Hugo Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEVERINO VALDES Y he and his coaccused were friends, he had acted as he did under the promise on Labarros part
GUILGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Ariston, Estrada for Appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. FRUSTRATED ARSON; ACTS CONSTITUTING. The fact of having set fire to some
rags and jute sacks, soaked in kerosene oil and placed near the partition of the entresol of an
inhabited house, should not be qualified as the crime of consummated arson, inasmuch as no
part of the house had begun to burn, although fire would have started in the said partition, had
it not been extinguished on time. Under such circumstances, the presumed author of the
punishable act performed all the steps conducive to the burning of the said house, but,
notwithstanding these acts, he did not accomplish the criminal act which he had intended to
consummate by reason of causes independent of his will, and for this reason, it follows that the
crime committed was that of frustrated arson.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court of
First Instance of this city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y Bunaladi,
alias Hugo Navarro y Bunadia, with the crime of arson, and, on the 20th of May of the present
year, judgment was rendered whereby Severino or Faustino Valdes y Guilgan was sentenced
to six years and one day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the costs. From this
judgment this defendant appealed. With respect to Hugo Labarro or Navarro, the proceedings
were dismissed, with the other half of the costs de officio.
Between 8 and 9 oclock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin was
absent from the house in which he was living with his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street,
San Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have been a resident of the neighborhood, called
Mrs. Lewin and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latters
house, for until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to
the fact she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did, and he found,
soaked with kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the
entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which were burning. At that moment the defendant
Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while the other defendant Hugo
Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called
for the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement,
Exhibit C, drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen that it was he
who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the date mentioned,
and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on
previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner,
to give him a peso for each such fire that he should start.
The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the
police station, although he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with
kerosene, in the place where they were found, and stated that it was the servant Paulino who
had done so. He alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry
mango leaves that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in the
police station, to wit, that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the house.
For lack of evidence and on his counsels petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the
other defendant Hugo Labarro.
Owing to the repeated attempts, made for about a month past, since Severino Valdes began to
serve the Lewin family, to burn the house above mentioned, occupied by the latter and in
which this defendant was employed, some policemen were watching the building and one of
them, Antonio Garcia del Cid, one morning prior to the commission of the crime, according to
his testimony, saw the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the
dwelling house, in which warehouse there was some straw that had previously been burned,
and that, when the defendant noticed the presence of the policeman, he desisted from climbing
the wall and entering the warehouse.
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the
burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an
occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. This crime is provided for and punished
by Article 549, in connection with Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the
sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes,
for, notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses
conclusive proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who
was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred in said house. In an affidavit the
defendant admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though at the trial, he
denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and
burning, and, without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that he
confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower
part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she
should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to continue burning until Mrs.
Auckback, noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was
submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently
is the same person as the driver Hugo Labarro.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the
acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of
his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot
be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that
no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag,
soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the partition of the entresol, the partition might
have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in connection with the
commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in
degree to that specified in Article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium
degree.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the
modification, however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be eight years and
one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 57 of the Code.
The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
 going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised
him to go home. Myrna then left the window to pacify her crying baby.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed
Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and
Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the
[G. R. No. 149028-30. April 2, 2003] clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers,
to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As Eugene was being assaulted,
Myrna returned to the window of her house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting
Eugene. She shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARMANDO CABALLERO, was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of events.
RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., and ROBITO From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to
CABALLERO, accused. pacify the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: Bay, what is the trouble between
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO you and Eugene? However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of
CABALLERO, JR., appellants. his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them
stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor.
DECISION For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was,
however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded
CALLEJO, SR., J.: to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: Tio, help me because I am hit. The commotion stopped only
upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San returned to the compound.
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo
Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Jr. of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 and RTC- In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo
1218 and meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to pay and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died
damages; and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and imposing on them the from the stab wounds they sustained.
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Eugene. He signed a
postmortem report containing the following findings:

The Antecedents POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION

Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single

Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound surrounded by a
barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel, Broce Street, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
in the same compound were Ricardo Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of
Eugene Tayactac, and her family. Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a
nephew of Wilma Broce. Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.

In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
(Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo
in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m. of said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold
Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which was across the Mondragon Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana
Broce, Eugenes girlfriend, for a chat. Susanas house was about 15 meters away from the store Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.
of Wilma. Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone:
Gene mopalit ka? (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene replied: What is this all about? We dont have
any quarrel between us. Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence Post-Mortem Findings:
of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined
him. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was = Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed postero laterally,
closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way to Susanas house. At that lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and the (L) pulmonary artery and the left
time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by the window of their house saw her brother Eugene middle lobe of the lungs;
 = Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS parasternal line directed
posteriorly;
= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7th ICS 2 cm. long directed anteriorly.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab wounds
with Massive Hemothorax (L) and Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]
He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharp-edged single-bladed
or double-bladed instrument, or by three instruments.[3]
Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Leonilo. He signed
a postmortem report containing the following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.
Post-mortem findings:
= Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post. axillary
line.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ injury.[4]
Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold Barcuma. He signed a
medical certificate stating that Arnold sustained the following injuries:
= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd
= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd
= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior axillary line at the level of
the 7th intercostal space, penetrating thoracic cavity and abdominal cavity.
... [5]
On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds sustained by Arnold could
have been caused by three different sharp-pointed instruments.[6] He further testified that Arnold
would have died because of the stab wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were charged with
Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC
1217 reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with
the use of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon said Leonilo Broce
physical injury described as follows:
= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.
and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to the death of Leonilo Broce.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission
of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene Tayactac in an
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, which reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter
with use of pieces of wood and stabbing him thereby inflicting upon said Eugene Tayactac
physical injuries which resulted to the death of the latter.
That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the
commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated murder for the
injuries of Arnold Barcuma. Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, it reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and
hunting knives, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one ARNOLD BARCUMA, by striking him with the use of pieces of wood and
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which would have resulted to
the death of said Arnold Barcuma, thus performing all the acts of execution, which would
have produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it, by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused that is, the timely medical
assistance rendered to said Arnold Barcuma.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission
of the offense.[9]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September
15, 1994. They pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Robito Caballero remained at-large.
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. They
adduced evidence that Ricardo was employed as electrician in the Office of the City Engineer
of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab driver. Robito resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San
Carlos City while Marciano, Jr. was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City and
was employed with the Victorias Milling Corporation.
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and went to Bacolod
City. Armando went to the house of his brother Ricardo to help in the construction of the latters
house and to take care of Ricardos fighting cocks while he was in his office. Ricardo arrived
home at 8:00 p.m. and had dinner with his family and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila
and their younger brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. allegedly
was mauled by a group of men and sustained an abrasion, a contusion and swelling of the left
side of his face. Ricardo and Armando brought their brother Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for
treatment. On August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr. was treated for:
= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;
= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;
= Swelling left face.
No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring complication.[10]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting Arnold. They
also denied having any altercation with the victims. They also denied stabbing Leonilo. They
had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna would implicate them for the deaths of Leonilo and
Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May 7, 2001 finding all the
three accused, now appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes
charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias Baby, Ricardo Caballero, alias Ricky and
Marciano Caballero, Jr., alias Jun, having been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offenses charged them as principals, are hereby sentenced to suffer:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, there being no mitigating
circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, the maximum penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Leonilo Broce the
sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or Eugenio Tayactac, there
being no mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty of death; and to pay the heirs
of Eugene Tayactac the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity; and
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having seriously inflicted
injuries upon the person of Arnold Barcuma which nearly resulted to his death, there being no
mitigating circumstance present, an imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, with no award as to damages, no
evidence having been introduced to establish, the same; and
4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to kill Eugene
and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was only appellant
Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it
concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the
injuries of Arnold.
In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of the trial court contending
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIMS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY KILLED THE
VICTIMS.[12]
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of errors.
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt their
respective guilt for the deaths of Eugene and Leonilo and for the injuries sustained by
Arnold. They assert that the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting their defenses of
denial and alibi. They claim that at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital
for the treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr.
The appellants are partly correct.
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault
Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained
by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always
predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and
intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself,
that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective
acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aiming
at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the attainment
of the same objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[15] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[16] Direct proof of a person in
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission
of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution.[17] Once
established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all.[18]
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures
and presumptions.[19] Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy
absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common
objective and purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the
contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the
intended crime.[21]
In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma whether the
latter was going to buy something from the store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he
and Armando had no quarrel between them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the
reaction of Eugene because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of
the Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr.
and Robito joined their brother, appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused
Robito were armed with knives. When Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant
Armando pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up on
Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene with
it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When
Arnold rushed to the situs criminis to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant
Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined
appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew twice on his
forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law of appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith,
all the appellants, including accused Robito returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all
the appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the commission of the
crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for
trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the
death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants
stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally
liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito
conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house
to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab
Leonilo. There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants
assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. It must be recalled that Leonilo rushed out of his
house when he saw the commotion, with the intention of aiding the victim or pacifying the
protagonists. He was, however, stopped by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the
chest. Leonilo retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that only the accused Robito
stabbed Leonilo:
Q After that, what happened next?
A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.
Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?
A Still located at Sumakwel.
Q In that case, the very house where Eugene Tayaktak leaned on when he was
ganged up by the four?
A Yes.
Q What happened after that?
A When he came out from the house and saw that it was Eugene Tayaktak, he
proceeded to approach them but he was not able to approach them because he
was met by Robit Bebot Caballero and stabbed by Robito Caballero.
Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was stabbed by Robito Caballero?
A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: Tio, help me because I am hit.
INTERPRETERS (observation)
Witness demonstrating by holding her left armpit.
Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the attach (sic) of the Caballero
brothers?
A Not (sic).
Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
A He appeared very weak and he was staggering.
 Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?
A Already dead.
Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he now?
A The two of them were (sic) already dead.
Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped?
A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived.
Q What did the accused do after the trouble was stopped?
A They went inside the compound of his (sic) father.
Q What happened next?
A Nothing happened. Both of them were brought to the hospital.[22]
In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the appellants of murder
for the death of Leonilo. As this Court held in People v. Flora:[23]
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma
and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and
no one else. For acts done outside the contemplation of theconspirators only the actual
perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to
the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which
are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual
perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not
even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of
Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor the injuries of Flor
Espinas caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals by direct
participation of murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove that:
.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.[24]
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. The essence
of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim. [25]
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he
sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susanas house. On the other hand, appellant Armando
was armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with
knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the
appellants killed Eugene with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder under
Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.[26]
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,[27] Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, distinguished an attempted from frustrated felony. He said that to be an attempted crime
the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
Thereafter, the phase is objective.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts
of execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing
interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary
to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention
of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause
the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.[28]
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature
or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and
accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified
that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of his body was mortal and could have
caused his death were it not for the timely and effective medical intervention:
Q And how about the size and the depth of the wounds and how big is each wound
and how deep.
A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is about 2 inches and the 3rd is 2 inches in
the left, penetrating the chest near the thorax along the lateral line.
Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are wounds which are not really very serious?
A As I said before, the most serious is the 3rd wound.
Q So even without the other wounds the 3rd wound - - it could be the cause of the
death of the victim?
A Yes, Sir.[29]
It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The appellants
performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated because of the timely
medical intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and the attack on him
was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. In
sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
The appellants denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. RTC-1218 and RTC-
1219 cannot prevail over Wilmas and Arnolds positive and straightforward testimonies that the
appellants killed Eugene and stabbed Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold had no motive to
falsely implicate the appellants for the said crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full
probative weight.[30]
Equally barren of merit is appellants defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak
for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit approbation, the appellants were
burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time the crimes were
committed, they were in a place other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically
impossible for them to have committed said crimes.[31] The appellants dismally failed in this
respect. They testified that they were at the house of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently
near the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was assaulted. Moreover, the records show
that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the
incident. This belies the claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in
the hospital at the time of the incident.
Penalties Imposable on Appellants
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218
on its finding that treachery and abuse of superior strength were attendant in the killing of
Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree with the trial court and contends that abuse of
superior strength was absorbed by treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants.The Court agrees
with the Solicitor General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by
treachery.[32]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since aside from the qualified circumstance
of treachery, no other modifying circumstance was attendant in the commission of the crime,
the proper penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the Solicitor General contends
that the indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed on the appellants is not
correct. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.[33] The latter
penalty has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty
should be taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of
frustrated murder, the appellants should be meted an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Civil Liabilities of Appellants
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to pay
in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amount of P75,000 by way of
indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said heirs. This is erroneous. Since
the penalty imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be
only P50,000. The heirs of the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages.[34]
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral damages to the victim
Arnold Barcuma on its finding that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove said
damages. The Court disagrees with the trial court. The victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified
on his injuries.[35] He is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P25,000.[36] Having suffered
injuries and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual damages, which in the
absence of evidence would, nevertheless, entitle him to an award of temperate or moderate
damages, herein fixed at P10,000.
The Verdict of the Court
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-
1219 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty of
the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, REVERSES the judgment of the trial court and
ACQUITS them of the said charge.
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac,
the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6,
first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The
appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim Arnold Barcuma
the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as temperate or moderate
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74048. November 14, 1990.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO CRUZ, alias

"Tikboy" and RADING SASON (at large), Accused, ROLANDO CRUZ, alias
"Tikboy", Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Hildawa & Gomez for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A FINDING

THEREOF. Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as
sufficiently as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures.
It is also a well-entrenched rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a
finding of criminal conspiracy. In the case at bar, while the prosecutions evidence against
Sason appears overwhelming, its evidence linking accused-appellant Cruz to the felonious acts
of Sason is weak and inconclusive and utterly insufficient to establish Cruzs guilt.

2. ID.; ID.; PHRASE "ANDIYAN NA" OR ITS OTHER DERIVATIVE FORMS, HAVE NO
CONSPIRATORIAL MEANING. As observed by appellants counsel, the phrase "andiyan
na" reportedly uttered by appellant Cruz minutes before the actual shooting may lend some
semblance of conspiracy. But semblance is still a semblance and it cannot take the place of
facts. "The phrase andiyan na has equivocal meanings. When a person recognizes someone
who passes by, it is not uncommon to hear from the former, andiyan na si mayabang,
andiyan na yung kaibigan mo, or other derivative forms of the expression andiyan na, not
to mention the unadorned andiyan na itself. These phrases have no conclusive conspiratorial
meaning." In other words, the supposedly damning utterances are susceptible of varied
interpretations. In all conscience, given the particular factual milieu as gleaned from the
records, we cannot abide by the trial courts rather sweeping conclusion that "andiyan na"
were intended by the appellant to goad the gunwielder into killing Baang, thereby raising
appellants culpability to that of a principal by inducement. Inducement exists if the command
or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have
materialized. It taxes the imagination how the controversial phrase imputed to the appellant
could become the moving cause without which Sason would not have shot the victim in cold
blood. Murder is a serious charge. The slightest doubt must be resolved in favor of innocence.
3. ID.; LIABILITY; COOPERATION PUNISHABLE BY LAW, EXPLAINED. Finally, it
may be asked: Could appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated in the
execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased.? It must be explained that
the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or intentionally
given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose. (People
v. Bello, 11 Phil. 526; People v. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil. 993) In the case at bar, there is
absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior plan or agreement between appellant Cruz and
Sason to kill the victim. That essential element cannot be automatically deduced from the fact
that the two accused had harbored a grudge against Baang. All told, the criminal complicity of
appellant Cruz, either as a principal by inducement or as an accomplice, in the killing of
Baang has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that he must be acquitted.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MOTIVE; CONJECTURE OR SUPPOSITION
THEREON, CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTION; SERIOUSNESS OF
THREATS MADE WHILE DRUNK OR IN A STATE OF STUPOR, GREATLY
IMPAIRED. The trial court attempted to bolster its conviction of appellant by citing the ill-
feelings reportedly existing between the appellant and the victim as a result of a scandal
during a church wedding. While it is true that the bride was appellants niece, it is equally true
that the victim Baang was married to Leonila Gullen, a first-cousin of the appellant. To
attribute anger and humiliation to appellant enough for him to want to kill a close relation
simply because of some wedding embarrassment which did not even affect him personally
is to indulge once again in another conjecture or supposition which cannot serve as a basis for
conviction. The court a quo also took into account the various threats made on the life of
Baang which appellant purportedly made. Considering that said threats were made while
appellant was drunk or in a state of stupor, their gravity or seriousness has been greatly
impaired.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz, alias "Tikboy", appeals from the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 169, finding him guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the
amount of P30,000.00.
The factual background is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the afternoon of November 25, 1983, Jesus Baang, married, 36 years old, fisherman,
succumbed to three gunshot wounds on the head, chest and back. According to several
eyewitnesses who were at the scene of the crime, his alleged assailant was Rading (Radito)
Sason, but Rolando Cruz was implicated as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement.
Accordingly, an information was filed by the Assistant Fiscal of Malabon on December 2,
1983, against Rolando Cruz, alias "Tikboy and Rading Sason, who is still at large, the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 25th day of November 1983, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another while armed with a gun, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot JESUS BAANG y VALDEZ, hitting the
latter on the different vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds
which directly caused his death." 1
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Accused Rolando Cruz filed a motion for bail,
contending that the evidence against him was not strong. A hearing was conducted on said
motion, and after the presentation of six (6) prosecution witnesses, bail was granted for his
provisional liberty.
Thereafter, Accused Rolando Cruz was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged. Trial followed. Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence adduced,
the Malabon trial court, thru Judge Eufrocinio S. dela Merced, rendered a decision on January
24, 1986. The dispositive part reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rolando Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder as co-principal in the commission of the said offense and hereby sentences to
suffer penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and
to pay the costs.
"The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00" 2
Hence the present appeal.
Accused-appellant Rolando Cruz comes before this Court on a lone assignment of error, to
wit, that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as a conspirator in the crime of
murder.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As earlier stated, there were several eyewitnesses to the shooting of Jesus Baang. Their
testimonies invariably pointed to Rading Sason as the lone gunwielder. One witness, Danilo
Soriano, 21 years old, laborer, graphically described the incident. He recounted that at around
four oclock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, he was at the store of Lola Ida in
Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila. He saw the victim Jesus Baang walking along M. Sioson
Street, followed by Rading Sason. Suddenly, Sason shot Baang from behind. After the first
gunshot, Baang turned around and faced his assailant who then shot him for the second time.
Baang tried to escape but he fell on the ground. It was at this point when the gunman delivered
the coup de grace and fatally shot Baang on the head. Sason then walked away from the scene.
3 "Q: How far is this house of Aling Jusing to the house of Rolando Cruz?
Soriano stated that he did not see the accused Rolando Cruz during the actual shooting. It was
afterwards, during the ensuing commotion, that he noticed Cruz standing at the alley leading
to the street, watching the crowd milling around the dead body of Baang. 4
Another eyewitness, Renato Ramirez, 23 years old, testified that at the time of the incident, he
was standing at the corner of Don Basilio Boulevard and M. Sioson St. He was on his way
home. He saw Sason walking a few paces behind Baang. Then two shots rang out. He saw
Baang fall to the ground. Sason approached Baang and shot him again. Then Sason left. 5
The shooting unnerved Ramirez who was only about one and one-half electric posts away.
When he met the gunman, he asked: "Pare, bakit?" To which, Sason replied: "Pare, wala kang
nakita." 6
Ramirez corroborated the testimony of Soriano to the effect that the accused Rolando Cruz
was nowhere near the scene during the actual attack.7
The witnesses narrations closely coincided with the findings of Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, the NBI
medico-legal officer who autopsied the victims cadaver at nine oclock in the evening of
November 25, 1983. His report disclosed that the deceased Baang was shot at the back, chest
and head with a .45 caliber pistol. He sustained three (3) wounds, two of which were fatal.8
The motive for the killing was apparently caused by the victim himself. It appears that one day
before the wedding of Laura, a sister of Rading Sason, a former girlfriend (Tiray) of the
prospective groom arrived from Palawan. Baang allowed her to sleep in his house and then
brought her the following morning to the church. The woman created a scene and as a result,
the wedding was celebrated at the side altar, instead of the main altar. The incident caused
embarrassment and humiliation to the brides family, particularly Rading Sason. 9
It was through the eyewitness account of Ismael "Doro" Rivera that the prosecution sought to
establish the existence of a conspiracy between Sason, the triggerman, and accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz to liquidate Baang.
Rivera, a 22-year old laborer and a cousin of the two accused, testified that at around two
oclock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, he was in the house of Aling Jusing, drinking
with Rading Sason, Danilo Soriano and Renato Ramirez. After a while, Soriano left, followed
by Ramirez who said that he was going to have a haircut. Then Sason followed suit and
headed in the direction of the church. 10
Rivera saw Rolando Cruz come out of his house and talked with Sason. Rivera
recalled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Under what circumstances Mr. Witness have you seen this Rolando Cruz at the house of
Aling Jusing before this Rading Sason left?
"A: He just came out of his house sir.
"Q: Who came out of his house?
"A: Rolando Cruz sir.
"A: A little bit far sir.
"Q: On that occasion that Rolando Cruz was seen by you before Rading Sason left, was there
any conversation that had took (sic) place between Rading Sason and Rolando Cruz?
"A: There was sir.
"Q: What was the conversation, do you know?
"A: Rolando Cruz told Rading Sason "andiyan na."
"Q: And after that utterances or remarks made by Rolando Cruz, what did Rading Sason do if
he did anything?
"A: The 2 of them left sir.
"Q: After the 2 of them left, what happened?
"A: I heard shots sir." 11
The above declarations were relied upon by the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz was a principal party in the killing of Baang. The court
said:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"The actuations of the latter (Rolando Cruz) in uttering the words Andiyan na to Rading
Sason of the presence of Jesus Baang could not be given any meaning except that he is a party
in the commission of the crime in the killing of Jesus Baang. He (Rolando Cruz) certainly
conspired and helped Rading Sason in the consummation of the crime charged. There is a
moral certainty that conspiracy existed and therefore Rolando Cruz is as guilty as the principal
by induction in the commission of the crime of murder." 12
Rolando Cruz, on his part, maintains his innocence. He claims that at the time Jesus Baang
was gunned down by Rading Sason, he was at the back of his mothers house near the
fishpond, which is three (3) electric posts away from the scene of the crime. He was spreading
and laying the fishnet. Then Ismael Rivera called out to him and told him of the violent
incident at the "labasan." He quickly went outside and saw many people looking at the
sprawled body of the victim. On that same day, November 25, 1983, Cruz was arrested by the
police and brought to the police headquarters for investigation. 13
The defense has assailed the trial court for giving undue weight to the words "nandiyan na"
reportedly uttered by Cruz and inferring therefrom a conspiracy to kill Baang. The defense
points out that Rivera, the same eyewitness who incriminated Cruz, also testified in court that
there was no proof that a plan to liquidate Baang was ever made between Sason and the
appellant. His testimony reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Mr. Rivera, do you know that Rading Sason and Rolando Cruz were charged before this
Court for Murder of Jesus Baang? Finally, it may be asked: Could appellant be held liable as an accomplice since he cooperated
in the execution of the offense by signalling the arrival of the deceased.? 19
"A: Yes sir.
It must be explained that the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is
"Q: And what you saw and what you narrated before the Court, could you tell us if you ever knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the
heard any plan between Rolando Cruz and Rading Sason to kill Jesus Baang? criminal purpose. 20 In the case at bar, there is absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior
plan or agreement between appellant Cruz and Sason to kill the victim. That essential element
"A: I just heard Rolando Cruz told Rading Sason "andiyan na." cannot be automatically deduced from the fact that the two accused had harbored a grudge
against Baang.
"Q: So you can confirm before this Court that you did not hear Rading Sason and Rolando
Cruz planning to kill Jesus Baang? All told, the criminal complicity of appellant Cruz, either as a principal by inducement or as an
accomplice, in the killing of Baang has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. It
"A: No sir." 14 follows that he must be acquitted.

Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of an offense, must be proved as sufficiently as the crime
itself through clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures. It is also a well-
entrenched rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of
criminal conspiracy. 15 In the case at bar, while the prosecutions evidence against Sason
appears overwhelming, its evidence linking accused-appellant Cruz to the felonious acts of
Sason is weak and inconclusive and utterly insufficient to establish Cruzs guilt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Rolando Cruz alias "Tikboy" is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

As observed by appellants counsel, the phrase "andiyan na" reportedly uttered by appellant Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Cruz minutes before the actual shooting may lend some semblance of conspiracy. But
semblance is still a semblance and it cannot take the place of facts. "The phrase andiyan na
has equivocal meanings. When a person recognizes someone who passes by, it is not
uncommon to hear from the former, andiyan na si mayabang, andiyan na yung kaibigan
mo, or other derivative forms of the expression andiyan na, not to mention the unadorned
andiyan na itself. These phrases have no conclusive conspiratorial meaning." 16

In other words, the supposedly damning utterances are susceptible of varied interpretations. In
all conscience, given the particular factual milieu as gleaned from the records, we cannot abide
by the trial courts rather sweeping conclusion that "andiyan na" were intended by the
appellant to goad the gunwielder into killing Baang, thereby raising appellants culpability to
that of a principal by inducement.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Inducement exists if the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence,
the crime would not have materialized. 17 It taxes the imagination how the controversial
phrase imputed to the appellant could become the moving cause without which Sason would
not have shot the victim in cold blood. Murder is a serious charge. The slightest doubt must be
resolved in favor of innocence.

The trial court attempted to bolster its conviction of appellant by citing the ill-feelings
reportedly existing between the appellant and the victim as a result of a scandal during a
church wedding. While it is true that the bride was appellants niece, it is equally true that the
victim Baang was married to Leonila Gullen, a first-cousin of the appellant. To attribute anger
and humiliation to appellant enough for him to want to kill a close relation simply because
of some wedding embarrassment which did not even affect him personally is to indulge
once again in another conjecture or supposition which cannot serve as a basis for conviction.
The court a quo also took into account the various threats made on the life of Baang which
appellant purportedly made. Considering that said threats were made while appellant was
drunk or in a state of stupor, their gravity or seriousness has been greatly impaired. 18

G.R. No. L-24177 March 15, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE
CARBONEL, ET AL., defendants.
MAMERTO DE LEON, ET AL., appellants.
Emiliano T. Tirona and Anastasio Morelos for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Fidel Arrojo, Mamerto de Leon, Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan
Susano Gualdrapa and Felipe Gualdrapa from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros convicting them of the crime of murder as principals, the first by induction,
and the second by direct participation, and sentencing each of them to undergo life
imprisonment; and Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa, Felipe Gualdrapa
and Jose Carbonel, of the crime of murder, as accomplices, and sentencing each of them to the
penalty of twelve years and one day reclusion temporal, all of them to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased, Eliseo Olmedo, and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Jose Carbonel has not appealed from the judgment, so that it has now become final as to
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To substantiate their appeal, the appellants assign the following supposed errors as committed
by the trial court, to wit: (1) The conviction of the herein accused, Fidel Arrojo and Mamerto
de Leon, as principals, and Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa, Felipe
Gualdrapa and Jose Carbonel, as accomplices, instead of acquitting them of the crime charged
in the information upon reasonable doubt; (2) its failure to consider the principal and
irreconcilable contradictions of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution which raise
reasonable doubt in favor of the accused; (3) the holding that the accused were identified,
when the evidence does not duly establish their identity; and (4) its failure to hold that Jose
Carbonel, one of the herein accused, is the only author of the murder of Eliseo Olmedo, as
shown by the confession of the said Jose Carbonel made in open court that he had killed
Eliseo Olmedo in self-defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt are as follows: On the date of the
commission of the crime there existed in the municipality of Ilog, Province of Occidental
Negros, two rival societies, enemy to each other, known as Mainawaon and Kusug Sang Imol,
respectively. Eliseo Olmedo was a member of the Mainawaon and Jose Carbonel, Mamerto de
Leon, Fidel Arrojo, Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa and Felipe
Gualdrapa, were members of the Kusug Sang Imol. Four days before the crime, Fidel Arrojo
was stopped on his way and then chased by four Mainawaons who tried to catch him, but he
succeeded in escaping. In the month of October, Fidel Arrojo went to the club of the Kusug
Sang Imol and told the vice-president, Ramon Larracas, and the secretary, Francisco Gemora,
both of the said club, that the Mainawaons of the barrio of Gosy, headed by Eliseo Olmedo,
were after him. Upon hearing such notice, Ramon Larracas struck the table with his fist and
said: "Why did you not kill him? Kill him." Francisco Gemora, also striking the table with his
fist, seconded the proposition, saying: "You try to kill him; you must kill him, because if you
kill him there, where there are manyMainawaons, they will become afraid, and if you kill him,
do not be afraid because in Bacolod there are good lawyers. I am a procurador here in Bacolod
and our club has a good lawyer in Bacolod." After the said interview, on the morning of
December 26, 1924, Fidel Arrojo was telling everybody the following: "Tonight, I am going to
kill threeMainawaons; if not F. Bello, then Juan Catalan; if not Juan Catalan, then Eliseo
Olmedo." On the afternoon of the same day, Eliseo Olmedo, Mamerto de Leon, Fidel Arrojo,
Jose Carbonel, Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa, Felipe Gualdrapa,
Santiago Helboligaya, Andres de Leon and Vicente Genito met in the house of one Basilio
Salinas where there was a little celebration of the birthday of one of the children of the owner
of the house. During their stay in the said house and while drinking tuba and eating some
viands, Fidel Arrojo and his coaccused were seen talking in a low voice and so behaving as to
arouse the suspicion of the other guests that something wrong was being planned. Fidel Arrojo
was seen looking intently at Eliseo Olmedo from head to foot. When Andres de Leon asked
him why he looked at Eliseo Olmedo in such a manner, Fidel Arrojo whispered to him in the
ear "You shut up, a lightning will strike that fellow, I am going to kill him." When the
departure of the guests began, Mamerto de Leon and Fidel Arrojo were the first to leave,
followed by Vicente Genito and Santiago Helboligaya. Afterwards Eliseo Olmedo left the
house accompanied by Catalino Matula, Jose Carbonel, Felipe Gualdrapa, Susano Gualdrapa
and Silvino Bulahan. When they were about 30 meters from the house of Basilio Salinas, the
voice of Fidel Arrojo was heard, saying "Go ahead, strike him now." Catalino Matula then
placed his right hand upon the shoulder of Eliseo Olmedo, whereupon a fight ensued between
the two. Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa, Mamerto de Leon and Felipe Gualdrapa
immediately also seized Eliseo Olmedo, two upon each arm, pulling his two arms crosswise;
two holding both legs; one holding his waist and Mamerto de Leon holding his nape with his
left hand. When Eliseo Olmedo had become weakened, his assailants took of his shirt and
lowered his pantaloons until the knees. On that instant the voice of Fidel Arrojo was again
heard saying "strike him now with the bolo." Upon hearing this, in the twinkling of an eye
everybody let Eliseo Olmedo and Mamerto de Leon strike him with his bolo on the nape and
everybody ran away. The witness Vicente Genito who saw with Andres de Leon all of this
from behind some shrubbery, attempted to interfere, but Mamerto de Leon met him and said
"You also want to help him?," at the same time giving him a bolo blow which hit him on the
right hand, inflicting a wound 2 inches long. When the body of Eliseo Olmedo was examined
by Dr. Fortunato Angeles on December 28, 1924, the following wounds and contusions were
found: One on the base of the cranium, 15 inches long by 1 inch wide and 1 inches deep,
which ran from the posterior part of the right ear downward almost to the back part of the lobe
of the left ear cutting the scalp, the occipital bone and the hard membrane which covers the
brains, and penetrating to the arteries and the cerebellum, - this wound is mortal of necessity;
another wound on the left shoulder 1 inches long, having the same direction as the former
one apparently inflicted by the same bolo blow; one ecchymosis about 3 inches in diameter on
the back; another on the buttock one upon each calf and one on each
omoplate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense tried to prove that the accused Mamerto de Leon and Fidel Arrojo, upon leaving
the house of Basilio Salinas, went directly to their respective homes and did not know of what
had happened until the following day. As to the other defendants, they attempted to prove that
when they had walked some distance from the house of Basilio Salinas, Eliseo Olmedo turned
to the accused Catalino Matula, Felipe Gualdrapa, Jose Carbonel and Susano Gualdrapa and
challenged them, saying that if they, the Kusug Sang Imol people, were really brave, they
could aline before him. Jose Carbonel, thinking that he was the person alluded to, approached
the deceased and the latter pushed and struck him with a dagger which did not hit him but
Vicente Genito. Then Eliseo Olmedo, with a penknife, attacked Catalino Matula. Jose
Carbonel, upon seeing this, struck him with a bolo on the nape, running away afterwards. As
to the defendants Silvino Bulahan and Susano Gualdrapa, the defense tried to prove that the
said accused remained in the house and did not leave until
later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence for the prosecution consists in the testimony of Vicente Genito and of Santiago
Helboligaya who witnessed the event. Andres de Leon, being a member of Kusug Sang Imol,
was included in the complaint, but later excluded to be used as state's witness, for the purpose
of proving the motive of the crime and also its commission by the defendants. The testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution is corroborated by the circumstances of the case and by
the marks of violence that were found upon the body of the deceased. The wound on the nape
shows that he was killed by bolo blows. The ecchymoses on the arm, on the back, on the
buttocks and on the calves corroborate the testimony of the witnesses that the deceased was
held by the defendants in those parts of the body. As to the identity of the defendants there
cannot be the slightest doubt, because they were seen by persons who knew them very well
and who were with them at the time and under such circumstances that it was not possible to
make a mistake about their identity. The slight contradictions found in the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution, far from denoting that they did not tell the truth, prove that each
of them testified only as to that which he perceived subjectively and objectively. It is a
phenomenon now no longer a matter of speculation, but a psychological truth, that two
persons seeing the same accident or act do not perceive the details in the same manner nor
receive the same impression. Experience has shown that there can only be absolute
coincidence in the details of observation of the same accident or act by two or more persons
when there has been a previous concert.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense of alibi, as regards the defendants Fidel Arrojo, Mamerto de Leon, Silvino
Bulahan and Susano Gualdrapa, cannot overcome the conclusive evidence of the prosecution
as to their identity and participation in the crime. As to the other accused neither is the
evidence that Eliseo Olmedo provoked the fight, compelling Jose Carbonel to defend his
person and his companions, meritorious since, aside from the fact that all the witnesses for the
defense are interested persons and partial witnesses on account of their natural tendency to
protect themselves, the circumstances of the case do not corroborate their testimony which
was contradicted by the witnesses for the prosecution who had witnessed the
event.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Having found beyond all reasonable doubt that all of the herein accused have cooperated in
killing Eliseo Olmedo, we shall now proceed to consider the nature of the crime committed
and the responsibility of each and everyone of them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The advices and assurances given to Fidel Arrojo by the vice-president and secretary of
the Kusug Sang Imol of Ilog; the statements made by him on the following day that he would
kill three Mainawaons, among them, the deceased Eliseo Olmedo; the secret conversations
that took place in the lower part of the house of Basilio Salinas in the afternoon of December
26, 1924; the cry of "Go ahead, strike him now" suddenly made by Fidel Arrojo when he got
about 30 meters away from the house of Basilio Salinas; the instantaneous action of Catalino
Matula in holding Eliseo Olmedo by the right shoulder and the cooperation, also
instantaneous, given by the deceased Mamerto de Leon, Silvino Bulahan, Felipe Gualdrapa,
Jose Carbonel and Susano Gualdrapa, holding the said Eliseo Olmedo in different parts of the
body; the second cry of Fidel Arrojo of "strike him now with the bolo;" the instantaneous blow
struck by Mamerto de Leon on the nape that caused his death, - all of this shows that in the
afternoon of the day when the crime was committed, the accused, headed by Fidel Arrojo,
conspired and agreed to kill Eliseo Olmedo, and united for one single purpose, each one
having his respective part in the consummation of the crime, assaulted said Eliseo Olmedo,
inflicting several wounds upon him, one of which was mortal of necessity and as a result of
which he died on the spot. The accused Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan, Susano Gualdrapa
and Felipe Gualdrapa cannot be considered as mere accomplices, because if they had not
participated in the conspiracy to kill Eliseo Olmedo, Fidel Arrojo would not have shouted
"strike him now with the bolo," and upon hearing it, they would have prevented Mamerto de
Leon from executing the order. Not only did they not do anything of the kind - giving it to
understand by their silence that they approved of the act - but they stripped Eliseo Olmedo of
his shirt, and would have done the same with his pantaloons, that were already lowered up to
the knees, if the order to kill him had not been given prematurely. ". . . If two persons pursue
by their acts the same object often by the same means, one performing one part of the act and
the other another part of the act, so as to complete it with a view to the attaining of the object
which they are pursuing, this will be sufficient to constitute a conspiracy. . . . It is not essential
that each conspirator shall take part in every act, or that he shall know the exact part to be
performed by the other conspirators in execution of the conspiracy. Conspiracy implies
concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution. Nor it is necessary that the
plan of a combination shall embrace in detail in its early stages the various means by which it
is to be executed, as it is sufficient that there is a general plan to accomplish the result sought
by such means as may from time to time be found expedient." (12 Corpus Juris, p. 545.)
"Generally it is not material that the plan which was carried out differs widely from the
original plan, nor will it be required to show the existence of any previous plan if, from the
evidence, it seems clear that there had been negotiations to the same end." (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, page 794, par. 490.) chanrobles virtual law library
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. "It need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter in and pursue a common design. The
existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. . . . The details of the conspiracy need
not be proved. If a community of purpose among the parties to do some criminal act or acts is
shown, it is not necessary that the acts which are charged, or of which evidence has been
given, were specifically contemplated by them or included in the original design. . . ."
(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, page 795, par. 491.) chanrobles virtual law library
The facts proven at the trial constitute the crime of murder, qualified by the circumstances of
known premeditation and alevosia, as regards Fidel Arrojo and of alevosia as regards the other
defendants, each and everyone of them being criminally responsible as principal, Fidel Arrojo
by induction, and all the others by direct participation, the penalty provided by law being
from cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death. In the imposition of the penalty there
are no generic circumstance modifying the criminal liability; hence, the penalty must be
imposed in the medium degree, that is cadena perpetua.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In view whereof, the judgment appealed from, as regards Catalino Matula, Silvino Bulahan,
Felipe Gualdrapa and Susano Gualdrapa, is reversed, and they are held guilty of the crime of
murder, as principals by direct participation, and each of them is sentenced to the penalty
of cadena perpetua, said judgment being affirmed in all other respects, with proportional costs
against the appellants and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already
suffered. So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARQUILLOS TABUSO y
SISTER @ BULAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by accused Arquillos Tabuso from the Decision of Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 92-108854.
Filed on August 5, 1992 by Assistant City Prosecutor Orlando Ana-Siapno, the
Information indicting accused Arquillos Tabuso y Sister @ Bulag, alleges:
That on or about July 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating with three others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon one ROBERTO BUGARIN Y PIGAR by shooting the latter
with a gun hitting him on the right armpit and right shoulder, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. [1]
With the accused entering a negative plea on October 22, 1992, upon arraignment with
the assistance of Atty. Bonifacio Macabaya, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Arturo
Cortes, Renato Datingginoo, Rosalinda Datingginoo, Cesar Bugarin, Marcial Cenido and Dr.
Rowena Asuncion, as its witnesses.
For the defense, the accused took the witness stand as the lone witness on his behalf.
Testified on by its witnesses, the version of the prosecution runs as follows:
On July 29, 1992, at 8:40 oclock in the evening, Renato Datingginoo passed by the group
of Arnold Mendoza, accused Arquillos Tabuso and some other companions in an alley, on his
way to Sevilla Street, Tondo, Manila, to buy food. He (Renato) heard Tabuso utter nandiyan na
si Dagul (TSN, December 10, 1992, p. 6). Referred to as Dagul was the deceased Roberto
Bugarin.
When he (Renato Datingginoo) was near the store, he heard two (2) gunshots coming from
the direction of the said alley. He went back to the alley and met one Banong who uttered, Utol,
wala iyon, binanatan lang si Dagul (TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 10). Banong is Arnold
Mendozas brother. He heard another gunshot. Thereafter, he saw Arnold Mendoza, Banong,
Arquillos Tabuso and another person hurriedly coming out from the alley, and proceeding to
their house.
Then, Renato went to the place where the incident happened, near his house, and he saw
Roberto Bugarin lying prostrate on the ground, stiffening (naninigas, nakatumba, nangingisay)
(TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 12). Thereafter, he brought him to the Mary Johnston Hospital. At
around 10:00 oclock in the evening, he learned that Bugarin died.
Rosalina Datingginoo testified that she and her uncle Amado Bugarin, heard two
gunshots, on July 29, 1992, at 8:40 oclock in the evening, while they were in the house of
Rebecca Ty, her sister. Her uncle closed the door so as not to get involved in the case. Somebody
knocked at the door and when her uncle opened it, it turned out that the person knocking was
Rolando Bugarin. She saw Arnold Mendoza shoot Bugarin twice and the latter lay on the floor
of her aunts house. Mendoza, Tabuso and their two companions hurriedly escaped from the
scene of the crime.
Dr. Rowena Asuncion of Mary Jonhston Hospital examined the victim and found him
with two gunshot wounds in the lungs, one on the right posterior axillary line with no point of
exit, and the other at the right midcalf of the thoracic line.Before declaring Bugarin dead, at 8:55
oclock in the evening of the same day, doctors inserted a tube in his throat to force air into his
lungs and to supply oxygen to the patient. They also inserted an intravenous line to his
extremities.
Cesar Bugarin, bereaved father of the deceased, claimed that he gave P5,000.00 to his
lawyer as downpayment for the P10,000.00 attorneys fees agreed upon. He also spent P3,000.00
for the cemetery arrangements, P9,000.00 for the services of Don Bosco Funeral
Parlor, P2,562.00 for transportation expenses, P26.00 for coffee, P36.00 for sugar, P104.00 for
orange juice, P100.00 for biscuits and P100.00 for peanuts and green peas. He experienced
anxiety by reason of his sons death and suffered moral damages, as a result.
Accused put up the defense of alibi.
Accused theorized that he was taking care of his child in his house at No. 50 Sampaloc
Street, Camarin, Caloocan, when the killing complained of happened. On July 31, 1992, WPD
Officers invited him to the UN Detachment Office and asked him about Mendozas
whereabouts. To his surprise, one Renato Reyes and another woman identified him, after which,
they incarcerated him for being a relative of Arnold Mendoza.
On August 9, 1993, Judge Inocencio D. Maliaman of the Regional Trial Court a quo found
the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to support a judgment of conviction and disposed,
thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Arquillos Tabuso Y Sister guilty of the crime of murder
as charged in the information, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. He is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim and P14,928.00 as consequential
damages and to pay the costs.
In the service of the sentence, the accused is entitled to the provision of Article 29[2] of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[3]
Undaunted, the accused found his way to this Court via the ordinary appeal at bar. To
buttress his protestation of innocence and plea for acquittal, appellant theorized:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CONSPIRED WITH ARNOLD MENDOZA IN THE MURDER OF
ROBERTO BUGARIN.
II
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TOTALLY REJECTING THE This Tabuso you are referring to is he the same person charged of homicide?
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
WITNESS:
III Yes, Sir, as far as I know, Arquillos Tabuso is merely a look out xxx (TSN, December 9,
1992, pp. 6-7)
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED- "WITNESS:
APPPELLATNT (sic) GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH I did not notice what happened, so I just pass (sic) by their group and proceeded to Sevilla
THE NECESSARY QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE.[4] St. and while going to Sevilla St., I heard a gunshots, (sic) sir.
FISCAL PINEDA:
The pivot of inquiry being factual and evidentiary, credibility of the witnesses assumes
extreme importance. Records on hand indicate that the sole basis of appellants conviction is his How far are (sic) you from Tabuso when he utter (sic) the words nandiyan na si Dagul
alleged conspiracy with Arnold Mendoza and some others.
WITNESS:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement on the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. (People v. Manuzon, 277 SCRA 550) In a number of cases, More or less 2 meters away, sir.
this Court ruled that similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
FISCAL PINEDA:
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Andal, 279 SCRA 474, 476)
You said you proceeded to a place when you are (sic) going to buy foods and you said you
The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-
heard 2 gunshots, is that correct?
conspirator. (People v. Ortiz, 266 SCRA 641, 643) Assumed intimacy between two persons of
itself does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal conspiracy." (People WITNESS:
v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432)
Yes, sir. xxx (TSN, December 9, 1992, p. 8)
Conspiracy certainly transcends companionship. (supra) Settled is the rule that to
establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
an illegal act is required. (People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310, 311)
Do (sic) you know if said Arquillos Tabuso has (sic) any relation to Arnold Mendoza?
A careful examination and appreciation of the attendant facts and circumstances show that
the witnesses were categorical in their narration that it was Arnold Mendoza who killed Rolando WITNESS:
Bugarin. The People placed heavy reliance on Renato Datingginoos testimony that Tabuso acted Before the incident, I do (sic) not know, Sir.
as a lookout, which conclusion must have been arrived at when Tabuso uttered Nandiyan na si
Dagul and from the fact that the assailants (including Tabuso) fled. ATTY. HERNANDEZ:
The Court thoroughly examined the transcript of stenographic notes and nothing can be What about after the incident?
deduced from the testimony of Renato Datingginoo that accused Arquillos Tabuso conspired
with Mendoza and some others in killing Bugarin. He (witness) testified: ATTY. MACABAYA:

FISCAL PINEDA: We object, she is incompetent to answer?

Do you know what these people were doing when you pass by? ATTY. HERNANDEZ:

WITNESS: She is testifying.

They were standing as if they were waiting for someone, Sir. COURT

FISCAL PINEDA: Witness may answer.

What happened when you pass by their group as if they were waiting for somebody else? WITNESS;

WITNESS: Yes, Sir, Arquillos Tabuso as a relation to Arnold Mendoza.

When I pass by their group, I heard Arquillos Tabuso saying nandiyan na si Dagul, sir. ATTY. HERNANDEZ:

FISCAL PINEDA: What relation does (sic) he have?

 WITNESS: Finally, the prosecution further theorized that appellant acted as a lookout during the
commission of the felony. But such a theory is incredible because Tabuso is known in Sevilla
They were cousin, (sic) sir. Street, Tondo, as Bulag or blind because of an eye defect.Considering his deformity, which is
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: undisputed, the Court entertains great doubts over his ability or efficacy to perform the role of
a supposed lookout.
What about the three suspected men whom you saw hurriedly escape, (sic) will you look
around if they were here now? Absent enough evidence to establish conspiracy, acquittal of accused-appellant is in order
since his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, as Alfonso El Sabio
WITNESS: was reputed to have said a long time ago and as cited by the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez
in People v. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769, 784; Mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos
They were not here, sir. presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED; and on the ground
of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Arquillos Tabuso y Sister @ Bulag is hereby
Were you able to know the two men aside from Arquillos Tabuso after the shooting who
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. With costs de oficio.
hurriedly escape? (sic)
Let the Director of Prisons, NBP, Muntinlupa City, cause the immediate release of
WITNESS:
accused-appellant unless there be any other legal ground for his continued detention and report
No, sir. xxx (TSN, December 16, 1992, pp. 6-11) to the Court within ten (10) days the action taken by virtue hereof.

Generally, ineffectualness to entirely narrate the trivialities of the incident by the witness SO ORDERED.
strengthens, as it negates rehearsed trial, however, in the case under scrutiny, the lapses in the
testimony of Renato Datingginoo were not caused by the natural fickleness of his memory but
rather the full account of what he witnessed. After a careful examination of the evidence, the
Court is not convinced that Tabuso acted as a lookout when he uttered "Nandiyan na si Dagul".
Mere utterance of Tabuso of nandiyan na si Dagul did not evince commonality in criminal
intent. There is a scant scintilla of proof of Tabusos alleged role as a lookout. It was never
proven by the People. Obviously, that Tabuso acted as a lookout is just a conclusion arrived at
by Renato Datingginoo. It is barren of any factual or legal basis.
So, also, when he passed by the group of Mendoza in order to buy food, Datingginoo
concluded that they were standing as if waiting for someone. He merely relied on inferences
and did not really know what truly transpired. He had no hand in the situation. What is
undisputed was that he only observed that all the culprits were standing near the alley. When he
proceeded to Sevilla Street to buy food, he heard a gunshot and while buying food in the store,
heard two (2) more gunshots.
To be sure, alibi and denial are weak defenses. But, the burden of proof in criminal cases
lies with the prosecution.

Well-entrenched is the rule that in order to sustain the conviction of an accused person, his
guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the State with the prosecution relying on the
strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. (People v. Almario, 275
SCRA 529)

What is more, when the accused testified on his behalf, he was consistent in his assertion
that he did not know anything about the killing. According to him, he was invited by the WPD
officers to the UN Detachment Office on July 31, 1992 and was put in jail when they failed to
locate Mendoza who is his relative. Mendoza and appellant Tabuso are cousins. However, sole
relationship does not necessarily make them conspirators, absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

[G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA
Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing
him to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito
Capa y Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latters death.
The Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot
Pilola were charged with murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large
and no fixed address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-
bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab
one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested [3] and tried, and
subsequently convicted of murder.[4] The decision of the trial court became final and
executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly
died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He
was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[5] Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[6]
On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve
de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian
Azul, Jr. were drinking beer.Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and
Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two
newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated
argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two
ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going
to close up.Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when
Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched
Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded
fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen
meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow
blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the
protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled
out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around
Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw
their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their
knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim
was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon
and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear
life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E.
Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it
bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once
more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house
and informed his wife and brother of the incident.[7]
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy
Report No. N-88-375,[8] with the following findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back,
suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is
sharp, lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space,
right, 5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-
penetrating, with an approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space,
left, 3.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the
left thoracic cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of
10.0 cm.;
3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space,
12.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating
upper lobe of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space,
left, 15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially,
penetrating the left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the
left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;
5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic
cavity and then penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0
cm.;
6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp
and the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line;
directed backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating
ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp,
lower extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0
cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with
an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt,
lower extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from
posterior median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and
then perforating the spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt,
lower extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward,
downward and medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth
of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp,
lower extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward,
upward and medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0
cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt,
lower extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward,
downward and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior
aspect, 1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion,
at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming
from outside. Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant
remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive
pain in his stomach. The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa
Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was
responsible for the stabbing.[9]
Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the
appellant was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from ulcer. The
appellant stayed home on the night of the incident.[10]
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int.
4, Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she
heard a commotion outside.Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of
her niece Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and
Julian were fighting. She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the
protagonists. Ronnie grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated
and fell down the canal. Not content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran
towards the direction of the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant
anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.[11]
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street,
Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was
earlier convicted herein. With cost against the accused.[12]
In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I Q All the eleven stab wounds?
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY
ANENT THE ASSAILED INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN
SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of
probative weight. This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct
examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-
examination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim. The inconsistency in Elisas
testimony impaired her credibility.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de
minimis importance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with
murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.
Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and collateral
detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather
than destroy her credibility.[14]
Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men
who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisas testimony is corroborated
by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven
stab wounds. The doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator
in inflicting those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar
instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven
stab wounds [are] located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another
stab wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was
located at the antero lateral aspect, its the front of the chest almost to the
side. And also another one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the
left side of the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen
left side or where the left kidney is located, lumbar area. Another one at the
side of the chest, left side of the chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen,
another stab wound at the left arm. Another one at the left forearm and the
last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm. These are all the eleven
stab wounds sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like
a knife, kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there
were several assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the
presence of different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This
lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by the one holding the one
which inflicted the instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the stab
wounds.
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.[15]
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas
testimony.[16]
Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think
of any reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of cases, we have
ruled that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as
in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[17]
Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony. Case
law has it that the trial courts calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by the appellate court.
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie
and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his
participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the
criminal acts. He asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and
that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed
the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter
between the victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the
appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not categorically
and positively assert as to what part of the victims body was hit by whom, and how many times
the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a
principal by direct participation.
We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it.[18] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately
from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by
direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design.[19] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.[20] There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the
other offenders,[21] and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or
was not in on the scheme from the beginning.[22] One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it.[23] One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in
contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. [24] Each of the conspirators is the
agent of all the others.[25]
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.[26] The mere presence
of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is
not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [27] Conspiracy to
exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the
legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[28] As a rule, the concurrence of wills,
which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and
circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same
end.[29]
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may
be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which
mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is
sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are
criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal
acts.[30] Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or
murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an
accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community
of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose;(b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts
that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[31] Accomplices come to know about
the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the
decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its
execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its
accomplishment.[32] However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by
performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct
participation, and not merely an accomplice.[33]
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and
Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the
appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with
their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and
the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian.When he failed to
overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow
block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and
the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired
to kill the victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There
is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim
was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined
Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill
the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not
merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the
victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The
stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the
victim or contributed materially thereto.[34]
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not
the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to
disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been present then.[35] In this case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing
incident, he was resting in the house of his cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was
suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.[36] But the appellant failed to adduce any medical
certificate that he was suffering from the ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the
appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed the victim. The appellants defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the appellant as one of the
victims assailants. The appellant himself admitted that his cousins house, the place where he
was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was merely ten to fifteen meters away from
the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elisa Rolan. [37]
The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs
criminis and later left his house. The records show that despite being informed that he was
sought after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly
and inscrutably disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988,
a subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was out of town.[38] The
appellants own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer
seen at Nueve de Pebrero after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve
de Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what
you were then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola
there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the
victim. However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The
appellants flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, no reason can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt
and admission that he had no tenable defense.[40]
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
and the Proper Penalty Therefor
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse
of superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on
his part.[41] In this case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without
provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the
latter. The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar
and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene
and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as
the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block.The
peacemaker became the victim of violence.
Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was
executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As
testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times
mostly on the chest and the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage
to the victims vital internal organs.[42]
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
treachery.[43] There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the
felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and mitigating circumstances attended the commission
of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita
Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current
jurisprudence.[44] The said heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000, also conformably to current jurisprudence.[45] In addition, the heirs are entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.[46]
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.