Learning on the Fly off Guadalcanal Acts of Valor: Michael Monsoor

U.S. Naval Institute December 2017

www.usni.org

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GUADALCANAL PROVED
Admiral Ernest King
gave his commanders the

EXPERIMENTATION authority to experiment

WORKS
with tactics, allowing
them to learn faster
than their Japanese
counterparts.

By Trent Hone

T
he Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) has called for high-ve-
locity learning at every level and
stressed its importance to innova-
tion and effective tactics.1 The
U.S. Navys historical experience demonstrates
the value of rapid learning. In the early years
of the 20th century, in particular, the Navy had
developed a system that allowed continual reas-
sessment, refinement, and evolution of tactical
doctrine. This learning system proved its value
in late 1942 during the Guadalcanal campaign,
when lessons from the fighting were quickly har-
nessedand eventually became instrumental to
victory in the Pacific during World War II. Sev-
enty-five years ago, the Navys ability to learn at

NAVY ART COLLECTION, NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND

high velocity and rapidly evolve tactical doctrine
led to operational success.
The invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942
triggered a six-month struggle for control of the
seas, skies, and jungles surrounding the island.
Frequently derided as Operation Shoestring be-
cause of inadequate preparations and sparse logis-

Shellfire from the USS Washington (BB-56) sinks the

battleship Kirishima during the Second Naval Battle for
Guadalcanal, as depicted by John Hamilton.

30 U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E N AVA L H I S T O R Y DECEMBER 2017 31

tical support, the campaign was a significant test of the Navys
combat doctrine. Admiral Ernest J. King, then serving as both
CNO and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH),
has been criticized for insisting that the Pacific Fleet take
the offensive so quickly, with the Pacific theater a second-
ary priority to Europe and insufficient resources available to
secure victory.
This criticism is misplaced. Admiral King knew his forces
could learn rapidly and believed the best way to unleash
their potential was to take the offensive immediately. By
fighting the Japanese, the Navys officers identified flaws
in existing doctrine and created new techniques. King was
confident they would evolve their approaches faster than
their opponents; he was correct. The rapid pace of learning
was most apparent in the development of the Navys surface
warfare doctrine. Lessons from the battles off Guadalcanal
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, shown above talking to commanders
during the 7 August 1942 invasion of Guadalcanal, distilled lessons
learned over the first few months of the campaign into a set of tactics
for the employment of destroyers and cruisers.
led to new techniques that ensured dominance later in the
war. The process involved is just as relevant today as it was
in 1942.
On a Shoestring
The Battle of Midway in June 1942 generally is considered
the turning point of World War II in the Pacific, but the
description is too generous. Prior to Midway, the Japanese
held the initiative and controlled the operational tempo.
The defeat forced them to pause but did not transfer the
initiative to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and his Pacific
Fleet. The first side to impose its will on the other would
control the pace of future operations.
Admiral King recognized the importance of the
opportunity and seized it. In late June, with astounding
32
audacity, he ordered Nimitz to prepare to invade Tulagi in
the Solomon Islands without approval from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) or President Franklin Roosevelt.2 King worked
out the high-level details after presenting the fait accompli;
the JCS ordered the initiation of the operation on 2 July.
When aerial reconnaissance revealed the Japanese were
building an airfield on the nearby island of Guadalcanal,
it became the primary objective. On 7 August, the 1st
Marine Division landed; the next day, it seized the airfield
and named it Henderson Field.3
The Japanese response was swift. The night of 8 August,
they attacked the Allied invasion force with a hastily
collected task group at the Battle of Savo Island. Relying
on well-developed tactics that emphasized stealth and
surprise, Japanese ships penetrated the screening disposition
and sank four heavy cruisers. Four other major night
actionsCape Esperance, Guadalcanal I, Guadalcanal II,
NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND
and Tassafarongawere fought before the campaign ended
in January 1943. These surface battles were the most
significant tests of the Navys tactical doctrine. Numerous
histories have recounted their details, but most have ignored
the learning and doctrinal changes they prompted.4
Experimentation began immediately. Rear Admiral
Norman Scott, who witnessed the stunning defeat at Savo
Island, recognized that established tactics for night combat
were inadequate.5 He drilled his ships in a new approach that
emphasized concentrated linear formations and the ability to
respond to threats from any direction. Scotts doubleheader
arrangement placed destroyers at the van and rear of a short
line of cruisers.6 It performed well at the Battle of Cape
Esperance the night of 1112 October, when Scotts Task
Force (TF) 64 surprised a Japanese bombardment force,
sinking two ships and forcing the rest to withdraw.
Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan faced a desperate
situation when he took Task Group (TG) 67.4 into the
Guadalcanal littoral the night of 1213 November. The
climax of the campaign had arrived, and his mission was
to stop a vastly superior Japanese bombardment force. He
leveraged Scotts linear formation, to allow him to attack in
the van and rear simultaneously, but expected to operate in
three separate groups. Callaghan planned to command the
large cruisers at the center of his formation himself; they
would be the decisive weapon.7
Lacking time to drill and develop clear tactics beforehand,
however, TG 67.4 disintegrated when it careened into
the Japanese formation. An incredible melee developed.
Callaghan acted on his plan; he was killed when his flagship
USS San Francisco (CA-38) engaged the battleship Hiei from
point-blank range. Although a tactical disaster, Guadalcanal
I was an operational victory; Callaghans aggressive tactics
preserved Henderson Field.
A single surface action group remained in the theater,
Rear Admiral Willis A. Lees powerful TF 64, which included
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
The USS Minneapolis (CA-36) received heavy
damage from torpedoes during the Battle of
Tassafaronga. Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright
hesitated when employing his destroyers, and the
heavy cruisers paid the price.
the battleships Washington (BB-56) and South Dakota (BB-
57). Prewar exercises had demonstrated the vulnerability of
battleships in night surface actions, but another Japanese
force was on the way, and there were no alternatives. Lee
violated established tactical principles and entered the
narrow waters of Savo Sound the evening of 14 November.
To mitigate the risk to his heavy ships, Lee eschewed the
linear formation and operated in two units. He sent his
four destroyers ahead to flush out the Japanese. The tactic
worked, but Lees destroyers were quickly overwhelmed.
The South Dakota validated the prewar concerns about
night fighting; electrical failures and close-range enemy
fire crippled her. Even so, the high standard of gunnery
training on Lees flagship Washington won the battle. She
sank the Japanese flagship Kirishima with a rapid series of
accurate salvoes.8
Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid distilled the lessons
from these battles and developed a new set of tactics for
his TF 67. He instructed his destroyers to close with the
enemy and attack with torpedoes; the cruisers, close enough
to use their guns but outside of torpedo range, would open
fire in concert with the destroyer attack. Kinkaid expected
to exploit the proven capabilities of both ship types
and overwhelm the enemy with a concentrated pulse of
firepower. Unfortunately, he was replaced by Rear Admiral
Carleton H. Wright before he could test the concept. At the
Battle of Tassafaronga, Wright lacked sufficient familiarity
with his subordinates and hesitated at a critical moment.
N AVA L H I S T O R Y DECEMBER 2017
The destroyer attack came too late; the failure to coordinate
allowed the Japanese to launch a decisive torpedo salvo and
cripple Wrights cruisers.
Historians have imposed a narrative on these battles that
emphasizes linear formations and the failure to effectively
employ destroyer torpedoes, but they have ignored the
learning and experimentation that took place.9 Admirals
Scott, Callaghan, Lee, and Kinkaid developed specific
tactics that reflected the capabilities of their forces and the
situations they faced. They tried different methods because
the Navy of 1942 leveraged a decentralized approach to
doctrinal development. TF and TG commanders created
tactics and battle plans that were specific to their forces.
Fleet-wide doctrine was limited to a set of tactical
guidelines.10 Admirals were expected to experiment; this
approach was a core aspect of the Navys learning system.
It led to the rapid assessment of established techniques and
introduction of new tactics off Guadalcanal.
A System for Learning
The origins of the Navys learning system can be traced to the
introduction of competitive war games and problems at the
Naval War College in the late 19th century. When Captain
Henry C. Taylor became president of the War College in
November 1893, he made these simulations a core part of the
curriculum, giving graduates experience with the challenges
of making quick decisions to cope with rapidly changing
situations.11 Taylor also emphasized individual creativity.
33
There was no staff solution to the open questions posed by
the problemsthe value came in the learning they fostered.
The same was true of the war games.12
Once the Atlantic Fleet was established in 1907, the Navy
began to employ similar methods at sea.13 Officers explored
the most effective methods for coordinating ships and men
in combat. Learning took place on two main levels. Fleet
commanders such Rear Admirals Charles J. Badger and Frank
Friday Fletcher developed high-level guidance and instructions
based on lessons from operational exercises and tactical drills.14
Less-senior officers experimented with common doctrines
that exploited the creativity of their subordinates.15
The most effective approach for developing doctrine was
introduced by Captain William S. Sims and Lieutenant
Commander Dudley W. Knox in the Atlantic Fleets Torpedo
Flotilla. Sims assumed command of the flotilla in July 1913.
Knox introduced Sims to the concept of doctrine at the
Naval War College and joined the flotilla as the captains
aide. Together with Commander William V. Pratt, Simss
chief of staff, they transformed the flotilla into a laboratory
for the development of tactical doctrine.
Frequent conferences brought the captains of the Torpedo
Flotilla together. They modeled various combat situations,
developed techniques for problem solving, and created
a shared sense of how to act in battle. Sims leveraged
the creativity of his subordinates to repeatedly surpass
expectations in tactical exercises.16 When he served as
Commander of American Naval Forces in Europe during
World War I, Sims employed the same approach and
validated it in combat.17
During the interwar period, new structures linked these
two levels of learning and created synergies between
them. CNO Rear Admiral Robert E. Coontz introduced
a frameworka planning processthat integrated the
development of war plans, fleet exercises, and the work of
the Naval War College. The culmination of this cycle was
the Fleet Problem, a large operational exercise involving
all major fleet units. Fleet Problems encouraged lower level
commanders to experiment with new tactical approaches
and doctrines, leading to new techniques for coordinating in
combat. These were harnessed to create new options at the
fleet level, and in 1929, Prattas U.S. Fleet COMINCH
introduced a flexible vocabulary for battle plans, allowing
the greatest single advance in fleet tactics the Navy had
yet seen.18
The arc of Kings career mirrored these developments.
As a young officer, he commanded destroyers in the
Atlantic Fleet Torpedo Flotilla and learned Sims approach
to doctrinal development. Later, when Knox fell ill, King
became Sims aide. During World War I, King served on the
staff of Atlantic Fleet Commander Admiral Henry T. Mayo
and became familiar with the challenges of fleet command.
In the 1920s, King commanded a submarine division and
34
explored sumarines utility in a fleet action. At age 48, in
1926, he accepted an offer to command the submarine tender
USS Wright (AV-1) and earned his wings at Pensacola. King
became captain of the new carrier USS Lexington (CV-2)
in 1930. During the Fleet Problems of 1931 and 1932, he
used his new type of ship to demonstrate the effectiveness
of independent carrier task forces and introduced the Navys
first combat air patrol. King became familiar with the
Navys learning system by participating in it; he recognized
its potential for stimulating new ideas and harnessing the
creativity of officers.
In 1932, King left the fleet to attend the Naval War
College, where exposure to strategic and operational problems
broadened his outlook. He began to realize that the Navys
emphasis on decentralized decision making had implications
beyond the tactical sphere. In battle, independent action by
subordinatesif coordinated by doctrine and planscould
NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND
seize fleeting opportunities and keep the enemy off balance.
There was an operational parallel: The Navys decentralized
approach to doctrinal development allowed it to experiment
with new tactics and methods extremely rapidly.
In effect, the Navys learning system had the potential to
be an OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop for doctrinal
development.19 King took this knowledge with him as he
moved on to command the Atlantic Fleet. In December
1941, he became COMINCH. When the opportunity arose
the following June, King pressed for an offensive because he
was confident the Pacific Fleets learning cycle for doctrinal
development would be more rapid than that of the Japanese.
Learning from Guadalcanal
Admiral King was correct, and Guadalcanal spurred learning
on two major levels during the fighting. The first has already
been described: Admirals in the theater rapidly adjusted
to combat lessons, taking advantage of the Navys trust
in them to develop the most effective doctrines for their
specific circumstances. These approaches did not always
work, but in the process, they provided valuable lessons
for the second level of learning. And one level up, at Pearl
Harbor, Nimitz and his staff reviewed action reports and
other accounts of the fighting, identifying weaknesses and
potential opportunities.
The Navys tactics off Guadalcanal had two clear limitations.
First, commanders lacked the time to adequately prepare their
subordinates for combat. They were expected to develop specific
plans and tactics, which would be indoctrinated through drill
and practice. But the rapid pace of the fighting and the limited
number of forces available led to ad-hoc formations gathered
on very short notice. Without clear doctrines to guide them,
these formations lost cohesion and fought as individual ships.
Contemporary documents emphasized the cost: It is unsound
and a waste of material to throw forces together just prior to
an action with no opportunity for OTC [officer in tactical
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
Admiral Ernest King learned to experiment as a junior officer in the
Atlantic Fleets Torpedo Flotilla before the World War I. Between the
wars, he commanded surface ships, a submarine division, and the
USS Lexington (CV-2).
command] to issue instructions, doctrine, orders, etc. We are
paying heavily for this.20
The second weakness involved information processing.
Even though radar and other sources could have provided
a clear picture of the night battles around them, none of
the Navys commanding officers was able to understand
what was really happening in combat. The problem was
not a lack of information; the problem was the inability to
integrate and process it. Shipboard organizations varied, but
they all fundamentally relied on the captain or formation
commander to assess the available information, synthesize
it, and determine what to do. In these fast-paced actions,
captains frequently became overwhelmed and confused.
Their cognitive limits were surpassed, and they fought their
ships based on what they could sense and see, lacking an
actionable picture of the battle around them.
As they assessed action reports from the combat theater,
Nimitz and his staff recognized the problem. He leveraged an
established mechanism to foster experimentation within the
fleet, issuing Tactical Bulletin 4TB-42 in November 1942.
It ordered all ships to establish a combat information center
(CIC). The bulletin provided a succinct explanation for
this substantial change in organization: Maximum combat
efficiency by individual ships and task organizations can best
N AVA L H I S T O R Y DECEMBER 2017
be attained through full utilization of all available sources
of combat intelligence. The CIC would receive, assimilate,
and evaluate information.21 What form this new structure
would take, Nimitz and his staff did not say.
The approach was deliberate. By clearly explaining what
the CIC would do, but not how it would do it, Nimitz
triggered the learning system and fostered a series of parallel
experiments within the fleet. Different ships developed their
own approaches, sharing their models with each other, and
reporting on their successes and failures. This allowed the
rapid identification of effective techniques, several of which
quickly emerged.
The last ship in Callaghans long line of battle was the
destroyer USS Fletcher (DD-445). Her captain, Commander
William R. Cole, and executive officer, Lieutenant
Commander Joseph C. Wylie, devised an ad-hoc approach
to increase situational awareness. Wylie stood at the edge
of the radar room and observed the displays. He formed a
picture of the developing action and verbally communicated
relevant information to Cole and the ships weapons officers,
coaching them onto targets.
When Nimitz and his destroyer commander, Rear
Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale, noticed what Wylie had done,
they brought him to Pearl Harbor and used his experience
to develop more formalized CIC techniques. By late 1943,
Wylie was back in the combat zone, heading a school that
familiarized captains and their crews with effective methods
for making the most of their shipboard information systems.
These approaches rapidly began to prove their worth. In
November 1943, during the campaign for Bougainville, Rear
Admiral A. Stanton Merrill used CICs to coordinate his
distributed formation and triumph over the Japanese in the
Battle of Empress Augusta Bay.
In the meantime, less senior officers in the combat theater
had continued to experiment. Captain Arleigh A. Burke
held frequent conferences with his captains and developed a
coherent doctrine emphasizing the use of destroyer torpedoes,
an approach like that devised by Sims 30 years before.
Commander Frederick Moosbruger employed Burkes tactics
for the first time in the Battle of Vella Gulf the night of 6
August 1943, resulting in a clear victory. On 25 November,
Burke repeated them, sinking three enemy destroyers at the
Battle of Cape St. George. CICs increased the effectiveness
of Burkes tactics; he noted in his action report: CICs
performed admirably. At no time was there confusion or
lack of knowledge. The battle was conducted better than
most drills.22
The other weakness exposed by Guadalcanal required a
different approach. In April 1943, Nimitz convened a board
to revise the Pacific Fleet Cruising Instructions. He ordered
the board to review current doctrinal publications, examine
combat reports, interview officers returning from combat
zones, and produce a new manual.23 They exceeded this
35

The USS OBannon (DD-450), Chevalier (DD-451),
and Taylor (DD-468) sail through Solomon waters
as part of Destroyer Squadron 21 on 15 August
1943. By this time, destroyer doctrine was well
developed, and commanders knew what to do and
when to do it.
NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND
authority and developed a new doctrinal publication that
addressed the challenges inherent in the Navys decentralized
approach to indoctrination. The resulting manual, Current
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, PAC-10, was
issued in June 1943. It introduced a more uniform tactical
doctrine that permitted the interchangeability of ships and
task units, an emerging requirement for the shift away from
a centralized battle fleet and toward the Navys first foray
into distributed lethality: a mutually supporting collection
of dispersed carrier task forces.24
The result was a dramatic increase in flexibility. With
PAC-10, ships could move from task force to task force or
theater to theater without lengthy instructions from their new
commanders. The manuals introduction clearly illustrated
the objective, a direct reaction to the problems exposed by
Guadalcanal: PAC-10 is intended . . . to obviate necessity
for . . . special instructions under ordinary circumstances
and to minimize them in extraordinary circumstances . . .
It must be possible for forces composed of diverse types, and
indoctrinated under different task force commanders, to join
at sea on short notice for concerted action against the enemy
without exchanging a mass of special instructions.25
PAC-10 provided a common framework and language
for tactical plans that increased cohesion without overly
restricting the capabilities of commanders. It proved
instrumental to the success of the Central Pacific offensive
that began in November 1943.26
Implications for Today
PAC-10 and the CIC enhanced the Navys ability to coor-
dinate ships in combat and were crucial to victory in the
36
Pacific. They were a direct result of lessons from the Gua-
dalcanal campaign. Without the tactical setbacks of late
1942, the flaws in prewar approaches would not have been
exposed. Admiral Kings insistence on taking the offensive
harnessed the Navys learning system and resulted in the
discovery of new techniques. PAC-10 provided new, more
resilient methods for developing and disseminating tactical
doctrine. The CIC introduced network-centric approaches
to information processing. Together, they dramatically in-
creased the capabilities of the fleet.
Admiral King recognized the importance of seizing
the initiative from the Japanese at the earliest possible
moment. He knew that by taking the offensive, the
Pacific Fleet would achieve two objectives. First, it
would control the pace of operations and force the
Japanese to react. Second, it would leverage the learning
system, rapidly absorb lessons from combat, and refine
its techniques. Admiral King had confidence that his
officers, imbued with the Navys emphasis on learning
and experimentation, would evolve their doctrine faster
than the Japanese. Guadalcanal was a triumph, not only
of arms, but also of high-velocity learning.
The Navys experience in 1942 has implications for
today. Rapid learning was possible because the Navys
approach was decentralized. Individual formation
commanderssuch as Admirals Scott, Callaghan, Lee, and
Kinkaidwere expected to develop specific approaches
for their situations. This led to variability. Most analyses
of Guadalcanal focus on the negative consequence, the
Navys inconsistent performance. They ignore the positive
result. Variability within the fleet allowed the more rapid
U N I T E D S TAT E S N AVA L I N S T I T U T E
identification of effective techniques through multiple
parallel experiments. Nimitz capitalized on this when he
ordered the introduction of the CIC. Burke leveraged it
when he invited his captains to explore how they could
effectively employ their destroyers.
The investigation of new techniques and methods
will be most effectiveand learning most rapidif the
process is decentralized. By allowing individual ships and
commands to experiment, the Navy of 1942 explored a
wide set of alternative solutions, quickly identifying the
best and discarding those that were less effective. The
same process can be leveraged today, provided sufficient
freedom is granted to lower level commands to develop
alternatives and experiment with them. Some approaches
will be unsuccessful; others will lead to new paradigms. The
chances of success will be maximized if the desired outcome
is clearly articulated. This is exactly what Nimitz did with
the CIC. Todays officers can leverage the same proven,
successful, war-winning strategy.
1. A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 1.0, January
2016, www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf.
2. Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral
Ernest J. King (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980), 199200.
3. The field was named after MAJ Lofton Henderson, who died leading
VMSB-241 against the Japanese at Midway.
4. CAPT Charles Cook, USN, The Battle of Cape Esperance: Encounter at
Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968); Eric Hammel,
Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November
13-15, 1942 (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988); CAPT Russel S.
Crenshaw Jr., USN, The Battle of Tassafaronga (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical
& Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995); James W. Grace, The
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999);
CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000); John Prados, Islands of Destiny: The
Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun (New York: NAL
Caliber, 2012).
5. Richard W. Bates, The Battle of Savo Island, August 9th, 1942,
Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Part 1 (Naval War College, Newport, RI:
Prepared for Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1950).
6. Report of night action 1112 October 1942, The Commander South
Pacific Area, 3 November 1942, World War II Action and Operational
Reports (Washington, DC: National Archives), Record Group 38, Records of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Box 19; Action off Savo Island,
Night of 11-12 October; report of., U.S.S. Helena, 20 October 1942, 2,
World War II Action and Operational Reports, Box 1025.
7. Trent Hone, Give Them Hell!: The U.S. Navys Night Combat Doctrine
and the Campaign for Guadalcanal, War in History 13, no. 2 (April 2006):
17199.
8. Lee had been Director of Fleet Training before the war and was a gunnery
expert. He knew the most effective techniques for hitting rapidly and
consistently at night and impressed them upon the Washingtons crew. See
Action Report, Night of November 14-15, 1942, U.S.S. Washington, 27
November 1942, 10, World War II Action and Operational Reports, Box 1501.
9. See, for example, Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat.
10. Trent Hone, The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy,
19221941, The Journal of Military History 67, no. 4 (October 2003).
11. Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the
Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, RI: Naval War College
Press, 1977), 73.
12. Rules for the Conduct of the War Games (Newport, RI: Naval War
College, 1905).
N AVA L H I S T O R Y DECEMBER 2017
13. This had been impossible previously because the Navys ships were
distributed among distant squadrons. See James C. Rentfrow, Home
Squadron: The U.S. Navy on the North Atlantic Station (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2014).
14. Result of Battle Maneuvers, July 1913, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Intelligence
and Technical Archives (Newport, RI: Naval War College Archives), Record
Group 8, Box 93; Results of Battle Maneuvers, June 1913, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, Intelligence and Technical Archives, Box 93; Battle Instructions,
United States Atlantic Fleet, 27 May 1916, General Board Records
(Washington, DC: National Archives), Record Group 80, General Records of
the Department of the Navy, Box 48.
15. LCDR Dudley W. Knox, USN, Trained Initiative and Unity of Action: The
True Bases of Military Efficiency, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 39, no.
1 (March 1913).
16. Letters from Flotilla Commander, Torpedo Flotilla, Atlantic Fleet on
Attacks by Flotilla against the Battleship Fleet protected by Double Screen,
March 1915, 1, Intelligence and Technical Archives, Box 42.
17. Doctrine and General Instructions, Force Instructions No. 25, U.S. Naval
Forces Operating in European Waters, London, England, 16 August 1918,
U.S. Navy and Related Operational, Tactical, and Instructional Publications
(Washington, DC: National Archives), Record Group 38, Records of the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Entry 337, Box 107.
18. United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930, Report of the Commander in
Chief United States Fleet, 14 July 1930, 9, 61-62, Records Relating to
United States Navy Fleet Problems I to XXIII, 1923-1941 (Washington, DC:
National Archives, 1974), Microfilm, Roll 13.
19. The OODA loop is attributed to COL John Boyd, USAF. The Navy of
the early 20th century understood the concept but never developed such
succinct terminology for it. See Hone, The Evolution of Fleet Tactical
Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941.
20. Secret Information Bulletin No. 5, Battle Experience Solomon Islands
Actions, December 1942January 1943, United States Fleet, Headquarters
of the Commander in Chief, Manuscript Collection 207 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Archives), Papers of CDR Winston S. Brown, USN, Box 1,
31-6.
21. Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletin No. 4TB-42, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, 26 November 1942, World War II Command File (Washington, DC:
Naval Historical Center Archives), Box 250. Note that the initial draft called
for a Combat Operations Center; Admiral King changed operations to
information. See Timothy S. Wolters, Information at Sea (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 206.
22. Action Report of Night Engagement off Cape St. George on the Night
of November 24th25th, 1943, Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty-
Three, 26 November 1943, World War II Action and Operational Reports,
Box 606.
23. Revision of Pacific Fleet Cruising Instructions, Pacific Board to Revise
Cruising Instructions, 18 May 1943, 1, World War II Plans, Orders, and
Related Documents (Washington, DC: National Archives), Record Group 38,
Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Box 22.
24. Trent Hone, U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the
Pacific, Naval War College Review, 62, no. 1 (Winter 2009). Although
the term distributed lethality is new, the concept is not. The transition to
a loose collection of carrier task forces allowed the Navy to fight in ways
unanticipated by the Japanese.
25. PAC-10, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, June 1943, v, U.S. Navy and
Related Operational, Tactical, and Instructional Publications (Washington,
DC: National Archives), Record Group 38, Records of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, Entry 337, Box 61.
26. Hone, U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific.
Mr. Hone is a managing consultant with Excella Consulting in Arlington,
Virginia. He writes and speaks about organizational learning, doctrine, and
strategy and how the three interrelate. He has been awarded the U.S. Naval
War Colleges Edward S. Miller Prize and the Naval History and Heritage
Commands Ernest M. Eller Prize. His forthcoming book,Learning War: The
Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 18981945, is expected from
the Naval Institute Press next spring.
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