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MCKENNAS AGENT-BASED REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS

Cameron Stein

PHIL 493: Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility

October 18, 2017

Cameron Stein
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Any account of moral responsibility will necessarily require that an agent acts
out of free will. While determinism may pose a threat to the possibility of responsibility,
compatibilists have argued that it is not necessary for an agent to have the ability to
act otherwise in a given situation. This paper will pose moral responsibility as
blameworthiness. In this sense, to be morally responsible is to warrant blame for an
autonomous, immoral action. Furthermore, that this free agency of an autonomous
action is threatened by determinism. Michael McKenna attempts to show that agents
that are responsive to rational consideration for actions act out of free will. The
argument appeals to counterfactuals to show that an agent would have acted
differently had they been aware of certain reasons for action, and were not causally
interfered with. So long an agent is reasons-responsive, the agent has free will, and is
therefore morally responsible. The argument is appealing, but properly defending
against incompatibilist arguments requires a strong account of what it means to be
reasons-responsive. I intend to show that McKennas agent-based reasons-
responsive theory is compatible with Frankfurt cases, and may be Moderately
Reasons-Responsive, without needing the ability to react otherwise, only requiring an
agent to be reactive.
McKenna explains that for an agent to be reasons-responsive, they must be
receptive and reactive to actual sufficient reasons for action. Receptivity is the ability to
recognize what reasons there are. McKenna initially proposes that to be reasons
reactive is to act on those sufficient reasons for acting, though he revises this definition
later. Assuming the first definition, we must question what reasons are we to say an
agent needs to act on? There are certainly a multitude of possible reasons present for
any given decision. Some have proposed that reasons response theories can be
placed on a spectrum from strong reasons-responsive (SRR) or weak reasons-
responsive (WRR) (McKenna 2013, 156). An SSR account holds all reasons into
consideration, while WRR needs only to account for at least one sufficient reason to
act otherwise. These are unsuitable to account for moral responsibility. SRR is too
strong, and no agent would be held responsible, while WRR is too weak and would
incorrectly label even the most severely impaired agents as responsible in any
situation. McKenna opts for a moderate reasons-receptivity (MRR), holding that an
agent needs only to be responsive to some reasons. Furthermore, McKennas variation
of MRR holds that the The spectrum of reasons to which an agent must be reactive
can be weaker than the spectrum of reasons to which she is receptive, but the
spectrum of reactivity still needs to display a sane, stable pattern along the lines of
moderate receptivity (2013, 157). That is, the agent can recognize a multitude of
reasons, but needs only to be reactive to some of those reasons.
An agent-based theory faces potential problems with Frankfurt cases. The agent
in the Frankfurt case is unable to do otherwise. That is, they will always inevitably come
to the same action. We can look to the case in which the agent, Jones, is preparing to
kill Smith. Black acts as a condition to limit Jones choice, by using neurological

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manipulation to force Jones to kill. Black will not act in the case that Jones will kill
Smith, but will intervene should Jones not want to act. For Jones to act freely in the
Frankfurt example, it seems impossible to explain in terms of responsiveness to
reasons. Blacks presence is a counterfactual intervener, so Jones could not act
otherwise, even if there were sufficient reasons available (McKenna 2016, 159). From
here, it appears we must conclude that an agent-based theory of reason-
responsiveness cannot fit into the constraints of the Frankfurt examples to explain
source freedom. Previous attempts to solve this problem have involved a shift to a
mechanism based view of reasons-responsiveness. However, McKenna is not fully
convinced of the arguments, and neither am I. For the purposes of this paper, I do not
see it necessary to critique the mechanism-based approach, but instead demonstrate
that an agent-based view can still sufficiently allow for MRR and, by extension, moral
responsibility.
The problematic proposition is that being unable to do otherwise means an
agent is unable to act otherwise. McKenna rejects this notion. Instead, McKenna
proposes that, while the agent is not able to react otherwise, this does not mean they
are not reactive. McKenna now proposes an agent who is suitably reasons-responsive
is reactive to sufficient reasons to do otherwise, even if, due to the presence of a
character like Black, she is unable to react otherwise (2013, 171). What needs to be
shown is that an agent can be causal in one case, but not the causal source in another,
even when the same actions are taken.
This principle is best illustrated in Carolina Sartorios SWITCH illustration. On
this illustration, a train headed for victim, B, is either to follow on the main track or
diverge to a side track at the flip of a switch that will later return to the main track,
killing B. An agent, A has reason to believe that a fragment of the main track is broken
and that, should he desire to kill B, must flip the switch (Sartorio 2011, 1081). Sartorio
shows that there are two different scenarios with similar outcomes, but different
accounts of responsibility. In SWITCH1, the fragment of the track is indeed missing,
while in SWITCH2, the track is intact, though this is unknown to the agent. It seems
clear that A is responsible for killing B in S1 but not in S2. Everything about A is the
same in both cases. He has the exact same intentions, and performs the exact same
actions. What Sartorio will have us conclude from this example is that causation is not
transitive in a single causal chain. In S1, the agent is causally efficacious, as he
introduces a threat that would have been cancelled. In S 2, the agent is not causally
efficacious, as he introduces no further threat to Smith.
What does this mean for the Jones case? This shows that the difference in
actual and counterfactual cases is dependent on a difference in the causal role of
agents (McKenna 2013, 172). In the Jones case, some of the reasons for Jones persist
in being the agential cause for action or do not persist in being the agential for action.
For example, should Smith's child be present, this would be a sufficient reason for
Jones, should be be receptive and reactive, to choose not to kill. This reason shows

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Blacks intervention is causal when Jones is receptive and reactive to the presence of
Smiths child.
Through this McKenna has shown moderate reasons-responsive source
compatibilism to be consistent even in Frankfurt cases. The reasons-responsive theory
requires that agents are both receptive and reactive to reasons for action. Concern had
previously been raised on the apparent inability to be reactive. McKenna has shown
reactivity to still be possible, even when I believe McKenna has shown this agent-
based model as compatible with Frankfurt cases.
Bibliography

McKenna, Michael. "Reasons-responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms." Oxford

studies in agency and responsibility 1 (2013): 151-83.

Sartorio, Carolina. "Actuality and Responsibility." Mind 120, no. 480 (2011): 1071-1097.

Cameron Stein