G.R. No.

139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since
Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and
Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume
his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling
the corporations.15

Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by
conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so
lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition
with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her
husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the
subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme
Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of
her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with
another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I.
Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation
rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at
the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared
that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and
that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he
loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments.
Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide
for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before
the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally
incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the
corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate
proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus 4 for
lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals'
ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the
decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on
October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory
presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to
wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical
examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its
resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps
towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and
other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and
compliance of the parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000. 10
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation
and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the
Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts
appointed by the Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to
reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for
reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that have been
resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should
not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed
that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and
incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go
to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the
lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it
is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there
are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an
exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and
Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as
spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together
and care for each other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. 21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda
and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship
with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.22
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty,
his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his
survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration.
At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of
subject.SO ORDERED.

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling

Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental
state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire
petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda
cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her
husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining
Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of
pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick
SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC;
these are: 1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions of the
Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail,
motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former
President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf of the
said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before
the Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon learning
of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner,
thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion is opposed by
the prosecution for the reason that petitioner should be arraign first
before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed a
motion to quash.
The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed
by petitioner and the prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason
that the prosecution have waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the
bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong
evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being deprived of
his liberty.
Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court
held that habeas corpus extends to instances where detention, while
valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted?
Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. General rule applies.
Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting
ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to
bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the
latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has
not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending
and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioners
restraint of liberty did not become arbitrary. His application for bail has
yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely
to the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution because he himself is
partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes.-------------------------
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until
the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and
resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding
that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be
granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to the
issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecutions
refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayans refusal to
grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that
as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is
strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched a seemingly
endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the
conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for
petitioners arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings and
insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and
Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked
for a bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it
is the presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail
hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its
entire case upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to
quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner
should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies.[104] He further
claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and
resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his
right to bail and to due process of law.[105]
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings which it had
earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a
continuing deprivation of petitioners right to bail.[106]He argues further
that the fact that he was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid
process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs.
Enrile,[107] where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to
instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later
become arbitrary.[108]
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper
because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information
which was earlier filed in court,[109] the warrant of arrest issuant
pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities.[110]
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.[111] In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes.[112] Thus, in previous
cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid,[113] and even though the
persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their
liberty.[114]
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does
not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same[115]applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities
on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie
where the deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become
arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no application in
the present case because the hearing on petitioners application for bail
has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of
petitioners petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself
is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not
the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail.[117] It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but
on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such
discretion in refusing to grant bail,[118] or has not even exercised said
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the
court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon
to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be
unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayans resolution of
the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner
is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
LACSON V. PEREZ
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and
violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,
stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was
a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of
rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests,
the following four related petitions were filed before the Court
(1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed
by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao;
(2) G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-
Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed
by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and
prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and
in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot
and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state
of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless
arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular
order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He
states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement
officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38.
Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice
Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means
that preliminary investigations will henceforth be
conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No.
147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No.
147810, p. 24)
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless
arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances
so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not
based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson
Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao
Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without
warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may
adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest
proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under
custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person
subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for
delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be
without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting
officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing
an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of
the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies
which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule
65, Rules of Court).1wphi1.nt
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise
inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest,
petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the "appropriate
court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be
directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the
case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly
premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges
have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the
event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by
that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued
warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued
against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that
petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing
intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside
the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support
of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is
manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA
149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as
one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions
for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance
of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and
complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at
the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the
present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in
imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact,
the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be
arrested without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147799
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty
(PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion"
is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an
encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the
constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on
May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be
an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental
powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" Thus, we held in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15,
2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is
not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established
since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable
to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which
the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief
has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some
of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting
the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible
at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-
interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in
the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed
by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in
his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under
imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being
contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords
little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first
instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the
Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799,
respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all
acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001
siege of Malacaang.SO ORDERED.
SANGCA V CITY PROSECUTOR
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant
petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu City Jail
for alleged violation of Section 5, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts are as follows:
In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), Regional Office VII, received information that Adam was
engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities in Cebu City and
neighboring cities and municipalities. After evaluating the information,
Police Chief Inspector Josefino Ligan, PDEA VII Asst. Regional
Director for Administration/Operation, together with FO1 Rayford A.
Yap and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, planned an entrapment operation.
The events leading to the arrest of Adam, as summarized in
the Resolution of the Department of Justice dated November 10, 2006,
are as follows:
On July 7, 2006, at about 2:00 P.M., Yap and Tuliao
were able to contact the informant and inquired from him if he was
really sincere with his words and the latter replied
affirmatively. Ligan immediately composed a team and planned for
an entrapment operation against respondent and her cohorts. A
short briefing was conducted where Yap was tasked to receive the
shabu while Tuliao would be the back up and at the same time the
arresting officer. They prepared a Pre-Operation Report and the
same was coordinated with the Tactical Operation Center of Cebu
City Police Office. The pre-arranged signal in the operation was
that Yap would miscall them once the transaction is
consummated. x x x
On or about 9:30 P.M. of the same day, the team,
including Yap, Tuliao and the informant, proceeded to Fuente
Osmea, Cebu City for the said purpose. Upon arrival
thereat, Yap and the informant proceeded to Pizza Hut while
Tuliao stayed behind near the parking area and so with the
members of the team closely watching them. When Yap and the
informant entered Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting
for them. They immediately approached her and the informant
introduced Yap to respondent as his former customer. They had a
short conversation and Yap asked respondent if she has with her
the item. Respondent told him that it is in her car at the parking
area. Respondent asked where the money is. Yap told her no
problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the
money. Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking
area so that she could give it to him and there, she got inside her
car. She took the shabu inside the compartment of her Toyota
Fortuner with plate number YCX 965 and handed to him one (1)
packed medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet filled
with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu. Upon
receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it was really
shabu or not and when he noticed that it was shabu, he
immediately miscalled the members of the team informing them
that the transaction was consummated and subsequently held
respondent. He then introduced himself as PDEA 7
operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car,
assisted Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her
cellular phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in
delivering and transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed
her that she is under arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA
9165 and likewise apprised her of the Miranda Doctrine in the
language she knew and understood but she opted to remain
silent. After which, they asked her name and she introduced
herself as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married,
businesswoman and a resident of Celiron, Iligan City. They
brought her along with the confiscated items to their office for
proper disposition. Later on, they found out that the item
that Yap bought from respondent, marked LA dated 07-07-
06 with Yaps signature, weighing 50.27 grams which was
submitted before the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis,
yielded positive results for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu, a dangerous drug.
Respondent denies the charge against her. She claims
that she is a trader of ready to wear clothing. As such, she
frequently travels to different Asian countries to buy goods for sale
in Cebu and in Mindanao. She supplies various boutiques
in Cebu City, including Salad Dressing at SM, D.
Blaz., BeautyLand and Lovelys Closet. She also operates a beauty
parlor in Talamban.
Respondent claims that on July 7, 2006, at
around 10:00 in the evening, she was at Pizza Hut, Fuente Osmea
Boulevard, together with her four children and their yayas. A friend
of hers, Ana, had called her earlier in the day saying that she
would pay off her loan to her (respondent) at Pizza Hut that
evening. Ana arrived a short time later. They were eating when
Ana received a call over her cellphone. From the gist of it, Ana was
talking to a certain Rose.Respondent did not mind them because
the conversation was only between Ana and Rose. A short time
later, a woman, who was introduced to her by Ana as a certain
Rose, arrived. Ana and Rose then proceeded to talk with each
other, and respondent did not mind them. A while after, respondent
saw Ana hand over a parcel to Rose, and the latter, on the other
hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then left. As respondent was
about to leave, Ana requested that she be allowed to hitch a ride
and respondent agreed. When they were outside, respondent
noticed a vehicle blocking her car, making it impossible for her to
back out into the road, without hitting the car. She then beeped her
car. Instead of moving their car, one of the men went down and
thereafter, entered her vehicle and demanded for the bag that was
allegedly given to Ana by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana
since they claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men
pointed their guns at respondent, including her children, claiming
that they were elements of PDEA and they were placing her under
arrest for illegal drug trafficking. They then grabbed respondents
green bag and from then on, she was never able to recover the
contents thereof, including the bag itself. Thereafter, respondent
was brought to the PDEA office where a certain Ryan Rubi was
also booked for alleged drug trafficking. During her conversation
with Ryan Rubi, she found out that he was arrested a few hours
earlier likewise by the PDEA, and during his alleged arrest, he was
required to produce a drug trafficker in exchange for his
release. Having been unable to produce any, he was charged. The
 name of Rose cropped up, and he said that during his arrest, the
police officers informed him that they were after Rose. His wife
was out to raise money for his release, or to produce a drug
trafficker so that he can be released. It was further ascertained by
Ryan Rubi that this Rose was actually arrested by the police
officers but was conditionally released on condition that she would
produce someone who would take her place. Thereafter, he
claimed that he overheard them refer to a certain Ana, who said
that she would also produce respondent to take her place. The
circumstances of respondents arrest and that of the said Ryan
Rubi are closely intertwined. In the police blotter, the vehicle
pertaining to respondent, which is the Toyota Fortuner was
ascribed to Ryan Rubi, while the latters vehicle was ascribed to
her. x x x[1]
The inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an
information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A.
No. 9165 was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-77562
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold Adam liable for the
offense charged, to wit:
A very thorough and careful scrutiny of the
records, particularly the affidavit of arrest, reveals
that no payment was ever made by the police
officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust
operations. The police officers have not even
alleged in their affidavits that payment was made
to respondent in exchange for the shabu. No buy-
bust money was ever presented. The certificate of
inventory does not show any buy-bust
money. These stick out like a sore thumb in the
case at bar.
Suffice it to say that one of the essential elements
to be established in the prosecution of the drug
buy-bust cases, that is, the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefore is wanting. It was
aptly said in the case of People v. Alilin, 206
SCRA 773, that: To sustain a conviction for selling
prohibited drugs, the same must be clearly and
unmistakably established.[2]
The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu
City to withdraw the information.[3] PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on December
8, 2006.[4]
In his Comment, Judge Gabriel T. Ingles, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, stated that at the
hearing of the motion to withdraw information on January 5, 2007, it
was found that:
In the affidavit of FO1 Rayford A. Yap
and PO2 Dindo M. Tuliao, there is indeed no
mention of their preparation of a buy bust money
before, during or after their briefing prior to the
alleged buy bust operation, nor is there any
mention of the price or consideration of the
sale. What is merely stated is that they had
enough money.
xxxx
Further convincing this court that there
was no buy bust money prepared are the
following:
a) In the Pre-Operation Report
dated July 7, 2006, bearing Control
Number 07-07-2006-03, there is no
mention of the buy-bust money in
the operational requirements;
b) In the Excerpt From the
Records of the PDEA 7 person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same
date and entry number 02422;
c) In another Excerpt From the
Records of the PDEA 7
Blotter/Logbook bearing the same
date and entry number 02422 there
is a mention in Facts of the Case the
recovery of 3 bundles of boodle
money with two (2) pieces of
genuine five hundred peso bills
wrapped with newspaper and
packed with packaging
tape. However, while the name of
the suspect is indicated in this
excerpt is Lovely Adam y Impal and
the evidence enumerated are as
follows:
1) one (1) medium size of heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet filled with
crystalline substance believed to be
shabu;
2) one (1) unit Nokia cellphone;
3) one (1) unit Toyota Fortuner with plate
number XCX 956 registered under the
name of Lovely Adam;
the narration of the facts of the case in said
excerpt also included the following statement:
Likewise, the apprehending officers seized one (1)
unit cellular phone (Sony Erickson) and the
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number GHC color
black registered under the name of Roberto Rubi,
which was used by the aforementioned suspects
in transporting illegal drugs.
This Roberto Rubi could not have been arrested
together with accused herein because there is no
mention of such fact in the Affidavit of Officers Yap
and Tuliao.
In fact, the head of the arresting team of herein
accused Josefino D. Liga[n] filed a Motion to
Withdraw Said Excerpt because there was an
inadvertent interchange of facts in another case
obviously against Mr. Rubi.
The problem, however, is that from the Excerpts
presented, it is not clear to this court to which case
the mention of boodle money applies. This court
cannot merely assume or conclude that the boodle
money has reference to the case of herein
accused because as stated, nowhere in the
separate affidavits of office[r]s Tuliao and Yap can
one find any mention of such. It is not even
mentioned in the other Excerpt also dated July 10,
2006 also submitted by the PDEA.[5]
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime
charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting
the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the
accused, unless otherwise held for another valid ground. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw
Information is hereby GRANTED and the accused
is ordered immediately released unless another
valid ground exists for her continued detention.
The prosecution and/or PDEA are/is
ordered to turn over to this court within three (3)
days from receipt hereof the dangerous drug
described in the information which shall in turn be
confiscated in favor of the state for proper
disposition unless the prosecution intends to refile
or file another case against the accused which it
deems appropriate as double jeopardy has not
attached. SO ORDERED.[6]
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus
is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. [7]
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been
released upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore,
the petition has become moot.[8] WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED.
MANGILA V PANGILINAN
GR No. 160739 July 17, 2013
Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila
and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the
RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of
RA 8042 were filed in the MTCC in Puerto Princesa City. he
complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by
Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
On the following day, Judge Pangilinan , Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge
Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including
the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in
accordance with the prevailing rules.
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested and detained at the
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the NBI.
Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus
to obtain her release from detention.
The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit
Issue: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the CAs finding.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate
and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to
procedure or on the merits.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding
in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of
restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the
only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the
release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ
will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan,
as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was
expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest
during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its
conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under
oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there
was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1wphi1 In the context of this
rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila
and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas
petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and
detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge
Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority
to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC
and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed
only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the
order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus
was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her
liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a
court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Her
proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the
warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had
been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of
the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We
agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not
be used as a substitute for another available remedy.
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR
CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner,
vs.RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
Nature of the Case
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with prayer for injunctive relief seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 17, 2013 as well as its
Resolution dated December 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 123759. In
the main, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 130 in Caloocan City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and
decide a special civil action for habeas corpus in relation to the custody
of a minor residing in Quezon City.
The Facts
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before
the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus,
docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition,
respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ,
directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the
court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada
(Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally,
respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses
where she can be served with summons and other court processes, to
wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2)
118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at the
Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor,
Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor.
Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of
habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court on March
28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the
Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the
habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioners Caloocan
residence, as witnessed by respondents counsel and barangay
officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for
Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89
in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia,
among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a
criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor
Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondents motion
and dismissed the guardianship case due to the pendency of the
habeas corpuspetition before RTC-Caloocan.4
The falloof the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is hereby
GRANTED.Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.5
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of
an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was
granted by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even date, the court
directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office
of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10,
2011.6 In compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011
Order as well as the Alias Writ during the preliminary investigation of
the kidnapping case.7
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special appearance,
moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan
for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition,8 claiming, among
others, that she was not personally served with summons. Thus, as
argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criseldasperson was not
acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying
petitioners omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,9 where the
Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process
requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service
of said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, as petitioner herein.10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily
require that service be made exclusively at petitioners given address,
for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for
as long as she was handed a copy of the court process in person by
anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally
serve petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-
Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person.11 The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion (Motion
to Quash Alias Writ; Motion to Dismiss)filed by respondent Ma.
Hazelina Tujan-Militante dated August 11, 2011 is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is hereby
directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez Cada before this Court
on February 10, 2012 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued
Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17,
2013,13 dismissed the petition for certiorari in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 of Caloocan City is
DIRECTED to proceed with due dispatch in Spec. Proc. Case No. C-
4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving utmost consideration tothe best
interest of the now nearly 14-year old child. SO ORDERED.14
In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when
respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the designated
Family Court in Caloocan City.15 It also relied on the certification issued
by the punong barangay of Brgy. 179, Caloocan City, stating that
petitioner is a bona fide resident thereof, as well as the medical
certificate issued by Criseldas doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that
her address is "Amparo Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocans
jurisdiction, the appellate court ruled that service of summons is not
required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known
as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on summons
contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding. 17
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the same
was denied by the CA in its December 27, 2013 Resolution.1wphi1
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC
Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeascorpus petition filed by
respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda.
Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-
Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance
of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner when the latter was served with a copy of the writ in
Quezon City.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case,
petitioner relies on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains
that the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the
family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of
the minor or wherever the minor may be found.18 As to respondent, she
asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but
Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.19
We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a
writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within its judicial region to
which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence
of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the
regular court shall refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its
presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in
places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be
enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of
minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ
shall be furnished a copy of the decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region,
petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be
filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed withany of the proper
RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.21
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds
relevance. Said provision, which contains the enumeration of judicial
regions in the country, states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. There are hereby
created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following
judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of
Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig,
Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
(emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family
court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is
sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as
here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court
of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to
the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still
be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the
former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioners insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the
provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and
not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner resides or where the minormay be found. (emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was
improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of summons, to begin
with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v.
Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a
summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. 22
In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated May 1 7, 2013 and its Resolution dated December 27,
2013 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO V WARDEN
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre,
had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs
Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected
him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his name.
Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain
Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him.
He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused
Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the
judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from
detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA
held that even assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named
in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus
may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the CA, should
have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing
the RTC decision before the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA
delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Wardens Return, the
RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should
have been appealed directly before the SC.
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus
Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due
to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and
accused in the Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the
case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented,
Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S.
Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. When he was in the presence of authorities, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers
had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process
of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is
the proper remedy in cases where a person with a mistaken identity is
detained
No, the CAs contention is not correct. Salibos proper remedy is not a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could
not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to
Datukan Malang Salibo will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for reinvestigation will not
cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the
Return before the CA
Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a
petition filed before CA or any of its members, the CA or any of its
members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its
presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is
then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower
court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to
determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the
decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.