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R
THEORY OF JUSTICE t
AWLS'S major work has been widely and correctlyac-
of the notion
claimedas the mostsearchinginvestigation
of justice in modern times. It combines a genuine and
fruitfuloriginalityof viewpoint with an extraordinarysystematic
evaluation of foundations,implicationsfor action, and connections
withotheraspectsof moral choice.The specificpostulatesforjustice
that Rawls enunciates are quite novel, and yet, once stated, they
clearlyhave a strongclaim on our attentionas at least plausible
candidatesforthe foundationsof a theoryof justice. The arguments
foracceptingthesepostulatesare part of the contractariantradition,
but have been developed in many new and interestingways. The
implicationsof these postulatesfor specificaspects of the institu-
tions of liberty,particularlycivil liberty,and for the operationsof
the economic order are spelled out in considerableand thoughtful
detail (as an economistaccustomedto much elementarymisunder-
standingof the nature of an economyon the part of philosophers
and social scientists,I mustexpressmygratitudefor the sophistica-
tion and knowledgewhich Rawls displayshere). Finally, the rela-
tionsbetweenjusticeof social institutionsand the notion of morally
rightbehavioron the part of individualsis analyzedat considerable
and intelligentlength.
It will become clear in the sequel that I have a numberof ques-
tions and objections to Rawls's theory.Indeed, it is not surprising
that no theoryof justice can be so compellingas to forestallsome
* Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard UniversityPress, 1971.
xv, 607 p. Cloth $15.00, paper $3.95.
t This note was prepared with assistance fromGrant N.S.F. No. GS28626X.
245
social worlds,but not to know who they are or will be. But em-
pirical knowledge is afterall uncertain,and even in the original
position individuals may disagree about the factsand laws of the
universe.For example, Rawls arguesforreligioustolerationon the
grounds that one doesn't know what religion one will have, and
thereforeone wantssocietyto tolerateall religions.Operationally,a
Catholic would have to recognizethat in the original position he
wouldn't know he would be a Catholic and would thereforehave to
tolerateProtestantsor Jews or whatever,since he mightwell have
been one. But suppose he repliesthatin factCatholicismis the true
religion,that it is part of the knowledgewhich all sensible people
are supposed to have in the original position,and that he insistson
it for the salvationof all mankind.How could this be refuted?
Indeed, just thissortof argumentis raisedby writerslike Marcuse,
not to mentionany totalitarianstate and, withinwider limits,any
state. Only those who correctlyunderstand the laws of society
should be allowed to expresstheirpolitical opinions. I feel I know
that Marxism (or laissez-faire)is the truth;therefore,in the origi-
nal position, I would have supported suppressingother positions.
Even Rawls permitssuppressionof those who do not believe in
freedom.
I hope it is needlessto say that I am in favorof verywide tolera-
tion. But I am not convincedthatthe originalpositionis a sufficient
basis for this argument,for it transfersthe problem to the area of
factualdisagreement.
There is another kind of knowledge problem in the original
position: that about social preferences.Rawls assumes that indi-
viduals are egoistic,theirsocial preferencesbeing derivedfromthe
veil of ignorance.But whyshould therenot be viewsof benevolence
(or envy) even in the original position?All that is required is that
theynot referto named individuals.But if theseare admitted,then
therecan be disagreementover the degreeof benevolenceor malevo-
lence, and the happy assumption,thatthereare no disagreementsin
the originalposition,disappears.
IV. SOME REMARKS ON UTILITARIANISM
It will alreadyhave been seen thatmyattitudetowardutilitarianism
is ambivalent.On the one hand, I findit difficultto ascribe opera-
tional meaning to the utilitiesto be added. On the other hand, I
have suggestedthat the practical differencesbetween the maximin
and the sum-of-utilitiescriteriaare not great,and indeed that the
maximin principle would lead to unacceptable consequencesif the
worldweresuch thattheyreallydiffered.
10 Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951), firsted.,
pp. 9/10.
W = (- V)-" = (2U7-a)-l'
income of the more able to be paid out to the less able. This is, in
fact,essentiallythe widespreadproposal for a negativeincome tax.
But since the effortto produce may in itselfdetractfromsatisfac-
tion, an income tax will lead individuals to reduce the number of
hours theyworkand thereforethe amount theyproduce. If the tax
rate on the more able is high enough, the amount of work will go
down so much that the amount collectedin taxes forredistribution
to the worst offwill actually decrease. It is at this stage that the
economybecomes close knit.
The conflictbetween incentiveand equity occurs in a utilitarian
frameworkand was already noted by Edgeworth(who was really
veryconservativeand was glad to escape from the rigorousegali-
tarianismto which his utilitarianismled). The mathematicalprob-
lem of choosing a tax schedule to maximize the sum of utilities,
taking account of the adverse incentiveeffects,is a very difficult
one; it was broached by Vickreyin his 1945 paper (op. cit.) and
analyzedby Mirrlees,"1 Fair,12and Sheshinski,13 among others.More
recently,the tax implications of the Rawls criterionhave been
analyzed along similar lines in forthcomingpapers by Atkinson,
Phelps, and Sheshinski.The practical implicationsof this research
are as yet dubious, primarilybecause too little is known about the
magnitude of the incentive effects,particularly in the upper
brackets.
As I have indicated, Rawls is inexplicit about the incentive
effectsand so does not give clear guidance to the determinationof
tax rates. On pages 277-279 he argues for progressiveincome and
inheritancetaxes to achieve justice,but thereis no indication how
the rates should be chosen. Clearly, the philosophy of justice is
under no obligationto tell us what the ratesshould be in a numeri-
cal sense; but it is supposed to definethe rule that translatesany
given set of factsinto a tax schedule.The maximin rule would, on
the face of it, lead to perfectequalization, i.e., 100 per cent taxation
above a certainlevel, with correspondingsubsidiesbelow it. As far
as I can see, it is only the incentivequestion that preventsus from
carryingthispolicyout.
The incentivequestion raises another issue with regard to the
obligation of an individual to performjustice (Rawls has much to
11J. A. Mirrlees, "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Tax-
ation," Review of Economic Studies,xxxviii (1971): 175-208.
12 R. C. Fair, "The Optimal Distribution of Income," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXXV (1971): 551-579.
18 E. Sheshinski, "The Optimum Linear Income Tax," Review of Economic
Studies,xxxix (1972): 297-302.
Economics,Harvard University