SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

GR No. 127325 March 19, 1997

CASE: Amendment to the Constitution

FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735
indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.
ISSUE: WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act,
as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum
of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right
This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas,
a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in
the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

(Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution.)

Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

203 SCRA 767
CASE: The Legislative Department - Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon
Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business
enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the
speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee
for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are
baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry
regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and
that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al
filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the
law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really
in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of
RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.

Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito

78 Phil. 1
CASE: Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to
election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the
election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor
of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was
duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if
one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into
the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the
two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of
each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents
may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or
by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order;
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case
of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.