16 June 2006

First Chamber
No. C04/327HR
JMH/RM

Supreme Court of the Netherlands

Decision

in the case of:

KECOFA B.V.,
established in Kerkrade,
CLAIMANT before the Supreme Court, defendant in the conditional cross-action,
attorney-at-law: mr. R.S. Meijer,

versus

the company under French law LANCME PARFUMS ET BEAUT et Cie S.N.C.,
established in Paris, France,
DEFENDANT before the Supreme Court, claimant in the conditional cross-action,
attorney-at-law: mr. T. Cohen Jehoram

1. The Dispute in factual instances

The defendant before the Supreme Court to be referred to hereinafter as: Lancme
summoned by writ of 13 July 2000 the claimant in the appeal and [party involved 1], resident
in [abode] to be referred to hereinafter individually as: Kecofa and [party involved 1], or
jointly as: Kecofa et al. to appear before the District Court in Maastricht and claimed that by
judgment as far as possible enforceable notwithstanding appeal:
I. primarily: Kecofa et al. be ordered each individually, taking effect immediately, to cease
and desist from any infringement of the trademark and copyrights exclusively owned by
Lancme, in particular that they be ordered to cease and desist from any production, trade,
offer for sale, keeping in stock, import and export of any cosmetic product provided with the
trademark FEMALE TREASURE and a scent which is a reproduction of the TRESOR scent
of Lancme;
alternatively: that Kecofa et al. be ordered each individually taking effect immediately to
cease and desist from any unlawful act as described in the body of the writ of summons, in
particular that they be ordered to cease and desist from any production, trade, offer for sale,
keeping in stock, import and export of any (scent) products provided with a scent which is
similar in a confusing or diluting manner with the TRESOR scent of Lancme, under the
trademark FEMALE TREASURE and from making unlawful advertising;
primarily and alternatively: this under penalty of a civil fine of NLG 10,000.for each breach
as well as for each day on which a breach continues in full or in part or at the discretion of
Lancme for each product by which a breach is committed;

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II. that Kecofa et al. be ordered each individually to furnish, within 30 days following the
service of the judgment to be rendered, to the attorney of the claiming party an account
certified by a chartered accountant and substantiated with all relevant documents as described
in more detail in said writ of summons;
III. this at the discretion of Lancme and whatever is the higher, either that they be ordered to
pay damages to be assessed at the profits made by them with the sale, to be defined on the
basis of the data of the account to be given as referred to in II of this claiming part, or that
they be ordered to pay a sum to be assessed ex aequo et bono at NLG 100,000., at least a
sum which the District Court will find reasonable and fair including the legal interest due on
this as from the day of the writ of summons until the day of full settlement;
IV. that they be ordered each of them individually to surrender the profits made with the sale
of the FEMALE TREASURE products (to be calculated on the basis of the data to be
submitted under the claiming part in II) to Lancme;
V. that the deposit of the trademark of [party involved i] stated in the body of this writ of
summons be invalidated and that the court orders of its own motion removal of this trademark
from the register;
VI. that Kecofa et al. be ordered each individually to pay the costs of these proceedings.

Kecofa c.s. contested the claims.

The District Court admitted by interlocutory judgment of 18 April 2002, corrected by
judgment of 23 May 2002, Lancme and Kecofa to furnish proof and held over any further
decision.
From the judgment Lancme lodged an appeal with the Appeal Court in s-Hertogenbosch.
Kecofa et al. lodged a cross-appeal.
By decision of 8 June 2004 the Appeal Court annulled the judgment on appeal in the principal
appeal and the cross-appeal and while adjudicating again:
1. ordered Kecofa by the seventh day following the service of this decision to cease and desist
from any infringement of the copyrights vested in Lancme relating to the perfume Trsor,
and ordered it in particular to cease and desist from any production, trade, offer for sale,
keeping in stock, import and export of any scent which is a reproduction of the perfume
Trsor, this under penalty of a civil fine of 2,500.for each product or for each day that the
breach continues after the service of this decision;
2. ordered Kecofa to submit by the thirtieth day following the service of this decision to the
attorney of Lancme an account certified by a chartered accountant concerning:
a) the total amount of infringing products produced and/or purchased by Kecofa after 12 July
1995;
b) the total amount of infringing products sold after 12 July 1995 by Kecofa;
c) the purchase and selling prices of the infringing product used by Kecofa after 12 July 1995;
d) all names and addresses of the persons/legal entities to which Kecofa supplied the
infringing products after 12 July 1995;
e) the full names and addresses of all persons/legal entities involved in the production and
trade of the infringing products;
f) the total amount of infringing products still in stock with Kecofa, this under penalty of a
civil fine of 2,500.for each time or each day that Kecofa acts contrary to one or more of
the orders stated in 2;

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3. ruled that the total of the civil fines to be forfeited by Kecofa as a result of not meeting that
stated in 1 and 2 above will not exceed 500,000.--;
4. ordered Kecofa to pay to Lancme against due proof of discharge a sum of 16,398.51
raised with the legal interest over a sum of 5,598.51 as from 13 July 2000 until the day of
settlement, and over 10,800.as from 30 January 2004 until the day of settlement;
5. ordered Kecofa to surrender the profit made with the sale of the infringing products (to be
calculated on the basis of the data to be submitted under the claiming part in 2) after 12 July
1995 to Lancme;
6. ordered Kecofa to pay the costs of the proceedings of the first instance incurred on the part
of Lancme;
7. ordered Kecofa to pay the costs of the proceedings of the principal appeal incurred on the
part of Lancme;
8. ordered Lancme to pay the costs of the proceedings of the first instance and in the
principal appeal against [party involved 1], in both cases assessed at nil;
9. ordered Kecofa and [party involved 1] severally, on the understanding that one paying will
acquit the other one, to pay the costs of the proceedings of the cross-appeal on the part of
Lancme;
10. declared this decision as far as possible enforceable notwithstanding appeal;
11. dismissed any further or other claims.

The deicison of the Appeal Court has been annexed to this decision.

2. The Dispute before the Supreme Court

From the decision of the Appeal Court Kecofa has lodged an appeal in cassation. Lancme
lodged a conditional cross-appeal, also against [party involved 1]. The writ of summons of
cassation and the statement of defence as also cross-appeal have been annexed to this decision
and are part thereof.
The parties moved for dismissal of the appeal on both sides. In the cross-appeal Kecofa
invoked inadmissibility to the extent that the appeal is directed against [party involved 1].
The case has been explained on behalf of the parties by their attorneys, for Lancme also by
mr. Ch. Gielen, attorney-at-law in Amsterdam.
The opinion of the Advocate General D.W.F. Verkade involves annulment and reference to
the lower court in the principal appeal and dismissal and, as far as the cross-appeal is directed
against [party involved 1] a declaration of inadmissibility in the cross-appeal.

The attorney-at-law of Lancme responded to this opinion by letter of 30 December 2005.

3. Examination of the plea in the principal appeal

In cassation the following can be assumed.

(i) Lancme markets under the trademark Trsor, of which it is the exclusive right
owner in the Benelux, a perfume in this country.
(ii) Since about 1993 Kecofa markets under the trademark Female Treasure bottles of
eau de parfum. This trademark has been registered in the Benelux Trademark
register in the name of [party involved 1].

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(iii) In the years 1994-1997 Lancme brought actions against Kecofa by reason of
alleged trademark infringement founded on the use and registration respectively of
the trademark Female Treasure by Kecofa. The claims were dismissed by the
District Court in Amsterdam, said judgment being confirmed by the Appeal Court
in Amsterdam, by reason of the opinion that the points of similarity were not of
such a nature that the public would associate Female Treasure with Trsor merely
by reason of similarity. The cassation appeal from this decision has been
cancelled.

Lancme founded its claims as stated in 1 above on the facts

(a) that the trademark Female Treasure infringes the trademark Trsor, (b) that Kecofa is
guilty of misleading advertising in the sense of Art. 6:194 BW [Netherlands Civil Code]
and (c) that there is infringement of copyright, since the scent of Female Treasure is a
faithful imitation, and thus a reproduction, of the exclusive scent of Trsor and the trade in
this scent is a communication to the public in the sense of Art. 12 Auteurswet 1912 (Aw).
The ground referred to in (a) and (b) is no longer relevant in the principal cassation
appeal.
(b) After the District Court found in respect of the copyright law ground that the
Auteurswet [Netherlands Copyright Act] does not hinder protection of a scent
combination under copyright law, provided the conditions are met, the District Court
admitted Lancme to furnish proof inter alia that the scent offered under the trademark
Trsor meets these conditions and that the scent combination of Female Treasure must be
considered to be an adaptation or imitation of the one of Trsor. The District Court
admitted Kecofa to prove, to put it briefly, that the scent combination of Female Treasure
is not the result of derivation.
In the appeal lodged from this interlocutory judgment the Appeal Court considered in
respect of the copyright law ground of the claims of Lancme as follows.
It put a priori the question of whether the perfume Trsor qualifies for protection under
copyright law, to which end it examined (a) whether it concerns a work which qualifies
for such protection by its nature, as well as (b) whether the work has an original character
and bears the personal stamp of the maker. As to question (a) it considered that this
distinction must be made between the olfactory substance (the substance which as a result
of its composition spreads a specific scent) and the scent (perceivable by the olfactory
sense) and understood the allegations of Lancme in such sense that it invokes the
protection for the olfactory substance (contained in the perfume bottles) (jur.gr. 4.11.1).
The Appeal Court found that the question of whether a single fragrance may qualify as
work in the sense of the Auteurswet did not require any discussion, since Lancme does
not invoke protection under copyright law for the mere scent of its product (jur.gr. 4.11.2)
and therefore that which Lancme invokes such protection for is not only perceivable
zintuigelijk, but also sufficiently specific, stable and objectively definable to allow
consideration as work in the sense of the Auteurswet (jur.gr. 4.11.3-4.11.4). As to
question (b) the Appeal Court considered that the allegations of Lancme in substantiation
of its argument in question to put it briefly: that the perfume was the result of a creative
process which resulted into a specific combination of components; that in this a striking
and unique perfume was aspired; that it is a combination of scents described in more detail
and that by reason of its scent it was already immediately in high demand from start on

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were not (sufficiently) contested by Kecofa and in principle justify the opinion that the
perfume presents the required originality to a sufficient level (jur.gr. 4.12 = 4.12.2). By
reason of the defence of Kecofa against the alleged original character the Appeal Court
also considered that protection under copyright law does not require that the work is new
in an objective sense, but only that seen from the perspective of the maker it is original,
and that only if the existence of a previous similar work prejudices the originality of the
later work, there is derivation. This being the case must be alleged and proven by the one
against whom the protection under copyright law is invoked (jur.gr. 4.12-4.12.4). The
Appeal Court found that the mere circumstance that seen several generally described
features a perfume would fit within a specific style or tradition, does not suffice to decide
that it is not original, which therefore also applies to the allegation of Kecofa that the
perfume Trsor is similar to an earlier perfume. The allegation of Kecofa that the
perfume Trsor is an adaptation of the perfume Eternity of Calvin Klein the Appeal
Court found insufficiently substantiated, against the background of that alleged by
Lancme in respect of the development process and the original character of the perfume
Trsor (jur.gr. 4.12.5). All this led the Appeal Court to the conclusion that the perfume
Trsor can be considered to be a work in the sense of the Auteurswet (jur.gr. 4.13).
Next the Appeal Court examined the question whether the scent Female Treasure of
Kecofa infringes the perfume Trsor protected under copyright law on the basis of the
criterion whether Female Treasure represents the features of Trsor protected under
copyright law to such an extent that the overall impressions which the works makes differ
too little to find that Female Treasure can be considered to be an autonomous creation
(jur.gr. 4.16-4.16.1). The Appeal Court used in this (the Dutch translation of) a search
report submitted by Lancme and made by its order by the French firm Breese &
Majerowicz (hereinafter: the B&M report), in respect of which it considered that although
Kecofa countered this by stating that it was not made by an independent body, Kecofa did
not contest the expertise of this research firm, nor contested the content of the report
(jur.gr. 4.16-4.16.3). On the basis of this report which concludes that there is a strong
similarity of Female Treasure with Trsor and the finding of the Appeal Court that
Kecofa did not (sufficiently) allege that there is no derivation, it reached the opinion that
Female Treasure can be considered to be an unlawful reproduction of the perfume
protected under copyright law Trsor, and so Kecofa infringes the copyright of Lancme
(jur.gr. 4.16.4-4.16.6).
As to the claimed damages and profit account the Appeal Court considered that a
reasonable interpretation fitting within the general system of property law of Art. 27a Aw
[Auteurswet] implies that no more than the sum which equals the highest of the sums
claimed on such grounds is allowable, and found that at the moment it could not be
established whether Lancme incurred any loss of profits, or not. However, it did allow
the claim for profit account, next to the claimed costs for establishing damage and liability
(jur.gr. 4.24).

3.3.1 Count 1 challenges jur.gr. 4.11. The complaints as to law and reasoning in a. and b.
imply that while ignoring the limits of the litigation and/or by reason of an
incomprehensible interpretation of the allegations of Lancme the Appeal Court found
that in this dispute Lancme invokes the protection under copyright law not for the scent
of the perfume Trsor (which can be perceived by humans with their olfactory sense), but

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for the (composition of) the olfactory substance (the olfactory source) , as it is found in the
bottles marketed under the trademark Trsor, and the Appeal Court thus gave a surprise
decision, since Lancme no sooner invoked an analysis of the similar components in the
respective perfume liquids but upon oral pleadings in appeal and Kecofa did not accept
the litigation on this point. In c. and d. the count develops this with complaints about
incorrectness and/or incomprehensibility of the opinion of the Appeal Court, because the
composition of the olfactory substance as such is in principle not open to protection as
work in the sense of the Auteurswet, and the same or almost identical scent (message)
can be produced by olfactory substances of a very different nature or composition and,
vice versa, a rather small difference in the concentration or mixture proportion of the same
type of components may result into a significant and even essentially different scent
(message). In e. the count includes the development of complaints about the reasoning in
jur.gr. 4.165, 4.16.4 and 4.21 in respect of the operative part of the challenged decision.

3.3.2 Upon examining this count it is a priori that it does not contest that a scent always
including hereinafter: a scent combination may qualify for protection under copyright
law. This starting-point is correct. The description laid down in Art. 10 Aw, next to the
non-exhaustive listing of types of works, of what must be understood to be a work in the
sense of this Act, is put in general wording and does not prevent from comprising a scent
in this. This implies that as to the question of whether a scent qualifies for protection
under copyright law, or not, it is decisive whether this concerns a product which is open to
human perception and whether it has an original character of its own and bears the
personal stamp of the maker. The notion of work in the Auteurswet does find its limits
where the original character of its own is no more than what is required to achieve a
technical effect, but seeing that in case of a perfume there is no purely technical effect,
this last condition does not prevent the award of protection under copyright law to the
scent of a perfume. The circumstances that the properties of the human olfactory sense put
limits to the ability to distinguish scents and that the level to which one can distinguish
different scents differs from one person to another, does not alter the above, nor does the
circumstance that the specific nature of scents has the effect that not all provisions and
restrictions in the Auteurswet can directly apply to this seen for instance the use of
perfume which cannot be denied to the ordinary user and which by its nature necessarily
implies spreading of the scent.
For copyright law to apply a scent cannot be identified either with the substance or
substances which make the scent. This substance or substances operate as not
necessarily exclusive incorporation of the work which is the scent, and they also
contribute to that the scent should not be excluded from protection under copyright law
for being too volatile or instable. In a perfume the scent therefore has to be distinguished
from the mixture of substances which the perfume is composed of and which the gaseous
olfactory substances which cannot be perceived with the olfactory organ are released from
when exposed to the open air.

3.3.3 To the extent that the complaints of count 1 are founded on the opinion that the
Appeal Court interpreted the stand of Lancme in such a sense that it invokes protection
under copyright law only for the composition of the olfactory substance of its perfume
Trsor, they lack basis in fact.

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To the extent that count 1.a. complains that the Appeal Court gave an incomprehensible
interpretation of the ground of the claim of Lancme and its allegations, it is founded,
seeing that these allegations do not allow any interpretation other than that as appears
from that considered above in 3.3.2: rightly Lancme looks for protection for the scent
of the perfume Trsor. Nevertheless this complaint cannot result into cassation for lack of
importance. As appears from jur.gr. 4.11.2-4.11.4 the Appeal Court expressed, although in
less fortunate wordings, that the scent is entitled to protection under copyright law, as
incorporated in the olfactory substance contained in the perfume bottles. Upon examining
the infringement question the Appeal Court next rightly examined whether the scent
Female Treasure should be considered to be a reproduction of the work Trsor (jur.gr.
4.16-4.16.1 and 4.16.6). Counts 1.b, 1.c, 1c. and 1.e develop count 1.a and therefore share
its fate.

3.4.1 Count 2 challenges jur.gr. 4.12-4.13 and 4.16-4.16.7. Count 2.a is proposed in the
event that one or more of the complaints of count 1 succeed, and so seen the above it does
not require any discussion. To the extent that the other complaints of count 2 also develop
the ones of count 1 they cannot result into cassation either.

3.4.2 Count 2.b furthermore challenges with independent complaints the opinion laid
down in jur.gr. 4.12-4.13 concerning the original nature of the perfume Trsor. It blames
the Appeal Court in the first place for (i) having founded this opinion on the allegations of
Lancme itself. This complaint fails, because the Appeal Court (in jur.gr. 4.12.2)
considered that Kecofa did not contest these alleged facts while stating (sufficient) reasons
and that they justify in principle the opinion that the scent of Trsor presents the required
originality and the personal stamp of the maker to a sufficient level. In (ii) the count
complains that Kecofa did certainly contest the allegations of Lancme in question while
stating reasons, this with reference to a large number of references in the documents of the
case, an important part of which does, however, not concern the matter at hand. To the
extent that the count meets the conditions to be made to I under Art. 407(2) Rv.
[Netherlands Code on Civil Procedure], it fails. The Appeal Court discussed in jur.gr.
4.12.3-4.12.5 the allegations by which Kecofa countered the allegations of Lancme with
in this respect said argumentation boiling down to that the perfume Trsor fits within a
long existing tradition of perfumes having a specific scent character, that it is comparable
with the perfume already previously existing Eternity and is an adaptation of the
perfume Exclamation and dismissed these allegations inter alia with reference to
NethSC 9 March 1962, NJ 1964, 403, in a manner which does not demonstrate an
incorrect conception of the law, nor is incomprehensible. That such parenthood with an
existing scent tradition does exist in the perfume Trsor, also if this allegation was
sufficiently substantiated with the scent atlas submitted by Kecofa, does not alter this.
The mere circumstance that a creation fits within an existing tradition of similar works
does not hinder the possibility of protection under copyright law thereof. That is why the
Appeal Court could leave the offer of Kecofa to furnish proof aside.
The complaint in (iii) also fails, since in the light of that considered in respect of
complaint (ii) it is not relevant that, as the complaint implies, the allegations mentioned
before of Lancme leave room for the possibility that the scent of Trsor has too little
features relevant to copyright law to distinguish it as work in the sense of the Auteurswet

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from the scents of similar perfumes within the tradition referred to by Kecofa. The
complaint in (iv) involves the reproach that the Appeal Court omitted to verify
empirically whether the scent Trsor has an original character of its own and bears the
personal stamp of the maker, the more since the B&M report does not include anything on
that account. This complaint is answered by that considered by the Appeal Court in jur.gr.
4.124-4.12.5 not contested in cassation i.e. that protection under copyright law does
not require that the work is new in an objective sense, but that it suffices that it is original
in a subjective sense, i.e. seen from the perspective of the maker, that it is up to the one
who contests such originality to allege and, when contesting to prove that the maker
derived his work from an earlier work, and that in this respect Kecofa alleged too little, or
did not sufficiently substantiate its allegations respectively.

3.4.3 Count 2.c complains that the opinion of the Appeal Court on the question of whether
the scent of Female Treasure infringes the copyright vested in Lancme relating to the
scent of the perfume Trsor is incorrect, or else incomprehensible for several reasons. The
complaint reads (i) that without any verification of its own, at least not without any further
reasoning than invoking the B&M report, the Appeal Court could not reach the opinion
that, to put it briefly, Female Treasure infringes Trsor, (ii) at least since Kecofa objected
to the non-independent nature of this report, made an offer to furnish proof and was
impeded to make a countercheck/analysis before the hearing before the Appeal Court, (iii)
at least since it is feasible by law that the B&M report does not rule out that Female
Treasure does not infringe Trsor, either because it stays within the limits of a free
imitation of trend/style, or because it presents sufficient independent features/differences
in respect of Trsor. These complaints are open to joint examination.
It is a priori that the Appeal Court was free in the formation of its opinion to take into
account the B&M report as it did. It is assumed that the counsel of Kecofa received the
report so shortly before the oral pleading session in appeal that it was not possible to order
a countercheck or analysis to be timely carried out, as Kecofa alleges in cassation, it was
up to its counsel to object at the session (at the latest) to the late forwarding in order to
effect either that the Appeal Court would leave the report out of consideration, or that the
oral pleading session would be held over until such a date that a reasoned contestation of
the report would be possible. However, the counsel omitted to make such an objection, did
not contest the expertise of Breese & Majerowicz, did not contest the content of the report,
not even in general wording and confined himself to characterizing this firm as an non-
independent research body. It was not required here that the Appeal Court would guard
the interests of Kecofa of its own motion, as referred to in NethSC 29 November 2002, no.
C00/128, NJ 2004, 172, for lack of any defence of Kecofa in this respect, it cannot be
understood without any restriction that the nature and extent of the B&M report justified
the suspicion that there was no time or opportunity to take due cognizance thereof and to
duly prepare the defence against it which does not necessarily mean: ordering a
countercheck or analysis to be carried out . In the light of the finding of the Appeal Court
that Kecofa did not contest the expertise of Breese & Majerowicz, the Appeal Court was
allowed to use this report.
Faced with the question of whether Female Treasure constitutes a reproduction or
adaptation of the work Trsor, the Appeal Court gave on the basis of the criterion stated in
jur.gr. 4.16.1 and (rightly) not contested in cassation could conclude from the B&M

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report that this was the case. Contrary to what the count intends, the judges did not have to
make their own observations as well. Without any further comment which lacks, it cannot
be understood why this report, which is founded both on a physical chemical analysis and
on a sense survey methodologically founded among 66 test persons, be less reliable than
the personal observation by judges of scents of only both perfumes in question next to
each other, even apart from the fact that as appears from the advertising statements cited
by Lancme and not contested by Kecofa, that the latter aims at banning all differences
between its perfumes and the perfumes it competes with, like Trsor, save where it
concerns its price. The complaint of the count fails by reason of the above.

3.5.1 Count 3 challenges jur.gr. 4.17 and 4.24 with the complaint that allowance of the
claim for profit account is incorrect, at least incomprehensible and/or insufficiently
reasoned, because a reasonable interpretation of Art. 27Aw implies that a claim for profit
account is not allowable (a) if it has not become sufficiently likely that the copyright
owner actually incurred damage or lost profit by reason of the infringement, nor (b) if it
has not become sufficiently likely that the infringer made himself consciously guilty of
piracy, at least if the infringement can be attributed to him, about which the Appeal
Court did not state anything.

3.5.2 The complaint in (a) fails. Art. 27a Aw which is founded also on the same idea as
Art. 6:104 BW allows the copyright owner to obtain damages in case of infringement
assessed at the sum of the profit made by the infringer with the infringement, precisely in
order to accomodate the right owner, if his damage is hard to demonstrate, but the
existence of some (form of) damage is likely. Apparently and not incomprehensible the
Appeal Court was of the opinion that it is likely that Lancme incurred at least some
damage by reason of the Female Treasure market launch, as Lancme also alleged in this
dispute.
The complaint in (b) fails to the extent that it is founded on the opinion that for allowance
of a claim for profit account under Art. 27a Aw more or other conditions apply than under
Art. 6:162 BW for award of damages in general, i.e.: that the unlawful acts can be
attributed to the infringer by reason of his fault, or a cause which falls within his
responsibility according to common practices. To the extent that the count involves the
complaint that the infringement cannot be attributed to Kecofa, because it did not know or
had to know about the copyright of Lancme, also seen the circumstance that Lancme
confined itself until July 2000 to actions against Female Treasure under trademark law,
fails because apparently and not incomprehensibly the Appeal Court understood from the
allegations of Kecofa stated in the count that it did not contest that the infringing acts can
be attributed to Kecofa, even apart from whether these allegations could result into the
conclusion advocated by it.

3.6 The cross-appeal which is lodged on the condition that the plea in the principal appeal
might be found grounded in any count, does not have to be discussed seen that considered
above.

4. Decision

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The Supreme Court:
dismisses the principal appeal;
orders Kecofa to pay the costs of the proceedings in cassation, assessed until this decision on
the part of Lancme at 561.34 for disbursements and 2,200.for fees.

This decision was rendered by vice-president D.H. Beukenhorst as president and justices P.C.
Kop, E.J. Numann, W.A.M. van Schendel, and W.D.H. Asser and pronounced in public by
justice E.J. Numann on 16 June 2006.

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