt exist in our mind that the
defendant-appellant had actually believed that he has committed all the acts of execution or
passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the
defendant-appellant.
We are, therefore, not prepared to find the defendant-appellant guilty of frustrated murder, as
charged in the information. We only find him guilty of attempted murder, because he did not
perform all the acts of execution, actual and subjective, in order that the purpose and intention
that he had to kill his victim might be carried out.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified and the defendant-
appellant is found guilty of the crime of attempted murder, and the sentence imposed upon him
reduced to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision
correccional to 10 years of prision mayor. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. With
costs against the defendant-appellant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERNANDO DIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Luis R. Feria for accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Automatic review of a decision of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District,
which imposed the death penalty.
An information for robbery with homicide was filed on October 1, 1971, against Danilo Tobias
and a John Doe. The order to arrest Tobias was returned unserved and he is still on the "Wanted
Persons Files."
On December 7, 1971, the information was amended to name Hernando Dio as the John Doe,
the appellant herein. As amended, the information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July 1971, in Pasay City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Danilo Tobias @ Danny Kulot and Hernando Dio @ Way Kaon, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, and with the use
of 'balisong', one of the accused was provided with, and by means of force,
threats and intimidation employed upon the latter, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and rob away from one
Crispulo P. Alega, one Seiko brand men's wrist watch (recovered); and the
said accused in accordance with and pursuant to their conspiracy, and in
order to carry out their avowed purpose, with intent to kill did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab for several
times Crispulo P. Alega, and which "balisong" was directly aimed at the
vital portions of the body of said Crispulo P. Alega, thus performing all the
acts of execution causing his instantaneous death. (Expediente, p. 68.)
Accused Hernando Dio pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned and after trial the court
rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Hernando Dio, Guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Amended
Information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Crispulo Alega the amount
of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and
another P10,000.00, as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. (Id., pp.
105-106.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
At about noontime on July 24, 1971, Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer by
profession working at the Sugar Construction Company, with a salary of
more than P500.00 a month went to the Southeastern College, Pasay City
to fetch his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, a third year high school student
thereat (pp. 55, 59, 63-64, 11 1973). They proceeded to the Pasay City
Public Market. As they were going up the stairs leading to the Teresa and
Sons Restaurant, Remedios, who was was about an arms-length ahead of
Crispulo suddenly heard the dropping of her folders and other things, being
carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she saw a man later
Identified as Danilo Tobias but still at large twisting the neck of Crispulo,
while the appellant was holding his (Crispulo's) two hands (pp. 56-57, 61,
tsn., Id.). The appellant and his companion tried to divest Crispulo of his
"Seiko" wrist watch, but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought the
robbers. At this juncture, the man who was twisting the neck of Crispulo
stabbed the latter on the left side of his chest. Crispulo ran down the stairs
followed by Remedies who shouted for help. When he reached the front of
the Pasay Commercial Bank he fell down and expired. At the time of his
death, the "Seiko" watch was strapped to his wrist. (pp. 57-61, tsn., Id., pp.
7-9, tsn., Jan. 22, 1973).lwphl@it
An autopsy conducted on the victim's body by Dr. Ricardo Ibarola
medicolegal officer of the NBI revealed that the cause of death was a stab
wound at the region below his left breast which penetrated the heart. Said
doctor opined that judging from the natural appearance of the stab wound,
it must have been caused by a single-bladed pointed instrument (pp. 6, 13-
14, tsn., Jan. 11, 1973; Exh. C and C-1, p. 87, rec.). The necropsy report
(Exh. A, p. 85, rec.) stated that the decease sustained the following injuries:
Abrasions: right zygomatic region, 0.6 x 0.4 infralabial
region, right side 1.7 x 1.4 come forearm right, upper
third, posterolateral aspect, 0.6 x 0.4 clean and left,
lower third, posterior aspect, 0.4 x 0.2 come right knee,
0.6 x 0.4 come right leg, upper third, anterior aspect,
1.4 x 0.8
Incise wounds, neck, left supers-lateral aspect, two in
number, 2.5 and 1.2 crime in lengths, both superficial
Stab wound: left inframammary region, level of the 5th
intercostal space along the parasternal line, 6.0 cm.
from the anterior midline, 0.5 crime below the left
nipple, elliptical in shape, 3.0 cm. long extended
laterally by 3.0 crime long rising slightly downwards,
medially edges, clean cut, sutured, medial extremity of
 which is blunt and lateral extremity, sharp; directed
upwards, medially and backwards involving, among
others, the soft tissues, thru the 5th intercostal muscles,
grazing the 6th rib superiorly, perforating the left
pleural cavity only, into the middle mediastinum by
penetrating the pericardium antero-inferiorly,
perforating the interventricular system and penetrating
the left ventricle of the heart at its apical portions,
approximate depth 11.0 cm.
After the appellant's arrest on October 24, 1972, he was investigated at the
Detective Bureau of the Pasay City Police Department and gave a statement
(Exh. D, p. 90, rec.) in the presence of Pat. Arturo Rimorin admitting that
on the date and nine of the incident, he and his co-accused, Danilo Tobias
administrative Kardong Kaliwa alias Danny Kulot, held up a man and a
woman; that they did not get the watch of the man; that he held the victim's
hands but the latter was able to free himself; that Danny Kulot stabbed the
man, that when the victim ran, they also ran away; and that he did not know
what happened to the victim (Exhs. D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5, p. 90,
rec.; pp. 27-3 1, tsn., Jan. 11, 1973). (Brief, pp. 2-6.)
Atty. Luis R. Feria, counsel de oficio of the appellant, states:
After a careful, considered and conscientious examination of the evidence
adduced in the instant case, undersigned counsel is constrained to conclude
that the findings of fact of the trial court, upholding the version of the
prosecution as against that of the defense, must have to be sustained. As
against the sole and uncorroborated testimony of appellant merely denying
any participation in the commission of the crime imputed to him (while
admitting that he was present at the scene of the crime), there is a formidable
array of evidence against him consisting of the clear and convincing
testimony of Remedios Maniti, who was in the company of the deceased at
the time he was killed and an eyewitness to the entire incident; the extra-
judicial written confession of defendant-appellant (Exhibit D) admitting
participation in the commission of the crime; the testimony of Patrolman
Arturo Rimorin who conducted the investigation of, and before whom
Exhibit D was executed and signed by, defendant- appellant, as well straight
the testimony of Sgt. Geronimo de los Santos of the Pasay Police to whom
defendant-appellant orally admitted that he held the victim's hands although
he had no part in the actual stabbing of the deceased.
With respect to the testimony of the eyewitness Remedios Maniti there is
absolutely nothing in the record (except perhaps that she was the sweetheart
of the deceased) to show, or even hint, that she had any reasons to perjure
herself by falsely incriminating defendant-appellant in such a grievous
crime, no bias, interest or prejudice against the latter as would move or
induce her to faithlessly accuse him of a crime which he had not committed.
More than ever, the time-honored ruling of this Honorable Court, too
elemental to require citations, that the findings of the trial court on the
question of credibility of the witnesses, having had the advantage of
observing their demeanor and manner of testifying, should not be disturbed
in the absence of strong and cogent reasons therefor, applies fully to the
case at bar. No such reasons can be found herein.
The same observations may be made with respect to the testimonies of
Patrolman Rimorin and Sgt. de los Santos. Moreover, as has been held by
this Honorable Court, where the prosecution witnesses, being government
employees who testified as to what transpired in the performance of their
duties, were neutral and disinterested and had no reason to falsely testify
against the accused, and did not subject him to any violence, torture or
bodily harm, their testimonies should be given more weight than that of the
accused (P. v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469: P. v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716.)
Then there is the extrajudicial confession of defendant-appellant, Exhibit D.
True it is that, belatedly during the trial, appellant claimed that his answers
appearing in Exhibit D were given because he was afraid as he was
intimidated and struck on the buttock with a long piece of wood (pp. 32-34,
t.s.n. Ses. of January 22, 1973). It is submitted that this last-minute,
desperate and uncorroborated claim falls flat in the face not only of the
presumption of voluntariness in the execution of confessions, but also of the
testimony of Patrolman Rimorin to the effect that Exhibit D was executed
voluntarily and that defendant-appellant was never maltreated (pp. 26, 31-
32, t.s.n. Ses. of January 11, 1973), and the latter's own admission that
before he signed Exhibit D, its contents were first read to him in Tagalog
and that he fully understood the same (pp. 24, t.s.n. Ses. of January 22,
1973), and his further admission that he has not filed any case against those
who had allegedly maltreated him (p. 33, t.s.n,Id.). Moreover, where the
alleged confession reveals spontaneity of the declarations belying the claim
that they were concocted or dictated by the police, the court win reject the
case that the confession was involuntary (P. v. Castro, 11 SCRA
699).lwphl@it (Brief, pp. 3-5.)
Notwithstanding the foregoing factual admission, Atty. Feria makes the following assignment
of errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 294,
PAR. 1, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
2. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE
DEATH PENALTY.
We have scrutinized the record, particularly the testimonial evidence, and indeed there is no
doubt that the appellant had a hand in the death of Crispulo Alega. There remains to be
considered, however, the claims of the appellant which are made in the assignment of errors.
The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he should not have been convicted of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not consummated.
He states that there was only an attempted robbery.

The Solicitor General states:

... We are constrained to agree with defense' contention. The evidence

adduced show that the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in
their criminal venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to
constitute the consummated crime of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier,
when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his
wrist (p. 59, t.s.n., Jan. 11, 1973). The killing of Crispulo Alega may be
considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out
the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the resistance
offered by the deceased. Consequently, this case would properly come
under the provision of Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code which states that

When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or

frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person
guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve
a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
(Brief, pp. 5-6.)

In his second assignment of error the appellant claims that the information does not allege any
aggravating circumstance nor was any proved during the trial.

Again the Solicitor General states:

We likewise agree with the contention of counsel in his second assigned

error that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not show the
attendance of any aggravating circumstance in the commands of the crime
and neither did the court a quo make any finding in this respect (pp. 7-8,
appellant's brief). (Id, p. 6.)

The crime committed by the appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Since
there was no attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be applied
in its medium period, i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law has also to be applied.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby modified; the appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide and
he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Crispulo
Alega in the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES,
and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Iloilo City, *dated 29 August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and
his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed Canasares, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal
Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO
CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose
maternal surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION (Art, 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, conspiring and confederating
among themselves, working together and helping one another, armed with guns and
handgrenade and with the use of violence or intimidation employed on the person of
Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita Hablero did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with intent of gain, cash in
the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz
wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued
at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary Choco
suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido
Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and Reynaldo Canasares also
suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also illegally detained, at the
compound of the New Iloilo Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino
Choco, owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who
is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said
Company; that likewise on the occasion of the robbery, the accused also asked and
were given a ransom money of P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by
aggravating circumstances of band, and illegal possession of firearms and explosives;
that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist
watches, two (2) lady's wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live
grenade were recovered from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New
Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00.
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at
about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The accused were armed with
homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita
Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her
that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed
his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being
a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this,
Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash
(P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded
with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed.
Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which
the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused also
took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to produce
P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released. Severino answered that he could
not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard.
Major Melquiades B. Sequio Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the
accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender with the assurance that no harm
would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the police station. The accused
refused to surrender or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In her
dialogue with the accused, which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded P100,000.00,
a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of
raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same and to release
Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they were out of the
door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram.
With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00,
which the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was
herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the
accused to surrender peacefully but they refused.1wphi1 UItimatums were given but the
accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive
and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to
the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower
extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical certificate
described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the
hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the course of her confinement from
April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his
co-accused entered the lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino Choco He
demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the
office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters,
and Rodita inside the office. He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from
getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all left on the counter,
and were never touched by them. He claimed further that they had never fired on the military
because they intended to surrender. Appellant's version also was that during the gunfire,
Severino's daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by
a bullet and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to
surrender but that they gave themselves up only much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of the
accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by
law and to pay the costs."
Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and in
not holding that the same was merely attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from
an attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking, In other words, the
crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the
carrying away or asportation And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted"
(Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property
belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the
taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without
the animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is
no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an
essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is
because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the
latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those items were
recovered from their persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee,
testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and
subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that
the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and
that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore,
sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and
the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-
accused and completed the taking.
The State established a "taking" sufficient to support a conviction of robbery even
though the perpetrators were interrupted by police and so did not pick up the money
offered by the victim, where the defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and
a club respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk of a convenience
store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions and placed money from the
register in a paper bag and then placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men;
these actions brought the money within the dominion and control of defendant and
completed the taking. (Johnson vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control of the
property by the taker,even for an instant, constitutes asportation (Adams vs.
Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray, 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs.
Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [Emphasis supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the
personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime, From the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the
same, the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981
ed., p. 594).
The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even
if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of
the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the
physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with
it" (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs.
Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not merely
attempted Robbery is in order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking because the place
was dark since the doors were closed and there were no windows. It will be recalled, however,
that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe the unfolding of events. Her
failure to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against her credibility,
it being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose
the complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862,
31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her credibility. The
defense has not proven that she was actuated by any improper motive in testifying against the
accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in respect
of which the findings of the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a superior position
to assess the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June
1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused
cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must
have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that the surrender
was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They
were, indeed, asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they refused until
only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of circumstances when they
knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The surrender of the
accused was held not to be mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded by the
constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan et al., G.R. Nos. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966,
16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their
surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And
while it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several
opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman 106
Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the accused-
appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the nature of the linked
offenses involved and the penalty imposed by the Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious
Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with Art. 267,
RPC )and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court that a complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the penalty for the
more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion
perpetua to death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious
Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did then
the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that
one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as
it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their
evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29
April 1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of Robbery but acquitted in the
case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the detention is absorbed in the
crime of robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations filed, one for
Robbery and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case, only one Information
was filed charging the complex offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been
consummated and the detention was merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police.
Not so in this case, where the detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation
of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery
so that it was held therein:
. . . were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the police at the
scene of the crime, they would have not anymore detained the people inside since they
have already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but
to resort to detention of these people as security, until arrangements for their safe
passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal detention punishable under the
penal laws but an act of restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace
officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People v. Uday 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery case
were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of
robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention was only
incidental to the main crime of robbery, and although in the course thereof women
and children were also held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery.
In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a
necessary means to commit the same.1wphi1 After the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to
Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The victims were then taken as
hostages and the demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for
their release. The detention was not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were
the victims held as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint
to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional
amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much later after several hours of detention
had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they
adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to
them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907]
where the restraint was for no other purpose than to prevent the victims from reporting the crime
to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085 [1953] where the victims were taken
to a place one kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the robbery; from
People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953]; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which
cases were cited in Astor and where the victims were only incidentally detained so that the
detention was deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention
are present in this case. The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary
and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among
those detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting ransom, another
listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.) not only from the detained persons themselves
but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a
necessary means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The
information filed in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath
by the offended party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape
committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house
at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by
the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with
threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay
with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her
will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After
the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence
and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO
ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable
doubt, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and considering the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY,PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the
amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant
found guilty of the crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29,
1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3,
subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC)
soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house.
Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984).
Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house
(p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She
then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-
9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since
the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced
complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the
second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still
poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled
off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the
knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only
a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
 Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this
position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this
stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping
(p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and
climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room.
Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a
window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in
front of the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she
ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were
inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs
crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped
it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and
saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial
Hospital where she was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a
Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing
with no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear
abrasions below (L) breast.
Back Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the
vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice,
tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger
can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges
noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show
remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore
casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be
justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations
also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make
mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility
(People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as
adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact,
complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of
spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one
of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim
that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her.
According to the accused, this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's
advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act."
(p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended
there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the
aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently
deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the
truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's
finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be
desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her
answer to every question profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and
straightforward. To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for
the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of
the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her
sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused
People v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not bother to contradict this statement.
did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was
committed. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall
building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. flat on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We
Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that
presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and really calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is
right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of
hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-
53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the
narration of the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo): The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the
same view.
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry
the weight of both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
the manner as narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials,
securedly nailed, and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same. Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio,
et al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 1. By using force or intimidation;
55, Rollo):
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the
ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings,
many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being
injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom xxx xxx xxx
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her
private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312),
We ruled that:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies
as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered
entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
her. All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred unless
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to
corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R.
No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim, the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.1wphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage
applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil.
209, 212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is
readily understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside
cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words,
to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign
force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when
he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which
should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes
attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a
foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and
the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felony is consummated. In a
long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v.
Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-
32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation
of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan
et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.
Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be
committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria 50 Phil.
998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this
is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which
provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted
or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria
case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape
in the amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared
that the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of
fact, he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as
interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of
uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not
oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony
of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras
People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot
be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance
with the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind
of the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive
testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other,
for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance
in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not
exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous
(which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in
inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there
was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration,
even if only partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to,
when you said comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167
SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People
v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr.
Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso, supra).

Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.

Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the
proper imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9,
1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty
but merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987
not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33,
February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335,
paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation
to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March
15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118
SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO, accused.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita[1] finally did away with frustrated rape[2] and
allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant
case lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by
considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is,
if the contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may send the
wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude
with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be
considered consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of
passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense
were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the
acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration
was not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was
sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for
consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there
was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.[3] The inference
that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required
for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime
to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into
the labia or lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of
the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the
lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external
genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,[4] the crucial doctrinal bottom line is
that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of,
the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other
words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement
of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips
of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to
attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed
either in its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would
exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may
seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused - a reclusive life
that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life
on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus
limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no
longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by
the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death,[5] hence this case before us on automatic review
under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. [6]
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 oclock in the
afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went
down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2)
children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a
helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she
heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down
to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Horrified, she cursed
the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her
blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path.
Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle
who were living within their compound, to chase the accused.[8] Seconds later, Primo was
apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back
of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials
instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative
results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer
on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence
and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will
against him for his refusal to run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a
playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both
of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them
and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad
but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for
help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente
punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards
the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to
explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead.
When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his
back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon
him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him
guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay
his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He
argues that her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with
implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience.
He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthels
younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo
drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the
episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard
and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides,
the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo
insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the
alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the
alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence
of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthels private parts more than
bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that
she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas
and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into
Crysthels vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel
was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended
party being below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor
is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. [10] But the
act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into
the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea[11] we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the
attackers penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the
context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the
accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which
could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on
the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his
penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt
his organ on the lips of her vulva,[12] or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of
her vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape.[14] As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their
natural situs or location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the
penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora.[15] Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated,[16] and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of
the female organ,"[17] but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment of the
drawbridge."[19] But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of
orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge
its onus of proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight.
Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her
daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact
between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her childrens room
Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel
without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently,
in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon
Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described
thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused
is pinning down the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his
left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primos kneeling position rendered
an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and
the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly
reaching Crysthels external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc.,
since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazons sight, not
to discount the fact that Primos right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it
from Corazons view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have
seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is
not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her
claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we
cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved.
To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite
her timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans instinct of self-preservation to remain where
he is and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have
already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal
behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazons presence would have been to pull his
pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively
short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to
conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the
question of the court -
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus -
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of
whether rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primos
penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration,[21] obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been
aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper
and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult
interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry.
Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the
accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the
prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate
Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he
responded with an erection.[23] On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold
his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having breached Crysthels vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primos advances by putting her legs close
together;[24] consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what
Primo did to her.[25] Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases
where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape
nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal
finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping
with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.[26] None was shown in this case.
Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender
age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true,
acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that
even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were
no external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the
absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim.[27]
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of
unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis
of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude
that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of
attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for
it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for
the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees
lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which
is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY"
CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay
damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant.
Ariston Estrada for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court of
First Instance of this city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y
Bunaladi, alias Hugo Navarro y Bunadia, with the crime of arson, and, on the 20th of May of
the present year, judgment was rendered whereby Severino or Faustino Valdes u Guilgan was
sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the costs. From this
judgment this defendant appealed. With respect to Hugo Labarro or Navarro, the proceedings
were dismissed with the other half of the costs de officio.
Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin was absent
from the house in which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street, San Miguel,
Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin
and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latter's house, for until
then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to the fact she
ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he found, so asked with
kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a
jute sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the
entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning
the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called
for the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement,
Exhibit C, drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who
had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the date mentioned. and he
also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on previous days;
that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro,
for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as he and his
coaccused were friends, he acted as he did under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a
peso for each such fire that he should start. lawphi1.net
The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the police
station, although he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with kerosene,
in the place where they were found, and stated, that it was the servant Paulino who had done so.
He alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves
that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in the police station,
to wit, that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the house.
For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the
other defendant Hugo Labarro.
Owing to the repeated attempts made for about a month past, since Severino Valdes Began to
serve the Lewin family, to burn the house above mentioned. occupied by the latter and in which
this defendant was employed, some policemen were watching the building and one of them,
Antonio Garcia del Cid., one morning prior to the commission of the crime, according to his
testimony, saw the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the dwelling
house, in which warehouse there was some straw that had previously been burned, and that,
when the defendant noticed the presence of the policeman, he desisted from climbing the wall
and entering the warehouse.
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning
of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when
some of its inmates were inside of it.. This crime of provided for and punished by article 549,
in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven
perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for,
notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive
proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of
having set the other fires that occurred in said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted
having made declarations in the police station, and though at the trial he denied that he set fire
to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and burning, and, without proof
whatever, laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a
pile of dry leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which,
however, did not forewarn his mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he
allowed the sack and the rag to continue burning until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume
of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was submitted to substantiate the accusation
he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same persons as the driver Hugo
Labarro.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the
acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his
will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be
classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no
part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag,
soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have
started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with the
commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in
degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium
degree.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the modification
however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be given eight years and one day
of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed in article 57 of the Code. The
defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO
I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG
SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in
pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of
regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87. was
sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained
the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered
three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and
rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel
was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew
was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that
the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel
to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches
with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two
days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from
the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain
Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was
fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to
different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members
were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present
at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-
appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-
way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,
CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9)
other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive,
and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters
M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and
crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then
direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter
returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies
in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial,
and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to
the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with
Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were
told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had
no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only
went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that
he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed
the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and
his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the
Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,
who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars.
After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together
with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board
"Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon
his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of
diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was
ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William
Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that
"M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made
by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a
port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The
General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not
ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride"
and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and
William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the
firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was
observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer,
purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was
completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as
contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas
that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in
under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later
turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was
thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters
defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of
said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is
hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the
said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value
thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate
of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the
cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex
Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency
plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served
his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of
Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail
of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being
represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional
right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as
counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the
trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after
Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend
that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to
sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their
constitutional rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege
that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all
times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime
committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts
attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and
punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the
evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove
any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further
argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in
committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo
were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects
and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?;
(2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did
Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)
can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such
and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters
and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991,
stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-
lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the
due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer.
During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences
of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992,
pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself
in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation
of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the
fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law
that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article
6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion,
the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy , but
without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply
shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the
technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of
rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA
680 [1988]).
 However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth
to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution
even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the
presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the
accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was
not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-
called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter
in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this
rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain
other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the
uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right
to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient
evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction
of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In
the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the
crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among
those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its
cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about
sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong
San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991...
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the
vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more
than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers
and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas
executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as
some of the pirates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to
the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2 1991 and remained
on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination, which turned out to be off the port of
Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is
not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain
denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate
tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to
work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said
accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time
without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the
details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the
trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had
to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place
merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and
17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite,
sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more
so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant
must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was
physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to
do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded
the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court,
there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off
Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring
them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their
fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-
appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other
hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity
.Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
"M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio
Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained
at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of
Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree
No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to
reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders
who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the
vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion temporal
shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not
being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Undersc
oring supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. -The penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Underscoring
ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person. including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided
that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement
nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the
other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces any personincluding "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel
in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person
is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise
no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously
as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it
to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive
vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the
vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such,
it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal
code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan,
278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
[1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was
convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco
and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery
brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice
of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal
(People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual
in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He
profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June
3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum
products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations
and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance
while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities.
Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted
in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T
Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-
appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels
of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list
of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong;
that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of
Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled
to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco
a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride"
was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed
his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record);
that he then paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio
Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival
at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH",
Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on
the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric
tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above.
It was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco
supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in
the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He
failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of
sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain
Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew
that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a
marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted
with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not
even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be
noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for
less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation -only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved.
This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was
well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders
of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued
by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p.
212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent
violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board
a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was
equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere
clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the
trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of
Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the
deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not do so, for which reason,
he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence
on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite,
under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body
of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting
in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin
Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance
in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS
DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS
FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE
OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-
appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982,
a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of
ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As
the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of
the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring
the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to
Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal
building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion
and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants
for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured
a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the
accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his
statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him
on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on
Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole
basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that
"even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable
testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the
case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption
that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime.
In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo
Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of
pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by
Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does
not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<re||an1w> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for
the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange
for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book
during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she
never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was
tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion.
Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants
quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on
the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body
was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-
examination that you were reading comics when you
saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and
lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that
incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw
what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured
with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a
talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I
was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago
you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you
told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to
know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his
ass, do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay
will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to
pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on
his ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and
then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did
Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on
Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to
know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you
prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline.
I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with
a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that
the time you told him not to pour gasoline when he
merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour
gasoline he was already in the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was
while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay
or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed
by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having
taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents
on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging
smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making
fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it
is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery
as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage"
(p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill
the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his
act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to
exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed
the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call
be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on
fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony
defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place
in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there
is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn,
June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<re||an1w>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00.
Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00
as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARMANDO CABALLERO,
RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., and ROBITO
CABALLERO, accused.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO
CABALLERO, JR., appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo
Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Jr. of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 and RTC-
1218 and meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to pay
damages; and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and imposing on them the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Antecedents
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound surrounded by a
barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel, Broce Street, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living
in the same compound were Ricardo Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of
Eugene Tayactac, and her family. Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a
nephew of Wilma Broce.
In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr.
(Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo
in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m. of said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold
Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which was across the Mondragon
Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana
Broce, Eugenes girlfriend, for a chat. Susanas house was about 15 meters away from the store
of Wilma. Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone:
Gene mopalit ka? (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene replied: What is this all about? We dont have
any quarrel between us. Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence
of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined
him. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was
closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way to Susanas house. At that
time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by the window of their house saw her brother Eugene
going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised
him to go home. Myrna then left the window to pacify her crying baby.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed
Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and
Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers,
to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As Eugene was being assaulted,
Myrna returned to the window of her house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting
Eugene. She shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident,
was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of events.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to
pacify the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: Bay, what is the trouble between
you and Eugene? However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of
his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them
stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was,
however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded
to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: Tio, help me because I am hit. The commotion stopped only
upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all
returned to the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo
and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died
from the stab wounds they sustained.
Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Eugene. He signed a
postmortem report containing the following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.
Post-Mortem Findings:
= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed postero laterally,
lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and the (L) pulmonary artery and the left
middle lobe of the lungs;
= Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS parasternal line directed
posteriorly;
= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7th ICS 2 cm. long directed anteriorly.
 CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab wounds with
Massive Hemothorax (L) and Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]
He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharp-edged single-bladed
or double-bladed instrument, or by three instruments.[3]
Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Leonilo. He signed
a postmortem report containing the following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.
Post-mortem findings:
= Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post. axillary
line.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ injury.[4]
Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold Barcuma. He signed a
medical certificate stating that Arnold sustained the following injuries:
= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd
= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd
= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior axillary line at the level of
the 7th intercostal space, penetrating thoracic cavity and abdominal cavity.
... [5]
On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds sustained by Arnold could
have been caused by three different sharp-pointed instruments.[6] He further testified that Arnold
would have died because of the stab wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were charged with
Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC
1217 reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting
knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with the use
of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon said Leonilo Broce physical injury
described as follows:
= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.
and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to the death of Leonilo Broce.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission
of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene Tayactac in an
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, which reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting
knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter with
use of pieces of wood and stabbing him thereby inflicting upon said Eugene Tayactac physical
injuries which resulted to the death of the latter.
That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission
of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated murder for the
injuries of Arnold Barcuma. Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, it reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting
knives, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one ARNOLD BARCUMA, by striking him with the use of pieces of wood and stabbing him,
thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which would have resulted to the death of said
Arnold Barcuma, thus performing all the acts of execution, which would have produced the
crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused that is, the timely medical assistance rendered to said
Arnold Barcuma.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission
of the offense.[9]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September
15, 1994. They pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Robito Caballero remained at-large.
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. They
adduced evidence that Ricardo was employed as electrician in the Office of the City Engineer
of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab driver. Robito resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San
Carlos City while Marciano, Jr. was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City and
was employed with the Victorias Milling Corporation.
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and went to Bacolod
City. Armando went to the house of his brother Ricardo to help in the construction of the latters
house and to take care of Ricardos fighting cocks while he was in his office. Ricardo arrived
home at 8:00 p.m. and had dinner with his family and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila
and their younger brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. allegedly
was mauled by a group of men and sustained an abrasion, a contusion and swelling of the left
side of his face. Ricardo and Armando brought their brother Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for
treatment. On August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr. was treated for:
= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;
= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;
= Swelling left face.
No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring complication.[10]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting Arnold. They
also denied having any altercation with the victims. They also denied stabbing Leonilo. They
had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna would implicate them for the deaths of Leonilo and
Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May 7, 2001 finding all the
three accused, now appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes
charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias Baby, Ricardo Caballero, alias Ricky and
Marciano Caballero, Jr., alias Jun, having been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged them as principals, are hereby sentenced to suffer:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, there being no mitigating
circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, the maximum penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Leonilo Broce the sum
of P75,000.00 as indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or Eugenio Tayactac, there being
no mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery
and abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty of death; and to pay the heirs of Eugene
Tayactac the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity; and
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having seriously inflicted injuries
upon the person of Arnold Barcuma which nearly resulted to his death, there being no mitigating
circumstance present, an imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day, with no award as to damages, no evidence having been
introduced to establish, the same; and
4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to kill Eugene
and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was only appellant
Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it
concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the
injuries of Arnold.
In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of the trial court contending
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIMS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY KILLED THE
VICTIMS.[12]
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of errors.
 The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt their
respective guilt for the deaths of Eugene and Leonilo and for the injuries sustained by
Arnold. They assert that the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting their defenses of
denial and alibi. They claim that at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital
for the treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr.
The appellants are partly correct.
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault
Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained
by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always
predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and
intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself,
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective
acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming
at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the attainment
of the same objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[15] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[16] Direct proof of a person in
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission
of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution.[17] Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. [18]
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures
and presumptions.[19] Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy
absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common
objective and purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the
contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the
intended crime.[21]
In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma whether the
latter was going to buy something from the store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he
and Armando had no quarrel between them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the
reaction of Eugene because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of
the Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr.
and Robito joined their brother, appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused
Robito were armed with knives. When Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant
Armando pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up on
Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene with
it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When
Arnold rushed to the situs criminis to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant
Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined
appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew twice on his
forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law of appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith,
all the appellants, including accused Robito returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all
the appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the commission of the
crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for
trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the
death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants
stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally
liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito
conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house
to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab
Leonilo. There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants
assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. It must be recalled that Leonilo rushed out of his
house when he saw the commotion, with the intention of aiding the victim or pacifying the
protagonists. He was, however, stopped by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the
chest. Leonilo retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that only the accused Robito
stabbed Leonilo:
Q After that, what happened next?
A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.
Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?
A Still located at Sumakwel.
Q In that case, the very house where Eugene Tayaktak leaned on when he was
ganged up by the four?
A Yes.
Q What happened after that?
A When he came out from the house and saw that it was Eugene Tayaktak, he
proceeded to approach them but he was not able to approach them because he
was met by Robit Bebot Caballero and stabbed by Robito Caballero.
Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was stabbed by Robito Caballero?
A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: Tio, help me because I am hit.
INTERPRETERS (observation)
Witness demonstrating by holding her left armpit.
Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the attach (sic) of the Caballero
brothers?
A Not (sic).
Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
A He appeared very weak and he was staggering.
Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?
A Already dead.
Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he now?
 A The two of them were (sic) already dead.
Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped?
A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived.
Q What did the accused do after the trouble was stopped?
A They went inside the compound of his (sic) father.
Q What happened next?
A Nothing happened. Both of them were brought to the hospital.[22]
In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the appellants of murder
for the death of Leonilo. As this Court held in People v. Flora:[23]
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and
the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no
one else. For acts done outside the contemplation of theconspirators only the actual perpetrators
are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are
not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators
are liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to
the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of
Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor the injuries of Flor Espinas
caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals by direct
participation of murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove that:
.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.[24]
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. The essence
of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim. [25]
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he
sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susanas house. On the other hand, appellant Armando
was armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with
knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the
appellants killed Eugene with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder under
Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.[26]
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,[27] Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, distinguished an attempted from frustrated felony. He said that to be an attempted crime
the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
Thereafter, the phase is objective.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
of execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary
to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention
of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause
the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.[28]
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature
or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and
accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified
that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of his body was mortal and could have
caused his death were it not for the timely and effective medical intervention:
Q And how about the size and the depth of the wounds and how big is each wound
and how deep.
A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is about 2 inches and the 3rd is 2 inches in
the left, penetrating the chest near the thorax along the lateral line.
Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are wounds which are not really very serious?
A As I said before, the most serious is the 3rd wound.
Q So even without the other wounds the 3rd wound - - it could be the cause of the
death of the victim?
A Yes, Sir.[29]
It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The appellants
performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated because of the timely
medical intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and the attack on him
was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. In
sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
The appellants denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. RTC-1218 and RTC-
1219 cannot prevail over Wilmas and Arnolds positive and straightforward testimonies that the
appellants killed Eugene and stabbed Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold had no motive to
falsely implicate the appellants for the said crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full
probative weight.[30]
Equally barren of merit is appellants defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak
for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit approbation, the appellants were
burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time the crimes were
committed, they were in a place other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically
impossible for them to have committed said crimes.[31] The appellants dismally failed in this
respect. They testified that they were at the house of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently
near the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was assaulted. Moreover, the records show
that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the
incident. This belies the claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in
the hospital at the time of the incident.
Penalties Imposable on Appellants
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218
on its finding that treachery and abuse of superior strength were attendant in the killing of
Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree with the trial court and contends that abuse of
superior strength was absorbed by treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants.The Court agrees
with the Solicitor General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by
treachery.[32]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since aside from the qualified circumstance
of treachery, no other modifying circumstance was attendant in the commission of the crime,
the proper penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the Solicitor General contends
that the indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed on the appellants is not
correct. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.[33] The latter
penalty has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty
should be taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of
frustrated murder, the appellants should be meted an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Civil Liabilities of Appellants
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to pay
in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amount of P75,000 by way of
indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said heirs. This is erroneous. Since
the penalty imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be
only P50,000. The heirs of the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages.[34]
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral damages to the victim
Arnold Barcuma on its finding that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove said
damages. The Court disagrees with the trial court. The victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified
on his injuries.[35] He is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P25,000.[36] Having suffered
injuries and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual damages, which in the
absence of evidence would, nevertheless, entitle him to an award of temperate or moderate
damages, herein fixed at P10,000.
The Verdict of the Court
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-
1219 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty of
the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, REVERSES the judgment of the trial court and
ACQUITS them of the said charge.
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac,
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6,
first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The
appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim Arnold Barcuma
the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as temperate or moderate
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74048. November 14, 1990.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO CRUZ, alias
"Tikboy" and RADING SASON (at large), Accused, ROLANDO CRUZ, alias
"Tikboy", Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Hildawa & Gomez for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A FINDING
THEREOF. Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as
sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures.
It is also a well-entrenched rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a
finding of criminal conspiracy. In the case at bar, while the prosecutions evidence against
Sason appears overwhelming, its evidence linking accused-appellant Cruz to the felonious acts
of Sason is weak and inconclusive and utterly insufficient to establish Cruzs guilt.
2. ID.; ID.; PHRASE "ANDIYAN NA" OR ITS OTHER DERIVATIVE FORMS, HAVE NO
CONSPIRATORIAL MEANING. As observed by appellants counsel, the phrase "andiyan
na" reportedly uttered by appellant Cruz minutes before the actual shooting may lend some
semblance of conspiracy. But semblance is still a semblance and it cannot take the place of
facts. "The phrase andiyan na has equivocal meanings. When a person recognizes someone
who passes by, it is not uncommon to hear from the former, andiyan na si mayabang,
andiyan na yung kaibigan mo, or other derivative forms of the expression andiyan na, not
to mention the unadorned andiyan na itself. These phrases have no conclusive conspiratorial
meaning." In other words, the supposedly damning utterances are susceptible of varied
interpretations. In all conscience, given the particular factual milieu as gleaned from the
records, we cannot abide by the trial courts rather sweeping conclusion that "andiyan na"
were intended by the appellant to goad the gunwielder into killing Baang, thereby raising
appellants culpability to that of a principal by inducement. Inducement exists if the command
or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have
materialized. It taxes the imagination how the controversial phrase imputed to the appellant
could become the moving cause without which Sason would not have shot the victim in cold
blood. Murder is a serious charge. The slightest doubt must be resolved in favor of innocence.
3. ID.; LIABILITY; COOPERATION PUNISHABLE BY LAW, EXPLAINED. Finally, it
may be asked: Could appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated in the
execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased.? It must be explained that
the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally
given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. (People
v. Bello, 11 Phil. 526; People v. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil. 993) In the case at bar, there is
absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior plan or agreement between appellant Cruz and
Sason to kill the victim. That essential element cannot be automatically deduced from the fact
that the two accused had harbored a grudge against Baang. All told, the criminal complicity of
appellant Cruz, either as a principal by inducement or as an accomplice, in the killing of
Baang has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that he must be acquitted.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MOTIVE; CONJECTURE OR SUPPOSITION
THEREON, CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTION; SERIOUSNESS OF
THREATS MADE WHILE DRUNK OR IN A STATE OF STUPOR, GREATLY
IMPAIRED. The trial court attempted to bolster its conviction of appellant by citing the ill-
feelings reportedly existing between the appellant and the victim as a result of a scandal
during a church wedding. While it is true that the bride was appellants niece, it is equally true
that the victim Baang was married to Leonila Gullen, a first-cousin of the appellant. To
attribute anger and humiliation to appellant enough for him to want to kill a close relation
simply because of some wedding embarrassment which did not even affect him personally
is to indulge once again in another conjecture or supposition which cannot serve as a basis for
conviction. The court a quo also took into account the various threats made on the life of
Baang which appellant purportedly made. Considering that said threats were made while
appellant was drunk or in a state of stupor, their gravity or seriousness has been greatly
impaired.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz, alias "Tikboy", appeals from the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 169, finding him guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the
amount of P30,000.00.
The factual background is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the afternoon of November 25, 1983, Jesus Baang, married, 36 years old, fisherman,
succumbed to three gunshot wounds on the head, chest and back. According to several
eyewitnesses who were at the scene of the crime, his alleged assailant was Rading (Radito)
Sason, but Rolando Cruz was implicated as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement.
Accordingly, an information was filed by the Assistant Fiscal of Malabon on December 2,
1983, against Rolando Cruz, alias "Tikboy and Rading Sason, who is still at large, the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 25th day of November 1983, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another while armed with a gun, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot JESUS BAANG y VALDEZ, hitting the
latter on the different vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds
which directly caused his death." 1
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Accused Rolando Cruz filed a motion for bail,
contending that the evidence against him was not strong. A hearing was conducted on said
motion, and after the presentation of six (6) prosecution witnesses, bail was granted for his
provisional liberty.
Thereafter, Accused Rolando Cruz was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged. Trial followed. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence adduced,
the Malabon trial court, thru Judge Eufrocinio S. dela Merced, rendered a decision on January
24, 1986. The dispositive part reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rolando Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder as co-principal in the commission of the said offense and hereby sentences to
suffer penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and
to pay the costs.
"The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00" 2
Hence the present appeal.
Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz comes before this Court on a lone assignment of error, to
wit, that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as a conspirator in the crime of
murder.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As earlier stated, there were several eyewitnesses to the shooting of Jesus Baang. Their
testimonies invariably pointed to Rading Sason as the lone gunwielder. One witness, Danilo
Soriano, 21 years old, laborer, graphically described the incident. He recounted that at around
four oclock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, he was at the store of Lola Ida in
Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila. He saw the victim Jesus Baang walking along M. Sioson
Street, followed by Rading Sason. Suddenly, Sason shot Baang from behind. After the first
gunshot, Baang turned around and faced his assailant who then shot him for the second time.
Baang tried to escape but he fell on the ground. It was at this point when the gunman delivered
the coup de grace and fatally shot Baang on the head. Sason then walked away from the scene.
3 "Q: How far is this house of Aling Jusing to the house of Rolando Cruz?
Soriano stated that he did not see the accused Rolando Cruz during the actual shooting. It was
afterwards, during the ensuing commotion, that he noticed Cruz standing at the alley leading
to the street, watching the crowd milling around the dead body of Baang. 4
Another eyewitness, Renato Ramirez, 23 years old, testified that at the time of the incident, he
was standing at the corner of Don Basilio Boulevard and M. Sioson St. He was on his way
home. He saw Sason walking a few paces behind Baang. Then two shots rang out. He saw
Baang fall to the ground. Sason approached Baang and shot him again. Then Sason left. 5
The shooting unnerved Ramirez who was only about one and one-half electric posts away.
When he met the gunman, he asked: "Pare, bakit?" To which, Sason replied: "Pare, wala kang
nakita." 6
Ramirez corroborated the testimony of Soriano to the effect that the accused Rolando Cruz
was nowhere near the scene during the actual attack.7
The witnesses narrations closely coincided with the findings of Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, the NBI
medico-legal officer who autopsied the victims cadaver at nine oclock in the evening of
November 25, 1983. His report disclosed that the deceased Baang was shot at the back, chest
and head with a .45 caliber pistol. He sustained three (3) wounds, two of which were fatal.8
The motive for the killing was apparently caused by the victim himself. It appears that one day
before the wedding of Laura, a sister of Rading Sason, a former girlfriend (Tiray) of the
prospective groom arrived from Palawan. Baang allowed her to sleep in his house and then
brought her the following morning to the church. The woman created a scene and as a result,
the wedding was celebrated at the side altar, instead of the main altar. The incident caused
embarrassment and humiliation to the brides family, particularly Rading Sason. 9
It was through the eyewitness account of Ismael "Doro" Rivera that the prosecution sought to
establish the existence of a conspiracy between Sason, the triggerman, and accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz to liquidate Baang.
Rivera, a 22-year old laborer and a cousin of the two accused, testified that at around two
oclock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, he was in the house of Aling Jusing, drinking
with Rading Sason, Danilo Soriano and Renato Ramirez. After a while, Soriano left, followed
by Ramirez who said that he was going to have a haircut. Then Sason followed suit and
headed in the direction of the church. 10
Rivera saw Rolando Cruz come out of his house and talked with Sason. Rivera
recalled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Under what circumstances Mr. Witness have you seen this Rolando Cruz at the house of
Aling Jusing before this Rading Sason left?
"A: He just came out of his house sir.
"Q: Who came out of his house?
"A: Rolando Cruz sir.
"A: A little bit far sir.
"Q: On that occasion that Rolando Cruz was seen by you before Rading Sason left, was there
any conversation that had took (sic) place between Rading Sason and Rolando Cruz?
"A: There was sir.
"Q: What was the conversation, do you know?
"A: Rolando Cruz told Rading Sason "andiyan na."
"Q: And after that utterances or remarks made by Rolando Cruz, what did Rading Sason do if
he did anything?
"A: The 2 of them left sir.
"Q: After the 2 of them left, what happened?
"A: I heard shots sir." 11
The above declarations were relied upon by the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz was a principal party in the killing of Baang. The court
said:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"The actuations of the latter (Rolando Cruz) in uttering the words Andiyan na to Rading
Sason of the presence of Jesus Baang could not be given any meaning except that he is a party
in the commission of the crime in the killing of Jesus Baang. He (Rolando Cruz) certainly
conspired and helped Rading Sason in the consummation of the crime charged. There is a
moral certainty that conspiracy existed and therefore Rolando Cruz is as guilty as the principal
by induction in the commission of the crime of murder." 12
Rolando Cruz, on his part, maintains his innocence. He claims that at the time Jesus Baang
was gunned down by Rading Sason, he was at the back of his mothers house near the
fishpond, which is three (3) electric posts away from the scene of the crime. He was spreading
and laying the fishnet. Then Ismael Rivera called out to him and told him of the violent
incident at the "labasan." He quickly went outside and saw many people looking at the
sprawled body of the victim. On that same day, November 25, 1983, Cruz was arrested by the
police and brought to the police headquarters for investigation. 13
The defense has assailed the trial court for giving undue weight to the words "nandiyan na"
reportedly uttered by Cruz and inferring therefrom a conspiracy to kill Baang. The defense
points out that Rivera, the same eyewitness who incriminated Cruz, also testified in court that
there was no proof that a plan to liquidate Baang was ever made between Sason and the
appellant. His testimony reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Mr. Rivera, do you know that Rading Sason and Rolando Cruz were charged before this
Court for Murder of Jesus Baang?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: And what you saw and what you narrated before the Court, could you tell us if you ever
heard any plan between Rolando Cruz and Rading Sason to kill Jesus Baang?
"A: I just heard Rolando Cruz told Rading Sason "andiyan na."
"Q: So you can confirm before this Court that you did not hear Rading Sason and Rolando
Cruz planning to kill Jesus Baang?
"A: No sir." 14
Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as sufficiently as the crime
itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures. It is also a well-
entrenched rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of
criminal conspiracy. 15 In the case at bar, while the prosecutions evidence against Sason
appears overwhelming, its evidence linking accused-appellant Cruz to the felonious acts of
Sason is weak and inconclusive and utterly insufficient to establish Cruzs guilt.
As observed by appellants counsel, the phrase "andiyan na" reportedly uttered by appellant
Cruz minutes before the actual shooting may lend some semblance of conspiracy. But
semblance is still a semblance and it cannot take the place of facts. "The phrase andiyan na
has equivocal meanings. When a person recognizes someone who passes by, it is not
uncommon to hear from the former, andiyan na si mayabang, andiyan na yung kaibigan
mo, or other derivative forms of the expression andiyan na, not to mention the unadorned
andiyan na itself. These phrases have no conclusive conspiratorial meaning." 16
In other words, the supposedly damning utterances are susceptible of varied interpretations. In
all conscience, given the particular factual milieu as gleaned from the records, we cannot abide
by the trial courts rather sweeping conclusion that "andiyan na" were intended by the
appellant to goad the gunwielder into killing Baang, thereby raising appellants culpability to
that of a principal by inducement.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Inducement exists if the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence,
the crime would not have materialized. 17 It taxes the imagination how the controversial
phrase imputed to the appellant could become the moving cause without which Sason would
not have shot the victim in cold blood. Murder is a serious charge. The slightest doubt must be
resolved in favor of innocence.
The trial court attempted to bolster its conviction of appellant by citing the ill-feelings
reportedly existing between the appellant and the victim as a result of a scandal during a
church wedding. While it is true that the bride was appellants niece, it is equally true that the
victim Baang was married to Leonila Gullen, a first-cousin of the appellant. To attribute anger
and humiliation to appellant enough for him to want to kill a close relation simply because
of some wedding embarrassment which did not even affect him personally is to indulge
once again in another conjecture or supposition which cannot serve as a basis for conviction.
The court a quo also took into account the various threats made on the life of Baang which
appellant purportedly made. Considering that said threats were made while appellant was
drunk or in a state of stupor, their gravity or seriousness has been greatly impaired. 18
Finally, it may be asked: Could appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated
in the execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased.? 19
It must be explained that the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is
knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the
criminal purpose. 20 In the case at bar, there is absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior
plan or agreement between appellant Cruz and Sason to kill the victim. That essential element
cannot be automatically deduced from the fact that the two accused had harbored a grudge
against Baang.
All told, the criminal complicity of appellant Cruz, either as a principal by inducement or as an
accomplice, in the killing of Baang has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. It
follows that he must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz alias "Tikboy" is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARQUILLOS TABUSO y
SISTER @ BULAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by accused Arquillos Tabuso from the Decision of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 92-108854.
Filed on August 5, 1992 by Assistant City Prosecutor Orlando Ana-Siapno, the
Information indicting accused Arquillos Tabuso y Sister @ Bulag, alleges:
That on or about July 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating with three others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon one ROBERTO BUGARIN Y PIGAR by shooting the latter
with a gun hitting him on the right armpit and right shoulder, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. [1]
With the accused entering a negative plea on October 22, 1992, upon arraignment with
the assistance of Atty. Bonifacio Macabaya, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Arturo
Cortes, Renato Datingginoo, Rosalinda Datingginoo, Cesar Bugarin, Marcial Cenido and Dr.
Rowena Asuncion, as its witnesses.
For the defense, the accused took the witness stand as the lone witness on his behalf.
Testified on by its witnesses, the version of the prosecution runs as follows:
On July 29, 1992, at 8:40 oclock in the evening, Renato Datingginoo passed by the group
of Arnold Mendoza, accused Arquillos Tabuso and some other companions in an alley, on his
way to Sevilla Street, Tondo, Manila, to buy food. He (Renato) heard Tabuso utter nandiyan na
si Dagul (TSN, December 10, 1992, p. 6). Referred to as Dagul was the deceased Roberto
Bugarin.
When he (Renato Datingginoo) was near the store, he heard two (2) gunshots coming from
the direction of the said alley. He went back to the alley and met one Banong who uttered, Utol,
wala iyon, binanatan lang si Dagul (TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 10). Banong is Arnold
Mendozas brother. He heard another gunshot. Thereafter, he saw Arnold Mendoza, Banong,
Arquillos Tabuso and another person hurriedly coming out from the alley, and proceeding to
their house.
Then, Renato went to the place where the incident happened, near his house, and he saw
Roberto Bugarin lying prostrate on the ground, stiffening (naninigas, nakatumba, nangingisay)
(TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 12). Thereafter, he brought him to the Mary Johnston Hospital. At
around 10:00 oclock in the evening, he learned that Bugarin died.
Rosalina Datingginoo testified that she and her uncle Amado Bugarin, heard two
gunshots, on July 29, 1992, at 8:40 oclock in the evening, while they were in the house of
Rebecca Ty, her sister. Her uncle closed the door so as not to get involved in the case. Somebody
knocked at the door and when her uncle opened it, it turned out that the person knocking was
Rolando Bugarin. She saw Arnold Mendoza shoot Bugarin twice and the latter lay on the floor
of her aunts house. Mendoza, Tabuso and their two companions hurriedly escaped from the
scene of the crime.
Dr. Rowena Asuncion of Mary Jonhston Hospital examined the victim and found him
with two gunshot wounds in the lungs, one on the right posterior axillary line with no point of
exit, and the other at the right midcalf of the thoracic line.Before declaring Bugarin dead, at 8:55
oclock in the evening of the same day, doctors inserted a tube in his throat to force air into his
lungs and to supply oxygen to the patient. They also inserted an intravenous line to his
extremities.
Cesar Bugarin, bereaved father of the deceased, claimed that he gave P5,000.00 to his
lawyer as downpayment for the P10,000.00 attorneys fees agreed upon. He also spent P3,000.00
for the cemetery arrangements, P9,000.00 for the services of Don Bosco Funeral
Parlor, P2,562.00 for transportation expenses, P26.00 for coffee, P36.00 for sugar, P104.00 for
orange juice, P100.00 for biscuits and P100.00 for peanuts and green peas. He experienced
anxiety by reason of his sons death and suffered moral damages, as a result.
Accused put up the defense of alibi.
Accused theorized that he was taking care of his child in his house at No. 50 Sampaloc
Street, Camarin, Caloocan, when the killing complained of happened. On July 31, 1992, WPD
Officers invited him to the UN Detachment Office and asked him about Mendozas
whereabouts. To his surprise, one Renato Reyes and another woman identified him, after which,
they incarcerated him for being a relative of Arnold Mendoza.
On August 9, 1993, Judge Inocencio D. Maliaman of the Regional Trial Court a quo found
the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to support a judgment of conviction and disposed,
thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Arquillos Tabuso Y Sister guilty of the crime of murder
as charged in the information, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. He is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim and P14,928.00 as consequential
damages and to pay the costs.
In the service of the sentence, the accused is entitled to the provision of Article 29[2] of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[3]
Undaunted, the accused found his way to this Court via the ordinary appeal at bar. To
buttress his protestation of innocence and plea for acquittal, appellant theorized:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CONSPIRED WITH ARNOLD MENDOZA IN THE MURDER OF
ROBERTO BUGARIN.
 II When I pass by their group, I heard Arquillos Tabuso saying nandiyan na si Dagul, sir.
FISCAL PINEDA:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY REJECTING THE
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. This Tabuso you are referring to is he the same person charged of homicide?
WITNESS:
III
Yes, Sir, as far as I know, Arquillos Tabuso is merely a look out xxx (TSN, December 9,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED- 1992, pp. 6-7)
APPPELLATNT (sic) GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME "WITNESS:
OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
THE NECESSARY QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE.[4] I did not notice what happened, so I just pass (sic) by their group and proceeded to Sevilla
St. and while going to Sevilla St., I heard a gunshots, (sic) sir.
The pivot of inquiry being factual and evidentiary, credibility of the witnesses assumes
FISCAL PINEDA:
extreme importance. Records on hand indicate that the sole basis of appellants conviction is his
alleged conspiracy with Arnold Mendoza and some others. How far are (sic) you from Tabuso when he utter (sic) the words nandiyan na si Dagul
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement on the commission of WITNESS:
a felony and decide to commit it. (People v. Manuzon, 277 SCRA 550) In a number of cases,
this Court ruled that similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of More or less 2 meters away, sir.
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Andal, 279 SCRA 474, 476)
FISCAL PINEDA:
The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-
You said you proceeded to a place when you are (sic) going to buy foods and you said you
conspirator. (People v. Ortiz, 266 SCRA 641, 643) Assumed intimacy between two persons of
heard 2 gunshots, is that correct?
itself does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal conspiracy." (People
v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432) WITNESS:
Conspiracy certainly transcends companionship. (supra) Settled is the rule that to Yes, sir. xxx (TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 8)
establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of
an illegal act is required. (People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310, 311) ATTY. HERNANDEZ:

A careful examination and appreciation of the attendant facts and circumstances show that Do (sic) you know if said Arquillos Tabuso has (sic) any relation to Arnold Mendoza?
the witnesses were categorical in their narration that it was Arnold Mendoza who killed Rolando
Bugarin. The People placed heavy reliance on Renato Datingginoos testimony that Tabuso acted WITNESS:
as a lookout, which conclusion must have been arrived at when Tabuso uttered Nandiyan na si Before the incident, I do (sic) not know, Sir.
Dagul and from the fact that the assailants (including Tabuso) fled.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
The Court thoroughly examined the transcript of stenographic notes and nothing can be
deduced from the testimony of Renato Datingginoo that accused Arquillos Tabuso conspired What about after the incident?
with Mendoza and some others in killing Bugarin. He (witness) testified:
ATTY. MACABAYA:
FISCAL PINEDA:
We object, she is incompetent to answer?
Do you know what these people were doing when you pass by?
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
WITNESS:
She is testifying.
They were standing as if they were waiting for someone, Sir.
COURT
FISCAL PINEDA:
Witness may answer.
What happened when you pass by their group as if they were waiting for somebody else?
WITNESS;
WITNESS:
Yes, Sir, Arquillos Tabuso as a relation to Arnold Mendoza.
 ATTY. HERNANDEZ: relationship does not necessarily make them conspirators, absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
What relation does (sic) he have?
Finally, the prosecution further theorized that appellant acted as a lookout during the
WITNESS: commission of the felony. But such a theory is incredible because Tabuso is known in Sevilla
They were cousin, (sic) sir. Street, Tondo, as Bulag or blind because of an eye defect.Considering his deformity, which is
undisputed, the Court entertains great doubts over his ability or efficacy to perform the role of
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: a supposed lookout.

What about the three suspected men whom you saw hurriedly escape, (sic) will you look Absent enough evidence to establish conspiracy, acquittal of accused-appellant is in order
around if they were here now? since his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, as Alfonso El Sabio
was reputed to have said a long time ago and as cited by the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez
WITNESS: in People v. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769, 784; Mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos
presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.
They were not here, sir.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED; and on the ground
ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Arquillos Tabuso y Sister @ Bulag is hereby
Were you able to know the two men aside from Arquillos Tabuso after the shooting who ACQUITTED of the crime charged. With costs de oficio.
hurriedly escape? (sic)
Let the Director of Prisons, NBP, Muntinlupa City, cause the immediate release of
WITNESS: accused-appellant unless there be any other legal ground for his continued detention and report
to the Court within ten (10) days the action taken by virtue hereof.
No, sir. xxx (TSN, December 16, 1992, pp. 6-11)
SO ORDERED.
Generally, ineffectualness to entirely narrate the trivialities of the incident by the witness
strengthens, as it negates rehearsed trial, however, in the case under scrutiny, the lapses in the
testimony of Renato Datingginoo were not caused by the natural fickleness of his memory but
rather the full account of what he witnessed. After a careful examination of the evidence, the
Court is not convinced that Tabuso acted as a lookout when he uttered "Nandiyan na si Dagul".
Mere utterance of Tabuso of nandiyan na si Dagul did not evince commonality in criminal
intent. There is a scant scintilla of proof of Tabusos alleged role as a lookout. It was never
proven by the People. Obviously, that Tabuso acted as a lookout is just a conclusion arrived at
by Renato Datingginoo. It is barren of any factual or legal basis.
So, also, when he passed by the group of Mendoza in order to buy food, Datingginoo
concluded that they were standing as if waiting for someone. He merely relied on inferences
and did not really know what truly transpired. He had no hand in the situation. What is
undisputed was that he only observed that all the culprits were standing near the alley. When he
proceeded to Sevilla Street to buy food, he heard a gunshot and while buying food in the store,
heard two (2) more gunshots.
To be sure, alibi and denial are weak defenses. But, the burden of proof in criminal cases
lies with the prosecution.

Well-entrenched is the rule that in order to sustain the conviction of an accused person, his
guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the State with the prosecution relying on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. (People v. Almario, 275
SCRA 529)

What is more, when the accused testified on his behalf, he was consistent in his assertion
that he did not know anything about the killing. According to him, he was invited by the WPD
officers to the UN Detachment Office on July 31, 1992 and was put in jail when they failed to
locate Mendoza who is his relative. Mendoza and appellant Tabuso are cousins. However, sole

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON
LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE
GAYOT PILOLA, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing
him to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito
Capa y Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latters death.
The Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot
Pilola were charged with murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large
and no fixed address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-
bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab
one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested [3] and tried, and
subsequently convicted of murder.[4] The decision of the trial court became final and
executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly
died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He
was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[5] Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[6]
On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve
de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian
Azul, Jr. were drinking beer.Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and
Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two
newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated
argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two
ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going
to close up.Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when
Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched
Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded
fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen
meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow
blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the
protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled
out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around
Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw
their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their
knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim
was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon
and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear
life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E.
Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it
bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once
more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house
and informed his wife and brother of the incident.[7]
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy
Report No. N-88-375,[8] with the following findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back,
suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is
sharp, lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space,
right, 5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-
penetrating, with an approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space,
left, 3.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the
left thoracic cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of
10.0 cm.;
3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space,
12.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating
upper lobe of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space,
left, 15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially,
penetrating the left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the
left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;
5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic
cavity and then penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0
cm.;
6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line;
directed backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating
ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp,
lower extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0
cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with
an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt,
lower extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from
posterior median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and
then perforating the spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt,
lower extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward,
downward and medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth
of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp,
lower extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward,
upward and medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0
cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt,
lower extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward,
downward and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior
aspect, 1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion,
at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming
from outside. Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant
remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive
pain in his stomach. The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa
Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was
responsible for the stabbing.[9]
Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the
appellant was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from ulcer. The
appellant stayed home on the night of the incident.[10]
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int.
4, Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she
heard a commotion outside.Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of
her niece Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and
Julian were fighting. She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the
protagonists. Ronnie grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated
and fell down the canal. Not content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran
towards the direction of the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant
anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.[11]
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street,
Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was
earlier convicted herein. With cost against the accused.[12]
In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
 I Q All the eleven stab wounds?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY
ANENT THE ASSAILED INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN
SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of
probative weight. This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct
examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-
examination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim. The inconsistency in Elisas
testimony impaired her credibility.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de
minimis importance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with
murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.
Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and collateral
detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather
than destroy her credibility.[14]
Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men
who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisas testimony is corroborated
by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven
stab wounds. The doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator
in inflicting those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar
instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven
stab wounds [are] located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another
stab wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was
located at the antero lateral aspect, its the front of the chest almost to the
side. And also another one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the
left side of the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen
left side or where the left kidney is located, lumbar area. Another one at the
side of the chest, left side of the chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen,
another stab wound at the left arm. Another one at the left forearm and the
last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm. These are all the eleven
stab wounds sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like
a knife, kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there
were several assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the
presence of different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This
lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by the one holding the one
which inflicted the instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the stab
wounds.
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.[15]
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas
testimony.[16]
Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think
of any reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of cases, we have
ruled that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as
in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[17]
Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony. Case
law has it that the trial courts calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by the appellate court.
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie
and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his
participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the
criminal acts. He asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and
that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed
the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter
between the victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the
appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not categorically
and positively assert as to what part of the victims body was hit by whom, and how many times
the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a
principal by direct participation.
 We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it.[18] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately
from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by
direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design.[19] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.[20] There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the
other offenders,[21] and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or
was not in on the scheme from the beginning.[22] One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it.[23] One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in
contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. [24] Each of the conspirators is the
agent of all the others.[25]
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.[26] The mere presence
of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is
not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [27] Conspiracy to
exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the
legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[28] As a rule, the concurrence of wills,
which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and
circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same
end.[29]
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may
be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which
mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is
sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are
criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal
acts.[30] Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or
murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an
accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community
of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose;(b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts
that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[31] Accomplices come to know about
the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the
decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its
execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its
accomplishment.[32] However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by
performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct
participation, and not merely an accomplice.[33]
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and
Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the
appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with
their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and
the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian.When he failed to
overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow
block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and
the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired
to kill the victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There
is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim
was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined
Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill
the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not
merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the
victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The
stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the
victim or contributed materially thereto.[34]
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not
the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to
disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been present then.[35] In this case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing
incident, he was resting in the house of his cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was
suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.[36] But the appellant failed to adduce any medical
certificate that he was suffering from the ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the
appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed the victim. The appellants defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the appellant as one of the
victims assailants. The appellant himself admitted that his cousins house, the place where he
was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was merely ten to fifteen meters away from
the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elisa Rolan. [37]
The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs
criminis and later left his house. The records show that despite being informed that he was
sought after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly
and inscrutably disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988,
a subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was out of town. [38] The
appellants own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer
seen at Nueve de Pebrero after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve
de Pebrero?
Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was
executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As
testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times
mostly on the chest and the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage
to the victims vital internal organs.[42]
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
treachery.[43] There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the
felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and mitigating circumstances attended the commission
of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

A I did not see him anymore, sir.

Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what
you were then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola
there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the
victim. However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The
appellants flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, no reason can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt
and admission that he had no tenable defense.[40]
The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita
Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current
jurisprudence.[44] The said heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000, also conformably to current jurisprudence.[45] In addition, the heirs are entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.[46]
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

The Crime Committed by the Appellant

and the Proper Penalty Therefor

The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse
of superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on
his part.[41] In this case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without
provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the
latter. The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar
and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene
and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as
the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block.The
peacemaker became the victim of violence.