Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1AC Solvency
Contention 2 is Solvency:
Mexico and the US are in a trade dispute involving tuna labeling provisions---
the US wants Mexico to accept labeling for tuna that have been caught without
harm to Dolphins, but WTO ruling found that these provisions hurt Mexican
fishermen.
Villarreal 12 (M. Angeles, Specialist/Analyst in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service,
8/9/12, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, pg. 26-27,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf, DOA 7/11/13, Keerthi)
The United States and Mexico are involved in a trade dispute regarding U.S. dolphin-safe
labeling provisions and tuna imports from Mexico. U.S. labeling provisions establish conditions
under which tuna products may voluntarily be labeled as dolphin-safe. These products may
not be labeled as dolphin-safe if the tuna is caught by intentionally encircling dolphins with nets.
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), some Mexican fishing vessels use this method when
fishing for tuna. Mexico asserts that U.S. tuna labeling provisions deny Mexican tuna effective
access to the U.S. market. In October 2008, Mexico filed a request for World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute settlement consultations with the United States regarding U.S. provisions on voluntary
dolphin-safe labeling on tuna products. The United States requested that Mexico refrain from proceeding in the WTO and that the case be
moved to the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism. According to the USTR, however, Mexico blocked that process for settling this dispute.82 In September 2011, a
WTO panel that was established in April 2009 circulated its final report to other WTO Members and the public. This report found that the objectives of
U.S. voluntary tuna labeling provisions are legitimate and that any adverse effects felt by Mexican tuna producers are the result of choices made by Mexicos own fishing fleet
and canners. However, the panel also found U.S. labeling provisions to be more restrictive than necessary
to achieve the objectives of the measures .83 The Obama Administration is appealing the WTO ruling. Mexicos economy ministry said
that it plans to file a counter-appeal.84 The government of Mexico wants the United States to broaden its dolphin-safe rules to
include Mexicos longstanding tuna fishing technique. It cites statistics showing that modern equipment has greatly reduced dolphin
mortality from its height in the 1960s and that its ships carry independent observers who can verify dolphin safety.85 However, some environmental groups that monitor the
even if no dolphins are killed during the chasing and
tuna industry dispute claims by the Mexican government, stating that
netting, some are wounded and later die. In other cases, they argue, young dolphin calves may not be
able to keep pace and are separated from their mothers and later die.
The plan puts verification proposal into action and revises all necessary legal
obstacles to solve the dispute (S. Advocate)
Smith 13 (Fran, Adjunct Fellow with the Competitive Enterprise Institute, founder of the International Consumers for Civil
Society, BA from University of New Orleans and MA from the State University of NY at Buffalo, 4/10/13, NOAA Proposes Tuna-
Dolphin Regulations To Comply With WTO Ruling, Open Market is the Blog of the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
http://www.openmarket.org/2013/04/10/noaa-proposes-tuna-dolphin-regulations-to-comply-with-wto-ruling/, DOA 7/11/13,
Keerthi)
To comply with a World Trade Organization ruling in a tuna-dolphin complaint brought by
Mexico, the U.S. proposed new regulations that would tighten the requirements for allowing tuna to be labeled
dolphin safe. The proposal was issued for comments by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration on April 5. It would revise the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)
of 1990, which established a dolphin-safe labeling standard for certain tuna products. Under the original rule, a
dolphin-safe label could be used only for tuna that was caught without using purse-seine,
encircling methods. But for tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Region (ETPR), additional certification was required
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured while catching the tuna. In the U.S. regulations, NOAA also established a
domestic tracking and verification program that provides for the tracking of tuna labeled dolphin-safe. In
a case brought by
Mexico in 2008, Mexico challenged in the WTO the U.S. dolphin-safe labeling system as violating
provisions of the WTOs General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and its Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement). Mexicos tuna fishermen catch their fish in the ETPR using purse-seine vessels
and complained to the WTO that the U.S. rules unfairly discriminated against Mexico. In the
case, US-Tuna II, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on June 13, 2012, adopted earlier WTO reports
finding that the U.S. labeling system did indeed discriminate against Mexican tuna and violated the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. In its proposed rule, NOAA would expand its current
requirements so all tuna products labeled dolphin-safe not just tuna harvested by large purse seines in the
ETP would be required to have verification statements from captains, and in some cases
observers, that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured while harvesting the tuna. In addition,
there are new storage requirements so tuna caught using gear designated as dolphin-safe has to
be stored separately from tuna caught in non-dolphin-safe gear from the time of capture
through unloading. This case is an important one as some countries use non-tariff barriers to protect their domestic
industries or to advance environmental goals. (See a 1996 CEI article about the Basel Conventions impact on international trade.)
NOAA key
Boxall 13 (Bettina, Pulitzer Prize winner in 2009, 4/6/13, NOAA expanding dolphin-safe tuna certification requirements, LA
Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/06/science/la-sci-sn-noaa-rule-dolphin-safe-tuna-20130405, DOA 7/11/13, Keerthi)
What were tryingto do is to bring everybody all around the world to the same standard as
weve been applying in the eastern tropical Pacific, said Kevin Chu, deputy southwest regional administrator for
the national fisheries agency. Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), the author of the 1990 dolphin-safe tuna law, praised the proposal,
which will be open to public comment for 30 days. Numerous times over the last 20 years the dolphin-safe
label has been in great jeopardy, she said in a statement. I am pleased that the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration has reaffirmed its commitment to protecting the integrity of this
label that consumers have come to trust and rely on.
1AC Biodiversity
Contention 1 is Biodiversity:
First, Uniqueness:
Status quo Dolphin Encircling will kill dolphin biodiversity:
recovering as expected (Gerrodette & Forcada, 2005). Because fishing effort on dolphins remains high (10,000-14,000 purse-seine sets per year (Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, 2004)), with each spotted dolphin being chased about 11 times and captured about 3 times per year, on average (Reilly et al., 2005), it is
hypothesized that indirect effects of the fishery may adversely impact ETP dolphins. This potential for ongoing adverse fishery
interactions has led to a - 218 - variety of research projects addressing the possibility that fishery effects (interactions) may be contributing to the lack of population recovery through unobserved effects on
dolphin survival or reproduction. Althoughthe issue of adverse fishery effects (in addition to direct mortality) on ETP dolphins has been
of concern since the early days of the fishery (e.g., Stuntz & Shay, 1979; Cowan & Walker, 1979; Coe & Stuntz, 1980) research through the early 1990s focused primarily on reducing directly-observed
mortality in the purse-seines. Once the current low level of purse-seine mortality had been achieved, research
focus turned to investigating other types of fishery effects. A major series of research projects was initiated between 1997 and 2002, in
accord with mandates of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA), an amendment to the US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) (Reilly et al., 2005). IDCPA-mandated
fishery effects studies focused on the question is the fishery having a significant adverse impact
on ETP dolphins? and included four related projects broadly characterized as stress studies.
These included 1) a review of current knowledge of stress physiology in mammals, with emphasis on marine
mammal physiology, 2) a necropsy program to examine dolphins killed during purse-seining operations, 3) a chase-recapture
experiment in situ using a chartered purse-seine vessel, and 4) various analyses of existing
(historical) data (Reilly et al., 2005). The effect of related noise was not specifically investigated as a stressor in these studies, but contributes to fishery- related stress in terms of initiating the
significant and prolonged evasion responses typical of dolphin schools chased and encircled by tuna purse-seiners in the ETP (Au & Perryman, 1982; Hewitt, 1985; Chivers & Scott, 2002). The IDCPA research
program also included a suite of studies to estimate current abundances, monitor environmental associations and their potential effects, and assess status and trends of these dolphin populations. Results of those
studies are not covered here. This paper summarizes results from completed studies and presents status reports for ongoing and proposed studies addressing the question of whether fishery interactions may be
negatively affecting population recovery of ETP dolphins
that tuna purse- seine fishing activities entail well-recognized stressors in other
The review concluded
mammals, especially wild animals, including prolonged heavy exertion, social disturbance, and
disruption of normal activities such as foraging. Typical mammalian responses to such
disturbances include changes in metabolism, growth, reproduction, and immune status, any of
which, alone or in combination, could significantly affect survival and reproduction. Of particular
concern for ETP dolphins prolonged heavy exertion in other wild mammals can lead to
was the observation that
presented by tuna purse-seine activities affect dolphin survival may , but quantitative estimates of the magnitude of these effects are not available (Curry,
1999; Reilly et al., 2005).
revealing snapshots of physiological conditions and characteristics of dolphins killed in the nets.
Various diseases unrelated to the fishery, but characteristic of normally healthy populations of wild mammals, were found in the majority of
the dolphins (Cowan & Curry, 2002). Lymph nodes indicated normal, active lymphoid systems (Romano, Abella, Cowan, & Curry, 2002a). Heart, lungs and
kidney contained lesions directly linked to death by asphyxiation, possibly resulting from an
overwhelming alarm reaction leading to death by cardiac arrest (Cowan & Curry, 2002). Tissue
abnormalities presenting as patchy fibrous scars in heart muscle and associated blood vessels
may have formed previously in response to excess secretion of stress hormones, possibly
indicating prior stress responses (e.g., possibly to fishery activity or predation attempts), although the direct cause and physiological consequences of
the lesions could not be determined (Cowan & Curry, 2002). Opportunistic samples of skeletal muscle showed cell damage
similar to that in heart muscle, indicative of a degree of capture myopathy that could lead to
unobserved mortality in some cases (Reilly et al., 2005).
W. Perryman, T. Gerrodette unpubl. data), and high fetal mortality (Perrin 1968) are population-level effects that directly
address the lack of recovery. The calf deficits estimated from cows that were killed without their calves indicate minimum levels of additional mortality
(about 14 % yr 1) not included in Table 1 (Archer et al. 2004). Reduced swimming ability and stamina of dolphin calves make
mother-calf separation during fishing activity more likely, particularly during the first 6 mo of life (Edwards 2006, Noren &
Edwards 2007); the implication is that the cryptic loss of calves could be much larger. The proportion of calves declined between 1993 and 2003 for both northeastern offshore
spotted and eastern spinner dolphins (K. Cramer, W. Perryman, T. Ger- rodette unpubl. data). In the case of spotted dolphins, the number of dolphin sets negatively affected
both the proportion of calves in the population and the length of time calves remained with their mothers. Fetal mortality in these dolphin populations is higher than in other
mammals (Perrin 1968), but whether this is natural or due to effects of chase and encirclement is not yet known. Ultimately, although the studies identi- fied here demonstrate
both potential and definitive fishery effects, we do not know the degree to which these effects are having cumulative impacts on either dolphin stock. It is also clear that, over
the past 5 or 6 decades during which the purse-seine fishery has operated, there have been changes in the structure of
the pelagic ecosystem in the ETP, but these changes have not been linked to the lack of recovery by either dolphin stock. Changes in the
physical and ecological environment of the ETP have been documented in (1) oceanography and
climate (Fiedler 2002, McPhaden & Zhang 2002, 2004), (2) plankton community structure and dynamics (Bidigare & Ondrusek
1996, Landry et al. 1996), and (3) the abundances of other animals at middle and upper trophic levels (Ballance et
al. 2002, Pitman et al. 2002, Watters et al. 2003, Hinke et al. 2004). Fiedler (2002) summarizes the findings of many other workers who have documented changes in the ETP. In
general these changes have not been linked to the dynamics of northeastern offshore spotted and eastern spinner dolphins, because temporal variations in these ecosystem
Variations in
variables largely occur at El Nin o scales, and to some degree at decadal scales, while this is not the case for temporal variations in dolphin abun- dance.
dolphin abundance have, since the 1960s, primarily been driven by variations in the direct mortality
caused by the purse-seine fishery. Nevertheless, the basic principles of ecology tell us that the physical and ecological environment ultima- tely
determines how many dolphins can be supported by the pelagic ecosystem. For example, Watters et al. (2003) predict that a long-term, declining trend in the biomass of large
phytoplankton (e.g. diatoms) in the ETP will cause the biomass of dolphins to decline regardless of potential fishery effects. Despite an in- ability to identify ecosystem effects on
the recovery of either dolphin stock, this possibility cannot be dismissed.
Its not too late to act- East Pacific Dolphins on the brink play key to solve
Fears 13 Dolphin Protection, Tuna Catch in Conflict for U.S., Mexico Darryl Fears;
Washington Post; 05/13/2013
http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_23231971/dolphin-protection-tuna-catch-conflict-
u-s-mexico#ixzz2ZUOvHDG3
No place in the ocean is like the eastern tropical Pacific, where for reasons that marine biologists
don't fully understand, tuna and dolphins swim together. "Marine mammals interact with most fishing gear
only incidentally, but in the ETP tuna fishery, the dolphins are an intrinsic part of the fishing operation," according to NOAA's
Southwest Fisheries Science Center. "The fishermen intentionally capture both tuna and dolphins together, then release the
dolphins from the net," the center explained in a statement. "The bycatch of dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific (ETP) purse-
seine tuna fishery stands apart from marine mammal bycatch in other fisheries, not only in scale but in the way the dolphins interact
with the fishery." For several decades starting in the 1950s, an estimated 150,000 dolphins were killed each year by the world's
fleets, including those of the United States "estimated to be over 6 million animals, the highest known for any fishery," NOAA
Next, Impacts:
Specific hotspot biodiversity checks extinction. Key to ag, medicine and disease
prevention, and ecosystems.
Mittermeier 11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He
holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony
Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations.
He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally
discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a
very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)
Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is irreversible. Human
activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a thousand or more times the
natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the
lost opportunity for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earths species (perhaps fewer than 10%, or
even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer (Novotny et al. 2002). As
species vanish, so too does the health
security of every human. Earths species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for cancer,
malaria, or the next new pathogen cures waiting to be discovered. Compounds initially derived from wild species account
for more than half of all commercial medicines even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein 2008). Natural forms,
processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices,
and other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared to burning down the worlds libraries
without knowing the content of 90% or more of the books. With
loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of
our crops and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for manufactured products,
and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems that support humans and all life on Earth
(McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency, and
freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Less
tangible, but no less important, are
the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value
species for their own sake, and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the
worlds cultures (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader
ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and
mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et
al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East
Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity
loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earths natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past
decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce
resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have
been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earths climate
changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009). In many
respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend
upon these ecosystems the most and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we
believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to
Extinction is a global
conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities?
phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the
threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global
conservation budget perhaps 90% originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus
critical that those globally exible funds available in the hundreds of millions annually be guided by systematic priorities if we are
to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss. The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation
is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where
should action toward reducing the loss of
biodiversity be implemented rst ? The eld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves
around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk
to the species present in a region if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get
another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The
number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In
contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they
contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated
in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all)
of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact. Myers seminal paper (Myers1988)
was the rst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale.
Myers described ten tropical forest hotspots on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high
levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of hotspot status. A subsequent analysis added
eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an
institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a rst systematic update of the hotspots. It
introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics
( > 0.5% of the worlds total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining.
These efforts culminated in an
extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientic publication (Myers et
al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-dened criteria and new data. A
most daunting of them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy At stake is not in this century.
only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security . History
states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often
tells us that
bred fanaticism and terrorism Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute
.
to global instability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion
rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and
caloric intake This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the
. Inevitably, that means eating more meat.
growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat . Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better
resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The
long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe . Productivity revolution To meet the
expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. Thats a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per
hectare typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, its been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water,
improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no
that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading
will generate the innovations
position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a
decisive role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet
humanitarian .
produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure.
Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a global influenza pandemic, according to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million
people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact
that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain which could only infect birds into a human-viable
strain (10).
bestows certain rights unto persons in order to ensure these needs are met and safeguarded.
The needs of life, liberty, and freedom from harm, for example, form the basis of human rights.
On the other hand, being classified as a thing either denotes an inanimate object or a nonhuman organism, both of which are assumed as not having the same needs as humans
because neither are believed to experience, in a human way, significant pain, pleasure, or similar sensations that stem from possessing some degree of mental sophistication.
Despite the fact that some humane laws exist to prevent unnecessary cruelty, animals are still
considered property and are usually denied the basic rights of life, liberty or freedom from
harm. The outcome of this blanketing distinction is that dolphins have much the same rights as
inanimate objects. The captivity industry benefits from this distinction: they are able to exploit the lives of dolphins by
denying them freedom and being allowed to cause them harm (and the captivity industry has become adept at hiding the harm they cause to dolphins in
their care). The assumption that dolphins have no needs is also what allows fishermen Taiji, Japan to post signs that say, These dolphins are owned by Fisherman Association,
and why they are allowed to slaughter hundreds of them at the notorious cove each year. The designation of dolphins as property begs for revision in light of what science
characteristics to qualify as persons: they are self-aware; they can make decisions and solve
complex problems. Their brain structure indicates that they likely experience emotions, they live
in complex cultures, and they use tools. It can be safely assumed that they have the capacity to
reflect upon their own lives and that their minds allow them to feel and think about pain. The Taiji
dolphins know that their family is being slaughtered all around them. (Even scientists say that the way dolphins are slaughtered in Taiji is unnecessarily cruel.) These are the
dolphins should be given certain basic rights not the right to vote, mind you, but merely
reasons that the Indian circular stipulates that
the rights not to be captured, confined, or killed, in order to prevent the suffering that they
most likely experience when these rights are violated. So far the announcement has been met with a positive response from
governing bodies in India. "(Dolphin captivity) is illegal now," said N. Venugopal, who heads the Greater Cochin Development Authority, one of the agencies in Kerala that was
considering a captive facility proposal. "It is over. We will not allow it anymore." It is expected that all relevant agencies and individuals will adhere to the ban. India has
carefully considered whether it is morally acceptable to allow dolphin captivity within its borders and has answered this question with a resounding no. This progressive
statement is helping to pave the way towards greater public understanding of who dolphins are. Theres a growing understanding that they are intelligent and emotional beings
who deserve to be free. The United States and other countries should take notice.
Loss of biodiversity turns evolution and resiliency simple ecosystems are more
susceptible to collapse and recovery is impossible- keystone species outweigh
regular extinctions.
Keim 11 (Brandon Keim, Freelance Science Journalist, Wired Science, October 26, 2011 Mass Species Loss Stunts Evolution for
Millions of Years, citing Delayed recovery of non-marine tetrapods after the end-Permian mass extinction tracks global carbon
cycle. By Randall B. Irmis and Jessica H. Whiteside. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, Vol. 278 No. 1723, Oct. 26, 2011. )
Ecological chaos reigned, with slight natural perturbations of climate and circumstance
repeatedly sending these simple new ecosystems into drastic decline. Another eight million years passed before
species abundance and ecological richness recovered to pre-extinction levels. Cause and effect are difficult to establish, especially at the distance of geological time, but the
patterns fit with evolutionary simulations that show biodiversity loss limiting post-mass
extinction recovery in the early Triassic. We are very interested to see that this specimen-oriented study supports our conclusion, said those simulations
authors, paleobiologists Peter Roopnarine of the California Academy of Sciences and the Field Museums Kenneth Angielczyk, in a joint e-mail. It really is a pioneering
approach. Whiteside and Irmis plan to conduct similar studies of other mass extinctions. If reduced biological diversity really did make
it harder for life to rebound, then the most pressing questions arent historical, but immediate.
Scientists say that Earth may now be entering another period of mass extinction, with species dying at a pace seen only five times in lifes history, including the Permian-
Triassic. Exactly how current extinction rates compare to those episodes is an open question, all the more pressing if modern extinctions represent
not just the loss of a lineage but a constraint on evolution for the foreseeable future, if not
millions of years to come. Were showing that low-diversity systems take a long time to
recover, said Whiteside. When you destroy links in the food web, effects exist that are difficult to see.
Normally when people think of extinctions, its of single species. This is a systems approach.
According to Roopnarine and Angielczyk, their analyses differ subtly from Whitesides in more precisely tracing post-extinction instabilities to losses of specific animal groups,
especially large predators and herbivores. Those equilibrium-maintaining animals are the ones now dying off fastest. Species that survive
are often so rare as to be, in ecological parlance, functionally extinct. My own personal feeling is that many modern communities are probably well on their way to the type of
instability inferred for the Early Triassic, said Roopnarine. The more we understand of the workings of these systems, the better equipped we are to make good choices.
Reject environment indicts from before 2011 studies have changed, the risk is
too large to take, and theres no redundancy.
Science Daily 11 ("Biodiversity Critical for Maintaining Multiple 'Ecosystem Services'" Cites
McGill University, August 19, www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110819155422.htm)
Aug. 19, 2011 As biodiversity declines worldwide, there is concern that this will lead to declines in the services that ecosystems provide for people, such as food production,
until now it has been unclear, whether just a few or in fact a large number of the species in an ecosystem are
carbon storage, and water purification. But
needed to provide ecosystem services. By combining data from 17 of the largest and longest-running biodiversity
experiments, scientists from universities across North America and Europe have found that previous studies have
underestimated the importance of biodiversity for maintaining multiple ecosystem services
across many years and places. "Most previous studies considered only the number of species
needed to provide one service under one set of environmental conditions," says Prof. Michel Loreau from McGill
University's biology department who supervised the study. "These studies found that many species appeared redundant.
That is, it appeared that the extinction of many species would not affect the functioning of the
ecosystem because other species could compensate for their loss." Now, by looking at grassland plant species,
investigators have found that most of the studied species were important at least once for the
maintenance of ecosystem services, because different sets of species were important during
different years, at different places, for different services, and under different global change (e.g., climate or land-use change) scenarios. Furthermore, the species
needed to provide one service during multiple years were not the same as those needed to provide multiple services during one year. "This means that
biodiversity is even more important for maintaining ecosystem services than was previously
thought," says Dr. Forest Isbell, the lead author and investigator of this study. "Our results indicate that many species are needed to
maintain ecosystem services at multiple times and places in a changing world, and that species
are less redundant than was previously thought." The scientists involved in the study also offer recommendations for using these
results to prioritize conservation efforts and predict consequences of species extinctions. "It is nice to know which groups of species promoted ecosystem functioning under
hundreds of sets of environmental conditions," says Isbell, "because this will allow us to determine whether some species often provide ecosystem services under environmental
conditions that are currently common, or under conditions that will become increasingly common in the future." But Michel Loreau, of McGill, adds au cautionary note: "We
The uncertainty over future environmental changes means that
should be careful when making predictions.
exercises. Program officials estimate that the sea lions in the Marine Mammal Program have recovered
millions of dollars of U.S. Naval torpedoes and instrumentation dropped on the sea floor. The U.S.
Navy kept its Marine Mammal Program a secret until the 1990s, and this spring CNN became one of only a handful of media outlets
to see firsthand how the program works. Watch Kaj take part in U.S. Navy marine mammal exercise The program trains
about 75 Pacific bottlenose dolphins, with natural biosonar that tracks better than any manmade
device; and 35 California sea lions, with supurb underwater eyesight. Not only do these trained marine mammals track and
retrieve millions of dollars in U.S. military equipment, they are also helping to save lives. The Navy won't disclose whether the
dolphins and sea lions have effectively intercepted terrorists attempting to do harm to any U.S.
facilities. Either way, " it serves as a deterrent effect ," says Christian Harris, operations supervisor for the program.
When animals protect Beasts of war The Navy's 'marine mammal militia' The mammals can be deployed via C-130 cargo aircraft to
perform their missions anywhere in the world within 72 hours. They have been used in exercises from Alaska to Hawaii, operating in
great temperature and environmental ranges. They also have the capability to operate off vessels. Dolphins
most recently
were deployed in the Iraq war, performing mine detection and clearance operations in the
Persian Gulf to ensure safe passage for humanitarian ships delivering aid. Some of these Iraq war
"veterans" are now back home, tasked with a new mission: guarding nuclear submarines in their homeports of Bremerton,
Washington, and Groton, Connecticut. A key part of the training program is teaching these mammals how
to intercept potentially hostile swimmers. There is an entire domain of port and harbor security devoted to anti-
combat swimmer or swimmer defense. Combat diving or swimming is practiced by a small contingent of
special operations forces around the world. Using an underwater breathing apparatus, at night,
is a very stealthy way to come upon a target unannounced and inflict violence of action with the
element of surprise. The German Kampfschwimmers, Israel's Shayatet 13, and the U.S. Navy SEALs are generally considered
the premier units that train and conduct combat swimmer operations around the world. The Marine Mammal Program
was conceived to defend against these kinds of attacks from hostile nations. The program is also
positioned to defend against lone swimmer terrorist attacks as well. In 2002, classified reports from
the intelligence community, gleaned from interrogations of suspects in Afghanistan, warned that al Qaeda was
planning on using scuba divers to attack U.S. Navy vessels in port or at anchor. And just this week a
picture emerged on the Facebook page of Oslo terror suspect Anders Behring Breivik, holding a modified assault rifle in what
appears to be a combat diving set-up. How the program started In the 1960s, the U.S. Navy began studying the hydrodynamics of
a Pacific white-sided dolphin in an effort to improve torpedo performance. The Navy quickly realized that the incredibly efficient
biosonar of the dolphin was excellent for detecting hard-to-find objects -- and people -- underwater. For the next quarter-century,
the U.S. Navy secretly honed the technique of using mammals to find both underwater objects, detect mines and combat swimmers.
The Navy deployed dolphins to Vietnam and the Persian Gulf to perform the swimmer
interdiction mission. In the 1990s, the U.S. military declassified the Marine Mammal Program and since then, it has been
headquartered at the Point Loma Naval Base in San Diego. The program is managed jointly by the Naval Warfare Systems Center
Pacific and military explosive experts, who are the backbone of the program. In addition, civilian marine biologists, veterinarians,
scientists and handlers are involved in the program. Researchers from institutions like Sea World to UC San Diego regularly
collaborate with them for research purposes. The program has an annual operating budget of $20 million, according to Marine
Mammal Program director Mike Rothe who expressed confidence that the program's future funding is not at risk.
mammals 5,
of my day of training in the bay:
seems strange that in this digital era, there's such a seemingly lo-fi approach to guard the Navy's most sophisticated and expensive
assets. But according to Rothe, nothing in today's hi-tech world can compete with these mammals'
biosonar abilities. "I hope that one day there is a robot or a UUV [unmanned underwater vehicle] that makes the mammal
program obsolete," he said. "But right now this is the best thing out there ."
sea. Massive container ships carrying everything from computers and televisions to petroleum and other essential
commodities transit the world's oceans and critical sea lanes each day. Because the stability of
America's economy is indelibly linked to the stability of the global economy, our Navy is sized to
protect American shipping as well as the flow of global commerce. This occurs at the low end of the
spectrum, where the U.S. Navy has worked with other partner nations to prevent scourges like piracy that can drive up maritime
insurance costs. It is also the case at the high end, where states
like Iran threaten to close the Straits of Hormuz
and raise world oil prices or China seeks to alter the current rules-based order at sea by
intimidating its neighbors over disputed territorial claims. Of course, America can work with its allies and
partner nations to help support this monumental task, but it can never trust the health of its economy to any other Nation. A day
when Iran determines which ships can transit the Strait of Hormuz or China dictates commercial passage through the South China
Sea is simply unacceptable to American interests. The U.S. Navy exists to ensure that day never comes. Finally, Americans want to
remain confident and effective leaders of the international system. This doesn't mean that our commitments need be endless or
that we should seek to involve ourselves in areas that we have no economic interest, but it does require the U.S. to remain actively
engaged on the world stage. Seapower offers the most flexible
and economical means to accomplish
this task. At the most basic level, Naval forces bolster conventional deterrence, helping to
reassure allies and put potential adversaries on notice of our ability to respond decisively to
aggression. More importantly, and unlike air or land-power, our Navy and Marine Corps team is
a highly versatile force that can be tailored to convey different diplomatic messages depending
on the situation. In peacetime, naval forces can operate forward, sustaining a regional presence
that sends a latent and durable message of deterrence, improve interoperability with foreign
Navies through exercises, and help respond to humanitarian disasters. In a crisis, Naval forces
can conduct robust military exercises to signal Washington's intentions and build different
packages of military power that are scalable to different circumstances. One minor situation may demand
a small surface combatant performing a presence mission and flying the flag, while a more serious crisis could call for an entire
Carrier Strike Group conducting training exercises with partner nations. It
is this flexibility of response that makes
naval power uniquely suited to an international security environment that requires scalpels in
some instances and axes in others. Building American Seapower to meet our global interests
demands a Navy of sufficient quality and quantity. Unfortunately, our Navy is currently under-
resourced and undersized to meet its core tasks. The unrelenting decline of America's battle force fleet over the
last two decades has now bottomed-out at 285 ships (the Navy's requirement, which has never been met, has ranged from 306-313
ships), and could be reduced to the 240-ship range if $500 billion in sequestration cuts remain in effect. In recent testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Samuel Locklear, the Commander of Pacific Command (PACOM) asserted that "285
(ships) is not meeting the global demand for the world we find ourselves in today." Even worse, a reduced fleet size coupled with an
increased operational tempo has only pushed fleet maintenance and our volunteer force of Sailors and Marines further to the
ragged edge. To remedy this shortfall, an independent panel of defense experts called for a fleet of 346 ships in 2010. But while we
certainly need more ships, we also need
to build a Navy with the right ships. Simply growing the fleet to a
larger size with small surface combatants or auxiliary ships is not sufficient. We must prioritize growing
our attack submarine, destroyer, and amphibious fleets, while also sustaining a fleet of 11 carriers. These platforms are the core
workhorses of the battle force fleet. In addition, we
need to work to revitalize our sea control capabilities.
Sea control is our ability to control important sea-lanes and drive enemy ships from the sea
where and when necessary. The current era where the U.S. Navy finds itself "out-sticked" by
Chinese anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) must be reversed. Complicating this challenge further, since 2000 the Navy
has built DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers (32 destroyers and counting now) without canisters for launching its Harpoon ASCM.
Developing a new offensive anti-surface weapon (OASuW) with more range and enabling our DDGs to carry the next-generation
Harpoon are critical priorities for enabling effective, credible sea-control in the future. The Navy also needs to extend the range of
the Littoral Combat Ship's (LCS) anti-surface missiles. Finally, the Navy should continue to invest in its ability to project power
ashore. Ultimately, Navies exist to affect decisions where they are made - on the land. The most direct means they have to do this is
by projecting power onto "the beach" using land-attack cruise missiles, naval surface fire-support, or facilitating the flow of Marines
and/or material to the shore for a range of peacetime and wartime missions. To sustain its power projection capabilities to more
confidently operate in the anti-access/area-denial maritime zones of the future, the Navy should focus on extending the range of the
carrier air wing (CVW) with unmanned strike platforms, invest in the the quantity and quality of its stand-off weapons, and build a
balanced amphibious fleet capable of meeting the requirements we set for it. The
U.S. Navy remains the surest
vehicle for protecting American interests and securing global stability. Its unique breadth of
capabilities give policymakers the flexibility to skillfully manage the emerging threats of the 21st
guaranty of peace."
Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep
engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a
liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and
the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of
its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have
differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy
promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the
fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that
strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served
primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet
Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening
to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary
for a stable and open international order. Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy
and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending
on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their
commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United
States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order.
Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy wastes money by
subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more
modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American
sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security
and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and
treasure but also make the United States more secure. They
are wrong. In making their case, advocates of
retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact,
the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is
little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to
balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The benefits
of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce
competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an
open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it
easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats.
Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while
exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure,
prosperous, and influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United
States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for
example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to
support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple,
because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required
for its replacement numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees,
brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years,
according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead,
most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less
clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones.
If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then
the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large
portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any
savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive
weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of
continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such
high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after
9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As
of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not
compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level
of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even
without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand
strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign
would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down
and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back
rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs. UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the
current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to
balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded
together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their
own or that they will do so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy
could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically
isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no
contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any
competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far
ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it
the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because
the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense
market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo
that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership
were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback especially
during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly
unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the
United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting.
Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the
fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is
wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from
employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions
came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011,
for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to
established international law and norms. Another
argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall
prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy
in place, the
logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive
purposes infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on that are necessary to keep
its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would.
The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their
leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced
against them a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their
position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no
reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies
by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline.
To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and
competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5
percent of GDP on defense a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt
Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from
dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with
any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries
dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the
global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States
has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their
militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course,
obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The
United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from
contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on
their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that
U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest
and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could
peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If
Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military
capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting
that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only
thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain
their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the
countries currently backed by Washington notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia might act
in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe.
Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there
refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a
continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European
help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a
U.S. withdrawal from key regions could
lead to dangerous competition , advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually
hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East but
at what cost? Werestates in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another,
they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional
proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater
regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those
countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can
promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when
there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability
of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning
the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively
managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world's key areas,
thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military
capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense
budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to
historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern
militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the
current
grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment
argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing
rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as
in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for
regional hegemony -- China -- and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene
there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that
is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the
current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it.
To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet
the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world
economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and
other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to
pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder.
Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on
economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep
the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways
that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get
allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred -- convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S.
dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with
South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one
diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why?
Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its
security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the
same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade
continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value
their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important
free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his
support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The
United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep
the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the
country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU's dependence on the
United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar.
As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that
responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international
cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In
order to counter
transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states
have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially
when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its
broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in
ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos
reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first,
but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on
nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for
Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for
example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make
progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced
when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as
terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger
position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example,
the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather
information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the
Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia,
India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in
the region. The
United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains
among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The
American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of
protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present
in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the
answer is yes -- a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up.
There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller
global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of
counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will
it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent
the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy
humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This
is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain
every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the
Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power,
and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a
powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A
grand strategy of actively
managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States
exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-
spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were
American leaders to
choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the
world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be
disastrous.
Even anti-hegemonic authors agree that in the new political climate the pursuit
of hegemony is inevitable
Posen 13 Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies
Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Barry R. Posen, January/February 2013,
Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back)
Despite a decade of costly and indecisive warfare and mounting fiscal pressures, the long-standing consensus among American
policymakers about U.S. grand strategy has remained remarkably intact. As the presidential
campaign made clear, Republicans and Democrats may quibble over foreign policy at the
margins, but they agree on the big picture: that the United States should dominate the world
militarily, economically, and politically, as it has since the final years of the Cold War, a strategy
of liberal hegemony. The country, they hold, needs to preserve its massive lead in the global balance
of power, consolidate its economic preeminence, enlarge the community of market
democracies, and maintain its outsized influence in the international institutions it helped
create.
Soft power preserves peace, re-builds failed states, deters rogues, and prevents
terrorism.
Michael Hirsh, former Foreign Editor of Newsweek, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2002
There is a middle choice between the squishy globalism that the Bush sovereigntists despise and the take-it-or-leave-it unilateralism
they offer up as an alternative. A new international consensus, built on a common vision of the international system, is
possible. In today's world, American military and economic dominance is a decisive factor and must be maintained -- as the right
believes -- but mainly to be the shadow enforcer of the international system Americans have done so much to create in the last
century, in which the left places much of its trust. It is this international system and its economic and political norms that again must
do the groundwork of keeping order and peace: deepening the ties that bind nations together; coopting failed states
such as Afghanistan, potential rogues, and "strategic competitors"; and isolating, if not destroying, terrorists. As
Henry Kissinger wrote, "the dominant trend in American foreign-policy thinking must be to transform power into
consensus so that the international order is based on agreement rather than reluctant acquiescence." Or, as Senator
Chuck Hagel, a Republican increasingly critical of the administration, recently summed it up, "We need friends."
Law): The US: Weve got dolphins, said retired Adm. Tim Keating in a
Wednesday interview with NPR. Keating commanded the U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain during the
run-up to the Iraq war. He sounded uncomfortable with elaborating on the Navys use of the lovable mammals but said in
a situation like the standoff in Hormuz, Navy-trained dolphins would come in handy: KEATING:
They are astounding in their ability to detect underwater objects . NPRs TOM BOWMAN: Dolphins were
sent to the Persian Gulf as part of the American invasion force in Iraq. KEATING: Id rather not talk about whether we used them or
not. They were present in theater. BOWMAN: But you cant say whether you used them or not. KEATING: Id rather not. The
Russians: It sounds like the plot from a stupid B-movie, but its true: A
marine mammal trainer and former Soviet
militiaman just sold four killer dolphins and a white beluga whale to Iran. According to a BBC report,
the dolphins and whale were trained by the Soviet navy to attack enemy frogmen with
harpoons attached to their backs and carry out kamikaze strikes against enemy ships. The
animals learned to distinguish between Soviet and foreign submarines by the sounds of their
propellers and were taught to carry mines to the hulls of enemy vessels to blow them (and
themselves) up. If the Iranians have four dolphins and Belugas, they might have plans for 400.
They may be less than two months from this , let alone two years, as has been said of their ability to create a
nuclear weapon for at least the past 20 years. When the GOP candidates get wind of this, they might challenge
Obama about letting the Dolphin Gap get out of hand, as John F. Kennedy used the fictitious Missile
Gap to close in on Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 White House contest.
Hormuz closure escalates to World War III and collapses the global economy.
*Joint Chiefs of Staff says US will attack if Strait is closed
Flores 12 Multi-awarded literary writer and has worked at Indonesias Ministry of Foreign
Affairs since 1992 (Jamil, January 16, 2012, Jamil Maidan Flores: World War III?
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/columns/jamil-maidan-flores-world-war-iii/491396)DR. H
Thats when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Thats not just another waterway. Its the most
important strait in the world. Some 35 percent of global seaborne oil exports pass through that sea lane. Close it and the
global economy becomes a hospital case. Can Iran do it? Like drinking a glass of water, says its naval commander,
Habibollah Sayyari. If that happened, says Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, America would have to
reopen it. That means minesweepers, battleships, aircraft carriers and everything the US Navy
can throw at the Iranians, including the kitchen sink. UK Prime Minister David Cameron says if that happened, the whole world would
come together to make sure the Strait stayed open. He also talks of an embargo on Iranian oil. One of the few remaining cooler heads in the
international community is Indonesia. It has appealed for calm and restraint on the part of all concerned. Meanwhile, pundits are constructing all sorts
of grim scenarios. Most predict that if
Iran closes the Strait, its navy will get acquainted with the bottom of
the ocean, but that the US will also suffer heavy losses in the ensuing asymmetrical warfare. Irans
Revolutionary Guards can launch kamikaze attacks with their speedboats. Some cite the ghastly possibility of Israel firing its
nukes, while Russia and China join the radioactive fray on the side of Iran. Still I do not worry. Not until
Indonesian ambassadors in the Middle East start making frantic calls to the Foreign Ministry to quickly send in planes to bring home the migrant
workers. In that event, World War III may have begun.
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to
a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows
that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers,
although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a
dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding
economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they
have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end
page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined
to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link
between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict
and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages
between internal and external
conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing . Economic conflict tends to spawn
internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour . Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to
amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.
(Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of
terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to
external tensions . Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary
theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of
force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary
tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being
removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periodsof weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in
the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of
economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at
systemic, dyadic and national levels .5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured
prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation isnot contradictory to other
perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such
as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of
global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As
such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.