Who Should Rule?

Who Should Rule?
Who ShouldRule?
Men of Arms, the Republic of Letters, and
the Fall of the SpanishEmpire
MNIC A RICKETTS
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Ricketts, Mnica, author.
Title: Who should rule? : men of arms, the republic of letters, and the
fall of the Spanish Empire / Mnica Ricketts.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017003262 (print) | LCCN 2017014333 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190494896 (Updf) | ISBN 9780190494902 (Epub) |
ISBN 9780190494889 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: SpainHistoryBourbons, 1700- | SpainPolitics and
government18th century. | SpainPolitics and government19th century.|
SpainColoniesAmericaAdministrationHistory18th century. |
SpainColoniesAmericaAdministrationHistory19th century. |
Elite (Social sciences)SpainHistory18th century. |
Elite (Social sciences)SpainHistory19th century. |
Political cultureSpainHistory18th century. |
Political cultureSpainHistory19th century.
Classification: LCC DP192 (ebook) | LCC DP192 .R53 2017 (print) |
DDC 946/.054dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017003262
135798642
Printed by Sheridan Books Inc., United States of America

A Don Alfonso Martn, hijo y nieto deQuiroz

The strongest, most indissoluble, most burdensome, and

constant bond with other men is what is called power
over others, which in its real meaning is only the greatest
dependence onthem.
Leo Tolstoy, Some Words about War
and Peace(1868)

CONTENTS
Acknowledgmentsix
Introduction1
PART ONE IMPERIAL REFORM:CONTENTIOUS

CONSEQUENCES, 17601 808
1. Toward a New Imperial Elite 9
2. Merit and Its Subversive New Roles 34
3. The Kings Most Loyal Subjects 62
4. From Men of Letters to Political Actors 84
PART T WO IMPERIAL TURMOIL:CONFLICTS

OLD AND NEW, 18051 830
5. Liberalism and War, 18051814 117
6. Abascal and the Problem of Letters in Peru, 18061816 141
vii

viii C o n t e n t s
7. Pens, Politics, and Swords:APath to Pervasive Unrest,

18201830 171
Epilogue203
Notes207
Bibliography267
Index301

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Someone dear once told me that sometimes it is impossible for us to understand

the awful turns in life and the meaning in them but that it is equally impossible
to understand the good turns and their meaning. This book is the result of many,
many good turns. I wish I could offer more than these few words of gratitude to
those who helped me get here.
My first recognition goes to Professor Scarlett OPhelan Godoy who men-
tored me while Iwas an undergraduate in Peru and helped me obtain a fellow-
ship to pursue a PhD at Harvard University that changed my life forever. Scarlett
is a model of strength and professionalism who cares deeply for her students and
moves mountains for them. Ithank her for her relentless support and friendship.
At Harvard, I was fortunate to find the most inspiring community of schol-
ars. Every minute of my life as a graduate student was as hard and wonderful as it
could possibly get. Perhaps one of the most enduring lessons I learned there is that
the best way to help students from diverse and less privileged backgrounds like
myself, is to lift them up with rigorous demands, generous help, and trust in their
abilities. Professor John H. Coatsworth created an amazing intellectual environ-
ment for his students at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies
and pushed us to be ambitious and bold. With blinding clarity, he thinks faster
than anybody else and is always the first to offer help. His path-breaking research
on the central role of laws and institutions, as well as his excellence as a teacher
and his kind advice, wit, and championship of social justice will remain with
me forever. Professor Susan Pedersen accepted me as her graduate student and
enthusiastically engaged with this project although I was not in her field, which
is British history. I took many classes with her to learn from her knowledge of
political and British imperial history and from her impressive teaching and ana-
lytical skills. Since the early stages of this study, she gave me the most valuable
advice about my work and career. Professor Jane Mangan, a first-rate historian of
ix

x A c k n owledgments
colonial Latin America and magnificent teacher, showed me new and dynamic
avenues of research on gender and the urban poor in the early viceroyalty of Peru.
Professor Robert Travers, a specialist in India and the British Empire, tolerated my
ignorance for a year and passionately shared his knowledge of imperial and global
history with me. Professor Dain Borges inspired me with expertise and kindness
as well as his lecturing on the intellectual and cultural history of Latin America.
One of the best turns of my life has been the mentorship of Professor John
Womack Jr., who has been involved in this project since the beginning of my
coursework at Harvard when, to my astonishment, he offered to teach an indi-
vidual one-to-one course on modern Spanish history. We read and talked for
hours then and later when Ibegan to write. Iam still trying to make sense of the
ideas he so generously shared with me in his tiny office, which was stacked up
with books and decorated with revolutionary icons. Meeting him was always the
highlight of my week, and our conversations are my fondest memories. Among
the many things Professor Womack taught me was to understand people on
their own terms, to respect the sources, to not use terms lightly, to ask hard ques-
tions, and to always work harder. Ihave tried my best to honor his lessons. He is
one of the best historians, writers, and human beings Iknow. Iwill never be able
to thank him enough.
Another astounding turn has been the support of Susan Ferber, executive
editor at Oxford University Press. Ithank her for her trust in this project, integ-
rity, rigor, and understanding. It has been an honor to work with her. Iam also
thankful to the anonymous readers at Oxford for their generous comments and
constructive critiques.
I owe a great debt to the institutions that supported this project throughout
the years. Harvards Graduate School of Arts and Sciences granted me with cru-
cial fellowships, stipends, and a completion grant. The David Rockefeller Center
for Latin American Studies and Real Colegio Complutense awarded me with
grants to conduct research in Peru, Spain, France, and London. A fellowship
from the John Carter Brown Library allowed me to consult its extraordinary
collections. And a post-doctoral fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt
Stiftung afforded me the opportunity to spend a year at the Ibero-Amerikanishes
Institut in Berlin and to work with Professor Stefan Rinke, a mentor and friend.
I am most grateful and proud to now be part of the department of history at
Temple University where I have found an inspiring and caring community. I am
grateful to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, which awarded me with a
summer grant and a sabbatical semester that allowed me to complete this proj-
ect; to my colleagues, in particular Barbara Day-Hickman, Travis Glasson, Petra
Goedde, Richard Immerman, Drew Isenberg, Rita Krueger, Jay Lockenour,
Arthur Schmidt, and Ralph Young, for their constant and explicit support; to
our great staff members, Anne Eckert, Vangeline Campell, and the late Patricia

Acknowledgments xi
Williams for their help; to my students, graduates and undergraduates, for their
interest in history and Latin America, their ideals, sharp critique, and push for
clarity; and to David Thomas, who helped me with crucial editorial assistance.
I also want to acknowledge the many people who assisted me in the quest
for archives and documents: Jos Carlos de Goyeneche, Amadeo Rey, and Ivn
Moreno Landahl for helping me access the private archive of the Conde de
Guaqui in Segovia; Lynn Shirey and Dan Hazen at Harvard have been incred-
ibly supportive by responding to questions and acquiring microfilms; Norman
Fiering, former director, and Michael T. Hamerly, former rare book cataloguer at
the John Carter Brown Library; Father Rondn for allowing me to work in the
convent of La Merced in Arequipa; Jay Barksdale of the New York Public Library;
Donato Amado, historian from Cuzco; Isabel Aguirre, reference director at the
Archivo General de Simancas; Mariano Esteban de Vega from Salamanca; Rafael
Sagredo, conservador from the Sala Medina, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile; Laura
Gutirrez director of the Archivo Arzobispal de Lima; and Delfina Gonzlez del
Riego technical director of the Biblioteca Nacional del Per.
All along Ihave been blessed with the friendship of Juan Carlos Estenssoro,
who initiated me in the wonderful field of cultural history, the joy of reading pri-
mary sources, and Pariss huariques. Natalia Majluf created an amazing repository
of images as director of the Museo de Arte de Lima; she also guided me and found
the perfect visual material for the cover of this book. Luis Eduardo Wuffarden
has always been willing to share his infinite knowledge of art history with me,
Gabriela Ramos offered her smart critical sense and generous care. And Renzo
Honores shared with me his vast knowledge of colonial legal history, all things
soccer, and unbeatable optimism. Jordana Dym, Richard Kagan, Kris E. Lane,
the late and dear Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, and Gabriel Paquette not only
offered support but inspired me with their own work. In Spain, Josep Fradera,
Luis Miguel Garca Mora, and Ascensin Martnez Riaza offered continuous help
and friendship.
I am also grateful to my classmates at Harvard University and old Bostonian
friends. Carrie Endries was always there to offer intelligent and kind advice.
Amlcar Chall, Balkiz Ozturk, Oliver Dinius, Nenita Elphick, Daniel Gutirrez
and Amina Sharma, Halbert Jones and Irene Gandara-Jones, Sergio Silva-
Castaeda and Patty Villareal, Ingrid Bleynat, Rob Karl, Elizabeth Rudy, Rainer
Schultz, Julia Sarreal, Isaac Campos-Costero, and Bill Surez-Potts. We strug-
gled together, but it was always fun. Suzanne Smith read chapters and proposals
and shared with me her knowledge on the history of political ideas. My friends
and family, across oceans, offered loving support: Maricarmen Beeck, Mercedes
Benavides, Lorena Borgo, Rosario Buenda, Iaki Arce and Elvira Bravo,
Carlos Giesecke, Jessica Haertel, Diana Lastres, Augusta Mara and Jos de la
Puente, Daniela Quiroz and Alexa Mullen, Ana Mara Rey de Castro, Martha

xii A c k n owledgments
and Patricio Ricketts, Hugo and Lala Snchez-Moreno, Antonia Snchez, Ivn
Thays, Cynthia Vainstein, Gaby Vidal, and Cynthia Whitaker. And Drs. Jimmie
Holland and Allison Applebaum offered their wisdom and generous advice in
critical moments.
I owe gratitude beyond words to my dearest NewYorkers and adopted fam-
ily:Hugo and Kasia Moreno, Stephen Pollard, Rebecca Dvila, and in particular
Nicols Dvila and Araceli Tinajerowithout whom Iwould not be here. They
came to stay when Imost needed them and before Iasked. They mean the world
to me.
My parents deserve my eternal gratitude. Their fascinating lives and the polit-
ical and intellectual discussions over breakfast, lunch, and dinner have shaped
me. With his enthusiasm and generosity, my father, Patricio Ricketts Rey de
Castro, made sure that I fully enjoyed this journey, without ever complaining of
the geographical distance between us. His passion for books, eternal optimism,
and joie de vivre are my inspiration. The memory of my mother, Marta Snchez-
Moreno, her intelligence, strength, and kindness are my solace.
My final and deepest gratitude goes to my late husband and our beautiful son.
The most wonderful turn my life could ever take was to meet Alfonso W. Quiroz.
A brilliant historian and passionate researcher, Alfonso was a comrade for much
of this journey and struggle. We shared the same love and concern for our coun-
try of origin, Peru, and through him I learned to know and love Spain, its archives
and peoples. Alfonso lived every minute of his life to its fullest potential. Nobody
worked harder than him; no one cooked better, swam more beautifully, or cared
more for everything that matters. His passion for archival research and his-
tory were contagious; his professionalism, sense of justice, and generosity were
exemplary; and his sacrifice for his work and the people he loved an inspiration.
Alfonso always pushed me to be better than I was and to give it all. I owe him the
moon, the sun, and the stars. This book is dedicated to our son, Alfonso Martn,
who came to our lives like a shooting star blessing us with joy. Like his father,
he always lifts me up, makes me better, and fills me with love and kindness. His
strength, thirst for knowledge, and persistence are my motivation and his laughs
and hugs the energy that got me here. I thank my little comrade immensely and I
am so happy to finally tell him: Termin mi vida, este libro es para t.
Mnica Ricketts
Philadelphia, December,2016

Who ShouldRule?

Introduction
After stabbing Princess Micomiconas giant enemy, Don Quijote fell asleep in
the shabby room of a venta (inn), while the owner, his family, and the barber
were listening to the priest read a novel aloud. The old knight came back for
supper all dressed up with his armor, helmet, shield, and sword. AMoor woman
and a former captive, who had just arrived, joined the group. They were all hap-
pily chatting when Don Quijote stopped eating and began a discurso (speech)
reflecting on the role of arms and letters in society. He was lucid, and when this
happened everybody listened. The old knight defied those who thought the
arms did not require any spirit when their ultimate purpose was peace. After
comparing the virtues, troubles, sacrifices, and skills demanded of men of arms
and men of letters, he concluded that the arms deserved more respect because
they required higher skills and sacrifices, although they brought fewer rewards.
There were more opportunities for men of letters. Even if as poor students they
had to eat the wealthys leftovers, they would never be as poor as the richest
soldier, who risked his life and conscience but rarely received pay or prize. The
priest who was a letrado and a graduate agreed with Don Quijote. Historians of
the seventeenth century and literary scholars would probably also support the
knights claims.1
This old order changed in the eighteenth century. Why and how this happened
is the subject of this book. Men of letters and military officers rose together as
new and competing political actors after the Bourbon succession to power. For
decades the contention among them was continual, often violent; it was disrup-
tive not only of the old order but also of Bourbon endeavors to establish a new
order, until the military emerged stronger and with a definite role in society.
Don Quijote would probably have liked how things turned out for men of arms.
Yet this outcome posed great challenges for both the formation of a constitu-
tional monarchy in Spain and a republican state inPeru.
This book examines the struggles for power between men of letters and mili-
tary officers in two central areas of the Spanish Empire:the viceroyalty of Peru
and Spain. The integration of histories that have been commonly studied in
2 Who ShouldRule?
isolation has been employed in the latest historiography.2 Historians of Latin

America have long considered political instability a major problem in their field,
while historians of Spain have argued the same about their field:however, neither
have brought the two histories together to look for comparable, similar, and even
the same antagonisms in both histories so as to explain their common struggles.3
This book analyzes the problem of instability as one of common imperial ori-
gins. In 1700 two dynastic lines, the Spanish Habsburgs (who had ruled Spain
since the sixteenth century) and the French Bourbons, disputed the succession
to the Spanish throne. After more than a decade of war, the latter prevailed, and
in 1713 a Bourbon king was confirmed to the Spanish throne.
Mistrusting the old Habsburg court circles, the Bourbons soon moved
to create a new power elite to help them govern. This project was first imple-
mented in the Spanish Peninsula and extended to Spanish America, as explored
in chapter 1. In eighteenth-century fashion, the new monarchy chose men of
letters and military officers of merit from among the provincial elites. One of
the distinctive concepts of the Bourbon program of reform was merit, no longer
understood as a condition or status resulting from someones ancestry and pure
blood, but as talent, skill, and good trainingthis is the subject of c hapter2. The
new Bourbon Crown sought new, professionally trained subjects for its minis-
tries. Writers and lawyers were needed to produce new legislation to radically
transform the Spanish world. They would reform the educational system and
propagate useful knowledge. Military officers, for their part, would defend the
monarchy and the empire in this new era of imperial competition. Additionally,
they would govern. Men of letters and military officers would not serve the king
as mere secretaries, entertainers, or guards. They were to act and command.
From the start, the rise of these political actors in the Spanish world was
uneven. Once the Crown secured its succession, in the 1720s, military officers
soon (and without much difficulty) formed a special, solid corps. Prior to the
eighteenth century, Spain and the empire lacked centralized and well-organized
forces either on land or sea. As a result, the Crown found significant space in its
military matters for substantial reform, and in a mix of old and new principles
forged its new army and navy into strong corporations with consciously loyal
commanders to the king. In the context of major imperial wars, Bourbon offi-
cers implemented an intense military reform in central areas of the empire, such
as Cuba and Peru, expanded the size and power of the army, and ensured that
loyal military officers occupied leading positions of power. In Peru, the military
became both a force of repression and an attractive institution for Indians and
castas (people of mixed descent), allowing them to climb higher on the social
and political ladder, a process discussed in c hapter 3.
By contrast, men of letters who tried to become new political actors con-
fronted constant opposition. Old deeply rooted elites in both Spain and Peru

Int roduc tion 3
resisted any attempts to curtail their power or prerogatives and undermined

the reform of education and the church. It proved difficult for the centraliz-
ing Bourbons to alter the traditional Habsburg society, which was based on
the tolerance of and negotiation with the particularities and privileges of each
place and group. As a result, men of letters were limited in exercising their new
authority. For the most part, they operated in state-protected spheres, such as
the new associations and press, in independent schools and academies, and in
the newly empowered secular branch of the church. Men of letters produced
laws and newspapers, gave speeches, and spread useful knowledge in their
teachings. Some, inspired by the new spirit of reform and the Enlightenment,
began to dream of new social orders in which they could lead, the subject of
chapter4.
In 1808 Napoleon invaded the Spanish Peninsula, took the Spanish monarch
and his father to France, and thereby, without intending it, triggered a liberal
revolution in the Spanish world. Men of letters and military officers were ready
to take center stage and claim power. In the spirit of the new historiography that
arose from the bicentennial anniversaries of the first liberal era of Cadiz (1808
1814) and insurgencies in Spanish America (18081816), my work reveals new
aspects of the Hispanic revolution by focusing on two critical yet understud-
ied themes of this era: the universal character of early Spanish liberalism and
its concern for military power. Traditionally, scholars of Latin America have
approached this period looking for the seeds of national identities, as well as the
causes of the empires breakdown. Without dismissing the importance of their
studies, this book shares recent trends by highlighting continuities and connec-
tions between the Peninsula and America in an attempt to recover crucial themes
of the struggles in these years overlooked in studies focusing on separation and
nationalism. Liberalism emerged in the Spanish world as an ideology for the
entire Spanish monarchy, the empire worldwide, an ideology both Peninsular
and American. Peninsular Spaniards called on their American brothers to unite
in the fight against oppression, understood in its broadest sense to be political,
economic, social, and cultural. Yet all across the Spanish world, liberalism and
war remained intertwined. Hence, one of the most pressing problems for the
new Liberals was the expanding power of the military, particularly in the empire
in America, which just in this period Spaniards in Spain and America began call-
ing Espaa Ultramar, or Spain overseas.
In contrast to the Peninsula, most parts of Spanish America did not expe-
rience an actual power vacuum after 1808. The oppressive actions of vice-
roys and governors-general in Spanish America, all of whom were by then
military officers, became a central topic for Peninsular Liberal writers, who
blamed them for dooming a compromise between Spain and Spanish America
that could secure the unity of a common cause, as examined in chapter 5. In

4 Who ShouldRule?
Peru, Fernando de Abascal, the viceroy in the crucial decade of 18061816,

was vehemently committed to expanding both his prerogatives and the mili-
tarys, while quashing efforts to implement liberal measures in his jurisdiction.
Abascal, the powerful leader of one of the largest armies in the Spanish world,
succeeded in both undertakings. Only a weak liberal opposition developed in
Peru, a liberalism concerned not so much with declaring independence from
Spain or with claiming autonomy within the empire, but mostly to overcome
the overwhelming and repressive power of the viceroy and his army, as dis-
cussed in chapter 6.
The books final chapter, on the decisive decade of 18201830, does not aim
to explain why the Spanish Empire broke down, or why it led to independence
and republicanism in Peru, but rather why this transition happened the way it
did, leading to pervasive political instability. After decades of military reform
and war, army officers with experience in command and government felt enti-
tled to rule. Old subjects and new citizens were also accustomed to seeing them
lead. Men of letters, on the other hand, found limited opportunities to exercise
their new authority despite their ambitions. Additionally, both in Spain and
Peru, Liberal men of letters failed to create a new institutional order in which the
military would be subjected to civilian rule. It would take decades of violence,
wars, and unrest in both parts of the former Spanish monarchy to accomplish
thatgoal.
In short and more broadly speaking, my book examines the rise of modern
politics in the Spanish world. Prior to this era, poltica was understood as the art
of good governing, polica (policy), and good manners. A poltico was someone
versed in the issues of government and affairs of the republic and kingdom and
someone of refined habits.4 Intrigues, deals, alliances, and struggles for power
took place in closed circles such as the court, church, and university, yet they
were exclusive and thus secretive activities.5 This old order of things changed
abruptly in the Spanish world when liberalism and war opened the monarchy to
new freedoms and ambitions. In recent decades, historians have approached the
emergence of modern politics by focusing on the rise and propagation of new
ideas, such as sovereignty and representation; new spaces of sociability, such as
academies or salons; or new practices, such as electoral ones.6 Building on these
works, this book looks at the individualsall men in this storywho seized
those ideas, understood them, found (or failed to find) spaces and institutions in
which to develop their goals, and took the lead in the new politics. After all, one
of the major changes brought by the nineteenth century was the possibility that
men from lower status and marginal areas could claim power and rule.
Methodologically, this history attempts to dynamically analyze the ideas,
expressions, and ambitions of the actors on the ground. In doing so, it con-
nects high and low politics, the decisions of Bourbon officers in the court of

Int roduc tion 5
Madrid with their counterparts in Peru, and the responses of Peruvian subjects,
from various backgrounds. It examines the opportunities for social and political
mobility offered by the successive waves of reform but also addresses the repres-
sive aspects of these reforms and their consequences. The records it draws on,
particularly the military ones, are scattered in various public and private archives
of Spain and Spanish America. To deepen a regional perspective from Peru, the
analysis includes sources from Cuzco and Arequipa, where the Royal Army of
Alto Peru was stationed. Additionally, in the quest for testimonies and writings
of men of letters, I worked in rare book, newspaper, and periodical libraries of
Peru, Spain, England, and the United States. Most of the testimonies collected
here are in Spanish, and the translations are mine.
In writing a parallel history of Peru and Spain in this transitional era, this
book aims to offer scholars of the Spanish Peninsula an avenue to connect their
history with America. So many of the struggles and problems Spain faced in the
1800s are closely related to developments in America, which makes its history
very different from France, Germany, or Britain. With regard to Peru, this com-
plicated old Spanish viceroyalty deserves more studies of its own. The histori-
ography of Latin America on the transition from the colonial to the republican
era, except for some exceptional Peruvians and peruanistas,7 has been dominated
by the cases of Mexico and Rio de la Plata, which are very different and do not
fit Peru (or Cuba for that matter.)8 Peru thus fell into the category of the odd or
failed case. Ihope this approach, which places the old viceroyalty of Peru with its
entrenched Spanish institutions in relation to the Peninsula, offers new oppor-
tunities for breaking our dependency on inadequate frameworks and honors
Perus strange and fascinating history.

PA RT O N E
IMPERIAL REFORM
Contentious Consequences, 17601808

Toward a New ImperialElite
In 1700 the Bourbons arrived in Spain, and thus a new era began. Charles II,
the bewitched last Spanish king from the Habsburg dynasty, had died with-
out leaving any children. Yet his will designated his great-nephew Philip de
Bourbon, Duke of Anjou, as his heir. Alternatively, the Crown could have
gone to his cousin, the Austrian Habsburg Archduke Charles. The geopolitical
European order of the day was dramatically shaken as a grandson of the omnipo-
tent Louis XIV was set to take over the weak but vast Spanish Empire, giving
the French and Spanish Bourbons dominion over the Western world. Habsburg
Austria rejected this decision. The Dutch Republic and England followed, fear-
ing a direct threat to their expanding commercial and imperial interests. Portugal
soon joined them. The death of a childless king triggered a gruesomewar.
The War of Spanish Succession broke out in 1702, lasted about twelve years,
and produced a different world order.1 Over a hundred treaties settled in Utrecht
(1713), and Rastatt (1714) established a new balance of power that tilted north.
After fighting French forces in North America and the pressures of Louis XIV
during its own succession crisis, Great Britain emerged victorious. According to
the peace conditions, Philip V renounced his right to succeed his grandfather,
Louis XIV, to guarantee that the crowns of Spain and France remained separate.
Spain surrendered Gibraltar, Minorca, the Spanish Dutch territories, Milan, the
Tuscan prisons, Sardinia, Sicily, and precious Naples, thus losing its European
possessions and allowing for British expansion in the Mediterranean. In return,
the settlement ensured the unity of the remaining Spanishworld.
With regard to Spanish America, the major war concession was commer-
cial. In 1713 Spain granted the British South Sea Company the asiento, the
Spanish royal monopoly on the African slave trade in the Spanish Empire for
thirty years. Once a year, the company was permitted to import 4,800 male
slaves at certain royally authorized ports in Spanish America. More important
commercially, the grant permitted the company once a year to anchor navos
de permiso (licensed merchant ships) in these ports to furnish supplies, such
as cotton textiles for clothes, for the slaves awaiting sale. Consequently British
10 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences
vessels began to crowd the seas of the Spanish Empire.2 By the end of the war,
British naval and commercial power was unmatched, and its new imperial role
was menacing.
In addition to this geopolitical transformation, the Bourbon succession to the
Spanish throne provoked a domestic and regional war that afflicted the Iberian
Peninsula for over a decade. Perhaps the wars most enduring legacy was the
strong factionalism that divided social groups and provinces (the elite in par-
ticular) into those who had sided with the Bourbons during the war (and shared
their calls for reform) and those who had favored the Habsburgs and opposed
any changes to the status quo. More specifically, when the War of Succession
broke out in Spain, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia rejected the new French
dynasty, along with the grandees, provincial powers, and regular orders of the
church that operated independently of royal control and opposed any effort at
centralization. Castile, Navarra, and the Basque provinces stood by the French.
The Bourbons also counted the support of the lesser nobility, believers in regal-
ism and centralism, and the secular church.3
Another key legacy of the War of Succession was the new Bourbon commit-
ment to centralize power and reform their new kingdom. This proved no easy
task. Spain was after all, as historian John Elliott has put it, a composite mon-
archy:it was a patchwork of kingdoms and provinces in the Peninsula, Europe,
and America governed by particular laws, privileges, and traditions.4 To com-
mand and consolidate central rule over such diversity, the Bourbons saw the
creation of a new power elite as crucial.5 For this purpose, Philip V elevated new
people to his administration and court and used all means possible to curtail the
power of grandees. He sought a new professionally trained and loyal elite in the
Peninsula and chose his secretaries and ministers from among them. His succes-
sors expanded these efforts to Spanish America.
In the past, historians of Latin America argued that one of the priorities of
the Bourbon Crown in Spanish America was the domination of Peninsular
over Creole power.6 According to this view, since the mid-eighteenth century,
royal authorities restricted the participation of Creoles in the administration.
Accumulated Creole resentment paved the way to independence.7 Yet as will be
argued here, the centralization of power was not a policy particularly designed
for Spanish America. It was a general Bourbon policy aimed at minimizing local
power.8 Bourbon authorities did indeed try to subordinate Creoles in Spanish
America, but they pursued the same policy toward the elites of Navarra, Seville,
and Catalonia after the War of Succession. Thus, to understand struggles arising
from the Bourbon reforms, it is essential to take a broader approach that begins
earlier and encompasses the Spanish Peninsula.9 For this reason, this chapter
addresses the Bourbon program of reform as centralist and regalistor, in
essence, as absolutistrather than anti-American or colonial.10

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 11
This chapter focuses on one of the Spanish Bourbons central goals: the cre-
ation of a new imperial power elite that would help the Crown govern, cen-
tralize the administration, and recover Spains lost prestige in the world. The
first part reviews the history of centralizing efforts in the seventeenth century
and in the era of the first two Bourbon monarchs, Philip V (17001746) and
Ferdinand VI (17461759). Keeping the focus on the rise of a new imperial
elite, it then turns to the reigns of Charles III (17591788) and Charles IV
(17881808), when the Crown concentrated its reformist efforts in Spanish
America and pursued two supposedly contradictory but actually convergent
goals: the centralization of political authority and the integration of Peninsular
and American elites. To account for the various reform programs and the inter-
national circumstances and contingencies that favored Bourbon plans in an era
of intense imperial competition, the chapter then analyzes the administrative
reforms and rise of transatlantic networks, the expansion of commerce and
migration, the enrollment of Spanish American children in Peninsular schools,
the revolution of communication, and the spread of the Enlightenment, all
of which contributed to the Bourbon plan of bringing elites from Spain and
Spanish America closer together.
The royal will to centralize power and to create a loyal elite has a long-standing
history in Spain. Ever since the union of crowns brought about the Spanish mon-
archy in 1492, the autonomy of the various kingdoms and provinces constituting
Spain has represented a great challenge to central authority. Along-lasting form
of rule by compromise and consent arose with the Habsburg monarchy after the
succession of Charles Iof Spain (V of the Holy Roman Empire).11 While such
governance inhibited conflict and guaranteed internal peace, it made any kind of
general reform extremely difficult.12
The discovery of America transformed the new monarchy into the largest and
wealthiest empire in the world. Nonetheless, the Spanish state was in serious
debt by the seventeenth century. Posing a challenge to the administration were
continual wars, taking place from the Netherlands to the North Atlantic to the
Caribbean to the Mediterranean (and in the Peninsula) that made for a series of
royal military defeats, as well as shortages of grain and fodder throughout much
of the Peninsula. These wars also led to a decline in population that left many
Castilian villages almost deserted.13 However, there was not much the Crown
could do in the short run to resolve this situation. To improve its finances and
recruit soldiers, royal authorities could have resorted to increasing taxes and
imposing a leve en masse, but according to the institutional foundations of the
Spanish monarchy, the Crown lacked the legal capacity to impose such measures
on kingdoms other than Castile or Aragon. This state of affairs created great anx-
iety among court circles. Some courtiers and letrados (lettered men) decided

to intervene by offering the king arbitrios (treaties) proposing new projects and
policies to solve Spains problems.14
In 1621 sixteen-year-old Philip IV was crowned to rule the Spanish mon-
archy in the throes of economic despair and a devastating war between the
Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties, which became infamous as the Thirty Years
War (16181648). Advised by his chosen chief minister, on whom he abso-
lutely relied, the king ordered major reforms. It is most significant that this loyal
and forceful minister, Gaspar de Guzmn y Pimentel, Count Duke of Olivares
(b. 1587d. 1645), was not beholden to the old court circles in Madrid. The
ambitious son of an efficient royal officer of Andalusian nobility had plans for
drastic measures to unify kingdoms in the Peninsula and enforce a great expan-
sion of Philips power. Ultimately, he failed. But his project remained alive among
Spanish Habsburg ministers, and after the War of Succession regained serious
support among Spanish Bourbon ministers.15 It bears notice that contemporary
with Philip and Olivares, the French Crown on directions from Cardinal-Duc
de Richelieu was also trying to reorder the French Bourbon monarchyand
succeeding. Yet while Olivares was zealously trying to expand his kings personal
power, Richelieu was committed to the organization of a powerful French state.16
The cornerstones of Olivaress ministry centered on strengthening the mon-
archs authority and making Castiles laws and traditions the standard. For these
and other reforms to succeed, Olivares considered the subordination of the old
aristocracy necessary.17 To educate a new service nobility under royal supervi-
sion, he founded the imperial school of San Isidro in 1625.18 The high nobles
resisted and did not register in the school.19 Olivares failed in these undertak-
ings and most others. His idea of conducting parallel wars in Flanders and Milan
to preserve Spains reputation in Europe and curtail the power of rising France
was disastrous and provoked rebellions in Portugal and Catalonia. In 1643 he
fell into disgrace, earning a long-lasting reputation as a tyrant. Despite his great
failures, Olivares left Spain with two important legacies:the consolidation of a
Union of Arms, whereby for the first time each Spanish kingdom was to con-
tribute men and weapons under urgent circumstances and upon royal request,
and the idea that centralizing the Peninsulas administration and power was key
to its reform.20
The decades after Olivaress tenure would prove to be a time of relative peace.
Coincidently, royal authority weakened and grandees and local aristocracies
gained power. The War of Spanish Succession changed this domestic balance of
power. The first Bourbon king, Philip V (b. 1683d. 1746), as soon as he could
decidedly pursued the centralization of power and curtailment of local elites.
Although he always encountered a strong and rooted resistance to reform, the
general sense of crisis and of Spains decline in relation to its rivals favored the
new Spanish House of Bourbon.

One of Philip Vs first governing objectives was to take the grandees out
of power, on the advice of Louis XIV to keep the high nobility away from the
administration. The Spanish king also removed them out of the army by decree-
ing that all military commissions would go to nobles in service, which excluded
the grandees and allowed the monarch to build his own court.21 While respecting
their status as high nobility, Philip V brought new people to his administration.
He relied on a small group of French advisors first, Italian counselors later,22 and
a critically new and well-trained Spanish elite, which are the most relevant for
this study. The monarch chose his new Spanish officers from the groups that had
sided with the Bourbons during the war, such as the provincial and lesser nobil-
ity, believers in regalism and centralism, and members of the secular church.
Over the years, Spain had developed a large imperial bureaucracy that served
the new Crowns purposes well.23 The Bourbons newly empowered men were
mostly provincial nobles, who were relatively independent from old Habsburg
circles. They were respected administrators and military or navy officers, such
as Melchor Rafael de Macanaz, Jos Patio, Gernimo de Uztriz, and Jos de
Campillo y Cosso. Following the example of the old arbitristas, some had writ-
ten essays or proyectos to the king proposing reforms, for which they were now
called proyectistas. Others served in the administration, but all were familiar
with the problems affecting Spain and the empire. Philip Vs heirs, Ferdinand
VI and Charles III, maintained and expanded the power of this new elite, which
in the late eighteenth century was succeeded by professionally trained lawyers
and administrators or navy and military officers such as Jorge Juan, Antonio
de Ulloa, Miguel Antonio de la Gandara, Bernardo Ward, Pedro Rodrguez de
Campomanes, Jos de Glvez, and Jos Moino. In the 1760s, these Bourbon
officers brought their peers to high-and middle-rank positions in the imperial
administration.
With this support, the Bourbon Crown pursued three major political or
administrative reforms in Spain: the elimination of provincial fueros (special
jurisdictions and privileges) in rebellious provinces, the curtailment of the con-
sejos (councils) power, and the implementation of a new system of local govern-
ment in the Spanish Peninsula, the intendancy, with the goal of consolidating
and controlling local affairs.
In 1707, Philip V imposed drastic measures over provinces that had supported
the Habsburgs by revoking the fueros of Aragon and Valencia and cancelling
their status as composite kingdoms. For the first time the central administra-
tion was empowered to place its delegates in the audiencias (royal councils) and
governmental posts of those provinces.24 Additionally, all viceregencies in the
Peninsula, except for Navarra, were replaced by captaincy generals to assure the
political and military control of those territories.25 Similar actions were taken
in Mallorca and Catalonia in 1716 under the leadership of Superintendant

Jos Patio.26 Despite this, the Bourbon road toward centralization was paved
with contradictions, and loyalty proved precious. Notwithstanding its com-
mitment to centralization and control, the new Crown willingly offered new
privileges and exemptions or maintained old ones in exchange for loyalty. This
was the case of Navarra and the Basque provinces, which had sided with the
Bourbons during the war and in return were permitted to retain their fueros.
Following Olivaress steps, the Bourbons also elevated of the Council of
Castile over other governing and provincial bodies but reduced its size and
duties. Under Bourbon rule, a small inner-court circle of secretaries and min-
isters directly controlled by the monarch administered the Crowns author-
ity.27 By the same reasoning the Crown also supported the introduction of the
intendancy system. As provincial authorities, intendants were to concentrate
the duties of war, finance, justice, and police. In contrast to the old corregidores
or local civil governors, however, local aristocrats would no longer be able to
purchase these commissions. Instead, the central government in Madrid would
carefully select them. Philip Vs secretaries were fervent believers in this new
administrative system, but their attempt at controlling local government faced
various setbacks.
The first project for intendancies was issued in 1702 under the supervision of
Jean Orry, an envoy of Louis XIV. Not much was done, however, until 1710 when
Philip Vs former finance minister in the Netherlands, the Count of Bergeyec,
was commissioned to develop a general reform of the administration. Despite
his influence, it was lesser Spanish nobles and political figures such as Patio,
Campillo y Cosso, and Macanaz who shaped this institution as holders of the
first intendancies. As with everything else, intendants encountered a strong
opposition in the provinces and in the Council of Castile. Because they repeat-
edly clashed with traditional authorities, including the church, their duties were
restricted in the 1720s to mainly military functions and the collection of taxes.28
Facing external and internal threats, Philip V was not willing to compromise on
the military control of his new kingdom.
While the first Bourbon administrations dedicated most of their energy
to consolidating power in the Spanish Peninsula, they attempted key reforms
throughout the empire to take control of affairs and elevate Spains standing in
the international arena. Even here, the new Crown faced a sea of exemptions,
old privileges, and special fueros. Concerned with the rise of British commer-
cial and naval power, Philip V decided to form a strong navy.29 Before 1700, the
Spanish Crown had waged most of its battles on European territories with forces
recruited from outside the Peninsula, regularly in Spanish Flanders or Milan.30
But the War of Succession moved the main theaters of war where British vessels
in the Caribbean were a threatening presence. One of the leaders of the naval
reform was Jernimo de Uztriz (b. 1670d. 1732), a provincial nobleman

from Navarra and one of the key reformist thinkers of eighteenth-century

Spain.31 Uztriz received military training in Flanders, where he also served
as general inspector of the army. An expert in naval and economic matters, he
returned to Spain to hold high positions in the new Bourbon administration.
His reformist projects are best expressed in his treatise on naval power of 1724,
where he proposed the development of a commercial fleet and an active trade
as the only solution to Spains lethargy.32 For the most part, Uztriz followed
the mercantilist ideas of Jean Baptiste Colbert,33 the French minister of Louis
XIV who was thought to have successfully recovered French superiority over
the Dutch by proposing policies to counterbalance British supremacy. Two key
Colbertian ideas were adopted in Spain:the promotion of a large commercial
navy and the formation of a royal fleet to protect trade routes.34 Notwithstanding
its Francophile character, the Spanish Crown also paid close attention to British
commercial and naval strategies.35
Struggling to improve its maritime presence, the Spanish Bourbons began
to sponsor expeditions to obtain accurate information about the empire and
to explore new navigation routes much like France and Britain were already
doing. As part of their commission, expeditionaries were expected to inform the
Crown about the activities of rival powers and any administrative problems fac-
ing the American kingdoms. Particularly knowledgeable individuals were naval
officers, among the rare few who had received a scientifically oriented education
and were well traveled. Their understanding of the empire became critical for
the new monarchy.
In 1735, Jorge Juan (b. 1713d. 1773)and Antonio de Ulloa (b. 1716d. 1795)
were among the first navy officers to sail to Spanish America as members of a
state-sponsored scientific expedition, which formed part of a French-led mis-
sion to measure the exact circumference of the equator. Between 1666 and
1683 Colbert had promoted studies of this kind in the Acadmie Franaise to
determine the longitude of the earth with the ultimate goal of expanding naval
routes.36 Years earlier, Antonio de Ulloa had been sent to Britain to familiarize
himself with the latest naval techniques there.37 In this new assignment, how-
ever, Juan and Ulloa were to report on the tensions and problems arising in
the American kingdoms, information that would help the Crown stabilize and
reform Spanish America.38
To improve trade with Spanish America, the first Bourbon administration
attempted to modernize the old trading system based on galleons and flotas
(government-protected convoys) by imposing a more frequent flow of ships
between the Peninsula and Spanish America. Once again, the authority over the
fleets schedule was in the hands of a local authority, the Consulado (merchants
guild) of Seville. An inevitable clash with this old institution followed.39 To break
its control and place the commercial center in a more viable port, in 1717 the

crown transferred royal authority over trade with Spanish America downriver to
the port of Cadiz, where in 1720 it established a consulado to replace Sevilles.40
It demanded more accountability from the consulados and reduced the duties of
the Consejo de Indias and Casa de Contratacin, two key institutions in charge
of Spanish American affairs. While the administration of Philip V could not fully
break the power of these long-standing Spanish institutions, the speed of travel
improved since the fleets no longer needed to receive a precise schedule from
the consulado in Seville to sail.41
These initial reforms gave the crown more control over the empires trade,
but did not solve its pressing fiscal needs. In the late 1710s, Philip V had engaged
in new wars to recover Spains lost possessions in Italy, which triggered in tense
reaction from old rivals, Britain in particular. Facing the financial strains of an
increasing British contraband in the Caribbean, Philip V forged a new trading
practice with Spanish America by chartering large companies with a special
license. In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands, France, and Britain had
chartered the first such companies. These Spanish companies were intended to
expand trade and open new commercial routes with America. They were also
expected to boost the exports of certain products, like cacao from Venezuela
and sugar from Cuba, while offering an alternative to the Andalusian monopoly
that controlled the trade of bullion from Mexico and Peru.42 The first Bourbon-
sponsored company, the Real Compaa Guipuzcana de Caracas centered in
Bilbao, was established in 1728 and commissioned to trade only with Venezuela
and the periphery. Additionally, the Crown sponsored more guarda-costas in the
Caribbean to patrol Spanish ships against British and French contraband.43 The
creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada was part of the scheme to plan to
curtail contraband and improve royally authorized trade.44
Although the Crown managed to obtain more revenue from Spanish
America, its demand for cash continued to exceed supply. This pressure only
intensified when new wars erupted in the 1730s. In 1733, under the leadership
of Secretary Patio, Spain signed the Family Pact for mutual Franco-Spanish
defense against Austria, which was Patios most enduring legacy. With this
support, Philip V decided to assist his son, future King Charles III, then Duke
of Parma, in resuming Utrecht-legitimated rule over Sicily and Naples, which
Britain was trying to prevent while continuing to penetrate the Caribbean. Five
years later, the suspension of Britains privilege over the asiento in 1739 led to
another major confrontation between these old rivals known as the War of
Jenkins Ear (17391743/48). At the beginning of the conflict, British Admiral
Edward Vernon attacked the key Spanish commercial entrept of Portobelo in
the Isthmus of Panama, challenging Spanish rule in the Caribbean. While the
Spanish Crown was struggling with these threats, England received Admiral
Vernon with lavish feasts. Pamphlets proclaiming Vernons victories and ballads

praising his honor and patriotism were sung all over England.45 British imperial
ambitions were no secret.
The most important reform regarding trade was the Crowns decision to
switch from a system based on fleets to one based on register ships, which
allowed for a significant increase in the volume of trade.46 As part of this pro-
gram, conceived of in the 1710s and fully implemented in the 1740s the Spanish
Crown granted permission for the creation of the Real Compaa de Comercio
de la Habana. Following precedents for royally chartered companies, a network
of Basque merchants with strong ties in Cadiz ran this venture. By midcentury
these new companies proved to be very successful, accounting for about twenty
percent of all imperial trade.47 Yet, the military defense of the empire remained
weak. Admiral Vernon attacked Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba in 1741, while
Commodore George Anson sacked the port of Paita in Peru. Nonetheless,
Philip V decided to intervene in the wars over Austrian succession with the aim
of retaking former Spanish possessions in Northern Italy.
Figure1.1 Johann Sebastien Muller, The Burning of the Town of Payta on the Coast of
Santa Fe in the South Sea, From George Anson, A Voyage Round the World in the Years
MBCCXL, I, II, III, IV. By George Anson, Esq; Commander in Chief of a Squadron of His
Majestys Ships, sent upon an Expedition to the South Seas. Compiles from papers and other
materials of the Right Honourable George Lord Anson, and published under his direction.
By Richard Walter, M.A. Chaplain of his Majestys Ship the Centurion, in that Expedition
(London:John and Paul Knapton, 1748). Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at
Brown University.

After the longest reign till then in Spanish history, Philip V died in 1746,
succeeded by his son Ferdinand VI (b. 1713d. 1759), who ruled for fewer
but hardly less embattled years. Like his father, Ferdinand was committed to
keeping a strong navy and expanding imperial trade. In 1752 he granted per-
mission to another company, the Compaa General y de Comercio de los
Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid, which became the most powerful com-
mercial enterprise of the Spanish Empire.48 Basque merchants with strong
ties in Cadiz led the business with merchants from America as suppliers. The
Cinco Gremios controlled a large commercial network that connected the
Spanish Empire with Amsterdam, London, and Paris, operating with facto-
ries or branches in Mexico, Veracruz, Guatemala, Lima, and Arequipa. The
Cinco Gremios successfully managed to control between a third and half of
the trade.49
Ferdinand VI continued to pursue his fathers quest for the centralization
of power, expanding it to the ecclesiastical realm. Bourbon relations with the
Vatican had remained strained since the War of Succession, for the Papal States
had served as key Habsburg allies. As a result, the Bourbons mistrusted Papal
interference in local affairs, such as the administration of schools and univer-
sities, and disliked its control over large productive territories. In 1753, after
the War of Austrian Succession, the Spanish Bourbons regained new strength
in Mediterranean Europe and signed a new Concordato (concordat) with Pope
Benedict XIV. This was a crucial achievement in the Bourbons attempt at
supremacy. Spain expanded the regio patronato (royal patronage over church
appointments) to the entire Spanish world and gained almost universal power
over church appointments.50 The subordination of the church was crucial for
the full control of local power and for the formation of a loyal elite in newly
reformed schools.
When Ferdinand VI died in 1759, his successor, his half-brother Charles III,
continued these struggles; however, his rule faced significant challenges.
Charless succession to the throne took place in the midst of the Seven Years
War (17561763) when military conflict between Britain and France in North
America and the Caribbean posed a greater and more direct threat to the sur-
vival of the Spanish Empire.
The 1760s marked a more intense era of imperial competition and consolidation
of regalist or absolutist forms of government.51 Most European rulers at the time
were concerned with applying the latest knowledge to the administration and
formation of global military power, for which centralization and reform were
seen as crucial.52 In this highly competitive world order, two years into his rule,
Charles III renewed the Family Pact with France, which immediately brought
Spain into war with Britain. Although by then Spains navy had significantly

improved, in 1762 the British navy took Havana and soon afterward Manila.53
Ayear of negotiations followed that ultimately culminated in the signing of the
Treaty of Paris of 1763. Spain ceded Florida to the British and thanks to Ricardo
Walls negotiations, France returned New Orleans and the entire vast Louisiana
territory to Spain, and England returned Havana and Manila to Spain.54
Under great pressure, the administration of Charles III decided to undertake
a major military, political, commercial, and administrative reform concentrated
on Spanish America.
A central part of this effort was the formation of strong political alliances
with local elites in America, which royal authorities considered necessary for
the protection and survival of the empire. Their problem was that even by the
mid-eighteenth century Spanish America still functioned in important matters
in the old Habsburg ways. Local elites in Peru continued to purchase provin-
cial offices. For example, the majority of oidores (royal councilors and advisory
board to the viceroy) of the audiencia in Lima were American Spaniards born in
America, who also prevailed in the cabildos (local or municipal government). As
in many other places of the Spanish empire, local elites controlled the viceroy-
alty of Peru.55 To break this system, the crown decreed in 1750 the end to the
sales of office and commissioned a Secretary of Marine and the Indies to curtail
the local power in the administration of the empire.
According to Bourbon plans, royal power was to prevail over all other
forms of power. The king would thus select his representatives among
professionally trained and loyal subjects who would serve independently
of local interests. Their autonomy would keep local elites in check, thus
protecting the kings authority and rights to American revenues. In the
1760s, the Crown sent general inspectors to Spanish America to implement
reforms and plan for the introduction of intendancies, which would central-
ize authority and control the local exercise of power and the collection of
taxes. The Crown put its first American intendancy in Cuba in 1764. After
a general inspection in Peru in 1776 and the outbreak of the Tupac Amaru
rebellion (17801783), six intendancies were established there. As the new
royal policy dictated, all commissions were to go to Peninsular Spaniards.
Yet as a symbolic act and to avoid additional confrontations, one intendancy
was given to a Creole. Despite local resistance, Bourbon centralizing poli-
cies were successfully implemented in Peru, and by the late eighteenth cen-
tury Peninsular Spaniards had regained control over local power in Spanish
America.56
Although the Bourbon reforms produced discontent among some dis-
empowered, American Spaniards rapidly tried to adjust to the new system
by penetrating the new Bourbon networks through, for example, marriage.
Despite initial restrictions, daughters of rich Creoles increasingly often married

Bourbon officers from the Peninsula.57 To restrain this practice, in 1776 the
Crown issued sanctions against such marriages and required an official approval
from the administration in Madrid for these unions. Yet the Crown was unable
to regulate them effectively. Moreover, since the delay in the approval of a mar-
riage certificate from the Peninsula could result in couples simply living in
concubinage (cohabitation), a special royal order for the American kingdoms
was issued in 1778, granting the audiencia or its local delegates the authority to
sanction these marriages.58 In the wake of the North American Revolution, the
Spanish Crown became less dogmatic in its policies to divide royal and local
power and began to see an advantage in the unions of loyal Bourbon officers
and rich Creole women. In subsequent years, the Crown even rewarded some
with nobility. From 1785 to 1805, the number of titles given to Americans
increased significantly. The audiencia of Lima received the most titles in
the Spanish Empire, followed by Mexico, Santo Domingo, and Cuba. Cuba
received the majority of titles of the Orden de Carlos III, a rank designed to
reward the merit and good service of Bourbon subjects.59 It is no coincidence
that the Spanish American territories with the majority of nobility titles turned
out to be the mostloyal.
Bourbon efforts to control local power while forging loyalty produced new
transatlantic clans that brought Peninsular and American elites closer together
in the late eighteenth century.60 Representative of the new Bourbon elite was the
Goyeneche in Arequipa, one of the most powerful and loyal family networks of
Peru. Don Juan de Goyeneche, a merchant from Navarra, arrived in Arequipa in
1768, married one of the richest arequipeo heiresses, Mara Josefa de Barreda y
Benavides, and established a large commercial network with partners in Cadiz
and powerful contacts in the Basque Provinces and Madrid.61 In order to pro-
tect and strengthen his interests, the Goyeneche patriarch sent his oldest son
to study in the Peninsula. There, Jos Manuel was able to advance his career
and the family business. Jos Manuel de Goyeneche achieved one the highest
posts in the army in 1808, that of Brigadier General de los Reales Ejrcitos, and
obtained for his brother Jos Mariano the position of oidor in the audiencia of
Cuzco in 1806.62 Jos Manuel de Goyeneche later became one of the leaders of
the royal army in Peru. The formation of transatlantic networks that integrated
Peninsular and American elites proved crucial to the Crowns fiscal needs. In
the late eighteenth century, Mexican and Peruvian subjects paid ordinary and
extraordinary taxes and send huge personal contributions to aid the Crown in
fighting its Europeanwars.
To strengthen this support, administrators in Madrid orchestrated cam-
paigns against the common enemy.63 This was not merely propaganda. After
attacks on key ports, people in Spanish America seriously feared British or
French invasion, and called for royal protection. In addition to external threats,

Spanish American elites had many reasons to fear the Bourbon monarchy and
comply with its calls for loyalty. In 1767 the Crown sanctioned the expulsion
of the Jesuit order from all Spanish territories, which was a shock to many
families who saw their Jesuit relatives forced to abandon their patrias (coun-
tries) overnight under humiliating conditions. In the viceroyalty of Peru, the
fear of an indigenous rebellion also helped the Crown renew an alliance with
local elites.64 Throughout the eighteenth century, Peru experienced constant
riots and rebellions, which intensified as the Bourbons implemented finan-
cial reforms aimed at improving the collection of old and new taxes. These
tensions peaked in 1780 in Cuzco when Cacique Jos Gabriel Condorcanqui,
Tpac Amaru II, led a massive, extensive insurrection against local authorities
and the Bourbon fiscal reforms. The rebellion led by Tupac Amaru lasted for
about six months, but his followers persevered in the Southern highlands for
two moreyears.
And yet the fears awoken by this great rebellion offered the Crown an
opportunity to co-opt Creoles and Indian elites into the new order. One of
the major weaknesses of rebel Tpac Amaru had been his failure to com-
mand the entire Indian nobility of Cuzco, since he did not belong to the
principal families of the province.65 Viceregal forces were able to capture the
cacique with the help of rival Indian nobles. After the rebellion, the Crown
reinforced ties with these Indian nobles of Cuzco by incorporating some into
the military and granting them promotions and rewards for their loyalty.66
At the same time the Crown used the upheaval to eliminate old privileges
and exemptions that loyal Indian nobles had received after the conquest,
as they have done with the rebellious provinces of Spain after the War of
Succession. With these policies, Bourbon authorities broke any potential
strength of Indian discontent. Thus, despite the initial violent clashes result-
ing from the reforms, the Bourbon Crown managed to forge a new and long-
lasting alliance with local elites in Peru, control potential local leaders, and
reassert Spanish rule.
The interconnected Spanish imperial system of the second half of the eighteenth
century did much to bring Peninsular and American elites closer together and
create a new imperial elite. The Crowns commercial policies and international
trends favored these goals, too. By then, goods, information, and people cir-
culated more frequently and quickly. Akey turning point was the royal decree
of 1778 allowing multiple Spanish ports to trade directly with the American
kingdoms. This decision broke the monopoly of Cadiz and allowed Spanish
America to forge a closer connection with the more prosperous and progressive
provinces of Barcelona, Santander, Navarra, and the Basque country. Another
boost to trade and migration came with the creation of new consulados in the

Peninsula and America:La Corua, Santander, and Mlaga (1785); Guatemala

and Caracas (1793); Havana and Buenos Aires (1794); Veracruz, Guadalajara,
Cartagena, and Santiago de Chile (1795).67
To expand trade further, particularly in the Pacific, the crown sponsored
in 1780 the creation of The Real Compaa de Filipinas. These policies sig-
nificantly increased commerce in Spanish America in subsequent decades.68
Although the establishment of large Peninsular, or rather imperial, trading
companies was thought to alienate Creoles and have negative consequences for
Spanish America, recent studies have shown that members of the local elite
also found in the large monopolies great opportunities to trade on a larger
scale.69 This was the case of the Goyeneche in Arequipa, who joined their part-
ners in Cadiz and made a fortune. Families such as this one participated in the
Peninsular networksdirectly or indirectly, as suppliers or shareholdersbut
remained silent while profiting from the new commercial possibilities. In con-
trast, families who rejected or could not adjust to the new order filed numerous
complaints as their fortunes declined.70
In the case of Peru, the statistics prepared by Hiplito Unnue for the vicere-
gal administration in 1793 show a significant growth in the value of exports and
imports in the years from 1782 to 1786.71 Although the number of ships travel-
ing to Callao decreased, the value of trade took off. In addition, the viceroyalty
of Peru regained significance as the Pacific opened to imperial expansion in the
second half of the eighteenth century.72
The intensification of world commerce led to a faster and more intense
flow of people throughout the Atlantic world. Without comparison, African
slaves constituted the largest group of migrants, but there was also a large
migration wave of white Europeans due to population growth in Europe and
the Americas, imperial competition, improved sea navigation, communica-
tion, and new ports and navigation routes in the case of the Spanish Empire.
This new flow of people and goods contributed to form Atlantic communi-
ties whose members, as historians have argued, shared common ideas and
values.73
In the 1760s, the Bourbon Crown began encouraging and sponsoring sub-
jects from northern Spain and the Canary Islands to settle in the peripheral
areas of the empire that were most vulnerable to the British.74 Likewise, Spanish
migration to Cuba became so intense after the British seizure of Havana in 1762
that it completely changed the social and political history of the island, which
became a royalist bastion in the Caribbean. Havana alone increased its Spanish
population by 78 percent in the years 1755 to 1778.75
This major impulse for migration came from the decree of free trade of 1778,
which impelled people from the most commercially vibrant ports of Northern
Spain to sail to key American trading posts. Large immigrant communities of

Basques, Cantabrians, and Galicians transformed the character of the Spanish

American kingdoms. They came from places that had long traded with France,
the Netherlands, and Britain, and took with them their economic traditions,
political claims, and strong sense of regional pride.76 Basques, in particular, were
committed to retaining their ties with their patrias in the Peninsula and with
thecourt.
The reverse migration of Spanish Americans to the Spain is difficult to
quantify, especially since Peninsular authorities were not too concerned
with registering differences of geographical origin in their censuses. Census
takers were commissioned to record the number of vecinos (neighbors), and
vecindad (rights of citizens to be part of a community) in Spain was achieved
through commitment, virtue, and time.77 But student enrollment records in
Spanish schools, whose applications required potential students to prove
their quality as nobles and legitimate children in their communities of ori-
gin, show revealing increase in the number of Spanish Americans living in
Spain.
According to the Crowns plans, a likeminded imperial elite was to be forged

in the reformed schools of the Spanish Peninsula, where children would be
trained to best serve the Crowns needs.78 During Charles IIIs rule and after
the expulsion of the Jesuit order in 1767, American Spaniards of notable status
were encouraged to send their children to Peninsular schools, which Bourbon
reformers and proyectistas had been advocating for decades.79
Already in 1749 when navy officers Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa
complied with the Crowns commission of reporting on the state of affairs
in Spanish America upon their return to the Spanish Peninsula, they rec-
ommended the education and training of American elite children in Spain,
including children of Indian caciques and mestizos.80 Likewise, in their respec-
tive proyectos of 1759 and 1762 Miguel Antonio de la Gandara and Bernardo
Ward urged the Crown to bring wealthy American Spaniardsparticularly
their children to be educatedbut also to have them spend their fortunes in
the Peninsula. They even favored their appointment to some administrative
posts there because, as Gandara argued:If they are all vassals of the king over
here (so they would risk nothing), why do they not alternate with us? Since
they cannot (nor is it suitable) [for them] to be used [as officers] there, let
them be officers here.81
Creating like-minded elites through these means was, in fact, a rather old
imperial practice.82 In the seventeenth century, for example, France implemented
a policy of francisation in colonial Canada. In 1666 Minister Colbert advised the
French settlers and Louis XIV of the need to civilize American natives to con-
stitute one people and one blood.83 Perhaps the most aggressive policies in this

respect were those attempted by Portugal. Under the ministry of the Marquis
of Pombal (17501777), the ultimate enlightened absolutist, the Portuguese
Crown pursued the consolidation of its empire. Pombal realized early on that in
the wake of British expansion the Portuguese Empire would only survive by lib-
erating itself from its dependency on Great Britain and by bringing Portugal as
close to its richest colony, Brazil, as possible. In order to secure connections with
this key possession, Pombal decided to win the support of its elites. As a result,
the children of Brazilian elites were sent to Portuguese schools and a new impe-
rial Luso-Brazilian elite of likeminded individuals was forged at the University
of Coimbra.84
The Spanish Crown followed the Portuguese and French examples, but
its larger and more complex empire posed greater challenges. Neither Brazil
nor French Canada possessed appropriate local schools for their elites over-
seas, whereas Mexico and Lima had an abundance of themalong with con-
vents, seminaries, and universitiesfounded in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries to create local imperial administrators. As in Spain, the Jesuit order
ran most of these schools, especially the elite ones. Hence, the expulsion of
the order in 1767 created new opportunities for educational reform and ulti-
mately favored Bourbon plans for enrolling elite American children in the new
Peninsular schools.
A year after the expulsion the Council in Madrid hosted an extraordinary ses-
sion under the leadership of its new president, the Count of Aranda. Charles III
had tasked grandee Francophile and military officer Aranda with restoring order
in Madrid after a series of uprisings and furthering the program of reform.85 The
Consejo Extraordinario convened the other two fiscales (attorneys) and power-
ful reformers, Campomanes and Moino,86 who were asked to address Arandas
concerns about the spread of Jesuit fanaticism in Mexico and America. The
meeting resulted in a report recommending forging closer alliances between
Americans and Spaniards. The fiscales asked how American Spaniards could
love a government they saw as trying to strip them of their gains and profits.
Eschewing punishments, they proposed attracting Americans to study in Spain,
placing them in Peninsular military units, and creating a special unit for them,
while sending Peninsular Spaniards to all key political and ecclesiastical offices
in America. After all, those paises (countries) should no longer be seen as pure
colonies, but as powerful and significant provinces of the Spanish empire, they
claimed. Finally, to curtail the formation of local aristocracies, the fiscales sug-
gested that each viceroyalty send a deputy to the court to be represented, along
with Castilla, Aragon, and Catalua.87 Such policies, they claimed, would dimin-
ish American Spaniards resentment and unify the empire.88
Charles III never implemented the last proposal, but the Crown did set
forth an ambitious educational reform in the 1770s. One of the pillars of this

program was the creation of a new school to train the highest members of the
elite in Spain and in the empire. The Estudios Reales de San Isidro, which was to
become the model for all other educational institutions, was first established
in 1629, when the Count Duke of Olivares pursued a similar goal and chose
the Jesuit order to run it.89 After the orders expulsion, the school reopened in
1770 as the Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid, under the directorship of
navy officer and expeditionary Jorge Juan. Juan had previously served as head
of the Academia de Guardias Marinas in Cadiz. He reformed the Seminarios
structure and its plan of study and promoted the participation of American
Spaniards.90
For the Crown, the enrollment of American children was important for forg-
ing a strong new Bourbon elite, as well as for the schools financial survival. In
the 1790s Charles IVs administration expanded its recruitment efforts. The
new favorite at court, regarded as a parvenu in the highest circles in Madrid, was
Manuel Godoy (b. 1767d. 1851). Godoy became Charless almighty minister
in Spain from 1792 to 1808 and was keenly interested in forming a new loyal
imperial elite, taking the Real Seminario under his direct protection. In his typi-
cal pragmatic fashion, Godoy decided that American Spaniards ought to enroll
and fund the school.91 When he ordered a study of the Seminarios finances and
fellowships for Americans, he discovered that in 1785 Jos de Glvez had already
planned to increase the American financial contribution to the seminary and
offer forty slots for Spanish American students in return.92 Godoy went further
in demanding extraordinary contributions from American ecclesiastical orders
and merchant guilds. In 1805 he ordered these guilds to send two hundred thou-
sand pesos to fund the Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid.93
Americans in the Real Seminario in 17501790 comprised about 10 per-
cent of total enrollment.94 Although this percentage is not overwhelming,
the group included the children of the most prominent American elite, who
would hold key positions of power in the years to come. Among its students
were Juan Baqujano y Carrillo, the son of a Basque merchant who married into
one of Limas richest families; Manuel Blanco Encalada, a son of the oidor of
La Plata who became the first president of independent Chile; Gregorio de
Toro y Zambrano, son of the corregidor of Santiago and superintendent of the
Casa de la Moneda of Chile; and Toms Alvarez de Acebedo, son of the regent
of the Audiencia in Chile.95
The Real Seminario was not alone in educating the children of Spanish
American elites. These elites also attended the University of Alcal, one of the
most prestigious schools for training middle-rank elite children to become
lawyers and state officials. American Spaniards enrolled in the colleges of San
Ildefonso of Alcal, most noticeable from 1600 to 1650 and 1750 to 1800, which
coincided with the two eras of Spanish imperial expansion.96

Americans, particularly Peruvians, also enrolled in the renowned Academia

de Guardias Marinas de Cdiz. Among its students was Jos Antonio de Peralta
y Rivera, who achieved the highest rank in the Spanish Navy, jefe de escuadra
(fleet marshal); Jos Manuel de Goyeneche, who became a leading loyal military
commander in Peru; Jos de La Mar, first liberal President of Republican Peru;
Mateo de Cosso, future mayor of Arequipa; and Jos Antonio de Lavalle, from
one of Limas richest families.97 The wealthiest and most privileged students
such as Simn Bolvar, however, traveled around Spain and Europe with their
private tutors. Other wealthy Americans joined military schools and army regi-
ments. In 1793 Manuel Godoy created a special unit for American Spaniards in
the kings army called the Compaa Americana de Guardias de Corps.98
The largest group of Americans in Spanish schools was found in the avant-
garde Real Seminario de Nobles de Bergara, in the Basque province of Guipzcua.
The school was organized in 1776 by a group of progressive Basque noblemen,
led by the Count of Peaflorida, who had also founded the Sociedad Bascongada
de Amigos del Pas. Their plan was to create a school for Basques from around
the world to form an exclusive, patriotic, enlightened, and scientific-minded
Basque elite.99 The schools emphasis was on the practical sciences: political
economy, agriculture, and mineralogy. The Sociedad Bascongada, which gov-
erned the school, invited professors from Freiberg, the most important min-
ing school in Europe.100 From its foundation to 1790, 22percent of its students
were American Spaniards.101 As at the Real Seminario de San Isidro, American
finances by and large funded the school of Bergara.102
The idea of bringing American Spaniards to study in the Peninsula gained
strength in the 1780s when the independence of the United States, the rebel-
lions of Tupac Amaru in Peru (17801783) and the Comuneros in New Granada
(1781), and the revolution in France (1789) posed greater concerns to the
Crown. Officials were eager to implement plans to strengthen imperial bonds
with local elites, including the noble Indians of Peru. In 1789, for example, Friar
Josef de Montealegre presented the Crown with a comprehensive project for the
creation of a school for American Spaniards in the literary cities of Spain.103
The former bishop of Arequipa, Miguel de Pamplona, helped his proposal
receive a favorable reception. Montealegres decade missionary work in New
Granada and direct experience of the Comunero revolt there lent his proposal
additional weight. In his report to the Crown, the friar claimed to understand
its concerns for curtailing the appointments of American Spaniards in their
places of origin but expressed his worries about their possible resentment and
disloyalty. In his view the Crown should fear shrewd Creoles much more than
timid Indians, as the more distinguished characters of every country were the
instruments that made the people from the lower Pueblo act. 104 Their unceasing
complaints were worsening imperial relations, he added. In the wake of North

American independence, what could happen if insurrection spread south?

Bringing noble Creoles to study in the Peninsula and intermarrying them with
Peninsular Spaniards seemed a great way to ameliorate this threat.
Citing the great Spanish politico and statesman Diego de Saavedra Fajardo
(b. 1584d. 1648)influenced by Macchiavelli (to the point of copying pas-
sages of The Prince and Discourses on Livy in his works), Montealegre strength-
ened his case with examples from the Roman Empire.105 He showed how
the Romans had demostrated a great capacity to instill both fear and love in
their subjects. They had developed an effective policy to win their subjects
over by attracting some families to Rome and offering the titles of citizen to
their friends. Montealegre advocated similarly bringing noble Americans to
study in the Peninsula. According to their merits and aptitudes, Creoles could
then be offered a toga (robe) in each audiencia, a canonry in each Cathedral,
and a regiment in each military company. They would feel indebted to the
Crowns generosity and become defenders of the monarchs rights. Hence,
with the appearance of a perfect liberty, they would be trapped with chains
of gold, which they would happily bear and with which their loyalty would be
assured.106 These American men would then marry Peninsular women, impe-
rial relations would become harmonious, the sciences and letters would prog-
ress, correspondence would improve, and Peninsular American Spaniards
harmony would prevail.107
According to Montealegres plan, the school for Americans was to accept
descendants of pure noble Spaniards born in the Indies, as well as sons of min-
isters, intendants, and military officers, without excluding noble mestizos or
the sons of meritorious caciques and noble Indians who provided special ser-
vices to the Crown.108 The Crown quickly approved the project in a royal order
announcing the foundation of the school for Americans in Granada, and the
king declared his will to better learn the merits of his American subjects so that
he could employ them in Spain and America in all the careers they could obtain
with their aptitude and conduct.109
The order explaining the application process appeared in different gazettes
in Spanish America. In Peru, the first announcement came out in the Mercurio
Peruano in August 1792. Creoles responded quickly, as did Indian nobles. In
October, the viceroy of Peru, Ambrosio OHiggins, wrote to inform the Crown
about the success of the proposal, but he could not hide the legal dispute that
followed.110 As soon as the school was advertised, the Indian noble Bartolom
de Mesa Inca Yupanqui presented his cousin for one of the fellowships offered
to the first qualifying applicants. Despite the royal order declaring that the
selection process would be determined by the timing of applications, and
Felipe Camilo Tpac Inca Yupanqui being third on the list, the viceroy refused
to select him on the grounds that there was no space left. Don Bartolom

de Mesa, lieutenant of an Indian milita regiment of Lima, wrote a letter to

the king complaining about this discrimination and successfully demanded
his nephews inclusion among the fellowship applicants.111 For the most part
the applicants to the school in Granada were children of Bourbon officers.
Although students began to arrive in Spain in 1794, the Crown never managed
to finish the school. The students were placed in various other schools and army
regiments of the Peninsula. When French revolutionary wars broke out, the
Crown reallocated its resources.
In an effort to better control its empire, improve commerce, and connect its
subjects, the Crown also began to develop ways of improving communica-
tion between Spain and Spanish America, which had previously been slow.
The organization of the mail system had followed the classic institutional
pattern established by the Habsburgs. In 1514, the Crown had granted the
commission of Correo Mayor de las Indias (Head Postmaster of the Indies)
in perpetuity to the Count of Castillejo and his descendants, who lived in
Lima. In 1764 the Crown removed this privilege and reformed the whole
system. Thereafter, correspondence was to be sent from several different
ports. Ships sailed from La Corua to Havana and mail was distributed from
there in three official mail routes or Carreras de Indias: Havana to Buenos
Aires, Havana to Veracruz and then to the Philippines, and Havana to
Veracruz, Cartagena, and finally South America.112 In 1799 Manuel Godoy
put the royal navy in charge of transporting the mail.113 Notwithstanding the
disruptions caused by numerous wars, this reform significantly improved
communication between the Peninsula and Spanish America in the second
half of the eighteenth century. According to a Peninsular subscriber of the
Mercurio Peruano in 1794, America and Spain had moved more than two
thousand leagues (ten thousand kilometers and the exact distance between
Spain and Peru) closer to each other, after the new mail system was estab-
lished. Since then, the author claimed, the business of Spanish America was
examined more carefully and, as a result, new and better regulations had
been more efficiently implemented.114
The greatest innovation of this new interconnected era was the emergence of
newspapers.115 News sheets began to arrive in the American kingdoms during
the War of Succession when the new Bourbon Crown had a particular interest in
keeping Spanish American elites and officers informed.116 As early as 1700, Lima
was granted a special permission to print newspapers. These were mostly official
publications in the form of leaflets or copies from the Gaceta de Madrid, which
reported on European events and was published only sporadically.117 By 1743,
however, Lima published its own Gaceta de Lima more regularly. As the editors
stated, their purpose was to elevate the court of Lima to the status of European

courts and to communicate the news, scientific discoveries, advances of com-

merce, and the most outstanding novelties of the rational world.118 Although
these publications did not yet include political discussions or controversies,
they initiated the tradition of the Crown communicating news about its political
activities and decisions involving wars. Viceroys began to sponsor editions of
local newspapers, which published news from Spain, new laws, and some official
correspondence between Peninsular and local authorities.
By the 1760s, newspapers and pamphlets circulated and the news emerged
as a new reality in the Spanish world. The Gaceta de Lima bemoaned not hav-
ing received any news from Europe and the situation of the court. The editors
also complained about the lack of information on the departure of merchant
ships.119 And while the information in the newspapers from 1760 to 1780 was
official and censored, American Spaniards learned about the dangers facing
the monarchy, imperial competition, European wars, and reforms taking place in
the Peninsula, such as the use of military uniforms in the Spanish court becom-
ing the norm.120 In addition to spreading useful information, newspapers of this
time frequently evoked the specter of a common enemy and presented Spaniards
as threatened by the British and French.121
A more modern type of newspaper with an evident local character emerged
in Lima in 1790. The first one to appear was the Diario de Lima, published by the
Peninsular Spaniard Jaime Bausate y Mesa. The following year, a group of limeo
elite men sponsored by Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos issued the
Mercurio Peruano, and the Basque priest Jos Antonio de Olavarrieta wrote the
Semanario Crtico.
Notwithstanding local interest and participation in them, newspapers
emerged in the Spanish world as an imperial phenomenon. Bourbon authori-
ties promoted them in order to improve commerce, to spread useful informa-
tion, and to make uniform and civilize their dominions. Their main sponsor
was Minister Campomanes, which meant that American gazettes largely fol-
lowed the form and content of the Gaceta de Madrid. Their goal was to share
information from different parts of the empire, Europe, and especially Madrid.
Because the official information in them appealed mostly to an elite leadership,
the Gaceta de Lima and the Mercurio Peruano ended up being financially unsuc-
cessful. Nevertheless, Viceroy Gil de Taboada insisted on continuing the publi-
cation of both and directly sponsored them in order to propagate opposition to
the French Revolution and to communicate news about Spanish wars against
France. From 1793 to 1794, these newspapers concentrated almost exclusively
on wars and diplomatic negotiations in Europe, while creating the sense that a
powerful enemy was threatening the entire empire.122
Through newspaper circulation the late Spanish Empire produced in cen-
tral areas of Spanish dominion a stronger sense of empire.123 The founders

of these newspapersexcept for Olavarrieta, who wrote a more literary

paperpursued the goal of spreading information about the viceroyalty and
the empire. The editors in Peru were following directions from the court in
Madrid and the activities of the newly established societies in the Peninsula
and other parts of Spanish America.124 These newspapers certainly served
local interests, but they were an imperial phenomenon.125 Furthermore, gov-
ernment documents about newspapers founding clearly show the strong
influence of royal authorities over these enterprises.126 For example, in
the introduction to his newspaper, Bausate y Mesa thanked Viceroy Gil de
Taboada for his support and stressed that a city such as Lima, aspiring to
civilization, needed a newspaper to place itself on equal footing with the
European courts. His intention was to awaken and enlighten the popula-
tion, Bausate claimed. He presented himself as following Charles IIIs deci-
sion to promote the Diario curioso, erudito y comercial in Madrid in 1786,
on which he had collaborated.127 Besides, Peninsular Spaniards and some
Creoles edited two of the three Peruvian newspapers of the eighteenth cen-
tury without complaint. These editors and officers who supported them
were obviously favoring the Crowns interests while also following the
Enlightenments ideals.
The Enlightenments universalism, which inspired Bourbon reforms, spread

the fundamental concept that the world was interconnected.128 Through books,
newspapers, and pamphlets, philosophers propagated a new cosmopolitanism
throughout the Atlantic world. Enlightened thinkers made a special effort to
reason in broad terms. To communicate their thoughts, they drew on examples
from remote parts of the world such as China, Tahiti, and Constantinople.
Writers in the English-speaking world, such as John Locke, David Hume, and
Adam Smith, who influenced Spanish authorities, also promoted a more inter-
connected world by arguing that commerce was key for bringing people, goods,
and ideas closer together.129
The rise of new associations, such as sociedades or tertulias, where men of
letters gathered to discuss literary and public matters, was part of this trend.
Eighteenth-century writers and sympathizers of the Enlightenment shared a
belief in a universal republic of letters. Participating in sociedades or tertulias
indicated ones cosmopolitanism and civilization. These groups began to appear
in the Spanish world around the 1760s. The first society of this kind was the
Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del Pas, founded by Basque noblemen with
strong French ties, such as the count of Peaflorida and his Francophile friends
in 1765.130 This society served as model for Pedro Rodrguez de Campomanes,
who a decade later founded the Real Sociedad Econmica de Madrid, designed
as the model for all associations in the Spanish world. In founding these

associations, Campomanes and Peaflorida were imitating the Royal Society of

London and the Acadmie Royale des Sciences founded by Colbert.131
From the 1770s onward, the Spanish Crown supported and sponsored
the creation of sociedades in key parts of the empire. These associations were
intended to further its reforms by spreading useful knowledge among the elites
and forging a close community of interests, independent of traditional univer-
sity and church circles. Their members were encouraged to give speeches, pub-
lish newspapers, and correspond with their counterparts in the Spanish world.
As with so many institutions and associations of this era, the Crown tried to
put these new associations under royal control. In 1773 the Basque society
lost its full autonomy and became the Real Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del
Pas. Notwithstanding the Crowns efforts to control and homogenize socie-
dades, their interests varied according to local concerns. For example, the Real
Sociedad of Madrid concentrated on discussing and communicating theories
of political economy. The Basque society, on the other hand, was mostly dedi-
cated to spreading knowledge about mining and agriculture.132
A common trend of these new associations, especially in the Basque case,
was their aspiration to attract Spanish American members. In the wake of a
major wave of emigration, American members were especially important to the
Basques because no matter where they lived, they thought of themselves as part
of a community. One of the most important goals of the Sociedad Bascongada
was therefore to reinforce familiar and cultural ties between their members
at home and abroad. In this they may have succeeded, since membership was
strongest in Madrid, Cadiz, Mexico, and Lima.133 The interest in American par-
ticipation also arose because American contributions were crucial to their finan-
cial survival. Thus, from 1765 to 1794 American Spaniards formed 45.9percent
of the Sociedad Bascongadas membership. From 1774 to 1790 they contributed
about 1,100,000 reales (137,000 pesos, which are equivalent to silver dollars of
the time) in dues to the Sociedad.134
Like newspapers, the new societies in Spanish America were an imperial
phenomenon. Bourbon authorities promoted them. Through a public order in
1777 Minister Campomanes explicitly instructed local authorities to sponsor
the formation of these economic and patriotic societies.135 As a result, about
seventy societies emerged in the Spanish world in the years 1780 to 1820.136
Manila founded one in 1781 and another in 1787; Nueva Granada was founded
in 1784, Santiago de Cuba in 1787, Lima in 1792, Guatemala in 1794, Bogot in
1801, and Buenos Aires in 1812. The histories of the Havana and Lima societies
are especially revealing. In the former, Captain General Luis de Las Casas and
the progressive elites of Havana fought for the foundation of a society in 1793.
Las Casas was an experienced Basque military officer who had been trained in
Paris, where he had become familiar with the new ideas of public associations

and discussions. The Basque bishop of Havana, Juan Jos Daz Espada y Landa,
strongly supported the governor in his efforts.137 Likewise, both Peninsular and
American Spaniards were involved in the creation of the Sociedad Econmica
de Amigos del Pas of Guatemala.138 In Lima, the official founder of the society
was the limeo Jos Baqujano y Carrillo, a nobleman of Basque descent, who
had studied in Spain, belonged to the Basque Society there, and retained strong
European connections in Spain. A more active member at the beginning of the
Lima enterprise was Jos Rossi y Rub, an expeditionary and reformer born in
Milan who arrived in Peru with the state-sponsored expedition of Alejandro
Malaspina.139 But its most fervent advocator and protector was Viceroy Gil
de Taboada.140 These new associations therefore did not develop as a sign of a
proto-nationalism or of a conscious Creole desire for affirmation, as has been
claimed, but were a product of Bourbon absolutism and the Enlightenment.
They were, in the words of Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, las hijas del
iluminismo (the daughters of the Enlightenment.)141
With the opening of the Spanish Empire to the world in the late eighteenth
century, scientists, military officers, and men of letters from different places
began to arrive in Spanish America. Along with them came Freemasonry, the
most subversive association of the Enlightenment. Apart from its clandestine
character, Freemasonry played an important role in propagating the idea that
free thinkers could unite across borders and oceans.
Freemasonry was one of the most universal and radical associations of the
Enlightenment. It took three of the most important elements of this current of
thought to its extreme:universal brotherhood, reason, and religious tolerance.
Anybody, regardless of his origins, social standing, or religious background,
could become part of this universal community or brotherhood. Members of
Masonic lodges were required to have a strong belief in reason and God, and
they had to pass a series of trials to prove their merit in the use of reason, loy-
alty, and secrecy. Its inclusive character during the eighteenth century (more
restrictive in the nineteenth) was appealing, especially to military officers sta-
tioned around the empire, and reinforced their ties between one another and
the Peninsula.142
The trials of the Spanish Inquisition in the late eighteenth century reveal
its extension throughout the empire.143 One notable trial for Freemasonry
was conducted in 1776 against Pablo de Olavide, a rich limeo who was tar-
geted not because he was a Creole living in Spain but a powerful advisor to
Charles III and close ally of Minister Campomanesreputedly one of the
most radical anticlerical reformists of the time.144 Olavides admiration for the
Enlightenment was no secret and served as a good excuse for the Inquisition.
He was known for having direct contact with the French philosophers and for
hosting in the 1760s an influential tertulia (salon) in Madrid, where he attracted

prestigious men of letters and military officers, such as Melchor Gaspar de

Jovellanos, Jos Mara Blanco White, and Antonio de Ulloa.145
Following the Bourbon theory of power, the Crown had appointed American
Olavide, an outsider to Peninsular traditional elites, as intendant of Western
Andalusia and tasked him with the difficult reform of the university and land
tenure system in Andalusia.146 In doing so, he alienated the high nobility, old
clergy, and traditional university authorities. Olavides trial by the Inquisition
for unorthodoxy, Freemasonry, and heresy was one the greatest of the eigh-
teenth century. His torments and the show trial the tribunal assembled reveal
the enduring power of the most traditional circles in Spain, who vociferously
fought the reform of education and land tenure.147 While Peninsular Bourbon
officers confronted rebellions and death when they attempted to curtail local
preeminence in Spanish America, American Spaniards such as Olavide faced
severe punishment for trying to break the traditional structure of Spanish power
in the Peninsula.
After their succession to the Spanish throne in 1700, and mistrusting the old
Habsburg court, the new Bourbon monarchs pursued the formation of a new
elite that would help them govern. In absolutist and regalist fashion the Crown
aimed at centralizing power into a small, loyal, and select group of officers in
Madrid, who would breed new and well-trained lettered and military adminis-
trators to help them reform their new kingdoms. And yet, while curtailing local
power, the Bourbons also pursued the integration of elites from Spain and the
empire, especially after the American and French revolutions. The aim to bring
Peninsular and American people closer together set the ground for the rise of new
alliances, interconnected histories, and likeminded groups. This understudied
aspect of Bourbon rule is key to assessing the challenging political options that
certain groups, such as the Peruvian elites, faced during the empires breakdown.

Merit and Its Subversive NewRoles
Along with reform, Bourbon officers and writers of the eighteenth century were
obsessed with the concept of merit. The word appears in countless texts, from
official documents to literary satires, which commonly argued that a society
should raise and be governed by men of merit. However, unlike in the Habsburg
era, the term no longer meant purity of blood or status:it implied talent, skill,
knowledge, and virtue. These new meanings of merit would ultimately challenge
the organization of traditional society.
The Crowns intention to create a meritocracy resulted from the realization
that Spain had lost its supremacy to France and especially Britain. To match
its imperial rivals and transform the Spanish world into a modern, profitable
power, Bourbon authorities aimed to radically reform schools and universities
and impose a more practical and scientifically oriented education. The church
administered schools and universities during the Habsburg era and provided a
humanistic education based on the scholastic method, favoring the nurturing
of future poets, writers, professors, artists, and courtiers. In contrast, Bourbon
authorities sought to train new loyal and useful servants of the monarchy
military officers and lawyerswho would possess effective skills to govern.
The drive for educational reform did not only come from the state. Since the
early eighteenth century, some Spanish men of letters campaigned to abolish
the scholastic method, propagate new ideas, and implement scientific study.
They passionately advocated for the spread of useful knowledge, which later
became one of the leitmotifs of Spanish liberalism. Like the Crown, these men
of letters were concerned that Spain had fallen behind in the international world
order.1 Despite, or perhaps because of, these calls for reform, traditional circles
of church and university circles rejected any changes that could undermine their
authority and fueros. Under such circumstances, reformist men of letters and
Bourbon authorities united in the fights against corporate privilege.
The struggle for the formation of a new merit-based power elite had sig-
nificant long-term implications. It created new opportunities for public dis-
cussion in various mediums, including articles sponsored by royal officials
34

Mer it and Its Subvers ive Ne w R ol e s 35
that criticized Habsburg society. It also ended up undermining the traditional

concept of authority. As reformers repeatedly stressed, authority was no lon-
ger an entitlement but something that had to be earned. The idea that merit
produced virtuous individuals and should allow them to make a claim to
leadership spread rapidly throughout the empire. Although it was promoted
by Spanish authorities, merit became highly subversive, as people in power
began to be questioned publicly and in print for their lack of merit and virtue.
Moreover, by the early nineteenth century military officers and men of letters,
believing that merit had given them a right to govern, would claim authority
as individuals, challenge the traditional order, and threaten the stability of
the empire.
This chapter examines the spread of the concept of merit in the late Spanish
Empire and its effect on the social and political elevation of military officers and
men of letters. It begins with the work of friar Benito Jernimo Feijo, widely
credited as one of the most influential Spanish writers of the eighteenth cen-
tury and among the first to articulate the new ideas about merit and to demand
an education based on useful knowledge.2 Among his direct followers was Jos
Eusebio del Llano Zapata, born in Peru. This chapter looks then at the struggles
of Bourbon officers and proyectistas for a major administrative reform of the
empire, which would produce new authorities based on their merits and vir-
tues in order to prevent bad government. Next, the analysis moves to the 1760s,
when Minister Campomanes attempted new reforms and collaborated with
the regalist and secular church in these undertakings. As these new ideas about
merit propagated in the new Bourbon schools after the expulsion of the Jesuits
spread beyond official realms, differing and subversive ideas about merit began
to circulate in Spanish newspapers and pamphlets. Conflicts unleashed when
the Bourbons efforts to create a ruling meritocracy did not quite turn out as
anticipated.
The life of Benito Jernimo Feijo y Montenegro (b. 1676d. 1764)represents

the convergence of interests between some men of letters and the new Bourbon
monarchy in the promotion of useful knowledge and a merit-based society. One
of the first advocates for the Enlightenment in Spain, Feijo was a Benedictine
monk from Ourense who had studied in Galicia, Asturias, and the University
of Salamanca.3 He spent most of his life working as a professor of theology and
philosophy at the University of Oviedo in Asturias, where he mentored students
and set forth his ideas in two collections of discursos or speeches:Teatro crtico
universal (17261740), and Cartas eruditas (17421760).
Feijo targeted the prevailing type of knowledge based on superstition and
prejudice. To undermine this tradition he produced impressive work in a clear
and simple style accessible to the majority. The medical profession stood out

for him as the best example of Spanish backwardness, and he dedicated several
essays to denouncing traditional medicine. Likewise, he criticized the practice
of relying on astrology to predict events, rather than observing natural phenom-
ena. Following mostly French scientists and philosophers of the Academie fran-
aise, Feijo claimed that knowledge should derive only from direct observation
and urged a scientific-based education committed to the dissemination of use-
ful knowledge.4 Despite his allegiance to the Academie franaise, the Benedictine
monk did not hesitate to cite English authors such as Newton, Bacon, Locke, or
French libertine writers such as Gabriel Naude, Pierre Gassendi, and La Mothe
Le Vayer.5
Talent, training, and knowledge were the principal qualities to be consid-
ered in the selection of authorities, Feijo wrote. Yet he seemed aware of the
potentially dangerous implications of a meritocratic system applied to a tradi-
tional society where social hierarchy had long been determined by birth. In his
discurso of 1730, The Worth of Nobility and the Ascendancy of Blood (Valor
de la nobleza e influjo de la sangre), Feijo addressed this issue and explained
his ideas about merit in relation to the concepts of nobility and hierarchy. He
began by claiming that the association between vanity and nobility was absurd.
Kinship in blood did not mean kinship in habits, he argued.6 Nevertheless, for
the sake of social order, it was necessary to respect hierarchies.7 To reconcile
these two apparently contradictory positions, Feijo stated that nobility was
not praiseworthy but honorable.8 Although there was no reason for the noble
to indulge in vanity, the humble had to revere him. Here Feijo claimed to fol-
low Aristotle, who had written that only virtue was laudable; nobility, wealth,
and power simply deserved honor. But since there was not enough space for
all virtuous men in positions of power, in cases of equal merit, nobles should
come first. After all, he argued, common or humble men were necessary for
agriculture and arts and crafts. The army was the only profession where
according to Feijothis notion that nobles deserved a higher status did not
apply. Military skills and courage were so rare and desirable for a state that
they alone would determine who should prevail. In time, the elevated military
officer could produce his own lineage and legitimize it with future honors and
rewards.9 Despite Feijos efforts to use his pen to resolve all possible misun-
derstandings, tensions between this new concept of merit and Spains tradi-
tional nobility persisted.
With discursos like this one, Feijo inaugurated a new tradition of openly
criticizing traditional values and questioning concepts of authority common
among noblemen and academics since the sixteenth century, if not earlier. As
several authors have noted, Feijo was among the first in Spain to question the
use of the scholastic method in Spanish universities. This was a central theme
in his works and became a leading idea in reformist campaigns well into the late

nineteenth century. The critique of scholasticism posed a great challenge, for it

implied targeting the old and prevailing concept of authority. Feijo nonetheless
endeavored to prove that knowledge should not be a privilege restricted to just a
few authorities and noblemen.
During Habsburg rule, Latin was the language of authority in the church and
universities, and only those who had mastered the ancient tongue could form
part of the nobility of the robe.10 Command of Latin had been a traditional
indicator of prestige, but by the seventeenth century the use of the language in
academic and ecclesiastical circles had come to be seen by some as an exclusion-
ary practice. Feijos texts, written in accessible Spanish, supported his claims
for a more widespread education and became his most effective weapon in this
struggle. Anybody could understand his claims and join his fight.11
In his pursuit of clarity, Feijo rejected obscure explanations of the scholas-
tic method rooted largely in Aristotlean texts. This type of knowledge served
only to exclude, he wrote, since few could read the Greek philosophers writings.
Feijo criticized traditional Spanish thinkers who made his teachings into arti-
cles of faith.12 Instead, the Benedictine monk tried to reconcile the new scientific
methods of Descartes, Newton, and Bacon with a Catholic education.13 General
ignorance of new and foreign ideas in Spain wasaccording to himthe main
reason behind Spanish backwardness.14
Feijos discursos produced a strong reaction in the conservative spheres of
the church and universities. Defenders of traditional learning wrote several
essays against him such as Antiteatro crtico (1729), Teatro anticrtico (1735),
and Reflexiones crtico-apologticas (1748). Yet Feijos new authority and power
relied on royal support. In 1750 King Ferdinand VI issued a decree prohibiting
the publication of works against the Benedictine monk.15 The monarch went
even further by directly sponsoring the publication of Feijos texts and mak-
ing him an advisor.16 As a result, Feijos collected works were published fifteen
times before 1786, and his books were the second most read in the Iberian world
after Don Quijote.17
Spanish American men of letters and priests knew Feijos ideas well. For
example, the limeo Pedro Peralta y Barnuevo (b. 1663d. 1743)regarded Feijo
as one of the most universal men of letters in the Spanish world.18 Feijos works
were everywhere. In Peru, his books were found in the room of a Jesuit priest
at the seminary in Arequipa. Likewise, Pedro Jos Chvez de la Rosa brought
along fourteen volumes of Feijos works to assist him in his new appointment as
bishop of Arequipa.19 Pedro Jos de Necochea, the priest of Guancarama, in the
remote highlands of Andahuaylas (bishopric of Cuzco), kept nineteen volumes
by Feijo in his large library. And the bishop of Trujillo, Jaime Baltazar Martnez
de Compan, also included Feijo in among the numerous books he brought
from Spain.20

Feijos impact grew as his followers emerged. Some were dedicated to the
collection of useful knowledge based on direct observation to assist the Crown
in the development of commerce and educational reform.21 Others were more
interested in participating in the new universal republic of letters and making
Spaniards more civilized. This was the case with Jos Eusebio del Llano Zapata
(b. 1716?d. 1780), a native of Lima, who had read Feijo closely and tried to
initiate a correspondence with him.22 In his early thirties Llano Zapata migrated
to Cadiz after having published several works on the sciences, philosophy, and
travel.23 The limeo was committed to the spread of useful knowledge in the vice-
royalty of Peru and an early campaign against the scholastic method of educa-
tion there.24 For the most part an autodidact, Llano Zapata evidently could speak
eight languages.25 Early in his life, he founded a public school in Lima where he
taught Greek, and at eighteen years of age he was the Latin examiner of the city.
Like most men of letters at the time, Llano Zapata always remained close to the
viceroys, who employed him as a writer of accounts and descriptions of official
festivities and celebrations.26
Like Feijo, Llano Zapata was a man of the Enlightenmentin its Spanish and
Spanish American versionswho considered himself part of a universal republic
of letters. His writings therefore addressed central debates within that community,
including modern medicine, natural phenomena, philosophy, and morality. Llano
Zapata engaged in specific discussions and using a simple style. Like the work of
the Benedictine monk, Llanos texts were intended to serve as a sort of encyclope-
dia of useful knowledge. The terrible earthquake of 1746 that devastated the city
of Lima and its port so absorbed his attention that he wrote a personal account of
it and submitted a seismological analysis of its causes to the king.27
Llano Zapata participated in political arguments, too. With his vast knowl-
edge and travel experience in Peru, Buenos Aires, and Brazil, Llano Zapata
felt entitled to refute the new works of French, British, and Spanish writers
who harshly criticized Spanish America in the late eighteenth century and
were strongly influenced by the works of friar Bartolom de Las Casas, whose
Brevsima relacin de la destruccin de las Indias (Short account of the destruction
of the indies) had been published in several languages beginning in the mid-
sixteenth century. After 1750 publishers in Britain and France issued several
new editions of Las Casass texts, as these rival powers sought to reassert the
old Black Legend of Spanish imperialism, which highlighted Spains mistreat-
ment of indigenous peoples in the New World. Llano Zapata responded to these
European critiques, but he stressed that his work was based on direct observa-
tion, not national passion. In his Memorias historico-physicas, critico-apologeticas
de la America del Sur (1758), Llano Zapata argued that his intention was to give a
more accurate account of South America to correct the prejudices and ignorance

of some writers who based their descriptions on the works of foreigners rather
than direct observation. To produce the most accurate description, he wrote
to Luis Milhau, Comisario Real de Guerra y Marina of Cadiz, that he had con-
sciously liberated himself from national passions, claiming:I am of all nations
because Iwant to be of the land of truth.28
The new concept of merit was central in Llano Zapatas writings. In his
Memorias, he declared that this was how he would judge people, whose
heroism rested on their virtue and actions.29 Addressing the Black Legend,
he criticized the distorted accounts of Spanish mistreatment of American
Indians for having failed to consider Spanish efforts to educate and civilize
the empires newest subjects. This legend had not acknowledged how dif-
ficult a task this had been, he claimed. Llano Zapata had himself married
an Indian noble, descendant of the last Incas of Peru and he seem to have
strongly believed that all Indians, or Spanish subjects, needed was educa-
tion.30 Knowledge and reason would make them abandon a natural state and
become reasonable people.31 To support his point, he mentioned the names
of talented Indian writers and priests in Lima. Their talent was not evident to
many intellectuals, he stressed, because most well-educated Indians chose the
ecclesiastical profession instead of becoming teachers or professors. Yet their
successful careers in the church proved that education could allow individu-
als with sufficient merit to fill positions of responsibility, even if they were
from lower-class or non-European backgrounds. The prospect of Indian pro-
fessors teaching in universities was certainly not popular among traditional
university authorities.
Llano Zapatas ideas seem to have become more radical after he estab-
lished himself in the cosmopolitan port of Cadiz. In 1768 he wrote to Ignacio
Escandn, the general commander of Guayaquil, to ask him for his assistance in
writing a history of Spanish American writers. This was part of a larger project
undertaken by two Spanish priests, Pedro and Rafael Rodrguez Mohedano,
who planed to produce a history of Spanish literature.32 Like Feijo, Llano
Zapata insisted that this work had to be written in a simple style without any
affectation or exaggeration since virtues did not need decoration. More impor-
tantly, every writer would receive an account according to his merit. As an iden-
tifier, each person would only be referred with the place of origin. In his literary
history, Llano Zapata stated, there would be no space for absurd genealogies of
linajudos (pejorative for noble) who feed themselves like worms by cracking
bones and scavenging in ashes. In the Tribunal of Literature only the authors
talents, inventiveness, and spirit mattered.33 Llano Zapata published these let-
ters as a statement in Cadiz in 1768 and had them republished in Lima the
nextyear.

While Father Feijo, Llano Zapata, and many others waged their struggles for
useful knowledge and the new role of merit in the republic of letters, the first gen-
eration of Bourbon officers waged theirs at the court, where conflict prevailed.
Philip Vs marriage to Isabel de Farnesio, Duchess of Parma, in 1714 brought
the dominating Cardinal Alberoni as prime minister, who was determined to
follow Colberts actions in France and impose major commercial reforms to the
Spanish world. Additionally, Farnese pressured the monarchy to recover Spains
lost territories in Italy. After several military defeats there and in his disastrous
attempt to invade England and restore the Stuarts, Alberoni fell in disgrace and
left. In 1724 King Philip V abdicated in favor of his seventeen-year-old son, Luis,
who died shortly thereafter. After such disarray at court, Philip V came back and
turned to Alberonis protge, Jos Patio, secretary of finance, and of marine
and the Indies, who ruled over a new generation of Bourbon officials.
Concerned with the sense of crisis dominating Spain and in addition to their
administrative service as ministers and secretaries, officers Melchor de Macanaz,
Gernimo de Ustriz, Jos Campillo y Cosso, and Antonio de Ulloa wrote long
proyectos to the king identifying the causes for Spains atraso (backwardness) and
proposing a transformation of Spain and the empire. Yet nothing was achievable,
they claimed, without educational reform. Like Feijo, they criticized obscu-
rantism and superstition for dominating the Spanish system of education, while
French and British schools were propagating useful scientific knowledge.
The commitment of British rulers to the formation of a meritocracy became
evident during the decades after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The training
of skilled professional clerks and their appointment to key administrative posi-
tions became central to the rise of Britain as imperial power by creating an effi-
cient fiscal-military state capable of successfully waging large-scale wars, such
as the Seven Years War.34 Similar ideas about merit and the need for a skilled and
professional elite to support the expansion of the absolutist state were central to
the rule of Louis XIV and his Minister Colbert. As a result of these policies, the
French nobility of the robe was elevated to the highest administrative posts.35
Likewise in Prussia, Frederick the Great was committed to developing an effi-
cient and well-trained bureaucracy that could serve the monarchy in supporting
his great and costly standing army.36
Spains new bureaucrats were aware of these European reforms and were
anxious to match their imperial rivals. Some passionately proposed a dramatic
reform of Spains old order. For example, in 1724 Geronymo de Uztariz stated
in the dedication of his Theorica y Practica de Comercio y Marina that his aim
was to take Spain out of its lethargy so that it could enjoy the substance and
strength it lost to other countries because of its lack of commerce and navy.37
Citing the famous French military engineer, the Marquis of Vauban, Uztriz
envisioned a world in which the estado llano was no longer oppressed but

transformed into a useful force that could provide the state with soldiers and
sailors. Spain needed naval academies to train engineers, cosmographers, and
experts in mathematics, he argued.38 These subjects would pay taxes and pur-
chase merchandise. Following the French example, Uztriz claimed it was up to
the state to produce effective policies that could accomplish these goals. In clos-
ing, the navarro secretary proposed the formation of juntas de comercio (trade
councils) to assist the Crown in spreading useful knowledge and academies of
arts and sciences, architecture, and painting that would provide the Crown with
exportable products.39
The new Bourbon officers were aware that in order to elevate the status of the
industrious professions, they had to change prevailing Spanish beliefs that these
were lowly activities. To do so, they needed a new concept of honor. This was
no easy task. Since the Reconquista, an hidalgo or lesser noble had distinguished
himself from a villano (commoner) precisely by not working with his hands in
servile professions, including commerce.40 The new Bourbon Crown tried every
means possible to make commercial pursuits and nobility compatible. To coun-
teract resistance, one of the methods pursued, as suggested early on by Macanaz
and Uztriz, was to bestow with nobility titles on merchants, a practice exten-
sively used in Spanish America in the late eighteenth century that produced a
new nobility.41
The pressure for change intensified in the 1740s as the expiration of the asiento
contract provoked a new war with Great Britain known as the War of Jenkins
Ear. During the conflict, British privateers attacked the Spanish fleet and some
key ports of Spanish America, revealing the weakness of the Spanish Empire.
Under these circumstances, Jos del Campillo y Cosso (b. 1693d. 1743)wrote
the most influential reformist proyecto of the early Bourbon era. Nobody better
represents the new role that merit played in the Bourbon administration than
Campillo, who came from low origins, rose to the highest administrative posi-
tions, and became a staunch advocate of a society governed by meritorious and
virtuous people.
According to his own statements, Campillo was born in Asturias to an hon-
est but impoverished family. After studying grammar and Latin, he traveled to
Crdoba where he served as page to the Cathedrals canon, who noticed his
employees talents and sent him to study philosophy there. In 1715 Campillo
served as secretary to the general intendant of Andalusia and two years later
began to work for the powerful superintendant of Seville and general inten-
dant of the navy, Jos Patio. Campillo soon joined Patios naval expeditions
to Sardinia and Sicily and in 1719 was sent as war commissioner to New Spain
and then to Cuba to plan the construction of a shipyard there. Campillos career
accelerated upon his return to Spain. In 1724 he was appointed as superinten-
dant of Cantabrias shipyard, where after clashing with the church for trying to

expropriate its land, he faced a denunciation to the Inquisition. Despite this

humiliation, the loyal Bourbon officer was supported by King Philip V, who
protected his official by granting him the Order of Santiago. With this order of
knighthood, Campillo continued to move up in administrative positions and
salary. In 1733 he served as intendant general of the army in Madrid, traveled
to Italy during the war of Austrian Succession, and returned after Patios death
hoping to inherit his former patrons position. Instead, he was appointed inten-
dant general of Aragon. Still, Campillo aimed and worked for more. His skills
were most successfully tested in 1740 when he submitted to the monarchs a
detailed financial reform program designed to provide the Crown with suffi-
cient revenues to wage a successful war in Italy. At that time, Philip Vs wife,
Isabel de Farnesio, was most interested in seizing the opportunities created
by the new European war to re-conquer Spains former Italian possessions.
Soon after reading Campillos report and interviewing him, the Asturiano was
appointed secretary of finance and given almost universal powers.42 His was a
proyectistas dream cometrue.
Campillo authored several essays proposing reform. His most interesting
and influential ones were written as a trilogy:Lo que hay de ms y de menos en
Espaa (What is abundant and what is scarce) of 1741, Espaa despierta (Spain
wake up) of 1742, and Nuevo sistema de gobierno econmico para la Amrica
(New system for the government of America) of 1743. Lo que hay de ms was
a radical critique of Spain, so extreme that the manuscript went unpublished
until 1962. This caustic piece must, however, have circulated in court circles,
since several manuscript copies remain today. Written in the form of a diction-
ary or manual, Campillos text denounced all problems affecting the Peninsula.
Spain lacked education, manufactured goods, justice, commerce, and useful
people. There were too many nobles, judges, and priests but too few profes-
sionals and soldiers. For Campillo, there were simply too few rewards and too
many privileges.43
Espaa despierta was published at the end of the eighteenth century, but
Campillos most influential work was his Nuevo sistema de gobierno econmico
para la Amrica.44 As the title indicates, he proposed a whole new system for the
administration of Spanish America, which largely rested on two principles:the
forging of useful subjects and the appointment of meritorious authorities com-
mitted to serving the kings interests and making the Spanish world prosper.
Although this text was only formally published in 1789, Campillos ideas were
well known and served as a blueprint for the reforms implemented in Spanish
America throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. Manuscript
versions circulated widely, and the text was reproduced almost in its entirety
in Bernardo Wards Proyecto econmico.45 To give a few examples of Campillos
readership in Peru, the articles of the Mercurio Peruano in 1791 cited the Nuevo

sistema repeatedly.46 So did Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza in his struggle to

reform the school of San Carlos in Lima, Bishop Martnez de Compan, and
Miguel de Eyzaguirre, the protector of Indians, in his campaigns of 1807 for the
education of Indians.47
The Nuevo sistema was conceived of as the third part of the previous essays on
Spain because, according to the Bourbon secretary, the wealth of Spain directly
depended on America. America and Spain were one, and both were gravely
ill. While Spain lacked information about America, the latter lacked Spanish
treasures.48 For Campillo the most serious victims of the monarchys maladies
were American Indians because they had been deprived of their liberties and
oppressed by ambitious miners and ruthless authorities.49 Indians could, how-
ever, still be turned into a productive and useful force, but in order to do so,
Campillo argued, they needed respect, liberty, education, and integration into
the Spanishworld.
Campillos ultimate goal with respect to Spanish America was to transform
the continent into a major market for Peninsular merchandise. And Indians,
whom he considered Americas greatest source of wealth, would become sig-
nificant consumers. Campillo adapted the existing Spanish concepts of natural
rights and the defense of the Indians articulated by father Bartolom de Las
Casas in the sixteenth century, and he crafted an ideology regarding the Indians
in Spanish America that would be inherited by Spanish and Spanish American
liberals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.50
To ameliorate the existing ills of mal gobierno (bad government) in America,
Campillo suggested having the same forms of government for America and
Spain. He considered it necessary to introduce the new Bourbon institutions
and authorities, such as intendants and visitadors, and to better control their selec-
tion. The plan advocated more careful selection of bishops according to their
merits, skills, and talents.51 Intendants were to replace corregidores, which were
the political and judicial authorities in Spanish America whose actions elicited
the most complaints against bad government. Corregidores stood for everything
reformists rejected: corruption, lack of administrative skills, and the exploitation
of Indians. The majority of corregidores had purchased their offices as an invest-
ment to make money. In contrast, intendants would bring knowledge, order,
justice, and prosperity to America, Campillo argued. Additionally, they would
protect the Indians against abuses, including those of the church, and transform
them into useful subjects who would learn agriculture and handicrafts to pro-
duce revenues for the state. With their earnings, Indians would then be able to
undertake commercial activities. For this new system to work, Campillo recom-
mended co-opting the caciques. The selection of these Indian authorities would
be based on their merits and not on old Indian customs and lineages. Intendants
would report to the Crown about their adelantamientos y aplicaciones (advances

and applications) to decide their awards in Madrid.52 Campillos caciques would

serve as teachers of agriculture, arts, and crafts, and they would transform the
Indian population into a productive force.53
Following the Bourbons interests in the centralization of power and curtail-
ment of local privileges and fueros, Campillo questioned the status of Indians
in Spanish America as a separate community. Part of the intendants mission
would thus be to inquire into the nature of Indian privileges and fueros. Only
those protecting the kings authority and ensuring the Indians liberty and sub-
sistence should be retained, while all other fueros, especially those impeding
free trade, ought to be abolished.54 The ultimate goal of Spanish government
in America should be the Hispanization of Indians and caciques, Campillo
believed. To this end, he suggested giving land to caciques under the condition
that they would speak, dress, and act like Spaniards. Common Indians would
then follow suit and receive land because, as the secretary argued, Indians were
free in theory, though not in practice. And if some Spaniards insisted in con-
sidering them barbarians, he stressed, it was only because Indians had been
oppressed for too long. Anew government would change everything and trans-
form them into useful subjects.
Campillo was no revolutionary and saw no use for a surfeit of enlightened indi-
viduals in a society.55 Yet, regarding Spanish America, he argued for a complete
change of the social order. In one of his diatribes against fueros and privileges,
Campillo proposed to establish a new hierarchy in Spanish America based on
an individuals clase (class) that would eradicate distinctions between Spaniards
and Indians. He considered all non-white people to be Indians. According to the
secretarys vision, once all Indians dressed like Spaniards, they would be treated
like Spaniards of their class and be able to enter the houses of governors,
intendants, and ministers, as well as occupy the same spaces in the church and
public ceremonies. Moreover, they could join brotherhoods and hold any hon-
orific commissions earned with their merits. Any Indiana category he used to
include anybody who was not a pure Spaniard, regardless of their class or calidad
(status)would be given the same treatment as Spaniards of the same sphere.56
All these measures, Campillo claimed, would make Indians happy and would
avoid unnecessary confrontations.
Campillos actions and writings shaped many administrative, economic, and
commercial reforms that were implemented in Spanish America both during
and after his tenure in the ministry. For example, he proposed visitas generales
(general inspections) that would provide the Crown with accurate and useful
information to restore el Gobierno Politico (the political government) and pre-
pare for its new economic system.57 Regarding trade, Campillo suggested a sys-
tem of packet boats to protect the Spanish fleet. He urged free trade within the
Spanish world, the establishment of trade companies, and the encouragement of

the companies of Barcelona and Madrid to begin trading with America. He also
planned to improve the mail system and create gazettes to assist commerce and
spread useful knowledge.
The Bourbon critique of bad government in Spanish America and the need
for reform outlasted Campillos death in 1743. Six years later, navy officers Jorge
Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, wrote a confidential essay to the king outlining the
main problems of the Spanish Empire: the excessive power of local interests,
corruption, the exploitation of Indians, and the poor training of royal authori-
ties.58 The difficulties facing the empire were basically problems of management,
they argued. The Crown should no longer sell public offices but should select
authorities from among the talented people who had already governed in the
Peninsula and supported the Bourbon reforms. Royal authorities in America
were to be experienced clerks, independent from local interests and factions
who had ideally served in the Peninsula first. In subsequent decades, the need for
experience and professional training became the main argument the Bourbons
used to curtail the power of local authorities and exclude Spanish Americans
from positions of power.59
By the 1740s the critique of old privileges and bad government had become
widespread. In 1747 King Ferdinand VI received a proyecto, written by a limeo
then living in Madrid. The text detailed and denounced the abuses and corrupt
practices of the viceregal government in Peru. The text, entitled Estado politico
del Reyno del Peru: Govierno sin Leyes; Ministros relajados: Tesoros con pobreza
(Political state of the Kingdom of Peru: Government without laws, dissolute
ministers) was never printed, but eight manuscript copies kept in different
libraries indicate its informal circulation in court circles. Key Bourbon officers,
such as Antonio de Ulloa and former visitador and superintendant of Peru, Jorge
Escobedo, referred to this text.60
Like Campillo and most proyectistas of the eighteenth century, the Estados
author claimed that bad government was responsible for the poor state of the
viceroyalty of Peru. Combining old and new ideas, the author blamed the vice-
roy for all evils and described him as a despotic and abusive governor who
obeyed no laws other than his own ambitions. Likewise, the limeo portrayed
the oidores as closely following the viceroys example. He criticized their involve-
ment in commerce and their taking advantage of the new war ( Jenkins Ear) to
purchase commissions. Under such circumstances, the author worried poor
students would never be able to compete with the merchants children who
had no honor or mastery. The writer then added: How can the children of the
student and military cease being plebeian, when merit does not keep up with
the Houses, when the unreasoning is almighty and the injustice full of riches.
Who will serve Your Majesty with virtue?61 Next, the Estados author criticized
the church for having transformed America into a theocracy. Like Campillo, he

thought there were simply too many priests and not enough good husbands,
which forced women into monastic lives.62
To remedy these problems, the limeo proposed in proyectista fashion, two
plantas (projects).63 First, he argued for a major military reform in America.
The way to ensure a good government in Spanish America, he claimed, was to
establish military forces and authorities there who would be loyal to the king,
well paid, and organized around premios (prizes). In this system, all promotions
would depend on merit, and the military bodies themselves would be in charge
of complying with clear rules for promotions. The limeo also wanted to apply
this model to the church, where secular priests loyal to the Crown would be
favored.64 Since such a reform could seem overwhelming, the author proposed a
short-term remedy to produce wealth quickly:the creation of a commerce com-
pany in Lima. Following the model established by the companies of Caracas
and Havana, the Lima enterprise would concentrate on trading Perus abundant
metals and opening a new commercial route via the Cape of Horn to avoid pri-
vateers attacks.
The limeos commercial company was never created but a military reform
did happen. And after incessant complaints about misgoverning in America, the
Crown under the direction of the Marquis of Ensenada, began an administrative
reform of the empire in 1750 by ending the sale of public office. Positions in the
administration had been sold systematically in both Spain and Spanish America
since 1633, when Philip IV and his main advisor, the Count-Duke of Olivares,
desperately tried to shore up the declining Spanish economy.65 These sales had
weakened imperial control in Peru, where this practice had been widespread and
the elite in Lima had gained control of viceregal administration.66 This policy
also led to the proliferation of offices and abdication of control that only a new
dynasty could change.67
Yet this was a difficult reform to attempt because the sale of public offices
had long been an easy way for the Crown to obtain fast cash. Nonetheless,
the Bourbon Crown, especially under Charles III, began to appoint func-
tionaries to key administrative offices under the premise that they were
experienced people who were professionally trained and loyal. Their merits
and virtues were to be proven and their selection made in Madrid. Spanish
Americans quickly adapted to the new rules by sending elite children to the
Peninsula for education and to establish contacts at the Bourbon court. In
addition, from the 1760s Spanish Americans, like those in Spain, began to
publish their hojas de mrito (merit records), accounts of their professional
training and administrative service. Those with the financial means pub-
lished their hojas in Madrid. In earlier times, these documents had been used
as a proof of social status, purity of blood, and lineage rather than as a proof

of merit in the modern sense of skill and professional accomplishment.68

Mid-eighteenth century hojas de mrito underscored education and profes-
sional experience and became key documents under the new rules of the
Spanish court.69
During the escalating imperial competition of the 1760s, the Spanish Crown
intensified reforms in Spanish America, under the guidance of Jos de Glvez,
Visitador General (17651771) of the empire. A lawyer born in Mlaga and
trained at the University of Salamanca, Glvez served the Crown in the French
embassy when Spain renewed its alliance with France in 1761 and entered into
a direct confrontation with Britain. Like many in the Bourbon administration
of the time, Glvez regarded war and defense as the highest priorities. He thus
encouraged the appointment of professionally trained military authorities with
an education in Peninsular military and navy schools to the highest administra-
tive posts.70 As Visitador General, and later as the leading figure in the Council
of the Indies from 1775 to 1787, Glvez showed a clear tendency toward favor-
itism and nepotism and failed to fully implement some key financial reforms,
but he did change the general rules of the administrative game.71 Positions of
the highest authority from the 1750s on went predominantly to professionally
trained military officers, appointed in Madrid. In Peru, all viceroys appointed
after 1745 were military officers, trained in the Spanish Peninsula and possess-
ing administrative or military experience there or in other parts of the empire.72
Although the Bourbons were successful in this administrative reform, their
attempts to transform the schools and universities of the Spanish world were
less promising.
Like their predecessors, Bourbon authorities were aware that to accomplish

real reform, they needed to transform the schooling system. Most seemed to
agree on the need to restrict the power of the Catholic Church over it. The
leader of the educational reform was Pedro Rodrguez de Campomanes, a
radical second-generation reformer who tried to enact the ideas of the early
Bourbon officers and proyectistas through his writings.73 Campomanes was
a lesser noble from Asturias who considered himself a disciple of Feijo.
He studied law at the University of Oviedo, developed a passion for history
and became an efficient bureaucrat of the royal mail and a prominent lawyer
during the reign of Ferdinand VI. In 1748 Campomanes joined the Royal
Academy of History in Madrid, investigated legal and institutional mat-
ters, and attracted the attention of the Crown for his strong regalist essays.
His writings and campaigns against the churchs privilegesthe Jesuits in
particularmade him a valuable collaborator for the Crown. Campomaness
regalist writings are credited as the intellectual and legal foundation of the

Concordato of 1753, which granted the king the power to preselect candidates
for bishoprics.74
In 1762 Campomanes was elevated to fiscal of the Council of Castille. In
these years, he produced reports supporting the liberalization of the grain
market and sheep-raising practices in Castile. He collaborated closely with
Pablo de Olavide, with whom he designed the experimental settlements of
the Sierra Morena. In 1774 Campomanes published his most influential
essay on popular industry and, a year later, one on the education of artisans.
Following his commitment to spreading useful knowledge, Campomanes
supported the foundation of the Real Sociedad Econmica de Madrid and
similar societies in other parts of the Spanish world. He remained a longtime
collaborator of the academy in Madrid and in 1780 produced his Memorias
sobre la sociedad econmica. To reward his loyal service and merits, Charles III
granted him the title of count of Campomanes in 1780. Three years later
Campomanes was elevated to governor of the Council of the Indies, a post
he held until 1791.75
A central figure in the new Bourbon power elite, Campomanes was strongly
committed to strengthening the power of the Crown, establishing a merit-
based society, and elevating men with backgrounds similar to his own. Joseph
Townsend, an Anglican minister who traveled throughout Spain from 1786 to
1787, found him to be one of the most brilliant intellects of the time. Two things
particularly struck Townsend about the Spanish minister: the elegance of his
dinner parties, because no man is fit to govern an empire who cannot give a
dinner to his friends, and his reluctance to receive the grandees of Spain in pri-
vate audiences.76 His clash with traditional Spanish nobility was no secret. An
outsider to these circles, Campomanes had no qualms about undermining their
status.77
Campomaness most famous and publicized text was his Discurso sobre el
fomento de la industria popular. This speech, first read at the Royal Academy
of History in Madrid and published in 1774, took the new ideas about merit
and useful knowledge of the previous generation in a more radical direction.
Campomanes, like his predecessors, aimed to refute the widespread notion
among foreigners that Spaniards were lazy, and he presented a plan for the social
transformation of the Spanish world. Through this text, written in clear and sim-
ple language, gentes (peoples) de todas las clases (of all classes) would learn to
become useful to the state and forge the nations prosperity.78 There would be no
more laziness or vanity. Furthermore, the Spanish world would have a new pro-
ductive nobility, committed to working with the state toward the nations hap-
piness. To this end, noblemen would be assembled or reduced in economic
societies, from which they would help all subjects fulfill their most useful social
roles.79

In Campomaness view every social group or authority would have a clear

practical mission. In addition to their role in society, the economic or patriotic
societies of Spain and the empire would sponsor scientific research and edit
newspapers to advance commerce and spread useful knowledge. Likewise, bish-
ops and the ecclesiastical orders would organize effective charities and collabo-
rate with the state and nobility on scientific expeditions and the collection of
useful knowledge. Intendants, for their part, would efficiently run local admin-
istration and public finance. Women would receive a practical education so as
to learn how to educate their families. Finally, the industrious groupsartisans,
peasants, and vagabonds includedwould achieve their highest potentials and
perform useful professions with honor.80 Collectively, all social groups would
make Spain prosper.
For this program to work, Campomanes urged the total elimination of privi-
leges and fueros. Guilds and brotherhoods should no longer exist, he stressed.
The new Spanish nation would have only one law for everybody. Rather than
rewarding its subjects with special privileges, the Crown would reward their
merits with promotions and prizes, administered by economic societies.
Campomaness Discurso on popular industry circulated widely with strong
royal support. In 1774 Charles III sponsored an edition of thirty thousand
copies to be sent to all parts of the Spanish Empire. The next year, four thou-
sand copies of his text on the education of artisans were printed for circu-
lation.81 Like Feijos writings, Campomaness works found their ways into
the libraries and writings of many Spanish Americans of the late eighteenth
century, including the Bishop of Arequipa, Pedro Jos Chvez de la Rosa, and
Bishop of Trujillo, Martnez de Compan.82 The Mercurio Peruano alluded
to Campomaness speech on popular industry several times, as well as to his
more critical texts. In 1791, for example, an article promoting change in the
university in Lima cited Minister Campomaness commentary on the reform
of the University in Salamanca, stating that one of its major problems was
that it had not been reformed since its founding and thus suffered from the
feces of those old centuries, which only las luces and the Enlightenment could
cure.83
As one of the leaders of Bourbon regalist policies with respect to the church,
Campomanes became a decisive figure in the appointment of ecclesiasti-
cal authorities in the second half of the eighteenth century. His actions show
that, despite the Crowns clashes with the church, the Bourbons did not intend
to reduce its influence to purely spiritual affairs. On the contrary, under royal
supervision loyal, well-trained Bishops and priestsideally secularwere to
help lead the process of reform.84 From the 1750s to the 1800s most key church
jurisdictions were headed by royalist bishops and archbishops strongly commit-
ted to the Crowns plans for reform:Francisco Antonio Lorenzana of Mexico,

Benito Mara Mox y Francol of La Plata, Antonio Caballero y Gngora of

Santa F, Pedro Corts y Larraz of Guatemala, Pedro Antonio de Barroeta of
Lima, Baltasar Jaime Martnez de Compan of Trujillo, and Pedro Jos Chvez
de la Rosa of Arequipa.85
These priests, whom the Bourbons trusted, were among those strongly influ-
enced by the doctrines of Jansenism. The most radical group in the Catholic
Church, Jansenists were Flemish, French, and Dutch clerics who believed in
the doctrines that Cornelius Jansen had written in 1640 under the influence
of Saint Augustine. Their doctrine followed three main principles:men were
left alone in the world to seek their own salvation, the church had to be com-
mitted to saving them by providing the necessary grace, and the only way to
overcome sin was through meditation and reflection.86 Jansenists urged the
restoration of the churchs main obligations and the reduction of its role in
secular affairs, especially in royal courts. From the beginning, Jansenists were
at theological, ecclesiological, and political war with the Society of Jesus and
rejected the ideas of the Counter-Reformation that the Jesuits so strongly
advocated.87 Jansenists campaigned for the transformation of Catholic prac-
tice into a more austere order, guided by a purity, clarity, and reason and dis-
tanced from grandiose fiestas, baroque art, and popular cult. Faith could not
be the result of mystical experiences but could only come from knowledge
gained by serious study, they argued. It was therefore necessary to restructure
education by reforming schools and seminaries.88 Consequently, pro-Jansenist
priests became passionate advocates of Bourbon cultural and educational
reforms. In return, Charles III appointed them to leading roles in the numer-
ous new seminaries and schools.89
Spain had officially complied with the Popes repudiation of Jansenism in
1664. By the eighteenth century, however, Jansenist books circulated widely
in the Spanish empire, in part because Campomanes and other royal authori-
ties favored this. Jansenists and pro-Jansenist literature had become part of the
library of the reformist Bishop of Arequipa, Chvez de la Rosa, who brought
works by Racine and Fleury, as well as pamphlets published in Avignon and
Paris on the reform of customs. Chvez de la Rosa even brought the letters of
Pascal, one of the most renowned pro-Jansenist writers, along with Estatutos
de la Universidad de Coimbra of 1773, which distilled the Marquis of Pombals
educational reform in Portugal.90
The Crowns alliance with this sector of the church was crucial for its plans
of reform. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Bourbon admin-
istrations plans for educational reform were thwarted by the church and the
Jesuit orders control of schools. The Bourbons relations with the Papal States
remained tense after the War of Succession and at first the new monarchs did
not want to put them at risk.91 Yet by the mid-eighteenth century, the Crown

had regained strength vis vis the church. The expulsion of the Jesuits from the
Spanish world enabled unprecedented opportunities, and in the 1770s, royal
authorities initiated slow and complicated reorganization. For the first time,
Bourbon authorities and secular priests governed most schools, especially those
for the elite. This measure produced serious damage:schools were shut down,
professors were expelled, and libraries were closed and purged. At the time of
the expulsion, the Jesuit order had been in charge of 117 colleges in Iberian
Spain and seventy in Spanish America.92 Some had a system by which the main
colleges dedicated to the education of the elites financed schools for Indians and
castas, and these never recovered.93
Given that the Crown was primarily interested in the education of elites,
Bourbon authorities concentrated on their schools and paid special atten-
tion to the training of military officers, lawyers, and clerks.94 Throughout the
eighteenth century, especially after the expulsion, the Bourbons created and
reformed numerous schools.95 They were able to do so with the help of the new
Bourbon bishops and the secular church who, fulfilling the expectations of
Campillo and Campomanes, became the Crowns allies in the pursuit of useful
knowledge.
The transformation of schools and universities, which enjoyed special statutes

and fueros was extremely difficult, and Bourbon reformers produced passionate
texts urging major changes. The peak of this reform happened under the leader-
ship of the Francophile count of Aranda, president of the Council of Castille,
who beat down French and Italian advisors and entrenched Spanish courtiers
to push the reforms further. Aranda commissioned Pablo de Olavide, another
Francophile, to produce a project that could serve as a model for all schools and
universities in the Spanish Empire. In 1768 the limeo finished a plan for the
reform of the university in Seville and obtained its approval the following year.96
With the authority of the states representative to the city of Seville and super-
intendant of Andalusia, Olavide submitted his plan of study with an introduc-
tion written with the style and tone of a political manifesto. Olavide began by
claiming that the new Bourbon education would leave no space for useless tradi-
tion and privileges because gangrene is not cured with collieries, but with cau-
teries.97 Only a new civil and modern type of education would produce useful
citizens to serve the state. In the Spanish nation, he stressed, all citizens would
have the same law. Spain would thus cease to be a body composed of many dif-
ferent small bodies, all hating, oppressing, despising each other, and living in a
constant civil war.98
To achieve these goals, Olavide proposed that the university be separated
from the control of the church and lose its special fueros. This measure would
liberate the university from the spirit of the party that comes along with the

churchs factions. Another major goal of the government should be the com-
plete eradication of the scholastic method of studies. This ought to be a war a
sangre y fuego (to the death).99 In addition, the state should forbid the enroll-
ment of the regular orders. Why waste resources on their education, when the
university should pursue the solid knowledge of practical sciences, which
makes men sincere, modest, and good.100 Auniversity ought to be more like a
public office at the states service, educating the few men who would enlighten
and direct the muchedumbre (multitude). For Olavide there was no point in
educating the poor.101 Finally, to make the new role of the university visible
in society, he proposed dropping the wearing of robes, which were not only
old fashioned and unhygienic but also reminders of an ecclesiastical education.
Students should instead wear military uniforms, then in vogue, and to avoid
vanity, the uniforms ought to be black.102
Following Olavides plan, in 1771 the Crown issued a similar program
for the reform of the University of Salamanca. Written for the most part by
Campomanes, the document became the blueprint for the reform of all major
universities in the empire. The following year, several other plans of reform were
drafted, but university authorities resisted them. As in Salamanca, reform was
only favored by lower-ranking university officials, who were unable to prevail
over their more powerful colleagues.103
Despite great expectations, the Bourbon educational reform resulted in fail-
ure. Bourbon authorities and their ecclesiastical supporters managed to take
command of a large number of schools but failed to control the main universi-
ties. Reform was constantly pursued but was blocked by traditional university
authorities, just as Feijo had encountered. Professors rejected new ideas and
educational methods, inasmuch as these innovations tended to question their
thinking and practices. The majority of professors were not trained in mathemat-
ics, agriculture, political economy, or vernacular languages, and they refused to
hand over power to new people.
In order to break this deadlock, Campomanes pursued the risky policy of
promoting alternative institutions. Professional schools and seminaries run by
reformist priests, especially by economic societies, received the full support
of the Crown. This was the origin of the seminaries of San Carlos, named after
King Charles, which emerged in many Spanish American cities around the
mid-eighteenth century.104 The Crowns solutions to these matters produced a
reformist elite in the empire that shared Bourbon ideals, as well as the rise and
consolidation of a strong and menacing opposition among traditional university
authorities and the old nobility.105
One of the models for the new Bourbon schools was the Seminario de Nobles
de Bergara, where many Spanish Americans studied. Akey condition for admis-
sion to the school was that the parents of a prospective student were members

of the Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del Pas. The seminary presented itself
as a patriotic school whose aim was the formation of a productive, skilled, and
well-trained elite. As the organizers claimed, the Seminario was modeled after
the practical schools established by the empress of Russia, the academia theresi-
ana y de Saboya promoted by the German emperor, and the mineralogy school
of Freiberg.106 It hired teachers from France, such as Louis Proust and Francisco
Chavaneau, and trained its students in law, mineralogy, chemistry, politics, com-
merce, and finance.107 The school was the pride of reformist Spaniards. In a let-
ter sent to the newspaper El Censor, Valentn de Foronda, a founder, stressed
that if Spain had more seminaries such as the one in Bergara, Spaniards would
become emperors of the universe. He was most enthusiastic about merit being
the schools leading principle because nobility becomes a ghost spirit when it is
not accompanied with virtue. According to Foronda, the major achievement of
Bergara was the system of checks and balances through which students had the
right to revise finances and elect their own authorities.108 Not everybody shared
Forondas enthusiasm. Traditional thinkers spread rumors about the schools
subversive character. In 1781 the Marquis de la Regala wrote to Flix Mara
Samaniego, a professor at Bergara, to praise him but to also warn him that the
school was being criticized in the court for promoting deism, which was a com-
mon allusion to Freemasonry.109
Notwithstanding these clashes, the Crown persisted in its pursuit of reform
and used the school of Bergara as a model. Concerned about the break of
the United States from empire, in 1786 Campomanes wrote to the count of
Floridablanca, secretary of state, about the urgent need to educate the nobles
and reinforce their loyalty. The prestigious Seminario de Nobles de Madrid,
which educated the highest elites, received the full attention of the Crown.
Pro-Jansenist priests, under the direction of navy officer Jorge Juan, took com-
mand of the school after the Jesuit expulsion.110 They concentrated on training
nobles for key administrative positions and emphasized the study of the law
and the army. Moreover, following a kings order of 1785, professors encour-
aged students to join the glorious career of the army. To facilitate this, the
seminary offered to help them get admitted as cadets into the units of their
preference.111
Campomanes ordered that all economic societies form schools modeled on
Bergara and the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid.112 In a plan to do so, written
in 1788 and published in 1790, the authors stressed that they were following
the model of Bergara, after comparing it with French and British schools. The
head of these schools was to be a talented military officer who would be able
to teach noble children the values of discipline and obedience.113 To gain use-
ful knowledge, students would be encouraged to join an urban tertulia, where
they would receive public newspapers and gazettes and have the liberty to think

about their contents in critical ways. The plan also established a list of main read-
ings in these schools:Robinson Crusoe (without the passages about religious tol-
erance), the fables of Samaniego, Aristotle, Bossuet, and classic authors such as
Cicero, Pliny, and Tito Livio. To encourage fluency in French, professors would
begin by assigning simple passages to students and continue on to Corneille,
Voltaire, Racine, and Boileau. In addition, students would be trained in Spanish,
history, law, physics, architecture, drawing, the arts, and commerce. For com-
mercial lessons, they would read Condillac, and the proyectistas Uztriz and
Ulloa.114 The new schools and the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid improved
in the early 1790s when Manuel Godoy tried to shape students into the new
elites who would run the empire according to his ideas. Yet like many other insti-
tutions, the schools suffered tremendously when their resources were drained
during the French revolutionary wars.115 Among other things, French invaders
of the Basque provinces used the main building of the Seminario in Bergara as
their headquarters.
Educational reform faced similar setbacks in the viceroyalty of Peru. Attempts
at reorganization were pursued to no avail at the University of San Marcos, an
old institution with a well-established corps of professors and authorities. In
1771, the university received new Constituciones (regulations) paralleling the
rules for Salamanca. As happened in Spain, traditional university authorities saw
the prospect of change as a direct threat to their authority and strongly opposed
those who favored new ideas. For example, old professors campaigned against
Cosme Bueno, a great admirer of Newton who held the chair of mathematics at
San Marcos. They regarded Llano Zapata with suspicion. The new regulations
proved difficult to apply and were abolished in 1788. Despite pressure from a
few professors who had been in Spain or had come in contact with new ideas,
such as Jos Baqujano y Carrillo and Vicente Morales Durez, and from stu-
dents such as Ignacio de Castro, who campaigned for the abolition of scholasti-
cism, San Marcos remained mostly a bastion of tradition.116
To overcome these obstacles, the Crown sponsored in 1770 the creation of a
seminary for the elite. The Seminario de San Carlos quickly became Perus most
progressive educational institution and with the support of Viceroys Guirior,
Croix, and Taboada, it emerged as a main center for the spread of reformist ideas
in the viceroyalty.117 Proud of his institution, the professor and priest Toribio
Rodrguez de Mendoza wrote in 1774 that nothing was more important than
merit in a professors career. In his view, the concept of venerable seniority was
simply a joke, because all that mattered for a teachers estimacin (respect) was
merit. Influenced by Jansenism, Rodrguez de Mendoza requested a new chair
of ecclesiastical history that pursued criticism and reinvigorated theology.118
In 1788 Rodrguez de Mendoza was appointed dean of the Seminario de San
Carlos and continued to fight aggressively for a more progressive education.

Rodrguez de Mendozas former teacher and mentor, Bishop Martnez de

Compan was strongly committed to a similar goal in Trujillo. In 1781 he
reopened the reformed Seminario Conciliar de Trujillo. Following the guide-
lines established by Campillo and Campomanes, the Bishop created seminar-
ies for operadores ecclesisticos (ecclesiastical assistants) in the main cities of his
diocese to reform priests and free them of their vicious habits. These schools
were to also teach the operators to administer charity effectively.119 During an
impressive pastoral visit to his bishopric, Martnez de Compan oversaw the
creation of fifty-one schools. In addition, he forged a plan for the formation of
schools for cholos y cholas (a term he used for both Indians and mestizos) to
provide useful education for the poor in his diocese that would help them attain
a decent profession.120
Likewise, Bishop of Arequipa Pedro Jos Chvez de la Rosa, previously dean
of the University of Osuna, reopened the Seminario de San Jernimo in 1791
and transformed it into a school of reformist thinking.121 Yet his clashes with
traditional orders and the cabildo eclesiastico (ecclesiastical chapter) became
so strong that he was forced to resign in 1802 and left Arequipa for Lima and
Cadiz.122
In Cuzcoa major educational center prior to the expulsion of the
JesuitsViceroy Guirior appointed Ignacio de Castro as the new dean of the
Seminario de San Bernardo in 1778 with the mission of reforming its cur-
riculum and methods. Having campaigned against scholasticism as a student,
Castro tried to follow the guidelines of Rodrguez de Mendoza, but lacked the
necessary financial means. The seminary had been a very influential institution
in Southern Peru during Jesuit administration, but it could not recover after
the expulsion.123
In contrast to the obstacles faced in educational reform, Bourbon authori-
ties did not face much competition or opposition in their efforts to promote
a military education in their dominions. There the central government exer-
cised full control of the army and all resources channeled towards war efforts.124
Consequently, military schools became leading institutions in the spread of sci-
entific thought and in the formation of imperial administrators. The most impor-
tant ones were the Academia de Matemticas de Barcelona, the Academia de
Guardias Marinas de Cdiz, the Academia de Guardias Marianas de Ferrol, and
the Academia de Artillera de Segovia. The future viceroys of Peru, Fernando
de Abascal and Joaqun de la Pezuela, studied in the schools of Barcelona and
Segovia respectively.125
As early as 1701, the Academy of Barcelona stood out as an avant-garde insti-
tution where professors from Brussels taught the latest military techniques.126
Reformed in 1764, becoming a royal academy more oriented toward the sci-
ences than the military in 1770. The academy was the most prestigious scientific

school in the Spanish Empire, and merit was proclaimed to be the leading prin-
ciple guiding the institution and military organization in general. Its promoters
proudly claimed that a scientific and progressive school like this would leave no
place for scholasticism, because the sounds of machines are more pleasant than
the voices of cloisters.127
Along with a new education, a new pride in the military profession was
being forged in military schools and circles. Army officers issued proclama-
tions praising the new nature of their profession and in its role in society.
For example, in a speech delivered in 1764 at the inauguration of the mili-
tary school of Segovia, the Jesuit professor Antonio Eximenociting classic
authors, along with Newton, Frederick the Great, Juan, and Ulloapresented
his tribute to the military profession. This praise was accompanied by a harsh
critique of men of letters who lacked real merit because, according to the
author, they spent their time giving meaningless speeches. In contrast, the mil-
itary profession was about practicing the sciences, achieving glory, and bring-
ing peace. Nothing could match the glory of the military, Eximeno claimed.
It was so absolute that it almost rivaled the glory of kings. For this reason, he
proclaimed to be willing to die holding his pen in order to teach his disciples
to die with the swords in their hands.128
The main challenge that Bourbon authorities faced when promoting the ideal
of merit was to reconcile new ideas that implied a new social organization with
a traditional hierarchy. Tensions inevitably arose. They were already present
in Feijos Discurso on nobility of 1730, but they became more evident in the
1770s, as the Crown pursued more aggressively their educational and military
reforms. It was hard to urge radical reform and at the same time long for order.
Moreover, after encouraging social critique, the Bourbon Crown could not
impede the circulation of more radical ideas about the role merit ought to play
in society, which largely appeared in newspapers and pamphlets printed in the
Peninsula with royal support.
While the official mission of the first newspapers was to propagate com-
mercial and useful information, they also brought news about the new role
that men of letters and military officers were achieving from the Crown. The
former were working as secretaries and advisors to kings, while the latter
were succeeding in battles and receiving rewards for their merits. The Gaceta
de Lima is filled with this content, since it was mostly concerned with spread-
ing news about the involvement of the Spanish Crown in European wars. For
example, as early as 1746, the Gaceta described in great detail the actions
of British Admiral Edward Vernon.129 Likewise, in 1753 the publication
reported anarchy in the Persian Empire, where each province had decided
to elect its own prince.130 A year later, the Gaceta described how a famous

Figure2.1 Printers use a printing press to print paper with the words Carlos II on it.
Abrazier burns next to the press. Ink. From Jos de Buenda, Presentacin real al soberano
nombre e immortal memoria del Catolico Rey de las Espaas y Emperador de las Indias
(Lima, 1701). Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University.
general of Corsica managed to take control of another revolution initiated by

Ayazo and Calvi.131 In 1787, El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios que se Publican
en Europa presented El clebre Washington (the renowned Washington) as
only figure comparable to the most famous generals of the Antiquity, mor-
tal but almost divine and virtuous like Aristides and Cincinnato, wise like
Fabio, skilled like Turena, and philosophical, simple, good-w illed, and kind
like Cantinat.132
More radical publications circulated freely throughout the Spanish Empire
in these years. Perhaps the most subversive paper was El Censor written by
Madrid lawyer Luis Cauelo with some collaboration by lawyer Luis Marcelino
Pereira.133 At its inception, the publication counted with the Crowns sup-
port and thus reached a wide circulation.134 The Mercurio Peruano cited it, and
Bishop Chvez de la Rosa brought copies from Spain home.135 In total, El Censor
published 167 Discursos defending ideas that were similar to Bourbon ideas of
reform. It rejected the scholastic method of studies and the role of the church

Figure2.2 Portrait of the printer Jos de Contreras y Alvarado and his assistant in front
of a type case stand and a fire. The printer holds a paper with the words Carlos II on it.
From Jos de Buenda, Presentacin real al soberano nombre e immotal memoria del Catolico
Rey de las Espaas y Emperador de las India (Lima, 1701). Courtesy of the John Carter
Brown Library at Brown University.
in civil affairs. It also favored the promotion of useful knowledge, formation of

a useful nobility, and freedom to exercise critique and trade. New ideas about
merit played a central role in the discussions of El Censor. Its critique, however,
had a darkertone.
For example, in 1783 Cauelo revisited Feijos Discurso of 1730 on the rela-
tion between nobility and merit and took the ideas of the Benedictine monk to a
more extreme level. In the form of a dialogue, the author reproduced his conver-
sation with a friend who had just come back from the Southern territories. In
those remote lands that formed a large empire, the author explained, there were
only three kinds of people:nobles, plebeyos, and infames (evil ones). Only people
who had committed terrible crimes formed part of the latter; however, nobody
who could perform a useful profession could be condemned to the evil group.
The second group, the plebeyos, included people of the professions who could
eventually become nobles because every door was opened to the plebe. As with
the nobles, there were a series of restrictions establishing degrees of nobility

according to merit.136 And in cases of equal meritsin contrast to what Feijo

had arguedmembers from the plebe should prevail, because they had shown
more talents and virtuosity to reach that status. This definition of merit is close
to DAlemberts famous description of the role of merit in Geneva where hered-
itary titles are unknown, and neither nobility nor wealth carry with them rank,
prerogatives, or easy access to public office.137
Always writing under pseudonyms, Cauelo led ongoing debate on the
role of merit. His social critique intensified in the last issues. For example, his
Discurso CLXIII reproduced some dialogues he had allegedly overheard. This
one dealt with the problems arising from having a nobility without merit. Here
a vil (evil) man, who happened to be rich, and a noble debated their status and
value in society. The noble was scandalized by the evil mans attempt to compete
with him. In response, the evil man questioned the right of his titles to demand
respect. The evil man claimed to feel much better from living by the sweat of
his brow rather than by charity and fraud. This comment hurt the noble who
comforted himself by claiming he was at risk to die on the gallows. But nobody
could persuade the evil man, who was not willing to exchange his plebeian rich-
ness for all the nobles illustrious laces. Besides, the evil man added, things had
changed, and more courtesies are attributed to rich men like me than to noble-
men. Alarge portion of hidalgusimos are serving me in the lowest ministries.
Ahumble man with whats sufficient is worthier than an illustrious one, who is
dying of hunger, the evil man concluded.138
El Censor turned then to a debate over the status of peoples and countries.
In one of his last texts, Cauelo decided to defend Africas literary merit. He
defied censorship when stating that he was basing his argument on Erasmuss
Praise of Folly and Rousseaus famous speech to the Academy of Dijon. Here
Cauelo argued that a nations value should not be measured by its superfluous
or dangerous progress but rather by its useful accomplishments. And so, after
comparing the most useful discoveries in the scale of reason, he concluded that
Africa largely excelled. El Censor was closed down in 1787, and Cauelo faced
the Inquisition.139
The social critique, however, continued. In 1789 the Correo de Madrid pub-
lished in several issues Jos Cadalsos provoking Cartas Marruecas. Cadalso,
born in Cadiz, was the son of a wealthy Basque merchant who had sent him to
study in France and then enrolled him in the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid,
where he opted for a military career. Cadalso traveled throughout Europe and
was well aware of the latest literature. His passion for the military was only
surpassed by his admiration for the Baron of Montesquieu whose Persian
Letters he imitated. In 1779, while his regiment was stationed in Salamanca,
Cadalso penned his Cartas Marruecas, a critique of Spain in the form of an
exchange of correspondence between the moor Gazel Ben-Aly and his friend

Ben Beley. Their letters were intended to discuss Spanish usage and traditions
but also to contrast a corrupt and vain Spain with a utopian Morocco. While in
Salamanca, Cadalso must have experienced firsthand the intense struggles for
power at the university during its attempted reform.140 And so, after discussing
some of the vices of Spanish nobility, Gazel Ben-Aly explained in letter XII how
in Morocco they did not have any idea about what is called here hereditary
monarchy. He could not believe that in Spain there were not only noble fami-
lies but also entire provinces with this rank. As an example, Ben-Aly described
his recent encounter with a driver and explained how he had intended to take
a coach to visit a friend but could not get the driver to bring the car. After
he demanded an explanation for his delay, the driver told him that he was a
nobleman and had been busy attending some people who wanted to kiss his
hands.141 Cadalso criticized everything and everybody in Spain:proyectistas,
polticos, escolsticos, luxury, and vanity. His praises, however, were directed to
his compatriots for the conquest of Americans who lived naked and owned all
the gold and silver of the universe but still lived without comfort.142 In 1782
Cadalso rose to the position of colonel of his regiment. He died in one of the
British attacks on Gibraltar.143
The tensions between the zealous pursue of reform and an equally zealous
opposition to it were observed by the Anglican minister Joseph Townsend, who
reported from the Peninsula clashes between the grand nobles and Bourbon
reformers in his account of 1787. Having experienced the success of a merito-
cratic system of elite rule in Britain that included the highest nobility, Townsend
tried to explain the outcome of this reform in Spain to his countrymen in the
followingway:
It must be striking to an Englishman to see all the most important

offices occupied by men who have been taken from the lower ranks,
and not to find among them one man of fashion, not one grandee of
Spain. These are all precisely where they ought to be:lords of the bed-
chamber, grooms of the stole, masters of the horse, all near the throne,
partaking of its splendor, whilst the drudgery and responsibility of
office is left to others who are better qualified to bear that burden. In
England it is far otherwise:our men of fashion, from their infancy, are
trained to high pursuits; at school they learn ambition, and when they
come into the House of Commons, they see, that to be distinguished
for application and for knowledge is the only way to gain consideration,
and to arrive at power. This proves such a spur to diligence, that, in spite
of their hereditary wealth and honors, many of the greatest men, and
the most able ministers, are to be found among our principal nobility.

In Spain, on the contrary, in the higher ranks, all is torpid. Satisfied with
hereditary wealth and honors, the grandees sink into mere sensualists,
and are lost. Nay, such is the general neglect of education, that the prin-
cipal ministers find it difficult to procure proper men to fill the common
offices.144
The comparison that Townsend draws is accurate. Historians have argued

that part of Britains success in becoming a strong imperial power after the
Seven Years War was precisely the prior formation of an efficient profession-
ally trained elite, which included the high nobility and forged gentlemanly
capitalists.145
In contrast, the new concept of merit that the Spanish Bourbons so strongly
promoted became a double-edged sword when traditional groups felt threat-
ened and resisted, authorities did not deliver, and rising talents saw their ambi-
tions frustrated. And yet, while the Bourbons failed in their main goals, their
reforms opened new spaces for critique of corporate privilege and rooted elites.
Authorities could not fully control the content of these critiques. A new concept
of merit as a condition for power spread rapidly in the Spanish world and altered
old ideas of authority. In the wake of opposition from traditional circles, merit
became a subversive concept when used to question authorities, their hierar-
chies, and their methods of governance. In the coming decades, this new con-
cept of merit would offer emerging political actors the grounds to articulate their
claims for power and recognition.

The Kings Most Loyal Subjects
Where extensively implemented, the reform of the military was perhaps the
most successful of all Bourbon attempts at modernizing and centralizing the
Spanish monarchy and its empire. Following the Seven Years War and
the British capture of Havana and Manila in 1762, the Spanish Crown put
together a comprehensive military reform program for Spain and key areas of
the empire. In Spanish America, this program was first introduced to Cuba and
extended to other strategic dominions such as the viceroyalty of Peru. After
building a proper navy but realizing that the Spanish monarchy could not
match Britains extraordinary naval power, the Spanish Bourbons instead con-
centrated on forming large, effective, and well-organized land forces. Following
their regalist, enlightened, and absolutist ideals, Bourbon reformers designed
the new military as a meritocratic, semiprofessional, and highly centralized
institution.1 Military officers were to become the kings most loyal and useful
subjects, and in return they would be respected as new authorities. In contrast
to the educational reforms, where traditional authorities constantly hampered
the Crowns intentions, Bourbon officers were able to develop their military
objectives, since the Spanish world did not possess large well-organized local
armies prior to the 1760s.2
Bourbon authorities expanded their reformist goals in the 1790s when the
French Revolution introduced large armies of patriotic fighters and dramati-
cally changed the way wars were fought. At the end of this decade, Napoleon
Bonapartes massive armed forces put even more pressure on the Spanish Crown.
By then, France had reemerged as a new power with strong imperial ambitions
that directly threatened Spain and Spanish America, while Britain had consoli-
dated itself as the worlds supreme navalpower.
To cope with these developments, Charles IV turned in 1792 to his shrewd
aide, twenty-five-year-old military officer Manuel Godoy. Under Godoys
leadership, the Crown continued to pursue the reform of Spanish administra-
tion, education, and traditions; however, the new wars demanded all of its
attention and resources. The government in Madrid urged officers overseas
62

The K ing s Most L o yal S ubjec t s 63
to collect greater revenue for military use and to strengthen the militarys
authority.
The Spanish Crowns decision to match its rivals by expanding the armies
and their privileges produced two fundamental but contradictory outcomes. In
some parts of Spanish America the military reform created a large institution
that attracted individuals of different social and ethnic backgrounds and placed
them under a new organization advocating professional equality and merit as
conditions of success, which clashed with the old Habsburg social order. In
addition, having failed to curtail corporate privilege and build a centralized
absolutist state (and despite the reformers rejection of special privileges) the
Bourbons consolidated the army as yet another corporation, protected by sepa-
rate legal regimes or fueros. Yet in contrast to the old Habsburg institutions, the
Bourbon armies operated under the control of the king and his direct repre-
sentatives in Spanish America.3 Civilian and traditional authorities and insti-
tutions such as the audiencia (royal council) and cabildo (local or municipal
council) had no jurisdiction over the military. Thus, by introducing the new
military into the old order but elevating its status and power above other insti-
tutions, the Crown did much to undermine the traditional social and political
order upon which the viceroyalty and the monarchy were founded. Astruggle
for power and authority between new and old authorities and institutions took
root and persisted.
This chapter examines the rise of the Bourbon military in the late eighteenth
century and the political and social tensions unleashed in the process. It begins
by discussing the decision-making process in the court of Madrid and proceeds
to look at its implementation in Peru. Turning to the realm of laws and high poli-
tics, the chapter reviews Spanish military rules prior to the 1760s and analyzes
the decision-making process behind Charles IIIs military reforms in Madrid
and their implementation in Peru, particularly the new military regulations
issued in the 1760s. These changes highlight how the Bourbon Crown resolved
its conflicting desire to redesign institutions in an enlightened and absolutist
fashion with a need to preserve old prerogatives of exception. The third sec-
tion examines in detail the organizing concepts of the Bourbon military regula-
tions:merit, loyalty, honor, and professional equality; and the new opportunities
these offered for legally marginalized subjectssuch as free blacks, mulattoes,
mestizos, Indians, and poor whitesin the military.4 As the next section then
shows, the new military regulations expanded the fuero militar, or the privilege
of soldiers to be judged by a separate military tribunal, which in turn established
the legal foundation for the overwhelming power of the military in Peru dur-
ing the republican era and its strength in Spain during the nineteenth century.5
Finally, the chapter looks at the great enthusiasm among many Peninsular and
Americans Spaniards for the military by the turn of the century.

In 1768, with the aim of articulating the military reform program, the Spanish
Crown published and distributed the Ordenanzas de S. M. para el rgimen, dis-
ciplina, subordinacin, y servicio de sus exrcitos, conceived for both Spain and
Spanish America and to be applied equally in all realms of the empire.6 A year
later, an addition concerning the militias in Cuba was issued as the Reglamento
para las milicias de infantera y caballera de la isla de Cuba7 to address American
particularities. These rules, laying the legal foundation for the rise of a powerful
military, were long lasting, outlived the empire, and remained in force both in
Spain and Peru until the late nineteenth century.8
Historians have been skeptical about the significance of laws and institutions
in the Spanish world. They have convincingly argued that the distance between
Spain and America, along with the confusion and corruption of Spanish legisla-
tion, transformed laws into dead letter or letra muerta. Without denying these
assertions, others have approached colonial legislation in a more dynamic way
showing how individualswomen, castas, and Indians in particularused
Spanish laws to their advantage in their quest for rights and status.9 The mili-
tary reveals another way in which people of diverse ethnic and socioeconomic
backgrounds, such as castas, were incorporated into Spanish institutions and
manipulated their intricacies to their advantage.10 The Bourbon military reforms
redesigned the royal army as a corps that could rapidly attract people from the
middle orders and castas in America by offering them unprecedented opportu-
nities to move up through the military ranks. It was no coincidence that two mes-
tizo military officers, Agustn Gamarra (b. 1785d. 1841) and Andrs de Santa
Cruz (b. 1792d. 1865), who had been trained in the royal army, were among
the first Peruvian presidents.
To fully understand the character of the Bourbon military reform and its
repercussions, it is necessary to examine the development of large armies in
central areas of Spanish dominion at the end of imperial rule and the power
of the military in these regions after independence.11 The viceroyalty of Peru,
with its central role in the Spanish Empire, its strong Peninsular connec-
tions, large royal armies, and entrenched Spanish institutions, offers an ideal
case study to evaluate the rise of Bourbon armies in Spanish America and its
consequences.
Claiming that the disorder of military legislation in the past had produced
much confusion, the Ordenanzas of 1768 abolished all previous laws in this
realm.12 Despite such radical claims, the military reforms of the 1760s were
built upon old principles. Core military rules in Spain and Spanish America date
back to the Reconquista, if not earlier, when military participation was seen as a
prestacin (service) and its regulations decided at the municipal level. As war pro-
gressed in Spain, each kingdom issued its own rules for combat and for the fuero
militar. In the thirteenth century, and in an effort to establish some unity in the

Christian territories, one of the first general codices for the Spanish Peninsula,
the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, established military service as a general duty
to the king and reshaped the fuero as a royal concession.13 Conquistadors then
brought these rules to America. Legal-minded Hernn Corts issued the first
military regulation specifically designed for Spanish America in Tlaxcala during
the conquest of Mexico. Following the spirit of the Partidas, and struggling to
legitimize his role as conquistador, Corts unified his forces to fight under his
command in the name of God and the King.14 Fifty years later, when attempt-
ing to regain control of the new American territories, Phillip II published the
Ordenanzas del descubrimiento, nueva poblacin y pacificacin de las Indias.15 It is
significant that there were no other major regulations until the Bourbon succes-
sion to the Spanish throne in 1700, which marked the beginning of the second
era of Spanish imperial expansion.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, armies played a limited
role in Europe and in the Hispanic world. Neither Spain nor the Spanish Empire
counted on centrally organized forces until the late eighteenth century. Before
that, the military organization was of almost a private character. For the most
part, nobles and elite members formed small militia units to serve the king and
did not face serious accountability.16 During this time, the Spanish monarchy
fought most of its European wars outside its territory with its regiments from
Flanders and Milan and thus did not need a significant number of forces in the
Peninsula.17
The arrival of the Bourbons brought a new era of administrative and mili-
tary expansion. Soon after his coronation, Phillip V initiated a major reform to
unify and homogenize all regiments under royal command. To start, all units
would bear the term real or royal.18 Much remained to be done after Spain lost
its European territories during the War of Succession and brought back its regi-
ments from Flanders and Milan. To reorganize all these forces the Crown issued
in 1728 new military Ordenanzas.19 While not fully implemented, these rules
and the subsequent reforms of the 1730s strengthened the monarchs power.
It was thus key to grant the king control over the armys promotion process. In
addition, the fuero militar ensured the armys independence from local inter-
ests; many corregimientos were militarized; the authority of the captain general
was consolidated; and the establishment of a militia system was attempted.20
In Spanish America, the most drastic transformation began in the 1760s
under the rule of Charles III. Before that, the Spanish Crowns main military
concern in America had been the defense of ports with geopolitical impor-
tance such as Havana, Veracruz, and Cartagena against the attack of pirates and
imperial rivals.21 Because of these threats Bourbon officials had been studying
Spanish military legislation to produce reform, but the British seizure of Havana
and Manila in 1762 accelerated their efforts.22 Anewly formed junta began to

work tirelessly in Madrid under the leadership of the Count of Aranda, while his
cousin and captain general of Cuba, the Count of Ricla, and his appointee, Field
Marshall Alejandro OReilly, prepared a specific plan for the island. These regula-
tions followed pragmatic interests, but they were not improvised. Professionally
trained and experienced military officers thought them through carefully and
defended them passionately against adversaries.23 Despite discussions and
disagreements, the Crown approved a plan for Cuba in 1764 that was initially
issued in 1765, finalized in 1767, and published in 1769 with the additions and
corrections of the viceroy of New Spain, Count of Revillagigedo, and the former
captain-general of Cuba, Francisco de Cagigal. The Ordenanzas of 1768 similarly
went through editions in 1764 and 1765 and was finalized in1767.
While both pieces of legislation came out almost simultaneously, the general
Ordenanzas served as the primary text. The Reglamento of Cuba complemented
the main text by organizing the incorporation of castas into the militia. The
Reglamento, however, made it clear that it was subordinate to the Ordenanzas;
thus, if the regular army and militia fought together in warsas happened in
the 1810sthe latter would govern all forces.24 According to the new rules, the
army in Spanish America would form part of the imperial army and respond
directly to the king or his direct representative. It would not be a colonial army
commanded autonomously by a governor, nor would it be an army of occu-
pation. Similarly, military men would be the kings soldiers and no longer the
guards of a specific authority or the defenders of a specific place. The publication
of these foundational and complementary pieces of military legislation conveys
the commitment of the Spanish Crown to centralizing power: this would be
done by placing all units of the empire under the same core rules so as to create
an imperial army. Therefore, to fully grasp these dimensions, it is necessary to
study these texts together, asone.
When explaining the principles and ideas behind the regulations of the 1760s,
historians have generally focused on external influences. Some have identified
French models, while others have found in the pragmatism of this project a pro-
foundly Iberian character.25 There were certainly French influences, but reforms
were taking place in Britain, Prussia, Poland, Portugal, Italy, and Russia simul-
taneously.26 And while Spaniards were attempting to imitate British commercial
expansion, British authoritiesdespite winning the Seven Years Warwere
seriously studying Spanish efforts at centralization. States and empires were mov-
ing in the same direction, developing plans for reform, expanding, and anxiously
competing against each.27 For example, to figure out the major transformations in
European military thinking, strategy, and technology,28 the Spanish Crown sent
its best men on espionage missions.29 Likewise, the best military students and
engineers were encouraged to travel through Europe to learn the latest military
organizational theories and tactics.30 This was the case for those who participated

in designing the new regulations of the 1760s. Count of Aranda, the leader of mil-
itary reformers, had studied in Parma, traveled to Paris, Vienna, Dresden, Berlin,
and Potsdam where he inspected the army of Frederick the Great. Army inspec-
tor Alejandro OReilly had spent time in Prussia learning military tactics.31 It is
therefore difficult to trace specific influences in these parallel histories.32
The Bourbon military reforms and new military regulations were both
pragmatic and politically savvy.33 Their aim was to form a professionalized
and centralized military corps that remained subordinate to the king and his
direct representative but also independent from the control of the audiencia
or cabildo. Instead of increasing the veteran corps in America by bringing pro-
fessional soldiers from the Peninsula (which could be slow and expensive)
authorities favored the formation of local professional armies (ejrcito regu-
lar) and ethnically diverse, semiprofessional (disciplined) militia units. This
new military would attract the best and most ambitious individuals of each
social and ethnic group and incorporate them into an institution that advo-
cated merit, not birth, as a condition of success. As a reward for their loyal
service, soldiers would receive military training, privileges, respect, equal-
ity in treatment, and honor. For some, there could even be power and glory.
Rather than vague promises, these principles were detailed in the regulations
and implemented in central areas of Spanish imperial dominion. Mexico and
Rio de la Plata issued their own regulations, which largely followed the text
for Cuba but included some variations.34 The Ordenanzas and Reglamento of
Cuba continued to dictate general rules, and despite later efforts to produce
new regulations, they remained as the primary legislation. In 1802 Manuel
Godoy attempted new reforms and issued Ordenanzas for artillery units, but
after 1808 these new rules were cancelled.35
In the 1770s and shortly after their publication, both the Ordenanzas and
Reglamento of Cuba took effect in Peru, though their full implementation was
slow but steady.36 This process remained a responsibility of the viceroys, who
by the late eighteenth century were all professionally trained military officers.
In his reports to the crown, Viceroy Manuel de Amat (17611776) claimed
to have conducted a major reform and created numerous regiments; however,
Amat was known for exaggerations and for corruption. His successor repeatedly
informed the Crown about the poor state of military forces, and official inspec-
tions revealed that his numbers had been falsified. The viceroy had appointed
officer corps but not actual forces under them.37 Nonetheless, the viceroys deci-
sion to enlist castasincluding Indians and mestizosinto the militia was long
lasting, a practice that yielded a distinct outcome in Peru because neither Indian
elites nor mestizos were considered in the regulations of Cuba. These groups
soon became aware of the opportunities offered by military legislative loopholes
and tried to take advantage ofthem.

Previous studies on the military reforms in Peru have paid much attention
to Amats role but neglected what followed after his tenure. After observing the
shortcomings of Amats undertakings, historian Leon Campbell concluded that
the Bourbon military reforms had largely failed. Amat was indeed unable to
form well-organized military forces to rapidly defeat the rebels during the Tupac
Amaru rebellion, and the viceregal government had to rely on Indian caciques
and their militia units to prevail.38 But to assess the true impact of these reforms,
one must look beyond the Great Rebellion and into the period of independence.
A second wave of military reforms took place in the 1780s under the leadership
of Viceroy Teodoro de Croix (17841790). Anephew of the Marquis de Croix
and one of the designers of the program of reform for Spanish America, Teodoro
de Croix was a professionally trained military man and staunch Bourbon officer.39
Croix served as governor of Acapulco, inspector of the troops in New Spain, brig-
adier, and general commander of the Interior Provinces of New Spain from 1776
to 1783, where he organized a system of defense that relied on a large army.40
And yet unlike in Mexico, Croixs main military goals in Peru were to central-
ize, professionalize the army, and reduce the number of troops. Local problems
favored his plans. The Tupac Amaru rebellion had put enormous pressure on the
old military and financial organization. Perus finances were overstretched with
the arrival of Peninsular troops after the upheaval and with situado militar (mili-
tary subsidies) sent to Panama and Buenos Aires for their military defense.41
Following Bourbon precedents and orders, Croix consolidated all units
under the term real or royal, economized, and strengthened royal power in the
face of internal and external threats. The unifying command of the army in Peru
was at this point the Regimiento Real de Lima, which had been created in 1778
but had effectively existed in name only.42 Croix kept veteran forces only in
Valdivia and Chilo, two strategic coastal defenses in Chile, and sent troops to
the port of Arica to control a possible British attack there. In addition, Croix
retained some troops in rebellious areas such as Tarma, Jauja, and Cuzco, which
had become a frontier upon the creation of the viceroyalty of La Plata. His pri-
orities remainedas stated in his report to the Crownto avoid a surplus of
officers and to achieve a centrally commanded army. Croixs reorganization of
the militia lasted despite his successors attempts to carry out yet another major
reform.43 Forces became more compact and centralized. Notwithstanding the
viceroys opposition to the arrival of intendants as new provincial authorities
and his initial clashes with some of them throughout the 1780s, the intendancy
system ultimately served his project by concentrating and consolidating military
and political power at the local level.44
As happened in Cuba and other areas of the empire, the enlargement of the
army in Peru began in the 1790s with the outbreak of revolutionary wars in
Europe and Haiti and the intensification of imperial competition.45 The major
expansion in Peru and other areas of the empire, as well as in Spain, occurred

later, in the era of Napoleonic Wars when the royal armies of Peru became of the
largest and most successful of the Spanish Empire.
With their new regulations, Bourbon officers aspired to create a force that could
efficiently defend the Spanish world and help the Bourbon Crown exercise its
authority and govern.46 The ambitious scope of these rules impressed some for-
eign observers. In an account of his journey through Spain in 1774 observing
military and political affairs, British officer William Dalrympe alluded to the
new Ordenanzas for duty, discipline, and subordination. Claiming that it was
not up to him to judge whether these rules were the most convenient ones, he
added:but this much is certain, that there is a system established, with which
every one is obliged to conform.47
The regulations revolved around the ideas of merit, honor, loyalty, and
professional equality. These terms were thoroughly explained in the regula-
tions, which could also be read as manuals for moving up the military ladder
to achieve a new social and political status. Each concept will be analyzed
inturn.
According to the Ordenanzas of 1768 the army was to be a meritocratic
system.48 Compared to the regulations of 1728, the explanations of what con-
stituted merit were far more detailed and extensive in the new text. Merit was
a complicated concept, because the regulationsat least in theorycreated
a new order that radically differed from traditional forms of social organiza-
tion. According to the Ordenanzas, talent, training, and subordination would
determine the status of a military man. Thus promotions at all levels were
to be based first on merit and then seniority. Professional accomplishment
would depend on successful examinations and reports on capacities and tal-
ents. Officers would thus rise in rank according to performances.49 In times of
war, officers, sergeants, and soldiers alike were to be rewarded in relation to
their courage and outstanding actions. To avoid misinterpretation, those out-
standing or distinguished actions were carefully specified.50 The Reglamento
of Cuba provided almost identical definitions for mrito distinguido (distin-
guished merit) for the militia.51 To professionalize the promotion process,
officers of these units were required to keep records of their soldiers actions.
Although high authorities in America such as viceroys could propose addi-
tional rules for promotion and could corrupt the system by appointing
their friends and relatives, they were forced to operate under new rules and
constraints.52
One of the most innovative aspects of the Ordenanzas and the Reglamento of
Cuba was their transparency. The rules for promotion were not kept secret and
known only by a few courtiers, as they had been in the past.53 Instead, they were
published and distributed throughout the empire. It is therefore not uncommon to

find reprints of the Reglamento of Cuba advertised for three pesos in the Gaceta de
Lima in 1794,54 since according to the new laws, cadets had to study the Ordenanzas
as a key part of their training.55 Likewise, the Reglamento underlined that militia offi-
cers, and veterans in particular, were to give their units a fair sense of the actions
considered distinguished and the importance of honor in military life.56
Disseminating the military regulations could also empower soldiers. Since the
duties and rights of all commissions were clearly outlined, soldiers and officers
could follow the rules for promotions and question any who disobeyed them.
Further, the regulations offered them manuals for moving up the military lad-
der. Theoretically, by adhering to these detailed rules of conduct, soldiers could
achieve the highest postsa novel system for the Hispanicworld.
Along with merit, the Crown actively promoted pride in the army as an hon-
orable profession. According to the Reglamento of Cuba, it was the officers duty
to inculcate in the soldiers their love for royal service and a fanatic aspiration
for military glory.57 Lack of honor among military men was a source of concern
because, as the Ordenanzas explained, an officer whose honor and spirit did not
stimulate him to good actions was worth little in the kings eyes. Ones record
of good conduct to good actions could thus be damaged by being late even by a
few minutes, making use of imaginary excuses to avoid duties, offering only sat-
isfactory work without showing strong will, and speaking frequently about the
military profession.58 It was up to the colonels to instill in their cadets the honor
of their profession.59 Besides, the Reglamento of Cuba stipulated that the value of
troops depended much more on their quality, good discipline, subordination,
and honor than on gross numbers.60 Since military men were to be the kings
best subjects, it was necessary to elevate their political and social status.
Starting with its title, the Ordenanzas underscored the role of subordination.
Numerous rules described the specific duties of each military commission to
establish a clear chain of command. Learning to obey was a condition for enroll-
ment, while insubordination was severely punished; only knowledge, rather
than blind submission, could make this system work.61
Elevating soldiers to an honorable position offered numerous concrete privi-
leges or liberties, the fuero militar and the exemption of the tribute or forced
contribution being the most important ones.62 These benefits were crucial for
people of color, who carried the mark of inferiority and were subjected to numer-
ous abuses. For example, the Reglamento of Cuba prohibited the punishment of
soldiers by caning and imprisonment for not complying with their obligations or
for simple disrespect. All officers of pardo and moreno (free black) units were to
be treated with estimacin (esteem). No one was permitted to offend them in
word or action, and those of their own class were respected among those of their
respective class.63 The chief of each unit would reprimand aggressors according
to the circumstances and magnitude of their faults, but always with kindness.64

Public punishments and executions were horrifying but common. Alleged

criminals of humble origins were often jailed arbitrarily and subjected to pub-
lic humiliation. An ordinary sentence was to be whipped in the public and cus-
tomary streets while a pregonero (town crier) proclaimed the offenders faults
and penalties. The goal was to expose them to vergenza pblica (public shame).
The executions of such sentences were city spectacles that brought forth large
audiences. This was the case for Miguel Geronimo de Arana, a sambo (mulatto)
declared guilty of murdering a black slave in a bakery of Lima. In 1792 he was
ordered to leave prison with a rope around his neck and taken by mule to the main
square to be hanged. He was to remain there until the royal courtroom decided
to remove his body after the vultures had picked him apart.65 In contrast to that
fate, the military would have its own fuero or courts and rules of justice. Common
people in the army could be sanctioned with death sentences, imprisonment, loss
of employment, or transfers to another military unit, but no public whippings or
binding with ropes were permitted. Aman serving in the kings army or militia
deserved respect.
The most complicated concept among this new set of rules was that of profes-
sional equality, a term that cannot be understood in twenty-first-century terms.
Attempts to implement proto-professional ideals in the military took hold and
challenged the foundations of monarchical rule. While subordination and loy-
alty were crucial in the new order, equal treatment of all individuals in a regiment
was imperative to building a strong esprit de corps. As stated in the Ordenanzas,
it was the officers responsibility to persuade all soldiers of their equal and fair
treatment.66 Yet these ideas presented the Crown with the challenge of creating
an institution whose members were presumed professionally equal against a tra-
ditional society organized around differences of birth and race.
The Ordenanzas and Reglamento of Cuba solved this major problem in the same
way Spanish rulers solved most of their problems: with ambiguity. While stat-
ing that merit and talent were to be the key conditions for authority and success,
the texts dedicated numerous articles to establishing differences and reconciling
military with traditional social hierarchies. To avoid undermining the authority
to which nobility was entitled in a monarchical order, the Ordenanzas of 1768
outlined special rules for the treatment of nobles in the army who did not neces-
sarily hold the highest ranks. The new Bourbon military was to have clear hier-
archies parallel to traditional social hierarchies. To prevent conflicts, particular
rules were established for public and special occasions when the two orders met,
such as festive ceremonies.67 The hierarchical order for the procession of authori-
ties in public ceremonies was spelled out as follows: Holy Sacrament (Santsimo
Sacramento), royal bodies, captain generals, generals of army in campaign, captains
general of a province, lieutenant generals, field marshals, brigadiers, colonels, lieu-
tenant colonels, and sargento-mayor. The grandees of Spain and the ambassadors

not serving in the army would receive the same treatment as the sergeant-majors,
while women demanded the same ceremony corresponding to their husbands
ranks. The Ordenanzas also established regulations on how to address the different
military and social ranks. For example, the grandees of Spain who were not part
of the army or did not hold a high military rank would be addressed according to
their noble titles, either as Excelencia or Seora. Soldiers distinguished by birth
could use a sword and be addressed as Don.68 The purpose, the text stated, was
not only to avoid abuses of military men (who sometimes forgot that their profes-
sion sought honor and personal glory) but also not to discredit other authorities.69
In response to the requests of the viceroy of Peru, the Crown also issued a royal
decree in 1787 to determine the protocol to follow in judicial proceedings.70
Perhaps a more important threat to social hierarchies in Spanish America
could come from the incorporation of castas and Indians into the militia, but
royal authorities correctly saw their assimilation in Peru as crucial. Their inclu-
sion made the enlargement and success of the royal army possible, but it also
made it difficult to preserve rigid social and ethnic differences. According to the
Reglamento of Cuba each casta was assigned its own militia unit with a plana mayor
(command group) of white men who would manage and train them. Despite these
distinctions, all unitsfree blacks, morenos, pardos, and whiteswere placed
Figure 3.1 Estado que manifiesta las fuerzas de la tropa, armas, de Potos (Military
state of the armed forces, troops from Potos. Espaa. Ministerio de Educacin,
Cultura y Deporte. Archivo General de Indias. AGI, MP Uniformes 001.

under the same main rules. The text took great pains to resolve these impossible
contradictions. For example, it stated that the authority and duties of all units
were to be the same.71 According to the Reglamento of Cuba the plana mayor in the
casta militia was reserved for whites, but all pardo and mulatto officers deserved
to be treated with distinction and respect.72 They would receive salaries and enjoy
special fueros twenty years after their retirement, though those salaries would be
less than whites.73 There would be no cadets in the units of pardos and morenos,
as those commissions were reserved for the nobility.74 Their career path would
go from corporal to sergeant and then to sub-lieutenant, but this could change if
someone performed outstanding service deserving of special reward.75
Nothing better illustrated the rise of this new ethnically diverse but still
homogenous military than uniforms. As stated in the Reglamento of Cuba,
all members of the militiawhites and castaswould wear the same white
uniforms to create a strong esprit de corps with slight variations in the uni-
forms cuffs and buttons and use different flags for their units. To add distinc-
tion, members of the Batalln de Morenos Libres of Havana would wear a red
jacket. Yet when war came, there was not much time to keep flags and buttons
straight.
Figure3.2 Batalln de Ynfantera de milicias blancas de Guayaquil. (White infantry

militia batallion from Guayaquil). Watercolor. Espaa. Ministerio de Educacin, Cultura
y Deporte. Archivo General de Indias. AGI, MP Uniformes049.

Figure3.3 Batalln de Ynfantera de milicias pardas de Guayaquil (Mulatto infantry

militia battalion from Guayaquil). Watercolor. Espaa. Ministerio de Educacin, Cultura
y Deporte. Archivo General de Indias. AGI, MP Uniformes048.
Reality always exceeded the complexities imagined in royal orders, partic-

ularly in the viceroyalty of Peru, where Incan descendants were granted the
rank of nobility after the conquest. Despite their second-rate status in rela-
tion to Spanish nobility, Indian nobles held positions of authority as caciques,
letrados, and priests of small parishes.76 Until the Great Rebellion of 1780,
they occupied a central space in royal festivities, especially in Cuzco, where
they processed with their emblems, tunics, and flags, displaying both their
allegiance to the Spanish monarch and their own power. In addition, from the
sixteenth century, mestizos and Indiansnobles and plebeianshad been
effectively using Spanish doctrines and legislation in their quest for rights
and status.77
Thus, when Bourbon reformers tried to curtail the participation of Indians
in the church and administration and forbid their use of Inca symbols of power
after the rebellion, many Indian nobles turned their eyes to the military. This
career offered Indians and castas new possibilities to advance their social and
political positions, as well as key exemptions to the newly imposed Bourbon
tributes.78 Despite the concerns of some authorities, Indians in Peru, unlike in
Mexico, were incorporated into the royal militia. Some Indians managed to hold

high posts in the Regimiento de Infantera de Indios Naturales de Lima, composed

of nine units supported with royal and private funds (initially there were not
enough whites to fill all high ranks).79 When authorities decided to implement
the Reglamento of Cuba, which established that only whites could serve in the
plana mayor of casta units, royal officers in Peru worried about negative reactions.
In 1779 Viceroy Manuel de Guirior communicated to the Crown his opposition
to placing Indian units under the same status as the pardo and free black militia.
Such a decision would inflict harm to the Indian nation, the viceroy argued,
recommending no changes. Their participation was not sufficient, he added,
and it was best to leave them with their own officers but without formal mili-
tary training.80 Likewise, Inspector Jos del Valle proceeded to reorganize and
enlarge the infantry units known as Inmemorial del Rey, composed of both
Spaniards and mestizos limpios (born from a legitimate marriage)81 Nonetheless,
concerns about the status of Indians and mestizos persisted. After the Tupac
Amaru rebellion, the Crown ordered the disbandment of Indian units. General
Inspector Manuel de Pineda warned that great care should be taken when com-
plying with the dissolution of the Indian officer corps. He noted that a past royal
decree had granted them those special privileges, and thus it would be wiser to
cancel those commissions only as the posts were vacated.82
Efforts to keep Indians and castas separated continued to languish in subsequent
decades, and Bourbon planners were not helped by Perus urban realities. People
increasingly intermingled as cities grew in the eighteenth century. Tellingly, the
concept of plebe that encompassed castas, Indians, and poor whites gained strength
in the administrative and colloquial language of Peru during these years.83 In
1784, however, both new problems and opportunities for Indians emerged when
Viceroy Croix undertook his military reform and revitalized the Regimiento Real
de Lima. The regiments of veteran Peninsular soldiers of Soria and Extremadura as
well as some militia units were merged into the Regimiento Real, and others were
dissolved.84 These measures produced confusion because some castas and Indians
ended up serving in the regular royal army.85 Likewise, some militia units, such as
the infantry and cavalry squadrons of free blacks of Lima, became part of the disci-
plined militia, thus adopting a more professional character.86
Perus compact and ethnically diverse army shocked Croixs successor. In
1790, shortly after his arrival, and worried about global revolutionary activity,
Viceroy Francisco Gil de Taboada wrote to the king to report on the military
state of the kingdom and the notorious role of people of color, gente de color, in
the army of Peru.87 He rejected the formula and the means by which castas could
obtain the same ranks as white people. They were given the same tactics, the
same arms, and the same distinctions as European troops without having the
same merits, he argued. Their uniforms were different but only slightly. Instead,

Gil de Taboada insisted that casta militiamen should always hold a lower rank
and remain under the command of white men. They should never be granted
the ranks of captain or colonel but only those of soldier, corporal, and sergeant.
However, there would be different terms to distinguish them, such as old Roman
militia names. Taboada added that Casta units and regiments should also possess
different flags and uniforms, and more importantly, that casta militiamen should
never carry swords. The council of generals in Spain did not support the vice-
roy and accepted only minimal changes. In their view, reducing the privileges of
castas and Indians would produce only discontent and weaken the capacity for
defense of the viceroyalty.88 The council did, however, oppose having Indians
in the officer corps and urged compliance with the Reglamento of Cuba. This
restriction proved hard to implement in Peru after the Great Rebellion, for
Spanish authorities remained too dependent on Indian elites to attempt their
estrangement.
The capacity of caciques such as Mateo Pumacahua to swiftly form large
militia units consolidated their role as key allies. Aware of their bargaining
capacity, Indian nobles demanded rewards and promotions. According to
the regulations, officials ought to reward meritorious and loyal actions on
the battlefield with promotions, but they were to avoid having Indians com-
manding units. Neither the Reglamento nor the Ordenanzas included special
rules for Indian caciques or mestizos. Contradictory and ambiguous responses
followed.
In 1793, three years into his tenure, Viceroy Gil de Taboada recommended
the promotion of a family of Indian nobles from Azangaro for their merits and
distinguished actions against the rebels. The king accepted the petition and pro-
moted these Indian nobles to the rank of officers. Cacique Carlos Chuquicallata
was awarded the rank and salary of infantry captain (capitan graduado de infan-
teria) with a salary of a hundred and fifty pesos, and his nephews were made
infantry lieutenants (tenientes graduados de infanteria) with salaries of thirty
pesos each. Nonetheless, authorities remained concerned about the role of
Indians in the military. As a result, in 1793 the President of the Royal Council
in Cuzco ordered the regent to implement the royal decree of 1780 abolishing
Indian regiments with utmost caution so that Indians would not suspect this
loss. Authorities were advised to stress that His Majesty had issued this decree
in order to alleviate his Indian subjects from the burden of military pensions.89
Contradictions followed. The following year, Cacique Mateo Pumacahua was
promoted to the rank of infantry colonel, while Manuel Carrasco Yupanquis
request to join the Regimiento Real de Lima as cadet was rejected on the
grounds that this was a corps for Spanish and not Indian nobles.90 Nonetheless,
Francisco Garces Chillitupa managed to obtain the commission of sublieu-
tenant in the officer corps of the Cuzco militia.91 Despite these precedents, a

royal order of 1795 rejected Bartolom de Mesa Tupac Yupanquis request for
a promotion to lieutenant colonel of the Lima militia because he was just a
merchant.92
If ambiguity predominated in the promotion of castas and Indians in the
1780s and 1790s, the outbreak of wars, beginning with the British invasion of
Buenos Aires in 1806, made authorities far more permissive.
A key condition for the growth and success of the royal army in Peru was its
offering the fuero militar or the royal entitlement of military men to be judged
by a separate military tribunal. The fuero conferred upon soldiers protection,
respectability, rights, and above all, liberties.93 Extending its scope in both the
Ordenanzas and Reglamento of Cuba of the 1760s, in the 1790s the fuero mili-
tar was further expanded along with the armies, producing damaging long-term
consequences for the political development of Peru, as well as Spain and other
parts of the empire.94 Although the expansion of military privileges such as the
fuero and the creation of numerous new rules to empower officers and soldiers
did not produce a major upheaval in the viceroyalty of Peru, they did alter ideas
of power and authority.95
The fuero militar was one of the most complex features of Spanish military
organization. The Ordenanzas of 1768 established that all men actively serving
in the military or in a related profession (including their wives and family) could
enjoy the fuero. Moreover, after fifteen years of service, they could enjoy it for life.
It was not clear, however, if military men could use military courts to sue some-
one or only to defend themselves.96 The Ordenanzas tried carefully to specify
the cases in which fueros did not apply: resistance to ordinary justice, blasphemy,
clandestine extraction of gold and currency, use of a dagger or knife, robberies,
amancebamiento (out of wedlock relations) in the royal court, entails and wills,
debts incurred before service, and participation in riots.97 This left much space
for ambiguity and maneuvering.
Likewise, the Reglamento of Cuba granted fueros to all militiamen. After
twenty years of service, militia officers could enjoy this privilege for life.98
To clarify the matter, the Crown issued an amendment to the Reglamento
establishing that in Cuba militia officers, including sergeants, possessed
active and passive fueros, meaning they could sue and be sued in a special
military court.99 Militiamen in other parts of Spanish America theoretically
only possessed passive fuero during active duty for the crimes listed in the
Reglamento.
Despite the Crowns efforts to restrict the fuero in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, so many people seemed to enjoy this privilege that authorities had dif-
ficulty establishing who really possessed it. For example, officials in Las
Palmas, Canarias, complained that the judge the Crown had sent to investigate

corruption allegations against local regidores (aldermen) could not proceed

since all regidores possessed the fuero militar. In response, the king decreed in
1771 that anyone holding political posts could not hold the fuero and be tried
by military courts.100
Tensions between civil and military courts and authorities also emerged in
Peru. In 1793, for example, Sub-inspector General Gabriel de Avils wrote to
Minister Aranda in Madrid to request protection against the scorn with which
some peoplecivil judges in particulartreated the military. According to his
report, the audiencia in Lima had refused to recognize the fuero for non-active
disciplined militia. Aroyal decree had ordered the restoration of this privilege
to all military men who had possessed it in the past, but the audiencia omitted
the militia. Inspector Avils disagreed and argued that Viceroy Amat and the
Reglamento of Cuba had granted the fuero to all military men.101 Likewise, in
1794 the municipal authorities of Arequipa protested that it was almost impos-
sible to find eligible vecinos (official city residents) for the alcaldes office who did
not enjoy the fuero. Arequipeos, as this statement suggests, had found a perfect
means to avoid this costly and unwanted office.102
There were two highly controversial issues in which the scope of fueros was
ambiguous for both Spain and Spanish America: contraband and sedition.
Civilian authorities worried about having a military that operated outside of
a system of checks and balances. Concerning contraband, fueros notoriously
favored corruption since military judges were usually involved in the criminal
activities they were supposed to punish. In 1794 the Council of the State under
Campomanes had tried to restrict fueros in cases involving contraband, but the
old minister could no longer prevail over Manuel Godoy, who decided that only
the navy, not the army, would lose fueros in smuggling cases, since the former was
exposed to the biggest frauds.103 Godoy constantly hindered any accountability
in the army, as his interest in expanding Spanish military power led him to avoid
alienating army officers and soldiers. As a result, the problem persisted. And as
wars multiplied, so did contraband. In 1807 Charles IV finally attempted to have
finance tribunals try military men for contraband trade activities, but it was to
no avail; the accused retained the right to have their superiors form part of the
hearings.104
Sedition was the other worrisome issue. In 1801 news of a supposedly
aborted insurrection in Cartagena, in which black slaves had planned to take a
castle, kill the governor, and steal royal funds, led the Crown to issue a royal
decree on the rights to fuero. According to the text, the commander of Cartagena
had argued that some of the rebellious slaves possessed the fuero militar as they
were property of navy officers. The disputes between the governor and the com-
mander had been so intense during the insurrection that they had completely
obstructed justice. As a result of this incidentthe order statedthe king had

decided to fully eliminate fueros for cases of sedition involving both the army
and the navy.105
Despite royal efforts to establish order, clashes between civil and military
judges continued. In these, however, the military usually prevailed. For example,
in 1794 the mayor of Piura in Northern Peru requested procedural guidance
from the government in Lima with regard to murder cases involving militiamen.
He did not want to defy the new military judges who claimed jurisdiction over
them. Men enrolled in the military felt so empoweredreported an outraged
mayor of Trujillothat even a mestizo had dared to initiate a fistfight against
the alguacil mayor (the municipals judicial chief constable).106 Likewise, in 1799
Viceroy Ambrosio OHiggins informed the Crown that a sergeant of the cavalry
regiment of Cuzco had tried to kill the president of the audiencia when the latter
attempted to sanction him. The viceroys main concern was not the crime but
rather the question of whether the aggressor should be tried in a military court
or not.107
The turn of the century found civil and military authorities in the viceroyalty
of Peru incessantly clashing over the scope of the fuero militar, the hierarchi-
cal protocol to follow in festivities, and the extent of their authority. There were
just too many new and old authorities competing for power. The new military
authoritiesintendants who had replaced the old corregidores, superintendants,
visitadores (royal inspectors), subdelegados (subdelegates), and comandantes
(military commanders)struggled against bishops, members of the cabildos
(municipal council), and oidores (high justices).
These clashes were more noticeable at the provincial level where the power
of the viceroy and the court were weaker and the military struggled to assert its
authority over the audiencia and the church.
During his sermon for Holy Friday in Cuzco in 1786, Friar Josef Espinoza
made his disapproval of this new situation clear. From his pulpit and in the pres-
ence of royal authorities and the veteran regiment of Soria, the priest boldly pro-
tested that the military had no other God than the king.108 The government in
Madrid must have rejoiced at thisnews.
While these clashes continued, lawyers and publicists were also looking
for spaces in which to exercise their authority. This new situation exasperated
new military authorities. For example, the intendant of La Paz, Juan Manuel
Alvarez, wrote several letters to his nephew Manuel Godoy, accusing the oidores
of Charcas of following the Great Turks despotism.109 In a letter from 1792,
with which Godoy received a snake as a present, Alvarez complained about the
impudence of one member of the royal council who told him that oidores were
not appointed to respect orders but to interpret them.110
Apparently, the increasing rivalry between military men, judges, and lawyers
did not particularly disturb royal authorities. Perhaps they should have paid

more attention to them since most reports and satirical pieces pointed to these
clashes as the cause of repeated unrest. By the late eighteenth century, tensions
between the military and legal professions had reached the tribunals, the highest
assemblies, and the streets.
This state of affairs is conveyed in a long satire written in the viceroyalty
of Peru after the Tupac Amaru rebellion. Apparently, the text aimed to refute
a report that the military inspector (who theoretically ought to be a civil-
ian) had written criticizing the withdrawal of troops from Puno to Cuzco
during the upheaval. The text presented a conversation between three main
characters: Don Peregrino, a well-educated and reasonable military man,
Doa Josefa, a heroine of the Tupac Amaru rebellion whose military virtues
had been so remarkable she had received a letter of praise from Frederick the
Great; and Don Froilan, the dean of San Marcos university who had written a
text criticizing the inspector. Don Peregrino initiated the argument by bring-
ing the news of the report, the existence of which he had learned during a
tertulia in a coffee house in Lima. He was furious with the attitude of limeos,
who felt entitled to talk about everything without having adequate knowl-
edge.111 Trying to calm him down, Don Froilan advised him not to worry
about those ignorant letrados who knew nothing. Doa Josefa soon joined
the dean of San Marcos reproaching these men for daring to blame the city
of Cuzco. Criticizing heroic generals such as Frederick the Great and General
Alejandro OReilly had become common those days, she added, even in the
most cultured of nations.112
Admiration for the military profession has a long history in Spain dating back
to the Reconquista and El Cid.113 The many chroniclers of the conquistadors
extolled the great accomplishments of men in arms in expanding Catholicism
and monarchical rule in the New World. Yet, despite the important role that
extraordinary actions could play in determining a persons social standing in
early modern Spain, honor and status were tied to collective values, such as birth
and race. The heroes of the Reconquista were almost all noblemen fighting for
God and the king. His followers, the conquistadors acted accordingly and did
everything they could to erase any stain of illegitimacy or impurity that could
damage their honor.114
The spread of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century put the individual
and his actions at center stage. And the Crowns absolutist and regalist ideology
shifted the praises to professions useful to the state. In this new atmosphere the
military was extolled as a noble and most needed profession.115 For example, in
1750 friar Feijo presented Peter the Great as a true model for producing good
soldiers and useful Generals of Land and Sea. Spain needed men like him, as
well as mathematicians, humanists, and philosophers to overcome barbarism,

the priest proclaimed, because merit, talent, and skill ought to prevail against
superstition and obscurantism.116 In the same way, Secretary of War and Navy
Jos Campillo y Cosso, protested in his Lo que hay de ms y lo que hay de menos
that Spain lacked education and useful people and argued for more profession-
als and soldiers.117 These writers and officers, and their successors in the 1760s,
received the full support of the Crown in their campaigns for reform. The con-
vergence of their ideals and the Crowns interests, as occurred in the military
reform, strengthened this rising new ideology.
While traditional and civilian authorities clashed with the new Bourbon
military and struggled against its new power, othersparticularly the young
were fascinated by it. Stories about the new role that military officers were
obtaining in Europe as leaders of large armies began to circulate in the gazettes
of the 1760s with the news of the Seven Years War. These types of accounts
became more frequent as war intensified and France changed the dynamics
and dimensions of war with its revolutionary armies of patriotic fighters in
the1790s.
The new roles that military officers were achieving in society alarmed many,
including the elites in Lima who produced the Mercurio Peruano in 1791. To dis-
cuss the new attitudes of military officers, the editors decided to describe their
adventures with a young officer. One afternoon, the article reported, they had
gathered in a study to discuss the concept of love as a possible subject for a new
article, when suddenlybreaking the rules of their societya member burst
into the room with the young Alcestes, a military officer of great talents but was
too possessed by the spirit of liberty that sometimes is less hideous in men of
his profession.118 Alcestes scandalized the audience by maliciously claiming
that love was just a matter of greed for women and of voluptuousness for men.
Before the editors could say anything, he accused them of following an outdated
philosophy based on ideal Platonism and left the room reassuring them of the
urgent need to write an article about this subject.
Juan de Goyeneche, one of the wealthiest men in Arequipa, expressed a simi-
lar concern to the Mercurios editors when in April 1795 he received a letter from
his son Jos Manuel, whom he had sent to Spain to be educated. It contained the
news that he had decided to join the military.119 Jos Manuels decision puzzled
his father. He had expected him to become a noble of the robe, which would bet-
ter conform with his status. The recent decision of the court to establish a special
army corps for American nobles in Spain was the fathers sole consolation.120 It
was hard for the old man to understand why the military profession had sud-
denly become so attractive, even for wealthy, powerful Creoles who did not need
to take such many risks to achievepower.
Perhaps nothing encouraged these young men more or represented the new
role of the military better than the rapid rise in the court of Manuel Godoy.

In 1795 this provincial second-rank noble from backward Extremadura was

only twenty-eight years old but had already excelled as an officer in the wars
against revolutionary France. But his next achievement would be something
unprecedented. Charles IV named him grandee of Spain and Prince of Peace.
Nobody, apart from the kings successor, the prince of Asturias, had ever had
the privilege of being called prince.121 Godoys greatest skills in the eyes of
the kings were his military talents and his sharp sense of geopolitical circum-
stances, which were key in these times of international war. He was aware that
Spain faced the risk of being subjugated by French and British imperial expan-
sions and fervently encouraged the militarization of Spain and its empire and
the promotion of the military profession. News of his new status and power
spread everywhere.
The new press contributed much to praising the new military. During the
French revolutionary wars, the Gaceta de Lima and the Mercurio Peruano were
filled with descriptions of battles, military plans, and peace agreements. Among
the news that circulated was the rise of a Corsican general named Napoleon
Bonaparte. In November 1805, the Minerva Peruana in Lima announced
Napoleons victorious entrance into Milan.122
Despite the subversive character of Napoleons coronation in 1804 and the
direct threat that the Napoleonic conquests posed to Spain, the years from
1804 to 1808 saw the proliferation of his infatuated Hispanic followers. One of
the most fervent was Bishop Benito Mara de Mox y Francol, also one of the
most influential disseminator of the Enlightenment in South America.123 Mox
arrived as newly appointed bishop of La Plata in Buenos Aires in 1807 during
the British seizure of this port. After publicly invoking the God of the armies
and the God of revenge, Mox called for the rise of Napoleons among his
parishioners.124 He tried to encourage patriotism and heroism against the British
by using the lessons from the great Napoleon.125 To reach a larger audience,
Mox printed his sermons and exhortations. In his desperate search for heroes,
Mox found General Santiago de Liniers, a Bourbon military officer originally
from France, commanding the Spanish resistance against the British. The glory
of the reconquest of Buenos Aires would make Liniers immortal, Mox pro-
claimed.126 Despite being granted such status by a priest, Liniers was killed in
the revolutionary upheaval of 1810.
Like Mox, thousands of people in these years became passionate about
the military and Napoleon. The idea that one could be devoted to a com-
mon man was new in the Spanish world and soon became very appealing,
as the next case reveals. In 1809 a disillusioned admirer who lived in France
explained to a friend his previous admiration for Bonaparte as a blinding pas-
sion. He confessed to him that he had gone to Paris to see in person the hero
of the century, the great Napoleon who had just been named consul. He

became such an admirer that he had almost memorized all of Napoleons bat-
tles and could not stand to hear any criticism of him. After his return to Spain,
he had swallowed a newly published biography of Napoleon and was known
to show Napoleons portrait to everybody. But when he returned to Paris and
learned about Napoleons abusive methods, his eyes were opened.127 The
admiration for Napoleon among Peninsular and American Spaniards ceased
in 1808, as disillusionment turned into a quest for Spains own extraordinary
men ofarms.

From Men ofLetters

toPoliticalActors
The rise of men of letters as new political actors was an unintended consequence
of the Bourbon reforms. These so-called men of letters thought of themselves
as performers on a public stage, looking for spaces in which to exercise leading
roles. Bourbon authorities seeking to create a meritocracy to rule Spain and its
empire effectively envisioned a subordinated body of clerks actively working on
the consolidation of royal authority. Well-trained lawyers were to take positions
in the administration and produce entirely new legislation to radically trans-
form the Spanish world. Writers, on the other hand, were to design and imple-
ment moral and intellectual reform in universities, newspapers, academies, and
theaters. Together, these loyal, virtuous, and professional men of letters would
lead the struggle against Habsburg corporate privileges. For, in the words of
Campomanes, men of letters in a Republic have the same duty as officers have
toward their troops.1 What the Crown could not forsee, however, was that the
newly empowered men of letters could use their new roles to publicly discuss
policies, question authorities, and imagine new social orders that would bring
them topower.
Unlike in the military, where obtaining a higher position depended on belong-
ing to the kings army, men of letters only formed part of a looser and divided
republic of letters without a clear status in the Spanish world. To achieve a lead-
ing commission these ambitious political actors had to persuade the Crown, as
well as their readers and listeners, of their new power. Building an audience was
essential for them, but this was difficult to achieve in a world that changed more
slowly than their expectations. By the turn of the century, men of letters were
still forced to operate within the scope and constraints of traditional institutions
such as the church and university, which fervently opposed reform. Schools
remained backward and literacy rates low.2 The difficulties in finding new spaces
led men of letters to clash with each other, changing both the nature of their
professions and the nature of politics.
84

From Men o f L etters to Poli ti cal A c tors 85
Politics had previously been an activity restricted to the court, church, and
university. People could riot to express their opinions about certain authorities
and could risk posting leaflets on church doors, but they could not debate in
public over forms of government or moral behaviors, much less over the virtue
or legitimacy of certain authorities. Politics was a secret activity.3
To discuss the transformation of men of letters into political actors in the
years 1780 to 1808, this chapter examines their new roles (or the changes in
their roles) as orators, pamphleteers, newspaper editors, gossipmongers, law-
yers, and revolutionaries.4 These distinctions are made for analysis, but they are
by no means exclusive. Alawyer in this era of dramatic change could speak in
public, write pamphlets, spread rumors, dream, and plan revolutions.
The late eighteenth century witnessed the transformation of panegyrics into

oradores, the Roman type of orators who no longer spoke to flatter or entertain
but to address civic and policy issues. With a simple and clear eloquence, the
new orators aimed to improve their societies by inciting their audiences into
action.
In previous times, letrados could be commissioned to speak in an acto pblico
(public act).5 On such occasions, they were expected to write and give a speech,
a panegrico, an eulogy praising the virtues of a certain authority or celebrating a
specific event. Accordingly, speakers were commonly referred to as panegiristas.6
At semipublic events that took place in smaller circles such as the court, church,
or the university, letrados spoke on behalf of the corporations they represented.
It was not until the 1750s in France when men of letters began to speak as indi-
viduals for a general and abstract public.7 In the Spanish world, this phenom-
enon also began in the late eighteenth century.
Until then, the oratoria sagrada (sacred oratory) and highly ornamented
Baroque aesthetic dominated public speaking.8 Under this influence, panegricos
became strictly regulated poetic forms of expression. The speaker was expected
to follow specific rules of composition to showcase his command of Latin, scho-
lastic philosophy, and the Baroque style. These obscure texts, filled with symbol-
ism and allegory, were intended only for the few and were written to impress
elites and to provide an almost mystical experience. Speaking in front of a public
was essentially an artform.9
With the spread of the Enlightenment and Neoclassicismwhich exalted
clarity, realism, and educationarts and letters were intended to communi-
cate simple and useful ideas in clear forms.10 Spanish Bourbons welcomed this
new aesthetic in their campaigns to reform popular traditions associated with
religious practices and to consolidate royal over religious power.11 Under them,
traditions were reshaped and given new meaning. For example, mathematic and
law certmenes (contests) slowly supplanted the old poetic ones, while university

examinations became semipublic shows of a candidates talents and merits.12 The

elite circles in Lima, always alert to any innovation in the expression of social
status, responded rapidly to these changes and began to circulate printed invita-
tions to these exams.13
The Crown also embraced the new oratorical style. It sponsored the publi-
cation of eloquence on textbooks explaining the rules of composition and the
different declamatory styles, as well as the overwhelming power of eloquence. In
1750 a state-sponsored compendium on the art of speaking and arguing stressed
three goals of eloquence:to delight, to persuade, and to dissuadein a pulpit,
school, or square.14 The author contended that eloquence was so effective that
it succeeded where armaments failed. As he put it, eloquence could reconcile
friends, suspend punishments, humiliate arrogance, conquer women, placate
mutinies, and render monarchs. Without it, nothing could be achieved. In the
end, the author explained, eloquence is to speeches what skill is to armaments.15
The ideas expressed in this state-sponsored manual coincided with those
propagated in the Encyclopdie ou Dictionnaire Raisonn des Sciences, des Arts et
des Mtiers (17511772). Through Voltaire, readers learned about the new polit-
ical role of eloquence in an enlightened world. In an article on this issue pub-
lished in 1755, the French philosophe explained that eloquence was a product of
nature with laws available to anybody willing to discover and explain them. Since
this art was inextricably tied to freedom, he argued, Greece was the only place
where true eloquence had existedbut the Roman republic had also enjoyed
it.16 Thereafter, eloquence only occurred in great assemblies such as the English
parliament. Because France lacked such an institution, the old oratory had found
its refuge in poetry, in funeral orations, and in the pulpit. Les Lumieres would, the
philosophe concluded, mark the return of reason, freedom, and true eloquence.
In the Spanish world, as in England and France, the transformation of pane-
giristas into orators fostered the emergence of political speeches.17 The first
speech of this kind in the viceroyalty of Peru took place in Lima at the University
of San Marcos in August 1781. Professors, authorities, and the elite of the city
congregated to officially welcome the new viceroy, Agustn de Juregui (1780
1784), who had arrived in Peru about a year earlier. This was a key ceremony
where local power recognized imperial power. Tradition prescribed that a dis-
tinguished professor offered the new viceroy a panegyric. This honor, however,
was given to limeo Jos Baqujano y Carrillo (b. 1751d. 1817), the universitys
youngest professor but also its wealthiest and most esteemed.
Jos Baqujano y Carrillo came from a noble family, and a large Basque
commercial network allowed him a monumental fortune. Baqujano had
studied in Lima at the seminary of Santo Toribio, where he became the deans
protg. Along with Bishops Chvez de la Rosa of Arequipa and Martnez de
Compan of Trujillo, the dean of Santo Toribio Agustn de Gorrichtegui

belonged to a group of reformist priests who tried to reform tradition and

propagate useful knowledge following the teachings of Feijo. After gradu-
ating and becoming a lawyer in 1769, Baqujano served as personal secre-
tary of Gorrichtegui, who had just been named bishop of Cuzco. He soon
realized that this was not the ideal way to achieve a prominent career in
the Spanish Empire and traveled instead to the Peninsula.18 At the court in
Madrid, Baqujano began gambling and lost about thirty thousand pesos
in six months.19 Under the pressure from his relatives and protectors, he left
the court and returned to Lima in 1777. Despite such losses, he was able to
bring with him a phenomenal library.20 Once settled in Lima, Baqujanos
goal was to become president of the university and a member, or oidor, of the
Audiencia; however, given his gambling losses and Bourbon administrative
reforms aimed at controlling local power, these positions were out of reach for
him. Instead, in 1778 Baqujano was named protector of Indians, professor of
law in 1780, and interim fiscal criminal (prosecutor in criminal cases) of Limas
audiencia in 1781.21
With the confidence of a young, rich, and avant-garde man of letters, Baqujano
delivered his speech to the new viceroy. Although he followed the old structure
that the genre demanded, the tone, content, and citations of his address were
those of modern political speeches. Baqujano began by praising the new vice-
roys career, but he quickly criticized old traditions and bad authorities. Unlike
the Baroque panegyrics that commonly presented high authorities as heroes,
Baqujano stated that eulogies and public inscriptions written in dependence
and fear would not determine the true qualities of a heroglory and immor-
tality. For this reason, he claimed to no longer be acting as a panegirista, which
he equated to an adulador (flatterer), but as an orador in the Roman sense. His
mission was to serve as the universitys interpreter in the appraisal of the new
viceroys merits.22
Baqujano argued next for the need for a fair and virtuous governor during
these tense times in the viceroyalty of Peru. The Tupac Amaru rebellion, blood-
ily suppressed in Cuzco only three months earlier, continued in Alto Peru.
Thus, the main target of Baqujanos speech became Visitador (royal inspector)
Antonio de Areche, the enforcer of severe fiscal reforms and responsible for
Tupac Amarus pursuit, trial, and brutal sentencing. The visitador listened to the
speech from a gallery in the universitys theater.
After explaining that common people only needed a modicum of virtue to
obey rules, Baqujano declared that a governor needed a great deal of it.23 He
then enumerated the meritorious military accomplishments and leadership of
the new viceroy and his forefathers, while criticizing the horrors of the wars they
fought. Likewise, in praising Jureguis previous achievements as governor of
Chile, Baqujano protested the oppression of Indians, their misery, humiliation,

and lack of possessions.24 He advised the new viceroy to act like a virtuous prince
and surround himself only with virtuous men to avoid being corrupted by the
spirit of intriguers.25 The main concern of a governor, Baqujano emphasized,
was to cultivate the peoples love for their ruler, because they were like a spring
that when pressed more than its elasticity bears, bursts and destroys the reckless
hand oppressing and holdingit.26
As was customary, Baqujanos eulogy was published immediately after
the ceremony and before authorities could prevent it. In the printed edi-
tion, the young professor showcased his erudition with citations from
Seneca, Tacitus, and Las Casas, as well as from forbidden authors and texts
such as the Encyclopdie, Marmontel, Raynal, Montesquieu, and (indirectly)
Macchiavelli.27 In the footnotes Baqujano selected telling examples from
these authors to illustrate his critiques, which infuriated Areche. For example,
in the climax of the eulogy, when Baqujano advised the viceroy to treasure
the loyalty of his American subjects and to beware intriguers, he cited from
Montesquieus Persian Letters the example of King Charles XII of Sweden who
had been estranged from his people by a calumny.28 In another example, taken
from Raynals Histoire Philosophique, the young professor described how in a
remote province of China innocent people had been severely punished for pro-
testing against an unjust mandarin and were thus alienated from the love of
their ruler.29
Baqujanos speech instigated a public political debate. Visitador Areche was
outraged that his authority had been questioned and satirized in his presence
first in an acto pblico (public act) and later in print. He wrote a letter to Minister
Jos de Glvez in which he blamed the new viceroy for allowing royal adminis-
trators to be discredited in public.30 Three weeks later, he wrote to Glvez again
about this incident and included two copies of Baqujanos Elogio. His agitated
prose revealed all that was new and therefore alarming to authorities. Areche
confessed to have been irritated in silence when he listened to the speech in
that theatre to which almost all the city attended.31 Alluding to the most con-
troversial passages, the visitador explained that in no way had he intended to cre-
ate a divide between the monarch and his subjects, as the text implied. Then
his indignation got the best of him. He could not understand, he stressed, how
authorities allowed the preaching against ministers of the king, tax collectors,
and the protectors of the Crowns rights in the theater of the university. He also
wondered how lettered limeos could read forbidden texts.32 It was easy to iden-
tify and repress those individuals who thought in these terms. Only by doing so
would the Crown effectively eliminate the possibility of contagion. Because, if
this is what the lettered subjects think and write God illuminate the King and
Your Excellency in finding ways to silence them, Areche concluded.33 The vis-
itador was quite perceptive in his last remarks. Perhaps only powerful Baqujano

had found the opportunity and courage to speak, but by then there certainly
were others who were eager todoso.
Faced with the new reality of having to defend Areches honor in print, royal
authorities commissioned a refutacion (rebuttal) to counteract Baqujanos cri-
tiques. The task went to Juan Baltasar Masiel, a well-read priest and famous
orator of Rio de la Plata, doctor of civil and canon law, advisor to the viceroy,
and director of the San Carlos school of Buenos Aires. Printed in Buenos Aires
the same year, Masiels 171 pages were intended to rebut every premise of
Baqujanos thirty-one-page speech. Masiel began by claiming that not all noble-
men were necessarily dignos (respectable). The Refutacin revealed Areches
indignation with the whole affair but especially with the comparison Baqujano
made with China. Masiel questioned how a lawyer from the audiencia and pro-
fessor from the university could refer to a law of China, which was the work
of despotism, and abusive authority that did not recognize any principles other
than a Mandarins whims.34
After receiving these accusations, the Crown issued a royal decree in August
1783 demanding the confiscation of the text.35 When authorities in Lima tried
to comply with the order, they could only recover 312 of the 600 copies, which
they sent to Madrid.36 Upon receiving the copies, the ministry demanded an
investigation into the circulation of subversive literature and renewed efforts to
curtail it. Viceregal authorities made sufficient excuses to save themselves. They
reported that there had been a lack of storage in the customs offices, so books
had been shipped directly to the recipients before the appropriate examina-
tion or inspection by the Inquisition. Viceroy Teodoro de Croix ordered cus-
toms to correct this problem immediately.37 Yet as the investigation revealed,
the more difficult issue was the universitys privilege to print the works of its
membersBaqujanos in this casew ithout the censors approval.38 This
old privilege was similar to the one that Parisian barristers held in the early
eighteenth century, which allowed them to engage in intense public aca-
demic debates.39 Viceroy Croix abolished this privilege in 1786 and decreed
that for every commissionincluding those of the universityprinters
would require a government license.40 As for Baqujano, after having his
personal library purged of subversive works, he sent a memorial to Madrid
repenting for his careless citations of forbidden books. He pledged absolute
subordination to the king in the future and kept the promise.41
Lima did not experience another major scandal of this type in the last
decades of the eighteenth century. The university continued to welcome the
new viceroys with panegyrics, which were mostly old-fashioned loas or dia-
logues in which the characters of fame and ambition debated the new gov-
ernors virtues and attributes. Following the new Bourbon ideals, these texts
were written in a more accessible style and emphasized martial virtues and

professional capacities. Some took the opportunity to promote industry and

condemn fraud and contraband.42
By the turn of the century, however, political speecheswhether they were

delivered to an audience, circulated as pamphlets, or distributed as copied
manuscriptswere recognized as playing a new political role in the Spanish
Empire. They circulated widely. The art of writing speeches and speaking for
an audience had been actively promoted in Spanish schools and universities
since the 1760s, making it possible to find eloquence manuals in the personal
collections of family archives.43 This art was furthered by the plan for the cre-
ation and reform of nobility schools in 1790, which ordered the construc-
tion of theaters for students presentations and special spaces for a tertulia.
Children of the elite were expected to study Roman oradores, particularly
Cicero.44 Under these circumstances, some Spanish men of letters went too far.
In 1800, for example, the former director of the military academy in Segovia
published a speech on Macchiavelli he had given at the Academia Florentina.45
The Spanish Inquisition was outraged when its authorities discovered that five
hundred copies of this speech were printed in Valencia, one hundred of which
were sent for sale in a bookstore and 169 of which went to a bookstore owner
in Madrid.46
By then, the idea that a speech could move people to political action was
widespread. This was clearly understood by Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmn
(b. 1748d. 1798), an arequipeo ex-Jesuit living in London, urging the even-
tual liberation of Spanish America, to be distributed during British naval expedi-
tions. His manifesto called for a new political order in which Spanish Americans
would speak freely and exchange products with nations from all over the world
while observing justice, reason, and humanity flourish.47 Along with all other
Jesuits, Viscardo was expelled from the viceroyalty of Peru in 1767 and found
refuge in Italy from where he started to correspond with British authorities.
In 1790 these authorities recruited Viscardo to aid their government in shap-
ing public opinion in Spanish America. Viscardo moved to London and wrote
essays for the Foreign Office about the possibility of independence in Spanish
America. In 1791 he produced the Lettre aux Espagnols-Amricains addressed
to James Bland Burges, the under-secretary of state. Francisco de Miranda, an
experienced military officer, published the letter in its original French version
in London in 1799 and two years later in Spanish translation. The letter had a
strong influence on future republican generations, but too little is known about
its circulation in the viceroyalty of Peru during these years. The letter had little
impact on Miranda, the insurgents of Rio de la Plata, and the British govern-
ment, which is odd considering that one of the first British acts to destabilize the
Spanish Empire was the invasion of Buenos Aires in 1806. Viscardos writings

and reports had explained to British authorities that this was one of South
Americas most vulnerable places.48 And yet, while his letter does not seem to
have directly impacted Peru, and Bourbon authorities managed to better con-
trol public events after 1781, officials could not stop the circulation of written
speeches.
Subversive literature, discursos (speeches), and pamphlets spread far and
wide in the Spanish Empire of the late eighteenth century. For the most part,
people received these texts in manuscript form along with letters from their
relatives and acquaintances in Spain and throughout Europe.49 This is how the
much-feared Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 circulated.
Viceroy Gil de Taboada was alarmed when he received a manuscript copy in
1791.50 Antonio Nario then translated it in 1793 and printed two hundred
copies in Santa Fe, New Granada. He was caught eight months later and put
to trial. Narios lawyer argued to the Royal Council that there was nothing
new in the Declaration, whose ideas were available in Spanish texts such as
El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios, which circulated with royal support.51 In his
defense, Nario also claimed to have been a close friend of the viceroy and to
have authorization to print small texts in his own press without having to pass
censorship.52
Despite the Crowns sentencing of Nario and its renewed efforts to curtail
the spread of clandestine texts, the Declaration of the Rights of Man continued
to circulate. For example, in 1797 the teacher and revolutionary Juan Bautista
Mariano Picornell published Dantons version of 1793, along with his own com-
mentary how to conduct an effective revolution in Spanish America.53
Yet not all pamphleteers pursued revolution. Some, following the teachings
of the Enlightenment, instead proposed societal reform. This was the case for a
man living in the viceroyalty of Peru who in 1796 translated an award winning
speech for the Academy of Dijon in 1750 by a citizen of Geneva, Jean Jacques
Rousseaus Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.54 Following the philosophes exam-
ple of reasoning, the Peruvian translator added his own critique in the footnotes,
which reflected on the need for virtue and on Rousseaus ideas with respect to
his society. The translator added also his own preface, in which he explained
his longtime admiration for this speech. After first reading it as a young boy,
he wrote, he was so excited that he thought Rousseaus eloquence might have
blinded him, but as an adult he believed in the strength of the philosophes rea-
sons.55 In the footnotes, the Peruvian translator condemned lavishness, inequal-
ity, and an overabundance of lettered and military men in the viceroyalty. He
also took a stand against Rousseau by questioning his enthusiasm for the old
Greek martial virtues; armies and universities were corrupt institutions, the
Peruvian stressed. Societies instead needed peasants, shepherds, and weavers,
for they had managed to remain untouched by the corrupt powers of science and

war. Wherever there are tropas regladas (standing armies), there is nothing but
despotism and corruption, the translator stressed.56
It was difficult for vice-regal authorities to curtail the circulation of forbidden
texts since their own actions and decisions were constrained by regulations com-
ing from Madrid. From 1789 to 1792 secretary of state, Count of Floridablanca,
tried to impose strict controls on the spread of information from France, but
these were relaxed in 1792 during the ministry of Francophile Count of Aranda
(1792) and during Godoys first year in power (17921793). At this time, Spain
was not only inundated with French pamphlets and newspapers but also with
French migr priests. The outbreak of the war between Spain and revolutionary
France in 1793 temporarily halted the spread of French propaganda, but it was
renewed after the peace treaty of Basel in 1795.57 French, English, and North
American books commonly circulated among intellectual circles in Spain and
Spanish America.58
Men of letters in the eighteenth century also fulfilled new roles as newspa-
per editors and writers of pamphlets. Previouly, the ideal career for such men
was a position in the administration as a letrado or as a university professor,
which required years of study and waiting for advancement.59 Talented men
who could not afford to wait ventured forth as poets, autores (authors), and
escritores (writers).60 The arts and letters awakening during the Counter-
Reformation and Golden Age created a large demand for them, particularly
in courts and big cities such as Lima and Mexico.61 Finding employment as
a writer was easier in these big cities, where men of letters could be hired to
write plays and poems to entertain the court, and memorials describing the
splendor of feasts and royal spectacles, or to give eulogies. These commissions
offered them opportunities to find long-term patronage, since independent
careers were undesirable. Even the most successful and prolific playwright of
the Spanish world, Flix Lope de Vega, disdained such a condition and dis-
liked the idea of adjusting his plays to a volatile markets taste. In Lopes view,
dependence on the vulgos (pejorative term for people) approval was a stress-
ful, degraded, and unpleasant condition for a writer. His goal, like those of his
contemporaries, was to serve a good patron.62 Eighteenth-century newspapers
and pamphlets would begin to allow the lettered to make livings out the vulgos
demands.
While the early gazettes of the 1740s and 1760s dealt mostly with commer-
cial and official matters, Peninsular newspapers of the late 1780s, such as El
Censor (17811786), El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios (17811791), and the
Diario de Madrid (17881813), began to debate political, social, economic,
and cultural issues. They were published in Madrid and circulated widely in the
Spanish Empire.63

Three newspapers of this kind appeared in Lima in the early 1790s:El Diario
de Lima (17901793), the Mercurio Peruano (17911794), and the Semanario
Crtico (1791). Each issue was priced at two reales, the same price as the cheap-
est ticket to Limas beloved theater, which put a newspaper in reach of an artisan
or a clerk.64 Asubscription, which was the editors desired form of sales and dis-
tribution of their publications was, however, out of reach for many. The Diario
de Lima was advertised at fifteen reales a month for limeos, with an extra charge
for suscribers in the provinces. Asimilar suscription for El Semanario, published
only on Sundays, was six reales. The most expensive suscription was that of
El Mercurio, fifteen reales for only two issues perweek.
The editors of these newspapers thought of themselves as leaders of opin-
ion and as authorities who could control an emerging public opinion. In their
efforts to elevate their societal role, men of letters clashed with each other. They
were divided over their projects, ideologies, and vanity but not their geographi-
cal origins. In an enlightened fashion, these new men of letters claimed that prog-
ress needed critique, and they showed their willingness to exercise their critical
faculties. They did not expect, however, to be criticized by their colleagues or,
even worse, by the reading public.
The first modern newspaper to appear in Lima in September 1790 was El
Diario de Lima, edited by Jaime Bausate y Mesa.65 A twenty-six-year-old man
from Extremadura, Bausate had arrived in the viceroyaltys capital only a few
months earlier with a prestigious background of teaching history at the Real
Seminario de Nobles de Madrid and collaborating on the Diario Curioso, Erudito
y Comercial de Madrid.66 From the beginning, Bausate placed himself within a
Spanish reformist tradition. He underscored that just as the Diario de Madrid
enjoyed the protection of Charles III, his Diario was protected by Viceroy Gil
de Taboada. Like all other major newspapers, he stressed, El Diario was going
to moderate knowledge transfer between the savages and the philosophers.
Claiming to follow the authors of El Diario de Madrid, he stated that his aim was
not to form a docto (erudite) but an ilustrado (enlightened) man by awakening
the intellect of the largest part of the nation. As Bausate put it, his newspaper was
intended to incite diligence and pleasure for studying, in all classes of citizens.67
With these words, Bausate paraphrased the Encyclopdies definition of the term
philosophe, whose declared mission was to bring causes to light.68 As a result of
his efforts, Bausate added, limeos would no longer need to send their children
to study in the Spanish Peninsula because he would educate them and help them
demostrate their talents to the world.69
Like the old gazettes, the Diario provided its readers with practical news about
commerce, rents, robberies, administrative vacancies, ship arrivals, and enter-
tainment. To serve his most plebeian readers, Bausate implemented a system
through which limeos could advertise their needs in print by dropping avisos

(notices) in one of the six boxes he had established in the citys squares. In
March 1791, for example, a man from Aragon, Spain, advertised himself for any
position decente (honest) to work with his pen or to serve in an hacienda for
whatever salary or retribution was decided upon the evaluation of his conduct.70
To accomplish the goal of spreading Las Luces, Bausates newspaper was writ-
ten in a clear and simple language. In classic enlightened fashion, most of his
articles discussed the new role of education, the reform of traditions, the educa-
tion of women and the plebe, and the role of newspapers in society. To convey
his message in a direct manner, Bausate used dialogues between common lime-
os, which were probably fictional but were presented as real. In the first issues,
El Diario included letters from readers, the majority of which were likely writ-
ten by Bausate himself and convey his expectations and vanity. Many of these
letters described the success of the newspaper in the citys tertulias and the
excitement people felt when reading it. For example, Bausate published a letter
from a tambero (provincial inn owner) from the outskirts of Lima. Like his mae-
stro Bausate, the tambero implied to be acting as a maestro at the local level. He
wrote to describe his excitement when receiving the newspapers that the blacks
from Lima used to bring for him, for which he rewarded them with abundant
guarapo (sugar-cane liquor). On one occasion, after serving his messenger with
spicy shrimp, liquor, and everything that was in his inn, the tambero was mock-
ingly asked by one of caporals (chief, herdsman) from a nearby hacienda if those
papers were a nobility title sent by the king. The tambero gravely responded that
these were the Diarios, brought to light by Don Jaime Bausate y Mesa with royal
support. Once the caporal had calmed down, the tambero gave him a detailed
explanation of what a newspaper was.71
Contrary to Bausates expectations and the tamberos excitement, not
everybody was enthusiastic about El Diarios commitment to spreading Las
Luces to the tambos. Bausate addressed these critiques with more dialogues.
In March 1791 a series of articles reported a discussion that had supposedly
taken place between a seamstress, a priest, and a teacher who were questioning
El Diarios mission. The teacher initiated the argument by criticizing Bausates
claim that his newspaper was going to repair three hundred years of abandon-
ment and oblivion. While the seamstress and the priest defended the paper,
the teacherrepresenting traditional educationrejected this claim and
mocked those who contended that father Feijos 117 discursos (essays) would
be sufficient to keep the vulgo awake in the future.72 In the end, the more plebe-
ian characters defeated the teachers arguments. The seamstress even claimed
to be willing to cut her thousand braidsif she had themto defend her
newspaper.73
Bausate made great efforts to promote his paper by reducing the price of the
monthly suscription and initiating a struggle against his main competitor and

strongest critic, the Mercurio Peruano.74 Of the three newspapers published in

the 1790s, the Mercurio was the closest to official circles. Although it has been
generally regarded as the voice of eighteenth-century Peruvian Creoles, its main
sponsor was actually Viceroy Gil de Taboada, and non-Peruvians were among
its main contributors:Peninsular Fray Diego Cisneros, Chilean Mariano Egaa,
and Milanese Jos Rossi y Rub.75 The Mercurios leader in its first and finest era
was Rossi, a mineralogist, royal clerk, writer, and musician who arrived in Lima
with the maritime expedition of Alejandro de Malaspina.76
The Mercurios introductory issue brought its funding story. Apparently, a
group of friends had decided to publish the newspaper after reading Bausates
Diario and realizing that Lima needed another publication that dealt with both
literary and general ideas. Their proclaimed mission was to spread useful knowl-
edge about the kingdom and to fulfill the patriotic duty of elevating the vice-
royaltys status in the world.77 The introduction included the list of subscribers,
headed by Viceroy Gil de Taboada and the viceroyaltys principal authorities.
In the first issue, Rossi y Rub published his Idea General del Per, in which
he declared that the Mercurios main goal was to make Perus history, as well as
its commerce, wealth, music, literature, and traditions, known to the world. The
publication would also serve to question and refute the calumnies of some for-
eigners. To accomplish this, the mercuristas would place themselves at the same
level of European philosophers and debate with them.78 In so doing they would
elevate the viceroyaltys status in the world and promote themselves as Perus
leading men of letters. Through their hard work, the Mercurio could perhaps
become the foremost newspaper of the Republic of Letters.79
While Calero did not consider it necessary to explain in his introduction who
the Mercurios authors were, the seventh issue revealed the Sociedad Acadmica
de Amantes del Pais as the group behind the Mercurio, though the writers iden-
tities continued to be hidden behind pseudonyms.80 As their somewhat embel-
lished and convoluted story goes, in 1787 Hesperiofilo (Rossi y Rub) had
founded with his few friends a congress of philosophers and a Philarmonic
Society to discuss literary and noticias pblicas (public news). Unfortunately,
time and illness had separated them; but when Bausates Diario emerged, they
decided to reunite and publish their own newspaper. This was only possible,
they explained, with the help of two new members, Archidamo (Fray Diego
Cisneros) and Cefalio (Baqujano, who by then had completely repented and
whose sister had married a viceroys nephew).81
In January 1792, in response to the viceroys encouragement, the mercuris-
tas transformed their association into a patriotic society named the Sociedad
de Amantes del Pas.82 They issued strict rules and constituciones and, to become
members, men of letters had to prove their merits with dissertations, be elected
by a plurality of votes, and then be confirmed by the viceroy, the societys

principal founder.83 Once ratified, the new member would choose a pseud-
onym. This process appeared exclusionary and pretentious tosome.
Initially, Bausate enthusiastically welcomed the Mercurio, but clashes between
the two papers occurred quickly.84 After the Mercurios fifth issue, Bausates
Diario began to mercilessly mock its adversary. Claiming that his readers had
also asked him to describe the origins of his project, Bausate began to joke about
how he had also founded a society Filoplica, where he and the other mem-
bers (Aristarco, Misodolo, Filomito, etc.) had joined together to instruct each
other and forget the tensions of the day.85 Soon afterwards, the Diario published
a letter by a limeo criticizing the Mercurio for being a declamatory paper
filled with inventions and exaggerations. They had promised natural history, the
reader claimed, but had brought only fables, for they did not know how to exer-
cise critique.86 Bausate continued to attack the Mercurio with scorn and made
fun of the filsofos de moda. The next month, another letter satirically reported
the formation of La sociedad de los feos (society of the ugly) by some Lima
residents. By then, the writer claimed, many new societies had come to being in
the city, such as la sociedad de los discursos en terminos elegantes (the society of
speeches given in elegant terms), la sociedad de los bellos ingenios (the society
of beautiful intellects) and la sociedad de los hombres hermosos (the society of
beautiful men). The sociedad de los feos (the society of the ugly) was special, for
it only accepted people with horrible physical features, and women.87
While waging a battle for recognition in the press, Bausate did not neglect the
official front. In March 1791 he published an account of his merits, addressed
to the king, which he likely sent to Madrid. After introducing himself and his
newspaper, Bausate explained to the monarch that two months after his edito-
rial enterprise began, he produced an hijuelo (offspring) in the Mercurio. Bausate
made sure to underline that he had created the viceroyaltys first newspaper.
While Conquistador Pizarro had offered Spain a large number of vassals, he now
presented himself as giving the Crown many more vassals through his Diario.
The newspaper circulated to both the wise and the savage Indian. Even miser-
able slaves used it to teach themselves how to read, he added.88
The Mercuristas worst enemy was not Bausate but the editor of the
Semanario Crtico, Juan Antonio Olavarrieta. This Basque Franciscan priest
arrived in Lima shortly before 1791 on a ship from the Compaia de Filipinas
where he served as chaplain.89 Like Bausate, Olavarrieta presented his news-
paper, whose title was Semanario crtico, reflexiones crticas sobre la educacin,
costumbres pblicas, poesa teatral, y otras materias, as an instrument to educate
and reform all classes of people. Yet in contrast to El Diario, Olavarrieta was
less interested in spreading news than in forming a new and enlightened public
through a newspaper written in a brief and clear style. As he explained in the
first issue, a newspaper could travel with ease from the press to the hands of

a Madama to a businessman and then to a craftsman. Its low cost and limited
format, as well as the ease with which it communicated various matters, earned
widespread attention, even from those whose professions did not allow them
to read books and volumes. Anewspaper, Olavarrieta stressed, could be easily
read in a sarao (soire), tertulia, a shop, a caf, during a walk or while standing
at a portal. All could find in it a rational pasture in proportion to their talents,
means, and occupations. Without expending any effort, the Franciscan priest
concluded, his readers would be enlightened.90 The Semanarios articles were
indeed brief and clear, and the whole newspaper consisted of a single leaflet,
which Olavarrieta wrote in its entirety.91
The Semanarios attempts at reform centered on two main targets:education
and tradition. As an admirer of the philosophes, the Franciscan priest began by
discussing the role of wet nurses and the upbringing of children. In these pas-
sages he almost literally copied Rousseaus Emile, but without citing him, in order
to avoid censorship.92 At the same time, Olavarrieta campaigned for the reform
of the theater, which he considered the ideal space in which to transform and
civilize a society. He explained the basic rules of dramatic performance, which
the public had to know so that they could properly criticize performances.93 In
doing so, some enlightened thinkers believed, they would train their minds to
the use of reason because anybody with the appropriate knowledge would be
able to think critically.94
The rest of the Semanario was almost entirely dedicated to satirizing the
Mercurio and responding to its critiques. The mercuristas questioned Olavarrietas
statements about the need to encourage widespread critique of tradition. In
typical conservative fashion, they emphasized that Olavarrieta belonged to
another hemisphere where critical writings were seen as necessary and that this
European preaching was not suitable for every pais (country).95 This statement
unleashed a long and fascinating debate.
Olavarrieta agreed with Bausate in considering the mercuristas pedants and
exclusionists, and his main clash with the Mercurio was precisely about the inclu-
sion of the plebe. In May 1791 the Mercurio published an article by Rossi y Rub
about the rise of new spaces for buen gusto (fine taste). There Rossi expressed
his concern about the fact that a sensible part of society seemed to enjoy the
same popular repertoire as the infamous plebe.96 Olavarrieta addressed this in
the third issue of El Semanario, claiming that the Mercurios social distinctions
were absurd since the real division in society was that between a sensible and an
insensible vulgo. Asensible man, he explained, had the capacity to understand
everything, while those lacking such aptitude merged instead with the infa-
mous plebe.97 In other words, divisions were about reason, not status or wealth.
All that people required, he argued, were some tools with which to exercise cri-
tique, which he was eager to provide.

The mercuristas were outraged and accused Olavarrieta of being a foreigner

who tried to revive a dormant factionalism between Americans and Europeans.98
Olavarrieta immediately denied this charge by proclaiming himself a defender of
Lima (especially of the women and blacks) against charlatans.99 These clashes
got more vicious over time. The mercuristas had other reasons to be upset, one of
which was that the Semanario Crtico was a more successful enterprise. To cope
with its financial losses, the mercuristas received subsidies from the viceroy.100
The mercuristas most prominent source of distress, however, was the realization
that they, who represented Limas elite and authorities, were being criticized in
print by people from lower social ranks, such as Olavarrieta. Year after year, the
mercuristas complained about the hard life of men of letters who pursued high
goals but constantly faced criticism.
By the end of 1791, and after the fifteenth issue, the Semanario Crtico ceased
to exist. In addition to the pressures from the Mercurio, the government in
Madrid under the direction of conservative Floridablanca issued a ban on all
private newspapers other than the official Diarios and Mercurios.101 Olavarrieta
left for Mexico and then for Cadiz, where he began publishing the Diario gadi-
tano, literario, comercial, poltico y econmico, wrote a few subversive texts, and
was soon imprisoned by the Inquisition. He managed to escape and reemerge in
the 1820s as one of the leading voices of Cadizs second liberal era.102
The Diario de Lima continued until 1793, while the Mercurio struggled along
until 1795 despite its writers complaints about readers disinterest and the low
number of subscriptions.103 By the end of 1793 the Mercurios leading authors
Rossi and Baqujanoleft for Spain, and the viceroy was no longer willing to
subsidize the newspaper. Fray Diego Cisneros took it upon himself to continue
with another volume.104 In August 1794 the mercuristas published their own
obituary. At the beginning, they wrote, there had been nothing but praise for
the Mercurio, but then everything had turned into critique. The newly fashion-
able concepts of patriotic love, public enlightenment, and the promotion of
literature were now spoken of by everyone, even women and old mulattoes, they
wrote. All wanted to talk, but nobody wanted to buy a suscription, mercuristas
complained. Hence, they had been left with no choice but to adjust their noble
cause to the taste of the masses and betray their ideals. The litany continued:My
unhappy Mercurio! You, who were born for the glory and embellishment of
Peru. How, tell me, did you turn more vulgar than the God, more frivolous
and charlatan that the Semanario Crtico? There was nothing else they do to
could save the sick Mercurio, they concluded.105
The mercuristas were wrong in blaming the publics lack of sophistica-
tion for their failure. Since its inception, but especially in its last years, the
Mercurio struggled to create demand for its topics. The clandestine literature
against Manuel Godoy and the Queen, as well as the speeches of French

revolutionaries seemed to have been far more exciting than the official reports
of wars or the long and tedious articles about free trade and the reform of
institutions. In addition, the fears of an upheaval and the increasing demand
for American revenues to wage Spains wars cut the viceregal subsidies for
culture. Consequently, there were no newspapers in the viceroyalty of Peru
between 1795 and 1805, except for occasional publications of the Gaceta de
Lima. This restriction could not, however, impede the spread of political dis-
cussions and gossip that had become a cherished new activity for common
limeos.
In June 1794 the alcalde del crimen (judge of the audiencia in charge of criminal
affairs) of Lima learned that some residents of the city, possessed by the spirit
of irreligion and licentiousness, had been spreading scandalous information.
Alengthy and throrough investigation to uncover the perpetrators followed.106
Jos Leandro Alvarez, an employee from the Temporalidades tribunal testified
first. On Saturday, he had gone to the shop of a noticioso (highly informed) bar-
ber for a shave. As usual, he had asked about news, which led to a conversation
about France. Suddenly, a well-dressed man raised his voice to tell them all that
after learning about the French Queens death, he had joined Joaquin Alzamora
and gone to a house where they met several Frenchmen who drank liqueur and
toasted in the name of liberty so noisily and joyfully that he thought he would
never leave the place alive. He managed to leave, however, around eleven at
night.107
The elegant man in the barbershop was Josef Andres Xaramillo, a sculptor
and close friend of the painter Josef Bermejo. Xaramillo was immeditately called
to give a statement. He introduced himself as a Spanish (e.g., white) sculptor
born in Lima. He admitted that he attended the dinner. As stated in his declara-
tion, he had gone there with Bermejo, who wanted to get a payment from the
French Fournier, the owner of the fonda (inn) El Caballo Blanco for a painting
he had done for him. Late at night, Xaramillo added, Fournier had invited them
into a small room at the back of his house, where he served drinks and began
to toast to liberty in both French and Spanish. Xaramillo claimed to have left
around 11p.m. in the company of Bermejo and Alzamora but noted that the
Frenchmen had stayed. Before concluding his statement, Xaramillo identified
the Frenchmen and stressed that both he and Bermejo had censured Alzamora
for his conduct.108
Bermejos statement followed. He presented himself as a forty-year-
old cuartern (quarter black) from Lambayeque and oficial pintor (officer
painter). Bermejo confirmed his friends statements and maliciously added that
Alzamora had been particularly happy during the dinner, because as an extrem-
ist Francophile he was always eager for news. Alzamora was so possessed by the

French spirit, Bermejo stated, that he even kept an image of Voltaire under his
pillow.109 The painter took the opportunity to also denounce the inns owner
Fournier, who according to his cook was being an out-of-control impious who
after learning about the French kings death had said that it had taken his coun-
trymen too long. Worse, Bermejo stressed, one day he had heard him say aloud
that he wished he were in France under the present circumstances.110
Taking no chances, authorities in Lima imprisoned Alzamora, Fournier, and
the other Frenchmen implicated in the case:the cook Antonio Peset, a tinsmith
named Clemente Savino with a public store (hojalatero con tienda pblica), and
the bakers Pedro Blanc and Pedro Via. Among the many things these individu-
als had in commonapart from allegedly attending the famous dinnerwere
their vast travels.
By the end of June, royal authorities called on the prisoners to testify.
Alzamora and Fournier, regarded as the main players in the conspiracy, went first.
Alzamoras case was the most complicated but also the most interesting, for it
reveals the intellectual and political worlds of plebeian men of letters. According
to his own declarations, Alzamora was born in Panama, was forty years old, had
married in Cartagena, and was a man con destino de escriviente (writer by trade).
Other testimonies confirm that he was a mulatto.111 Alzamora could speak
Spanish and French fluently and had learned some Latin. As a young boy, he had
traveled to Spain, where he began to work as secretary for Antonio de Ulloa and
his limeo wife. He also served in Louisiana and Cadiz. Alzamora then worked as
mayordomo (accountant, caretaker) for the viceroy of Peru Manuel de Guirior.
He traveled with his courtly entourage to Lima in 1778, along with Monsieur
Blanc, the cook implicated in thecase.
Alzamora was pressured to describe his connection to the other
Frenchmen and his attendance at the dinner. He claimed to know Fournier
well, for he used to eat in his inn, and declared that he was also acquainted
with the other Frenchmen. Yet when questioned about his French read-
ings, Alzamora took great care to mention only those books allowed by the
authorities and to deny any knowledge of Voltaires works. He denied having
attended the dinner.
Fournier came next. He was a Frenchman from Provence who had been
living in Lima for ten years. He had traveled as a cook from France to Spain,
Buenos Aires, Chile, and Lima, where he met Alzamora, who helped him as an
agent in bureaucratic affairs. He declared, however, that he no longer owned
the inn El Caballo Blanco, but a small misteleria (bar), where no such dinner had
taken place.112 The other Frenchmen confirmed knowing Alzamora from having
worked or dined with him, or from having employed him in legal matters, but
they all denied having attended the famous dinner and cheering for the terrible
news from France.

The more authorities inquired, the more complicated the case became. At the
end of the month, Mariano de Egaa, a lawyer, writer for the Mercurio Peruano,
and criminal judge of Limas royal council, was commissioned to investigate
this event and the private and public conversations about the revolutions in
France.113 Egaas voluminous report reveals how easily news could circulate in
Lima and how pervasive political discussions were throughout the city. Fearing
that something similar to the terror in France would happen in the Peninsula
or in America, Bourbon authorities attempted to exercise more strict control
on publishing and the circulation of information in the 1790s. They deported
suspicious Frenchmen and confiscated French literature. They also organized
anti-propaganda campaigns, donations, and processions, which ultimately con-
tributed to spreading even more news about the revolution.114
Meanwhile, in prison, the accused were repeatedly called upon to give state-
ments and confess. As was customary, their possessions were confiscated before
anything was proven, which complicated Alzamoras case. Although he hardly
owned any furniture in his small room on the Desamparados street, authorities
found many forbidden books and documents: a manuscript copy of Mirabeaus
speech to the National Assembly, a booklet with the ten patriotic command-
ments, and a small picture of Voltaire.115
After those findings, investigators were eager to know where this material
had come from. In his defense, Alzamora declared that since he worked as
copyist, the baker Pedro Blanc had given him Mirabeaus speech to copy and
that the arms maker Pedro Viaa had done the same with Petions speech.
He could not remember who had given him Voltaires painting.116 Blanc
confirmed this version but stated that he had received Mirabeaus speech
from the tinsmith Savino, who declared that the barber had given it to him
along with some accounts from the French Assembly. The barber allegedly
then handed the documents over to Alzamora.117 Faced with such confusion,
authorities found it impossible to uncover who had given the speeches or
painting to whom. All of the accused also continued to deny their presence
at the dinner.
Appeals followed, and defense lawyers joined in. The accused were sent to the
royal prison of Valdivia in Chile, where they apparently continued their political
discussions. Records reveal that shortly after their arrival, the prisons warden
reported that Alzamora explained to him why inspectors had failed to find some
of the key letters in his room, the ones a Frenchman had sent him announcing
the imminent arrival of French ships in Lima. Apparently, after reading them he
had quickly translated them and mailed them to Pasco, Potosi, and other places.
According to a parallel inquiry, a few months earlier, the Bishops of Guamanga
and Cuzco had received subversive letters expressing vivas for French liberty
and calling for the death of Spanish tyranny.118 The warden of Valdivia added

that the other prisoners also bragged that they would soon be liberated.119 Soon
afterward, the criminal judge decided that Fournier deserved the death pen-
alty, Alzamora a similar sentence, and the others imprisonment on the Spanish
Peninsula.120
By September the prisoners lawyers had managed to call some witnesses
and prepare coherent defenses. Fourniers lawyer argued that his client, though
a humble wanderer of the world, was a decent man. He had never hosted the
dinner in question or sang for the French kings death. This was all an inven-
tion of his two Genovese cooks and reported only by the painter Bermejo. They
were all men from the bajo pueblo (low people), he stressed, who liked to drink.
Fourniers lawyer then added that accusations like these, based solely on hear-
say, should not be so severely punished in an enlightened century. Their juntas
(gatherings) were occasional (but not seditious) and usually full of drink. He
also questioned the validity of the accusations that the painter and sculptor sang
subversive songs, which seemed unlikely given that the former could not speak
French.121
Alzamoras defense illuminated the possible motives for such a serious accu-
sation. According to his witnesses, Bermejo had become Alzamoras enemy
after finding out that his former mistress had betrayed him with the copyist.
The defense also declared that the witnesses considered Bermejo to be a drogu-
ero, which could mean boticario (pharmacist) but was used by the witnesses to
allude to someone who sold recreation drugs.122 Most of the witnesses described
Bermejo as a drunk and a droguero. According to one testimony, Xaramillo also
engaged in those activities, but in moderation.123
Among Alzamoras witnesses were some members of Limas elite, such as the
accountant of the Royal Tribunal of Finances, Juan Nepomuceno Rodrguez,
the military officer Antonio Bello, and two of the richest noblemen in the vice-
royalty, Manuel de Muatones y Salazar and Lorenzo de la Puente Carrillo de
Albornoz. At some point, they had appointed Alzamora not only as accoun-
tant but also as their childrens French and algebra teacher. De la Puente gave
a strong deposition stating that he had never noticed any sign of libertinism
in Alzamora, but he had heard that the painter Bermejo was a droguero like
Xaramillo.124
In a small city like Lima, located close to a main port, with proliferating cafs,
fondas, and shops, rumors circulated quickly in the 1790s. While a nobleman
such as de la Puente was aware of the painter Bermejos occupations as a drogu-
ero, common people such as Alzamora and his friends were well informed of the
latest news from revolutionary France and could imagine a different world order
in which there was no king and simple and virtuous people such as themselves
could hold highposts.

Those particularly keen to imagine new world orders were the new lawyers, ener-
gized with the courses on derecho natural y de gentes (law of nature and nations)
and the new role the Crown had granted them.125 During the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, the archetype of a Spanish man of letters was the letrado,
who functioned, for the most part, as a lawyer.126 Letrados proliferated in this
early era of state and ecclesiastical expansion. They usually coopted administra-
tive commissions in a town or court, serving as professors, lawyers, regidores in
the municipality, oidores in the royal council, and notaries in the many judicial
procedures that bureaucratic Spain demanded. By the mid-eighteenth century,
with the spread of the Enlightenment and intensification of Bourbon attempts to
reform the legal system, education, and traditions, letrados began to be eclipsed
professionally by proper lawyers.127
Lawyers played a crucial role for the Bourbon Crown. Royal authorities
were aware that to fully realize their ambitious program of reforms, they
needed to reorganize the old and vast Habsburg legislation and write new
laws, regulations, and codes. This Herculean task demanded a larger num-
ber of professionally trained lawyers who would no longer serve the Crown
as mere secretaries and notaries or as interpreters of old Roman or Canonic
law but as creators of a whole new legal world order. To address these needs,
the Crown promoted courses on derecho natural y de gentes that dealt with
the rights and obligations of individuals and countries. With this action, the
Spanish monarchy put itself at the forefront in these matters, for at the time
these courses were only taught in German Protestant countries.128 Charles III
declared them mandatory for students applying for law licenses in Madrid.
The first course on this topic was taught at the Real Seminario de Nobles de
Madrid in 1771. Shortly thereafter, other schools and private academies began
teaching them both in Spain and in Spanish America.129 Imposing new courses
was an extremely difficult task. Charles IIIs lettered advisers aimed to curtail
the churchs influence on education and create law schools to serve royal needs
directly. As Olavide suggested in 1768, instead of wasting resources on the
formation of canon lawyers, universities ought to produce a useful servants
to the Crown.130 The monarchs lettered advisors also wanted to increase the
number of lawyers to counterbalance the growing administrative power of the
military and to handle the numerous legal disputes produced by the expansion
of the military and creation of the intendancy system in Spanish America.131
Campomanes and Floridablanca, in particular, argued for new law courses and
the elevation of the lawyers status.132
Bourbon authorities encouraged Spanish and Spanish American writers to
produce their own essays on the laws of nature and nations.133 Men of letters and
some law professors and Bourbon high officials such as Jovellanos joined the
Crown in this attempt and urged that literature on these topics be made available

to scholars and professors.134 If they wanted to join the universal republic of let-
ters, he claimed, they needed to learn derecho natural y de gentes. His demands
were heeded. In 1776 Joachin Marin, a professor of derecho natural y de gentes of
the Real Seminario, published a piece on this matter. Following Feijos teach-
ings, Marin presented his text as a discurso, where the professor explained the
main goals and principles of this new science. In the introduction, he summa-
rized derecho natural as a group of laws created by God and transmitted to men
through their natural reason. Derecho de gentes then applied those laws to nations
and states and provided the state with key rules to realize its greatest potential.135
For Marin, the key role of these courses was their capacity to change the old way
of doing politics, based on intrigue and chatter, and not, Marin stressed, on inves-
tigating the principles governing nations and states.136 Politicsunderstood as
policy and applied knowledge of the lawwas becoming a central part of the
new legal profession.
In his text, Marin traced the origins of natural law to the writings of Hugo
Grotius, Johan Gottlieb Heineccius, Samuel von Puffendorf, and Thomas
Hobbes, who had created a new science after discovering the principles of natu-
ral law.137 Wolfio (Christian Wolff), Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and the Baron of
Montesquieu later followed these authors. The professor expressed his enthu-
siasm for Montesquieu by underlining that the Lesprit des lois was critically
acclaimed all over Europe. Here he navigated dangerous waters. What was most
exciting about Montesquieu, he stressed, was that unlike traditional politi-
cians, he did not divide the nature and form of states into monarchic, aristo-
cratic, and democratic but rather into republican, monarchic, and despotic. Not
only had the French writer discovered the differences between them but he had
also created a new plan by which each form of government could help achieve
social harmony.138
To fully understand these ideas, it was necessary to read modern writers, he
added. He condemned some authors, singling out Rousseau for his unjust cri-
tiques of authority.139 Yet in so doing, Marin summarized for readers some of the
philosophes central ideas. Marin explained that authors such as Rousseau had
created a new tyrannical kingdom of reason by elevating it as the only judge and
arbiter.140 The French philosophe, however, was not an isolated case. The new sci-
ence of the law had already spread throughout Europe, he stressed. It had started
in Protestant universities, but had already begun to reach Catholic universities
and private academies. It was therefore crucial for the Spanish Crown to pro-
mote the study of derecho natural y de gentes in order to avoid confusions of fatal
consequences.141
Despite royal orders mandating that universities offer these courses, many
existing schools and universities in Spain and Spanish America resisted the
incorporation of what they referred to as Protestant and subversive literature

in their curricula. University authorities worried that the courses directly ques-
tioned the scholastic method, would require the appointment of new professors
outside their control, and included subversive and heretical readings by protes-
tant authors or forbidden authors such as Montesquieu. Authorities were also
concerned about the popularity of these courses among the young. Jos Cadalso
best described this situation in his Eruditos de la violeta (1772), a satire he wrote
during his stay in Salamanca at the height of university reform there. The teach-
ings of the derecho natural y de gentes were in everybodys mouths, Cadalso
claimed, especially in those of public-juris-peritos (satirical for young new pub-
lic lawyers). These new conversations about the ways in which societies could
organize themselves alarmed the defenders of the old regime, for it meant that
everybody could now talk politics. As Cadalso put it, mocking the new state of
affairs:In ancient times, only those responsible for it, such as princes, ambassa-
dors, and generals could talk about this matter. But those were barbarian times,
where noone talked more than he should. What a difference with our times.
Now, there is not a cadet, first-year student or young merchant who does not talk
about Menchaca, Ayala, Grocio, Wolfio, Pufendorf, Vatel, Burlamaqui, etc.142
The fears of traditional authorities were, however, justified; these courses
could ultimately question the ideological foundations of the monarchy. By pro-
moting derecho natural y de gentes at major schools and universities, Bourbon
authorities inadvertendly became the main advocates of these potentially sub-
versive new ideas. For example, a central concept conveyed in these courses was
that of equality.143 As the Spanish textbooks explained, all men were born equal.
The same natural laws, which were an intrinsic part of human nature, affected
their reason and sentiments. In consequence, all men shared the same natural
obligations and rights.
In 1788 Professor Manuel Joaquin de Condado, in charge of derecho natural
y de gentes at the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid, published a detailed lecture
on this topic. He explained that according to natural law, all men possessed the
same nature and should therefore have equal obligations and rights, with no one
enjoying special prerogatives or exemptions. The principle of equality would be
destroyed if one man had more power than others. And since all were equally
free, no one was dependent on another. This intrinsic moral freedom did not
mean, however, that people could act without restrictions, only that men were
subject solely to the natural order and its laws.144
Condado also explained that men should be allowed to follow their own
judgment in determining their actions without being obliged to give explana-
tions. He then clarified the specifics about natural laws, rights, and obligations
with statements such as the following:all men were granted the natural right to
defend themselves against an invader; men had formed civil societies to protect
themselves against invaders and natural laws provided that all men enjoyed the

fruits of their work. At this point, the professor took special care in dismissing
the idea of a social contract. The right to govern the mass of united forces in a
societyhe underlinedwas called autoridad soberana. It expressed the gen-
eral will, understood as the right to determine what is convenient for every-
body and therefore mandatory in a society. Autoridad soberana also possessed
the necessary power to enforce the general will.145 The professor continued to
explain the best forms of government, which were much under discussion by
a turba de escritores (a writers mob), the role of the states institutions, and the
need to promote agriculture, industry, education, and commerce. The second
part of the essay was dedicated to explaining derecho de gentes. It described the
rules governing the relations between nations, as well as the nature of wars.
For his students training, Marin translated and edited Heineccius, carefully
removing the most controversial passages.146 Moreover, Bourbon authorities
fueled a public political discussion on the nature of society and its forms of
governments.147 The opposition against the new courses and texts led to strong
factionalism within the leading universities of Salamanca and Alcal, which
was made public in printed texts, as well as within many other schools of the
empire.148
Thus, faced with the impossibility of reforming old institutions, Bourbon
authorities created new parallel ones. Following, the Count of Floridablancas
advice, Charles III promoted new private academies of law and seminarios con-
ciliares, like the Seminario de San Carlos of Lima, where these courses could be
taught freely. These schools were associated with the university but depended
directly on the bishops, many of whom were royalists. Likewise, the old law
academy of Madrid founded in 1730 became the new royal academy in 1763,
presided over by Floridablanca himself and committed to training the best law-
yers in the monarchy.149 The academy was granted permission to print and circu-
late the speeches of its members.150
An additional plan to escape university control was the creation in 1770 of
the abogados de audiencia (lawyers of the royal council), whose professional
titles were not granted by the university but by the local audiencia. This mea-
sure strengthened the role of seminaries and academies, which could send their
students to the audiencias to obtain their professional titles.151 The Bourbons
short-term solution of supporting alternative law schools led to the sudden mul-
tiplication of the number of lawyers, assistants, and picapleitos (pettifoggers)
in Spain and the empire.152 In 1793, Lima had a total of 49 lawyers, 38 scribes,
12 procuradores (solicitors), and 12 receptores (judicial officials in charge of col-
lecting fines), all of whom were listed with their names and addresses in the
new official Bourbon administrative guides.153 In 1797 Cadiz had a total of 79
lawyers, 83 in 1800, and 74 in 1801.154 Likewise, there were 298 lawyers and 8
different law schools in Madrid in 1803.155 The increasing number of lawyers

produced conflicts not only with the proliferating military but also between law-
yers of different backgrounds.
Following royal orders, the university of San Marcos in Lima prepared its own
plan of reform, which largely followed the plan for Salamanca of 1771, establish-
ing that students graduating in law would study Heineccius along with Roman
and Canon law. In their fifth year they would also learn the history of Spanish law
with a special emphasis on the Leyes de Indias and criminal institutions.156 From
the very start, the new regulations faced strong opposition at the university and
were only partially implemented.157 As a result, Baqujano y Carrillo received
only a temporary appointment for the chair of Vsperas de leyes, which stipulated
that he would teach derecho patrio, another term for derecho de gentes, with spe-
cial care, alerting students to the differences between this law and Roman law.158
Despite the royal order, San Marcos did not fully create a chair for the new law
courses until much later.159
The first full course on this subject was taught in Lima in 1786 at the Convictorio
de San Carlos under the direction of Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza.160 One of
the leading men of letters of the Peruvian republic, Rodrguez de Mendoza was
a priest originally from Chachapoyas and was trained by pro-Jansenist bishops
Gorichtegui and Martnez de Compan. Among his collaborators and stu-
dents were Vicente Morales Durez, Mariano Rivero, Jos Joaqun de Olmedo,
and Ramn Feli, all future deputies at the Cortes in Cadiz.161
An enthusiastical supporter of the Bourbon program for educational reform,
Rodrguez de Mendoza was commissioned by Viceroy Croix to write a plan
for the reform of the Convictorio in 1787. This infuriated university authori-
ties in San Marcos who had not been asked to supervise the project.162 In his
report, Rodrguez de Mendoza strongly advocated the study of the new phi-
losophy and law. As a true royal reformist, he supported his case with citations
from proyectistas and Bourbon officers Macanaz, Campillo, and the Marquis of
Ensenada.163
Following the Real Seminario in Madrid, Rodrguez de Mendoza organized
university contests or certmenes, which usually took place in the university, as a
way to promote the new status of these courses.164 For example, the invitation to
the first philosophy contest of the Convictorio de San Carlos in 1793 stated that
this delightful and important study had been cultivated with such zeal and had
such a positive welcoming, that there was hardly anyone who wanted to devote
himself to the dangerous and difficult service of civil and canonical law without
preparing himself first with this sublime knowledge.165
As in Peninsular Spain, young students and lawyers in Peru started to pas-
sionately advocate for the implementation of courses on the law of nature and
nations. They no longer wanted to spend their time memorizing the laws of
Justinian to become experts in Roman and Canon law. Baqujano y Carrillo best

expressed this sentiment in his application for the chair of Vsperas in 1788. This
time Baqujano did not dare question royal authorities but instead concentrated
on criticizing the churchs intervention in civil affairs to discredit the priest who
was his rival for the chair.166
To comply with royal orders of 1804, a few years later the viceroyalty of Peru
established a Colegio de abogados (school for lawyers) with a relatively inclusive
policy for the admission of illegitimate children (hijos naturales), which also
contributed to the increasing number of lawyers.167 By that time, many cities
in Spanish America were campaigning for the right to have their own universi-
ties in order to produce their own lawyers, as was the case in Arequipa. Led by
Bishop Chvez de la Rosa, the elites argued that their students applications for
administrative positions in other cities were being rejected because they were
foreign.168 After a long negotiation, Chvez de la Rosa obtained permission
to graduate students from his seminary provided he suppress courses on the
derecho natural y de gentes.169
These mixed attempts at reform produced unforeseen consequences for
authorities in the court, as well as alarming ones for local authorities. Royal
officers in Peru reported clashes between new lawyers and students of the law
and the military in the last decades of the late eighteenth century. In Cuzco, for
example, the installation of a new audiencia in 1787 greatly increased the num-
ber of lawyers, scribes, and picapleitos, and clashes ensued.170 The council not
only graduated cuzqueo students of the University of San Antonio Abad or the
school of San Bernardo but also gave titles to most graduates from the region.
Students from Guamanga, Arequipa, Charcas, and northern Argentina traveled
to Cuzco to obtain their titles.171 Competition with the proliferating cuzqueo
military was inevitable. In 1797, soldiers and students from San Antonio Abad
ran into each other at the Casa del Juego de la Pelota (a building to play the game
of ball, a classic Basque game). After trapping the students inside the house, the
soldiers took them to a garrison, removed their gowns, and beat them up. The
soldiers later defended themselves by claiming that the students had seriously
offended them by calling them, among many other things, cholos (pejorative for
mixed). This was unacceptable to men who claimed to be the true represen-
tatives of the king.172 Problems of this nature continued. In 1801, the mestizo
soldado distinguido (mixed and distinguished soldier) Jose Mariano Garzes
Chillitupa complained of having been suddenly recruited by the provincial cav-
alry regiment of Cuzco, although he had asked his officer for permission to finish
his jurisprudence study at the university. His gown was taken off, and he, too,
was beatup.173
Conflicts between the military and the new lawyers increased over time. In
1803 the newly appointed teniente asesor interino (interim lieutenant councilor)
to the royal council of Cuzco, Manuel Ubalde, attempted to incarcerate a few

soldiers for sedition. They managed to avoid the sentence, alleging their right to
the fuero militar, which led Ubalde to imprison only one of the soldiers. Ubalde
then used his pen to defend his honor. He wrote a declamatory speech under-
scoring the importance of his authority. Artillerymen have turned judges into
their targets, without realizing the respect these judges deserve as the priests of
justice, fathers of the patria, sacred people and true representatives of the sover-
eign, Ubalde stressed.174
By the turn of the century, men of letters and lawyers considered themselves
more knowledgable, more virtuous, and thus more suited than others to exer-
cise power.175 They learned about the role of lawyers in building and leading
new states and orders during and after the American and French revolutions.
The newly reformed Spanish world, compared to previous eras, offered these
ambitious individuals more opportunities to fulfill their expectations, but it
was impossible to satisfy them all. The Crown could not fully reform or con-
trol the university or the church and by then feared sedition and revolution
too much to continue opening spaces for public expression and debate. Men of
letters were left with a difficult choice. Some struggled within the system, con-
stantly looking for new commissions and fighting against established authori-
ties; others opted to create a new society in which they would hold a dominant
position.
In 1794 the silversmiths of Madrid alerted Manuel Godoy to an imminent
conspiracy that was to take place during the feast of Saint Blas.176 The leader
was Juan Mariano Picornell, an enlightened man from Palma de Mallorca who
had created a private school in Madrid.177 Picornells close circle of conspira-
tors included a university professor of humanities, a candidate for the chair of
mathematics at the University of Salamanca, a lawyer, and a French teacher,
all of whom belonged to the marginal university groups, which strongly advo-
cated reform. Their idea was to organize a massive coup against Godoy with
the support of the people in Madrid while the French invaded Irn. Once
power was secured, they would impose a constitutional monarchy. Before
anything could happen, their plan was foiled. To avoid more tensions within
the Peninsula, Manuel Godoy sentenced the perpetrators to prison in Spanish
America.178
Despite Godoys efforts to repress men of letters and prevent conspiracies,
the circulation of subversive literature continued, often with him as a target. In
response, he commissioned pamphlets defending his cause and attacking his
enemies.179 Among the rumors spread were those of an affair with the queen,
which pamphlets claimed, had corrupted the monarchy.180 Also between 1794
and 1795 a paper entitled Oracin apologtica dicha en la Plaza de Toros de
Madrid, which circulated among professors and students at the University

of Salamanca, directly attacked Godoy, traditional university circles, supersti-

tion, an obsolete education of the law based on corrupt Roman legislation,
the abuse of taxation, and finally the lack of bread and bullfights (Godoy him-
self had banned bullfighting).181 The text became such an effective political
manifesto that its call for pan y toros (bread and bullfights) became a political
slogan during the Godoys fall and was used as a title in its reprinted version
of 1812.182
The threats of jail, bans, and deportations were not enough to deter
some writers. During his exile in La Guaira, Venezuela, Picornell took his
struggle to a new level. In 1797 he translated and published Dantons ver-
sion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, with text anno-
tations addressed to Americans.183 Although the edition appeared to have
been issued in Madrid, Picornell had printed it apparently in Guadaloupe.184
Speaking as an American Spaniard, Peninsular Picornell announced his plan
to bring about a revolution to the kingdoms of the New World, which were
the major victims of despotism and oppression. Since monarchs would never
change, he claimed, force was the only solution left. More than an argument
for independence, this was a call for a strategic revolution, using reason to
legitimize the use of force. In his view, Spanish America presented an ideal
scenario for a revolution of this kind, since there were no princes or grandees,
and the nobility and church of the Spanish Peninsula would be too scared to
intervene. The American kingdoms already had armies, which could easily
be persuaded to oppose tyranny and oppression in order to redeem their
nations.185 The tyrant would never be able to wage a war against Spanish
America without American revenue, Picornell added. Once this revolution
was achieved, everybody would be free from the kings monstrous appe-
tite. They would propagate las luces, open the ports to other nations and
build many republics. Picornells plan did not end here. The next step would
be the liberation of the Spanish Peninsula by American Spaniards, since
both parts of the empire were victims of the same oppression. Reassuring
his readers, he added: We need to live with the firm conviction that the
Spaniards from Europe will never look at us [Americans] as enemies, and
that if the tyrant would send some troops against us, the majority would
take our party, for while the king keeps many Spaniards corrupted through
their interests, it is evident that there is an infinite number of patriots, true
good men, who are free from this corruption, and who would surely join us
in the destruction of tyranny.186 To succeed they needed to remain united,
radically reform education and traditions, build a new and virtuous citizen,
establish a meritocracy, and promote the publicity of opinions, the stron-
gest pillar of liberty.187

The viceroyalty of Peru, despite its loyal elites and entrenched institutions,
was not immune to conspiracies and attempts at revolution. In 1805, authorities
in Cuzco received alarming information that some individuals had been plan-
ning a call to arms and the foundation of a new empire.188 The leaders of the con-
spiracy were the mineralogist Gabriel de Aguilar, originally from Hunuco, and
the lawyer and teniente asesor (legal assistant) from the audiencia of Cuzco, Jos
Manuel Ubalde, born in Arequipa.189 Eager to achieve in traditional Peruvian
society, they both belonged to the professional middle orders that had been
energized by the Bourbon reforms and the new literature announcing great
changes in theworld.
According to the large legal case filed against the conspiracists, Aguilar pos-
sessed some wealth. This was not the case for Ubalde, who, much like other
men of letters, lived a precarious and almost marginal life. After graduating in
Cuzco, Ubalde had managed to find a well-paid position in Lima, where he lived
in a estado feliz (happy state).190 Around 1800 or 1801, he received a visit to
his office from Aguilar, during which Aguilar asked him for legal aid in a min-
ing lawsuit.191 Ubalde was impressed by Aguilars personality and stories. For
some time, he had no news about this particular man, until one day a letter from
Aguilar arrived, announcing his imprisonment and asking him for help. Ubalde
agreed to serve him. Soon afterward, however, Ubalde received a viceregal let-
ter requesting his relocation to Cuzco, where he would serve as interim lieuten-
ant advisor of the new audiencia. This decision greatly disappointed him, since
Cuzco in 1803 was a depressed city and his salary would be considerably lower,
but he had no choice.192
In his statements, Ubalde reported how isolated and impoverished he felt
in this new position. All he wanted was to become a lawyer of the audiencia
in Lima, to continue reading Raynal, Filangieri, and French writers, and to
eventually obtain the position of minister to the king, as one of his aunts had
dreamed. Alone in Cuzco, he longed to see Aguilar, whom he imagined living
on the European continent or in barbarian territories searching for mineral
riches.193
When Aguilar reappeared, Ubalde decided to become his disciple. He seemed
eager to learn from his stories of amazing journeys, while benefiting in some way
from his mining businesses. Aguilar possessed a vivid imagination and claimed
that his ideas were revealed to him through his childhood dreams.194 Apparently,
he liked to regale people with his stories, the most impressive of which was
his alleged trip to Spain.195 According to Ubalde, on Aguilars journey to the
Peninsula, the people of Rio de la Plata paid him respect and offered him posi-
tive invitations to make himself the Caudillo of a political mutation.196 Once
in Madrid, he submitted to the Queen and Godoy (with whom he allegedly

lodged) reports on the threat of British invasions on America via the Maraon
River. As a reward, he expected to receive the governorship of a frontier region
in Indian territories. Once he realized that this would not happen, and resented
by it and by the corruption he witnessed in the Palace and the Court in gen-
eral, Aguilar decided to travel to Cadiz and submit the reports to the English
consul there.197 Ubalde seemed mesmerized by this affair.
One day, in the midst of a long conversation, Aguilar asked Ubalde if it would
be a sin to participate in the spiritual plot [conjuracin espiritual] of a pueblo
to inagurate a new King or something of the sort.198 Ubalde took some time
to answer while trying to remember his readings on the subject:the political
predictions he has heard of Raynal and knows of Filangieri, the texts of Saint
Ambrosius, several documents published in the newspapers El Semanario
Erudito, and the Juicio Imparcial of Campomanes.199 A few days later, Ubalde
replied that, according to Saint Thomass doctrines, it was licit to oppose a
government when it becomes tyrannical or shows signs of usurpation, but not
if these opposing actions could cause hardship for a community. Apparently,
Ubalde had tried to persuade Aguilar to abandon the idea of crowning himself
emperor of Cuzco by reminding him that he had no relationship to the city and
that they should avoid the spilling of blood.200
Thus, following the advice of his lawyer, Aguilar recognized that he lacked
any legitimacy to rule an empire. Instead, he decided to look for someone else to
do so. Aguilar then said, according to Ubalde, if it was not up to him to be King,
at least he would be the assisting hand that would sit someone in the throne.201
Together, Aguilar and Ubalde chose municipal officer (regidor) Valverde, a
descendant of the last Inca, and tried to marry him to a descendant of another
lineage to strengthen his legitimacy.202
To enlarge their base of supporters, Aguilar and Ubalde started to distribute
key positions of their future empire. They offered Lieutenant Mariano Lechuga
command of the general military and the titles of archbishop and bishop to a
priest who supported them.203 Their strategy was to take the citys patrol, assault
the garrison, take the arms and the money, kill the president and all the mem-
bers of the royal council, and crown Valverde emperor. Their plan was foiled by
Lieutenant Lechuga, who was later rewarded and promoted for his meritorious
action.
Aguilar and Ubalde were hung in the main square of Cuzco six months after
their trial began on December 1805. The others implicated were either arrested or
deported. To protect Cuzco, the president of the audiencia ordered an increased
number of troops stationed there and the installation of veteran forces in the
city. Additionally, he suggested to the authorities in Madrid the possibility of
sending Inca families connected to the rebellion to Madrid and others to Lima
or Buenos Aires. In Spain, these young noblemen could be trained in the military

or literary profession.204 The minister and fiscal of the audiencia in Madrid,

Benito de la Mata Linares, who had previously served as the judge in Peru
against Tupac Amaru in 1781, recommended more reforms in the viceroyalty
to avoid the excess of priests, to dampen the confrontations between Spaniards
and Creoles, and to protect Indians.205 The ultimate decision on these matters
was left to Manuel Godoy. Facing the defeat at Trafalgar in 1805 and the direct
menace of the Napoleonic armies and the British navy, he did not care for more
reforms. All Godoy seemed to want was to secure loyalty through military
Figure4.1 Francisco de Goya, El sueo de la razn produce monstruos (The sleep of

reason produces monsters),17961797. FromLos Caprichos.Gift of George W.Davison
(B. A.Wesleyan, 1892), 1946. Open Access Image from the Davison Art Center,
Wesleyan University. Photo:R.Lancefield.

rewards. Upon receiving the reports, he recommended that the crown grant
the president of the audiencia of Cuzco a military rank and its members their
incorporation into the garrison troop. The informer Lechuga and the military
of Cuzco especially ought to be rewarded.206
The transformation of men of letters into political actors was the result of a
long process of reform in combination with the spread of the Enlightenment.
Energized by new ideas and opportunities, and encouraged by the Bourbon
monarchy, men of letters (orators, pamphleteers, gossipmongers, lawyers, and
revolutionaries) tried to lead an emerging public opinion, speak in public, ques-
tion traditions and authorities, and change the old way of doing politics. The
world around them did not, however, change so quickly. In frustration, some
turned to more radical options and planed conspiracies. Everything would
seemingly change when Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808. Their time to lead was
at hand, and they wereready.

PA RT T W O
IMPERIAL TURMOIL
Conflicts Old and New, 18051830

Liberalism and War, 18051814
The nineteenth century did not start auspiciously for the Spanish monarchy. The
Crown faced direct threats to its power and prestige from nearby revolution-
ary France and Britain. As happened during the Bourbon Succession of 1700,
war and defeat brought despair to Spain. Men of letters, who had been develop-
ing their own public personae and their various self-representations in Spanish
public life, as well as asserting their new roles as political actors for decades,
responded by urging reform. New opportunities arose for them in 1808 when
Napoleon, on his way to securing Portugals coast against the British, invaded
Spain, forced King Charles IV to abdicate in favor of his son, Ferdinand VII, and
took both as captives to Bayonne, France. In response, people rose up against
French rule while men of letters organized and began to design a new constitu-
tional order that they would alsolead.
The years 18081814, encompassing the Napoleonic occupation, are referred
to as Spains first liberal era.1 Liberalism rose in the Spanish world in the midst
of this crisis as a new ideology calling Peninsular and American Spaniards to
unite, to open the monarchy to new freedoms, and to fight against oppression,
understood in its broadest sense to be political, economic, social, and cultural.
Those who shared these ideals began to call themselves and be referred to as
Liberals,* a term previously used to allude to someone generous and graceful
or to a liberal education devoted to the intellect in contrast to a servile educa-
tion that demanded the use of hands.2
Liberalism came to being in this part of the world in the context of a war on
a scale and of a fury unprecedented there. And despite the new opportunities
available to the new Liberals in the absence of a legitimate king, their efforts
would be continually undermined and thrown into the most violent disorder.
War, military rule, and powerful military actors were major obstacles for Spanish
Liberals and did much to shape their political thought.
*
Liberal will be capitalized when referring to what self-proclaimed Spanish and Spanish
American Liberals said or did. It will left in lowercase when speaking of liberalism in generalterms.
117

118 Imperial Turmoil: Conflicts Old and New
Two major events frame this chapter, the battle of Trafalgar of 1805 and the
defeat of Napoleon in 1814. The analysis focuses on the debates and clashes
between men of letters and military officers that took place in the Spanish
Peninsula and among Spanish exiles during these years. It first examines how
these two groups arose in parallel, as allies and rivals in Spains great power vac-
uum. It then examines the debates in the press and the increasing factionalism
among men of letters. Turning to the clashes in the Cortes of Cadiz, the chapter
details the debates between the lettered and the military. The text concludes by
discussing the role that the critiques of military rule in Spanish America played
in the evolution of Spanish liberalism.
The imperial competition between France and England reached its highest
intensity in the Napoleonic era, which posed an immediate threat to Spain
and its empire. Napoleonic armies managed to take war to a new level, as no
state had been able to so quickly assemble such massive and well-organized
forces to fight wherever they were ordered.3 In response, the British monar-
chy had expanded its fleet to become the major naval power at the time.4 Spain
needed to find some sort of settlement with one of these imperial competi-
tors. In 1795 Manuel Godoy took a realistic approach and signed a peace treaty
with France, which earned him the title of Prncipe de la Paz (Prince of peace)
and granted Spain stability. Yet the Spanish Crown remained concerned by the
speed with which war expanded, and the intensification of threats to its over-
seas dominions.5
These were stressful times in the Americas. In 1791 the French Revolution
had reached the Caribbean. Toussaint LOuverture and his followers rose up
in arms in Haiti to defend the principles of the revolution and the abolition of
slavery against the Haitian planters. News and refugees terrified the neighboring
Spanish colonies.6 To pacify the region and recover the sugar industry, in 1802
Napoleon sent a massive army of about twenty thousand men to repress rebel
Haitians, but he was defeated. Two years later, Haiti, the island neighboring
Cuba and the Captaincy General of Venezuela, became an independent black
republic. Soon afterward, Haitian forces occupied the Spanish side of the island
and retained it until1809.
The greatest setback for the Spanish monarchy occurred, in the coasts of
Cadiz in October 1805, when the British crushed the French and Spanish navies
at Trafalgar. For Britain, this victory confirmed its preeminent naval power.
For Spain, Trafalgar ended any hopes it had to curtail British expansion into its
empire and overcome its tight control over the Atlantic.7
Two months after Trafalgar, British forces occupied Cape Town in South
Africa. Four months later, in April 1806, Francisco de Miranda, a Venezuelan
revolutionary, commanded an expedition with British support to attack

Liberalism and War, 1 8 0 5 1814 119
Caracas.8 That June, the British fleet of Cape Town invaded Buenos Aires.
Spanish authorities were shocked and completely unprepared for the defense
of this part of the Spanish Empire. Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmn had been
right a decade earlier when he had identified the coasts of Rio de la Plata and
Montevideo as the most vulnerable in terms of defense in his Letter to Spanish
Americans.9
By August, Spanish forces managed to retake Buenos Aires under the com-
mand of the governor of Misiones, Santiago de Liniers, while Miranda tar-
geted Venezuela for the second time. In February 1807, the British occupied
Montevideo and once again attacked Buenos Aires in July. Finally, in August
1807, Spanish authorities regained control of the region and forced British gen-
eral William Carr Beresford to capitulate. British forces could have recovered
Montevideo or Buenos Aires, but the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in March of
1808 suddenly changed the geopolitical calculus and transformed Great Britain
into Spains strongestally.
Spains strategic alliance with Britain proved necessary, since it would prob-
ably not have been able to defeat Napoleon alone, and a provisional govern-
ment would have had difficulty organizing in the occupied Peninsula without
British protection from the sea. Spain had no fleet remaining and despite the
military reform, the monarchy lacked sufficient forces to deter Bonapartes
armies.10
In the long term, the alliance with Britain turned into a pact with the devil
for Spain. From 1808 to 1814 Britain became both Spains major supporter
and its largest source of concern, particularly in the empire. British envoys in
Spain were involved in the military organization of the Peninsula, in the deci-
sions and plans of the Junta Central (Spains governing body) and its successor,
the Regencia (Regency). At the same time, they participated in the negotia-
tions with Spanish American insurgents. In exchange for their military coop-
eration, British merchants received permission to trade with Spanish America,
which led to more contraband and conflicts between the defenders of Spanish
monopolies and the promoters of free trade.11 Spanish officials were aware of
these problems but could do little to counter them, other than warning their
friends and subordinates of Britains efforts to take advantage of this situation.
For example, in 1810 Viceroy of Peru Fernando de Abascal responded to fel-
low Asturiano and leading member of the Junta Central, Gaspar Melchor de
Jovellanos, about the arrival of Englands secret agents. Jovellanos had asked him
to be watchful, for these traginantes (wanderers), he wrote, did not waste the
opportunity to have the Peninsula conquered and aspired to the independence
of South America. Taking advantage of the terrible situation in Spain, Abascal
wrote, English people had calculated what they could gain from it:with one
hand they assist the monarchy with aid to liberate Spain from the oppression of

the tyrant; with the other, they try and permanently dominate the commerce in
America, the viceroy stressed. No territory except his viceroyalty had escaped
their contagion, he concluded.12
The French invasion of Spain produced dramatic political change in the Spanish
world.13 After removing the Spanish monarchs from the throne, Napoleon named
his brother Joseph King of Spain and the Indies and quite suddenly, Spains arch-
enemy began to take over the Spanish Peninsula. Common people violently rose
up against the invaders, inspiring their countrymen to follow them. As the inva-
sion progressed and the notables tried to organize, the press took the lead. The
rage that Spanish subjects felt after realizing that France had conquered them
could not be easily explained.14 Someone in Spain had to be blamed, and for
Spanish nobles there was no better scapegoat than Manuel Godoy. Godoys fall
in 1808 was perhaps the most dramatic in Spanish history. Pamphlets blamed
the corrupt government of this Spanish dictator for weakening the country and
making it vulnerable to Napoleons ambitions. According to contemporary writ-
ers, Napoleons arbitrary invasion was the direct result of degradation and abuse
in Manuel Godoys court.
Soon pamphlets, royal orders, sermons, and satires blaming Godoy circu-
lated throughout the Spanish world. He was a crooked newcomer, a degraded
courtier, a thief, a Minotaur, and a Lucifer.15 American publications followed
suit and portrayed Spain as a betrayed and mistreated woman.16 Sermons and
pamphlets charged God with sending Napoleon as a punishment for Godoys
corruption. With these accusations, the favoritos enemies destroyed his
reputation for good but also undermined traditional concepts of authority,
since they also blamed Charles IV for his weakness and Queen Maria Luisa
for her affairs with Godoy. Never before had royal authority been so publicly
discredited.17
To boost Spains morale, men of letters wrote to extol the Spanish military in
the press. In contrast to the evil monster Napoleon, Spain and Spanish America
would produce their own leaders, who would be virtuous and talented military
men willing to die for their country and achieve posthumous glory. Pamphlets
and newspapers published eulogies of old Spanish caudillos. El Cid, Pelayo,
and Guzmn would reproduce themselves and spread virtue. Newspapers and
pamphlets from the Spanish Peninsula also spread the exemplary actions and
achievements of military and guerrilla leaders.18 For example, a description of
the siege of Zaragoza of 1808 issued in Spain and reprinted in Lima presented
Juan Palafox of Aragn as a great leader. This twenty-four-year-old-man had
taken command of the region when the general commander tried to surrender.
While he had no previous military experience, he possessed a strong and vir-
tuous spirit, the text stressed.19 These relaciones (accounts, descriptions) were

commonly reprinted in Spanish America as pamphlets or in sections of news-

papers.20 Revealingly the press resorted to Spanish military heroes of the recon-
quista, conquista, or to improvised guerrilla leaders such as Palafox, Juan Martn
from Castille, and El Empecinado as models of exemplary actions.
Since prior to 1808 military conflict took place outside Spain, the Peninsula
did not experience military reform at the same intensity as the key imperial bas-
tions of Cuba, Veracruz, Cartagena, and Peru.21 Facing the rise of revolution-
ary France, Godoy had tried hard to enlarge Spains forces by expanding their
privileges in order to recruit notables; however, his efforts directly clashed with
the high nobles who felt their own privileges threatened. Hence, Napoleon eas-
ily conquered Spain and kept it for six years, during which Britains officers and
military experts struggled to put together a Spanish resistance and, more impor-
tantly, a functioning army.22
The organization of Spanish resistance was a messy and hurried process.23
In the absence of the king, the head of the army, it was unclear who should
be at the lead against Napoleon. The mob and guerrillas improvised militias,
armies, and military leaders. They put the men in the fields, took the largest
losses, and were revered in the press. In contrast, the regular army fell into the
hands of Sir Arthur Wellesley, later known as Duke of Wellington, who arrived
in April 1809 but could not obtain an official appointment as commander-
in-chief until September 1812.24 He brought equipment, British funds, and
organization, but ultimately he could not control or hold the Spanish army
together, which led to increased violence and anarchy. The greatest victories
remained those won by guerrillas.25 Captain generals plotted against each
other, guerrilla leaders, and the British, but also waged a separate war against
the Junta and the Cortes, trying constantly to undermine their efforts at liberal
reforms.
While military officers and guerrillas showed off their leading roles on the
battlefield and in assemblies and the press, reformist men of letters attempted to
build a constitutional rule for the Spanish world. This proved a great challenge
for people with no previous experience in representative government.
Prior to his departure for Bayonne, France, King Ferdinand left in place a Junta
Suprema de Gobierno in Madrid with the authority to rule during his absence.
In March 1808 the mobs took the streets to riot and rebel against the French in
Aranjuez. Two months later, King Ferdinand abdicated the Spanish throne in
favor of Joseph Bonaparte. Riots and executions proliferated. Following an old
tradition, notables of the Peninsulas main towns convened to resist the invasion
and formed provincial juntas proclaiming their freedom from French rule and
their loyalty to Ferdinand VII, El Deseado (The Desired One).26 In this crisis, the
provincial elites, men of letters, and military officers found new opportunities to
exercisepower.

Figure5.1 Pas de abanico. Piece of a fan. PIECE OF AFAN. "DIA DOS DE MAYO
DE 1808 EN MADRID /Asesinan los franceses los Patriotas en el Prado May 2 in
Madrid, (Frenchmen kill patriots in El Prado) /Published by London Behrmann &
Collmann.Prior to 1820. Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Museo de Historia.
In July the army of the Junta de Sevilla achieved a crucial victory over the
French at Bailn, forcing Napoleons troops to leave Madrid.27 Quite suddently,
the provincial Junta de Sevilla named itself Junta Suprema de Espaa e Indias
and began to issue its proclamations while the other juntas remained in place.
The junta of Valencia also added Suprema to its title. Finally in September 1808,
to avoid increasing struggles for power between ambitious juntas, thirty-five
delegates of these local juntas met in Aranjuez to establish the Junta Suprema
Central Gobernativa, the body that would govern in the name of the king during
his absence. They declared the junta of Bayonne null. Count of Floridablanca,
former advisor to King Charles IV, presided over the meeting and Jovellanos,
president of the Asturias junta, stood out as leading member.
As the Junta Central or Suprema tried to organize itself, Napoleons armies
advanced into new territories, discrediting its rule and forcing its members to
flee to Seville, where they agreed to summon the old Spanish Cortes that had
not met since the Middle Ages. Jovellanos was instrumental in this decision.
For decades, he and the members of the Real Academia de la Historia had been
studying the old constitution and Cortes and considering the possibility of
using the old Cortes as a platform to develop a new Spanish parliament.28 But
the stakes had gotten higher. In contrast to medieval times, all provinces of the
Spanish Empire, including those of Spanish America, were called to join this
struggle, organize elections, and send delegates to represent their localities in
this great assembly. The final goal was to produce a new constitution that would
transform the monarchy.

As Napoleon advanced, the Junta moved from Seville to the isle of San
Fernando in Cadiz, a fortressed city that the British fleet could easily protect.
In this process, the Junta Central stunned many by resigning its authority in
January 1810 and ceding it to the Consejo de Regencia de Espaa e Indias
(later known as Regencia), composed mostly of military officers:Antonio de
Escao, a navy officer who had fought in Trafalgar; Francisco de Saavedra, a
military officer and former secretary of state under Godoy; Pedro de Quevedo
y Quintano, Bishop and Inquisitor General; Esteban Fernndez de Len, mili-
tary officer and former Director of the Tobacco monopoly and army intendant
of Caracas; and Javier Castaos, head of the army in Andalusia and victorious
Spanish commander at the critical Battle of Bailn in July 1808, presided the
Regencia. As Liberals tried to set the Spanish world on a constitutional path,
the military retained executive power, a contradictory state of affairs for a rising
Spanish liberalism.29
The debates over the future of the Spanish world that began with the French
invasion produced political revolution. Never before had policy been debated in
an open arena with an open public. Once exclusively argued in the inner circles
of the court, political discussions were now held on in numerous new forums.30
The press possessed the largest audience, allowing writers to expose their politi-
cal ideas more freely than in the rigid and constrained structure of the Cortes.
Additionally, the press brought together opinions from Spain, Spanish America,
and London where most Spanish Liberals found refuge during the invasion and
return of absolutism.31 The press also became a central arena for men of letters
and military officers to assert their own new authority and power.
As soon as they were formed, juntas issued proclamations calling on all
Spanish subjects to rise and resist. The Junta Suprema acted accordingly, for it
needed to consolidate its legitimacy in the absence of the king and to stake its
claim to representing all provincial juntas in Spain and beyond. In pamphlets
and leaflets circulated throughout the Spanish world, the junta established a
new tradition of communicating and justifying its actions to the general pub-
lic, something the king had rarely felt compelled to do.32 But the junta did not
always appear to have calculated the impact of its statements, amidst violence
unleashed by Napoleons invasion. For example, to present its cause as heroic
and legitimate, proclamations praised resistance against tyranny.33 Texts repeat-
edly claimed that the juntas mission was to regenerate Spain from the corrup-
tion of Godoy and the Machiavellian rule of Napoleon. But first, all had to resist
the invaders with patriotism and fight against despotism.34
The junta could not afford to delay calling Spanish Americans to join the
struggle, for they were in desperate need of American financial assistance.
Hence, the junta of Cadiz issued statements asking Spanish Americans to take

part in the future assembly and to contribute with aid.35 Several communiqus
explained that Napoleon, the tyrant of Europe and oppressor of humanity, had
taken away their monarch. Spanish Americans were urged to proclaim their alli-
ance with Ferdinand and resist Napoleon, who was sending envoys to seduce
loyal Spanish American subjects.36
The press played an important role in the public dialogue between Peninsular
and American subjects. Yet in claiming solidarity, some Liberals got carried
away. The proclamations of 1809 are revealing. In a communiqu written by
The European Spaniards to The Spanish Americans, the former called on
their American brothers to join the struggle against Napoleon and oppression in
general, including that of evil and corrupt Spaniards, as well as military despots.
America and Spain form one sole body, the text stressed, and their sentiments
must be uniform.37 In a response, Spanish Americans from Lima promised to
join the fight. Great things were about to happen, they announced. Spaniards
would soon restore King Ferdinand and establish an equitativo (fair) and just
government, which rewarded people according to their virtue and talent. There
would be no place for aduladores serviles (servile flatterers), and lack of trust
between mother and children would disappear.38 Although Spanish Americans
might not have written this proclamation, the text is a good example of how
arguments about them were presented.
These passionate calls for action also opened a door for more extreme ones.
In 1809 an incendiary dialogue between Atahualpa and Ferdinand VII circulated
in South America. Its author, Bernardo Monteagudo, a lawyer born in Tucumn,
would become one of the leaders of the uprising against the president of Charcas
in 1809 and virtual ruler of Peru during the era of Liberator Jos de San Martn
(18211823). His Dilogo urged Peruvians to rise against absolutism, enslave-
ment, and, worst, the oppression by Spaniards.39 Faced with the dissemination
of such subversive texts, governors, general commanders, viceroys, bishops, and
priests felt compelled to follow the juntas example and produce their own proc-
lamations. Anew era of public political debate had begun in the Spanishworld.
The freedom of the press was a de facto reality after the French invasion. The
official decree that the Cortes issued in November 1810 sanctioning this liberty
only served to confirm it. As a result, newspapers proliferated and gave birth to
publicistas (publicists) and periodistas (journalists), new terms that began to be
used during these years.40 Men of letters praised themselves for being writers
for the public and dedicated large sections of their newspapers to explaining the
nature of their profession. At a time when the military was achieving merits in
the battlefield, men of letters were urged to prove their own. And while in these
years some wrote admiringly of guerrilla leaders such as Mina and Empecinado
and criticized the junta for neglecting them, a great deal of anti-military literature
circulated as well. El Redactor General de Cdiz took the lead calling for an urgent

military reform. In 1811 the paper included an announcement of the new pub-
lication El Antimilitar Oficial (anti-military official), mocking the proliferation
of so many new oficialitos (little officers). In passing, the writer asked:What an
embarrassment it is to see them crawling on the streets with those huge swords
or boasting on their horses, puffed up, with those hideous elastic hats. Whats
all that noise, just to see the sighs of women?41 In contrast, writers presented
periodistas as threatening those with murky hearts who had sacked the nation,
those who had earned ranks through favors.42 The paper published a series with
the title Declamacion contra el despotismo militar (Declamation against military
despotism).43
Likewise, military officers fought to defend their honor, status, and power in
the new arena of the press. But their conceptualization of themselves and their
new education involved a special corporate sense of duty to the king, the mon-
archy, the Regencia, and the Spanish people. In this sense, they were not in their
own minds actores, performers, plaintiffs, or advocates for plaintiffs, but loyal
servants of whomever they were in duty sworn to serve.
For example, in 1813, El Espaol Libre issued by a so-declared military man
came out to defend the Regencia, the Church, and the military and to address
Liberals critiques directly. The third issue consisted of a dialogue between a
deputy for Cortes and a military man in which the latter presented as absurd the
art of persuasion and as hopeless the efforts of writers who are useless in larger
tasks. He could not stand their deep meditations and the continuous studying
by some wise and deserving representatives of the Spanish people.44
In addition to carrying out the struggle between men of letters and military
officers, the new press contributed more than any other sphere to the forma-
tion of two political groups or factions in Spain and Spanish America, known
as liberales and serviles or absolutists.45 Newspapers were produced by and iden-
tified with supporters of either of these groups, which helps us establish dis-
tinctions.46 For example, El Espectador and El Semanario Patritico defended
the new ideas of equality, liberty, sovereignty, and citizenship. With passion,
writers explained the wonders of elections and constitutions. Likewise, El Voto
de la Nacin Espaola claimed that elections had been the driving force behind
Roman splendor.47 More radical ones, such as El Duende de los Cafs and El
Conciso, added an anti-clerical tone to this spectrum. Their articles blamed the
Catholic Church for the oppression of the Indians. Overall, the main topics
raised in these Liberal publications were oppression, equality, the key role of
men of letters, the representation at the Cortes of Cadiz, the Constitution, and
the arbitrary rule of the military. Yet these publications soon faced the emer-
gence of their opponents, such as El Atalaya de la Mancha, El Articulista Espaol,
El Sol de Cdiz, and La Gaceta Ministerial de Sevilla. Priests wrote and ran most of
them. They opposed liberal reforms and the Constitution, which they presented

as great menaces. In sum, anti-Liberals were committed to defending the role of

the church, the scholastic method of education, traditions, the military, and the
war in Spanish America.48
These publications made explicit attempts to identify themselves and
their opponents in discrete and opposing groups. To leave no doubts
between the two, they chose a warlike language. In 1811, El Redactor General
de Cdiz presented Liberals as an army commanded by generals of merit,
with an officer corps composed of expert and bold officials called periodis-
tas, and a troop of volanderos,49 who only used bladed weapons and fought
for the freedom of the patria. This group stood out more for its discipline
and skill than for its numbers. Its generals excelled in planning attacks and
rallying the troops, but failed to maintain alliances. In contrast, the serviles
formed a large group that lacked discipline in combat. They also lacked a
cavalry and instead resorted to donkeys, which they trained to kick and bray
in the fights.50 Two years later, El Conciso defined their rival serviles as those
who did not support the constitution, opposed civil liberties, and defended
arbitrary rule, the privileges of seoros, and the Inquisition.51 Servil was a
term commonly used to accuse someone of total submission and flattery.
A servil were also called illiberal, antiliberal, anticonstitucional, antifilsofo,
and no-filosofo.52 Naturally, the supporters of this faction presented them-
selves as guarantors of order and monarchical power.
Overall, these groups behaved as political alliances more than parties. Their
principles remained in some instances ambiguous, but there was no sign yet of
a unique Spanish American ideology in this first liberal era. Spanish subjects
on both sides of the Atlantic formed what looked increasingly like transoceanic
political alliances separated along lines of liberty and oppression.
The challenges of oppression became a dominant theme in the early writings of

Spanish Liberals, particularly when discussing Spanish Americas status in the
new liberal order. These debates merged with an old tradition of denouncing
abuses, propagated in courses of the law of nations and nature and best articu-
lated in the sixteenth century by Friar Bartolom de las Casas (c. 1484-1566).
His writings condemning conquistadors abuses of Indians and their creation
of an unjust system of rule were known and read for generations.53 In the late
eighteenth century, this tradition of denouncing bad government and mistreat-
ment was revitalized and influenced by the Enlightenment, constitutionalism,
and French and Atlantic revolutionary critiques of absolutism.
For some early Liberal thinkers, no region had been more oppressed than
Spanish America. And nothing showed this better than Americans repressed
efforts at organizing juntas and autonomous governments, which con-
trasted with their quick formation in the Peninsula. In 1809, Alberto Lista

(17751848), editor of El Espectador Sevillano, addressed this matter in his

paper, where he explained that Americas subjugation derived from a Spanish
rule imposed on conquest and on a tyrannical corrupt system based on ine-
quality.54 The need to put an end to this oppression was also Jos Mara Blancos
(b. 1775d. 1841, later known as Blanco White) strongest contention. In con-
trast to Las Casass appeals to the monarch for new and just laws, Lista and
Blanco approached the problem from an enlightened point of view, emphasiz-
ing culture and education as agents of change while identifying the roots of
oppression in the obscurantism that had dominated the Spanish world. This
reasoning led them to place Spain and Spanish America on equal footing for, as
they claimed, ignorance had subjugated Spanish people everywhere. To rem-
edy this situation, Lista and Blanco demanded a revolution of education and
traditions.55 Lista called on writers and los sabios (the wise) to defend liberty
and direct public opinion. They possessed the means to become the first organ
of public opinion through their knowledge of history, jurisprudence, and
political and moral studies. Leading this tribunal ought to be their most sacred
obligation, he stressed.56
Jos Mara Blanco proved one of the most critical and loudest voices of the
liberal era of Cadiz. Some scholars have placed him as one of the earliest and best
political writers of the modern Spanish world. According to Spanish philologist
Vicente Llrens, Blanco was the first to identify a political group as Liberal, a
usage he spread throughout Europe during his editorial adventures in London.57
Blancos status exemplifies the abrupt transformation of eighteenth century men
of letters into modern political writers and actors struggling to find a space in
which to express themselves and to exercise power.58
Blanco was born in Seville in 1775 to an Irish merchant and an Andalusian
woman of the provincial elite. To avoid the profession of commerce his father
had planned for him, Blanco enrolled in the University of Seville. Yet he rejected
the dogmatism of scholastic methods and joined a group of professors who
were fighting for educational reform, including Alberto Lista, Manuel Mara
de Mrmol, Manuel Mara de Arjona, and Flix Reinoso. Enthusiasts of the
Enlightenment and the Jansenist critique of Papal power, they met in tertulias to
learn and debate newideas.
In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Blanco finished his studies of
theology, fell in love, conceived a child without knowing it, and was ordained
a priest despite his aversion for the ecclesiastical world. Soon he parted from
the clergy and left Seville for Madrid, where he joined the tertulia of Manuel
Quintana and the Real Sociedad Econmica de Amigos del Pas.59 There Blanco
offered presentations on poetry and eloquence and began to frequent the royal
court, where he was recruited to establish and run a new school following
the model of Swiss Pestalozzi.60 These contacts and experiences gave Blanco

the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the functioning of the

royal court and its leading members, many of whom would later run the juntas
and regency.
In 1808, Blanco witnessed the mutiny of Aranjuez and arrival of French
forces in Madrid. Along with the Junta Suprema, he fled to Seville, where he
collaborated with El Semanario Patritico, arguably Spains first political news-
paper, and published his first writings on policy, forms of governments, the
decision-making processes of leaders, and courtly intrigues.61 In his autobiogra-
phy, Blanco wrote about this paper:The Semanario, being the only publication
in which something like philosophical views on public matters had appeared for
the first time in the Peninsula, gave an idea to the Junta (a most timid and selfish
body) of the power which the Press could exert over mens minds.62
In the Semanarios pages Isidoro Antilln, Blanco Whites co-editor, began
a long series on the history of military operations in Spain. Just when he was
about to discuss the actions of the Duke of Infantado, grandee of Spain and
general commander of the army, censorship reached him. The duke let the edi-
tors know he disapproved his actions being publicly scrutinized and pressured
Manuel Quintana, head censor and friend of Blanco, to discontinue the series.
Blanco complied but began another set of articles under the title El problema
politico (the political problem), in which he called for the prerogatives of the
powerful to be curtailed and advocated balanced powers.63 After these articles,
the Semanario received another order of censorship. With Quintanas approval,
Blanco published a manifesto against this act of repression, which infuriated
members of the junta but was great publicity for the Semanario.64
In late 1809, Blanco along with the junta, fled to Cadiz with the intention of
leaving for good. Later in his life, he wrote about feeling overwhelmed by the
desperate situation of Spain and the widespread culture of oppression that still
reigned despite the new freedoms. Such hopelessness made him long for exile.65
Blanco arrived in London in March 1810, where he established himself with
the help of family, friends, and British merchants and diplomats he had met in
Spain. His closest and most influential contact was Henry Vassal Fox or Lord
Holland, leader of the Whig party. AHispanophile, Lord Holland invited him to
visit and lodge in his house, where Blanco enjoyed a great library and met promi-
nent politicians and men of letters. Lord Holland, along with Richard Wellesley,
secretary of foreign affairs and former ambassador to Spain, compelled Blanco
to publish a new newspaper.66
So, two months after his arrival in London, Blanco began the colossal task
of writing El Espaol, as well as occasionally collaborating with the Foreign
Office.67 The paper came out once a month and each consisted of about eighty
pages. Except for the official proclamations and communiqus that the newspa-
per reprinted, Blanco wrote all of it. Initially, the print run was about 500 copies,

but soon it increased to 2,000. The paper was issued in London, but the Foreign
Office and some contacts of Blanco and Lord Holland sent copies to Cadiz.
British merchants also shipped copies to the Canary Islands, Lisbon, and vari-
ous ports in America, which caused much concern among royal authorities.68 In
1811, Fernando de Abascal, viceroy of Peru, sent a royal order to the Intendant
of Puno, a district neighboring the tumultuous viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata,
to curtail the circulation of El Espaol and El Colombiano because these writ-
ings promoted the subversion of unity and buen orden (good order).69 Abascal,
the Regencia, and Cortes had good reasons to worry, since Blanco directly ques-
tioned their actions and authority.
At the start of his new editorial venture Jos Mara Blanco changed his name
to Blanco White, revealing with this choice the duplicity of his life and thoughts.
And it is precisely this duplicity that makes his views so interesting and unique.
Unlike most of his Francophile contemporaries, Blanco White articulated a polit-
ical critique in an Anglo-Saxon fashion. Influenced by Lord Holland, English
Whigs, and Edmund Burke in particular, he advocated for moderation and com-
promise, concepts that found no space in this polarized era.70 Yet, despite this
strong influence, Blanco White cannot be simply described as an Anglophile.71
His writings, with their universalizing ideas, inclusion, and concern for Spanish
America, stand at the core of emerging Spanish liberalism. With a tone of indig-
nation, he fought against oppression in all its manifestationspolitical, cultural,
economic, and religious.72
Beginning with the first issue of El Espaol, Blanco White questioned the
legitimacy and intentions of the first juntas because he did not consider them
truly representative of the people and because they repressed public opinion
by maintaining press censorship. Likewise, he condemned their secretive and
old-fashioned methods for selecting representatives. For Blanco White, some
juntas, like the one in Seville, had ended in the hands of the caporales del pueblo
(towns bosses). He further criticized the Junta of Seville for proclaiming itself
as Suprema de Espaa e Indias (Head of Spain and the Indies) without having
consulted the people first.73 The only solution to such flagrant lack of legit-
imacy was the reunion of a legitimate congress of the nation, which, lead-
ing public opinion, would elect an executive power respectable in the eyes of
Spaniards and excite with its discussion a national spirit that is disappearing.
But a reunion of its members is what the Cortes most feared, Blanco White
stressed.74
For Blanco White, the second significant mistake in the first era of the Spanish
revolution was the Convocatoria a Cortes (Summit to Cortes). Blanco White
accused the members of the Junta Central for delaying this decision, which he
believed resulted from the juntas fears. Moreover, he claimed that the junta had
mocked the nation by promising to convene the assembly under its command,

as if it would perpetually rule.75 Blanco White further accused its members, with
a few exceptions, of taking advantage of the unrest and lack of procedures and
leaving the Spanish people with a despotic regency.
As editor, Blanco White maintained an active correspondence with Lord
Holland and his librarian, Mr. Allen, who he considered his teachers in politics,
this important and difficult branch of knowledge.76 Lord Holland repeatedly
encouraged Blanco White to moderate his claims and specify his critiques.77
They discussed the summit to Cortes, projects for the constitution, and the
American problem that caused Blanco White great anguish. In these difficult
times, Blanco White conceived of his duty as editor of El Espaol as giving his
readers a political education. For his part, Lord Holland kept Blanco informed
of events in the Peninsula, as well as the growing discontent his writings were
producing among members of the Regencia and Cortes.78 In July 1810 Blanco
White responded to heated polemics his texts had unleashed in the assembly:
I only intended to excite indignation against a bad government, in order that
the public opinion should be warned against any other of the same description,
which might appear in the present circumstances. I would certainly have made
the apology of those worthy members of the junta who never connived to the
mischevious purpose of the others, had I had an oportunity to do so, at the time
I wrote 79
Thanks to his proximity to Lord Holland, Blanco White obtained firsthand
information on the outbreak of violence in Spanish America. Upon receiving
the first news, the future of this region became a priority for Blanco White. In
his autobiography Blanco revealed the happiness he felt with the news from
Caracas and his immediate identification with American autonomous efforts.
For Blanco White, the cause of American Spaniards and his own were one and
the same: a struggle against the oppression of despotism, political and ecclesi-
astical, still dominating the Spanish world. From the start, Blanco White called
persecuted Americans his paisanos (countrymen, neighbors) and declared to
hope for a mental freedom that went beyond political considerations. He put
these thoughts in print in El Espaol, which caused him even more repudiation
among authorities in Cadiz, who accused him of betraying his country and
promoting hatred between Peninsular and American Spaniards. These accu-
sations were not true. While harshly denouncing oppressive Spanish rule in
America and the curtailment of liberties there, Blanco White defended the
unity of the Spanish world and fought for a compromise between Peninsular
and American Spaniards. He criticized actions on all sides, Liberals, absolut-
ists, Peninsular or American, threatening this possibility.
In condemning the old system of rule in Spanish America, Blanco White
became one of the harshest critiques of the Junta Central, the Regencia, and
Cortes leading members for their contradictory and illiberal attitudes

towards Spanish America. He accused the Cortes of proclaiming democracy

and equal representation while denying citizenship to castas, even to people
who had only one percent of African blood. Castas were indeed excluded from
the franchise.80 For Blanco White, a division between pure Spaniards and
the rest should never exist.81 Some went further than he did by claiming that
there should be no nobility either. As a pamphlet of 1811 stated, the highest
title should always be that of citizen, and merit ought to prevail. Spaniards
would be better off, the writer argued, by following the British franchise and
establishing that any educated male who owned property should be entitled
to citizenship.82
And yet, while defending the right to liberty on both sides of the Atlantic,
Blanco White was no admirer of democracy and feared anarchy. He criticized
the junta for initiating people in the practice of politics who were completely
unprepared for it. In 1813, he explained that those who studied politics in Spain
before the French invasion obtained their knowledge of men from reading nove-
las morales (moral novels) and their information of kingdoms and republics
from novelas politicas (political novels). It was impossible, he added, to learn the
science of governing people without taking some part in it or in public busi-
nesses. A Spanish boy would only learn the name of Politica from listening his
professors cite the Polticos de Aristteles. And it should not surprise anyone,
Blanco stressed, that thirty years ago these professors would mistake the term
Politica with buena crianza (good upbringing). He concluded: Under those
circumstances, if by any fortune some of these young men, gifted with imagina-
tion, with a fondness for all kinds of studies, and thus discontented of the miser-
able routine to which they were subjected, found some book of the many France
brought to light in its philosophical era; the effect would be the same as that the
Nueva Heloisa would produce in the imagination of a Capuchine novic e if
circumstances would not allow him to quit the robe, it would not be strange that
he ended setting up the convent on fire.83
Opening up the practice of politics so suddenly had led to the rise of
fogosos polticos (fiery politicians). Without calculating the consequences,
Blanco explained, the Junta had dangerously encouraged the rise of new
political actors who had only read the Declaration of the Rights of Men
and Citizen. To validate his claim, he confessed that as a young Spaniard he
had been a victim of the same feelings and thought that there was no nobler
profession than that of resisting those in power and being a lawyer of the
dispossessed.84
Under the influence of his British advisors, Blanco White defended the
need for gradual reforms.85 There was, however, not much he could do in this
respect. Politics proliferated and so did writers and opinions. As a result, men
of letters competed over ideas and also about whose voice had the greatest

authority. Although some Liberal pamphlets tried to convey the idea that any-
body was entitled to express opinions, and speeches with the title Discurso
de un miembro del populacho (speech by a member of the lower people) cir-
culated, there were fierce disputes over the legitimacy of these opinions.86
Some were dismissed under the title of charlatanes (charlatans). In 1811,
Liberal El Conciso reproduced an article published in La Corua arguing that
there was nothing worse than the poltico charlatan. Without prior knowledge
or criteria, without considering ancient or modern history or knowing what
a man is or what moves him, charlatans tried to obtain this science [poli-
tics] they never got from their universities, from the corrillos (pejorative for
gatherings].87
Despite his identification with American oppression, Blanco White also
feared the spread of politics in Spanish America. He dismissed the armed
philosophism of the Venezuelas new congressmen as dangerous. Blanco won-
dered how Venezuelans could have published a declaration of the rights of the
people while refusing to allow dissent.88 He criticized American philosophers
for aspiring to an impossible independence.89 In his view, these Creoles were
only hiding their true motive for action, which was sheer ambition, a feeling
with the most disruptive effect among people who had been enslaved for so
long.90 Writers and politicians ought to be more careful, Blanco White stressed,
because there was nothing more difficult than to establish who should rule in a
society of equals.91 Unfortunately for Spain, he claimed, the sudden and uncon-
trolled eruption of public opinion as a tribunal entitled to question and destroy
anybody had destroyed civil society.92 For this admirer of Burke, there was a
natural evolution toward liberalism even for radical Venezuelans who were try-
ing to find shortcuts.
Another strong Liberal voice in the Spanish Peninsula and among migrs
was that of Alvaro Flrez Estrada. Born into the provincial elites of Asturias,
he studied at the University of Oviedo, and thanks to family connections
and the support of his fellow countrymen, Jovellanos and Campomanes, he
found a place in the royal court. His second marriage was to the daughter of a
wealthy and powerful courtier. In 1792, while in Madrid, Flrez Estrada dared
to translate and publish works by Jacques-Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre on
the laws, arts, and sciences of past peoples. For this and other reasons, Godoy
did not quiet trust him and Flrez Estrada grew disgusted with the court. In
1801 he returned to the mountains of Asturias to finish his fathers project of
building a smithy, but was soon elected a member of the principalitys deputy.
His political career took off with the Napoleonic invasion, as he organized
his provinces resistance and became the leader of the Asturias junta and
wrote its first proclamations. When the local junta dissolved, Flrez Estrada
moved to Seville where he published a proposal for a new constitution that

envisioned a strong parliament and a limited monarch. He also wrote a treaty

on the freedom of the press. In 1810, he traveled to England where he contin-
ued publishing and began to seriously read works on political economy. He
returned to Spain in 1811, became the Asturias representative to the Cortes,
and translated Gabriel Bonnot de Mablys text on the rights and duties of the
citizen. There he founded his own newspaper, El Tribuno del Pueblo Espaol.93
No other publication in these years seems to have been as concerned with
explaining the purpose of a liberal government and defending the separation
of powers and subordination of the military than El Tribuno.
In 1812 Flrez Estrada published first in London and then in Cadiz a
well-read treaty on the disagreements between America and Spain, propos-
ing methods for reconciliation and mutual prosperity. His conclusion after
analyzing the causes of discord between Spanish subjects was aligned with
Blanco Whites. He contended that both Spain and Spanish America had
been subjected to the same evils, shared the same interests, and thus needed
each other to fully overcome oppression. Both parts were united in a com-
mon process but Americans were repressed and could not select sovereign
authorities. If they had known their rights well and had been aware of the state
to which they had been subjected, these inhabitants would have tried to form
juntas or corporations of honest people to hold the supreme power, Flrez
Estrada stressed.94 Like Blanco White, the Asturian delegate condemned the
juntas illiberal attitude in restricting American representation and in fail-
ing to replace the despotic authorities governing Spanish America.95 Flrez
Estrada argued in favor of allowing Spanish Americans to trade freely and to
enjoy a good education and free property. Americans and Spaniards should
possess the same freedoms. But Americans were trapped by adventurers
turned despots, he bemoaned, and the Liberal new government of Spain had
failed them.96
The debates of the Cortes and final proclamation of the Constitution in Cadiz
brought new hopes for Liberals but also increased tensions with Spanish
America. Delegates and substitute delegates from all parts of the Spanish Empire
met in the Cortes of Cadiz for two years until they signed the Constitution. Since
Cadiz lacked a proper government building to host the assembly, the junta solved
the problem by using the theater. They could not have found a more apropriate
space for these new political actors. Most sessions of the Cortes were public and
became a place where people could hear the latest news about Napoleon and
rumors about the secret intentions of the Regencia, and where aspiring politi-
cians could display their eloquence.97 Men of letters measured their status in the
assembly by the success of their speeches. One of the dominant voices in the
Cortes was that of the representative from Oviedo, Agustn de Argelles, whose

oratorical talents earned him the title of The Divine. But speeches and dis-
cussions caused great tensions and divisiveness. According to Peruvian deputy
Vicente Morales Durez, in 1810 Cadiz looked like the devils kingdom, as he
felt cornered by bayonets, bombs, military men, politicians, the wise, sophists,
intriguers, legislators, and demons.98
The most contentious debates of the Cortes dealt with issues of representa-
tion, Spanish American in particular, their organization, the exclusion of people
from African descent from citizenship, the abolition of slavery, the role of reli-
gion, and the Inquisition.99 Yet the discussions on the power of the military were
also central to the political process at this time.
Two days after the Cortes were inaugurated on September 25, 1810, mili-
tary forces pledged their oath of allegiance to the sovereignty of the assem-
bly. The next day, the question of how to create and sustain a large army was
discussed, while a Comisin de Guerra (war commission) was established.
The Cortes began to receive numerous reports, in the old proyectista fashion,
on such topics as military and guerrilla organization and general recruitment.
Some were debated by the general assembly, the less important ones by the War
Commission.
One of the first contentious debates regarding the military dealt with the
Cortess capacity to decide on the armys commissions.100 The Ordenanza General
del Ejrcito of 1768 was still in effect and did not anticipate the control of mili-
tary promotions and organization being shared with a legislative assembly. The
military was the Kings army, and his direct representatives managed these deci-
sions. Given this major hurdle, some members began to debate the possibility
of issuing new regulations.101 In August 1811 Argelles defended the need for
new regulations to address this problem against those who rejected the idea of
incorporating new guerrilla forces into the military establishment. Opponents
claimed that if subjected to regulations, their members would desert. The proj-
ect was rejected.
The status of military officers in this new social order was also a source of
disagreement. Some deputies asked for a policy of open admissions in military
schools and bodies that would forgo the requirement of a noble condition. To
overcome the challenge of reconciling traditional and military hierarchies, the
deputy for Valencia, Joaqun Lorenzo Villanueva, claimed that the nobility
should expect special honors when placed alongside regular soldiers of equal
standing but that it should never demand exclusive rights over the command
of this profession. Deputy Florencio del Castillo of New Spain seconded the
motion arguing that in opening the schools and academies to everybody, the
Enlightenment would spread and the fatherland will count on honorable and
deserving sons. Deputy Manuel Villafae of Valencia challenged the audience by

claiming that the Cortes had already established that every Spaniard was a sol-
dier of the patria. Hence, every one of them was noble for its profession, which
demanded the approval of the motion.102 This exposition led to a more serious
debate on the social organization of the monarchy. Absolutists, such as Peruvian
deputy Blas Ostoloza, defended restriction on the schools admissions policies;
Liberals opposed them, but no compromise or solution wasmet.
Yet the most challenging problem for Liberal deputies remained the fuero mil-
itar. Reconciling a liberal constitutional monarchy with this old Bourbon privi-
lege was no simple task. Deputy Felipe Aner, a lawyer from Catalonia, tackled
the issue directly by claiming that the militarys subjection to special laws and
tribunals impeded absolute equality and uniform treatment of the military and
other classes of people.103 Afew weeks later, Deputy Gregorio Laguna, a military
officer from Badajoz who held absolutist convictions, defended the fuero militiar,
based on the heroic careers and the need to protect them from intrigue and arbi-
trariness. As deputies weighed in, some raised the old debate on the merits of the
pen versus the sword. Defenders of the fuero claimed this privilege was needed
in times of war to protect and reward soldiers; they reminded Liberals that the
ecclesiastical fueros continued to be in effect. In the end, the article restricting
the fuero was defeated and the regulations of 1768 with Godoys later additions
remained as strong asever.
In January 1812 the Cortes began to debate the inclusion of African descen-
dants in the Spanish American franchise. This potentially carried long-term
consequences for territories with large Afro-descendant populations or cas-
tas that would remain excluded for decades, if not centuries. Liberals were
divided on this issue. Moderate Liberals, along with absolutists, opposed their
incorporation. The biggest challenges to their exclusion came from Liberal
American Spaniard deputies, such as lawyer Mariano Mendiola from Mexico,
secular priest Antonio Larrazbal y Arrivillaga from Guatemala, and lawyer
Vicente Morales Durez from Peru, who reminded deputies that castas had
played a key role in the establishment of militias in the region and should not
be neglected, letalone offended. Moreover, as the latter explained, their units
already possessed their own officials, colonels, sergeants, and captains, so
depriving them of similar positions in the civilian administration would make
no sense.104
Discussions on the power of the military grew tense, as the Cortes debated
the specific sections of the constitution pertaining the military. The first arti-
cle established that the monarchy would have a permanent national military
force for the external defense of the state and the preservation of internal
order. According to the text, the army would remain subordinated to the king
but the militias would not. Argelles passionately defended this distinction,

presenting it as a compromise to the system of permanent armies. Under this

new organization, the king was not able to use the militia without the approval
of the Cortes, thus allowing the assembly some control over the use of force.105
The issue of the fuero militar came up again 1812 as the final articles of the con-
stitution on this matter were finalized. Fueros remained in place to be admin-
istered according to the regulations of 1768, but one article established a
Tribunal of War and Navy that would oversee the causes of individual subjects.
When the constitution was finally proclaimed in March 1812, it declared that
sovereignty lay in the nation, which consisted of the union of the Spanish people
from both hemispheres. It established a constitutional monarchy, in which the
king had limited powers for veto and was controlled by his ministers. Parliament
would meet in a single chamber with no representation for the church or the
military. Forced contributions, such as the Indian tribute, were eliminated, while
the situation of the Inquisition remained ambiguous until its abolition was
finally decreed in February1813.
For some Liberal critiques, Blanco White in particular, the Constitution
posed four major problems for the survival of this liberal regime. First, it sanc-
tioned radical changes without involving all groups affected, such as the church
and the military, which in his view had been dangerously alienated.106 Second,
the charter promised equal representation for Spanish Americans, but its defi-
cient electoral system and Peninsular fears of being numerically overwhelmed
ended up excluding large majorities.107 Third, it proclaimed a constitutional
monarchy, which in effect placed the king in a subordinated and superficial
role, thus imposing the rule of the legislature. Finally, the constitution disre-
garded the needs of the military at a time of war. In Blanco Whites view, these
flaws undermined the legitimacy of the government and condemned it to fail-
ure. By 1813 he had revised his initial definition of Liberal for a more negative
one:Liberals were now a group of extremist reformers, factionalist and uni-
lateral, a party that had managed to impose a constitution that only represented
their ideas.108
Regarding the military, the Constitution decreed that although the king was
the supreme commander, the legislature would decide on the financial affairs
and size of the army. It would also have to approve any activities of provincial
militia units outside their locality. While noble privileges to enjoy special juris-
dictions or seoros were eliminated, ecclesiastical and military fueros were left
in place. In the end, despite liberal efforts to create a new constitutional monar-
chy, the military remained a separate body with its own exemptions, privileges,
andlaws.

Figure5.2 Constitution. Aleluya of the Constitution from its promulgation in Cdiz in

1812 until its restoration with General Riego. Print, ca. 1820. Ayuntamiento de Madrid.
Museo de Historia.

Historians agree that the debates in the Cortes were crucial for American
Spaniards development of an identity after feeling underrepresented and dis-
criminated against during these liberal years. Yet the upheavals and growth of
military power in Spanish America also played a key role in shaping Spanish
liberalism. The news of the war in America and the repression against the
efforts at autonomy there led some Liberals to specify their struggles and cri-
tique. From initially fighting against a general oppression, some turned to royal
military authorities, such as viceroys and captain generals, whom they saw as
direct heirs of absolutism and the cause of violence and discontent in Spanish
America.
Blanco White and Alvaro Flrez Estrada led this fight. Versed in English
political writings, they were concerned with the great risks of conceding
the military too much influence. Since the civil war that brought Oliver
Cromwell to rule in 1653, the English feared the stationing of standing
armies in their country. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, cutting
down the armys size and power became a central topic in the debates on the
organization of the state. Counting with a large and active army was consid-
ered a major fiscal burden and an incentive to corruption and praetorianism.
Blanco White shared these ideas not only because he admired the English
constitutional monarchy, but also because his readings of war reports from
Spanish America were confirming those principles. Although he believed
that the Cortes should prioritize the war against Napoleon, Blanco White
confessed to being deeply anguished by the Cortes failures to curtail the
repressive actions of military authorities in America.109 Other writers had
been spreading this kind critique against authority since at least 1809. As
the Respuesta de los espaoles americanos a la proclama que les han dirigido
los nobles sevillanos (Response of Spanish Americans to the proclamation
sent by the Sevillian nobles) issued in Lima put it: You [Ambitious nations
of American dominion] have had no other talent in governing your colo-
nies than in keeping a portion of them as miserable slaves, whom you have
denied all education, and all career that was not servile; and if we have suf-
fered, it is because many of our politicians have dared to partly adopt your
destructive system, oppressive and unjust.110
In the eyes of Blanco, the origins of all evils in Spanish America lay in the
disproportionate power of the viceroys and captain generals, who by then
were all military officers. He explained this situation as the result of the long-
lasting oppression that for so long ruled in Spain and America and continued
to dominate the Regencia and Cortes. Blanco White articulated this critique to
the American problem in 1811 after learning of the unrest in Mexico and the
brutal repression that had followed. He was outraged by the failure of the Cortes
in disapproving the measures of the former Regencia of continuing the war in

America. Instead of sending conciliators, Blanco White argued, the Cortes had
sent viceroys and regal envoys with the most absolute powers. Americans
were fighting to liberate themselves, to shake from the yoke of those second-
rate tyrants, a thousand times more oppressive than sovereign despots.111 How
could it be possible, Blanco White asked, that the Cortes deputies could waste
so much time discussing censuses, the classification of population, and the base
of national representation to know if the colonies were or were not part of the
monarchy, when they had to solve the problem of visceral despotism, the gov-
ernment of viceroys and captain generals.112
For Blanco White, the only true problem that the Cortes had to face was
the American one and a compromise was the only peaceful solution possi-
ble. But this could only be achieved by granting Americans the freedom to
govern autonomously and equality in industry, commerce, and representa-
tion. This position gave Blanco White prestige and legitimacy in the eyes of
American Liberals. His exchanges with Mexican-born teacher, priest, and
writer Servando Teresa de Mier were published in El Espaol, thus showing
that a critic was not necessarily an adversary. Mier had emigrated to London,
where Blanco White helped him settle, as he did with other liberals in exile,
Peninsular and American.113
Blanco White and Mier addressed the pertinence and possibility of Spanish
American independence. For revolutionary and republican Mier, Spanish
America was already prepared to free itself, for its choice to rebel showed that its
citizens were more enlightened than Peninsular Spaniards. If they lacked experi-
ence or knowledge, Spanish Americans would resort to the best of all academies,
the revolution.114
As the war progressed in America, Miers position won more support-
ers. Yet he began to moderate his defense of independence until it was
more aligned with Blancos critique. In his second letter published in El
Espaol in May 1812, Mier argued that Peninsular officers such as Velasco,
Benegas, Figueroa, Goyeneche, and Elio, whom he called verdugos (execu-
tioners), viziers, and monsters, had violated the foundational rules of the
law of nations. In so doing, they had legitimized the right of the people to
rise against an unjust war to avoid a second destruction of the Indies, Mier
claimed, paraphrasing Las Casas. He closed with strong words and a call
to arms. The Spanish government had rewarded General Venegas for the
slaughter of Guanajuato with the cross of Charles III; had awarded a ribbon
to Viceroy Abascal for a massacre in Quito; and had squandered bastones
(staffs of office) to the Callejas, Cruzes, Goyeneches, and other barbarous
murderers. How could these scandals be left unpunished?, he asked and
added:No, humanity is more horrified than our indolence:A las Armas!
(To arms).115

Three months later, Blanco White issued a response to Mier. By then Blanco
had already expressed his discontent with the Constitution and recognized the
failure of compromising efforts.117 He was losing hope. His fatigue showed but
could not dampen his indignation. He began by analyzing current Spanish poli-
tics to show how the initial Liberals ideals had been completely distorted. In
passing he questioned the use of the term liberal to describe the Cortes poli-
tics, which does not consult rules of conduct other than those of self-interest is
called Machavelica despises the laws of equality, friendship, and gratitude,
to destroy its own interests.116
Nothing demonstrated the Cortess illiberal attitude more clearly than the
stubbornness of its members in winning an impossible war in America and in
supporting viceroys there. Blanco White considered violence the true cause
of the unrest. Where are the first steps of these Liberal Cortes in avoiding
the war? he asked. Do they come from those commissioners and viceroys
that the Cortes unleashed overseas like fierce beasts so that one destroyed over
130 towns and more than 150,000 men in the kingdom of Mexico? Or so that
each could perpetrate the most damage possible, according to their hatred
and their small means to the point of attacking a town in the midst of a disas-
ter as like that of Caracas? Blanco White concluded his address to Mier by
rejecting the option of independence in Spanish America. Yet he emphatically
stated that the government in Spain had sealed this option with blood from
their own and their brothers. Blanco White offered to continue writing about
Americans problems and struggles to help them avoid the evils of Jacobinism
and Francophilia.118
He carried out the publication of El Espaol until 1814, when the return
of Ferdinand VII and absolutism ended Spains first liberal era. Until that
moment, Blanco did not cease advocating for compromise and continued to
see Peninsular and American struggles for liberty as one and the same. Peace
would only return, he repeatedly argued, when arbitrary military rule came to
an end.119

Abascal and theProblem ofLetters

inPeru, 18061816
The Napoleonic invasion of Spain produced a great divide between the Peninsula
and the empire. While the kings exile in France created a theoretical and practi-
cal power vacuum in Spain, in Spanish America the viceroys, who were direct
representatives of the king (not the Spanish state) remained in their posts. Those
such as Jos Fernando de Abascal (18061816) consolidated and expanded
their power and prerogatives. Abascals decade-long tenure in Peru shaped the
history of the country. His belief in the exceptional merits of the military and its
right to rule, along with his governing methods, established a model for future
military leaders eager to gain strength and suppress the lettered in an unstable
newworld.
A provincial nobleman from Asturias, Abascal, unlike his prominent coun-
trymen, chose to pursue a place in the military. After receiving elite training at
the Real Academia de Ciencias y Artes de Barcelona, he served in Puerto Rico,
Rio de la Plata, Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Guadalajara. At sixty-three years of
age, he was appointed viceroy of Peru in recognition of his outstanding military
and administrative career.1 Abascals deep knowledge of the Spanish Empire
and its geopolitical affairs were only surpassed by his sharp political intuition.2
Faced with British expansion in the South Atlantic, large-scale international
war, and the power vacuum in Spain, Abascal ruled Peru in a quasi-dictatorial
manner. To sustain his control across his jurisdiction and beyond, he oversaw
the expansion and consolidation of one of the largest and most successful armies
of the Spanish Empire, which he used to govern and curtail discontent. This
chapter analyzes Abascals military and repressive policies, which sustained his
strong viceregal rule. After discussing Abascals background and initial plans for
Peru, it examines the effects of the first upheavals of Rio de la Plata and Charcas
in the viceroyalty. The analysis then looks at Abascals military policies and the
role played by General Jos Manuel de Goyeneche in the viceroys schemes, fol-
lowed by the rise of loyal military caudillismo in Peru and the viceroys actions in
141

curtailing the power of men of letters and lawyers. Finally, the chapter discusses
the new elections and rebellions that challenged the viceroys tenure inPeru.
From his arrival in Peru, Abascal fervently committed to expanding the

military and defending the region against attacks by the British Navy or
an insurrection. His personal experiences might have contributed to his
sense of urgency. In 1804 the Spanish Crown had originally appointed
Abascal viceroy of Rio de la Plata and president of the royal council there.
Eager to take up the post, the future viceroy left Veracruz and traveled
to Montevideo, despite being warned about the blockade Great Britain
had established in the South Atlantic. Authorities had recommended that
Abascal take the more secure route of Valparaiso, and their fears were real-
ized when in 1805 British vessels captured Abascal along the coast of Rio
de la Plata. 3 Two and a half years later, British officers finally agreed to
free Abascal on the condition that he solemnly swear to never again fight
against their monarch. This oath could only be withdrawn in the event
of an exchange with another prisoner of his same rank.4 Perhaps aware of
the risks of appointing a viceroy of La Plata who was incapable of fighting
against Britain, the Spanish Crown named Abascal viceroy of Peru. The
oath remained, however, a source of concern for the Spanish Crown. In
December 1806 viceroy of Rio de la Plata, Santiago de Liniers, captured
General Beresford, a British officer who could be bartered in exchange for
Abascals oath, but the officer managed to flee in April 1807.5 Luckily, a
few months later, General John Whitelocke surrendered to the Spanish
and agreed to withdraw the viceroys pledge. 6
These events, as well as the violent unrest unleashed in Rio de la Plata after
the British attack on Buenos Aires, made Abascal conscious of the great risks
faced by Spain and its empire. Confronted with the rise of the British Navy, the
destruction of the Spanish fleet in Trafalgar, and massive Napoleonic armies,
Abascal decided to concentrate on the expansion of a large standing army, one
that would integrate all groups in society through proper and effective rewards
in order to protect Peru and secure loyalty. In 1807 Abascal prepared a plan of
government and sent it to royal authorities in Madrid, who responded by urging
moderation in almost all of the viceroys proposals. Abascal, however, stood by
his plan. He pursued four main objectives. First, he aimed to establish a surveil-
lance system to control his jurisdiction. Commissioners would look after travel-
ers, fine hacienda owners for mistreating their slaves and for failing to report
their flights, and find out how many weapons vecinos possessed. Second, the
viceroy aimed to expand the armed forces. The plan foresaw the incorporation
of people of color into the militia by offering their officers some compensa-
tion or monthly payments for their service because all people of color, even

Aba scal and the P robl em o f L etters in Pe r u, 1806 1816 143
the plebe, have their eyes in the pardo and moreno units. Abascal worried about
finding adequate ways to pay them. As his report stressed, Politics demands this
under the current circumstances. Third, Abascal pursued the incorporation of
whites into these forces. White artisans would join the dragoon unit, and mer-
chants of the capital and landowners would also be enlisted. The nobility would
form a single unit that could bring together Peninsular and American Spaniards
and thus smooth possible tensions between these two groups. Fourth, the plan
insisted on the need to control lawyers, basing this on the opinion that lawyers
and their kind were harmful, unreliable, and applied just and wise laws in irratio-
nal waysso they could not be depended on.7
Figure6.1 Pedro Daz, portrait of Don Jos Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, virrey
del Per (18061816). Art Museum, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
Photo:Daniel Giannoni.

The violence spreading in the Rio de la Plata region reaffirmed Abascals urgent
need to implement his plans. By the time Napoleon invaded the Spanish
Peninsula, the southern region had experienced two years of intense politi-
cal unrest. British attacks on Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807 ignited rivalries
between old and new authorities, which undermined the precarious vice-regal
power in the area. Similar events were happening in Venezuela, as Francisco de
Miranda tried to take Caracas twice with the support of the British.
In Rio de la Plata, members of the cabildo clashed with their counterparts
from the audiencia, while military authorities struggled against one another and
against both the cabildo and audiencia.8 In 1806, in the midst of the first British
invasion of Buenos Aires, Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte fled to Cordoba to
secure Spanish rule there while Santiago de Liniers, then governor of Misiones,
marched from Montevideo, organized guerrillas along the way, and took com-
mand of Buenos Aires in February1807.
Linierss success was celebrated in the press and in pamphlets. Among his most
notable followers, Bishop of La Plata (Charcas) and Buenos Aires, Jose Benito
Mox y Francoli proclaimed Liniers a hero, comparable only to Napoleon.9 To
strengthen Linierss power and its own, the royal council of Buenos Aires offi-
cially removed Sobremonte from office in May 1808 and proclaimed Liniers the
new viceroy.10 It was a de facto coup dtat.11
Aware of the fragility of his power, Liniers informed Viceroy Abascal that the
cabildo was trying to intervene in his operations but that he had managed to
lead them his way.12 In the wake of a possible new British attack, Liniers rap-
idly assembled a voluntary militia, which became a breeding ground for several
insurgent leaders. His new authority faded, however, quickly.13 News about the
disputes between Liniers, the cabildo, and the royal council circulated widely.14
His French origins and sudden new military and political powers made him sus-
picious and reviled as anti-French sentiment tookroot.
Informed of the Rio de la Plata unrest and concerned about Napoleons ambi-
tions, the new liberal authorities in Spain dispatched Jos Manuel de Goyeneche
as new brigadier general of the Royal Armies with the commission of com-
municating the official news of the Napoleonic invasion and helping organize
the regions military defense.15 Awarding an Arequipeo Creole such a great
honor showed the juntas interest in securing the loyalty and financial assis-
tance of American elites, but it also revealed that the struggle ahead would be a
militaryone.
Goyeneche was well suited for this commission. The Goyeneche name
carried great prestige in the Peninsula and his fathers successful trading busi-
nesses in the region assured him wealth and status.16 Like Abascal, Jos Manuel
de Goyeneche had received an outstanding military education. In 1804, as a
young member of Manuel Godoys court, he had been assigned to lead a select

group of men through Europe to investigate the progress of the leading armies
at the time.17
Goyeneches service to the Prince of Peace earned him crucial knowledge and
prestige but also tarnished his reputation. News about his connections with the
abhorred Godoy spread throughout Spanish America before his arrival in Buenos
Aires in 1808. Rumor had it that during the mutiny of Aranjuez, the mobs had
almost caught Goyeneche and destroyed his property while he was lodging at
the house of a marchioness closely connected to Godoy.18 These circumstances,
his unusual commission, and his power made Goyeneche extremely suspicious
in the eyes of members of the royal council and cabildo of Rio de la Plata, who
were attempting to retain their authority over the expanding and clashing powers
of viceroys, captain generals, and proliferating military officers. To discredit him,
Goyeneches enemies spread the word that he was in fact an envoy of Princess
Carlota Joaquina, Ferdinand VIIs sister, who was married to the prince regent
of Portugal and reputedly planning to take over Spanish America. According to
these rumors, Goyeneche had been secretly commissioned to hand the Spanish
American kingdom to the Portuguese Crown installed in Brazil or, worse, to
Napoleon. Oidores and members of the cabildo found in this gossip an argument
to reject Goyeneches inconvenient new military powers.19
Goyeneche arrived in Buenos Aires in August 1808 as Santiago de Linierss
authority weakened and Governor of Montevideo Francisco Javier Elo pre-
pared his overthrow with the support of the cabildos in Montevideo and Buenos
Aires. They accused him of treason and collaboration with Napoleon. In January
1809 the cabildo of Buenos Aires tried to remove Liniers from power and install
a junta, but the newly created militia resisted this move.20
Unrest also grew in Caracas, where the cabildo clashed with the audiencia
on the strategy for facing the Napoleonic invasion of Spain; the former favored
the formation of a junta while the latter opposed it. The captain general of
Venezuela took action, repressed the council, and temporarily brought calm.
Members of the cabildos (civilians mostly of American origins) were defying
the power of captain generals and military presidents of the audiencias all over
Spanish America. The audiencias, institutions traditionally made up by Creoles
and civilians, were now largely overseen by military officers of Peninsular
origins.
News of these affairs circulated far and wide. In 1809 tensions reached
Charcas, a region bordering Peru but subordinated to the Rio de la Plata vice-
royalty that had strong commercial ties with Buenos Aires. Their neighbors
attempts at autonomy inspired many in Charcas to plan similar actions.21 The
seat of an old audiencia and an equally old university, Charcas, attracted students
from southern and Alto Peru, Chile, and Rio de la Plata to study law. This city of
students and lawyers was a breeding ground for revolutionaries.

In May 1809, following the steps of its counterpart in Buenos Aires, the
royal council of Charcas rejected the authority of its president and proclaimed
a junta. Ramn Garca Len y Pizarro, a military officer of noble Peninsular
origins on the verge of retiring, was an easy target. Lawyers trained in Charcas
led the movement, which also included vecinos and letrados from Alto Peru and
Cuzco.22 In his report to the Crown about the upheavals in the area, Liniers
directly blamed lawyers for the unrest and accused the oidores of producing
chaos. These oidores were constantly showing the people that there was no
higher authority than theirs, while resisting the viceroys orders in the most
daring and scandalous manner. They agreed on one thing to dissent in a hun-
dred; they did to undo, Liniers added. Trying to minimize the importance of
the unrest, the viceroy explained that the sedition in Montevideo had spread
with letters and subversive papers that could only make an impression in the
audiencia of Charcas, whose ministers go there to study the constitution of the
state and to let themselves be seduced by the first lawyers that show up to gov-
ern them. These provinces have the tendency to succumb to the hesitations
of self-pride and have become a school for those who think that they can rule
anything (to ruin everything) with five paragraphs of the Ynstituta, the viceroy
stressed. In a calmer yet more pejorative manner, Liniers partially attributed
these problems to the ignorance of most ministers, who had suddenly been
granted a new authority.23
The highest royal authorities in Buenos Aires and Charcas, who worked
closely with Viceroy Abascal, saw these actions as attempts at insurgency
and rebellion. Together they schemed a counteroffensive. As the vecinos of
Charcas were planning on replacing the old president of the royal council,
the Spanish junta named Vicente Nieto, to the position. As a field marshal,
who had served in Buenos Aires and as governor of Montevideo, Nieto had
led troops from Buenos Aires to ruthlessly repress the insurgents of La Paz in
1809.24 President Nieto wasted no time and ordered the capture of the audi-
encias unruly members; the audiencia, however, acted faster and imprisoned
him first. The oidores then formed a junta to govern in the absence of King
Ferdinand. Two months later, the municipality of La Paz formed another
junta, claiming to represent an autonomous government. Their other objec-
tive was the liberation of Charcas from its dependency on Buenos Aires and
on Lima, in particular.25
Viceroy Abascal knew what was at stake and took no risks. In August 1809 he
sent his armies to defeat what he saw as insurgent efforts.26 Perhaps because of
the imminence of the repression and because Goyeneche and his new army had
a strong presence there, events in La Paz turned violent.27 The leaders of the new
junta decided to defend their rights by establishing gallows in the main square to
hang Europeans, who they equated with royal authorities. Yet among the leaders

of this upheaval were the navarro Juan Pedro Indaburu, the gallego Juan Antonio
Fernandez, and the vizcano Domingo Anibarro.28 The head of the movement
was Juan Jos Castelli, a lawyer from Buenos Aires who was trained in the mili-
tias that Liniers had created. Like many other revolutionaries of the 1810s, he
had studied law in Charcas and was part of the group that overthrew Viceroy
Balthasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, Linierss successor in Buenos Aires. Castelli con-
tinued the fight against royal forces in Crdoba, where he met former Viceroy
Liniers and his improvised anti-juntista militia. In August 1810 Castellis forces
captured the viceroy and executedhim.
By then, Abascal had to contend with another front in the north. Ayear ear-
lier, in August 1809 a group of prominent vecinos (mostly lawyers) in Quito had
decided to form a junta during the cabildo elections there.29 They proclaimed the
need for self-government and independence from Santa F and Lima. In their
manifesto, the new juntistas claimed to be neglected as American Spaniards and
to be organizing a legitimate government to resist the menace of Napoleon. The
junta was composed of American Spaniards, who opposed the predominance
of European Spaniards in the administration. Despite the strength of their ide-
als, Quito juntistas failed to gain the support of the other provinces. As they
lost strength, factionalism proliferated, and Abascals troops defeated them in
December1809.
In May the cabildo abierto (open municipal assembly) of the city of Buenos
Aires refused to recognize the new authority of the regency in Spain, over-
threw the viceroy, and formed the Junta Superior Provisional Gubernativa de
las Provincias del Rio de la Plata. The same month, vecinos of Santiago, Chile,
deposed Captain General, Francisco Garca Carrasco, as he repressed their
efforts to form a junta and appointed an old Creole nobleman, Mateo de Toro
Zambrano. After long discussions, the junta members refused to acknowledge
the authority of Spains regency and formed an autonomous government.30 In
July 1810 vecinos of Santa F followed suit and formed the Junta Suprema del
Reino de Granada.
By and large, the leaders of these first upheavals and struggles for autonomy
in South America were lawyers from the cabildo, royal council, and university.
They were perceived as a new menace, especially by military officers defending
royal authority. The strong antagonism between civilian and military authority
fueled the rising rivalry between American and Peninsular Spaniards as these
early struggles for autonomy were repressed. Abascal seemed aware of the chal-
lenges ahead.
In contrast to the unrest spreading throughout neighboring territories, royal and

viceregal authority consolidated in Peru through the expansion of the military. It
was no accident that Peru and Cuba, the territories of the empire with the largest

armies, did not have juntas or that their efforts at forming them were successfully
repressed.31
The expansion of the army in Peru that began in the 1790s significantly
expanded during Viceroy Abascals decade-long tenure, which coincided with
the Napoleonic Wars. He set forth the third and definitive wave of reforms,
transforming the military of Peru into one of the largest and most successful
forces in the Spanish Empire and the South Atlantic. Abascals reforms gave
the Peruvian military its final form. He restructured and renamed Perus forces
Los Reales Ejrcitos del Per. Under him, the army became a highly central-
ized, ethnically diverse, and expansive institution that operated beyond civil-
ian control and remained loyal to the viceroy and the king. With these forces,
Abascal ruled in a dictatorial manner and defeated insurgents north, west,
andsouth.
The arrival of Jos Manuel de Goyeneche and the viceroys decision to form
the Royal Army of Alto Peru proved key. After Trafalgar, the devastation of the
Spanish Navy, and the menacing presence of British vessels in the Atlantic,
Abascal could not expect Peninsular protection by sea and was aware of the need
to defend Peru with land forces.
After his initial problems in Buenos Aires, Goyeneche was appointed
interim president of the audiencia in Cuzco in August 1809. Two months
later Abascal ordered him to move to Puno and establish headquarters there.
The place chosen was Zepita, a key geopolitical location by Lake Titicaca,
very close to La Paz and Chuquisaca, from which the royal army could con-
trol access by land to Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa from Rio de la Plata and
Alto Per. There, the new brigadier general oversaw the formation of a new
army, planned battles, and conducted maneuvers. Soon this force became one
of the most prestigious in the Spanish empire. The viceroys who succeeded
Abascal served as lieutenant generals of this army first, and future republican
caudillos Agustn Gamarra and Andrs de Santa Cruz learned military tac-
tics and command strategies in this regiment. It is no coincidence that the
areas of greatest unrest during Abascals tenure were those close to the army
of Alto Peru, pressured with strong controls and intense demands for goods
and recruits.
This force was massive. It was composed of paisanos or, in the words of
Goyeneche, rudos paisanos (rustic locals), which at the time and in that region
meant locals, Indians and mestizos.32 Two men proved crucial in its success:Jos
Manuel de Goyeneche and Mateo Garca de Pumacahua. Both secured the loy-
alty and dominance of southern elites, which might explain the dominance of
these groups in the future republican history ofPeru.

To Abascals concerns, Goyeneche built this army his way, funded it partly
with his own wealth, and chose the officer corps from among his arequipeo
friends and relatives.33 The viceroy was aware of Goyeneches leverage but recog-
nized he could do little, for he did not want to antagonize this powerful Creole.34
One of Goyeneches earliest recommendations regarding the military was to
rebuild the units of Paruro, Cotabambas, and Chumbivilcas that had played a
crucial role in the rebellion of 1780. Apparently, the old officers had been hand-
ing him requests for rewards. Former Viceroy Avils had abolished these units
without much consideration. But in Goyeneches view they were composed
of robust men of the best quality and should additionally be granted the fuero
militar. This privilege would stimulate them, for they felt degraded when see-
ing their causes handled by subdelegates, who were generally paisanos and the
lettered, the brigadier general stressed.35 With this army, Goyeneche achieved
great victories over the insurgents from Charcas and La Paz in October 1809 and
Argentinean forces in Guaqui in June 1811. Part of his success was the organiza-
tion of guerrillas, a tactic he learned in Spain or elsewhere in Europe.36
Goyeneche earned the reputation of commanding an army of twenty-thousand
men, a number that was probably exaggerated but speaks to his fame.37 In 1809,
the arequipeo general reported a total of 3,433 men, 276 of whom were partida
de guerrillas.38 He also claimed to have organized about 1,500 men to hunt for the
leaders of the junta of La Paz and the lawyer Murillo, who had dared to appoint
and call himself general commander of the Revolutionary junta.39 Yet more than
in Goyeneches military training and wealth, the strength of the Alto Peru Army
lay in its capacity to maintain an effective system of patronage and rewards.40
Achieving victories was crucial for this system to work. Land distribution, boo-
ties, and confiscations were used to pay soldiers and secure loyalty. Abuses and
looting prevailed.41 Abascal was aware of the need to create an army that became
more attractive to Peruvian subjects than that of insurgents. Rewards were thus
crucial. Facing the major financial constrains that the viceroyalty underwent after
the Cortes abolished the Indian tribute in March 1811, the viceroy implemented
an aggressive system of promotions in the army and distribution of land. In addi-
tion to his pay, each soldier received a topo (traditional family subsistence unit) of
land in property as he achieved promotions in the army.42
Yet Abascal not only conceived of the army as a force of repression but also
as a way to channel discontent. Abascal excelled in incorporating Creoles, castas,
and Indians into Spanish rule through the army and took this scheme to another
level.43 According to Abascals tenure report, of a total of 7,500 men enlisted in
infantry and artillery militias, two thousand belonged to the regiments of pardos
and morenos. Of the 1,080 cavalrymen, 230 were pardos and morenos.44 Those

numbers more or less coincide with the 6,500 he claimed in a report to his friend
Aguirre in 1811. Abascal also reestablished the urban militia unit of pardos libres
of Guayaquil because he considered it far more loyal than the white militia
unit, which was addicted to the system of the revolution, and they helped him
weaken the Quito juntistas.
In 1811 the viceroy created the unit of Voluntarios Distinguidos de la
Concordia Espaola del Per, predominantly composed for the most part
of Spanish Americans, including mestizos and pardos.45 Apparently members
of Limas cabildo had been asking for this special regiment.46 Additionally, he
reinstated the urban militia units of Cotabambas, Chumbivilcas, Aymares,
and Paruro and created the Compaa de Hsares de dragones de Tinta. One
of Abascals boldest military decisions was to restore the noble Indian unit of
Cuzco, abolished in 1793, to stimulate these individuals. Although they did not
qualify for it, he named them as a disciplined militia, which gave them a higher
professional status than the urban white militia and facilitated the transition of
its members to the professional army.47 Asymbol of this possibility was Cacique
Mateo Pumacahua.48
Like Goyeneche, Pumachua was one of the wealthiest individuals in the
Cuzco region and a member of its elite and the old Inca nobility. He repeat-
edly proved his power and loyalty with his impressive capacity to quickly put
together militia forces and defeat insurgents. His victories over the Tupac
Amaru forces were not forgotten. In the increasingly tense environment of the
south, Cacique Pumacahua was a crucial ally. He helped secure the support of
paisanos in the Cuzco region and loyalty of Indian elites. In 1811 Pumacahuas
army of 3,500 men secured the defeat of revolutionaries in La Paz.49 The caci-
que was rewarded with the rank of brigadier, an unprecedented commission
for an Indian. Reports from Spain frequently stated that Goyeneche was key
for the Alto Peru Army and ought to be rewarded, and the Arequipeo gen-
eral repeatedly stressed that Pumacahua was vital for the same reasons. In
October 1811, facing Castellis menace, Goyeneche urged Abascal to verify
that Pumacahua had left for La Paz with his naturales (indigenous men). His
arrival was important, the general commander underscored, not for the fear
he could instill among insurgents but for his influence in pueblos that look
at that capital [Cuzco] as principal axis of stability and respect in the whole
continent.50
Peninsular authorities made sure to reward both men. Goyeneche achieved
the highest commissions. As an Indian, Pumacahua received only limited and
temporary rewards. His subsequent discontent contributed much to the greatest
unrest during Abascals tenure.
With the support of the army and the insecurity generated by the Napoleonic
invasion of Spain, Abascal set forth three crucial war policies that strengthened

his rule but had damaging consequences for the future of the Peruvian state.
First, he expanded viceregal power. He served both as representative of the king
and captain general of the royal armies. As such, he had the right to select all
commissions in the army, as well as nominate the president of the audiencia of
Cuzco. Following Godoys recommendation of awarding military ranks to these
authorities in 1808 after the Aguilar Ubalde conspiracy, Abascal named military
officers as presidents of the Cuzco audiencia: thus, a crucial institution was co-
opted, one that could have offered some checks and balances to the viceroys
authority. Beyond his direct control were the church and the cabildo. It is no
wonder that members of the latter institution and priests from the lower orders
always appeared on the lists of conspirators and rebels.51
Second, Abascal forged a crucial alliance with the elites of Peru, who sent
enormous contributions to the war in Spain and South America. He orches-
trated propaganda campaigns largely directed to create a sense of despair in
order to obtain financial support for them. As one of Abascals statements put
it in 1808: Thus, brave Spaniards and Americans as long as the blood of
the immortal champions buried in the ruins of Numancia and Sagunto run in
our veins. our haciendas [possessions] and our lives will be sacrificed to the
invaluable good of possessing Ferdinand VII.52 Abascal obtained funds from
the cabildo, mining tribunal, estate owners, hospitales, cofraternities, cajas de cen-
sos de indios, and especially from the merchants guild or consulado. In return,
the merchants were offered high interests for the large and repeated donativos
to Abascal and the Crown.53 Private individuals provided the viceroy with high
contributions as well.54 For example, by 1810 Cacique Mateo Pumacahua had
donated two thousand pesos at no interest to the Crown. Likewise, by 1819 the
total contributions of Goyeneches father amounted to ten thousand pesos.55 By
1812 the Crown owed the consulado of Peru about 5.5 million pesos, which left
its merchants depleted.56
In return, the viceroy protected the interests of Peruvian elites by taxing prod-
ucts coming from Panama and by opposing any attempts at free trade, which
could bring the British closer.
Third, Abascal was committed to expanding and restoring the old viceroy-
altys territories, which also served elite interests. In 1806, after the viceroys
demands, the port of Guayaquil became a dependent of Limas consulado and
of Limas military. Likewise, in October 1809 Cuenca opted to subordinate to
Perus authority. In July 1810 the president of the Charcass audiencia sent the
viceroy a petition to repeal its annexation to the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata
in 1776 and return to the viceroyalty of Peru, which Abascal confirmed. In
1812 the coastal city of Valdivia in Chile was strategically subjected to Peru.57
Abascals methods of funding the war, expanding his power, and elevating
the viceroyaltys prestige in South America worked in the short term but were

unsustainable in the long run, leaving the viceroyaltys forces and finances
exhausted when he left in1816.
The expansion of the military in Peru under Abascal also produced important
and long-lasting political consequences. The viceroyalty remained protected
from successful attempts at independence but not from political conflicts
and the rise of a military caudillismo. Viceroy Abascals campaigns to collect
money contributed much to spread the new roles that loyal caudillos, such as
El Empecinado, and guerrilla leaders were achieving in Spain.58 Caudillos have
often been defined as pro-independent insurgents and prominent patrons
coming from large haciendas where they learned command strategies.59 While
this kind of leader seems to have predominated in the llanos of Venezuela and
the pampas of Rio de la Plata, from 1809 onward both Spain and Peru saw the
rise of loyal military leaders, who were referred to as caudillos, learned to lead
in the royal army, and who were not necessarily looking for independence. We
should not forget that the term caudillo was used both in Spain and America
before independence. It was used during the reconquista as revealed in the lit-
erature of the time and in the Siete Partidas of King Alfonso X in the thirteenth
century. The 1729 Spanish dictionary, Diccionario de Autoridades, defined
caudillo as the one who guides, leads, and rules over people of war, as their
head. This definition was then broadened to include the head and leader of
war people (Dux, belli caput) or the head of a guild, community or corporation
(Caput, praefectus).60
Abascal succeeded in restraining the rise of separatist or pro-independence
caudillos in Peru, but he faced the emergence of loyal caudillos such as Goyeneche
and Pumacahua. Jos Manuel de Goyeneche had been correct when as a young
boy he had assured his father that joining the military was a good opportunity for
a Creole to gain a prominent place in society. During the war against the insur-
gents, as had happened with Spanish guerrilla leaders and military officers, the
press in Peru enthused about Goyeneche as a Spanish American. His achieve-
ments were officially commemorated in Lima and Arequipa.61 In the celebra-
tions of his victories in Alto Peru held at the university of La Plata, he was called
a Gran Pompeyo, padre de la patria, and a true Peruvian Hero who had been
trained with the latest military knowledge in Europe and who should go in peace
to govern.62 Goyeneche was compared with General Castaos, who led the first
Spanish victory against Napoleon in Bayln.63 In 1813 the Crown rewarded his
actions by giving him the title of count of Guaqui and soon afterward the highest
nobility title possible, Grandee of Spain.
Despite all this glory, Goyeneche could not avoid the destiny of most mili-
tary heroes of his time. His opponents, men of letters and lawyers in particular,
blamed him for trying to elevate himself as a Napoleon. The liberal El Peruano

criticized him for overreaching and abusing his power in acting as the president
of Alto Peru instead of just serving as a general commander.64
Abascal resented Goyeneches prominence, and their relationship became
tense. They disagreed on the strengths of their forces, strategy, and vision. In
increasingly heated exchanges, Abascal questioned each of Goyeneches deci-
sions, and the latter defended himself, sometimes by refuting the viceroys ideas
with erudite examples from military history, including Bonapartes campaigns.65
Their relationship ultimately fell apart in 1813 after Goyeneches defeat by the
insurgents of Rio de La Plata in Salta, Alto Peru. The viceroy could not tolerate
that Goyeneche had signed an armistice with General Manuel Belgrano without
asking for his permission.66 Belgrano and Goyeneche, two leading members of
the American elites, reached an agreement. Abascal was furious.
Prior to these events, Goyeneche had urgently and repeatedly asked the
viceroy for reinforcements and for his authorization to form a larger officer
corps, without which he thought the royal cause would be lost.67 Abascal
accused him of surrendering to datos melanclicos (melancholic statements)
and presenting him with an indecent proposal.68 In his defense, Goyeneche
claimed that his goal had been to negotiate an armistice with Belgrano, not
a new form of rule.69 Soon after the defeat of Salta, Goyeneche left for Spain
and never returned. Sub-inspector of artillery, Joaqun de la Pezuela was
named general commander of the army of Alto Peru. The viceroy could now
rulealone.
In the end, Abascal managed to prevail over this rival military figure, to defeat
insurgents with his large and well-organized forces, and to elevate himself as
supreme ruler; however, he still had to cope with proliferating and disturbing
men of letters, who directly questioned his authority. Protected under the new
freedom of the press, the lettered in Peru began to publish works claiming that in
Spanish America viceroys had become true military despots.
As outlined in his plan of governance of 1807, Abascal tried to restrain men of

letters by all means possible. He began by promoting a large network of infor-
mants who intercepted letters and pamphlets and wrote him detailed accounts
on suspicious activities.70 In his personal archive, Abascal kept a large number of
letters by women, who along with their petitions for the well-being of their loved
ones, made sure to offer the viceroy precious information on key actors of their
local communities.71 The viceroy also tried to control the circulation of foreign-
ers and so-called subversive literature.72 In his tenure report of 1816, Abascal
stressed that in order to secure peace in the viceroyalty he could not let vehe-
ment speeches travel without any restrictions.73 Abascals surveillance system
proved effective, as it is no coincidence that on most occasions, insurgents were
given away before they couldact.

And yet, despite all these efforts aimed at controlling men of letters, and like
most military rulers to follow him, Abascal realized that he also needed them to
prevail in the new arena of public opinion. They would write for him and help him
come across to his viceregal subjects as an efficient administrator and civilizer.
The viceroy was smart enough to carefully choose his men from among those
formerly associated with viceregal power. Most had formed part of Viceroy Gil
de Taboadas court and had been members of the Sociedad de Amantes del Pas
that produced the Mercurio Peruano. This was the case of priest Joaqun Larriva,
member of the Inquisition and professor of literature, philosophy and geography
at San Marcos, as well as Hiplito Unnue and Gregorio Paredes, Cosmgrafos
Mayores del Reino and professors of sciences.74 No independent lawyers were
among Abascals collaborators, only Baqujano y Carrillo who after his bad expe-
rience with his eulogy to the viceroy in 1780 and the Mercurio Peruano seemed
solely interested in attaining higher positions in the administration.
Abascals closest man of letters was Hiplito Unnue, the son of a Basque
merchant and a Creole woman who, like the viceroy himself, belonged to Perus
provincial elite. In the 1790s Unnue had worked as the secretary of Viceroy Gil
de Taboada, editing his tenure report and preparing statistical guides for com-
mercial purposes. He held the chair of anatomy at the University of San Marcos
and the first chair of medicine in Peru at the Escuela de San Fernando, where he
later served as dean. Unnue became Perus first professional doctor. Overall,
and despite his official commissions, Unnue seemed more interested in scien-
tific research than in politics.75 The viceroy could not have found a better col-
laborator among the lettered.
Viceroy Abascal needed men of letters to fulfill three main objectives: to
propagate the juntas decrees and the Constitution along with his opinions about
them; to praise him as great ruler through his public works, which included such
acts as the cleaning of water channels and streets, the creation of the Escuela
de San Fernando, the establishment of the first school of medicine in Peru, the
rebuilding of the city walls, and the construction of a public cemetery (his great
source of pride); and to counter liberal threats with government-sponsored pub-
lications. Notwithstanding all the viceroys struggles on this front, pamphlets
and newspapers created some of the few arenas for public discussion that briefly
existed in Peru during the liberal era of Cadiz. Abascal confronted his worst
criticshere.
By 1806 Lima relied on one main newspaper, the Minerva Peruana, for local
and international news such as concerned the war with Britain and the menace of
Bonaparte. Yet the Napoleonic wars created a new demand for news. Addressing
this strange reality, the Minerva Peruana published in January 1809 the letter of
a reader complaining about the delay in the publication of news. He wondered
how it was possible that newspapers from Europe arrived and remained in the

hands of some particulares (private individuals) for days before the news was
finally published. By the time those papers reached the printer, they were dirtier
than Napoleons conscience, the writer stressed. After all, the public had more
rights to the news than a few particulares, he concluded.76 Afew days later, the
editor responded by apologizing and explaining that the delay had not been his
fault but that of the juez de imprentas (censor) and the printers employees who
could not perform their work without reading the newspaper first. To add more
drama to the story the editor added that he had felt so frustrated by the workers
delay that he had wanted to take their eyes out or cut their legs.77 This sense of
entitlement to the news was unprecedented.
Abascal took control of the paper, but things got complicated when the
Minerva began to communicate the news of Napoleons invasion and the new
ideas and arguments discussed in the Spanish Peninsula. 78 In 1809, for example,
the Minerva published a statement by the Junta Suprema de Sevilla condemn-
ing Napoleon and calling for a civilian government that subordinated military
affairs.79 The paper counterbalanced these statements by extolling the war in
the Peninsula and the heroic caudillos of Spain, the guerrilla leaders Palafox,
Castaos, and El Empecinado, and the actions of generals Agustn Blake and the
Duke of Wellington.
Despite Abascals efforts at counterpropaganda, his control of information
ended in April 1811 when the official decree proclaiming the freedom of the
press reached Peru.80 The viceroy took all possible restrictions contemplated in
the law to impede the implementation of this decree and appointed a censorship
board, the Junta de Censura de Lima, composed of a nobleman, a priest, and the
dean of the school of San Carlos.81 But soon he had to accept the emergence of
new publications and the spread of a liberal critique that directly questionedhim.
The new press that emerged in the viceroyalty of Peru in the era of Cadiz did
not pursue a nationalist program or independence. As in the Spanish Peninsula,
the new publicistas of the 1810s conceived of themselves as fighters against arbi-
trary rule, oppression, and absolutism. There were some extremists who aimed
for revolution, but for the most part Liberal writers focused on defending the
junta and opposing absolutism and despotism, which, in Peru, meant Abascals
militaryrule.
The leading men of letters opposing Abascal in the Lima press were the
members of the Tertulia del Campo: Manuel Villalta, Gaspar Rico, Miguel de
Eyzaguirre, and Fernando Lpez Aldana. Abascal saw Villalta and Rico as the
leaders of the most subversive newspapers of Lima.82 Limeo Villalta was a well-
known son of oidores and noblemen in Peru, who had fought against rebel Tupac
Amaru, served as governor of Callao, and traveled to Spain in search of better
professional opportunities. In Peru, he was one of the first to publicly accuse
Viceroy Abascal of arbitrary rule. Although Villalta also protested the neglect

of Spanish Americans in the administration, he more generally critiqued the

inequality and oppression created in a despotic rule such as the one established
by Abascal.
In his tenure report, Abascal rejected Villaltas claims and accused him of
forging American resentment and jealousy of Spanish privileges, which he con-
sidered the driving forces of insurgents to form a party.83 Yet, in 1811 the defend-
ers of Villalta against the viceroys attacks wrote a pamphlet underlining that he
had legitimately criticized the junta for sending the worst authorities to Spanish
America and for supporting despised governors. Based on arguments of natural
law, the text claimed that all men were born equal in both Espaas and that some,
such as the viceroy, should not attempt to divide subjects by planting the seeds
of division and discord between children of the same mother. If you dont drop
those barbaras (barbaric) ideas, it will be impossible to reconcile, the pamphlet
implicitly told the viceroy.84 Abascal responded by trying to have the Junta de
Censura ban the circulation of these manifestos.85
Of all the publicistas of the 1810s, Gaspar Rico was by far the most aggres-
sive. Rico was a Peninsular Spaniard from the Rioja, closely connected by mar-
riage and business to the limeo elite.86 He worked for the powerful Spanish
trading company Los Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid and began his career
as a writer with a campaign against the rival Compaa de Filipinas, defend-
ing himself against accusations that he misappropriated funds from the Cinco
Gremios. The viceroys lack of support for his cause, as well as his opposition
to any attempts at free trade infuriated the riojano.87 In 1811 Gaspar Rico
published his newspaper El Peruano.88 Although a Peninsular Spaniard, Rico
had no problems writing as a Peruvian, a term he used more as a voluntary
than as a determined identity. He used the collective we (as in we, Peruvians)
to protest against abuses. In Spain it is believed convenient to preserve the
dependency or union in the Americas to send us proclamations and texts full
of lessons, sentiments, and expressions that amaze us. It is believed useful to
spread sincere promises to remedy all damages and offenses suffered together
with the mother patria and, in particular, by our different constitution:a gen-
erous procedure that demands equal correspondence from America and noble
trust. 89 Rico also considered himself a representative of the Liberal Spaniards
of Cadiz. He proclaimed El Peruanos main goal to be the propagation of the
Cortes debates and decrees. He was a Liberal fighting against the oppression
of despotism.
Systematic despotism, whether carried out by the viceroy or the church,
led to corruption, Rico wrote.90 Only by appointing virtuous authorities and
rewarding the honor of citizens would this situation end the vices inherited
from the court of Charles IV. It was not possible, he argued, that Spain enjoyed
all liberties while Spanish America remained oppressed. Nothing represented

this better than the restrictions Abascal had imposed on the freedom of the
press, he stressed. Is silence the only true homage to his Majesty? Rico asked,
adding that Peninsular newspapers painted and lamented with the most vivid
colors and strongest sentiments, the disgusting images one tries to erase. Could
it be licit, praiseworthy, and even convenient to play there with all the springs
of the machine in a just and liberal government, while at the same time it is
here illicit, blameful, and damaging to reveal to the people that they need to
be treated by stable laws and that no minister can abuse his authority without
punishment?91
In a pamphlet he published around this time, Rico openly criticized the alli-
ance between the viceroy and the interests of some rich families of Peru, which
were trying to discredit him in the press.92 Ricos statements infuriated Abascal,
who tried by all means to sanction and imprison him.93 But soon, the viceroy
had to cope with the emergence of an even more critical publication, El Satlite
del Peruano, issued in support of Rico and considered by Abascal to be the most
incendiary and subversive paper of Lima.94 Its publisher was Fernando Lpez
Aldana, a lawyer of Limas royal council, who in 1811 had clandestinely circu-
lated the subversive paper El Diario Secreto de Lima.95
From the start, El Satlite proclaimed itself a defender of El Peruano but
stated that it was committed to a more liberal plan.96 History and politics
were to be its main topics. Additionally, the paper would provide all informa-
tion required to educate citizens in all that is needed to form a publicista.97
El Satlite began by discussing the use of the term patria. Spain, liberated
from the French, was the madre patria for Americans and Spaniards, and both
dominions, America and Spain, formed one sole patria. El Satlite explained
that Americans should only reject as brothers those who opposed the happi-
ness of America, meaning those who wish the continuation of the old colo-
nial government. They are worst than the French, and it is necessary not to
recognize them as brothers, but to exterminate and disappear them. El Satlite
stressed that Americas future depended on the revolution in Spain.98 Facing
accusations for subversion and insurgency by the censorship junta,99 El Satlite
came back in the first issue to its discussion of the term patria, arguing that
the Americas and Spain formed one whole patria. If the American provinces
were not coloniesas the junta insistedthen authorities in the court had
no real power over them. But if they were equal, American Spaniards should
have the right to select their own governors and get rid of despots. Aldanas cri-
tique trespassed all permissible boundaries by openly proclaiming admiration
for the French Revolution. As he defiantly put it, this had been the only true
revolution because it had made people realize that they were dispossessed not
because they belonged to a different order but because a despotic government
had oppressed them.100

Aldana wrote this paper as a Liberal and revolutionary, not as a national-

ist. El Satlite considered that Peninsular and American Spaniards had been
victims of the same oppression and corruption under the rule of Charles IV.
He referred to the junta as despotic and despised it for the same reasons as
Blanco White, whose writings along with those of Campany and Jovellanos he
strongly recommended.101 In his view, the eloquent, high-minded discourses
of the Cortes had accomplished very little. If the representatives to the assem-
bly sincerely desired equality in the Spanish world, El Satlite claimed, they
should have ensured real political participation, guaranteed liberties, and abol-
ished the Inquisition. Since he had little faith in the Cortes, he could only hope
for a revolution in Spain, which he seemed to imply would then bring one to
Spanish America.102
Viceroy Abascal reacted to these statements forcefully. He tried to
imprison Aldana and his followers, and he also pursued more aggressive
measures by sponsoring new publications.103 One of these new publications,
El Verdadero Peruano (18121813), was dedicated to vilifying Rico and his
supporters while advocating unity. The first issue tied the notion of patria
to the king and the Constitution.104 Repeatedly, this newspaper praised the
achievements of the army unit of La Concordia, the public works of the
viceroy, and the rule of general commanders. He reinforced the idea that
Spanish Americans ought to be happy for living under a reformed rule that
rejected despotism, assured freedom by appropriately providing justice, and
rewarded merit.105 The paper presented the sons of the great Pelayo as grate-
ful for belonging to this grand empire that had produced the constitution of
1812.106
The editors of El Verdadero Peruano were priest Toms Flrez and doctor Jos
Pezet. Among the collaborators figured Hiplito Unnue and Flix Devoti, doc-
tor of Italian origins who had also been a member of the Sociedad de Amantes
del Pas and professor at San Fernando.107 These writers were also involved in the
campaigns of the Argos Constitucional and most publications defending Abascal,
the king, and traditional law and order.108
In 1813 the viceroys newspapers engaged in a new discussion about the term
patria, arguing that there was clearly only one. Mean provincial ideas would
always be followed by weakness and misery, El Argos Constitucional argued.109
Soon this publication faced poignant attacks by the Anti-argos, which made fun
of its opening claim that as the mythological argos they were defending the con-
stitution. The Anti-argos wondered how these ignorant men could claim that
they could teach the people something. What made them think of themselves
as superior? How could men of such limited talents call themselves Argos in
politics?110 Worst, how could these publicistas of unknown origins dare to argue
that electing representatives is not an exercise of sovereignty?111 Facing growing

opposition and lacking permission from the junta, Viceroy Abascal alleged con-
spiracies in Lima, imprisoned and deported Gaspar Rico to the Peninsula in
June of1812.
Additionally, the Junta de Censuras in Peru ordered the confiscation of all
issues of El Peruano. In his tenure report, Abascal justified his actions by claim-
ing that he had been forced to quell subversion in this tranquil country.112 Soon
afterward, the viceroy sponsored El Investigador (18131814), a less controver-
sial publication dedicated to local matters and to praising Abascals public works,
and then El Pensador del Per (18141815), a paper aimed at presenting the
widely criticized campaigns against the Chilean and Cuzco rebels in the best
possible terms.113
And yet, despite Abascals intense propaganda campaigns, repressive actions,
and obstructions of liberal measures coming from Cadiz, the viceroy had to face
a louder and proliferating menace:lawyers.
Viceroy Abascal profoundly mistrusted lawyers and tried hard to curtail

their actions. He saw them, with good reason, as the instigators of unrest in
the region. In a letter he drafted to Jovellanos in 1810 accounting for the vio-
lence in Rio de la Plata, Abascal explained that a sad congress of abogadillos
(little lawyers) of poor opinions and other perverse men had arbitrarily
selected Liniers as president of the junta, only to depose him soon afterward
and appoint a so-called Saabedra the commander of the largest militia corps.
As soon as the city of Buenos Aires learned of the creation of a Consejo de
Regencia, an open cabildo (assembly) was called, bringing together three hun-
dred people eager to alter the legitimate government, the viceroy stressed. He
recognized that these lawyers possessed some authority but claimed that in
comparison the militarys authority was superior because it was earned.114
Goyeneche, like so many military officers, shared Abascals mistrust, attribut-
ing the riots of 1809 in Chuquisaca to a small number of doctorcillos (little
doctors) and ministers of the audiencia with no morals whatsoever who
only liked discord and disorder.115
Abascal and Goyeneche were right to see lawyers and writers as a threat,
for they openly defied the expansion of military power in the region. By then,
men of letters knew how to make effective political arguments to discredit the
military and the viceroy. For example, in 1809, three lawyers of the royal coun-
cil of Chuquisaca submitted a report to the Junta Suprema of Seville request-
ing their exemption from military service. In it, they accused the president
of the audiencia of overreaching and of trying to create a Legion of Honor
like that of Bonaparte, which was the worst insult possible at the time. They
seemed outraged by the thought that the president was trying to capriciously
establish military ranks for all civilian posts and downgrade them, declaring

for example that the mayor only deserved the rank of colonel. They rejected
the idea of being obligated to join the military. According to the foundational
codex of Spanish legislation, Las Siete Partidas, they stressed, masters of the
law or lawyers were not expected to ride in cavalry to battle or to accept any
other commission. These lawyers also protested against military authorities
intercepting their writings and trying to obtain their report, in which they had
argued that the militarys arbitrary attitude was typical of despots. In contrast
to Abascal, they defended the superior merits of lawyers vis vis the military.
The lawyers concluded that they had earned certain prerogatives and exemp-
tions for their studies; teachings of the law; distribution of justice; defense of
widows, orphans, and the weak against the threats of the evil and powerful;
their love of virtue, peace, and order in society; and inspiring the respect,
obedience, and subordination owed to his Majesty, in particular. Despite their
great eloquence, the report was probably intercepted before it could reach its
addressee.116
One of the most challenging lawyers Abascal faced was the well-respected
Miguel de Eyzaguirre (b. 1770d. 1821). The second son of a Basque merchant
established in Chile, Eyzaguirre had studied in Santiago where he had tried
hard to obtain the chair of law at the University of San Felipe. Instead, he was
named dean and commissioned to travel to the Peninsula to negotiate regula-
tions for the new university. In 1805 following the Bourbon rule curtailing the
power of local elites in local administration, the Crown appointed Chilean-born
Eyzaguirre fiscal del crimen in Lima and protector of the Indiansthere.
Eyzaguirre took his job seriously. In 1807 he petitioned Viceroy Abascal to
exempt Indians from having to pay the reparto, tribute, tithe, and other contri-
butions. In his report, the new protector underlined that the Americans from
Peru, are not foreigners, and the King does not want that they call themselves
conquered but pacified because they are men like us who should not be excluded
from universal equality.117 In condemning abuses against Indians, Eyzaguirre
blamed oppressive government.118 The intendancy system was supposed to rem-
edy these problems, he argued, but it had lost strength in recent times. He also
criticized those who made money by exploiting Indians, who were so poor that
they could not even satisfy basic duties established in natural law, such as feeding
themselves and their children.119 According to Abascal, Eyzaguirre had exceeded
even Raynals and Robertons critiques of Spanish rule.120
Two years later, in another report, Eyzaguirre argued that Indians possessed
no liberties. He presented a detailed list of abuses they suffered, singling out spe-
cific authorities. For example, he accused the subdelegate of Trujillo of using
Indian common waters and the subdelegate of Huanta of charging them double
payments. Eyzaguirre condemned this situation by stressing that the king had
created many laws to protect his Indian subjects but these were disobeyed and

Indians treated inhumanely.121 To remedy this situation, Eyzaguirre suggested

paying Indians for their labor so that they could improve their lives. Once they
were made equal to Spaniards, they would free themselves from oppression,
Eyzaguirre claimed.122
With these arguments, Eyzaguirre followed and cited the old Spanish proyec-
tista Campillo y Cosso.123 Unlike the old Bourbon officer, who addressed his
critiques in essays addressed to the monarch, the fiscal made his ideas public in
pamphlets and in Ricos El Peruano, which infuriated Abascal.124
Eyzaguirre became one of the most passionate advocates for the abolition
of the tribute in Peru.125 He presented it as an abusive practice that reinforced
inequality. He considered it the governments obligation to make Indians
equal by abolishing the tribute, distributing land to them and educating them.
Eyzaguirres campaign against the tribute took place at a time when Abascal des-
perately needed these funds to wage the wars against insurgents in neighbor-
ing territories. The viceroy tried to obstruct the implementation of the Cortes
decree of March 1811 abolishing the tribute, but he consistently faced the public
opposition of Eyzaguirre and other legal authorities. In 1812 Abascal wrote a
report to the secretary of state in Spain complaining about the attitude of the
audiencias fiscal del crimen (crime attorney) and sindico procurador de la ciudad
(legal representative of the city) who instead of applauding and favoring mea-
sures that necessity authorizes and makes fair and convenient fight them
with sophisms, mistakes in calculus, and a notorious ignorance of the principles
of political economy.126
In addition to Eyzaguirres public statements questioning and undermining
his decisions and authority, Abascal had to deal with his active defense of the
Indians implicated in rebellions. In some cases, such as the upheaval of Hunuco,
the fiscal put the viceroy in a tough spot by claiming that as minors, Indians were
not yet conscious of their actions. With these arguments, though pejorative and
demeaning, Eyzaguirre obtained pardons for the accused Indians.127
Abascal despised Eyzaguirre and did everything he could to discredit him.
In 1812 he accused the fiscal of being involved in the subversive activities of
his brother Agustn, the mayor of Santiago and leader of the Chilean junta.128
In December 1812 Eyzaguirre was elected deputy for the Cortes representing
Lima, but Abascal managed to veto him.129 In 1813 the viceroy accused him
of planning a conspiracy in Lima along with the Count of la Vega del Ren and
others in accordance with the Cuzco rebels.130 Abascal unsuccessfully tried the
alleged conspirators in a military tribunal, arguing that they had organized sedi-
tion against the military commander protected by the fuero. Per the viceroys
orders, a captain of the Concordia regiment arrested the count in October 1814
and took him to the artillerys barracks. Although Abascal was forced to set
him free, the attempt to treat a high noble from Lima in this manner shocked

and defied the traditional foundations of Peruvian society.131 Finally in 1815

after the return of Ferdinand VII, Abascal received royal permission to deport
Eyzaguirre to Spain. The fiscal sent a report in his defense to the Crown, and
Peninsular authorities offered him the first vacant seat in the chancillerias (chan-
ceries) of Valladolid or Granada.132 Despite his poor health, Eyzaguirre began
his trip to the Peninsula in 1818; however, his ship was attacked by pirates,
which forced him to return to the northern region of Lambayeque in Peru,
where he lived in self-imposed exile. Although Eyzaguirre was accused of being
associated with the insurgents of Chile, he did not join them. He also refused
the position of governor of Lambayeque that Argentinean insurgent General
Jos de San Martn offered to him in November 1820.133 According to a descen-
dant, Miguel de Eyzaguirre died in his bed in Lambayeque in May 1821 with
his devocionarios (prayers book) and the Constitution of Cadiz at his side.134 He
had fought for liberalism, not for independence.
While repressing opponents, Abascal tried to appear as a benefactor and
sponsor of American elites. He chose special occasions to praise key loyal
supporters with great pomp. For example, in 1812 the viceroy spared no
expense in organizing a splendid public feast in Lima to celebrate the elec-
tion of limeo noblemen Jos Baqujano y Carrillo as a member of the state
council in Spain. The feasts theme was the reward of loyalty with equality.
Like old baroque celebrations, all social and ethnic groups were expected
to participate. Speeches praised the generosity of the Cortes in recognizing
the merit of Spanish American subjects. Mulattoes and blacks offered their
dances to the newly elected member.135 Soon afterward, Lima hosted another
major celebration to commemorate the death of the Peruvian deputy to
the Cortes, Vicente Morales Durez. Descriptions of the feast emphasized
how this Peruvian subject, elected president of the Cortes shortly before he
died, had defended the patria with his eloquence and writing.136 What the
panegirista did not disclose was that Morales Durez had forcefully spoken
in Cadiz against the rule of despotic governors, such as Viceroy Abascal.137
Morales Durez knew of Abascals active opposition to the formation of a
junta in Peru and to sending deputies to the Spanish Peninsula who would
not necessarily defend him.138
Regardless of the liberties proclaimed in the constitution, Abascal made life
for Liberal men of letters in Peru difficult. With the viceroy counting on the sup-
port of a strong army and the powerful limeo elite, some found rebellion the
only solution.
Despite Abascals actions, the new freedom of the press, the arrival of the
Constitution, and the elections energized people from all social backgrounds
and introduced them into the practice of politics. The electoral process in Peru

began in 1809 with the elections for representatives to the Cortes and lasted for
about five years. The new liberal elections happened in stages and in multiple
rounds. Authorities and electors had to navigate with an abundance of convo-
luted decisions and rules, which left ample room for interpretation, manipula-
tion, and discontent.139 Abascal tried to control the outcomes by imposing his
own candidates, delaying the departures of the deputies chosen to represent
Peru in Cadiz he disliked, and obstructing the electoral process.140
The first round of elections for representatives to Cortes resulted in the selec-
tion of deputies Abascal trusted:Francisco Salazar y Carrillo for Lima and abso-
lutist Tadeo Grate for Puno, who were the first to arrive in Spain. Others such
as Mariano de Rivero and Jos Joaqun de Olmedo, deputies for Arequipa and
Guayaquil respectively, arrived almost at the end of the sessions.141 To repair this
delay, the junta in Spain offered the possibility of choosing provisional depu-
ties from among prestigious Peruvians living in the Peninsula. These were Blas
Ostolaza, an absolutist priest immortalized in Benito Prez Galdoss Episodios
nacionales; Vicente Morales Durez, Ramn Feli, and Dionisio Ynca Yupanqui,
an Indian noble who had studied at the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid and
spent almost his entire life in the Peninsula.142 Morales and Feli were precisely
the type of people Abascal tried hard to repress, lawyers who belonged to the pro-
vincial elite or the middle orders, took great pride in the merits of their profes-
sion and felt entitled to imagine a new and less oppressive form of government.
The electoral process in Peru is tied to conspiracies and rebellions. Abascal
and his subordinates made up some conspiracies and constantly alleged secret
plots against them, though their repressive actions did indeed lead to rebel-
lions. Conspiracies, riots, and upheavals were not unusual phenomenon but
a key component of imperial rule.143 In Peru, they had been common during
the eighteenth century, culminating in the Tupac Amaru movement.144 There
was, however, a major difference between those rebellions and the ones Viceroy
Abascal confronted. In the eighteenth century, the leaders were mostly mer-
chants; their followers were Indians and mestizos and a smaller group of Creoles.
Uprisings grew out of local concerns, protests against bad government, excessive
taxation, and abuses against Indians. In contrast, nineteenth-century upheavals
were mostly led by lawyers of Creole origins who sought the support of mesti-
zos and Indians. They were more internationally and regionally oriented, being
closely articulated to the events destabilizing the Spanish Peninsula, Rio de la
Plata, and Charcas.145 For this reason, the region of the southern highlands that
connected the viceroyalty of Peru with the Atlantic became an area of unrest
from 1809 to 1814.146 Royal authorities were aware of this and attempted to con-
tain the spread of news and attack before any action took place. Although they
downplayed the importance of the new rebel leadership by referring to them
as charlatans or los abogados dscolos (mad lawyers), Abascal and Goyeneche

prepared strong military counteroffensives against them.147 In 1811 the viceroy

led an army to the border with Rio de la Plata and coordinated with viceroy Elo
of Montevideo.148
As attempts at autonomy multiplied in Rio de la Plata and Charcas, tensions
proliferated in Peru. In 1809 there was an aborted attempt at forming a junta
inLima. Again in September 1810 Viceroy Abascal claimed a conspiracy there
led by a priest born in Buenos Aires named Ramn Eduardo Anchoris.
A new electoral cycle began in 1810 after the Rio de la Plata petitioned the
junta to expand the process to the realm of the cabildos.149 Electors were to
choose one deputy per partido (party, region), which was equated in most cases
to an intendancy. More people were politically mobilized as Peru chose thirteen
representatives.
In June, 1811 Francisco Antonio de Zela disregarded obedience to the vice-
roy of Peru, led a group of vecinos from Tacna, and swore allegiance to the junta
of Buenos Aires. He started a brief insurrection, hoping to join the forces of
insurgent Castelli. The uprising ended when Goyeneche defeated Castelli in
Guaqui shortly thereafter.150
Discontent multiplied in the viceroyalty with arrival of the Cortess
decree abolishing the Indian tribute in March 1811 and the realization of
many that the viceroy and other local authorities were not complying with
the order. Amajor upheaval broke out in Hunuco in February 1812. Much
like in Tacna, the leaders wanted to establish a junta with the support of
their Rio de la Plata counterparts. According to the records, the rebels pre-
sented the struggle partly as one against chapetones, referring to Peninsular
Spaniards. Nonetheless, Indians began a program of confiscations of prop-
erty that apparently did not take into account whether the items belonged
to European or American Spaniards.151 In Huancayo, the priest Jos Ignacio
Moreno, a former teacher of mathematics, philosophy, theology, and law
at the Convictorio de San Carlos, was caught preaching to his parishioners
during the rebellion about their rights to defend the laws decreed by the
junta to protect them.152
As the Army of Alto Peru appeased the southern highlands by execut-
ing reputed leaders of conspiracies and repressing others, Goyeneche wrote
a reassuring note to viceroy Abascal, advising him to make himself respect-
able by dureza (toughness) to live in peace. He reported that the provinces of
Cochabamba, Charcas, and Potos were so calm that they resembled hermi-
tas (shrines), and that nobody is involved in politics and our old enemies,
the doctors, are now our panegiristas Abascal was reportedly happy with the
news but skeptical that those panegiristas were acting in good faith,foras he
repliedperfidy was deeply rooted in them.153

The Constitution of Cadiz arrived in Lima in September 1812. Abascal did

everything he could to delay the publication of the fatdico libro de la llamada
Constitucin (fateful book of the so-called Constitution).154 But he finally had
to send it to the provinces so that Spanish subjects could swear their loyalty to the
new Liberal rule. According to official reports, Abascal printed and distributed
four thousand copies of the Constitution.155 Some were sold for two pesos in the
stores of principal main cities.156 At the same time, the viceroy tried to propa-
gate his interpretations of what the Constitution really meant with the assistance
of newspapers such as El Verdadero Peruano and the church. For example, after
reading the constitution in the pulpit, the bishop of Arequipa gave his explana-
tions of what equality and liberty really meant.157
The third and most intense round of elections took place over the years 1812
1814. Electors had to choose deputies to cortes ordinarias (ordinary aseembly),
diputaciones provinciales (provincial councils), and ayuntamientos constitucionales
(constitucional municipalities). This process reached the local level, as it started
in the parishes, which energized and mobilized people from the feared plebe.158
The Constitution mandated, in an unprecedented way, that every municipal
office be decided with elections. All of a sudden, elections proliferated, while
new cabildos constitutionales (constitutional municipalities) and their members
emerged. This decision opened new opportunities for men of letters of lower
status who began to actively defend their rights and protest against the obstacles
created by military authority and arbitrary rule. By then, there were indeed few
spaces for emerging civilian political actors vis vis the intendants, military offi-
cers, and audiencias made up mostly by members of the elite.159
Aware of the impact the constitutional elections might have in Peru, Abascal
tried to avoid and delay them. He defended his actions to the secretary of state
in Spain by claiming that these elections would lead to the political involvement
of the plebe, which he considered too risky, for it would inhibit the participation
of the true and honest citizens (the only ones who should be entitled to this
right, he stressed). The plebes active political participation would only produce
turmoil, he added. In his view, governors, who by then were all military officers,
ought to lead the selection of authorities. In so doing, they would impede the
spread of factions, which he considered harmful to a society.160
Constitutional elections occurred at a time when Abascal was taking over tra-
ditional civilian posts to appoint military officers and awarding military titles to
civilian authorities. For example, on the eve of the rebellion in Cuzco in 1814,
Arequipeo Jos Gabriel Moscoso held the titles of teniente coronel de los reales
ejercitos, gobernador intendente y presidente del cabildo.161 Moscoso was trained
as a military officer in Spain where he took part in the sieges of Zaragoza in
1808 and 1809 after the people had risen against the new French authorities.

As usually happens, this accumulation of power led to abuse and corruption.

Protests and violent confrontations defending the constitution followed.
Already in 1813, the vecinos of Caravel, Arequipa, rose against Colonel Pablo
de Rospigliosi. They deposed him and elected a new mayor, forcing officers to
hide their military uniforms and badges to avoid further confrontation.162 In
October 1813, Enrique Paillardele, an officer of the Army of Alto Peru born in
Buenos Aires and stationed in Tacna, led an insurrection with the goal of join-
ing Belgranos forces. The army under the command of Joaqun de la Pezuela
defeated them shortly thereafter.
The major rebellion of Abascals tenure broke out in Cuzco in 1814 and spread
south, resulting from a combination of idealism and repression.163 Abascal and
other royal authorities blamed the uprising on external influences from the
La Plata region, which had brought a strong animosity between europeos and
patricios, but the story is more complex and connected to viceroys policies.164
The unrest in Rio de la Plata and Alto Peru in 1809 and 1810 had put the
Cuzco region under great stress but the old Inca bastion had also faced inter-
nal problems with repeated conflicts between old and new, civilian and military
authorities. Since the 1780s Cuzco faced the political and understudied fiscal
pressures of an expansive military force, which only increased with the rise of the
formidable Royal Army of Alto Peru. All over, subjects experienced strong con-
trols but also the increasing financial demands and abuses from the army. Some
generals such as Domingo Tristn and his brother Po had no shame, and their
corruption and ruthlessness were widely known. Notwithstanding repeated
accusations for misconduct and Abascals recognition of their vices and fears of
their potential power, both men continued to escalate to the highest positions.165
Viceroy Abascal even feared that Domingo Tristn, appointed intendant of La
Paz by the new junta there, could march to Lima and proclaim himself viceroy
and captain general. This never happened, but Domingo was elected deputy for
Arequipa in 1813, although he did not manage to reach Spain in time. Po, on
the other hand, regained the prestige he lost in the defeat of Salta after leading
forces against Pumacahuas attacks of Arequipa. In 1815 he was named inten-
dant of that province, in 1816 provisional president of Cuzcos audiencia, in 1823
Viceroy La Serna promoted him to field marshal. Finally, when La Serna fell in
the final battle of Ayacucho, Po Tristn would serve as viceroy of Peru for a few
days.166
The militarization of political authority in the southern Andes created seri-
ous conflicts. In 1784 after the Tpac Amaru rebellion, the Crown introduced
the intendancy system in Peru. Cuzcos first intendant, Benito Mata Linares, was
the judge in charge of the trial against rebel Tupac Amaru who ordered his and
his familys tortuous death. Mata Linares already showed mistrust for the role
of Cuzcos cabildo. To curtail its actions, Mata relied on the audiencia, which

had been co-opted by Peninsular members.167 Moreover, since the implementa-

tion of this new system of local rule, the intendant (always a military officer) of
Cuzco and highest authority in the region tended to serve also as president of
the audiencia thus combining political, judicial, and military authority. And as
stated earlier, per Godoys instructions, the president of the audiencia was to be
a military officer. This did not happen in Lima, where the viceroy possessed the
right to preside over the audiencia.168
In addition to these problems, Cuzco experienced an effective power vacuum
in the years 18091815. The absence of a long-lasting president of the royal coun-
cil there opened a window of opportunity for the discontented. When the decree
announcing the need for elections to name a representative to the Spanish Cortes
arrived there in 1809, the president-intendant and former navy officer, Francisco
Muoz de San Clemente, was old and sick, and Abascal named Goyeneche presi-
dent only to send him to Puno to organize the royal forces. The viceroy made sure
to maintain the control of Cuzco, even nominally, in the hands of Goyeneche.
In the meantime, Spanish lawyer oidor Manuel Pardo served as the audien-
cias regent and oversaw the first elections of early 1809 for a representative to
the Cortes in the worst way possible. 169 The selection process took place in his
house, and all candidates were members of the audiencia of Peninsular origins,
which caused widespread discontent. There were three rounds of elections: in
1811, 1812, and 1813 respectively, with members of the audiencia and cabildo
participating. And the last one posed the biggest problems.170
As tensions grew in Cuzco, Abascal took the unprecedented measure of
appointing the Indian cacique Mateo Pumacahua president-substitute of Cuzcos
audiencia and interim intendant governor while Goyeneche was away.171 No other
Indian had ever held so much political power. Besides being a member of the
highest Indian elite, which probably was not particularly appealing for Creoles or
mestizos, Pumacahua was a senior military officer, brigadier general of the Royal
Army of Alto Peru, widely known for his royalism and for deploying the most
effective forces to defeat rebel Tupac Amaru. Pumacahua served Abascal well by
obstructing and repressing all attempts at implementing liberal policies.
But factionalism broke out. Members of the cabildo struggled against the
audiencia and its new provisional president.172 Pumacahua, for his part, began
to repress agitators by claiming a conspiracy, while his authority was directly
questioned. In December of 1812 the constitution of Cadiz arrived in Cuzco.
Conflicts started when lawyer and leader of a new constitutionalist faction
of the cabildo, Rafael Ramrez de Arellano, found out four days had passed
between the arrival of the constitution and its publication. He and thirty other
vecinos of Cuzco signed a manifesto in protest. The critique was framed as a gen-
eral rejection of arbitrary rule.173 By February 1813 the city was about to hold
other elections to select new constitutional authorities and electors, but facing

the rumors of a conspiracy and with the support of members of the audiencia,
Pumacahua imprisoned Ramrez de Arellano, the alleged planner of the rebel-
lion. Mounting pressure forced Pumacahua to free him a few hours later. When
elections were finally conducted, Ramrez de Arellanos faction prevailed.174
Manuel Galeano, his opponent and candidate of the audiencia, won only in a
few parishes. As a result, Ramrez de Arellano became the audiencias first pro-
curador sndico (public attorney) and immediately began to defy Pumacahuas
authority.
While this was happening, Belgranos insurgent army of Rio de la Plata
defeated the Army of Alto Peru in Salta, and Goyeneche resigned. As brigadier
general, and a decorated army officer, Pumacahua might have expected to suc-
ceed as general commander of the Royal Army of Alto Peru , but the commis-
sion instead went to Peninsular Joaqun de la Pezuela, future viceroy of Peru.
In reponse, Pumacahua resigned as interim president of Cuzcos audiencia and
retired to his large hacienda in Urquillos.
In October 1813, as Cuzco constituted its new diputacin provincial (provin-
cial council), the royal council alleged the planning of another conspiracy and
arrested three members of the royal army:Vicente Angulo, Gabriel Bjar, and
Juan Carbajal, who had repeatedly clashed with this institution.175 And as yet
a final election approached in August 1814, Jos Angulo led an expedition to
liberate his brother and partners, took control of the barracks, incarcerated the
president of the royal council and its members, issued proclamations against
tyranny, and formed a new government, a revolutionary junta, which distanced
them from the constitutionalparty.
The leaders of the Cuzco rebellion were the Angulo brothers, three mes-
tizo cuzqueos from the middle orders. Jos was dedicated to agriculture while
Vicente and Mariano were merchants. The latter also served as a militia officer.176
On October 5, 1814, the rebels formed a junta, named Jos Angulo governor
president, and refused to recognize the viceroys authority. After these initial
actions, the Angulos promoted themselves to captain and vanguard generals.
Soon they realized that in order to secure their rule they would require more
troops. As royal authorities had always done, they called powerful cacique
Mateo Pumacahua. He was the ideal Indian ally: rich, noble, and possessing vast
military experience. More importantly, he had a great fortune and an extraordi-
nary capacity to recruit men and form militias. Manuel Pardo, regent member
of the Cuzco audiencia, reported to the minister of state in Spain that the mesti-
zos Angulos and Bjar and the white Hurtado de Mendoza were all poor, unlike
Pumachua, un indio neto (pure Indian), whose proporciones (goods) exceeded
him.177 The insurgent Angulos offered Pumacahua the leadership of the forces
against Arequipa. He became lieutenant general, Inca, and marshal of Peru.178
Pumacahua immediately issued his own proclamations.179

One of the insurgents first actions was to imprison and kill Francisco de
Picoaga, field marshal of the Alto Peru Army, and arequipeo Jos Gabriel
Moscoso, the former governor of Cuzco. Aware of an imminent attack by the
viceroys forces, the rebels organized troops to march into neighboring terri-
tories of Huamanga, Puno, La Paz, and Arequipa. Looking for decisive battles
in Arequipa was a bad idea. This region was the bastion of Goyeneches power
and home to a large number of officers from the Alto Peru Army. Their plan
was to win the support of the discontented in Arequipa before they reached
the city. Despite some initially favorable demonstrations, this did not hap-
pen. Revolutionaries found supporters only in a small group of lawyers and
priests from the middle orders who could only gather a reduced number
of followers. Among them were priest Manuel Fernndez de Crdova and
twenty-four-year-old poet Mariano Melgar, who had studied with reformist
Bishop Chvez de la Rosa and became one of the first Peruvian writers to
use Indian rhythms. Melgar joined the Angulos and Pumacahua as auditor de
Guerra (war inspector).180 In March 1815 Melgar was shot in the pampas of
Umachiri in Puno. Pumacahua was caught in Sicuani. Ten days later, Abascals
forces, under the command of ruthless general Juan Ramrez, took Cuzco.
The Angulos were hung in the main square of Cuzco, as Tpac Amaru had
been in 1781.181 General Ramrez sent Pumacahuas head to Cuzco as a war
trophy.182 In his report to Mariano Osorio, Abascal wrote that a counterrevo-
lution had defeated the insurgents of Cuzco, adding that after General Juan
Ramrez had marched back to Alto Peru, the people had armed themselves
against the cholos that remained, killing half of them.183
The rebellion in Cuzco culminated in the sound victory of the Royal Army
of Alto Peru and Abascals consolidation over Argentinean and insurgent forces,
which strengthened the repression in Peru. As a consequence, all lawyers from
Cuzco who had been involved in the upheaval were immediately suspended
from their offices. An order listing fifteen lawyers was sent to the juzgados ordi-
narios (local courts) of Cuzco demanding that they only accepted recursos (legal
actions) from lawyers with open and well-known law offices.184 Even vaguely
suspicious Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, whose litigious protests and writings
annoyed Abascal, was sanctioned, accused of being involved in the rebellion,
and deported first to Lima and then to Spain.185 The victory also provided the
Royal Army of Alto Peru with abundant resources to reward the merits and loy-
alty of its forces. The officers and heads of the troops received land, public hom-
age, and medals.186 After being looted by the insurgents, Cuzco and Alto Peru
were sacked again by the royal army.187
By October 1814, the news of Napoleons defeat, the restoration of Ferdinand
VII to the Spanish throne, and his subsequent abolition of the Constitution
and liberal laws reached Peru. They could not have arrived at a better moment

for Viceroy Abascal.188 All that seemed to be left for revolutionary lawyers and
men of letters was to write satirical pieces against military rule and absolut-
ism such as the one below, circulate them clandestinely, and hope for more
auspicioustimes.
The military believed

That the King money wouldbring
And with remarkable happiness
His side theytook
Freedom they destroyed
The good one theychased
Order was disrupted
The lights extinguished
And the King only brought crosses
And everyone he crucified.189

Pens, Politics, andSwords

A Path to Pervasive Unrest, 18201830
The year 1820 marked a turning point for both Spain and Peru. On January 1,
Lieutenant Colonel Rafael de Riego, commander of an infantry batallion from
Asturias, organized a mutiny in a small town between Seville and Cadiz. He
relied on the support of the officers and troops, who demanded their delayed
payments and refused to be sent to Spanish America after learning of the hard-
ship General Pablo Morillos expedition experienced in its war against Simn
Bolvars troops in New Granada and Venezuela. Following a new practice that
began in 1814, Riego issued a pronunciamiento (public statement and call for
action) against the shipment of the stationed troops and for upholding the con-
stitution of 1812. In Napoleonic fashion, he rallied people to join him. After a
slow start, Riego counted on supporting uprisings in La Corua, Zaragoza, and
Barcelona calling for the restoration of the constitution and election for Cortes.1
Finally in March, the count of Abisbal, captain general of Andalusia, and General
Francisco Ballesteros, military governor of Madrid, pressured the king to swear
his acceptance of the constitution while the crowds rioted outside his palace.2
The military and the people succeeded, ushering in a new liberal era inSpain.
Across the ocean, new insurgent leaders and liberators, all military officers,
were defeating governor-generals and viceroys.3 They promised a new era of
freedom and wealth after so many years of oppression. Men of letters planned
and spoke about new systems of rule. Despite big ambitions and hopes, war con-
tinued to challenge and doom their plans. After the independence of Peninsular
Spain from the French in 1814, the royal efforts to reconquer the Spanish
American kingdoms and provinces by force provoked more violence and divi-
sion.4 By 1820 Spain had lost the captaincy generals of Venezuela and Chile,
the intendancy of Paraguay, and the viceroyalties of La Plata and New Granada.
Mexico would turn to independence suddenly in 1821, leaving the Spanish
monarchy without its precious viceroyalty and primary financial provider. The
171

Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Alto Peru, and Peru remained loyal, though the
last was under great stress.
The new liberal era of Spain, Trienio Liberal (18201823), brought men of
letters and old Liberals back from exile. The restored constitution and Cortes
offered them new opportunities. Yet the four years of war against Napoleons
forces and the subsequent six years of absolutist repression in the Peninsula had
left the lettered weak, divided, and inexperienced in government, while the mili-
tary consolidated and expanded its power and privileges. Factionalism thus pro-
liferated. In Peru, the struggle to build an independent state that began in 1820
opened new and unprecedented spaces for men of letters. But war continued
there, too, and the military prevailed.
This chapter traces the transformational decade of the 1820s through the
struggles for power between men of letters and military officers in Peru and
Spain. Although this was a time of separation and independence, a parallel and
intercomplicated analysis of the political developments on the Peninsula and the
old viceroyalty sheds light on common aspects of their histories that remained
interconnected even after the empires breakdown.
This chapter begins by examining the clashes between the lettered and the
military during the Trienio in Spain and the challenges Liberal men of letters
faced when confronting the independence of Spanish America. It then turns
to Peru and analyzes the political dynamics of the war during the final years
of Spanish rule (18201824). Jos de San Martns brief rule in Lima (1820
1823) highlights many parallel processes taking place in the Peninsula. Finally,
the analysis explores the struggles for power between men of letters and mili-
tary officers during and after Simn Bolvars rule in Peru (18231826) and
the final triumph of the military and the caudillos in the old viceroyaltys new
republicanlife.
Unlike the first liberal experiment of Cadiz when the pioneers of change were
men of letters who led the juntas and the Cortes and wrote the constitution,
the leaders of the 1820s were military officers. They claimed to have defeated
Napoleon and did not seem willing to relinquish their new status. The militarys
leadership was not new, but it changed dramatically after the restoration of
Ferdinand VII. Military officers had served as administrators and governors for
much of Bourbon rule in Spain and the empire. During the Napoleonic invasion
and absence of the king, they led regular forces and guerrillas and made sure to
have a presence in the governing body of occupied Spain, impeding any attempts
at subordinating their fueros to an abstract Spanish state. Their new standing
became evident upon the kings return to Spain in 1814 when General Francsico
Javier de Elo, the former unruly viceroy of Montevideo and self-proclaimed
viceroy of Rio de la Plata defeated by Uruguayan General Jos Artigas, joined

A Path to Per va s ive Unre st, 1820 1830 173
the king in Valencia to offer him his troops. Once in Madrid, King Ferdinand,
named El Deseado, secretly appointed General Elo captain general, who began
to persecute liberals and purge the army.
Back in the court, Ferdinand relied on the support of absolutists and serviles,
who handed him a manifesto urging him to reject the constitution of 1812 and
restore the old order. The text began by comparing the years of the kings exile
with the five days of anarchy old Persians experienced following their monarchs
death. This eloquent start granted the statement the name manifiesto de los persas
(Persians manifesto) and their supporters the persas. With the backing of abso-
lutists and key military figures, the newly restored Crown intensified repression.
Numerous reputed Liberals were exiled or sentenced to hard labor.5 Ferdinand
abolished the Cortes, banned associations and the press, brought back the Jesuit
order, and restored the Inquisition. The king was now free to rule without overt
checks and balances, but his paranoia went too far. He developed a surveillance
system to look for secret associations and Freemasonry, which he considered
a conspiratorial sect.6 He also persecuted military officers and former guerril-
las, alienating and driving some toward Liberal fields. In retribution, the king
faced several retaliatory military uprisings and pronuncimientos:General Espoz
y Mina (Pamplona, 1814); Juan Daz Porlier (La Corua, 1815); General Luis
Lacy (Barcelona, 1817); General Juan Van Halen (Valencia,1818).
While these rebellious attempts failed, they allowed Peninsular military offi-
cers to test their agency and leadership by commanding groups of soldiers and
peoples in the pursuit of the causes they represented and thus asserting their
new power.7 The American precedent is key in this history. One should not
forget that military officers in the former American provinces had been lead-
ing insurrections, speaking to the people, and fighting to rule new independent
states for some time bythen.8
After his effective pronunciamiento of 1820, Field-Marshal Riego became a
hero for Spanish Liberals. He embodied the new type of military officer whose
mission was no longer to obey but to lead. Peninsular Spain was attuned to
America. Like Jos de San Martn and Simn Bolvar, Riego became a widely
praised caudillo. Songs celebrated his heroic actions everywhere, inevitably
questioning the old order. The most famous and unprecedented song was the
Trgala, a victorious call for the Constitution and a direct attack on Ferdinand.
The chorus read: Al que le pese, que roa el hueso,/Que el liberal le dir eso:/
Trgala, trgala, trgala /Trgala, trgala, trgala, perro (Whoever regrets it /
Shall chew a bone /For the liberal /Would tell him this:Swallow it/swallow
it /swallow it /swallow it dog.9 Other lines chanted to the heroism of military
leaders:Riego, Quiroga,/Agero, y Baos/El servilismo/Van sofocando/Y al que
le pese? Trgala (Riego, Quiroga,/Agero, y Baos/Servile attitudes/Are
defeating/Whoever regrets it/Swallowit)

Figure 7.1 Constitucin de 1812 [ca. 1820]. Estampa, Annimo. Museo del
Romanticismo, Madrid.
Figure7.2 El enfermo por la Constitucin (The sick from the Constitution), ca.1820.
Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Museo de Historia.

The chanting of this song followed Riego throughout Spain. In September

1821 he was paid tribute in the theater El Prncipe in Madrid with the Trgala
in the presence of the citys authorities, an unprecedented event. The Trgala
became the anthem of Spanish liberalism and later of republicanism.10
Riegos movement for the restoration of the constitution and the Cortes
brought men of letters back to the political game. Newspapers, patriotic soci-
eties, and Freemasonry returned to Spain. Conducting politics was, however,
far more challenging than during the first liberal era, because Ferdinand VII
remained in power, sent spies everywhere and made sure that his absolutist sup-
porters formed part of the Cortes.
As a consequence, serious political debates took place somewhere outside
the assembly. The new patriotic societies offered this space. There men of letters
could exercise their craft and, as liberal writer Benito Prez Galds put it, direct
public business [and] pressure the government to obey the constitution.11
During the fractured Trienio there were as many sociedades patriticas (patriotic
societies) and newspapers in the Peninsula as there were Liberal factions. The
most famous societies were El Caf de Laurencini of the exaltados (radicals),
La Fontana de Oro of the moderados (moderates), and El Anillo de Oro of the
anilleros, also called doceaistas or constitutionalists.12 Their meetings were
organized around discursos (speeches). Members were expected to present well-
conceived addresses or improvise effectively in order to persuade the audience
with eloquence. Prez Galds gathered together the most vivid descriptions of
these meetings in his short novels La Fontana de Oro and El Grande Oriente. In
these accounts, the audience of those associations constantly interrupted ora-
tors with vivas or fueras and proclaimed their own opinions, as was common
in the theater. Count Giuseppe Pecchi, member of the Italian-based Carbonario
lodge who traveled around Spain in these years, described how the Fontana de
Oro could host about 800 to 900 people of both sexes and all ages.13 The socie-
dades were indeed the ideal meeting place for new and old political actors. But
suspicion ruled, for anyone could be seen as a demagogo (demagogue) trying to
undermine the new freedoms in the eyes of Prez Galds or as a freemason in
the eyes of theking.
Freemasonry and secret societies were widespread in the Spain of the
1820s.14 Perhaps better than any other kind of associations, they reveal the
contradictions of this era when universalism and rising nationalisms coex-
isted. During the Trienio a new Spanish lodge, called the Comuneros, came into
being. Its members claimed to no longer form part of an international lodge,
but of a Spanish lodge, with Castilian rituals and symbols.15 Notwithstanding
these divisions, Freemasonry continued to be a strong unifying force. Thus,
for the radical El Despertador Jerezano, Freemasons and the Spanish comunero
lodges, despite their differences, aspired to the same goals. In the words of the

editors, all were were masons or comuneros who swore to die before surrender-
ing to a tyrant, to never be subjected to a despotic king or government, and
to defend with their pens or swords the principle that sovereignty lay in the
nation.16
Aiming for larger audiences, the sociedades of the 1820s produced their own
newspapers. Astounded, Count Pecchi explained that by 1821 Spaniards were
all into the news completely cured of the mania of romance reading; with them,
the day for idylls and sonnets has gone by; so that their troubadours are now
converted into journalists.17 Each society issued its own paper. The leading
members of the Fontana de Oro produced El Universal Observador with the
mission of publicizing the regulations and discussions of their society and pro-
moting a culture of order and respect for the constitution. The president was
supposed to keep order and give everybody a turn to speak. Special regulations
were issued for oradores. Supposedly, every individual had a right to have a say or
read something pertinent. But authorizations were needed. Nobody could inter-
rupt, express passion, speak of absentees or authorities without proper dcor,
voice personal complaints, talk of personal adversaries, yell, show strong ges-
tures, or confuse what is doubtful with what is probable or what is probable with
what is certain.18
In contrast, the Aurora de Espaa concentrated on reporting about the sessions
that the exaltados held in the Caf de Laurencini. This publication is an extraordi-
nary source for understanding the level of intensity of the gatherings. As Aurora
writers repeatedly emphasized, anybody could speak up at the Laurencini, even
children and laboradores (peasants). Apparently on one occasion while discuss-
ing the differences between civil liberties and libertinaje (license), a simple arti-
san rose to proclaim that the alguaciles (bailiffs) were corrupt men. He argued
that their commissions should be offered instead to soldiers, who had been for-
gotten by the state and lived in misery.19 The next meetings seem to have been
even more agitated. After reading aloud the letters that inquisitors and priests
had produced against the sociedad, some members decided to put a sheet on the
door with the names of those traitors who deserved to be spied upon. Finally,
the reading of yet another letter by the former viceroy of Navarra against the
Constitution ignited the society. Apparently only the news of his removal from
office calmed everybody but protests of some guardias de corps against their cap-
tain followed.20 The game of politics had spread everywhere, as too many wanted
to be informed andspeak.
Political oratory reached a climax in Spain during the Trienio Liberal.21 It was
a reputedly effective tool to move people to action. New political actors used
their eloquence to show off their virtues and power. The influence of speeches
and proclamations was becoming so evident that the military could not neglect
mastering this weapon. Thus in 1821 Lieutenant Colonel Jos Mara Paniagua

printed in Zaragoza a treatise on military eloquence for officers to educate his

armies in this art. In contrast to other oradores, the military would speak as lead-
ers of a proud and solid corporation.
Paniagua offered to train officers in the rules of oratory so that they could
then persuade their soldiers and the people to act. He began by explaining that
military oradores ought, first and foremost, to be clear. They were to avoid long
citations of Greek and Latin, and connect with their soldiers through their pas-
sion for military action. They ought to be serene, cold, and knowledgeable about
military history, but they would not be academics. Oradores were to move audi-
ences by speaking in a simple style about past heroic actions. For emphasis he
suggested using metaphors such as gigantic objects, pyramids, and torrents.
Paniagua advised his readers to remember the power words achieved during the
crusades. He concluded by appealing the military to realize their new responsi-
bilities. Military men were no longer simply obedient subjects; they needed to
talk to the people, instruct them about their rights, and restore their freedoms.
Force, training, and obedience were no longer sufficient for military men called
to lead and govern, Paniagua argued.22
While new political actors rose, issued pronunciamientos, and talked pub-
licly about government issues, Ferdinand VII tried everything he could to
undermine the prestige and power of the second liberal government. He
purposely appointed a provisional junta formed only by the constitution-
alists of Cadiz, leaving behind the exaltado supporters of Riego and thus
antagonizing Liberals. In response, these revolutionaries staged upheav-
als against the new government with the support of patriotic societies and
comuneros. Finally, in 1822 the king briefly named Riego president of the
Cortes and brought the exaltados to power, upsetting everyone. Apparently,
he appointed freemasons and left comuneros behind. Thus, by claiming that
republicans had taken command of Spain, Ferdinand found an excuse to
welcome the French invasion of April 1823. With the support of the Holy
Alliance, the Spanish monarch had requested, the French restored his abso-
lutist powers and drove Liberals once more into exile.23 Absolutist rule came
back with strength to Spain. Three years of renewed liberalism were not
enough to come to terms with somuch.
Considering the level of factionalism, it is not surprising that Peninsular Liberal

men of letters failed to find a peaceful solution to the growing divide between
them and American Spaniards in this short-lived liberal era. The return of abso-
lutism in 1814 and subsequent increase of repression in America had shattered
the hopes of some. After his restoration, Ferdinand appointed a military junta
to advise him on these matters. He received numerous memorials urging him
to send pacification missions to America, but none of these efforts succeeded as

the prospects of British intervention antagonized many. Instead, the king took
a hardline approach by intensifying the counterinsurgent war there.24 He sent
the largest expedition the Americas had ever seen to combat Bolvars war in
Venezuela and New Granada. General Pablo Morillo was given extraordinary
powers as commander in chief of the expedition, governor of Caracas, and presi-
dent of the audiencia there. This fully invested cuasi dictator left Cadiz with 18
ships, 42 transports, and 10,500 men to wage war.25 In addition to increased vio-
lence, the spread of romanticism in the 1820s, with its emphasis on nationalism
and tradition, led to the rise of a new Spanish identity that no longer included
Spanish Americans and divided old provinces.26 Despite all odds, some old
Liberals continued to advocate for a compromise with their American brothers.
In 1818, during his second exile in London, Alvaro Flrez Estrada published
a memorial addressed to the king, which circulated widely in the 1820s. There
he continued to claim that Spain and America constituted a single body and
that Americas brutal system of oppression would ultimately lead to the deg-
radation and deprivation of Peninsular Spaniards because their histories were
intertwined. Much like Blanco White and other Peninsular Liberals, Flrez
Estrada still believed that America was not ready for self-rule. Flrez Estradas
earlier writings argued that independence and liberty were two discrete issues
that should not have been addressed together; now he claimed that, whereas
freedom was a necessary condition for prosperity, independence was only justi-
fiable when freedom could not be attained in any other way. As a true Spaniard,
he added, he could only wish for the unity of America and the Peninsula. Yet
as a hombre (man), he belonged to a larger family and thus could not defend
a union at the cost of American liberties.27 In this memorial, Flrez Estrada
blamed Ferdinand VIIs absolutism for the war against Spanish American insur-
gents and their estrangement. But he still hoped for reconciliation and urged the
monarch to call for a representative Cortes and appease Americans by decreeing
an end to all persecutions, full freedom of the press and trade, and the abolition
of the Inquisition. He begged the monarch to send commissioners to all rebel
provinces to negotiate with their governments and congresses under the sole
condition that a union with Spain be maintained.
Concerned about the power of the military in the Peninsula, in 1818 Flrez
Estrada also published an essay discussing the monarchys prospects for issuing a
separate constitution regarding the military. Heavily influenced by Anglo-Saxon
political writings, he vehemently argued for the need for a single constitution
that would subordinate all institutions under the same law, because the military
was the nations armed body, not the monarchs. Flrez Estrada protested the
desigualdad de las clases (inequality of classes) and the risk of creating a stand-
ing army that would leave society without contrapesos (checks and balances) and
inevitably lead to corruption and praetorianism.28

The intensification of war in Spanish America troubled some Spanish

Liberals during the Trienio.29 Despite their disagreements and the separation
of key provinces, some Peninsular Liberals continued to hope for a solution
and see the American struggle for freedom as their own, blaming tyrannical
governors, military officers, and viceroys for the violence and divisiveness.
For example, the constitutionalist faction argued in the Aurora de Espaa that
the restoration of the Liberal charter would solve all problems, even those
of Spanish America. In April 1820 the editors responded to a memorial sub-
mitted by American Spaniards living in Madrid who complained about the
lack of representation in the new Cortes. After recognizing that Americans no
longer trusted Peninsular Spaniards because they had been so often betrayed
and left in the hands of the most despotic, unjust, and tyrannical authorities,
they promised to support their American brothers,30 who should no longer
be afraid because, as they later put it, the constitution would bring equality
and enable a union to succeed.31 Likewise, the moderate faction Friends of
Order shared this same faith in the constitution and the same rejection of
Spanish American independence. In their El Universal Observador, the most
widely read newspaper of the 1820s, they underlined that the American
problem lay not in the laws but in the corruption and abuse of authori-
ties.32 Former afrancesados, and later moderates, Alberto Lista, Sebastin de
Miano, and Jos de Hermosilla defended a similar position in El Censor.
While advocating for unity between Peninsular and American Spaniards,
they began to consider independence an option for Spanish America if the
oppressive rule that had reduced Spanish subjects to the condition of slaves
continued there.33
Most Liberals in Spain recognized that authorities were exploiting and cor-
rupting Spanish America but rejected the choice for independence. Further,
they could not help develop a patronizing and even scornful attitude toward
the rise of a new Spanish American Liberal ideology that had gone further
than theirs by proclaiming independence and republicanism. Many argued
that immaturity would doom their projects to failure. For example, in October
1820, El Censor of Spain carried a heated exchange with El Censor Americano, a
newspaper published in London by Andrs Bello and Antonio Jos de Irisarri,
two Americans who were trying to obtain French and British recognition of
for the independence of Chile. Bello and Irisarri criticized the new Spanish
Cortes for the lack of American representation and compared the situation of
Spanish America with that of North America prior to its independence.34 The
Peninsular Censor rejected the grounds for such comparison because of the
state of oppression, brutalization, and poverty that for more than three cen-
turies Spain had imposed on its possessions overseas. Unlike North America,
Spanish America was not mature enough for independence, El Censor claimed.

It stressed that the lack of prestigious lawyers and thinkers in Spanish America
would make them easy prey for men with extraordinary powers who might
seek to impose a dictatorship. As cosmopolitans, they added, they still hoped
that Spaniards could retain America by granting it liberty.35 And they urged
the new Cortes to impose restrictions on the power of viceroys and captain
generals there.36
For the extremists, the so-called exaltados who continued to see a com-
mon fight on both sides of the Atlantic, a compromise between Peninsular and
American Spaniards was no longer possible. Absolute freedom was now the only
option for Spanish America. As the Basque Jos Antonio de Olavarrieta, writ-
ing as CLARRAROSA, put it in his influential Diario Gaditano, the struggle was
between death or slavery and death or liberty. Present circumstances were
so desperate, he emphasized, that all Spaniards should rush to arm themselves
against despotism.37 The former Franciscan priest called for the full equality of
America, in line with the enlightened spirit he had expressed thirty years ear-
lier as a newspaper editor in Lima.38 Olavarrieta no longer blamed the state of
affairs on the lack of education but on the oppression of America by ruthless
military authorities such as General Morillo, who had kept Venezuelans subju-
gated. He was a passionate admirer of Riegos movement and wrote a Diccionario
tragalolgico o biblioteca porttil de todo lo tragable por orden alfabtico in which
he explained what old concepts meant in a new Liberal era.39 Olavarrietas oppo-
nents tried to discredit his writings by calling him a revolutionary and a free-
mason, serious accusations under Ferdinands rule, which ultimately sent him
to prison. He was released two days before he died. At his funeral in Cadiz, he
was dressed in everyday clothes, and his writings were put in his coffin. He held
the constitution of 1812 in his hands. Lots of people, his readers in particular,
attended the funeral. As per his instructions, there were no priests and no reli-
gious hymns.40
Blanco White was never this radical, but he wrote admiringly of Olavarrieta,
shared by then his take on the inevitability of Spanish American independence,
and blamed despotism and tyranny for it. In a letter to Lady Holland in July
1819, Blanco spoke of the horrid degree of Tyranny which is exercised in Spain
in the face of all civilized Europe and of the refined cruelty of not allowing a
man of Letters the means of writing is such that it makes my blood really boil in
my veins.41 Shortly before the French invasion, Blanco began another editorial
enterprise in London with his Variedades o Mensagero de Londres (18231825).
Like many Peninsular Liberals, Blanco had come to terms with American inde-
pendence and began to present Spanish Americans as more advanced on the
liberal scale. In an 1825 article Blanco argued that the independence of Spanish
America had proven how its people had ascended the civil and intellectual scale
and offered the proliferation of newspapers as proof of their improvement. He

still claimed, however, that Spanish Americans had a long way to go in their
political education to avoid further suffering. But he also maintained that their
present state was unquestionably better than the government of a succession of
blood-sucking viceroys, with their huge hungry and proud satellites.42
By then, most Spanish liberals shared Blancos defense of American inde-
pendence. Some even expressed their admiration for their American brothers
who had managed to liberate themselves from a state of oppression that still
subjugated the Peninsula and had condemned them to a precarious exile. For
example, in April 1825, the Ocios de Espaoles Emigrados, a Spanish-language
newspaper printed in London by migr Liberals, commented on the Battle
of Ayacucho, which sealed the independence of South America. The article
praised Spanish America for bearing children who know how to protect them-
selves from the corruption that supports the degrading humiliation of des-
potism in Europe.43 While Peninsular and American liberals waged separate
struggles after 1824, the idea that their cause was similar persisted. Absolutist
rule continued in Spain for a decade. Spanish America would have to endure
militarism.
The years from 1823 to 1833, from the second French invasion to Ferdinands
death, were marked by thousands of executions, brutal repression, purges, and
deportations. The old court remained divided between exaltados, moderate
Liberals, and hardcore absolutists. Faced with the need to affirm his power and
major economic hardship with the loss of the American kingdoms, Ferdinand
began to make compromises with some moderates after 1824.44 Despite this,
the kings troubled rule ended with another long and violent war. Absolutists or
carlistas, supporters of Don Carlos (the late kings brother) as heir, opposed the
right of the Liberals or isabelinosthat is, defenders of Ferdinands daughter,
Isabellato rule. By then, the leaders of these factions were all military officers.
They had become the arbiters of politics, or the kingmakers.45 In a new and deci-
mated monarchy tormented by war, foreign invasion, bankruptcy, and factional-
ism, military officers held power. Any settlement or negotiation went through
them. Any faction looked for a commanding sword to prevail. Interestingly,
among the strongest groups were the former ayacuchos, the generals who fought
the last battles against the insurgents in Peru.46 The most famous was General
Baldomero Espartero, a military officer from La Mancha who had fought against
the Napoleonic invasion, traveled with General Morillo to face Bolvars forces,
and joined the prestigious Royal Army of Alto Peru. Back in Spain after King
Ferdinands death, Espartero became the Liberals sword. He held the offices of
viceroy of Navarra and president of the Ministers Council.47 He defined Queen
Isabellas succession and ruled as active regent from 1840 to 1843. He was over-
thrown by General Ramn Mara Narvez, another military caudillo. War and
instability continued for decades.

Men of letters in Peru could not find a straightforward path to exercise

power either, for the military clearly dominated the scene. After Abascal left
in 1816 at the age of seventy-three, a crisis of viceregal authority ensued, as
often happens after the tenure of strong rulers. Abascals counterinsurgent
wars were extremely costly and by then poverty began to take over Peru.48
Limeos had loaned millions of pesos to the royal cause and were beginning
to feel the burden. To express their concern and their loyalty to this faithful
custodian of their interests, many vecinos went to the port of Callao to wish
Abascal farewell.49 Prior to his departure, he had recommended Joaqun de
la Pezuela, who seemed to have the best credentials, as his successor. Pezuela
had been trained at the artillery school in Segovia and taken part in the wars
against revolutionary France in the 1790s.50 He served as subinspector of
artillery in Lima from 1805 to 1813 and then as general commander of the
Royal Army of Alto Peru. And yet, despite his wealth of experience under
Abascals command, Pezuela failed to establish a strong alliance with the
elite in Lima. He was at first mistrusted and later reviled for his nepotism
and corruption.51
From 1814 to 1819, after numerous defeats in the neighboring Northern
territories and the constant threat of disease, decimated Peninsular troops
arrived in Peru.52 General Pablo Morillo had halted some troops in New
Granada, as he desperately needed them to face Simn Bolvars armies.
Among the new officers was Pezuelas successor as general of the Royal Army
of Alto Peru, Jos de La Serna. Originally from Jrez de la Frontera, La Serna
was also trained at the artillery school of Segovia and had participated in the
war against France of 1794 and 1795; yet unlike Pezuela, La Serna carried the
pride and prestige of having fought against Napoleon.53 The general arrived in
May 1816 but did not bother to pay a visit to the viceroy and traveled directly
to Alto Peru.54
The military careers of La Sernas companions were all outstanding. Most of
these officers had requested to be sent to America once the war in Spain was
over. Jos de Canterac joined La Serna as jefe del estado mayor (military chief of
staff) of Alto Peru. He had previously fought against the French in Catalonia and
obtained special recognitions for his services in the famous battle of Sagunto.
He was promoted to general commander of the army cavalry in Andalusia.55
Jos de Carratal participated in the battles against the French in Spain and the
insurgents in Margarita. Baldomero Espartero was highly experienced, as was
Andrs Garca Camba.56 According to the latter, the most famous and influential
military officer in this group was the reputed Liberal, Gernimo Valds. Finally,
the expedition of Jos Antonio Monet arrived in Lima in 1817 and continued on
to Chile. It brought Jos Ramn Rodil, who had also participated in numerous
battles against the French.57 Many in this group would later form the ayacuchos,

the generals who fought the last battles for Spanish rule in South America and
became decisive political actors upon their return to Spain.
The arrival of these officers in Peru put the royal army under the great stress
of having to accommodate them and their ambitions. In the meantime, insur-
gents in New Granada, Argentina, and Chile recovered from Abascals counter-
insurgency. Soon after taking office, Pezuela wrote to the Crown requesting even
more Peninsular troops and complaining about the poor state of the army.58 His
demands contradicted his predecessors actions, and he soon faced the oppo-
sition of the limeo elite. Pezuela ignored the numerous complaints about the
heavy financial pressures caused by the excessive number of newly arrived offi-
cers.59 Members of the limeo elite became suspicious of the new viceroy and
accused him of caring only for his own business. Without forming part of his
close circle of power, which was the Alto Peru officer corps, the elites from Lima
had no way to hold Pezuela accountable. The new viceroy rapidly lost credibility.
When Abascal left Peru in 1816 and absolutist rule strenghthened in Spain the
balance of power in the Americas began to shift. In July the congress of Tucuman
declared the independence of Argentina. In 1817 General San Martns army
arrived in Chile after crossing the Andes. Bernardo OHiggins became Chiles
Supreme chief. In February of that year the insurgents achieved a major victory
there, putting Peru at great risk. San Martn and OHiggins began to prepare an
invasion of Peru with British support by thesea.
The spectacular defeat of Pezuelas expedition by the Chilean forces in Mayp
and Talcahuano in 1818 outraged limeos, who blamed the viceroy for prepar-
ing an extravagant naval expedition under the command of his son-in-law,
Mariano Osorio, with the sole purpose of making him governor of Chile. The
defeat proved a devastating outcome for Peru; the viceroyalty was ruined both
militarily and financially as Chile consolidated its independence. Peru lost its
main ships and its established trade relationship with Chile. By and large, Peru
had lately depended on selling sugar to Chile and buying wheat in exchange.60
Now there was no bread in Lima and prices skyrocketed. Complaints to the
Crown against Pezuela proliferated.61 He was charged with being a despot who
did everything he could to collect money in order to favor his son-in-law,62 and,
worse, he was going to ruin the viceroyalty even if there was no invasion by the
insurgents.63 To remedy the shortage and comply with British pressure, Pezuela
decided to open the ports to free trade and let British vessels sell products in
Peru. This policy outraged a large group of elites who accused him of promoting
contraband for his own benefit and using the Crowns ships to send his money to
Europe.64 Meanwhile, factionalism spread in the army and viceregalcourt.
Pezuela managed to retain power by reinforcing ties with his circle of mili-
tary officers from the Royal Army of Alto Peru, mostly Creole and mestizo offi-
cers, through patronage and rewards. One of Pezuelas closest collaborators was

future President of Peru, Jos de La Mar, who was originally from Cuenca, pro-
fessionally trained in Spain and, like the new Peninsular officers, enjoyed the
glory of having fought in the war against Napoleon and in the famous siege of
Zaragoza of 1809. He arrived in Peru in 1817 as brigadier of the royal army with
the commission of subinspector and governor of Callao. Pezuela promoted him
to field marshal and general of the royal army.65
Facing an economic crisis, the viceroy decided to use bureaucratic posts to
compensate military officers. It was not an unusual measure, but it was one he
took farther than anyone before him. In November 1818 the viceroy wrote a let-
ter to the ministry in Madrid communicating his decision to reward victorious
officers with employment in the treasury. He argued that the difficult circum-
stances necessitated his pursuit of new ideas to secure loyalty. Since there were
few hopes for the compensation of so many officers until the final victory, and
since the treasury would never be able to afford so many pensions and salaries,
he appointed Colonel Domingo Ynfantas as accountant of Arequipas customs
and Colonel Miguel Muxia as the administrator of the tobacco monopoly in
Chuquisaca.66
The newly arrived Peninsular officers tried to take advantage of Pezuelas
unpopularity and pressured for major military reforms to control the army. Their
success in Spain made them feel entitled to lead the fight against the insurgents.
As general commander of the Royal Army of Alto Peru, Jos de La Serna had
enough power to unleash his reforms, yet his arrogance led him into danger-
ous waters. According to English-born general Guillermo Miller, La Serna intro-
duced so many innovations totally inapplicable to Peru and was so eager to
boast his knowledge of tactics that he alienated the officer corps.67 Much like
Viceroy Gil de Taboada in the 1790s, La Serna and his Peninsular officers initially
rejected the idea of a racially inclusive army and opposed promoting Creoles,
castas, and Indians to high military ranks. The major surgeon of the Royal Army
of Alto Peru, a Pezuelista, wrote in a history he composed in Rio de Janeiro in
1821 that the newly arrived officers disdained the old ones and laughed at the
shields and medals their elders had worked so hardfor.68
La Serna merged units and appointed Peninsular officers to the highest
comissions. According to the Pezuelista Manuel de Mendiburu, these measures
produced exorbitant rates of desertion.69 And they took place at the worst pos-
sible time, when General Jos de San Martn was planning an invasion of Peru
by sea with British support. Mestizos Agustn Gamarra and Andrs de Santa
Cruz, future republican caudillos, complained of feeling neglected under the new
command. In 1820 General Pedro Antonio de Olaeta reported how Gamarra
had protested in writing about General La Sernas decision to place Europeans
in the highest positions of the Unin Peruana unit, disregarding the merits of
Americans. Olaeta claimed that with this measure, Gamarra was only buying

time to join the approaching party of revolutionaries.70 By then Gamarra served

in the newly arrived battalion Numancia, which was composed of military men
recruited in Santa Fe. Apparently, he had earned a good reputation for guer-
rilla warfare, which he first learned under General Goyeneche.71 Claiming that
this unit could be subversive, La Serna reorganized it, despite the opposition
of the sub-inspector of the army, Jos de La Mar. La Serna criticized Pezuela
for keeping Gamarra as his aide de camp and Santa Cruz as military governor
of Chorrillos and commander of Carabaillo despite accusations against them.72
La Serna and Colonel Gernimo de Valds mistrusted Creoles and mestizos and
accused Pezuela of ruling like a Creole. They were right. Santa Cruz, Gamarra,
La Mar, and the officers of Alto Peru were Pezuelas base of power, which
La Serna was trying to weaken. La Serna, the commander of the Royal Army of
Alto Peru was dangerously altering the institution that incorporated all groups
in society and allowed for upward mobility.
In September 1820 change shook Peru. The constitution of Cadiz was sworn
again in Lima, and nine days later insurgent General San Martn landed on
the coast of Pisco, 150 miles south of the capital.73 In January 1821 the entire
battalion Numancia, including Gamarra, joined the army of San Martn. Santa
Cruz followed them in Pasco. These new patriots were immediately promoted
to higher ranks.74 On Christmas Eve that year, Trujillo proclaimed indepen-
dence. The leader of the movement was the limeo governor of that province,
the Marquis of Torre Tagle.75
All this alarming news gave a new impetus to La Sernas faction in Peru. By
late January 1821 he, Valds, and Canterac led a junta of generals and organized
a mutiny in Aznapuquio, north of Lima, with the support of Limas cabildo.
Twenty officers signed a manifesto claiming that Pezuela was no longer capa-
ble of governing Peru and was even willing to capitulate. El imperio de la nece-
sidad (the needs empire) had demanded an immediate solution to curtail the
progress of San Martn.76 Through this maneuver, La Serna became Perus new
and last viceroy. The merchants from Lima, whose interests had been seriously
damaged by Pezuelas direct negotiations with the British, backed La Serna. This
first military coup in Peruvian history reveals the rise of a military caudillismo
closely connected to its Peninsular counterpart.77 As was happening in the Spain
of Riego, military officers, trained in the royal armies, were leading groups and
soldiers altering the political order and earning acclaim for it. They were now
more than the kings most loyal subjects.
La Sernas first act as viceroy was to appoint Jos de Canterac as general com-
mander and brigadier of the royal army, leaving behind the Creole General Jos
de La Mar, who did not sign the manifesto against Pezuela. To prevail La Serna
did not need to abolish any civilian checks and balances, since by then viceroys
possessed full powers of rule as virtual military dictators.78 Though a reputed

Liberal, La Serna did impede the application of the Constitution in 1822, how-
ever, that decision was made in the context of a guerra a muerte when Spanish
generals needed full powers to wage wars and could not implement a consti-
tution that directly undermined their authority.79 Furthermore, Liberals
whether civilian or military, whether in Spain or Peruwere highly divided and
held contradictory views. By then Peninsular Liberals had mixed feelings about
the Constitution, and their doubts only increased after 1820. Apparently among
exaltado officers, there was no consensus for the Constitution either, since the
text clearly undermined their claims for rewards and recognition.80 Spanish lib-
eralism cannot be reduced to constitutionalism; it was a far more complex and
contradictory ideology.
Notwithstanding these issues, two main factions did divide the royal army
of Peru in these years. On the one hand stood La Serna and the newly arrived
officer corps claiming to defend the Constitution. In opposition to them were
Viceroy Pezuela and Pedro Antonio Olaetas group, which supported Ferdinand
and refused to accept La Sernas new authority. Not only did the clash between
these two factions produce turmoil in Peru, but the discord also continued in
Spain. During and after the independence of Peru, La Sernas ayacuchos fought
to defend their reputation against the accusations of Pezuela and Olaeta, who
blamed them for the final defeat.81
About six months after taking control of the army and government in Peru,
in July 1821 La Serna moved royal forces to the highlands and governed from
there. After his experience in the Spanish Peninsula, he was aware that the only
way to resist British-supported invasion by sea was to fight inland. At the end
of the month, General San Martn marched into Lima and declared indepen-
dence in the main square. General La Mar surrendered the fort of Callao in
September and joined the army of San Martn. It was the beginning of a new
era forPeru.
As in the Spanish Peninsula, factionalism pervaded everything in Peru, partic-

ularly the new independent front. San Martn counted on the support of two
wealthy Creoles and leaders of the nobility, Bernardo de Torre Tagle and Jos de
la Riva Agero, who had achieved some professional training as military officers
and served in key administrative positions. As the intendant of Trujillo, Torre
Tagle probably felt that his professional background and social status entitled
him to govern the new republic.82 Riva Agero, for his part, had secretly corre-
sponded with San Martn and the leaders of the insurgency of Rio de la Plata to
win over Peninsular General Canterac, who in his mind was the actual viceroy.
Through an emissary, a friend of Canterac, Riva Agero had let the general know
about the state of affairs in Spain and the possibilities for obtaining more advan-
tages in caudal (wealth) and dignidades (recognition) in America than in Spain.

He tried to convince him that our general (San Martn) would award him
with the title of lieutenant colonel and an estate of the Temporalidades tribu-
nal (administration of former Jesuit properties) if he surrendered the capital.83
Some men of letters who had closely worked with Viceroy Abascal, such as
Hiplito Unnue and Flix Devoti, also joined San Martn. They likely saw
no point in following La Serna to the highlands. With the idea that patriotism
demanded their services, men of letters switched sides and assumed their new
role as statesmen without apparent trouble. As literary scholar Angel Rama
noted, they acted as an adjustable bridle, its reins slipping easily from the hands
of the viceroys into the grip of the newly powerful caudillos.84
Despite the declaration of independence, San Martns projects for Peru were
not ideologically distanced from those of some Spanish Liberals. His immedi-
ate goal was to find a European prince, ideally a Spanish Bourbon, to crown
king of Peru. Upon his arrival in Pisco, San Martn initiated talks with Viceroy
Pezuela. Hiplito Unnue served as the viceroys secretary. Likewise, liberal
Peninsular authorities sent navy officer Manuel Abreu to begin negotiations
for a peace agreement. After Pezuelas downfall, San Martn restarted the talks
with La Serna, who were ideologically closer to each other. They met in May
1821 and signed an armistice. There were numerous signs of a possible com-
promise. San Martn also met with envoy Abreu, who proposed the formation
of a regency of three members presided over by the viceroy to rule Peru. Both
armies would unite and declare independence and then would select a prince to
govern Peru.85 Their ideals were related, but San Martns demand for a declara-
tion of Peruvian independence became an impossible condition for a Spanish
Liberal authority. Negotiations broke down. Shortly thereafter, Peninsular
General Valds apparently threatened San Martn with creating an Inca empire
in the highlands that would have a stronger legitimacy in Peru than his imposed
government. Baqujano y Carrillos group supported the negotiations with the
patriots in a manifesto that included the signatures of cabildo members.86 Since
San Martn no longer counted on viceregal support for his monarchical plans,
he sent a commission to Europe in the search of a prince to successfully rule
Peru. During the search, San Martn would govern as Protector de la libertad
del Per. Unfortunately, the liberator was by then physically and psychologically
ruined.87 The real governor of Peru was his secretary, the Argentinean lawyer
Bernardo de Monteagudo, who after ten years of war had ideologically evolved
from Jacobinism to Bonapartism.
After declaring Perus independence, Monteagudo and San Martn devel-
oped ambitious plans to transform the old court of Lima into the center of a
Napoleonic-inspired empire. Following this model, San Martn decided to
secure his power by creating a new merit order, the Orden del Sol, through
which he would form a new power elite. He also promoted Masonic lodges to

protect himself with loyal associates and to spread his ideas.88 These measures
were so obviously Napoleonic that limeos referred to him as emperor.89
For his new government San Martn appointed Monteagudo as minister of
war, Hiplito Unnue minister of finance, Juan Garca del Ro minister of foreign
affairs, Riva Agero as president of Lima, and Torre Tagle as general commander
of the militia and general inspector of all civilian affairs.90 He created a provi-
sional statute to rule Peru while instating a new set of rules.91 Despite all these
provisions, Monteagudo ruled Peru as a virtual dictator, and together with San
Martn they formed a newcourt.
To gain supporters for his monarchical cause and to appear as a patron of
the arts, Monteagudo created the Sociedad Patritica, where Creoles would dis-
cuss the new institutions and rules that should govern Peru. As in Spain, the
Sociedad Patritica sponsored two newspapers, El Sol del Per, a weekly paper
to inform people of their duties and rights, and a quarterly paper to publish the
members essays.92 Monteagudo was elected president of the patriotic society
and Hiplito Unnue, minister of finance, was vice president. Among the cen-
sors were the priests Francisco Javier de Luna Pizarro and Mariano Jos de Arce,
who had been persecuted for his support of the cuzqueo and Rio de la Plata reb-
els in 1814. The aristocrats Diego de Aliaga and Antonio Alvarez del Villar were
part of the board of governors, who despite their noble status occupied lower
positions than that of Monteagudo and Unnue. Two former opponents, the
extremist Liberal of the 1810s and publisher of El Satlite del Peruano, Fernando
Lpez Aldana, and the defender of Abascals ideas in El Verdadero Peruano, Flix
Devoti, were in charge of the publication of El Sol del Per.93
In its first session, representatives of the Sociedad proposed that members
write essays about three main topics that were also intensively discussed in the
Peninsular press of those days: first, the ideal form of government for the Peruvian
state, taking into account its extension, size, population, traditions, and place
on the scale of civilization; second, the causes that had delayed the revolution
in Lima; and third, the need to keep public order, end the war, and perpetuate
peace.94 These competitions and writings propagated a false sense that anybody
could participate in the decision-making process of the independent Peru.
The priest Jos Ignacio Moreno addressed the first issue. He was known
for having given a speech propagating liberal ideas during the rebellion of
Hunuco in 1811. With the same passion, Moreno now defended monarchi-
cal rule for Peru. Like most Peninsular Liberals, Moreno believed that as a
nation Peru was still in its infancy and that its citizens needed to be educated
and civilized before they could have democracy. Perus diverse ethnic popu-
lation was one of the main obstacles to this type of government.95 Moreno
faced the opposition of Arce, who accused him of using the same argu-
ments as Ferdinand VII and defending absolutist rule.96 Maritegui joined

Arce, claiming that it was precisely the accumulation of power by Viceroy

Abascal that had delayed independence and impeded the rise of a Peruvian
revolutionary leader.97 Despite Monteagudos efforts to control the discus-
sions in the society, he faced strong critiques by republicans, the members
of a new political group that emerged under the leadership of secular priest
Luna Pizarro. In the third session, Luna Pizarro argued that those discussions
ought to take place in a congress that represented the entire country and not
in a private and exclusive society in Lima.98 Only the press carried these dis-
cussions to a larger public.99
While men of letters planned and debated Perus future in societies and
the press, war continued and San Martn saw his authority rapidly weakening.
He faced two major challenges: the recovery of royal forces in the highlands
and his inability to form a cohesive group of support in Lima. In this context,
Monteagudo initiated a campaign of terror that only made things worse. He sys-
tematically persecuted Peninsular Spaniards and confiscated their possessions,
which led to the alienation of the limeo elite and many Creoles, who had close
familiar and commercial ties with peninsulares.100 Since confiscations did not sat-
isfy Monteagudos expectations, he began a violent and indiscriminate collec-
tion of money. These actions significantly worsened the economic crisis that had
been affecting Peru since the independence of Chile in 1818. Limeos started to
revile Monteagudo.101
The powerful minister faced a growing opposition in the press, in the streets,
and in the theater, with texts, speeches, and songs. Authorities were alarmed
when they discovered one day that pamphlets against the minister had fallen
from the theaters high floors into the audience.102 By then, the theater had
become a favorite space for governors to show off their disputed authority and
obtain public recognition. La Serna and San Martn both enjoyed going attend-
ing performances and encouraged the production of plays and songs in their
honor. For example, after overthrowing Viceroy Pezuela, La Serna commis-
sioned special plays in the theater to represent him favorably. He attended in
the company of his family and planed to be acclaimed in the court of Lima. San
Martn acted accordingly.103
For both factions it was equally crucial to dominate public opinion. San
Martns government-sponsored patriotic newspapers and plays aimed to edu-
cate Peruvians in the new patriotic vocabulary and ideology. Thus, after the dec-
laration of independence there were numerous articles in newspapers explaining
the new meanings of the terms patria, patriotismo, libertad, nacin, ciudadana,
and soberana. The press became a true political arena, which each group used
to present their causes and destroy its opponents. San Martn, Pezuela, and
La Serna inundated Peruvians with proclamations and manifestos defend-
ing their actions, while individuals (particulares) used this forum to spread

calumnies or to defend their honor.104 Though almost always subordinated to

military officers, writers were in great demand in the1820s.
When Viceroy La Serna left Lima for the highlands, he made sure to take with
him a printing press and the most vocal publicista, Gaspar Rico. From 1821 to
1825, Rico, the longtime enemy of Abascal, followed the last viceroy and pub-
lished his manifestos and a leaflet called El Depositario. In this satiric one-page
newspaper, he led a powerful campaign to discredit San Martn and his army. He
repeatedly claimed that patriots were just corrupt interlopers only interested in
sacking Peru.105 He joked about San Martns pomp and his dreams of becoming
an emperor, while denigrating Monteagudo as a mulatto.106
Likewise, to defend himself and propagate his ideas, Monteagudo sponsored
several newspapers such as El Pacificador del Per, Los Andes Libres, El Nuevo
Depositario, El Correo Mercantil, Poltico y Literario, and El Sol del Per.107 By then,
San Martn and Monteagudo faced the critiques not only from royalists but also
from republicans. Among the latter, the strongest voices were those of the Abeja
republicana and El Tribuno de la Repblica Peruana, written by Jos Faustino
Snchez Carrin, Francisco Javier Maritegui, and Mariano Tramarria, whose
articles were seen as eloquent and educational. If Peru were to become a repub-
lic, they would serve as its oradores. Their mission was to teach their readers
about republican ideas and virtues. For the Tribuno it was important that solid
political ideas were presented via simple, clear, masculine statements.108 The
most famous republican texts were the letters of the Solitario de Sayn (Loner of
Sayn) written by Snchez Carrin.109 Addressing the critiques of monarchists
and Spanish Liberals, the Solitario de Sayn argued that Peruvians were civilized
enough to have a republican government. All they needed was freedom and edu-
cation to decolonize.110
San Martn called for elections in December 1821, and nine months later he
inaugurated the first constitutional congress of independent Peru. This newly
born institution was ruled mostly by lawyers and priests, and like the Cortes in
Spain, was rife with factionalism.111 Since the discrediting of Monteagudo and
San Martn brought with it the discrediting of monarchical ideas, republicans
took control of the new congress.112 The president was Luna Pizarro, and his
secretaries were the writers of La Abeja and El Tribuno, Snchez Carrin and
Maritegui, all men from the middle orders and the former two from the prov-
inces. Luna Pizarro possessed the classic credentials of a Liberal man of letters.
He had been a student of the reformist and pro-Jansenist priest of Arequipa,
Chvez de la Rosa; he became a secular priest and traveled to Spain to serve
as de la Rosas secretary from 1809 to 1811 and also served as chaplain of the
Council of the Indies. Upon his return, he was appointed dean of the school
of San Fernando.113 Snchez Carrin was younger. He had earned a reputation
as an effective speaker at the Convictorio de San Carlos and also as an extremist

republican. In 1818 Pezuela exiled him to his estate in Huamachuco, north of

Lima. Maritegui had been an outstanding student at San Carlos. Other mem-
bers of congress were the professor of San Carlos Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza
and students of his such as Jos Joaqun de Olmedo, as well as Abascals men of
letters Hiplito Unnue, Jos Pezet, and Gregorio Paredes. These leading men of
letters were all talented lawyers and oradores. Their merits gave them a predomi-
nant place in the republic of letters but were insufficient to build a real republic.
None of them were part of Limas high nobility or had connections with the
Royal Army of Alto Peru. They belonged to the provincial elite and lacked the
capacity to build strong networks of power by themselves that could back their
leadership.
While congress debated, the exhausted General San Martn left Lima in
February 1822 to have an interview with Simn Bolvar in Guayaquil. He left
Torre Tagle in charge of the government. The meeting was frustrating, and
San Martn returned but retained Tagle in power. He traveled for a second time
in July that year. Taking advantage of this situation, Monteagudos opponents
Luna Pizarro, Tramarria, and Snchez Carrin organized an upheaval and forced
Monteagudo to resign. He was deported to Panama in July.114
The downfall of Monteagudo predicted the immediate breakdown of
San Martns rule. And the celebrations of his collapse targeted the favorite min-
ister. The Abeja Republicana claimed that Monteagudo was a despot oppressing
Peruvians with his secret reports and his system of confiscations and espio-
nage.115 El Periquito stated that Lima was too big to be manipulated by fanatics
and the madness of this American Napoleon.116 Some had already started to call
Jos de San Martn El Rey Jos.117
San Martn left Peru for good in September 1822, leaving the country in the
hands of a highly divided congress. After tense debates, congressmen elected
a Junta de Gobierno, composed of General Jos de La Mar, Manuel Salazar y
Baqujano, and General Felipe Antonio Alvarado. Not only did these new poli-
ticians lack the support of strong interest groups, but they also faced a severe
economic crisis. Under this threat, some members of Limas elite joined the
royalists.118
In February 1823 nobleman Riva Agero took advantage of the crisis, staged
a military coup, and became president of Peru by force. He sent General Santa
Cruz to congress to submit a manifesto signed by the most important military
officers at the time demanding his confirmation as president.119 This military
mutiny divided Peruvian supporters of independence, also called patriotas.
Some members of congress tried to elect aristocrat Torre Tagle as president.
Yet following the coup, Torre Tagle had to cede his post to Riva Agero, who
asked for Bolvars help. Tensions between Riva Agero and congress had esca-
lated by the time Antonio Jos de Sucre arrived in Lima as Bolvars envoy. Soon

afterward, congress dismissed Riva Agero, who tried to initiate a parallel gov-
ernment while Sucre and Torre Tagle competed for power. But this old nobles
lack of connections with the new political actors or former members of the
Royal Army of Alto Peru doomed his project. By then, the Spanish royal army
stationed in the highlands was becoming stronger. La Serna had installed a vice-
regal court in Cuzco and from there dared to send an expedition to attack and
plunder the capital.120
Antonio Jos de Sucre arrived in Peru from Quito with four thousand men in
September 1823. Bolvar reached Lima in September. The old viceroyalty was in
despair. The economy was devastated, the new political elite was discredited and
fractured, the armies were divided, and Lima was threatened by disease and ban-
ditry.121 Two months later, congress proclaimed Perus first constitution, which
was written for the most part by republican Snchez Carrin.122
Like the Constitution of Cadiz, this liberal text reduced presidential power
to a minimum in favor of legislative power, which meant the rule of men of let-
ters. Liberals in Peru were aware that they did not need to curtail absolutism
but rather its direct heir, military despotism. In addition, the constitution of
1823 declared freedom of expression and the abolition of all nobility titles.123
Congress was too divided to build enough support for this constitutions ambi-
tious goals. Moreover, its articles against privilege alienated nobles and mem-
bers of the elite, whom Gaspar Rico defended. In La Depositaria, he satirically
claimed that this new Peruvian republic composed of a gentuza (pejorative term
for the people)children of the American sun, grandchildren of the African
moon, and great-grandchildren of Europes lancersshould forget the sweet
name of moderate monarchy.124 This liberal text was so out of step with the
military atmosphere that the day before it was sworn, Congress abolished the
articles that could undermine Bolvars new authority. Perus first Liberal consti-
tution was not even fully in effect for one day.125
By 1823 royalist forces stationed in the highlands had strengthened signifi-
cantly. Viceroy La Serna had long forgotten his initial dislike for a racially inclu-
sive army and tried to rapidly incorporate Indians and mestizos into the militia
and the army on a large scale.126 His expert generals formed guerrilla units to
combat San Martns own guerrillas.127 Years later, La Serna claimed that his army
was in fact more Peruvian than that of the enemy, alluding to the fact that San
Martn had mostly recruited slaves from the coastal haciendas, and Bolvar had
brought with him a large number of officers and soldiers from New Granada.128
Faced by insurgent forces from abroad, the royal army changed its name to
Ejrcito Nacional del Per.129
By late 1823 La Serna gained the support of the former rebellious regions of
Cuzco and Alto Peru. The elites of Cuzco enjoyed being once again the center

of power and the new court.130 After years of neglect and depression, Cuzco
became the capital and its Incas were used as symbols of Peru in both the
patriota and royal press.131 La Serna also received crucial backing from the
Arequipeo elite, who gave great sums to the royal army in the 1820s. According
to the libros de cabildo (municipal records), Arequipa had contributed twenty
thousand pesos monthly since 1816. Additionally, in 1822 they were asked to
give thirty thousand pesos, along with several extraordinary contributions.132
Notwithstanding this great fiscal pressure, Arequipeos seem to have found
in their new status an opportunity to elevate the political, cultural, and com-
mercial standing of the city. For years, they had tried to obtain permission to
establish a university. Instead they created the Academia Lauretana de Ciencias
y Artes de Arequipa and established chairs for courses on law, mathematics,
philosophy, religion, and bellas artes. While limeos were endlessly arguing in
the Sociedad Patritica, arequipeos claimed to be dedicated to promoting use-
ful knowledge about the arts and sciences and the Constitution of Cadiz. It was
one way to assert their independence from Charcas and Lima. Men of letters
in Arequipa elected Viceroy La Serna as their protector. But this group faced
the opposition of the cabildo and the bishop, who rejected Viceroy La Sernas
reputed Liberalism.133
With the south lost to royalist forces, Bolvar left Lima to protect the north.
His aim was to obtain the support of Riva Agero, who had moved to Trujillo
with an important part of the army. Yet, before Bolvar could move forward, the
arequipeo General Antonio Gutirrez de La Fuente led a military insurrection
and overthrew Riva Agero in favor of the Liberator. Bolvar then decided to
leave Lima, which was riddled with tuberculosis, to establish his headquarters
in the north. His troops made sure to sack it before leaving. Bolvar fell ill in
Pativilca and remained there. Despite the support of some key members of
Perus elite, division prevailed. The Marquis of Torre Tagle resented Bolvars
power and started negotiations with royalist general Canterac, who marched
into Lima. In February 1824 prisoners of the fort of Real Felipe in Callao and
some guards rebelled in support of General Rodil, who took the port. Tagle and
many limeo aristocrats joined them and took refuge in the fort.134 Chaos, pov-
erty, and disease reigned in the former court of Lima.135
Bolvar ruled Peru like a military dictator. Although congress continued to
meet, he curtailed its prerogatives and tried to control men of letters. But as he
well knew, he also needed them to govern. Bolvar gave full powers to his most
fervent admirer, republican Snchez Carrin, who was appointed minister gen-
eral of the affairs of the Peruvian republic and put in charge of the government
and the army.136 Snchez Carrin became Bolvars ideal right hand man in Peru,
as he was a confessed republican and opponent of San Martn and Monteagudo
and, more importantly, not a limeo aristocrat.

Yet Bolvar could never find enough support in Peru. He profoundly disliked
the limeo elite, and they despised him. For the Liberator they represented a
corrupt court; to them Bolvar was an interloper.137 Yet, like Napoleon in revo-
lutionary France, he was the strongest man in an ocean of factions. Bolvar did
everything he could to provide for this army and its officers and was infuriated
when he realized that limeos were reluctant to support his demands.138 His
Colombian-based army grew to ten thousand men in three months.139
Peruvian independence was sealed on December 9, 1824, at the Battle of
Ayacucho, when La Sernas force of 9,300 men met General Antonio Jos de
Sucres army of 5,780 men in the Pampa de la Quinua.140 After a long fight,
the royal armies surrendered, and General Canterac offered a capitulacin
Figure7.3 Allegoric shield in honor of Simn Bolvar. Anonymous, 1825. Ministerio de

Cultura del Per. Museo Histrico Regional de Cuzco. Photo:Daniel Giannoni, Archivo
Digital de Arte Peruano (ARCHI).

(capitulation). The battle became a symbolic event for both patriotas and roy-
alists. For former American Spaniards, it was a final and sound victory over the
Peninsular forces. For Peruvians, it was also the end of a long and devastating
civilwar.
In January 1825 Spanish military officers and Peninsular vecinos initiated
their exodus from the port of Quilca in Arequipa. Some decided to stay while
others, such as General Olaeta, refused to surrender. He was finally defeated in
April 1825 in Sucre, Alto Peru, where he had led a parallel and absolutist vice-
regal government since early 1824. General Rodil held firm to the fortress of
Real Felipe in Callao and remained under siege until January 1826. By the time
he finally gave up, 2,095 veteran soldiers and between 2,700 and 4,000 civilians,
Peninsular and American Spaniards, had died. Gaspar Rico was one of the vic-
tims, along with many noblemen, including Torre Tagle and Diego de Aliaga.141
In a world of armies, officers, and their lettered secretaries, there was no space
left for old privileges.
Bolvar remained in the south, consolidating independence and securing the
support of Cuzco, Arequipa, Puno, and the newly created republic of Bolivia.
This was the area of influence of the Royal Army of Alto Peru (and not surpris-
ingly the ultimate bastion of royal power) and Bolvar made sure to control it.
Like Viceroy Abascal, Bolvar was convinced that only an army of occupation
could hold Peru together, so he set forth an aggressive program of reform, which
was repudiated by some he called intriguers.142
Having secured the backing of all army forces and the loyalty of powerful
Southern generals such as Agustn Gamarra, Andrs de Santa Cruz, and Antonio
Gutirrez de la Fuente, all from this region, Bolvar returned to Lima in January
1826. There he oversaw the writing of a new constitution that would protect Peru
from anarchy by giving him extensive powers for life. With this decision Bolvar
faced growing rejection and mistrust, particularly in the capital. Additionally,
he alienated a key group of military officers, who expected significant rewards
after the long war and felt neglected when Bolvar decided to compensate the
Colombian army first for their leading role in the Battle of Ayacucho.143 The
decimated Peruvian treasury could offer no more. Bolvars days in Peru were
numbered.
After independence the struggle between men of letters and military officers
intensified in Peru. The battle over who had more merit to govern began. It
was waged in within the circles of power but also in the press. Eloquence
was thus in great demand. Military officers used pamphlets and newspapers
to claim their merits of having won the war with their blood and swords.
In return, they asked for respect, rewards, and power. They produced long
articles explaining their accomplishments and their projects for bringing

freedom, education, and wealth to the people. For example, in the intro-
duction to El Sol del Cuzco, the editor explained that the soldiers who had
achieved freedom were friends of the Enlightenment and of the peoples
rights. They were not mercenaries like the Spanish soldiers who oppressed
them with a liberal code.144 Despite their noble ideals, the newspaper was
mostly a forum for Bolivarian military officers to fight their opponents and
praise their leader. They even brought back Inca Huayna Capac to salute the
Liberator and avenge the blood of his children.145 Other military officers and
men of letters constantly wrote to protest the disrespect of their merits. For
example, the soldier and editor of La Estrella de Ayacucho claimed that he
had long served the Libertador as a writer and did not need any backing to
accuse him, if necessary, of violating the laws of the patria.146 After so many
years of learning about the crucial role of merit in a virtuous society and the
rewards given to meritorious men, the new Peruvian republicans were ready
to stake their claims.
Faced with the need to establish a new government and produce a constitu-
tion, Bolvar looked for men of letters. His most loyal, Snchez Carrin, had died
in June 1825. His obituary stated that he had defended liberty with his knowl-
edge in congress, although he would have liked to fight it with a sword in Junn
and Ayacucho.147 Bolvar subsequently found support in Unnue, Abascals clos-
est writer, the erratic Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, and Jos Mara de Pando.
By 1826 most of them were disenchanted with the promises of democracy and
freedom and believed in the need for a strong government that could impede
anarchy. Their opponents called them vitalicios for supporting Bolvars constitu-
tion for life. The leader of the vitalicios was Pando, a limeo aristocrat, who had
been educated in the Seminario de Nobles de Madrid, served the king in diplo-
matic missions in Europe, had been imprisoned by the French, worked as state
secretary during the Trienio Liberal in Spain, and apparently participated in the
liberal upheaval of Lisbon in 1820. Pando arrived in Lima in 1825 after escaping
Ferdinand VIIs persecution of liberals. Custodians of Callao informed Bolvar
of Pandos capture. After an interview, Bolvar offered him the ministry of for-
eign relations. He needed a professionally trained lawyer and diplomat such as
Francisco de Paula Santander or Andrs Bello, someone who had contacts in
Europe and could help him design a new government and establish international
relations with key powers.148 Pando assumed these roles and produced the con-
stitution of 1826.149
By then Bolvars admirers began to compare him to Napoleon, who in the
eyes of many Peruvian officers appeared as the great military capable of defeat-
ing the Bourbons. Bolvar tried to avoid being associated with such a controver-
sial figure.150 He constantly underscored in his letters that although Napoleon
had been one of the most extraordinary men in history, his own goal was to

Figure7.4 Jos Gil de Castro, Simn Bolvar, ca. 18261830. Ministerio de Cultura
del Per, Museo Nacional de Arqueologa, Antropologa e Historia del Per.
Photo:Daniel Giannoni,ARCHI.
surpass him. His glory was going to be greater since he would be remembered as
a defender of liberty, with his Constitution serving as proof of his true ideals.151
Most importantly, he argued, he would not fall like Napoleon.152 Nevertheless,
two weeks after proclaiming the constitution for the second anniversary of inde-
pendence in December 1826, there was a mutiny against him. Afew days later
Bolvar left Lima for Guayaquil en route to Venezuela, never to return.
Military caudillismo and factionalism rent Peru after Bolvars departure. From
January 1827 to 1830, five presidents tried to govern the new republic. Military
officers, both supporters of Bolvar such as Gamarra, Santa Cruz, and Gutirrez

de la Fuente, and their opponents, such as La Mar and Jos Flix de Iguan,
struggled against each other to rule Peru and emerge as the new Peruvian cau-
dillo. They were all mestizos, forneos (foreigners), or members of the provincial
elite. None of them had strong ties with the limeo elite.153 They were aware that
their power depended on the army. Infatuated with their own authority, they
dismissed the idea that anyone intended to overthrow them. Santa Cruz, for
example, claimed that the plans of guerrilla leader Ninavilca to lead a revolution
were just drunken fantasies, much like Ubaldes dreams.154 Despite their overt
arrogance, these officers knew that their status was fragile and also that a military
insurrection could quickly destroy their power. For this reason, in 1827 Gamarra
sent Santa Cruz a letter alerting him of the need to maintain a good relationship
with his troops so as not to lose everything.155 In another letter, Santa Cruz told
Gamarra that Lima had been like Babylon before the arrival of General La Mar
in 1827. I assured you, [he wrote] things have turned to a state where without
discipline in the militia and without any moral, every man could only trust his
security to his sword.156
In this unstable and violent era, two major political groups, Liberals and vital-
icios, consolidated their power. They were composed both of men of letters and
military officers. The former were led by Luna Pizarro and La Mar and issued
El Duende Republicano, Atalaya contra Vitalicios, El Telgrafo de Lima, El Hijo de
su Madre. The vitalicios, controlled by Pando and Gamarra, produced Crnica
Poltica y Literaria de Lima and El Mercurio Peruano.
In this new country with a courtly past, much of its political life remained
tied to the Spanish Peninsula. Liberals accused vitalicios of representing oppres-
sion and absolutism using the same terms that their predecessors in Cadiz had
used in their fight against Ferdinand VII. Liberals took command of the gov-
ernment for two years in June 1827 and in the middle of a war with Bolvars
Gran Colombia produced another Liberal Constitution in 1828, which theo-
retically lasted for four years. Evoking the struggle of Riego in Spain, colonel
Iguan celebrated this event and published in his newspaper Atalaya contra
Vitalicios an adaptation of the Riegos song Trgala. Like Ferdinand, Bolvar and
the vitalicios, like the serviles of Spain, would have to swallow this new Liberal
Constitution.157 Following the Peninsular song, the Peruvian Trgala was quite
provocative:Swallow it dog /Mean vitalicio/You wont get ahead/To the dam-
age/Of the nation/It has been founded/To your disgust/The August Temple/
Of liberty/Swallow it dog But what am Isaying?/Ah. Iam a fool/It is quite
certain/The great Simon/will come/Swallow it dog. The vitalicios only had
to swallow this Liberal Constitution and cope with it for a brief period, as the
military and former Bolivarian faction soon returned.
In June 1829, the Peruvian military officer Agustn Gamarra took power and
proclaimed that the time of national caudillos had finally come. He urged cuenquino

Figure 7.5 Naif art, anonymous. Early 1800s. Oil on canvas. Ministerio de Cultura del
Per. ARCHI.
La Mar to resign with the motto of no ms extranjeros, no ms [no more foreigners,

no more].158 By using the xenophobic argument, Gamarra was trying to dismiss
his rivals. The long-lasting era of Peruvian caudillos was on course, but Gamarras
leadership was constantly undermined by his alter-ego, Andrs de Santa Cruz, a
zealous follower of Bolvar and Napoleon. He spoke French, developed plans for
continental alliances, and produced a constitution and several codes, which were
a source of great pride.159 Both had been trained in the Royal Army of Alto Peru
under Goyeneche, fought insurgents for decades, and switched allegiances shortly
after San Martns arrival in Peru. Their long years had given them enough experi-
ence of command and connections to stake a claim to leadership.

Figure 7.6 Pancho Fierro, Presidente militar (Military president), ca. 18341841.
Watercolor. Museo de Arte de Lima (MALI).
Figure 7.7 Pancho Fierro, Vocal de la Corte Suprema (Supreme court justice), ca. 1834
1841. Watercolor. MALI.
By 1830, military rule had succeeded in Peru, as in many of the new

Spanish American republics. Military officers had not only defeated the
Bourbons and achieved independence but had also promoted themselves
as ultimate political leaders. They claimed that their success on the bat-
tlefield entitled them to rule. As El Sol del Cuzco put in July 1825:one of
the advantages of our independence is that a citizens merit will be closely
known by the government and rewarded accordingly. Thus, each one will

Figure 7.8 Pancho Fierro, Profesor del Colegio de San Carlos (Professor of the School of
San Carlos), ca. 18341841. Watercolor. MALI.
Figure 7.9 Francisco Javier Corts, Afroperuano uniformado (Afroperuvian in uniform),

ca. 18271838. Watercolor. MALI.
have a stimulus for virtue and display his talents and abilities with the hope
of a certain reward.160
In the euphoria of these years, Peruvian military officers looked for a model.
Some chose Bolvar, but others found Napoleon, a successful military officer,
defeater of the Bourbons turned emperor by the peoples acclamation, as a pow-
erful model for Peruvian caudillos. For example, in July 1829 Manuel Aparicio
advised General Antonio Gutirrez de La Fuente that in order to avoid gossip

202 Who ShouldRule?
and trouble, he had to act like a Napoleon and work towards his goals without
making any stops. Likewise, the arequipeo allies of Gamarra chose to celebrate
the seventh anniversary of independence in a room decorated with a portrait of
Napoleon and paintings of key events of his life because recognition has dic-
tated this homage to his extraordinary man. To him we owe our independence,
the revolution of Spain was the precursor of that of America.161 The power of
the military was so evident that according to the United States envoy Samuel
Learned, officers had become the arbiter of political power in these coun-
tries,162 a phrase that would repeatedly be used for Spain and Latin America.
This turn of events profoundly disappointed men of letters, who had expected
not just to design new constitutions and laws but to govern. Their role remained
secondary. They were subordinated to military caudillos, who appointed them as
publicistas, ministers, secretaries, and sometimes vice-presidents. They acted as
old courtly validos or favorites and walked in the shadows in their black suits.163
They took on these subordinated roles, but they wanted more. As a writer put it
in a pamphlet of 1838 alerting Bolivians against General Santa Cruz, with the
sword one can only cut heads, not write laws. With it, one can only spread blood
not enlighten nations and the present century belongs to philosophy.164 While
military officers fought against each other on the streets and battlefields, men of
letters intrigued, talked, wrote, and plotted against each other and against the
military. Some, like these cuzqueo writers of 1833, worried and began to elevate
prayers of this sort:
Deliver us,Lord
from those things called revolution
cedition, faction, cambiamiento (change), desertion, defection,
riot and othersalike
To Thee do we pray, hear us, hear our prayer.165

Epilogue
In 1833 the first Peruvian president and caudillo, Agustn Gamarra, finished
his tenure of four years in power after facing seventeen conspiracies and
vicious opposition in the press. A succession of sixteen military presidents
followed until the civilian Manuel Pardo won the election of 1872. Fifty years
after independence, Pardo could finally govern, thus fulfilling the aspirations
of men of letters. He was the son of the leading publicista of the 1830s, the
aristocrat and playwright Felipe Pardo y Aliaga, who was Gamarras secretary
and behind numerous conspiracies in the 1840s. In 1878, while serving as
president of the senate, Manuel Pardo was shot to death. After the other civil-
ian governments failed, the military returned to power in 1881 for another
fourteenyears.
In Spain, the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833 put an end to his absolutist rule
and set off a series of civil wars that lasted well over a century and led Spain into
a horrible depression and a violence that devastated everything, in the words
of historian and President in Exile of the Spanish Republic Claudio Snchez
Albornoz.1
Military officers were the leading actors of these wars; they commanded
pronunciamientos, consolidated political groups, and decided who should rule.
In Spain, they were strong enough to overthrow rivals but not to rule by them-
selves. At most, they could attain the role of regents, as was the case of General
Baldomero Espartero in the years 1840 to 1843. Some military officers might
have aspired to establish a military dictatorship there, but by then this system
and a republic were doomed to failure by external pressure as was monarchism
in Peru. While the neighboring independent republics would never have allowed
Peru to remain under Spanish rule or to be governed by a semi-independent
Bourbon king as San Martn intended, neither France nor Austria nor Britain
would have accepted a military dictatorship or a republic in Spain. This pres-
sure manifested itself in foreign interventions both in Peru and Spain and greatly
contributed to factionalism and instability. But foreign pressure alone does not
explain the continuous civil wars in both countries.
203

204 Who ShouldRule?
Rumor had it, by then, as the well-connected Count Mosca in Stendhals The
Charterhouse of Parma warned his lover, the Duchess of San Severino, that the
nineteenth century belonged to lawyers.2 This was not quite true in Peru, and
not quite in Spain. After years of military reforms, wars, repression, and a virtual
military dictatorship in Peru during Viceroy Abascals tenure, power lay with the
army, which remained the strongest and most solid institution during and after
the wars. Men of letters recognized their dependent condition but did not accept
it. They shared Count Moscas opinions about the status of lawyers. For years,
writers, publicistas, and lawyers had been reading about the leading roles men
like themselves had achieved after the American and French revolutions, dur-
ing the liberal era of Cadiz, and in neighboring places such as New Granada.3
Unfortunately for them, men of letters in Spain and Peru lacked strong institu-
tions that could back them and that they could operate through. Under these
circumstances, they turned to their competitors, military leaders, siding and
plotting with and against them. The weakness of their alliances and continuous
rivalry paved the way for decades of unrest.
In the attempt to understand such an outcome, this book looked at the con-
flict between men of letters and military officers as new political actors from
its Bourbon origins in the 1700s to the 1830s. This was certainly not the only
cause of persistent violence and unrest in Spain and Peru; the financial bur-
dens of continuous war, social and political inequalities, and economic despair
in both Peru and Spain by the 1820s account for much. But the Bourbons
intense efforts at reform undermined the political and social foundations of
the old Habsburg order and the subsequent wars destroyed what was left of
civilian and traditional institutions. The military emerged victorious at a time
when men of letters and lawyers in particular thought their time to rule had
finally come. It took them decades and numerous conspiracies to realize those
dreams.
The dramatic years of 1760 to 1830 brought about new political actors and a
new way of doing politics. This study focused on diverse actors and connected
ideas and plans in the court with responses on the ground. The Bourbon pro-
gram of reform, the Enlightenment, the new scale of wars, and liberalismboth
Peninsular and Americanled to the rise of new kinds of individuals who felt
entitled to rule. Ambitious men of letters and military officers led revolutions
that would change the order of things and position them as new authorities. To
understand why they succeeded or failed, it is worth making them the focus of
our study. After all, if they did everything they could to have a leading role, and
in so doing changed the political game forever, we should not just see them as
reflections or products of something else but read what they said and wrote and
take them as seriously as they took themselves.

Ep ilog ue 205
This book returned to an old and central theme in political history: the
struggle for power. During these years of change and revolution, some of the
most violent struggles were about power. People fought in many ways, from
the margins and the center, through persuasion and coercion, with their pens
but also with their swords. Sometimes they fought for their ideals and communi-
ties, but most often they fought for themselves.

NOTES
Introduction
1. This was an old debate in Spanish society, which dates back to the fifteenth century, if not earlier.
See Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974), 3236. On how the relation between men of letters and arms was con-
ceived of from its beginnings as a conflict, see Peter Russell, Arms versus Letters:Towards a
Definition of Spanish Fifteenth-Century Humanism, Aspects of the Renaissance; ASymposium,
ed. Archibald R. Lewis (Austin:University of Texas Press, 1967),4758.
2. For works committed to comparative, inter-comparative, and parallel studies see Kenneth
Maxwells pioneering eighteenth-century political histories integrating Portugal and Brazil.
See his Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) and Naked Tropics: Essays on Empire and Other Rogues (New York:
Routledge, 2003). For a pathbreaking study bringing together Peninsular and American his-
tories see John H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 1491-
1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). For a call to the search on connections in
the histories of both Europe and America see his preface to Spain, Europe, and the Wider
World, 1500-1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), xiiix x and Kenneth J.
Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic System, Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Jack P.
Greene and Philip D. Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 72. In this line,
Gabriel P. Paquette has opened new avenues of research with his Enlightenment, Governance,
and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808 (Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008); Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: the Luso-Brazilian
World, c. 1770-1850. See also his edited volume Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and
its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830 (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009)
and the following edited with Matthew Brown, Connections After Colonialism: Europe and
Latin America in the 1820s (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013). Studies focus-
ing on trade and imperial commercial relations in Spanish America have often included the
Peninsula in their analysis. For studies of this kind that attempt a broader overview of the
reform program see Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Silver, Trade, and War. Spain and
America in the Making of Early Modern Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2000); Carlos Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire: Mexican Silver and the War
Between Spain, Britain, and France, 1760-1810 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007); Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth
Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2014) and Adrian J. Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-
1763 (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2014). For recent illuminating studies connecting
Spain and Spanish Americas peoples, cultures, and legal systems see Mara Elena Martnez,
Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial mexico (Stanford,
207

208 notes to pages 25
CA.: Stanford University Press, 2008); Nancy Van Deusen, Global Indios: The Indigenous
Struggle for Justice in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015);
Jane E. Mangan, Transatlantic Obligations: Creating the Bonds of Family in Conquest-era Peru
and Spain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Karoline P. Cook, Forbidden
Passages: Muslims and Moriscos in Colonial Spanish America (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
3. Carr, Raymond, Spain Rule by Generals, Soldiers and Governments. Nine Studies in Civil-
Military Relations, edited by Michael Eliot Howard. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957,
13548; Eric Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain. 1800-1854 (Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 1967); Pierre Vilar, Hidalgos, amotinados y guerrilleros: Pueblo y poderes en
la historia de Espaa (Barcelona:Editorial Crtica, 1982). More recently, Spain in the Liberal
Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
For Latin America see John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1806-1826, 2d ed.
(NewYork:Norton,1986);
4. This is the definition included in the Diccionario de la lengua castellana, en que se explica el ver-
dadero senitdo de las voces, su naturaleza y calidad Madrid, 1737. In 1788, the Diccionario
castellano con las voces de ciencias y artes y sus correspondientes en las tres lenguas francesa, Latina
e italiana included a definition of poltica as fraude, infidelity in society and trade, and the good
economy of a family. The Diccionario Nacional o Gran Diccionario Clsico de la Lengua Espaola
(184647) listed many different new definitions for this term, including the poltica of resis-
tance, intrigues to obtain a specific goal and one for politicomana, the fixation or urge to get
involved in cosas polticas (political things), to talk about them, a passion for policia. See http://
buscon.rae.es/
5. Robert Darnton, The Devil in the Holy Water or the Art of Slander from Louis XIV to Napoleon
(Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), c hapters22 and23.
6. See Franois-Xavier Guerra, Modernidad e Independencias: ensayos sobre las revoluciones his-
pnicas (Mxico:Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1993); Los espacios pblicos en Iberoamrica.
Ambigedades y problemas. Siglos XVIII- XIX, edited by Franois- Xavier Guerra et al.
(Mexico:Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1998); Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution
in the Iberian World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Brian Hamnett,
Constitutional Theory and Political Reality:Liberalism, Traditionalism and Spanish Cortes,
1810-1814, The Journal of Modern History 49, n1 (March 1977):D.1071-D.1110; Historia
de las elecciones en Iberoamrica, siglo XIX:de la formacin del espacio poltico nacional (Buenos
Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1995; Jaime E. Rodrguez O. The Independence of
Spanish America (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jordana Dym, From
Sovereign Villages to National States. City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759-1839
(Albuquerque:University of New Mexico Press, 2006); and Rafael Rojas, Las repblicas del
aire:utopa y desencanto en la revolucin de Hispanoamrica (Mexico:Santillana, 2009). For a
new study on indigenous and slave agency and their loyalism see Marcela Echeverri, Indian
and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution:Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern
Andes, 1780-1825 (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2016). Also Cecilia Mndez
Gastelumendi, The Plebeian Republic:The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State,
1820-1850 (Durham:Duke University Press,2005).
7. See Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru (Lincoln and London:University
of Nebraska Press, 1979) and Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, El mito de la independencia con-
cedida: Los programas polticos del siglo XVIII y del temprano XIX en el Per y Alto Per
(1730-1814), La independencia del Per Concedida, conseguida, concebida?, eds. Carlos
Contreras and Luis Miguel Glave (Lima:Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2015):20945 and
La independencia en los Andes:una historia conectada (Lima:Fondo Editorial del Congreso del
Per,2014).
8. For influential general overviews that take Rio de la Plata or Mexico as reference and explain
Peru as a failed case, see John Lynch, The Spanish American. Respectively for general analysis on
Spanish America from Mexican perspectives see David Brading, The First America. The Spanish
Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State 1492-1867 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).

notes to pages 911 209
Chapter1
1. See Henry Kamen, Spains Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1773
(London:Penguin Books, 2002), 4423 and Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War,147.
2. Georges Scelle, La traite ngrire aux Indes de Castille, contrats et raits dassiento etude de droit
public et dhistoire diplomatique puise aux sources originales et accompagne de plusierus docu-
ments indits, 2 vols. (Paris:Larose & Tenin, 1906). During the War of Succession, British
vessels tripled in numbers and their freight capacity was enlarged by sixty percent John B.
Hattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and
Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (NewYork:Garland, 1987),23.
3. Henry Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-15 (London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1969), c hapter5 and Antonio Domnguez Ortiz, Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII espaol
(Barcelona, Caracas, Mxico:Ariel:1976), c hapters1and3.
4. John H. Elliott, A Europe of Composite Monarchies, Spain, Europe, and the Wider World,
xvi, 7. For a seminal analysis on the great variations in the distribution of power and insti-
tutional configuration of early modern monarchies see H. M. Koenigsberger, Dominium
Regale or Dominium Politicum et Regale. Monarchies and Parliament in Early Modern
Europe, Politicians and Virtuosi. Essays in Early Modern History (London:Hambledon Press,
1986),125.
5. Ihave borrowed the term power elites from Wolfgang Reinhard, who takes it from C.Wright
Mills and Vilfredo Paretos theory of the circulation of elites. Reinhard defines power elites
as individuals among the agents or servants of the state and among societys ruling
classes, who were the really important promoters of state power by using their position
formal or informalin the service of the state. See Wolfgang Reinhard Power Elites, State
Servants, Ruling Classes, and the Growth of State Power, in Power Elites and State Building
(Oxford:European Science Foundation. Clarendon Press, 1996),6.
6. The vast historiography on the Bourbon reforms has changed a great deal in the past few years
with the rise of Atlantic and global history, which allow for wider approaches. Particularly
important have been the latest efforts by Kenneth Andrien and Allan J. Kuethe, as well as
Adrian J.Pearce to push the analysis back to the early eighteenth century to include the ini-
tial reforms that affected both Spain and America and to analyze the reforms in close connec-
tion with military objectives. See Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic and Pearce, The
Origins of Bourbon. See also Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War; Jorge Caizares Esguerra,
How to Write the History of the New World:Historiographies, Epistemologies, and Identities in the
Eighteenth Century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Jeremy
Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University
Press, 2006); Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World; Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire; Paquette,
Enlightenment, Governance; and Paquette (ed.) Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe.
7. See, for example, Mark A. and D.S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority. The Spanish Crown
and the American Audiencias (Columbia:University of Missouri Press,1977).
8. For a legal analysis against this classical interpretation on the causes of independence see
Richard Konetztkes article of 1950 La condicin legal de los criollos y las causas de la inde-
pendencia, La ideologa de la emancipacin Hispano-Americana. Seleccin de textos por Jos
A.de la Puente Candamo (Lima:Publicaciones del Instituto Riva Agero, 1958),1024.
9. Among the latest calls for this kind of approaches are Kenneth Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic
System, Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, eds. Jack D. Greene and Philip D. Morgan
(NewYork:Oxford University Press, 2009, 5580 and John H. Elliotts preface to his Spain,
Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800 (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 2009). On the
connection between Bourbon reformism in the Peninsula and Spanish America see Manuel
Lucena, The Limits of Reform in Spanish America, Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe
and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830, ed. Gabriel Paquette (Farnham, England: Ashgate,
2009), 30720.
10. For a discussion on the character and intellectual foundations of Bourbon regalism and abso-
lutism see Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, chapter2.
11. Elliott, A Europe of Composite Monarchies and Koenigsberger Dominium Regale.

12. John H. Coatsworth, Political Economy and Economic Organization in the Iberian New
World, Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, John H. Coatsworth, Vctor Bulmer
Thomas, and Roberto Corts Conde, 23773 (eds.), vol. 1. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 23773.
13. Antonio Domnguez Ortiz, Instituciones y sociedad en la Espaa de los Austrias
(Barcelona:Editorial Ariel, 1985), chapter2.
14. John H. Elliott, Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain, Spain
and its World, 1500-1700:Selected Essays, 3d ed. (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1992),
24161.
15. John H. Elliott, The Count Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1986), 68485.
16. John H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1991),435.
17. Domnguez Ortiz, Instituciones y sociedad,2223.
18. Elliott, Power and Propaganda in the Spain of Philip IV, Spain and its World, 16288.
19. Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974),39.
20. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, 68384.
21. Kamen, The War of Succession,9293.
22. Kamen, The War of Succession, c hapter5. Pearce, c hapters2and3.
23. Elliott, Spain and its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Spain and Its World
(New Haven, CT, and London:Yale University Press, 1989), c hapter1 and Domnguez Ortiz,
Instituciones y sociedad,712.
24. Kamen, Melchor de Macanaz and the Foundations of Bourbon Power in Spain, Crisis
and Change in Early Modern Spain (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company,
1993):699716, esp.701. See also Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World,230.
25. Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon,45.
26. Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon,63.
27. Kamen, The War of Succession, 10717.
28. Kamen, The Establishment of Intendants in Early Bourbon Spain, Crisis and Change,113.
29. Kamen, Spains Road to Empire, 440. Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic, 456;
Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire,2529.
30. On Spains wars and garrisons in Europe see Jonathan I. Israel, Conflicts of Empires: Spain,
The Low Countries, and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713 (London and Rio
Grande:The Hambledon Press, 1997) and The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-
1661 (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982).
31. Julio Caro Baroja, La hora navarra del XVIII (personas, familias, negocios e ideas)
(Navarra:Diputacin Foral de Navarra, Institucin Prncipe de Viana, 1969), 28995.
32. Gernimo de Uztriz, introduction to Theorica y practica de comercio y de marina en diferentes
discursos y calificados exemplares que con especificas providencias se procuran adaptar a la monar-
chia espaola 3d ed. (Madrid:En la imprenta de Antonino Sanza,1757).
33. Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 164. On the Dutch and Italian influences of Uztriz see
Franco Venturi, Spagna e Italia nel Secolo dei Lumi. Corso di Sotria Moderna Anno Accademico,
1973-74 (Torino:Editrice Tirrena, 1974),2124.
34. Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 15356.
35. Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, 3645 and John Elliott, Learning from the Enemy:
Early Modern Britain and Spain, Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800, 2551.
36. Alice Stroup, A Company of Scientists. Botany, Patronage, and Community at the Seventeenth-
Century Parisian Royal Academy of Sciences (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990),49.
37. See Antonio de Ulloa, La marina. Fuerzas navales de la Europa y costas de Berbera. Transcripcin,
edicin y estudio preliminar de Juan Helguera Quijada. (Cdiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de
Cdiz, 1995).
38. Jorge Juan y Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas.
39. Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 12425 and160.
40. Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic, c hapter1; Pearce, The Origins, chapter2.

41. Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War,181.

42. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic, 23233.
43. Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739- 1763, 2d ed. (London and
Edinburg:Frank Cass & Co., 1963),28.
44. This is a key reform of the early Bourbon era for Pearce. See The Origins.
45. Kathleen Wilson, Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain:The Case
of the Admiral Vernon, Past and Present 121 (Nov., 1988):74109.
46. Pearce, The Origins.
47. Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance,100.
48. Jos Miguel Medrano and Carlos Malamud, Las actividades de los Cinco Gremios Mayores
en el Per. Apuntes preliminares, Revista de Indias 48, no. 18283 (1988):42133, esp.423.
See also Jorge Pinto Rodrguez, Los Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid y el comercio colo-
nial en el siglo XVIII, Revista de Indias 51, no. 192 (1991):293326.
49. Medrano and Malamud, Las actividades. On the increase of trade see Xabier Lamikiz, Trade
and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and Their Overseas
Networks (London:Royal Historical:Boydell Press,2010).
50. William J. Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750-1874 (Cambridge:Harvard
University Press, 1984), 3. On the reforms affecting the relation between the monarchy and
the church see Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic, chapter5.
51. Franco Venturi, Church and Reform in Enlightenment Italy:The Sixties of the Eighteenth
Century, The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 ( June 1976):21532. On the more appro-
priate use of the terms regalist governance instead of enlightened absolutism for the
Spanish case see Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance,6.
52. H. M. Scott, The Problem of Enlightened Absolutism, in Enlightened Absolutism. Reform
and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe, ed. H. M. Scott (London: Macmillan,
1990):135.
53. Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire,23.
54. Kamen, Spains Road,484.
55. Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence to Authority, Part 1.
56. John R. Fisher, El Peru borbnico 1750-1824 (Lima:Instituto de Estudios Peruanos 2000), 78
and9091.
57. Paul Rizo-Patrn, Linaje, dote y poder. La nobleza de Lima de 1700 a 1850 (Lima:Pontificia
Universidad Catlica del Peru. Fondo Editorial, 2000), 8687. On Cuba see Sherry Johnson,
The Social Transformation of Eighteenth-Century Cuba (Gainesville:University Press of Florida,
2001), chapter5. On Buenos Aires Susan Migden Socolow, The Bureaucrats of Buenos Aires,
1769-1810:Amor al Real Servicio (Durham, NC:Duke University Press, 1987), chapter7.
58. Pragmtica sancin para evitar el abuso de contraer matrimonios desiguales. El Pardo, 23
de marzo de 1776, and Real Cdula declarando la forma en que se ha de guardar y cumplir
en las Indias la Pragmtica Sancin de 23 de marzo de 1776 sobre contraer matrimonios. El
Pardo, 7 de abril de 1778, Coleccin de documentos para la historia social de Hispanoamrica,
1493-1810, ed. Richard Konetzke, vol. 3 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientficas, 1953-1958), 40613; 43842 respectively.
59. Rizo-Patrn, Linaje, dote y poder, 2436 and 127. On nobility titles granted to Spanish
Americans see Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los americanos en las rdenes nobiliarias (1529-
1900), vol. 1 (Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas, Instituto Gonzalo
Fernndez de Oviedo, 1947), LXXIV. Like in Cuba, the majority of Mexican titles were
awarded in the second half of the eighteenth century. See Doris M. Ladd, The Mexican Nobility
at Independence 1780-1826 (Austin:Institute of Latin American Studies. The University of
Texas at Austin,1976).
60. For a further discussion see Redes sociales e instituciones comerciales en el imperio espaol, siglos
XVII a XIX, eds. Antonio Ibarra and Guillermina del Valle Pavn (Mxico:Instituto Mora;
UNAM, Facultad de Economa,2007).
61. Carlos Malamud, La consolidacin de una familia de la oligarqua arequipea: los
Goyeneche, Quinto Centenario 4 (1982):49135.
62. In 1817, through lobbying the nuncio in Madrid, the retired brigadier helped his other
brother, Jos Sebastin, become bishop of Arequipa. Archivo Goyeneche, Archivo Mercedario

de Arequipa, (hereafter cited as AG), Libro II and Documentacin particular de la familia

Goyeneche, leg.28.
63. For an analysis on Peruvian and Mexican ordinary contributions and extraordinary donativos
to the crown see respectively Alfonso W. Quiroz, Deudas olvidadas. Instrumentos de crdito
en la economa colonial peruana 1750-1820 (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per,
1993), c hapter3 and Carlos Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire, chapter3.
64. On the role played by racial fears in the conservatism of limeo elites see Alberto Flores
Galindo, Aristocracia y plebe:Lima, 1760-1830 (Lima:Mosca Azul Editores, 1984), part2;
Charles Walker, The Patriotic Society: Discussions and Omissions about Indians in the
Peruvian War of Independence, The Americas 55, no. 2 (Oct. 1998):27598.
65. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru
(Kln:Bhlau, 1985), 22123.
66. The power elites of Cuzco included noble Indians. On this issue see David T. Garrett, His
Majestys Most Loyal Vassals:The Indian Nobility and Tpac Amaru, Hispanic American
Historical Review 84, no. 4 (2004):575618.
67. See Gabriel B. Paquette, State-Civil Society Cooperation and Conflict in the Spanish
Empire: The Intellectual and Political Activities of the Ultramarine Consulados and
Economic Societies, c.1780-1810, Journal of Latin American Studies 39, no. 2 (May, 2007):
26398.
68. Malamud and Medrano, Las actividades, Malamud, La consolidacin de una familia,
and Fisher, El Per borbnico, 102. Also Ana Cristian Mazzeo, El comercio libre en el Per:las
estrategias de un comerciante criollo:Jos Antonio Laballe y Corts, 1777-1815 (Lima:Pontificia
Universidad Catlica del Per,1994).
69. John R. Fisher, El impacto del libre comercio en el Per, 1778-1796, Revista de Indias 48
(1998):40119, esp.408. See also Jos Miguel Medrano and Carlos Malamud, Las activi-
dades, 42829 and Jess Turiso, Comerciantes espaoles en la Lima borbnica:anatoma de
una elite de poder (1701-1761) (Valladolid: Universidad, Secretariado de Publicaciones e
Intercambio Editorial, 2002), 34243.
70. Fisher, El Peru borbnico, 12227. On creoles benefiting from the Bourbon reforms see
Alejandra Irigoin, Bargaining for Absolutism:ASpanish Path to Nation-state and Empire
Building, HAHR 88, no. 2 (2008):55175.
71. While the value of imports in 1781 was 424,183 pesos, it dramatically increased in 1782 to
1,199,653; to 1,744,644 in 1783; 3,093,964 in 1784; 6,045,715 in 1785; and 13,766,740 in
1786. Although imports dropped from 1787 onwards, they still maintained the level of 3 to
5million pesos a year. The same increase is noticeable for the value of exports. In 1783 the
viceroyalty of Peru exported 561,067 pesos. This amount went suddenly up to 17,121,206
pesos in 1784, then it went down to 7,877,912 pesos in 1785; 9,168,467 in 1786; 5,424,268
and then varied between 2 to 6million Balanza del comercio entre los puertos de la Pennsula
y el del Callao en lo corrido desde el ao de 1781 hasta el de 1790. Por don Joseph Ignacio
Lequanda, and Gua poltica, eclesistica y militar del virreynato para el ao de 1796 com-
puesta de orden del superior gobierno por Hiplito Unnue, Gua poltica, eclesistica y
militar para el ao de 1793, ed. Jos Durand (Lima:Cofide,1985).
72. Fisher, El impacto and Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with Spanish
America, 17971820, Journal of Latin American Studies 30, no. 3 (October, 1998):45979.
73. Interestingly, Alison Games has found a strong correlation between the provinces of
North America that received the highest number of British and European migrants and
the most loyal provinces during the American Revolution because their ties had become
stronger. Alison Games, Migration, in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, eds. David
Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (NewYork:Palgrave, MacMillan, 2002):3150, esp.47.
On the world coming together in the 1760s era see C.A. Bayly, The First Age of Global
Imperialism, c.1760-1830, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 26 (1998):510
and The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA:Blackwell Publishing, 2004),
Part1; and Emma Rothschild, The East India Company and the American Revolution,
Center for History and Economics Working Paper Series. Cambridge (April 2002). On the
globalization of communications see Robert Darnton, An Early Information Society:News
and Media in Eighteenth-Century Paris, American Historical Review 1105, no.1, (February

2000): 135 and Tony Ballantyne, Empire, Knowledge, and Culture: From Proto-
Globalization to Modern Globalization, in Globalization in World History, ed. Anthony
Hopkins (London and NewYork:W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 11540. On the emer-
gence of an Atlantic community in the 1760s see Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History:Concept
and Contours (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,2005).
74. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic, 260. Unfortunately, the Spanish empire lacks general and com-
parative studies on movements of people for the eighteenth century.
75. Johnson, The Social Transformation, chapter3,52.
76. Herr, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution, 13436.
77. Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations. Immigrant and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish
America. (New Haven:Yale University Press, 2003), introduction and chapter2.
78. Reglamento, Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid,1799. AHN, Universidades, leg. 691/II.
79. Marie-Laure Rieu-Millan, Projets de formation des lites croles dans la Pninsule, la fin du
XVIIIe sicle, Mlanges de la Casa de Velzquez, vol. 18, no. 1 (1982):199214. Here Rieu Millan
analysis the project of bringing creoles to the Peninsula as part of a renewed Peninsular colonization.
80. Jorge Juan y Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas de Amrica, ed. Luis J. Ramos Gmez, 2nd ed
(Madrid: Historia 16), 34950. For an analysis on the influence of Indian nobles from Peru
on Juan and Ulloas account, see Kenneth J. Andrien, The Noticias secretas de America and
the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the Spanish American Empire, Colonial Latin
American Review 7, no. 2 (December 1998): 17592.
81. Gandara wrote:Yo hablo de gente rica de comercio, de letras, de armas y de distincin. Si
todos son vasallos del Rey ac (que no hay riesgo de nada) por que no han de alternar con
nosotros? Ya que no pueden (ni conviene) ser empleados all, senlo ac. Hay mejor modo
de arrastrar hasta aquellas riquezas que no nos llegan por la via del Comercio? Vuelven ac, a
lo menos, los hijos de aquellos padres que se nos fueron all. Antonio de la Gandara, Apuntes
sobre el bien y mal de Espaa. Edicin, transcripcin y estudio preliminar por Jacinta Delgado
(Madrid: Clsicos del Pensamiento Econmico Espaol, 1988), 131. Bernardo Ward also
developed this idea in his proyecto:As el indiano rico vivira en Madrid y dejara en Lima
o Mjico un hombre hbil encargado de sus intereses; sus caudales continuaran emplea-
dos como siempre y el beneficio de su comercio y sus rentas en Indias (si las tuviese) las
gastara en Espaa, y no las llevara el contrabandista extranjero. Bernardo Ward, Proyecto
econmico en que se proponen varias providencias dirigidas promover los intereses de Espaa, con
los medios y fondos necesarios para su plantificacin:escrito en el ao de 1762. Cuarta impresin.
Madrid:1787 (Madrid:Clsicos del pensamiento econmico espaol. Instituto de Estudios
Fiscales, 1982),82.
82. On the key role of collaborators and likeminded elites for imperial consolidation see John
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade, The Economic History
Review vol VI, no. 1 (1953): 115; P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-
2000 (Harlow, England:NewYork:Longman, 2002), c hapter2; Niall Ferguson, Empires
with Expiration Dates, Foreign Police (SeptemberOctober 2006):4652; Charles S. Maier,
Among Empires: American Ascendency and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard
83. Saliha Belmessous, Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century
French Colonial Policy, American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (April 2005), 32249.
84. See Kenneth Maxwell, The Idea of the Luso-Brazilian Empire, Naked Tropics, 10943 and
Pombal and the Nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian Economy, HAHR 48, no. 4 (Nov.
1968):608731.
85. Richard Herr, Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime (Berkeley,
LA and London:University of California Press, 1989),3435.
86. The details of the Councils session come from Konetzkes pathbreaking study, La condicin
legal,1921.
87. No pudiendo mirarse ya aquellos pases como una pura colonia, sino como unas provincias
poderosas y considerables del imperio espaol. Ibid.,19. See also Jaime Eyzaguirre, Ideario y
ruta de la emancipacin chilena, 13th ed. (Santiago:Editorial Universitaria, 1984),5258.
88. Rieu-Millan, Projets de formation des lites croles, 199202.
89. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, 188 and Power and Propaganda.

90. Vicente de la Fuente, Historia de las universidades, colegios y demas establecimientos de enseanza
en Espaa, vol. IV (Madrid:Imprenta de la Viuda hija de Fuentenebro, 1889), 16164.
91. AGI, Indiferente,1619.
92. AHN, Universidades,690.
93. The sum was divided as follows:Cadiz 24,000; Lima 26,000; Mexico 24,000; Buenos Aires,
Veracruz, Havana, and Caracas (each) 20,000; Cartagena and Santander (each) 12,000; etc.
AGI, Indiferente1619.
94. The Archivo Histrico Nacional in Madrid keeps the records of student enrollments that
reveal the geographical origins of the students as well as the names and titles of their parents.
See AHN, Universidades 1304, 1333 F, 1357, L 1314; AMB, A.R.S.fondoa; Julin Martnez
Ruiz, Filiacin de los seminaristas.
95. AHN, Universidades 1304, 1333 F, 1357, L 1314; Flix de Brjula y Martn Crespo y Jos
de la Brjula y de Ochavento, Indice de los caballeros hijosdalgo de la nobleza de Madrid
(Madrid: n.p.,1920), Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Linaje e Ilustracin. Don Manuel Uchu
Inca y el Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid (1725-1808), El hombre y los Andes. Homenaje
a Franklin Pease G. Y., ed. Javier Flores and Rafael Varn (Lima: Pontificia Universidad
Catlica del Per, Fondo Editorial, 2002), 64156.
96. Manuel Garca Blanco, Seis estudios salmantinos (Salamanca: Centro de Estudios
Salmantinos, 1961), Jos de Rjula y de Ochoterena, Indice de los colegiales del Mayor de
San Ildefonso y Menores de Alcala (Madrid, C.S.I.C., Instituto Jernimo Zurita, 1946). Also
Kagan, Students and Society, 24244.
97. Jos Antonio del Busto, El arequipeo Jos Antonio de Peralta y Rivera de las Roelas, jefe
de la escuadra de la Real Armada Espaola y virrey electo del Nuevo Reino de Granada,
Boletn del Instituto Riva-Agero 23 (1996):40712. Real compaa de guardias marinas y cole-
gio naval, catlogo de pruebas de caballeros aspirantes, vols. 15, (Madrid:Instituto Histrico
de Marina, 1943). AGS, Secretara de Guerra 7095, Exp. 57, 59; Manuel de Mendiburu,
Diccionario histrico-biogrfico del Per, 2d ed. (Lima: Imprenta Enrique Palacios, 1931
1934); Jos Antonio del Busto Duthurburu, El arequipeo Jos Antonio de Peralta, and
Diccionario de Historia de Espaa, ed. Germn Bleiber, 2d ed. (Madrid: Ediciones de la
Revista de Occidente,1962).
98. Lista de los jovenes americanos, que solicitan la bandolera de reales guardias de corps. AGI,
Indiferente general,1633.
99. Plan de la Escuela Patritica Bascongada, Archivo Municipal de Bergara, Guipzcoa
(AMB), C/085-03, 1770. On Basque enlightenment and the school of Bergara see Jess
Astigarraga Goenaga, Los ilustrados vascos:ideas, instituciones y reformas econmicas en Espaa
(Barcelona:Crtica,2003).
100. John R. Fisher, El Real Seminario de Bergara y las tentativas de modernizar la tec-
nologa minera en el Peru (1788-1810), in Comerciantes, mineros y nautas. Los vascos en la
economa americana, ed. Ronald Escobedo Mansilla, Ana de Zaballa etal. (Vitoria-Gasteiz,
Spain:Servicio Editorial Unversidad del Pas Vasco, 1996):36576.
101. Julin Martnez Ruiz, Filiacin de los seminaristas del real seminario patritico bascongado y
de nobles de Vergara (San Sebastin:Publicaciones de la Real Sociedad Vascongada de los
Amigos del Pas del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas,1972).
102. Jess Astigarraga, La expansin de la RSBAP por Amrica, La Real Sociedad Bascongada
y Amrica. III Seminario de Historia de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del Pas
(Bilbao:Fundacion BBV, 1992), 91104.
103. Representacin al Rey Seor D.Carlos IV para el establecimiento en Espaa de un colegio
mayor de Nobles Americanos, AGI, Indiferente General,1619.
104. Representacin alRey.
105. Jess Villanueva Lpez, La influencia de Maquiavelo en las empresas polticas de Diego
de Saavedra Fajardo, Studia historica. Historia moderna 19 (1998):16996.
106. Ellos estaran muy contentos con estas ventajas; porque cada uno solo atenderia su propio
interes; y baxo la imagen de una perfecta libertad, se les aprisionaba con unas cadenas de oro,
que sufririan alegremente, y con las que se aseguraba su fidelidad. Representacin al Rey.

109. Real Cedula por la qual su Magestad funda un colegio de nobles americanos en la ciudad de
Granada. Madrid, 1792. AGI, Indiferente,1620.
110. Ambrosio OHiggins to the Marquis of Bajamar. Santiago, 15 Oct. 1792. AGI,
Indiferente,1620.
111. AGI, Indiferente general, 1620 and 1621. For an analysis on the project of educating the
Indian nobility in Spain see Monique Alaperrine Bouyer, Del Colegio de Caciques al
Colegio de Granada: la educacin problemtica de un noble descendiente de los incas,
Boletn del Instituto Francs de Estudios Andinos 30, no. 3 (2001):50125.
112. Francisco Garay Unibaso, Correos martimos espaoles, vol. 1 (Bilbao: Bolsillo Mensajero,
1987), 30. For a recent study on the Spanish mail system, see Sylvia Sellers-Garca, Distance
and Documents at the Spanish Empires Periphery (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2014), c hapter 3, in particular.
113. Garay Unibaso, Correos martimos,161.
114. Los tiempos han variado las cosas; los Conquistadores han desaparecido; la autoridad de
los particulares se ha disipado; la Amrica desde el ao de 1764, en que se establecieron los
Correos martimos se ha acercado ms de 2000 leguas la Espaa:desde entonces ha sido
mas conocida; sus negocios se han examinado mas despacio; y este espacio ha producido
mejores Reglamentos y providencias que han tenido mejor y mas pronto cumplimiento por
la vigilancia del Gobierno, y de los sugetos que ha destinado hacerlas observar; pudien-
dose asegurar sin riego de temeridad, que han Ganado mas estos Reynos su felicidad en los
ltimos treinta aos, que en los doscientos setenta anteriores desde que los conquistaron
nuestras armas. Mercurio Peruano, 20 Apr.1794.
115. For a latest study on the emergence of the news, see Andrew Pettegree, The Invention
of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale
University Press,2014).
116. Diarios, y memorias de los sucessos principales, y noticias mas sobresalientes en esta ciudad de
Lima, corte del Peru, desde 17 de mayo del ao 1700 hasta fines de Diziembre de 1711 con las que
se han recibido por Cartas y gazetas de Europa en el mismo tiempo. The only copies that exist of
these news-sheet are kept at the NewYork Public Library. See News-sheets printed in Lima
between 1700-1711 by Jos de Contreras y Alvarado, Royal Printer, Bulletin of the NewYork
Public Library 78, no. 1 (Autumn, 1974):768.
117. For example, Gaceta de Lima, 20 Apr. to 9 Jun.1756 De las mas recientes Gacetas de Madrid;
que la ultima es de 28. Del inmediato Octubre; conducidas por la via de Chile, en defecto
del Aviso, que se esperaba; son mas particulares las siguientes NOTICIAS DE EUROPA.
See also Jess Timoteo Alvarez and Ascensin Martnez Riaza, Historia de la prensa hispano-
americana (Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992), 38.
118. Gaceta de Lima desde el primero de diciembre de 1743 hasta 18 de enero de 1744, John Carter
Brown Library.
119. Gazeta de Lima, 27 Nov. 1759 to 24 Jan.1760.
120. Gaceta de Lima, 15 Oct. 1760 to 10 Dec. 1760. The Gaceta de Lima also was informative
about the positions and promotions awarded by the Crown in Spain, and the diplomatic
agreements established by theCrown.
121. From 1756 to 1763 the Gazeta de Lima dedicated long articles to narrating the Seven Years
War in detail.
122. According to John Fisher, the Mercurio Peruano helped reinforce ties between Peru and
Spain in the short term. John Fisher, El Per borbnico,161.
123. For a similar conclusion based on her studies on Central America see Jordana Dym,
Conceiving Central America:ABourbon Public in the Gazeta de Guatemala (1797-1807),
in Enlightened Reform, 98118.
124. The Semanario Critico did not follow this pattern as it pursued a different agenda.
125. Adifferent interpretation has dominated the field since the 1980s, when Benedict Anderson
argued that the early circulation of newspapers in Spanish America and the traveling of
Bourbon officers through the empire spread information about the different characters of
the empires peoples and regions, provoking the emergence of distinct imagined commu-
nities. This development planted the seeds of nationalism and established a path towards
independence. Anderson built a general interpretation for the rise of nationalisms largely on

the Spanish American case that was mostly based on the traditional historiography on Latin
America thatas a sort of Whig historyhad been arguing since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury:that the spread of the Enlightenment had led to the development of nationalism and
consequently to independence. According to this view, the Enlightenment, spread through
newspapers and pamphlets, brought a sense of community to the different American
administrative units that, because of their isolation, already possessed self-contained char-
acters. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. (London, NewYork:Verso, 1991), chapter4.
126. Expediente en copia certificada sobre la formalizacion de la Sociedad de Amantes del Pais
para el Mercurio Peruano Andean Collection, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University
Library, Box 33, Folder 222. For the best study on the imperial dimensions of the emergence
of newspapers and associations see Robert J. Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish
World (1763-1821) (Syracuse, NY:Syracuse University Press,1958).
127. Diario de Lima, prologue, BNL; Analisis del Diario curioso, erudito, economico y comercial
que con privilegio de este Real y Superior Gobierno da a luz Don Jayme Bausate y Mesa.
AGN, Coleccin Moreyra, D 102. See also, Jean Pierre Clement, Aproximacin al Diario de
Lima (1790-1793) y a Jaime Bausate y Mesa, su autor, El Argonauta Espaol no. 3 (2006)
www.argonauta.imageson.org. On Viceroy Luis de Las Casas role in the publication of the
Papel Peridico de la Habana see Johnson, The Social Transformation,124.
128. On the importance of reconsidering the universalizing character of the Enlightenment see
Robert Darnton, George Washingtons False Teeth (NewYork and London:W. W.Norton &
Company, 2003), c hapter1.
129. Emma Rothschild, The East India Company and the American Revolution (Cambridge,
Mass.: Working paper, Center for History and Economics Working Paper Series, 2002).
On the influence of British writers see Shafer, The Economic Societies, c hapter2; Herr, The
Eighteenth-Century Revolution, 18182; 37778; Fernando Ortiz, La hija cubana del ilumi-
nismo, reprint of the 1943 edition (Havana:Editorial Academia,1993).
130. On the Sociedad Bascongada, Astigarraga, Los ilustrados vascos.
131. Shafer, The Economic Societies, 2627,50.
132. Ibid.,3435.
133. Number of members for the years from 1765 to 1793 were as follows:Total 1,039; Mexico
City 253, Madrid 253, Cadiz 148, Lima 102, Bilbao 87, Sevilla 80, Vergara 71, Havana 69,
Paris 49, Vitoria 48, Manila 44, San Sebastian 40, Puebla 35, Chihuahua 34, Arequipa 31,
Buenos Aires 16, Santiago de Chile 10, Trujillo (Peru) 10, Cartagena 9, Bogot 8. Ibid.,
12526.
134. Jess Astigarraga Goenaga, La expansin de la RSBAP por Amrica, La Real Sociedad
Bascongada y Amrica. III Seminario de Historia de la RSBAP (Bilbao:Fundacin BBV,
1992): 91104, esp. 1001. Also Juan Vidal Abarca, Estudio sobre la distribucin
y evolucin de los socios de la RSBAP en Indias (1765-1793), La Real Sociedad,
10548.
135. Jean Sarrailh, La Espaa ilustrada de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, 3rd ed. (Mxico, Buenos
Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1957), 236.
136. Shafer, The Economic Societies,48.
137. Ortiz, La hija cubana.
138. Shafer, The Economic Societies,2045.
139. Catherine Poupeney Hart, Prensa e ilustracin:Jos Rossi y Rub, del Mercurio peruano
a la Gaceta de Guatemala, Istmo 13 ( Jul. Dec., 2006), http://istmo.denison.edu/n13/
proyectos/prensa.html.
140. The statutes of the Sociedad de Amantes del Pas were not issued until after the Mercurio
was published. On this and the viceroys support of the society see Juan Carlos Estenssoro,
Proyecto ilustrado e independencia, paper submitted to the conference Coloquio de Hisotria
de la Independencia De Reino a Repblica (Lima:Universidad del Pacfico, 1994), 110 and
Shafer, The Economic Societies, 15860. For more details see Documents Concerning the
Sociedad de Amantes del Pas, AC, box 33, Folder222,
141. Ortiz, La hija cubana.

142. On the cosmopolitan character of British freemasonry and its ties with imperial expansion
see Jessica Harland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire: Freemasons and British Imperialism, 1717-
1929) (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 2007), chapter2.
143. Jos A. Ferrer Benimelli, Masonera e inquisicin en Latinoamrica durante el siglo XVIII
(Caracas: Universidad Catlica Andres Bello, Instituto de Investigaciones Histricas,
Caracas, 1973) and La masonera en la historia de Espaa. Actas del I symposium de metodologa
aplicada a la historia de la masonera espaola. (Zaragoza, 1985), and La masonera espaola
(Madrid: Editorial Istmo. Coleccin La Historia en sus textos, 1996).
144. AHN, Inquisicin, legs. 3736 exp.70, 3733 exp.80, 1866, exp.1-2
145. Juan Marchena Fernndez, El tiempo ilustrado de Pablo de Olavide, vida, obra y sueos de un americano
en la Espaa del S.XVIII (Sevilla:Ediciones Alfar, 2001), 289 and Pablo de Olavide:de criollo ilus-
trado a vctima de la inquisicin, Revista Historia de la Educacin Latinoamericana 3 (2001):1146.
146. AHN, Inquisicin 3736, no. 70. On this issue see Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-Century
Revolution,78.
147. Herr, Rural Change,3841.
Chapter2
1. For a discussion on the connections between eighteenth-century reform efforts and the
Enlightenment see Gabriel Paquette, Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and Its
Atlantic Colonies in the Long Eighteenth Century and Charles C. Noel, In the House
of Reform: The Bourbon Court of Eighteenth-Century Spain, in Enlightened Reform in
Southern Europe, 120 and 14565, respectively.
2. Citing Spanish historians Palacio Atard and Vicente Rodrguez Casado, Iris M. Zavala,
Clandestinidad y libertinaje erudito en los albores del siglo XVIII (Barcelona, Caracas,
Mxico:Editorial Ariel, 1978),136.
3. Feijos works were well known in Italy, France, and Portugal. See Agustn Millares Carlo,
foreword to Feijo. Teatro crtico universal. Seleccin, prlogo y notas por Agustn Millares Carlo,
vol. 1 (Madrid:Clsicos Castellanos. Ediciones de La Lectura, 1923), 1114. Feijo is also
considered as the initiator of a revolution from above. See Zavala, Clandestinidad.
4. Letter XIX Paralelo de Luis XIV, rey de Francia, y Pedro el Primero, Zar, o Emperador de la
Rusia, Cartas eruditas, http://www.filosofia.org/bjf/. See also Gaspard Delpy, Bibliography
des sources franaise de Feijoo (Paris:Hachette,1936).
5. Zavala, Clandestinidad,129.
6. La nobleza es pura denominacin extrnseca; y si se quiere hacer intrnseca, ser ente de
razn. Benito Feijo, Valor de la nobleza e influjo de la sangre. Teatro crtico universal, o
discursos varios en todo gnero de materias, para desengao de errores comunes. Benito Jernimo
Feijo; edicin, introduccin y notas de Giovanni Stiffoni (Madrid:Clsicos Castalia, 1986),277.
7. Ibid., Valor de la nobleza, 28485.
8. Ibid., Valor de la nobleza,287.
9. Ibid., Valor de la nobleza,294.
10. Kagan, Students and Society,xix.
11. Franco Venturi, Spagna e Italia,19.
12. Concepcin S. Amor, Ideas pedaggicas del Padre Feijo (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientficas, 1950),142.
13. Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution,38.
14. Carta XVI. Causas del atraso que se padece en Espaa en orden a las Ciencias Naturales,
Cartas eruditas. Tomo segundo [1745], http://www.filosofia.org/bjf/. See also Amor, Ideas
pedaggicas, 22126.
15. Herr, The Eighteenth Century,39.
16. Venturi, Spagna e Italia,18.
17. Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 3940. Delpy, Bibliography des sources.
18. See Jerry M. Williams, Censorship and Art in Pre-Enlightenment Lima. Pedro de Peralta
Barnuevos Dilogo de los muertos:la causa acadmica. Study, facsimile edition, and translation
(Potomac, MD:Scripta Humanistica, 1994),8.

19. Nota de los efectos pertenecientes al equipaxe del Iltmo Sor. Dn. Pedro Josse Chavez, obispo
conducido en la Fragata de Su M.nombrada Santa Rufina. 1788. AGN PJ, #5 Pi 175/6. See
also, Pedro Guibovich Prez, Tradicin y modernidad. La biblioteca del obispo Pedro Jos
Chvez de la Rosa, Cuadernos de investigacin del Instituto Riva-Agero no. 2 (Lima:Instituto
Riva Agero,2014).
20. Seminario de San Jernimo, Arzobispado de Arequipa, archivo, Libros del aposento del
padre Vizente Valcarzel, Inventario de los libros de la biblioteca del los PP. Jesuitas de
Arequipa, siglo XVIII. ARC, Tasacin de los Libros del difunto Doctor Don Pedro Jos
de Necochea, cura que fu de la Doctrina de Guancarama, Intendencia, Gobierno, 1820
1823. Daniel Restrepo Manrique, La iglesia de Trujillo (Per) bajo el episcopado de Baltasar
Jaime Martnez Compan, 1780-1790, vol. 1 (Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain: Eusko Jaurlaritzaren
Argitalpen Zertitzu Nagusia-Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco, 1992),
30. Also Emily Berquist Soule, The Bishops Utopia:Envisioning Improvement in Colonial Peru
(Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), c hapter1.
21. On the Bourbon bishopss commitment to useful knowledge, Berquist, The Bishops Utopia,
chapter2.
22. Vctor Peralta Ruiz, Las tribulaciones de un ilustrado catlico. Jos Eusebio Llano Zapata en
Cdiz (1756-1780), in Jos Eusebio Llano Zapata, Memorias histrico, fsicas, crtico, apolo-
gticas de la Amrica Meridional, eds. Antonio Garrido et al. (Lima: IFEA, PUCP, UNMSM,
2005), 3773.
23. Guillermo Furlong referred to Llano Zapata as the American Feijo. Cited in Flix Alvarez
Brun, Jos Eusebio de Llano Zapata, Nueva Coronica 1 (1963), 33101. See also Jos
Eusebio del Llano Zapata, Resolucion Phisico-Mathematica sobre la Formacion de los Cometicos
Cuerpos, y efectos que causan su Carta, o diario que escribe a su mas venerado amigo, y doctor
Ignacio Chirivoga y Daza (Lima, 1747, 1748), Obras varias (Lima, 1743-1748). Vctor
Peralta Ruiz, Las redes personales en Per y Espaa de dos ilustrados catlicos:Pablo de
Olavide y Jos Eusebio Llano Zapata, Revista Complutense de Historia de Amrica 34 (2008),
10728.
24. John Tate Lanning, The Reception of the Enlightenment in Latin America, Latin America
and the Enlightenment, ed. Arthur P. Whitaker (ed.), 2nd Ed. (Ithaca, NY:Great Seal Books,
1942),7193.
25. Preliminar y cartas que preceden al Tomo Ide las memorias historico-physicas, critico-apologeticas
de la America Meridional. Su Author J.E. LL. Z. (Cadiz:En la Oficina de D.Pedro Gomez de la
Requena,1758).
26. Carta o Diario que escribe D. Joseph Eusebio de Llano y Zapata a su mas venerado amigo
(Lima:Calle de la Barranca por Francisco Sobrino,1747).
27. Charles F. Walker, Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and its
Long Aftermath (Durham, NC:Duke University Press, 2008),2122.
28. Carta que el autor de estas memorias escribe don Luis Milhau, comissario Real de
Guerra y Marina en el Departamento de Cadiz remtiendole el Primero Tomo de ellas.
Preliminar y cartas. For a different interpretation on the writing of history in the eighteenth
century see Jorge Caizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World:Histories,
Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford: Stanford
29. Lo que en ellos se hallase de virtud, sera el heroysmo, que buscamos. Lo que se encontrasse
abominable, en el mismo desprecio tendra su acusacion, y castigo. No decantamos heroes, ni
menos representamos infames. Cada uno por la relacion de sus hechos se formar el character
de su merito. Preliminar ycartas
30. Alvarez Brun, Jos Eusebio,7477.
31. Las ignorancias, que por lo comn le advierten en los Indios, no son defecto de su capacidad,
sino falta de cultura. Siempre, que se carezca de lo Segundo, no sera bien reglado lo primero.
Preliminar y cartas.
32. See Peralta Ruiz, Las tribulaciones,6869.
33. Carta- persuasiva al seor don Ignacio de Escandon Sobre asunto de escribir la
historia-literaria de la America Meridional. Sv avtor don Joseph Evsebio de Llano Zapata
(Cadiz,1768).

34. See John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1989). See also Fred Anderson, The War that Made America.
AShort History of the French and Indian War (NewYork:Viking,2005).
35. See Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit. Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute
Monarchy in France, 1600-1789 (Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press, 1996) and
Franklin L. Ford, Robe and Sword; the Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV
(Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1953), c hapter12.
36. Rudolf Vierhaus, The Prussian Bureaucracy Reconsidered, Rethinking Leviathan. The
Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany, ed. John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999), 14965.
37. A la Catholica Magestad del Rey Nuestro Seor Don Phelipe V, Don Geronymo de
Uztariz. Theorica, y practica de comercio y de marina [1742] Introduccin de Gabriel Franco
(Madrid:Aguilar,1968).
38. A la Catholica Magestad, 24 and6061.
39. A la Catholica Magestad, 41112.
40. William J. Callahan, Honor, Commerce and Industry in Eighteenth-Century Spain (Boston,
Baker Library:Harvard University of Business Administration, 1972),13.
41. Callahan, Honor, Commerce, chapter2.
42. Jos Martnez Cards, Don Jos del Campillo y Cosso, Revista de Indias 30, no. 11922
( JanDec, 1970):50342.
43. Jos del Campillo y Cosso, Dos escritos polticos. Lo que hay de ms y menos en Espaa/
Espaa despierta. Estudio preliminar y notas: Dolores Mateos Dorado (Oviedo: Clsicos del
Pensamiento Asturiano,1993).
44. The first edition of 1962 reproduced only an abridged version of Campillos manuscript. Ibid.,
lxii. Zavala, Clandestinidad y libertinaje,282.
45. Brading, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763-1810 (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge
University Press, 1971), 2526 and Martnez, Don Jos del Campillo, 53435.
46. For example, Mercurio Peruano 31, 17-4-1791
47. Fernando Romero, Rodrguez de Mendoza:hombre de lucha (Lima:Editorial Arica, 1973), 183;
Miguel de Eyzaguirre, Manifiesto, 1809. AGI, Diversos 2 A.Soule, The Bishops Utopia,1718.
48. Joseph del Campillo y Cosso, Nuevo sistema de gobierno econmico para la Amrica:Con los
males y daos que le causa el que hoy tiene, de los que participa copiosamente Espaa; y reme-
dios universales para que la primera tenga considerables ventajas, y la segunda mayores intereses
(Madrid:En la Imprenta de Benito Cano, 1789), 11 and17.
49. Campillo y Cosso, Nuevo sistema,2022.
50. On the long-lasting influence of Las Casas ideas see Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession
in Spanish American Narrative (New Haven:Yale University Press,2007).
53. According to Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, the Bourbon reforms did alter the selection criteria of
caciques and undermine the legitimacy of traditional Indian lineages. This process started by mid
eighteenth century but intensified after the Tupac Amaru rebellion. See Scarlett OPhelan Godoy,
Kurakas sin sucesiones:del cacique al alcalde de indios (Per y Bolivia 1750-1835) (Cuzco:Centro de
Estudios Regionales Bartolom de las Casas, 1997). See also David Garrett, Shadows of Empire.
The Indian Nobility of Cusco, 1750-1825 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005).
55. Campillo y Cosso, Nuevo sistema, chapter6.
56. baxo de este nombre comprehendo todos los que no son Espaoles puros, sean
de qualesquiera clase calidad se le dar en todo y por todo el mismo trato que los
Espaoles de la misma esfera. Campillo y Cosso, Nuevo sistema,1267.
58. On Juan and Ulloas denunciations of corruption see Alfonso W. Quiroz, Corrupt
Circles:AHistory of Unbound Graft in Peru. Baltimore and Washington, DC:Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, Johns Hopkins Press, 2008, chapter1.
59. Jorge Juan y Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas de Amrica, 44344. According to Kenneth
Andrien, Juan and Ulloas report followed royal ideas of reform as well as the complaints

of Indian elites known in the Spanish Peninsula. Kenneth J. Andrien, Noticias Secretas de
America and the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the Spanish American Empire,
Colonial Latin American Review 7, no. 2 (Dec. 1998): 17492.
60. Estado politico del Reyno del Peru; Govierno sin Leyes:Ministros relajados:Tesores con
pobreza: Fertilidad sin cultivo: Sabiduria desestimada: Milicia Sin Honor: Ciudades sin
Amor Patricio. Madrid, 30 April 1747, in Real Academia de la Historia (hereafter RAH),
Coleccin Benito Mata Linares, vol. 67 (9-9-3/1722). For a discussion of its authorship see
Quiroz, Corrupt Circles, 3435 and Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Victorino Montero del
Aguila y su Estado Poltico del Reyno del Per (1742) Anuario de Estudios Americanos 31
(1974), 751807.
61. Como dejaran de ser plebeyos los Hijos del estudiante, y del Militar, quando no es, el
merito, el que a de mantener las Cazas, donde es poderosa la sinrrazon, y se llena de riquesas
la iniquidad? Quien servir V.M.con la virtud? Estado Poltico, 1111v.
62. Estado Poltico,22v.
63. Estado Poltico,46
64. Estado Poltico,30.
65. Kenneth J. Andrien, The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the
Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633-1700, The Hispanic American Historical Review 62, no. 1 (February
1982):4971. See also J. H. Parry, The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under
the Habsburgs, Iberoamericana 37 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1953), 173. On this practice in the Spanish Peninsula see Antonio Domnguez Ortiz,
La venta de cargos y oficios pblicos en Castilla y sus consecuencias econmicas y sociales,
Anuario de Historia Contempornea 9 (1982):10537.
66. Mark A. Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority. The Spanish Crown and
the American Audiencias (Columbia:University of Missouri Press, 1977), 54,77.
67. J.H. Parry, The Sale of Public Offices, 73; Andrien, The Sale of Fiscal Offices,71.
68. The Diccionario de la Real Academia of 1734, 1780, and 1791 reproduced these traditional
definitions when emphasizing that merit was the action or right for reward or punishment,
and associating merit with the religious concept of grace. See http://buscon.rae.es
69. The John Carter Brown library and the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid maintain good collec-
tions of hojas de mrito. See for example:El doctor don Nicols de Cardenas, y Pea, prebendado
de la Santa Iglesia Metropolitana de Lima, ex-cathedratico de artes (Madrid, 1760); Relacion
de los meritos, y servicios de don Luis Joseph de Abaria, Osorio y Morales, capitan de caballeria del
numero y batallon de la ciudad de Santiago del reyno de Chile (Madrid, 1763); Meritos y servicios
de la persona, y casa del doctor don Joseph Morales de Arambur y Montero:que se hacen presentes
la justificacion del Exmo. seor don Manuel de Amat y Junient, cavallero del Orden de San Juan,
gentilhombre de la Cmara de S.M.con entrada, teniente general de sus reales exrcitos, virrey, gov-
ernador, y capitan general de estos Reynos del Peru, y Chile (Lima, 1767); Relacion de los meritos,
y servicios de D.Juan Daroch Moreno, capitan de caballos del regimiento de la ciudad de Santiago
de Chile (Madrid, 1770); Relacion de los meritos, y servicios del Doctor Don Francisco Joseph de
Marn:Canonigo Magistral de la Iglesia Cathedral del Cuzco (Madrid,1772).
70. See Herbert I. Priestley, Jos de Glvez, Visitor-General of New Spain (1765-1771), 2nd ed.
(NewYork:Kraus Reprint, 1974), chapter9.
71. Linda Salvucci, Costumbres viejas, hombres nuevos:Jos de Glvez y la burocracia fiscal
novohispana (17541800), Historia Mexicana 23, no. 2 (1983):22465.
72. Jos Manso de Velasco (17451761) was a Basque military officer who became brigadier
and general commander of the royal guards in Spain. He was appointed captain general
in the Philippines in 1733 and president and captain general of Chile in 1735. Manuel de
Amat y Junient (17611776), trained in the military from the age of eleven, obtained high
ranks for participating in the battles of Africa and served as president of Chile from 1755
to 1761. Manuel de Guirior (17761780) was a Basque lieutenant general from the royal
army and gentilhombre of the kings chamber in Spain. Agustn de Juregui (17801784) was
also a professionally trained military officer who had made a prominent career after standing
out in military campaigns in Algiers. As an army officer, he served in Puerto Rico and Cuba,
fought in Portugal, and attained the rank of field marshal; in 1773, was appointed president
of Chile. Teodoro de Croix (17841789) was the nephew of a prestigious Bourbon official

who became viceroy of New Spain. Early on Croix developed an outstanding military and
administrative career in Havana, Sonora, and California. He was appointed viceroy of Peru
after the Tpac Amaru rebellion for his experience with the Indians in the Mexican fron-
tier. Croix was one of the closest people to Jos de Glvez. Francisco Gil de Taboada (1790
1796) was a navy officer who held the posts of state councilor, lieutenant general in the royal
army, and viceroy of New Granada before arriving in Peru. The Crown took particular care
in the appointment of authorities after the Tpac Amaru rebellion, and selected two of their
best men, Croix and Gil de Taboada. See Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the
Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1941). Jos Antonio Lavalle, Galera de retratos de los gobernantes y virreyes del Per (1532-
1824) publicada por Domingo de Vivero (Lima:Librera Clsica y Cientfica,1891).
73. John Reeder, Estudio preliminar, Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular, 1774, ed.
John Reeder (Madrid:Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1975),36.
74. Campomanes exchanged correspondence with father Feijo. Pedro Rodrguez Campomanes,
Escritos regalistas. Estudio preliminar, texto y notas de Santos M. Coronas Gonzlez
(Oviedo: Clsicos Asturianos del Pensamiento Poltico, Junta general del Principado de
Asturias), vol. 2, xix,xxv.
75. Reeder, Estudio Preliminar.
76. Joseph Townsend, A Journey through Spain in the years 1786 and 1787 with particular Attention
to the Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, Population, Taxes, and Revenue of that Country and
Remarks in passing through a Part of France, vol. 1 (London:Printed for C.Dilly, in the Pultry,
1791), 32830.
77. See Callahan, Honor, Commerce,34.
78. Campomanes, Discurso sobre el fomento, 1774, ed. John Reeder, foreword.
79. Campomanes, Discurso sobre el fomento, 1774, ed. John Reeder,43.
80. Discurso sobre la educacin popular de los artesanos, y su fomento [1755], ed. Reeder, 331.
Callahan, Honor, Commerce, chapter4.
81. Reeder, Estudio preliminar, 11 and Herr, The Eighteenth Century,501.
82. The library of Chvez de la Rosa included works by Bernardo Ward, Campomanes, Juan and
Ulloa along with military treaties and military educational manuals. AGN, Nota de los efec-
tos. See also Restrepo, La iglesia, vol.1,30.
83. Uno de los motivos mas conocidos de la decadencia de las universidades (dice el primer
Magistrado de la Nacion, y uno de los sabios mas ilustres de la Europa) [Campomanes] es la
antigedad de su fundacion:por que no habiendose reformado desde entonces el metodo de los estu-
dios establecidos desde el principio, es preciado que padescan las heces de aquellos antiguos siglos,
que no pueden curarse sino con las luces, ilustracion que ha dado el tiempo, y los descubrimientos
de los eminentes sugetos de todo el orbe literario. Mercurio Peruano 56, 17-7-1791.
84. Callahan, Church, Politics, 5.On the early efforts of the Bourbon Crown to cut the preemi-
nence of regular order in favor of the secular church see Kenneth J.Andrien, The Coming
of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru, in Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe,
183202.
85. On Bishop Martnez de Compan and his ties with the Bourbon Crown, see Emily Berquist
Soule, Bishop Martnez Compans Practical Utopia in Enlightenment Peru, The Americas
64, no. 3 ( January 2008):377408 and her The Bishops Utopia. Also John Tate Lanning, The
Enlightenment in Relation to the Church, The Americas 14, no. 4 (1958):492.
86. David A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens. The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France
(NewYork:Oxford University Press, 1994), 6869. For a general analysis on Jansenism see
Lucien Goldmann, The Hidden God. AStudy of Tragic Vision in the Penss of Pascal and the
Tragedies of Racine (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul,1964).
87. See Dale Van Kley, The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the Jesuits from France, 1757-1765 (New
Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1975), 22932.
88. Callahan, Church, Politics,6869.
89. Callahan, Church, Politics,17.
90. Nota de los efectos.
91. Mariano and Jos Luis Peset, La Universidad espaola (siglos XVIII y XIX):Despotismo ilus-
trado y revolucin liberal (Madrid:Taurus Ediciones, 1974),7681.

92. Nicholas P. Cushner, Soldiers of God, The Jesuits in Colonial America, 1565-1767. (Buffalo,
NY:Language Communications, 2002),175.
93. Callahan, Church, Politics, 28 and176.
94. La Fuente, Historia de las universidades 4,119.
95. It is not clear from the sources when exactly were the most important schools created and
reformed. The most accepted dates are the following:Real Academia de Ciencias y Artes de
Barcelona (created in 1716/1720, reformed in 1770), Academia Particular de Matemticas
(Orn 1732, Ceuta 1739), Real Academia de Caballeros Cadetes del Real Cuerpo de Artillera
de Segovia (1764), Escuela de Guardamarinas de Cdiz (created in 1717, reformed in 1751 by
Jorge Juan), Real Academia de Noble Compaa de Cadetes in Havana (1764), the Seminario
de Nobles de Vergara (1776), Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid (created in 1725, reformed
in 1770), Escuela Militar de Avila (1774), Academia de Guardamarinas de El Ferrol (1776),
Academia de Guardias Marinas de Cartagena (1776), Instituto de Gijn (created by Jovellanos
in 1782 following the model of the seminary in Bergara. More schools were created and
reformed in the era of Manuel Godoy. La Fuente, Historia de las universidades, vol. 4, 198.
See also Horacio Capel Sez, De Palas a Minerva:la formacin cientfica y la estructura institu-
cional de los ingenieros militares en el siglo XVIII (Barcelona and Madrid:Serbal, CSIC, 1988),
14888; Jos Simn Daz, Historia del Colegio Imperial de Madrid. Del Estudio de la Villa al
Instituto de San Isidro:aos 1346-1955 (Madrid:Instituto de Estudios Madrileos,1992).
96. Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 7475 and Rural Change,38.
97. Pablo de Olavide, Plan de Estudios Universitarios. Idea general. Obras selectas, ed. Estuardo
Nuez (Lima:Biblioteca Clsicos del Per, 3, 1987),531.
98. Olavide, Plan de estudios,533.
99. Ibid.,537.
100. Ibid.,534.
101. Ibid.,536.
102. Ibid.,544.
103. George M. Addy, The Enlightenment in the University of Salamanca (Durham, N.C: Duke
University Press, 1966), 110 and chapter6.
104. Antonio Alvarez de Morales, El pensamiento politico y jurdico de Campomanes
(Madrid:Instituto Nacional de Administracin Pblica, 1989),7478.
105. See Callahan, Honor, Commerce, chap.2.
106. Plan de la escuela patritica bascongada, 1770, AMB, C/085-03 and Ordenanzas de los
seminaristas, 1776-1804, C/065-03.
107. Planes y programas de enseanza para el colegio de Vergara, 1776-1804. AMB, C/087-02.
Also Antonio Lafuente, Jos de la Sota y Jaime Vilchis, Dinmica imperial de la ciencia:los
contextos metropolitano y colonial en la cultura espaola del siglo XVIII, El reformismo
borbnico ed. Agustn Guimer (Madrid:Alianza Universidad, 1996),187.
108. Miscelnea coleccion de varios discursos, en que se tratan los asuntos siguientes Por el mae-
strante de Ronda D.Valentn de Foronda, de la Academia de Ciencias de Burdeos, y de la Sociedad
de Valladolid (Madrid:Imprenta de Benito Cano, 1787),2.
109. Cartas del marques de la Regala a Don Feliz Maria Samaniego. Valencia, 17 noviembre
1781, AMB, C/085-06.
110. Jean Sarrailh, La Espaa ilustrada,206.
111. Count OReilly to Pedro de Llerena. Cadiz, May 10, 1785. AGMS, leg.36.
112. Expediente en que se trata de eregir en la ciudad de Granada un Seminario para educacion
de la nobleza y gentes acomodadas. 1786. AHN, Consejos,4595.
113. Plan de gobierno y estudios formado de orden del consejo, para los seminarios de educacion de
la nobleza y gentes acomodadas que se establezcan en las capitales de provincia (Madrid:En la
Imprenta de la Viuda de Marin,1790).
114. Plan de gobierno y estudios.
115. Simn Daz, Historia del colegio imperial,261.
116. Felipe Barreda Laos, Vida intelectual del virreinato del Per (Buenos Aires:Talleres Grficos
Argentinos, 1937), 283, 286, and302.
117. Romero, Rodrguez de Mendoza,99.

118. Letter of Toribio Rodriguez de Mendoza to an unknown recipient. San Carlos, Lima, 6 April
1774, in Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza. Los idelogos, CDIP, vol.1, no. 2,5455.
119. The library of Martnez de Compan included among its 2,000 volumes, works by Ustriz,
Campomanes, Feijo, Juan and Ulloa, among others. Restrepo Manrique, La iglesia), vol. 1,
30, 33537, 34143.
120. Carta pastoral del obispo Baltasar Martnez de Compan dirigida a los indgenas del
obispado sobre la fundacin de dos casas de educacin de cholos y cholas. Ibid., 6290.
Also Soule, Bishop Martnez Compan, c hapter4.
121. Oracion panegirica que en accion de gracias por la consagracion del Illmo. Seor Doctor D.Pedro
Joseph Chaves de la Rosa, del Consejo de su Magestad, dignisimo Obispo de Arequipa, dixo en la igle-
sia de San Pedro y San Pablo de esta Capital el dia XXIII de Febrero de 1788 el R.P. D.Juan Rico, sac-
erdote de la Congregacion del Oratorio (Lima:En la imprenta Real de los Nios Expsitos,1788).
122. Francisco Javier de Luna Pizarro, Escritos polticos recopilacin, introduccin y notas de Alberto
Tauro (Lima: Biblioteca de Historia, UNMSM, 1958), xiiixvi. On Chavez de la Rosas
disputes with the cabildo eclesistico and intendant. Archivo Goyeneche (AG), Libro IV, P.
31621.
123. Daniel Valcrcel, Historia de la Educacin colonial, vol. II (Lima: Editorial Universo S.A.,
1968),8688.
124. A similar development took place in eighteenth-century France. See Nira I. Kaplan, A
Changing Culture of Merit:French Competitive Examinations and the Politics of Selection,
1750-1820 (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1999), chapter. 1. See also Rafe Blaufarb,
Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building: French Military Administration after the
Seven Years War, French Historical Studies 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001):22346.
125. AGMS, Seccin 1 Personal, Subserie Expedientes Personales, clebres.
126. Academia de Barcelona, AHN, Estado671.
127. Pere Grap Vilumara, LEscenari Acadmic Europeu en el Rerefons de la Reial Acadmia
de Cincies i Arts de Barcelona, La reial academia de cincies Iarts de Barcelona als segles
XVIII I XIXX. Histria, cincia I societat, eds. Agust Nieto-Galan y Antonio Roca Rosell
(Barcelona:Instituts dEtudis Catalans, 2000),75.
128. Oracion para la apertura de la Real Academia de caballeros cadetes del Real Cuerpo de artil-
leria nuevamente establecida por S. M. en el Real Alcazar de Segovia dixo El Padre Antonio
Eximeno, de la Compaia de Jesus, profesor de dicha academia en el dia 16 de mayo de 1764
(Madrid,1764).
129. Suplemento al numero 5, 1746. Gazeta de Lima,JCB.
130. Desde 18 de enero hasta 5 de marzo de 1753.Ibid.
131. De 18 de abril a 6 de junio de 1754.Ibid.
132. El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios que se Publican en Europa, 22 December1787.
133. Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-Century, 18487 and Elsa Garca Pandavenes Introduction,
El Censor (1781-1787). Antologa (Barcelona:Labor, 1972),2021.
134. Garca Pandavenes, Introduction,21.
135. See Mercurio Peruano, 3-11-1791 and Nota de los efectos.
136. Discurso LXI, El Censor obra peridica comenzada a publicar y terminada en 1787. Edicin
facsmil, con prlogo y estudio de Jos Miguel Caso Gonzlez (Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo,
Instituto Feijoo de Estudios del siglo XVIII, 1989), 257.
137. Geneva, [1757], The Encyclopedia of Diderot & DAlembert. Collaborative Translation
Project. http://www.hti.umich.edu
138. Con que te atreves t a competir conmigo?y por qu no he de atreverme? En qu me
eres superior, sino en orgullo y vanidad? Por ventura son ttulos sos que deban causarme
respeto? Yo no trueco mi plebeya riqueza por tu ilustrsima lacera. Mas rendimientos
tributan los nobles como t a los ricos como yo, que stos a los nobles. Una porcin de
hidalgusimos me estn sirviendo en los ministerios ms bajos. Ms vale un humilde con lo
suficiente, que un ilustre que se muere de hambre. Discurso CLXIII, El Censor, 74950.
139. Para puestos en la balanza de la razn los descubirmientos, si se deben estimar ms los ms
provechosos, Africa no cede a ningn pas el valor de los suyos y en algunos muy
importantes tienen indubitablemente la prefencia. Discurso CLXV, ibid.,759.

140. Antonio Zoido, Introduccin, Jos Cadalso Vazquez, Cartas Marruecas (Sevilla:Biblioteca
de la Cultura Andaluza, 1986),1113.
141. Cartas marruecas,p.62.
142. Ibid., Carta XLI, p.106.
143. Zoido, Introduccin,17.
144. Joseph Townsend, A Journey, vol 2.,246.
145. See Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, chap.2.
Chapter3
1. On the key role of institutions to explain economic performance and political developments
see John H. Coatsworth, Political Economy and Economic Organization in the Iberian World,
The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, eds. John H. Coatsworth, Vctor Bulmer
Thomas, and Roberto Corts Conde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. 1,
23773. Also Douglass North, Economic Performance through Time, Noble Prize Lecture,
1993, American Economic Review 84 ( June 1994): 15968 and Understanding the Process of
Economic Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). On the need to write
political and institutional history in new ways see Alejandro Caeque, The Political and
Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America, History Compass 11, no. 4 (2013): 28091.
2. As has happened in other fields, however, military historythough rich and sophisticated
for the Spanish Empirehas generally been considered dry and technical, and developed
as an almost separate discipline. On the need for a new military history see Robert Citino,
Military Histories Old and New:AReintroduction, American Historical Review 112, no. 4
(2007):107090.
3. Elliott, Spain, Europe & the Wider World; Koenigsberger, Dominium Politicum et Regale.
4. In recent decades, historians have carefully studied the capacity of the royal army to attract and
incorporate different ethnic groups, see Allan J. Kuethe, The Status of the Free Pardo in the
Disciplined Militia of New Granada, The Journal of Negro History 56, no. 2 (1971):10517 and
his Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808 (Gainesville:University Presses of
Florida, 1978); Ben Vinson III, Bearing Arms for his Majesty. The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial
Mexico (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 2001); Clment Thibaud, Repblica en Armas.
Los ejrcitos bolivarianos en la guerra de independencia en Colombia y Venezuela (Bogot:Editorial
Planeta, IFEA, 2003); Juan Marchena Fernndez, Gumersindo Caballero, and Diego Torres,
El ejrcito de Amrica antes de la independencia:Ejrcito regular y milicias americanas, 1750-1815,
CD-ROM (Madrid: MAPFRE, 2005); Marixa Lasso, Race War and Nation in Caribbean
Gran Colombia, Cartagena, 18101832, American Historical Review 111, no. 2 (2006):336
61; Peter Blanchard, Under the Flags of Freedom. Slave Soldiers & the Wars of Independence in
Spanish South America (Pittsburgh, PA:University of Pittsburgh Press,2008).
5. Lyle N. McAlister, The Fuero Militar in New Spain (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1957). For Peru, see Leon Campbell, Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 1750-1810
(Philadelphia:American Philosophical Society,1978).
6. Ordenanzas del ejercito para su regimen, disciplina, subordinacin y servicio. Dadas por S.M.
Catlica en 22 de Octubre de 1768. 4 vols. (Madrid:Orden Superior,1768).
7. Reglamento para las milicias de infantera y caballera de la isla de Cuba aprobado por S.M.y mandado
que se observen inviolablemente todos sus artculos por Real Cdula expedida en el Pardo 19 de Enero
de 1769, reprint (Lima:Imprenta de la Real Casa de los Nios Expsitos, 1779). On the imple-
mentation of military reforms in Cuba see Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic, 23644.
8. Only minor changes to the Ordenanzas were attempted in Peru until the first Cdigo de
Justicia Militar was issued in 1898. In Spain a new military code to replace the Ordenanzas
was proclaimed as late as 1884 bringing only partial reform. Jorge Basadre Historia del
derecho peruano:nociones generales, poca prehispnica, fuentes de la poca colonial y del derecho
republicano, 4th ed (Lima: Librera Studium, 1988), 266; Javier Garca Martn, De un
ejrcito real a otro nacional:jurisdiccin y tribunales militares entre Antiguo Rgimen y
liberalismo doctrinario, Estudios sobre ejrcito, poltica y derecho en Espaa (siglos XII-XX),
eds. Javier Alvarado Planas and Regina Mara Prez Marcos (Madrid:Ediciones Polifemo,
1996), 20336.

9. See, for example, Woodrow Borah, Justice by Insurance:the General Indian Court of Colonial
Mexico and the Legal Aides of the Half-real (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1983)
and Ann Twinam, Private Lives, Private Secrets:Gender, Honor, Sexuality, and Illegitimacy in
Colonial Spanish America (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 1999). For more recent
works on Peru see John Charles, More Ladino than Necessary:Indigenous Litigants and
the Language Policy Debate in Mid-Colonial Peru, Colonial Latin American Review 16, no. 1
(2007):2347 and Jeremy Ravi Mumford, Litigation as Ethnography in Sixteenth-Century
Peru:Polo de Ondegardo and the Mitimaes, Hispanic American Historical Review 88, no. 1
(2008):540. See also Brian E. Owensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) and Nancy E. van Deusen, Global Indios: The
Indigenous Struggle for Justice in Sixteenth-Century Peru (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2015). Also Jane E. Mangan, Transatlantic Obligations:Creating the Bonds of Family in
Conquest-era Peru and Spain (NewYork:Oxford University Press,2016).
10. For a new and illuminating approach on litigation in the eighteenth century see Bianca
Premo, The Enlightenment on Trial:Ordinary Litigants and Colonialism in the Spanish Empire
(NewYork:Oxford University Press,2017).
11. John Fisher, Redes de poder en el virreinato del Per, 1776824:Los burcratas, Revista
de Indias 56, no. 236 (2006):14964. John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1806-
1826. 2d ed. (NewYork:Norton,1986).
12. Ordenanzas, vol. 1, introduction.
13. Remedios Morn Martn, De la prestacin militar general al inicio de la idea del ejrcito
permanente (Castilla:siglos XIIXIII), Estudios sobre ejrcito, 27, 3435, and 46. See Las siete
partidas del Rey don Alfonso el Sabio, cotejadas con varios cdices antiguos por la Real Academia
de la Historia, vol. 2, partida segunda y tercera, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com
14. J. H. Elliott, The Mental World of Hernn Corts, Spain and Its World:1500-1700 (New
Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1989),2741.
15. Fernando de Salas Lpez, Ordenanzas militares en Espaa e Hispanoamerica (Madrid:MAPFRE,
1992),18.
16. Henry Guerlac, Vauban: The Impact of Science on War, Makers of Modern Strategy:
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1952), 27; Andr Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe,
1494-1789 (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979), chapter 2.
Brewer, The Sinews.
17. See Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe:Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden
as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660 (London and NewYork:Routledge, 2002), 3837 and
Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1982) and Conflicts of Empires: Spain, The Low Countries, and the Struggle for World
Supremacy, 1585-1713 (London:Hambledon Press,1997).
18. Francisco de Solano Prez-Lila, Los orgenes de los Reales Ejrcitos. Reformismo y planifi-
cacin, Historia social de las fuerzas armadas espaolas, 3rd. ed. (Madrid:Editorial Alhambra,
1986), vol. 1, 67. On Philip Vs military reform see Francisco Andjar Castillo, La reforma
militar en el reinado de Felipe V, Felipe V de Borbn 1701-1746:Actas del Congreso de San
Fernando (Cdiz) de 27 de noviembre a 1 de diciembre de 2000, ed. Jos Luis Pereira Iglesias
(San Fernando, Cdiz and Crdoba:Ayuntamiento de San Fernando, Fundacin Municipal
de Cultura, Universidad de Crdoba, 2002), 61540. See also Jan Glete, War and the State
in Early Modern Europe:Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-
1660 (London:Routledge, 2002), 38994.
19. Ordenanzas de su Magestad para el regimen, disciplina, subordinacion y servicio de la infanteria,
cavalleria, y dragones de sus exercitos, en guarnicion, y en Campaa. De orden de su magestad
(Madrid:En la imprenta de Juan de Ariztia, 1728). See also Marchena etal., El ejrcito de
Amrica,6972.
20. Andjar, La reforma militar and his Los militares en la Espaa del siglo XVIII. Un estudio
social (Granada:Universidad de Granada, 1991),2749.
21. J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: The European Overseas Empires in the Eighteenth Century
(NewYorkWashington:Praeger Publishers, 1971), chapter7.
22. Salas Lpez, Ordenanzas militares, 67 and Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World,295.

23. Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815, 2532, and Antonio Alvarez de Morales, Los proyectos de
reforma del Conde de Aranda, Estatutos sobre ejrcito, poltica y derecho en Espaa (siglos XII-
XX), eds. Javier Alvarado Planas and Regina Mara Prez Marcos (Madrid:Ediciones Poligemo,
1996),159.
24. Quando se juntase la Milicia para guarnicion, Campaa en todo lo relativo al Servicio, sub-
ordinacion, y disciplina, se arreglar lo prevenido en las Ordenanzas generales del Exercito.
Reglamento, chapter3, art. 19,18.
25. McAlister, The Fuero Militar, 5 and Allan J. Kuethe and Lowel Blaisdell, French Influence
and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial Reorganization, Hispanic American Historical
Review 71, no. 3 (1991):579607.
26. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World,295.
27. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 30305.
28. Guerlac, Vauban, 2648, and R. R. Palmer, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Blow: From
Dynastic to National War, Makers of Modern Strategy, 91119. The military manual of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century was that of Prussian General Karl von Clausewitz. See
his On War trans. Matthijs Jolles in The Book of War (New York: The Modern Library, 2000),
39294.
29. Arthur P. Whittaker, Antonio de Ulloa, Hispanic American Historical Review 15, no. 2
(1935):15594.
30. Andjar, Los militares,59.
31. See Alvarez de Morales, Los proyectos de reforma, 15166. On OReilly see Kuethe,
Cuba,2532.
32. On the intellectual hybrid character of Bourbon reforms, see Paquette, Enlightenment,
Governance, introduction and chapter1.
33. McAlister, The Fuero Militar, 5; Allan J. Kuethe and Lowel Blaiswell, French Influence and
the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial Reorganization, Hispanic American Historical Review 71,
no. 3 (Aug., 1991):570607.
34. Marchena et. al., El ejrcito de Amrica,122.
35. Ordenanza dividida en catorce reglamentos que S. M. manda observar en el Real Cuerpo de
Artillera para sus diferentes ramos de tropa, cuenta y y razon, y fbrica, 2 vols. (Madrid: de
Orden Superior,1802).
36. Campbell, Military and Society, Juan Marchena Fernndez, Oficiales y soldados, ejrcito y mili-
cias en el mundo colonial americano (Madrid:MAPFRE, 1992) and his The Social World
of the Military in Peru and New Granada, eds. Allan J. Kuethe and Anthony McFarlane,
Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State
University Press, 1990), 5495. See also Jos Ragas, El discreto encanto de la milicia.
Ejrcito y sociedad en el Per borbnico, El virrey Amat y su tiempo, eds. Carlos Pardo-
Figueroa and Joseph Pager (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per, Instituto Riva-
Agero, 2004), 20928.
37. Viceroy Manuel de Guirior to Jos de Glvez. Lima, 5 Sept. 1778. AGS (hereafter cited as
AGS), Secretara de Guerra (hereafter cited as SG), leg. 7128, exp. 19, 124 and Visitador
Antonio de Areche to Jos de Glvez, exp.22, 166. On Amats corruption see Quiroz, Corrupt
Circles,6667.
38. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru
(Cologne: Bhlau, 1985) and David T. Garrett, Shadows of Empire. The Indian Nobility of
Cusco, 1750-1825. NewYork:Cambridge University Press,2005.
39. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic, 3045 and 319 and Allan J. Kuethe and G. Douglas Inglis,
Absolutism and Enlightened Reform: Charles III, the Establishment of the Alcabala, and
Commercial Reorganization in Cuba, Past and Present, no. 109 (1985):11843.
40. Teodoro de Croix was born in the region of Lille in France. As a boy, he was trained in the
Spanish army and served in Italy. In 1750 Croix was commissioned in the Walloon guard,
becoming lieutenant in 1756. For his merits, he was anointed Caballero de la Orden Teutnica
in 1756. He became captain in 1765. In 1766 Croix traveled to New Spain with his uncle,
the Marquis of Croix and viceroy of New Spain. There, Teodoro de Croix became governor
of Acapulco. From 1766 to 1770 he served as inspector of the troops of New Spain and was
promoted to the rank of brigadier. Croix left Mexico with his uncle in 1771 first to Havana

and then to Spain. In 1776 he was appointed commander general of the newly formed
Comandancia General de las Povincias Interiores de Nueva Espaa with vice-regal powers. See
Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783
(Norman, OK:University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), 17-18 and67.
41. Viceroy Croix to Jos de Glvez. Lima, 5 Dec. 1784. Sobre medidas para reducir la oficialidad
y ahorrar a la real hacienda. AGS, SG, leg. 7128, exp.24, 182. According to Juan Marchena,
from 1762 to 1768, the viceroyalty of Peru sent 2,460,222 pesos to Panama. Likewise, vice-
roy Amat claimed to have sent 1,141,054 during his five years in office. In addition, in 1778
Viceroy Guirior reported to the crown that Peru had sent one million and a half pesos to
Buenos Aires to aid in its defense. Juan Marchena, La financiacin militar en Indias:intro-
duccin a su estudio, Anuario de Estudios Americanos 36 (1979):81110.
42. In the 1780s royal orders and communications urged authorities in Peru to follow the Cuban
model and establish inexpensive militia forces to defend the coast against a foreign attack.
Dictamen del Seor Inspector General, Manuel de Pineda. On the efforts of the crown to
reduce the deficit by limiting military expenses see Allan J. Kuethe, Decisiones estratgi-
cas y las finanzas militares del XVIII, Por la fuerza de las armas. Ejrcito e independencias en
Iberoamrica, eds. Juan Marchena and Manuel Chust (Castell de la Plana, Spain:Universitat
Jaume I, 2008), 96100.
43. Consulta que hace la Junta de Generales sobre la fortificacion, y defensa de los Puertos de
la Mar del Sur en el Reyno del Per, Madrid, 13 March 1793. Archivo General Militar de
Madrid (hereafter cited as IHCM), Fondo de Guerra (hereafter cited as FG), 2-1-7-4.
44. Relacin que hace el excelentsimo seor Theodoro de Croix.
45. See Kuethe, Cuba, and Johnson, The Social Transformation. On Spanish responses to the rise of
the British Navy in Mexico, see Christon I.Archer, Reflexiones de una pica de guerra total:el
impacto de la defensa martima de Nueva Espaa entre 1789 y 1810, Por la fuerza, 23975.
46. In this sense, the ideals of the Spanish Bourbons were closer to those of the German armies.
See John Childs, The Army and the State in Britain and Germany during the Eighteenth
Century, Rethinking Rethinking Leviathan. The Eighteenth- Century State in Britain and
Germany, ed. John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999),5770.
47. William Dalrymple, Travels through Spain and Portugal, in 1774:With a Short Account of the
Spanish Expedition against Algiers in 1775 (London:J. Almon, 1777),66.
48. See Guillermo Cspedes del Castillo, Las reformas indianas del absolutismo ilustrado,
Ensayos sobre los reinos castellanos en Indias (Madrid:Real Academia de la Historia, 1999),
23336. The establishment of merit based administrations and armies was a common ideal
in eighteenth century Europe. For Britain see Brewer, The Sinews and for France, Blaufarb,
Noble Privilege.
49. El buen desempeo del capitan en todo lo expresado recomendar muy particularmente su
mrito, y en l debe fundar mucho mas que en su antigedad, la esperanza de sus ascensos.
Ordenanzas, vol. 1, treaty II, title X, art. 26, 15657,187.
50. Ordenanzas, vol. 1, title XVIII, art. 18,214.
51. Reglamento, chapter9, art.1,36.
52. In 1797 Viceroy Ambrosio OHiggins (1796-1801) informed the Crown about a system for
promotions that would alternate applications between sergeants who took administrative
positions in the assembly and those who served in campaigns because the former had fewer
opportunities to accumulate merit. AGS, SG, leg. 7110, exp.20. See also Jos Fernando de
Abascal y Sousa, Memoria de Gobierno, 1816. Edicin preparada por Vicente Rodrguez Casado
y Jos Antonio Caldern. 2 vols. Seville:Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericana, 1944, 369
171. In his study on Cuba, Allan Kuethe has shown how the Cuban elite managed to co-opt
all highest commissions in the military after the reforms of the 1760s and how some posts
were still sold in the 1790s. Much like in France, where traffic of influence and nepotism coex-
isted with a merit-based military, these elite members held previous military titles or had con-
ducted some extraordinary action during the attack of 1762. See his Cuba, 1753-1815:Crown,
Military, and Society. Knoxville:University of Tennessee Press, 1986, c hapters5 and 6.See
Blaufarb, Noble Privilege and Absolutist State Building: French Military Administration
after the Seven Years War, French Historical Studies 24, no. 2 (Spring 2001):22346.

53. Darnton, An Early Information Society.

54. Gaceta de Lima, N.7, 12 March1794.
55. Ordenanzas, vol.1, treaty II, title XVIII, art. 24,245.
56. Reglamento, chapter3, art 17,18.
57. Todos los Oficiales de Milicias dedicarn todas sus conversaciones dr sus Compaias
amor mi Real Servicio, fomentando en ellas, por todos los medios posibles, fanatismo para
la gloria Militar, con frequentes Relaciones de las funciones que han visto, y distinguidas
acciones que han odo.Ibid.
58. Ordenanzas, vol. 1, treaty II, title XVIII, art. 12, 21011.
59. La enseanza de los cadetes debe comenzarse por manifestarles el honor y conveniencia que
les resultar de aprender su oficio, y la poca fortuna que han de esperar en la milicia si no les
acompaa su aplicacin, inteligencia y espritu. Ibid. art. 26,246.
60. Reglamento, chapter3, art. 1,1516.
61. Ordenanzas, vol.1, treaty II, title XII, art. 26,187.
62. According to the Ordenanzas, officers and soldiers were exempted from paying servicios
ordinarios ni extraordinarios. It was a privilege included in the fuero. Ordenanzas, vol. 3,
treaty VIII. The Reglamento follows the same principle but does not offer specifics. On this
respect see McAlister, The Fuero Militar, chapter4 and Vinson, Bearing Arms, chapter4.
63. Los Oficiales de los Batallones de Pardos, y Morenos, sern tratados con estimacion: nin-
guno se permitir ultrajarlos de palabra, ni obra; y entre los de sus respectivas clases, sern
distinguidos, y respetados. Reglamento, c hapter4, art. 12,22.
65. Expediente promovido por el Alcalde de Palpa, D. Baltasar Polo sobre que se le permita
castigar a los delincuentes con azotes o exponiendolos a la vergenza publica. 1794. AGN,
Real Audiencia, Causas criminales, leg. 78, cuad. 958 and leg. 72, cuad.869.
66. Es objeto muy interesante el que todos los individuos de un regimiento estn persuadidos
que se les trata con equidad, y que se les guardan puntualmente las condiciones de su empeo
en el servicio:el capitan responder de que as se haga en su compaa. Ordenanzas, vol. 1,
tratado I, title X, art. III,157.
67. Ordenanzas, vol.1, treatyIII.
68. Ordenanzas, treaty II, title XVIII, art. XIII, 24041.
69. Ordenanzas, treaty III, title VI, art. 1,384.
70. Konetzke, Coleccin de documentos, vol. 3, no.2, 63637.
71. Reglamento, chapter2, art.3.
72. Reglamento, chapter4, art. 12, 22 and Marchena et. al, El ejrcito de Amrica,126.
74. Andjar, Los militares,417.
76. See Renzo Honores, Una sociedad legalista:abogados, procuradores de causas y la cultura
colonial en Lima y Potos, 15401670 (PhD diss., Florida International University,2007).
77. Garrett, Shadows of Empire; Jeremy Ravi Mumford, Litigation as Ethnography in Sixteenth-
Century Peru:Polo de Ondegardo and the Mitimaes, Hispanic American Historical Review 88,
no. 1 (2008):540; John Charles, More Ladino than Necessary:Indigenous Litigants and
the Language Policy Debate in Mid-Colonial Peru, Colonial Latin American Review 16, no. 1
(2007): 2347.
78. On the Bourbons new taxes on Indians and mestizos in the 1770s see Scarlett OPhelan Godoy,
Entre Glvez y Areche:el factor acumulativo de presin fiscal y la gran rebellion de 1780,
Historias paralelas. Actas del primer encuentro de Historia Per-Mxico (Lima y Mxico:Pontificia
Universidad Catlica del Per, Fondo Editorial; El Colegio de Michoacn, 2005), 21336.
79. Report of Viceroy Amat to the Crown. Lima, 29 Oct. 1772. AGS, SG leg. 7128, exp.19,121.
80. Manuel de Guirior to Joseph de Glvez. Lima, 20 July 1779. AGS, SG leg. 7128, exp.25,186
81. According to the reports, these mestizos were by and large tailors. AGS, SG leg. 7128, exp.11,52.
82. Dictamen del Seor Inspector General, Manuel de Pineda. Lima, 1784. AGS, SG leg. 7128,
exp.25,184.
83. Juan Carlos Estenssoro, La plebe ilustrada, el pueblo en las fronteras de la razn, ed.
Charles Walker Entre la retrica y la insurgencia:las ideas y los movimientos sociales en los Andes
siglo XVIII (Cusco:CBC, 1996),3366.

84. Relacin que hace el excelentsimo seor Theodoro de Croix, virrey que fue de estos reinos
del Per y Chile a su sucesor el excelentsimo seor don Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos,
desde 4 de abril de 1784 hasta 25 de marzo de 1790. Yale University, Andean Collection,
box 17, folder 173.
85. For example, in 1805 the Indian from Cajatambo, Gervasio Pumajulca filed a request to be
transferred to the Indian militia unit, de naturales. He claimed to have been incorporated
to the Real Regimiento de Lima at the age of nineteen. AGN, Superior Gobierno 3, leg. 118,
cuad.606.
86. Unnue, Gua poltica,315.
87. Marchena et. al., El ejrcito de Amrica,101.
88. Consulta que hace la Junta de Generales. IHCM, FG, 2-1-7-4.
89. Report of the president of Cuzco to the regent. Lima, 13 April 1793. BNL, C1384.
90. Pumacahua had served as colonel of the regiment of Yndios nobles before it was abol-
ished. BNL, C 1384 and AGS, SG, leg. 7122, exp.31, 50. AGS, SG, leg. 7104, exp.36.
91. Per. Concesiones de grados y agregaciones de varios oficiales destinados a aquel Reyno
desde 1790. AGI, Lima1482.
92. AGS, SG, leg. 7104, exp.27.
93. On privileges as liberties see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. Walter W. Cook (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press,1964).
94. The Ordenanzas of 1728 dedicate only a brief section to explaining the fuero militar.
95. About fifty years ago, Lyle McAlister argued that after the Seven Years War the extension of
this privilege in New Spain created serious frictions between civil and military authorities
that ultimately undermined the foundations of monarchical authority there. For this historian
and former military officer who had fought in Europe during World War II, the fueros grow-
ing power established the basis of militarism in Mexico. See the introduction of McAlister to
his The Fuero Militar. McAlisters followers and students tried to complement his work but
some reached different conclusions. Allan Kuethe agreed with him but found that these argu-
ments did not fully apply to New Granada, where the military was not so appealing an institu-
tion for Creoles, and the region had not been militarized or centralized before independence.
Christon Archer, on the other hand, concluded from his work on Mexico that the Bourbon
military reforms had not led to the expansion of the military there and had thus failed to pro-
duce a true militaristic spirit in the republic. Gnther Kahle made a similar argument for
Mexico but emphasized the key role of the Bourbon Crown in putting the army beyond civil-
ian control. More recently, Victoria Livia Unzueta has discussed the institutional impact of
the Ordenanzas and fuero militar in Mexico and claimed that these rules played a central role
in Mexicos political history. For Peru, Leon Campbell claimed that the failure of Bourbon
reforms proved no connection between Bourbon military policies and the rise of militarism
after independence, although he did not carry his study beyond 1810. To account for such
discrepancy, one has to consider the great differences between the American kingdoms and
provinces and question the selection of sources relating to earlier or later periods. Changing
historiographical trends are also relevant. Some of these works on the Bourbon military
were written in the 1970s, when rebellions and ethnic upheavals were the major source of
explanation for historical change. Since conflicts between civil and military jurisdictions did
not produce great social upheavals, they lost strength as explanatory categories. See Allan
J. Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808 (Gainesville:University
Press of Florida, 1978); Gnther Kahle, El ejrcito y la formacin del estado en los comienzos
de la independencia, 2nd ed. (Mexico City:Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1997); Victoria
Livia Unzueta Reyes, La permanencia del fuero de Antiguo Rgimen en la sociedad mexi-
cana decimonnica:el fuero militar en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, in Cultura poltica
en Amrica. Variaciones regionales y temporales (ed.) Ricardo Forte y Natalia Silva Prada
(Mxico:Universidad Autnoma Metropolitana/Biblioteca de Signos, 2006), 87104. Also
Campbell, Military and Society and John Fisher, Soldiers, Society, and Politics in Spanish
America, 17501821, Latin American Research Review 17, no. 1 (1982):21722.
96. McAlister, The Fuero Militar,7.
97. See Ordenanzas, vol. 3, treaty VIII De las materias de justicia.
98. Reglamento, chapter4Del fuero y goces de estos cuerpos.

99. Real declaracion sobre puntos esensiales del Reglamento para las milicias de infantera y caballera
de la Isla de Cuba mandada observar por S.M.por Real Cdula expedida en Aranjuez quince de
Abril de mil setecientos setenta y uno. See also Johnson, The Social Transformation,1478.
100. Real Cedula de Su Magestad a consulta de el consexo en que declara por punto general, que
todo militar, que exerza empleo poltico, pierde su fuero en todos los asuntos gubernativos.
1771. BNP V/C 230.
101. Gabriel de Avils to the Count of Aranda. 17931794. AGS, SG 7101,3.
102. Archivo de la Biblioteca Municipal de Arequipa. Libro de Acuerdos del Ayuntamiento. 2
April, 1794.
103. Reports of the council of states meeting in San Lorenzo in August 1794. AGS, SG, leg. 7313,
file,11.
104. Expediente sobre real orden en que S.M.declara que siempre que los tribunales de rentas
formen procesos a cualquier individuo militar, en causa de complicidad con los reos de otras
clases. 10-10-1807. BNP, D10323.
105. Manuel de Arredondo al Gobernador Intendente de Puno sobre casos de sedicion, 15
Nov. 1801. AGN, Coleccin Santa Mara 179. See also Real Cedula sobre que se declara los
casos en que debe conocer de las sublevaciones o sediciones populares la jurisdiccion real o
militar. 1801. BNP, D8297.
106. Expediente por el alcalde de Piura Miguel Serafin del Castillo solicitando que se deter-
minase la forma de proceder en las causas criminales que ocurran contra individuos alista-
dos en las milicias de aquella ciudad, pues los jueces militares le promovian competencias.
AGN, Superior Gobierno, leg. 24, cuad. 694. See also Angel Luis Guerrero Domnguez,
Lex et Bellum. Fuero Militar y milicias del norte del virreinato del Per a finales del siglo
XVIII. Las armas de la nacin. Independencia y ciudadana en Hispanoamrica (1750-1850)
ed. Manuel Chust y Juan Marchena (Madrid:Iberoamericana, 2007),1535.
107. AGS, SG, leg. 7111, exp.26.
108. Gabriel de Avils to the Marquis of Sonora. Cuzco, 30 April 1786. AGI, Cuzco29.
109. Juan Manuel Alvarez to Manuel Godoy. Paz, 17-8-1792. AGI, Correspondencia del
Prncipe de la Paz. Indiferente General1633.
110. nosotros no nos envia el Rey para que nos sugetemos las Leyes, sino para que las
interpretemos [underlined in the original]. Juan Manuel Alvarez to Manuel Godoy. Paz,
14-6-1792.Ibid.
111. por que Lima est de tal modo que no hay quien no se meta a ablar de estas mate-
rias, y a decidir sobre ellas aun que carezcan de la instruccion que estas piden. Don Froilan
added:Ya empiezas con tus porfias, tu no hagas caso de nada, esos son letrados abladores
que no saven palabra; como han de ablar de la carta, si mi amigo no escrive a nadie ni al Sor.
Virrey Indignacin a la carta del Sr. Inspector general escrita sobre las operaciones
militares contra los rebeldes y sobre el despueblo de Puno y su retirada al Cuzco. Lima?
1780s? Yale University, Andean Collection Box 18, folder178.
112. Indignacin a la carta del Sr. Inspector.
113. For a brief but excellent analysis on the central role of honor in pre-modern Spain see
Marcelin Defourneaux, Daily Like in Spain in the Golden Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1979), chapter2. Also Antonio Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain
of Philip III, 1598-1621 (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press,2000).
114. Cortess efforts to obtain a certificate of legitimacy for his son with Malinche, Martin, are
telling. See Camilla Townsend, Malitzins Choices: An Indian Woman in the Conquest of
Mexico (Albuquerque:Univ. of New Mexico Press,2006).
115. Horacio Capel Sez, De Palas a Minerva:la formacin cientfica y la estructura institucional de los
ingenieros militares en el siglo XVIII (Barcelona and Madrid:Serbal /CSIC, 1988), 14888.
116. Feijo, Paralelo de Luis XIV, Rey de Francia, y Pedro el Primero, Zar, o Emperador de la Rusia,
(1750), letter XIX, Cartas eruditas y curiosas, http://www.filosofia.org/bjf/bjfc319.htm.
117. Campillo y Cosso, Dos escritos polticos, 12122.
118. Aventura de la sociedad en orden al amor y sus propiedades, Mercurio peruano, 23
January1791.
119. Letter of Juan de Goyeneche to his son Jos Manuel. Arequipa, April 1795, AG, bookII.
120. Letter of Juan de Goyeneche to Francisco Barreda, Arequipa, April 1795,ibid.
121. Parra de la, Emilio, Manuel Godoy. La aventura del poder (Barcelona:Tusquets, 2002), 14748.

122. Minerva Peruana, November1805.

123. Benito Moxos Manifiesto de un amante de su Rey, de la Patria y de la verdad en obsequio de
estos sagrados deberes, para desvanecer las sediciosas ideas de los enemigos que accidentalmente
han entrado en Buenos Aires of 1806 was reprinted the same year in the Minerva Peruana.
Apparently, gazettes of Mexico and Madrid reproduced it too. See Coleccin de varios papeles
relativos a los sucesos de Buenos-Ayres escritos por el Illmo. Sr. D.D. Bernardo Mara de Mox y
Francol (Lima:1808) and Rubn Vargas Ugarte, Don Benito Mara de Mox y de Francol,
arzobispo de Charcas (Buenos Aires:Imprenta de la Universidad, 1931),59.
124. El obispo de Huamanga pide a sus sacerdotes que oren por la derrota de los ingleses, AGN,
Miscelnea1260.
125. Mox, Benito Mara de, A todos los fieles de nuestro Arzobispado:salud en el Seor. Plata,
24 de noviembre de 1807, Coleccin de varios papeles.
126. Edicto de Mox, Plata 31 de julio de 1807, Edictos del Illmo. Sr. Don Benito Mara de Mox y
Francoli expedidos con ocasion de las noticias de las armas espaolas en una y otra banda del
Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires:en la Imprenta de los Nios Expositos,1807).
127. Como se piensa en Francia de Bonaparte noticias particulares de la vida de este hombre escrita por
un viagero espaol un amigo suyo de Madrid (Lima:Reimpreso en la calle de Bravo,1809).
Chapter4
1. Las gentes de letras tienen en la Repblica el encargo que en las tropas los Oficiales,
Campomanes, Discurso sobre la industria popular,48.
2. According to the census of 1876, literacy rates for the province of Lima in 1876 were 38.3
percent; 25.7 percent for Arequipa; 5.6 percent for Cuzco; and 25 percent for Lambayeque.
Censo general de la Repblica del Per, formado en 1876. 7 vols. (Lima: Imprenta del Teatro,
1878). Following Pablo Maceras estimates, by the end of the 18th century less than 20 percent
of children received an elementary education. See his Noticias sobre la enseanza elemental
en el Per durante el siglo XVIII, Trabajos de Historia, vol. 2 (Lima: INC, 1977), 215301,
esp. 258. Regarding Spain and according to the countrys first official numbers, 24.2 percent
of the population was literate (39.2 percent male, 9.2 percent female). See Antonio Viao.
La alfabetizacin en Espaa: un proceso cambiante de un mundo multiforme. www.usal.es/
efora 3 (March, 2009). Kagan, Students and Society, chapter 5.
3. Darnton, The Devil in the Holy, chapters22 and23.
4. Spanish dictionaries of this transitional era recorded the emergence of new terms describ-
ing the activities men of letters were undertaking:filsofo (1780), editor (1791), hombre de
buenas letras (1803), and publicista (1817) See the correspondent dictionaries to the years
listed above in http://buscon.rae.es.
5. By 1780 the word public was used to mean something common, vulgar, or known by
everybody. According to the dictionary of the Real Academia, pblico meant:Notorio,
patente, y que lo saben todos. Publicus./Vulgar, comun y notado de todos; y as se dice:lad-
ron pblico, muger pblica, etc. Publicus/Se aplica la potestad, jurisdiccion y autoridad
para hacer alguna cosa, como contrapuesto privado. Publicus./Pblica. Usado como sub-
stantivo, se llama en las universidades aquella funcion lucida, en que se defiende alguna
question del derecho pblico, y antecede los demas exercicios para el grado de licenciado.
Exercitatio publica, veluctus./Pblica honestidad. V. Impedimento./Pblica voz y fama.
Expr. Con que se da entender que alguna cosa se tiene corrientemente por cierta y ver-
dadera, por asegurarlo casi todos. Vulgaris opinio in omnium ore. http://buscon.rae.es
6. As the 1734 dictionary of the Spanish language shows, the terms orador and panegirista had
become almost interchangeable. See Diccionario de la lengua castellana, 1734, http://buscon.rae.es
7. Paul Friedland, Political Actors. Representative Bodies and Theatricality in the Age of the French
Revolution (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2002),3334.
8. Jos Antonio Rodrguez Garrido, La voz de las repblicas:poesa y poder en la Lima de ini-
cios del XVIII, Agencias criollas. La ambigedad colonial en las letras hispanoamericanas, ed.
Jos Antonio Mazzotti (Pittsburgh: Instituto Internacional de Literatura Iberoamericana,
2000), 24965. On oratoria sagrada see his Sermn barroco y poder colonial:La oracin
panegrica al apstol Santiago de Espinosa Medrano, Discurso colonial hispanoamericano,
ed. Sonia Rose de Fuggle (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA:Rodopi, 1992), 11529. For France

and for the role of Jesuit schools in promoting oratoria sagrada, see the classic text of Marc
Fumaroli, Lage de lloquence:rhtorique et res literaria, de la renaissance au seuil de lpoque
classique (Geneva:Droz; Paris:Champion,1980).
9. Rama, The Lettered,31.
10. Friedland, Political Actors, 21 and c hapter2. For an analysis on the rise of the neoclassical
aesthetic in France see Thomas E. Crow, Painters and Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Paris
(New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1985) and Irwin David, Neoclassicism. Art & Ideas
Series (London:Phaidon Press,1997).
11. On the Bourbon cultural reforms see Juan Carlos Estenssoro, Modernismo, esttica, msica
y fiesta:elites y cambio de actitud frente a la cultura popular. Per 1790-1850, 18195 and
La plebe ilustrada:el pueblo en las fronteras de la razn, 3366. For Mexico see Juan Pedro
Viqueira, Relajados o reprimidos?:diversiones pblicas y vida social en la Ciudad de Mxico
durante el Siglo de las Luces (Mxico:Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1987), chapter3.
12. For example Certamen conclusiones matemticas, defendidas en esta Real Universidad de
S.Marcos, en presencia del Excmo. Seor Virrey, Real Audiencia, y demas Tribunales, por D.Manuel
Martinez de la Ruda, ayudante de la companyia de artilleros y brigada del Callao:D.Pedro Ruiz, y
D.Diego Machado, cadetes de la tropa; baxo la instruccion, y direccion del Doct. D.Cosme Bueno,
Catedrtico de Prima de Matematicas, y Cosmgrafo mayor de estos Reynos. Dedicadas al mismo
Excmo. Sr. Manuel de Amat y Junient, caballero del Orden de S.Juan:Gentilhombre de Cmara,
con entrada: El dia 11 de Junio de 1768 (Lima: En la Imprenta Real. Calle de Palacio,
1768), JCB; and Certamen publico de derecho natural, politica y derecho de gentes que en el Real
Seminario de Nobles de esta corte han de tener los caballeros seminaristas Don Remigio Argumosa,
y Don Manuel de Ibarrola bajo la direccion de su maestro D.Manuel Joaquin de Condado,
Catedrtico de Derecho Natural y de Gentes del mismo Seminario el dia (sic) Diciembre de 1788
(Madrid:En la Imprenta de la Viuda de Ibarra, n.d.), BNM. For a description of old-style
certmenes see Jeffrey Williams, Censorship and Art in Pre-Enlightenment Lima,5556.
13. The Moreyra collection of the national archive in Lima keeps a small sample of these invita-
tions, including those to the examinations of Jose Joaqun de Olmedo and Jos Baqujano y
Carrillo. AGN, Coleccin Moreyra, Misc., D.1, 104105,n.d.
14. Epitome de la eloquencia espaola. Arte de discurrir y hablar con agudeza, y elegancia en todo
genero de assumptos, de orar, predicar, arguir, conversar, componer embaxadas, cartas, y reca-
dos. Con Chistes, que previenen las faltas, y Exemplos, que muestran los aciertos. Compusolo
Don Francisco Joseph Artiga olim Artieda, Infanzon, ciudadano de la vencedora ciudad de
Huesca, profesor de mathematicas, y receptor de la universidad. Dedicado a Nuestra Sra.
Del Pilar (Barcelona:En la imprenta de Mauro Marti, en la Plaza de S.Jayme, 1750),47.
15. Epitome de la eloquencia espaola,13.
16. See the article on eloquence in the Encyclopdie methdique par ordre des matires, http://
www.hti.umich.edu/d/did/index.html. On the circulation of the Encyclopdie in Spain and
Spanish America see Jefferson Spell, Rousseau in the Spanish World before 1833:AStudy in
Franco-Spanish Literary Relations (Austin:University of Texas Press, 1938), 220, 22627.
17. For France see Friedland, Political Actors, chapter 2 and Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture,
and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). For
England see John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter9.
18. Mark A. Burkholder, Politics of a Colonial Career. Jos Baqujano and the Audiencia of Lima
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980), 1621; 3032. For Baqujanos
biography see also Jos de la Puente Brunke, Jos Baqujano y Carrillo (Lima: Editorial
Brasa,1995).
19. Carta confidencial de Manuel de Gorrichtegui a Julin de Arriaga, Madrid 24 Nov. 1774.
Los Idelogos. Jos Baqujano y Carrillo, CDIP, I, no.3,67.
20. Jos de la Riva Agero, Don Jos Baqujano y Carrillo, La emancipacin y la repblica. Obras
completas de Jos de la Riva Agero, vol. VII (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per,
1971),46.
21. For an interpretation of Baqujanos career as representing the frustration of Creoles aspira-
tion see Burkholder, Politics of a Colonial Career.

22. See Elogio al virrey Juregui por Baqujano en la Universidad de San Marcos,CDIP I, no.3,
6566;67.
23. Elogio,6869.
24. Ibid.,8189.
25. Ibid.,8485.
26. que el pueblo es un resorte, que forzado ms de lo que sufre su elasticidad, revienta
destrozando la mano imprudente que lo oprime y sujeta. Ibid.,8889.
27. In 1786 Baqujano wrote a letter of regret to the authorities emphasizing that he had never
owned the works of Machiavelli. He claimed to be only citing what other authors had writ-
ten. Memorial de Baqujano al virrey expresando su arrepentimiento por el Elogio. Lima,
Jul. 1786. Ibid.,259.
28. Elogio al virrey,85.
29. CDIP I, no.3,89.
30. Carta de Glvez a Areche con noticia sobre el Elogio y de los parlamentos con los caciques
propuestos por Juregui. Lima 3 Nov. 1781. CDIP I, no.3,18283.
31. Confieso que me irrit en silencio cuano o este discurso en aquel teatro donde asisti cuasi
toda esta ciudad Carta de Areche a Glvez sobre la intencin crtica y poltica del Elogio
y su referencia a cuestiones del momento. CDIP I, no.3, Lima, 22 Nov. 1781,186.
32. Carta de Areche, CDIP I, no.3, 19294.
33. Si esto hacen, piensan y escriben los letrados Dios ilumine al rey y a vuestra excelencia para
tomar los medios para acallarlo Carta de Areche a Glvez sobre la intencin crtica y poltica
del Elogio y su referencia a cuestiones del momento. Lima, 22 Nov. 1781. CDIP I, no.3,96.
34. Reflexiones sobre la famosa arenga, pronunciada en Lima por un individuo de la universidad
de San Marcos, con ocasion del recibimiento que hizo dicha universidad a su virrey, el excmo
sr. Don Agustin de Jauregui y Aldecoa, el dia 27 de Agosto de 1781 por Juan Baltasar Maciel.
CDIP I, no.3,107.
35. CDIP I, no.3,215.
36. Ibid.,241.
37. Examen del texto del elogio en la secretaria de Indias, por orden de Jose de Galvez. Aprox.
17851787. Ibid., 25253.
38. Examen del texto, CDIP I, no.3,250.
39. For a study of the Parisan barristers right to print, see Bell, Lawyers and Citizens, chapter3.
40. Decreto del virrey Croix sobre libros prohibidos y expediente de Baqujano, Lima, 11 Aug.
1786. CDIP I, no.3, 26364.
41. Memorial de Baqujano, 25960. Burkholder, Politics of a Colonial Career,66.
42. Elogio del Excmo Seor Don Ambrosio OHiggins, marques de Osorno, virrey del Per; que como
prolusion de la rplica del acto literario dedicado a su exc. Por don Francisco de Arriz, colegial del
Real Convictorio de San Carlos, y defendido para obtener los grados de licenciado y Doctor en
sagrados Cnones dixo en la Real Universidad de San Mrcos el dia 24 de mayo de 1800. Don
Joseph de Arriz, agente fiscal de la Real Audiencia de Lima, oidor honorario de la de la Plata, doctor
en teologia y canones, catedratico de visperas de leyes, padre del graduando (Lima:n.p.,1800).
43. The Moreyra collection also keeps a few of these manuals. Diversos estilos, D.1 103351;
De la eloquencia en general, AGN, Coleccin Moreyra, Misc. D.1 103352; Historia
susinta de la Filosofia, and D.1 105205.
44. See Plan de gobierno y estudios del consejo para los seminarios de educacion de la nobleza y gentes
acomodadas que se establezcan en las capitales de provincia (Madrid:En la Imprenta de la Viuda
de Marin, 1790). AHN, Consejos,4595.
45. Eximeno was an ex-Jesuit who had left the order before the expulsion. Despite this he traveled
to Italy in 1767 where he became a prestigious man of letters and a musician. He returned
to Valencia in 1798. See Mara Jos Bono Guardiola, El espritu de Maquiavelo de Antonio
Eximeno, IV Encuentro de investigadores de las universidades de Alicante y Macerata (mayo,
1995), eds. Enrique Gimnez, Miguel A. Lozano, and Juan A. Ros (Alicante:Universidad de
Alicante, 1996),3952.
46. Expediente para recoger la obra El Espritu de Maquiavelo o Reflexiones de D. Antonio
Eximeno. AHN, Inquisicin, leg. 4460, exp.17.

47. David Bradings introduction to Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmn, Letter to the Spanish
Americans. AFacsimile of the Second English Edition (London, 1810) (Providence, RI:The John
Carter Brown Library, 2002),28.
48. Projet pour rendre lAmerique Espagnole indpendante. Suite du prcdent projet of 1790. Ibid.,
34, 1011, 1819. See also Viscardos letter to the British diplomat in Italy, John Udny, of
September 1781 on the imminent British landing in Rio de la Plata. Juan Pablo Viscardo y
Guzmn. Obra completa (Lima:Biblioteca Clsicos del Per 4, 1988),14.
49. The Moreyra collection holds a large number of unidentified manuscripts informing the
recipients about news and intellectual debates in Spain. See for example Retractacion que
a la hora de la muerte hizo de su probabilismo el Padre Fr. Joseph Cliquet Author de la obra
intitulada Flor del Moral, AGN, Misc. D.1. 10398. And La Nacion Hebrea al General
Bonaparte, 1794-1795. AGN, Misc. D.1 103354. For a study on the circulation of news
from the French Revolution in Peru see Claudia Rosas, Del trono a la guillotina. El impacto
de la Revolucin Francesa en el Per (1789-1808) (Lima:IFEA, Embajada de Francia, Fondo
Editorial de la PUCP, 2006), c hapter2.
50. Rosas, Del trono,77.
51. Hctor Enrique Quiroga Cubillos, Juicio al toro del fucha (Juicio a Don Antonio Nario por la
edicin y distribucin de un papel considerado sedicioso. Real Audiencia de Santafe. 1794) (Santa
F de Bogot: Ediciones Academia Colombiana de Jurisprudencia, 2004), 171.
52. See Enrique Ros, Antonio Nario, primer traductor al espaol de los derechos del hombre.
En el bicentenario de la Revolucin Francesa, Espaa y la Revolucin Francesa, ed. Antonio
Elorza, Jean-Ren Aymes etal. (Barcelona:Crtica, 1989), 74345. Also Quiroga, Juicio al
toro, 208. Jefferson R. Spell, Rousseau in the Spanish World before 1833 (Austin:University of
Texas Press, 1938),224.
53. Derechos del hombre y del ciudadano, con varias maximas republicanas y un discurso preliminar
dirigido a los americanos (Madrid:En la Imprenta de la Verdad, ao de 1797).BNM.
54. Discurso que merecio el premio propuesto por la Academia de Dijon el ao de 1750 sobre
esta question Si el restablecimiento de las Ciencias, y de las Artes ha contribuido a prurifi-
car las costumbres? Por un Ciudadano de Ginebra. Traducido en el Peru ao de 1796. Yale
University, Andean Collection, box 32, folder187.
55. Quando en mi juventud le este discurso se arrebat mi Corazon, y temi mucho que me
hubiera alucinado su elocuencia. Discurso que merecio el premio.
56. Ibid.
57. See Herr, The Eighteenth Century, chapters810.
58. Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 373. See also Spell, Rousseau in the Spanish World, part1.
59. Kagan, Students and Society, 14051.
60. Diccionario de la lengua castellana (Madrid, 1734). http://buscon.rae.es.
61. As Bernardo de Balbuena recorded, the city of Mexico counted around 300 poets by the
late-sixteenth century. See Rama, The Lettered, 18. See also Jodi Campbell, Monarchy,
Political Culture, and Drama in Seventeenth-Century Madrid. Theater of Negotiation (Aldershot,
UK:Ashgate, 2006), chapter1.
62. Donald Gilbert-Santamara, Writers on the Market. Consuming Literature in Early Seventeenth-
Century Spain (Lewisburg, PA:Bucknell University Press, 2005), c hapter1.
63. Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 183200; Garca Pandavenes, Introduction,2021.
64. Mnica Ricketts, El teatro en Lima y la construccin de la nacin republicana. Licentiate
Thesis (Lima:PUCP, 1996), c hapter1. According to Pablo Maceras estimates for the years
1790 to 1800, for two reales in Lima one could buy a pound of lard, a kilogram of sugar, a
cooking pot, a pound of yarn, twenty bricks, or about fourteen kilos of oil. Pablo Macera, Los
precios del Per. Siglos XVI-XIX. Fuentes. Vol. 1 (Lima:Banco Central de Reserva del Per.
Fondo Editorial).
65. Jean Pierre Clement, Aproximacion al Diario de Lima (17901793).
66. See Representacin que hace D. Jayme Bausate y Mesa, Autor del Diario Curioso, Erudito,
Economico, y Comercial de Lima en el Reyno del Peru. Ala Magestad del Seor D.Carlos IV. 1791
(Lima, 1791); see also Jean-Pierre Clement, Aproximacin al Diario de Lima (1790-1793) y
a Jaime Bausate y Mesa, su autor, El Argonauta Espaol 3 (2006), http://argonauta.imageson.
org.

67. Analisis del Diario Curioso, Erudito, Economico, y Comercial, que con privilegio de este
Real y Superior Govierno da a Luz Don Jayme Bausate y Mesa. En la Ymprenta de Nios
Expositos de Lima. AGN, Coleccin Moreyra, Miscelnea. This was the introductory text
included in the first issue of the Diario de Lima (DL), 1790, Vol.1.
68. See the article philosophe in the Encyclopdie methdique par ordre des matires, www.hti.
umich.edu/cgi/t/text.
69. Historia de la sociedad acadmica del diario y sus principios. Ibid. Historia de la sociedad
acadmica del diario y sus principios. DL, 17-1-1791
70. DL, 14-3-1791.
71. DL, 13-10-1790.
72. DL, 19-3-1791.
73. DL, 21-3-1791.
74. The initial prices for the subscriptions were 15 reales per month for Lima residents, 30 for
foreigners living up to 100 miles, and 45 reales for subscribers living 100 to 200 miles away.
See DL, introduction. Vol. 1.Afew months later subscriptions for limeos were reduced to 12
reales and to 15 for foreigners. Jean Pierre Clement, Aproximacion al Diario de Lima (1790-
1793). For a traditional study of the Mercurio as precursor of independence see Jos de la
Riva-Agero, Don Jos Baqujano y Carillo, 21109; Jos A. de la Puente Candamo, Notas
sobre la causa de la independencia del Per (Lima:Librera Studium, 1970). For its role in creat-
ing a romantic Creole patriotism see Juan Carlos Estenssoro Modernismo, esttica, msica
y fiesta. About the Mercurios role in spreading modernity and a Catholic Enlightenment
see Jean-Pierre Clement, El Mercurio Peruano, 1790-1795. Textos y estudios coloniales y de
la Independencia. 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert; Madrid: Iberoamericana, 1997).
On the Mercurios position towards the Indians, see Charles F. Walker, The Patriotic
Society:Discussions and Omissions about Indians in the Peruvian War of Independence,
The Americas 55, no. 2 (Oct. 1998):275298. For an analysis on the Mercurios role in forg-
ing Creole royalism see Vctor Peralta, En defensa de la autoridad. Poltica y cultura bajo el
gobierno del virrey Abascal. Per 1806-1816 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientficas, 2002), 2538. And for a study of Hiplito Unanues articles for the Mercurio
and their role in promoting a Creole national identity see Jaime Caizares-Esguerra, Nation
and Nature:Natural History and the Fashioning of Creole National Identity in Late Colonial
Spanish America, Paper delivered at the XX LASA Meeting (Guadalajara, Mexico,1997).
75. Estenssoro, Proyecto ilustrado and Riva-Agero, Don Jos Baqujano.
76. Catherine Poupeney Hart, Prensa e ilustracin:Jos Rossi y Rub, del Mercurio Peruano a la
Gaceta de Guatemala, Istmo. Revista virtual de estuanddios literarios y culturales centroamerica-
nos 13 ( July 2006) http://www.denison.edu/collaborations/istmo/n13/proyectos/prensa.
html. See also Estenssoro Proyecto ilustrado and Clement, El Mercurio, vol.1,31.
77. Prospecto del Papel periodico intitulado Mercurio Peruano de Historia, Literatura, y Noticias
Publicas, que nombre de una Sociedad de Amantes del Pais, y como uno de ellos promote
dar luz Don Jacinto Calero y Moreira (Lima:En la Imprenta de los Nios Expositos, 1790).
Prologue.
78. Idea general del Per, MP, 2-1-1791.
79. Hiplito Unanue al Presidente de la Sociedad Ambrosio Cerdan y Pontero. Lima 14-4-
1791/1794. Documents concerning the Sociedad de Amantes del Pas. Yale University,
Andean Collection, Box 33, folder222.
80. Historia de la Sociedad Academica de Amantes del Pais y principios del Mercurio Peruano.
Mercurio Peruano (MP), 23-1-1791.
81. Burkholder, Politics of a Colonial Career,79.
82. Documents concerning the Sociedad de Amantes del Pas. Yale University, Andean
Collection, Box 33, folder222.
83. See Progresos y estado actual de la Sociedad de Amantes del Pais por el Seor Oidor,
Presidente de ella, Don Ambrosio Cerdan y Pontero, Documents concerning the Sociedad
de Amantes del Pas. Lima. 1792-1794, Yale University, Andean Collection, Box 33,
folder222.
84. DL, 1-1-1791.
85. DL, 17-1-1791

86. DL, Supplement. 18-1-1791.

87. DL, 21-2-1791.
88. Representacin que hace D.Jayme Bausate yMesa.
89. Beatriz Snchez-Hita, Juan Antonio de Olavarrieta, un fraile con vocacin de periodista
ilustrado, El Argonauta Espaol 6 (2009) http://argonauta.imageson.org; Jos Mara
Azcona y Daz de Rada, Clara-rosa, mason y vizcano (Madrid:Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1935),
1617. See also Roberto Forns, La estrategia comunicativa del Semanario Crtico de Juan
Antonio Olavarrieta:Ilustracin y polmica en el periodismo limeo en 1791. B.A. Thesis
(Lima:PUC,1988).
90. Semanario Crtico (SC),no.1.
91. The cost of both the Semanario and the Mercurio per issue was two reales. However, while
the former only charged for a monthly suscription 6 reales, the latter charged 14 reales. See
the prologue to the Mercurio and the first number of the Semanario.
92. Estenssoro, La plebe ilustrada,37.
93. Nunca ha ignorado el autor del Semanario Crtico, que un Artesano, que una Mujer Plebeya,
en una manera que el vulgo sensato es incapaz de manejar las poticas de Homero
pero ser incapaz de manejar, de leer, y comprehender las reglas principales del Drama admi-
nistradas en leves retazos semanales, y en una quartilla de papel? SC,no.3.
94. Mnica Ricketts, El teatro en Lima:tribuna poltica y termmetro de civilizacin, 1820-
1828, La independencia del Per. De los Borbones a Bolvar (Lima: Pontificia Universidad
Catlica del Per, Instituto Riva Agero, 2001), chapterone.
95. MP, 9-6-1791.
96. La parte sensata de los concurrentes se mezcla en aplaudir unos entremeses, que se execu-
tan solo para congeniar con la infima plebe, Nuevos establecimientos de buen gusto, MP,
26 May 1791. For an extended anlysis on this issue see Estensoro, Modernismo, esttica,
and La plebe ilustrada.
97. El mayor favor que puedo hacer es dividir el vulgo en sensato, e insensato. El sensato puede
comprehender todo, aquel conjunto de personas que no debiendo ser vulgares, sino muy
ilustradas se equivocan y confunden en sus producciones con la infima plebe. El insensato
puede comprehender todas aquellas que no tuvieron la menor proporcin para ilustrarse.
SC,no.3.
98. MP, 23-6-1791.
99. SC,no.5.
100. The number of subscribers for the Mercurio went from 399 in 1791 to 258 in 1793. Clement,
El Mercurio Peruano vol. 1, 6869. In the introduction to 1794, the mercuristas clearly stated
that had it not been for their patronViceroy Gil de Taboadathey would have fallen into
bankruptcy. See MP, 2 Jan.1794.
101. Snchez Hita, Juan Antonio de Olavarrieta. Herr, The Eighteenth-Century,262.
102. Ibid. AHN, Inquisicin, leg 3726, exp. 188. See also Viaje al mundo subterrneo y secre-
tos de la Inquisicin revelados a los Espaoles seguido de El Hombre y el Bruto y otros escritos
edicin, introduccin y notas de Daniel Muoz Sempere y Beatriz Snchez Hita (Salamanca
and Cadiz:Grupo de Estudios del Siglo XVIII, Universidad de Salamanca, Universidad de
Cdiz, Plaza Universitaria Ediciones,2003).
103. MP, 3-1-1793.
104. Riva-Agero, Don Jos Baqujano,5253.
105. Oracion fnebre historico-panegrica que en las exequias del Mercurio Peruano, pronunci
Su padre de Agua MP, 21-8-1794.
106. The analysis that follows is based on a large and detailed judiciary record kept in Spain:Causa
seguida en Lima contra varios franceses sobre juntas y palabras sediciosas. Los procesados
son: Joaqun Alzamora, Carlos Fournier, Monsieur Clermont, Clemente Sabino, Pedro
Blanc, Pedro Viana. 1794-1795, AHN, Consejo de Indias, leg. 21290, no.211. On this case
see also Rosas, El miedo a la revolucin and Del trono a la guillotina.
107. Declaracin de Jose Leandro Alvarez. Ibid., exp.1,4r6v.
108. Declaracin de Josef Andres Xaramillo. Ibid., exp.1,6v7r.
109. Loquendose y regosijandose como los demas franceses y aun excediendose a ellos como
que sabe muy bien el Frances, y esta poseido de su espiritu tanto que por la familiaridad

que ha tenido con el sabe y le ha visto que duerme poniendo bajo de la almoada a Bolter.
Declaracin de Bermejo. Ibid., exp.1, 11r11v.
110. Ibid., exp.1, 12v13r.
111. Declaracin de Pedro Blanc. Ibid., 56r62r.
112. Declaracin de Fournier. Ibid., 44r51r.
113. Jos Mara Egaa declara sobre la comisin que se le encarg de averiguar las conversacio-
nes pblicas y privadas sobre las revoluciones de Francia. Ibid., 80r82r.
114. For the repression against Frenchmen in Peru, see the documentation of Viceroy Gil de
Taboada in Documentacin Oficial Espaola, CDIP 22, vol. 1 (Lima:Comision Nacional
del Sesquicentenario, 1971). Also Claudia Rosas, El miedo a la revolucin. Rumores y
temores desatados por la Revolucin Francesa en el Per, 1790-1800, El miedo en el Per.
Siglos XVI al XX ed. Claudia Rosas (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per. Fondo
Editorial, 2005), 139-166 and Del trono a la guillotina, chapter4.
115. Reconocimiento de papeles, Alzamora. Lima, 20 Jun. 1794. Ibid., exp.1/3,1r3r.
116. Segunda declaracin de Alzamora. Ibid., exp.1, 115r131r.
117. Otra de Pedro Blanc, ibid., exp.1, 156v158r.
118. Real Orden. Reservada. El virrey sobre los extrangeros que viven en Lima. AGI, Estado 73,
N.114. See also Rosas, Del trono,81.
119. Declaracin del alcaide de la prisin de Valdivia, Lima, 7-7-1794. AHN, Consejo de Indias,
leg. 21290, no.211, exp.3/1,2r4r.
120. Vista Fiscal. Lima 18-7-1794, exp.1, 178v180r,ibid.
121. Manuel Suares en nombre de Carlos Fournier. Ibid., exp.4, Lima, 5 Sept.1794.
122. According to the Real Academia dictionary of 1791droguero meant El que trata en dro-
gas, las vende. Aromatum propola. See http://buscon.rae.es. For an analysis on the con-
nections between the trade of pharmacists and painters see Gabriela Siracusano, El poder
de los colores:de lo material a lo simblico en las practices culturales andinas; silgos XVI-XVIII
(Buenos Aires:Fondo de Cultura Econmica de Argentina, 2008), 208222.
123. Declara Don Eusebio Josf Gomez. 19 Sept. 1794. AHN, Consejos, leg. 21290, no.211,
exp.4.
124. AHN, Consejos, leg. 21290, no.211, exp.4.
125. On the new courses with an emphasis on derecho real see Mariano Peset Reig, Derecho
romano y real en las universidades del siglo XVIII, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Espaol
45 (1975), 273339. Jos Luis y Mariano Peset, Carlos IV y la Universidad de Salamanca
(Madrid: Consejo Superio de Investigaciones Cientficas, Instituto Arnay de Vilanova,
1983), 222224. For New Granada, Vctor Uribe Urn, Disputas entre Estado y socie-
dad sobre la educacin de los abogados a finales de la etapa colonial en la Nueva Granada,
Historia y sociedad no 3 (1996):3557.
126. Diccionario de la lengua castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces, su natura-
leza y calidad, con las phrases o modos de hablar (Madrid, 1734). http://buscon.rae.es
127. Angel Rama considered letrados as agents of an imperial dominion that rested on urban
Creole domination. Thanks to a vibrant new and rich historiography, we now know
that there were castas and Indian men of letters who worked as letrados and, as Gabriela
Ramos has claimed, did indeed strengthen colonial rule but fought also for their com-
munities and for themselves. See Angel Rama, The Lettered City, edited and translated
by John Chasteen (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), chapter 2 and Kagan,
Students and Society. Gabriela Ramos, Indigenous Intellectuals in Andean Colonial
Cities, Indigenous Intellectuals: Knowledge, Power, and Colonial Culture in Mexico and
the Andes eds. Gabriela Ramos and Yanna Yannakakis (Durham: Duke University Press,
2014), chapter 1. See also the key work of Alcira Dueas, The Lima Indian Letrados:
Remaking the Repblica de Indios in the Bourbon Andes, The Americas 72 ( January
2015): 5575.
128. Jos Carlos Chiaramonte, Nacin y estado en Iberoamrica:el lenguaje poltico en tiempos de las
independencias (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2004),1089.
130. Olavide, Plan de estudios. See also Raymond Carr, Spain 18081939 (Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1966),7576.

131. About the rivalries between the golillas and the Count of Arandas faction see La Fuente,
Historia de las universidades, vol. 4, 87. For an analysis of the endless new legal disputes that
the intendancy system produced in Peru see John Fisher, The Government and Society in
Colonial Peru:the Intendant System (London:University of London,1970).
132. The Count of Floridablanca was named president of the Real Academia de Derecho Espaol
y Pblico in 1763, where he organized semi-public academic speeches. The members used
to present their dissertations and debated legislation and forms of government. In the 1790s
the Academy became a bastion of Jansenist thinking. See Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 62,
18, and 401. See also La Fuente, Historia de las universidades, vol. 4,169.
133. See Germn Zamora Snchez, Universidad y filosofa moderna. Labor reformista de Francisco
de Villalpando (1740-1797) (Salamanca:Acta Salmanticensia. Biblioteca de Pensamiento y
Sociedad 64, 1989). Chapter two deals with the writings of the Mexican Juan Benito Daz
de Gamarra y Dvalos.
134. Sarrailh, La Espaa ilustrada,575.
135. Historia del derecho natural y de gentes por Don Joachin Marin, abogado de los Reales Consejos,
del Ilustre Colegio, y Cathedratico de este mismo Derecho, en los Reales Estudios de esta Corte
(Madrid:por D.Manuel Martin, Calle de la Cruz, 1776), 2-3,5.
136. Historia del derecho, 9.For a similar distinction between verdadera and falsa poltica see
Feijos speech La poltica ms fina, Teatro crtico universal 1, http://www.filosofia.org/
bjf/bjft104.htm.
137. Historia del derecho,1819.
138. Ibid.,4142.
139. Ibid.,4243.
140. Ibid.,45.
141. Ibid.,5859.
142. Antiguamente no hablaban de esta facultad sino aquellos a quienes competa, como prn-
cipes, embajadores y generales. Pero tiempos brbaros seran aquellos en que no hablase
cada uno ms de lo que le toca! Qu diferentes son los nuestros! En ellos no hay cadete,
estudiante de primer ao ni mancebo de mercader que no hable de Menchaca, Ayala,
Grocio, Wolfio, Pufendorf, Vatel, Burlamachy, etc. Jos Cadalso, Los eruditos de la violeta.
Introduccin, seleccin y notas de Nigel Glendinning (Salamanca:Anaya, 1967),89.
143. Carr, Spain 1808-1939,76.
144. Certamen publico de derecho natural.
145. Ibid.
146. Heineccius was the most famous promoter of the law of nature and nations in the early eigh-
teenth century. He was a professor of jurisprudence in Halle, Germany. See Basadre, Historia
del derecho, 318. Also Antonio Alvarez de Morales, La difusion del derecho natural y de gentes
europeo en universidad espaola de los siglos XVIII y XIX, Doctores y Escolares, vol. 1,5355.
147. Gua de litigantes.,180.
148. Ibid., 166, 328. See also Germn Zamora Snchez, Universidad y filosofa moderna, part1;
Vicente de la Fuente, Historia de las universidades, vol. 4, 173. On Spanish America and
Peru see John Tate Lanning, Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies (Port Washington,
NY.: Kennikat Press, 1971), c hapter 3; and Carlos Daniel Valcrcel, Reformas virreinales
en San Marcos (Lima:Imprenta de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1960),
chapter3.
149. La Fuente, Historia de las universidades, vol. 4, 17374.
150. Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 180183.
151. La Fuente, Historia de las universidades, vol. 4, 17374.
152. According to La Fuente there was a sudden abundance of fraudulent lawyers in Spain after
this measure. Ibid., 25556.
153. See Gua poltica, eclesiastica y militar del virreynato del Peru para el ao de 1793, 5866. For
definitions of legal occupations see glossaary provided in Matthew C. Mirrow, Latin American
Law:AHistory of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America (Austin:University of Texas
Press,2004).
154. Abogados del ilustre colegio de la M.N.Y.L. Ciudad de Cadiz, que actualmente residen en
ella. AGI, Arribadas315.

155. Gua de litigantes y pretendientes. Ao 1803 (Madrid: por D. Benito Cano con privilegio
del Rey N.S., 1803); Kalendario manual y guia de forasteros en Madrid para el ao de 1803
(Madrid:en la Imprenta Real,1803).
156. Carlos Daniel Valcrcel, Reformas virreinales en San Marcos,5444.
157. Antonio Espinoza Ruiz, La reforma de la educacin superior en Lima: el caso del Real
Convictorio de San Carlos, El Per en el siglo XVIII. La era borbnica, ed. Scarlett OPhelan
Godoy (Lima: PUCP, Instituto Riva-Agero, 1999), 221. For discussions and literature
about the tensions within the university of San Marcos see Fernando Romero, Rodrguez de
Mendoza:hombre de lucha, c hapter7. And John Tate Lanning,ibid.
158. La Universidad. Libro XIV de Claustros (1780-1790), CDIP XIX, no.1,15.
159. In 1788 Viceroy Croix ordered a report from the rector of San Marcos informing him about
the state of the university. No courses on derecho natural y de gentes were taught at the uni-
versity. See Carlos Daniel Valcrcel, San Marcos en 1788 (Lima:Imprenta de la Universidad
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos,1962).
160. Basadre, Historia del derecho,320.
161. Romero, Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza, 8081. See also Ricardo Cubas Educacin, elites
e independencia: el papel del Convictorio de San Carlos en la emancipacin peruana,
La independencia del Per. De los Borbones a Bolvar, ed. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy
(Lima:PUCP, Instituto Riva-Agero, 2001), 289317.
162. Espinoza Ruiz, La reforma de la educacin,224.
163. Romero, Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza, 18083.
164. Romero, Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza,220.
165. El Derecho de la Naturaleza y las Gentes, ese delicioso importante estudio se ha cultivado
con tanto anhelo, y tiene ya entre nosotros tan buena acogida, que apenas hay quien qui-
era entregarse al peligroso y dificil prelado del Derecho Civil y Canonico, sin prepararse
primero por esos sublimes conocimientos. Primer certamen de toda la filosofia que segun el
nuevo y mas exacto plan de estudios tendran en presencia de los ilustres individuos de la Real
Academia los alumnos del real convictorio de San Carlos Don Mariano Parral, Don Juan Antonio
Andueza, Don Justo Figuerola, Don Manuel Alvarado, Don Joseph Pedemonte, Don Carlos
Pedemonte baxo la direccion de el doctor don Joseph Ignacio Moreno, vice-rector del dicho Real
Convictorio, Maestro de Filosofia y Matemticas, y Regente de los estudios de Leyes y Cnones
(Lima:Imprenta Real de los Nios Hurfanos,1793).
166. Alegato que en la oposicion a la catedra de prima de leyes de la Real Universidad de San Marcos de
Lima dixo el Dr.D.Joseph de Baquijano, y Carrillo, catedratico de visperas de la misma facultad,
socio de la Sociedad Vascongada de los Amigos del Pais. El dia 29 de abril de 1788. JCB. See
also Reflectio extemporanea ad explanationem legis panphilo XXXIX D.De Legatis, et fideicom-
missis III Qvam, in pvblico certamine pro primaria legvm cathedra, pronvntiavit D.Josephus de
BaquiIIano, et carrillo 1788.
167. Estatutos para el gobierno y direccin del ilustre Colegio de Abogados de la Ciudad de Lima forma-
dos con arreglo a la real cedula de su ereccin dada en Madrid a 31 de julio de 1804 (Aprobados
por esta Real Audiencia. Impresos en la Real Casa de Nios Expositos.1808).
168. SJ, Reglamento del Seminario,1801.
169. Francisco Garca Caldern, Universidad de Arequipa, Memoria sobre el estado y los pro-
gresos de la instruccin pblica en Arequipa, Anales Universitarios del Per redactados y
publicados por el D.D. Jos G.Paz-Soldn, vol. 2 (Lima:Imprenta de la Epoca por J.E. Del
Campo, 1862),7374.
170. From 1802 to 1807, 61 students graduated in law at the University of San Antonio Abad,
40 in theology, 6 in philosophy, and 3 in medicine. Libro donde se apuntan las partidas de
los grados que se confieren en esta Real Pontifica Universidad de N.P.S. Abad. ARC, De la
direccion, leg. 50. Cuzco, 18021807.
171. See ARC, Real Audiencia, Gobierno, legajos 158159.
172. Representacion del Sr. Rector de San Antonio Abad solicitando que los individuos de
su colegio por qualesquier delito que cometan sehan entregados a el y no se extorcione
y atropelle el fuero que gozan por los soldados, como lo hicieron en una contencion
rixsosa (sic) que tuvieron unos con otros en el juego de la pelota. ARC, Int. Gob. 148,
17971798.

173. Expediente seguido por Don Jose Mar Chillitupa sobre que este no queria estar en el
Regimiento de caballeria sino en el de infanteria en donde estaba filiado primero, ARC, Int.
Gov. 150, 18001802.
174. Expediente promovido por los Yndividuos del Real Tren de Artilleria de esta Plaza sobre
que se les mantenga en la posesion del fuero que gosan y no se les bilipendie por los Jueses
ordinarios, ARC, Real Audiencia, Administracin, legajo 150, 1802-1805.
175. On the role of virtue in the American and French revolutions see Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revoltuion (Cambridge, MA:Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1992); J. G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:Florentine Political Thoguht
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,
2003), part3; Patrice Higonnet, Goodness beyond Virtue:Jacobins during the French Revolution
(London, Englnad; Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Darnton,
The French Revolution at the Street Leel, What was Revolutionary about the French
Revolution? The Eleventh Charles Edmonson Historical Lectures) Waco, TX:Markham Press
Fund, 1989). For Spain see Richard Herr, El principio de la virtud y la crtica poltica:los
orgenes de la monarqua constitucional en Francia y Espaa, El mundo hispnico en el Siglo
de las Luces, VV.AA (ed.) (Madrid:Editorial Complutense, D.L. 1996), vol. 1, 11939.
176. Antonio Elorza, introduction to Pan y Toros y otros papeles sediciosos de fines del siglo XVIII,
recogidos y presentados por Antonio Elorza (Madrid:Editorial Ayuso, 1971), 1112. See also
Herr, The Eighteenth Century, 32527.
177. Discurso teorico practico sobre la educacion de la infancia dirigido a los padres de familia por
Don Juan Picornell y Gomila. Con licencia y aprobaciones necesarias (Salamanca:Por Andrs
Garca Rico.1786).
178. As explained earlier, Picornell later became a revolutionary in Caracas. See also Elorza, Pan
y Toros,1213.
179. Jos Miguel Caso Gonzlez, Jovellanos (Barcelona:Editorial Ariel, S.A.,1998), 21722.
180. Herr, El principio de la virtud.
181. Elorza, Pan y Toros, 31. Also Herr, The Eighteenth Century,3315.
182. Elorza, Pan y Toros,7.
184. On this issue see Eduardo Ruiz Martnez, La librera de Nario, 200, and also Harris Gaylord
Warren The Early Revolutionary Career of Juan Mariano Picornell, Hispanic American
Historical Review 22, no. 1 (February, 1942),5781.
185. Derechos del hombre y del ciudadano, xixiii.
186. en el interin, nosotros debemos en el caso de que el tirano envie algunas tropas contra
nosotros, la mayor parte seran de nuestro partido; pues aunque el rey tiene corrompidos,
por medio del interes, muchos Espaoles, es evidente, que hay infinitos patriotas, verdade-
ros hombres de bien, que se hallan libres de esta corrupcin, y que seguramente se unirn
nosotros para la destruccin de la tirania. Derechos del hombre,xvi.
187. Ibid., xxxviiix xxix. See also Harris Gaylord Warren The Early Revolutionary Career of
Juan Mariano Picornell,1116.
188. The so-called Aguilar-Ubalde conspiracy has been usually regarded as an odd conspiracy:
it was not seen to fit the pattern of eighteenth-century rebellions or the pro-autonomy
upheavals of the 1810s. For the most part, historians have tried to explain the Inca com-
ponent of the conspiracy, the participation of Indians, and dominant role of Cuzco in the
planning. These approaches have certainly been crucial to understanding the social and
regional tensions of early nineteenth-century Peru. Historians have, however, paid insuf-
ficient attention to the declared motivations of the leaders, which could seem trivial or even
absurd. Yet in taking their expectations and political goals seriously, we can uncover a new
type of political thinking and scheming, which had more in common with the Peninsular
conspiracies, the French Revolution, and the rise of Napoleon. For an illuminating analysis
of Gabriel Aguilars role and his dreams in the context of the Andean utopia see Alberto
Flores Galindo, Buscando un Inca. 3d ed. (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1987), 175242. For
a discussion of the Indian participation in the conspiracy and of Cuzcos leading politi-
cal role in the viceroyalty of Peru see John Fisher, Regionalism and Rebellion in Late
Colonial Peru: The Aguilar Ubalde Conspiracy of 1805, Bibliotheca Americana, vol. 1, no. 1

(September 1982), 4559; and Charles Walker, Smoldering Ashes. Cuzco and the Creation of
Republican Peru. 1780-1840 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 8688. Also Mnica
Ricketts, Spanish American Napoleons: The Transformation of Military Officers into
Political Leaders, Peru, 17901830, Napoleons Atlantic: The Impact of Napoleonic Empire in
the Atlantic World, eds. Christophe Belaubre, Jordana Dym, and John Savage (Leiden: Brill,
2010), 20928.
189. They were supported by other lawyers, the Indian Diego Cusiguamn, a lieutenant colonel,
and two priests from the convents of San Francisco and La Merced. Report of 1805 signed
by the president, the Audiencia, and the regente interino of Cuzco to the central administra-
tion in Spain. AGI, Cuzco29.
190. Primera declaracin de Ubalde, El conato revolucionario referente al proceso seguido a Aguilar,
Ubalde y otros. Recopilacin histrica de Carlos Ponce Sangins (La Paz:Sesquicentenario de la
Republica. Ediciones de la Casa Municipal de la Cultura Franz Tamayo, 1975),4046.
191. El conato,4144.
192. Ibid.,4243.
193. Primera declaracin, El conato, 40-46.7477.
194. Declaracin de Aguilar, ibid.,8586.
195. Primera declaracin de Ubalde, ibid.,4143.
196. deferencias y positivas invitaciones a que se hiciese Caudillo de una mutacion poltica,
Segunda declaracin de Ubalde, ibid., 47. Aguilar also declared having traveled to Spain in
1795. Primera declaracin de Aguilar, ibid., 86. Declaracin de Don Manuel Ampuero,
ibid., 13338.
197. Segunda declaracin de Ubalde, ibid.,4748.
198. Tercera declaracin de Ubalde, ibid.,51.
199. Cuarta declaracin de Ubalde, ibid.,5758.
200. Ubaldes statements do not follow a strict chronological order and can be confusing to fol-
low. Tercera y cuarta declaraciones de Ubalde, ibid., 53 and60.
201. Tercera declaracin de Ubalde, ibid.,5253.
202. mas reflexionando este ultimo que no concurrian en Aguilar los entronques y rela-
ciones de familia para aparentar derecho a este Ymperio, y hallando a su parecer las que
juzgaba necesarias en el regidor Valverde, quien se decia Nieto de los Emperadores por su
segundo apellido de Ampuero (aunque segun tengo entendido ninguna descendencia tiene
de aquellos Principes) determinaron proponerselo en la primera ocasion. Expediente rela-
tivo al juicio seguido a los conspiradores Aguilar y Ubalde. Lima, 1805. BNP,D-120.
203. Ibid.
204. Report of the president of the audiencia in Cuzco to the ministry in Madrid. Cuzco. 10-12-
1805 and 10-1-1806. AGI, Cuzco29.
205. Manuel Godoy to Josef Caballero. Madrid 6-9-1806. AGI, Cuzco29.
206. El Principe de la Paz por medio de sus secretarios Madrid 6-9-1808. AGI, Cuzco29.
Chapter5
1. Liberalism emerged as a vague, open, often contradictory, and moving set of ideas, which
makes any fixed or narrow definition anachronistic. According to the 1817 dictionary of the
Real Academia Espaola:Liberal was El que obra con liberalidad la cosa hecha con ella.
Liberalis, munificus Expedito, pronto para ejecutar cualquiera cosa. Expeditus, promtus,
strenuous Se dice del arte propia del ingenio diferencia de la mecnica. Liberalidad
was Virtud moral que consiste en distribuir generosamente los bienes sin esperar recom-
pensa alguna. Liberalitas. This edition reproduced the definition first established in the
1734 Diccionario de Autoridades. The first political definition for a dictionary seems to have
been reproduced in 1846 as Liberal:El que tiene ideas favorables la justa libertad del
pueblo. Vicente Salv, Nuevo diccionario de la lengua castellana, que comprende la ltima
edicin ntegra, muy rectificada y mejorada del publicada por la Academia Espaola , 1846.
The first dictionary of the Real Academia Espaola to incorporate this new meaning was
that of 1852. Previously, all include the old meaning of generous and liberally educated. See
buscon.rae.es.

For attempts at definitions on the Spanish case, the works of Javier Fernndez Sebastin
stand out. See for example his latest edited volume Diccionario poltico y social del mundo
iberoamericano. Conceptos polticos fundamentales, 1770-1870, vol. 2 (Madrid: Centro de
Estudios Polticos y Constitucionales, 2014) and La aurora de la libertad. Los primeros lib-
eralismos en el mundo iberoamericano (Madrid:Marcial Pons, 2012). The works of Roberto
Brea for the Spanish American world are also crucial. See El primer liberalismo espaol y los
procesos de emancipacin de Amrica, 1808-1824:una revisin historiogrfica del liberalismo
hispnico (Mxico, D.F.:El Colegio de Mxico, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2006).
For a general discussion on the definitions of liberalism and the challenges respecting its
early phases see Duncan Bell, What is Liberalism? Political Theory 42 no. 6 (2014):682
715 and Domenico Losuardo, Liberalism: A Counter History trans. by Gregory Elliott
(London:Verso, 2011). For illuminating studies on liberalism in other parts of the world
see Uday Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal
Thought (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1999); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire:The
Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005); C. A. Bayly, Rammonhan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism
in India, 180030, Modern Intellectual History, vol. 4, no. 1 (2007), 2541 and his
Recovering Liberties:Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire:The Wiles Lectures
Given at the Queens University of Belfast, 2007 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
2012); Maurizio Isabella, Risorgimento in Exile:Italian Emigrs and the Liberal International
in the Post-Napoleonic Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Richard Stites, The
Four Horsemen:Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (NewYork:Oxford University
Press,2014).
2. For these definitions see the dictionaries of 1734, 1780, and 1817 at http://buscon.rae.es/
3. In the words of Karl von Clausewitz, war reached its absolute strength in the Napoleonic
era. Karl von Clausewitz, On War in The Book of War (New York: The Modern Library, 2000),
9179.
4. David A. Bell, The First Total War. Napoleons Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It
(Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company,2007).
5. For an interesting analysis of British expansion to Spanish America see Rafe Blaufarb, The
Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence, AHR 112, no. 3
( June, 2007):74263.
6. On the role of rumors and refugees from the Haitian Revolution in Cuba and Venezuela see respec-
tively Ada Ferrer, Freedoms Mirror:Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (NewYork:Cambridge
University Press, 2014); Cristina Soriano, Revolutionary Voices: The Presence of Visitors,
Fugitives and Prisoners from the French Caribbean in Venezuela (1789-1799), Storia e Futuro,
Rivista de Storia e Storiografia no. 30 (Nov., 2012). http://storiaefuturo.eu
7. On this see Blaufard, The Western Question.
8. Karen Racine, Francisco de Miranda:ATransatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution (Wilmington,
DE:SR Books, 2003),162.
9. Viscardo wrote the following to the British diplomat in Italy, John Udny, of September
1781 En este momento las gazetas nos anuncian que el jefe de la escuadra Johnstone
ha entrado en el ro de la Plata con 3 mil hombres de desembarco. No quepo en m de
alegra al ver a los Ingleses en posesin del sitio ms importante, por el cual solamente los
espaoles podan atacar el Per con alguna esperanza de buen xito. Este acontecimiento
nos revela la conducta prvida de los ministros muy avisados de Gran Bretaa. Juan Pablo
Viscardo y Guzmn. Obra completa (Lima:Biblioteca Clsicos del Per 4, 1988), 14. See
also, Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmns Letter to the Spanish Americans as it was published
in William Walton, Present State of the Spanish Colonies (London:Longman, Hurst, Rees,
Orme, and Brown, 1810) Vol. II:Appendix D, 1011, 1819. And Juan Pablo Viscardo y
Guzman, Letter to the Spanish Americans:Afacsimile of the second English edition (London,
1810), ed. David Brading (Providence, Rhode Island: The John Carter Brown Library,
2002),9.
10. For an analysis of the British role in the military organization of Spain against the Napoleonic
forces see Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan,2003).

11. Charles J. Esdaile, The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1988), chapter 1 and The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the
Spanish Army, 1812-1814 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990). On free trade debates
see chapter three of Patricia H. Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy: Viceroys, merchants,
and the Military in Latin Colonial Peru (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press,2007).
12. Abascal to Jovellanos. Lima, 14-3-1810. AGI, Diversos 1, 1810, Ramo2.
13. Among the main supporters of this interpretation are Jaime Rodrguez O.and Brian Hamnett.
See respectively The Independence of Spanish America and Process and Pattern: A Re-
Examination of the Ibero-American Independent Movements, 1808-1826. See also Jeremy
Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution.
14. The object of Spanish rage in this period is the subject of a controversy. Richard Herr defended
the idea that despite political alliances, France was Spains arch enemy. See Richard Herr,
Good, Evil, and Spains Rising against Napoleon, Ideas in History:Essays Presented to Louis
Gottschalk by his Former Students eds. Richard Herr and Harold T. Parker (Durham:Duke
University Press, 1965), 15781.
15. Cayo hermanos mios la gran torre de Babilon, cayo el Lucifer de Espaa, y de ser el angel mas
vello, lo bemos convertido en el mas avominable demonio:cayo el marido de 20 mugeres, la
una dada por la ley, la otra por el Rey, y las demas, sin Dios, ni ley, y por decirlo todo cayo el
Principe de la paz; y para dar gracias a tan divino favor, llegad hermanos mios a los pies de
este divino Seor. Pasaje chistoso acaesido entre los estudiantes de Sevilla, AAL, PI, 24:4.
See also Centinela contra Franceses. Parte Segunda. Por D.Antonio de Capmany (Lima:En la
Imprenta de Nios Expsitos,1809).
16. Sentimientos de un americano espaol dirigidos sus compatriotas (Lima:En la Casa Real de los
Expsitos,1808).
17. Herr, Good,Evil.
18. Proclama a los Espaoles Americanos. Los Espaoles de Europa (Valencia: Por la Viuda de
Agustn Laborda,1808).
19. Relacion del primer sitio de Zaragoza, del 14 de junio al 15 de agosto de 1808 publicada en Londres
por M.Pelletier, y traducida por el editor de la Minerva Peruana (Lima:En la Real Imprenta de
Ninos Expositos,1810).
20. Cargos que el tribunal de la razon de Espaa hace al emperador de los franceses (Reimpreso en
Buenos Aires, en la Imprenta de Nios Expsitos,1809).
21. E. Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1967); Charles J.Esdaile, The Spanish Army; Francisco Andjar Castillo,
Los militares en la Espaa del siglo XVIII. Un estudio social (Granada: Universidad de
Granada,1991).
22. On this see Charles J.Esdaile, The Spanish Army and his The Duke of Wellington, chapter2.
23. Raymond Carr is still an exception. See Carr, Spain 1808-1939, 10515. Also Guillermo
Cspedes del Castillo, Amrica Hispnica (1492-1898) (Madrid:Labor, 1983), chapter XII
and Francisco Andjar Castillo, Los militares en la Espaa del siglo XVIII. Un estudio social
(Granada:Universidad de Granada,1991).
24. Esdaile, The Duke of Wellington,51.
25. Carr, Spain 1808-1939, 86115. Esdaile contends that British forces should be credited
for winning the Peninsular War. See Charles J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War:ANew History
(NewYork:Palgrave Macmillan,2003).
26. See Hamnett, Process and Pattern; Rodrguez O., The Independence of Spanish America;
Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution; Chust Calero (ed.), La eclosin juntera. Also Franois-
Xavier Guerra, Modernidad e independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispnicas
(Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992); Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamrica); Inventando
la nacin: Iberoamrica siglo XIX, ed. Antonio Annino and Franois- Xavier Guerra
(Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 2003); Gabriella Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y
representacin en el Per, 1808-1860: Los itinerarios de la soberana (Lima: Fondo Editorial
UNMSM, SEPS, ONPE,2005).
27. Carr, Spain 1808-1939,80.

28. See the correspondence between Jovellanos and Lord Holland about the Cortes. Gaspar
Melchor de Jovellanos, Obras completas, vol. 5 (Oviedo:Centro de Estudios. Ayuntamiento
de Gijn, 1985). Also Herr, The Eighteeenth Century, 34143.
29. On the military and conservative domination of the Regencia see Esdaile, The Peninsular War,
chapter8. E. Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854 (London:Oxford
30. On the secret and restrictive nature of politics in pre-revolutionary France see Darnton, An
Early Information Society and The Devil in the HolyWater.
31. See Londres y el liberalismo hispnico, ed. Daniel Muoz Sempere and Gregorio Alonso
Garca (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2011). Also Mara Teresa Berrueza Len, La lucha de
Hispanoamrica por su independencia en Inglaterra, 1800-1830 (Madrid:Ediciones de Cultura
Hispnica,1989).
32. See Richard Hocquellet, La publicidad de la Junta Central Espaola, Los espacios pblicos en
Iberoamrica, 14067.
33. La Junta Suprema del Reyno la nacion espaola (Reimpresa en Lima en la imprenta de los
Hurfanos,1809).
34. The following proclamations are filled with statements of this kind. Para que en los Dominios
de Indias se tengan entendidos, guarden y cumplan los Reales Decretos insertos en que
V.M.ha tenido bien crear el Consejo Supremo de Espaa e Indias. Palacio del Alczar de
Sevilla, set. 1809. Archivo Arzobispal de Lima (hereafter AAL), Papeles importantes 17:18.
See also the proclamation of Seville 10-5-1809. Ibid,17:19.
35. On the huge amount of Mexican loans and donations to the Peninsula see Marichal,
Bankruptcy of Empire, 21420. For Peru see Alfonso W. Quiroz, Deudas olvidadas: instru-
mentos de crdito en la economa colonial peruana, 1750-1820 (Lima:Pontificia Universidad
Catlica del Per, Fondo Editorial, 1993), 14548.
36. Sentimientos de un americano espaol dirigidos sus compatriotas (Lima:En la Casa Real de los
Expsitos, 1808). See Viceroy Fernando de Abascals proclamations of 1808 and 1809 calling
for donativos. For example the text issued in Lima, 10-10-1808. The Minerva peruana used to
publish detailed lists of peruvians donating to Spain. See the issue # 48, 28-10-1808.
37. Proclama a los Espaoles Americanos. Los Espaoles de Europa (Valencia: Por la Viuda de
Agustn Laborda,1808).
38. Respuesta de los espaoles americanos a la proclama que les han dirigido los nobles sevillanos
(Sevilla:En la Imprenta de Hidalgo,1809).
39. Dilogo entre Atahualpa y Fernando VII, en los Campos Elseos en 10 fojas. BNP, D12191.
40. Publicista was defined for the first time in the 1817 dictionary Academia usual of the Real
Academia de la Lengua as: El autor que escribe del derecho pblico el muy versado en
esta ciencia. Juris publici scriptor. Likewise, the first definition for periodista came up in the
1822 dictionary Academia usual and read as follows:Compositor, autor editor de algun
peridico. As stated earlier, dictionaries tend to be conservative and include definitions once
a term has been widely used. Real Academia Espaola, Banco de datos [CREA], Corpus de refer-
encia del espaol actual. The Real Academias dictionary of usage also registers the appearance
of these terms in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Real Academia Espaola:Banco
de datos [CORDE], Corpus diacrnico del espaol. http://www.rae.es.
41. El Redactor General de Cdiz, 19-8-1811.
42. Coro:De los periodistas,/libranos Seor, Alos que tenemos/turbio el Corazon Alos que
hemos hecho/un sendo bolson,/robando vilmente / nuestra nacion/ Alos que de gra-
dos /Nos lleno el favor /Por ricos en vicios /pobres en valor Artculo comunicado A
los periodistas, El Redactor General de Cdiz, 17-8-1811.
43. El Redactor General de Cdiz, 24-8-1811.\
44. El Espaol Libre, 26-7-1813.
45. For an analysis of the origins of the terms liberal and servil see Mara Teresa Garca Godoy,
Las Cortes de Cdiz y Amrica. El primer vocabulario liberal espaol y mejicano (1810-1814)
(Sevilla:Diputacin de Sevilla, 1998), 27187. According to her and Juan Marichal, liberal
was a term used in the Middle Ages to refer to the liberal arts in contrast to the artes mecni-
cas or serviles and therefore it became later associated with men of letters. For a good attempt

at categorizing these two political groups see Brian R. Hamnett, Constitutional Theory and
Political Reality:Liberalism, Traditionalism and Spanish Cortes, 1810814, The Journal of
Modern History 49, no.1 (March, 1977):D.1071-D.1110. In the dictionaries of 1817 and 1822
the definition of servil accepted by the Real Academia was the following:Lo que pertenece
es propio de los siervos y criados. Servilis Bajo, humilde y de poca estimacin. Se dice
tambien de las cosas del nimo. See http://buscon.rae.es.
46. El Conciso, 22-10-1810. Each political group produced its own newspaper and some circulated
widely. Even the British sponsored newspapers to support the actions of Lord Wellington in
the Peninsula. See, for example, Los ingleses en Espaa dedicated several issues to praise Lord
Wellington in1813.
47. El Voto de la Nacin Espaola, 13-12-1809. Among the many Liberal newspapers of the time
were El Espectador, El Semanario Patritico, and El Conciso.
48. See the introduction to Manuel Gmez Imaz, Los peridicos durante la Guerra de la independen-
cia (1808-1814) (Madrid:Tipografa de la Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos,1910).
49. Volandero most probably alluded to the person in charge of distributing leaflets or hojas
volantes.
50. El Redactor General de Cdiz, 3-9-1811.
51. El Conciso, 8-5-1813.
52. From Mara Teresa Garca Godoy, Las Cortes de Cdiz y Amrica,275.
53. Rolena Adorno, The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative (New Haven,
CT:Yale University Press,2007).
54. See El Espectador Sevillano, 25-10-1809. Lista was part of a group of men of letters who ini-
tially supported French rule in Spain for which they were called pejoratively afrancesados.
55. See for example El Espectador Sevillano, 25-10-1809 and 9-11-1809. El Espaol, 30-4-1810.
56. El Espectador Sevillano, 9-11-1809. See also the issue of 29-10-1809.
57. Vicente Llorns, Sobre la aparicin de liberal, Nueva Revista de Filologa Hispnica 12, no. 1
(1958):5358.
58. Vastly read, praised, and condemned in his time, Blanco was almost forgotten during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. The increasing interest in Spanish liberalism of recent times
has revived this character. Lately, there has been a big effort to publish and propagate the works
of Blanco. A digital version of El Espaol can now be accessed at the portal of the Hemeroteca
of the Biblioteca Nacional de Espaa. For reprinted works, many of which exist in electronic
format, see Cartas de Juan Sintierra: Crtica a las Cortes de Cdiz (Barcelona: Linkgua, 2011);
Jos Mara Blanco White, Epistolario y documentos: Textos reunidos por Andr Pons. Edicin
de Martin Murphy (Oviedo: Instituto Feijo de Estudios del Siglo XVII, Universidad de
Oviedo, 2010); Artculos de crtica e historia liberaria, edicin, introduccin y notas de Fernando
Durn Lpez (Seville: Fundacin Jos Manuela Lara, 2010); Juan Goytisolo, Blanco White,
El Espaol y la independencia de Hispanoamrica (Madrid: Taurus, 2010); Obra completa de
Jos Blanco White, ed. A. Garnica et al. Vol.1: Semanario Patritico, Vol 2: El Espaol, n13
(Granada: Editorial Almed, 2005); Cartas de Espaa. Traduccin de Antonio Garnica (Seville:
Fundacin Jos Manuel Lara, 2004); Bosquejo del comercio de esclavos. Edicin de Manuel
Moreno Alonso (Seville: Ediciones Alfar, 1999); Autobiografa de Blanco-White: edicin, tra-
duccin y notas de Antonio Garnica (Seville: Publicaciones de la Universidad, 1988).
On the life of Blanco White see his autobiography, Joseph Blanco White, The Life of the Rev.
Joseph Blanco White, Written by Himself; With Portions of his Correspondence, ed. John Hamilton
Thom. (London:J. Chapman, 1845). For an excellent biography see Martin Murphy, Blanco
White:Self-Banished Spaniard (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1989).
59. On the importance of Quintanas tertulia see Antonio Alcal Galiano, Recuerdos de un anci-
ano (Madrid:L. Navarro, 1878), 56, 8788; Alberto Drozier, Quintana y el nacimiento del
liberalismo en Espaa (Madrid:Turner, D.L., 1978). See also Vicente Llrens, Jovellanos y
Blanco:En torno al Semanario Patritico de 1809, Nueva Revista de Filologa Hispnica 15,
no. 12 ( Jan.Jun. 1961):26278.
60. In 1808 Blanco was appointed tutor of the youngest Spanish infante or prince. The Life of the
Rev. Joseph Blanco White, Written by Himself, vol. 1,137.
61. Llrens, Jovellanos y Blanco.

62. The Life of the Reverend Joseph Blanco White, vol. 1, 147. On this topic see the analysis of
Antonio Garnica y Raquel Rico Linage en su introduccin a la Obra completa de Jos Blanco
White, ed. A.Garnica, etal. Vol.1:Semanario Patritico.
63. These articles have been compiled in Obra completa de Jos Blanco White, 1.Peridicos politi-
cos:Semanario Patritico (Seville, 1809), eds. Antonio Garnica Silva and Raquel Rico Linage
(Granada:Editorial Almed,2005).
64. The Life of the Reverend, vol. 1, 14850. On this see also Llrens, Jovellanos y Blanco.
65. The Life of the Reverend, vol. 1, 15559.
66. The Life of the Reverend, vol. 1, 180. On this see also Antonio Garnica, Presentacin de los tres
primeros nmeros de El Espaol, Obra completa de Jos Blanco White, ed. A.Garnica etal., Vol.
2, ixx xxiv.
67. See Antonio Garnicas introduction to Jos Blanco White. Cartas de Espaa. Traduccin, intro-
duccin y notas de Antonio Garnica (Sevilla:Fundacin Jos Manuel Lara, Clsicos Andaluces,
2004), XIVXIX. For a more extended biographical analysis on Blanco White see Martin
Murphy, Blanco White:Self-Banished Spaniard (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1989)
and Autobiografa de Blanco White, 205. Blanco White wrote also reports for the British crown
on the insurrection of Spanish America, which show his privileged access to information. For
example, A Sketch of the State of the Insurrection in South America according to the Most
Recent Drawn in August 1813. London, 14-8-1813. PRO, F.O. 72/154.
68. Garnica, Presentacin de los tres primeros nmeros See also Garnica, Blanco
White, un periodista exiliado: El Espaol de Londres, Blanco White, el rebelde ilustrado,
Antonio Cascales Ramos (coord.) (Seville: Fundacin Centro de Estudios Andaluces,
2009),3951.
69. La Real Orden deca as:Excmo. Seor:Cortes y Blanco, dos Espaoles de mala intencion
complicado el primero en la causa del alboroto del dia de San Blas y eterno adulador de Don
Manuel Godoy se han refugiado Londres en donde pasan el tiempo publicando, dos period-
icos conocidos con el nombre del Colombiano y el Espaol como en estos impresos se habla
de la Peninsula y que maliciosamente se vierten especies subversivas de todo buen orden y
de aquella union que sola nos puede salvar:ha dispuesto S.M.se prohiva en esas Provincias
la libre circulacin de ambos periodicos y conformandose con esta soberana resolucion dis-
ponga lo conveniente a su cumplimientos Cadiz, 19 de agosto de 1810. Lima, 17-11-
1811. Seccin Miscelnea, 0005, Archivo General de la Nacin, Lima,Per.
70. On the role of compromise in Blanco see Pons, Blanco White y Amrica, chapters1and2.
71. On British influences see Joaqun Varela Suanzes, Un precursor de la monarqua parla-
mentaria:Blanco-W hite y El Espaol (1810-1814), Revista de Estudios Polticos no. 79
( JanuaryMarch 1993):10120.
72. On Blancos liberalism and his position on America see Roberto Brea, Jos Mara Blanco
White y la independencia de Amrica:una postura pro-Americana? Historia Constitutional
3 (2002):117 and my own Jos Mara Blanco White:Contra la Junta y las Cortes y por
Amrica, Voces americanas en las Cortes de Cdiz:1810-1814 (Lima:Pontificia Universidad
Catlica del Per, Fondo Editorial and Instituto Francs de Estudios Andinos, 2014):37186.
73. Reflexiones generales sobre la revolucin espaola, El Espaol, prospecto, 30-4-1812, 12. In
his autobiography, Blanco White stated that the junta faced two major problems:it was ruled
mostly by merchants, and it opposed the Duque of Albuquerque, who was the best Spanish
military officer. See Autobiografa de Blanco White,192.
74. Reflexiones generales sobre la revolucin espaola, El Espaol, prospecto, 30-4-1812,22.
75. Reflexiones generales sobre la revolucin espaola, El Espaol, prospecto, 30-4-1812,21.
76. The Life of the Reverend Joseph Blanco White, vol. 1,207.
77. Lord Holland warned Blanco about the need to be specific in his writings:When any thing
therefore is done wrong it is not the Spanish nation but the regency, it is not the Cortes but
the ruling faction in them. Ihear nothing from Cadiz but believe they are going on very ill.
Lord Holland to Blanco White. 17-9-1811. BL, Add. Mss 61645. Their correspondence has
been translated and reproduced in Blanco White, Epistolario y documentos.
78. Blanco White to Lady and Lord Holland. London, 25-10-1810. BL, Add. Mss61645.
79. Blanco White to Lord Holland, 10-7-1810. BL, Add. Mss61645.

80. On the restrictions to castas see Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Ciudadana y etnicidad
en las Cortes de Cdiz, Elecciones no. 1 (2002): 16585 and Poblacin y sociedad,
Per: crisis imperial e independencia, ed. Carlos Contreras and Scarlett OPhelan Godoy
(Madrid:Fundacin Mapfre and Santillana Ediciones Generales, 2013):20557.
81. El Espaol, 30-10-1811.
82. Proposicion extraviada en la sorpresa del 26 de octubre, algun seor diputado del augusto
congreso nacional sobre el modo de impedir la degeneracion fsica de los espaoles castizos. UN
HIJO DE MADRID que tuvo este venturoso hallazgo lo presenta liberalmente AL PUEBLO
SOBERANO (Cdiz:Imprenta de la Junta Superior,1811).
83. El Espaol, 30-1-1813.
84. El Espaol, 30-1-1813.
85. El Espaol, 30-10-1811.
86. Qu es lo que ms importa a la Espaa? Discurso de un miembro del populacho (En Cadiz; en
la Imprenta de la Ciudad de D.Manuel Comes,1808).
87. Extract from a newspaper of La Corua. El Conciso, 25-11-1811.
88. El Espaol, 30-10-1811.
89. El Espaol, 30-2-1812.
90. El Espaol, 30-2-1812.
91. El Espaol, 30-2-1812.
92. El Espaol, 30-12-1811.
93. See Joaqun Varela Suanzes-Carpegnas introduction entitled Retrato de un liberal de
izquierda to his book Alvaro Flrez Estrada (1766-1853): poltica, economa, sociedad
(Oviedo:Junta General del Principado de Asturias,2004.
94. Alvaro Flrez Estrada, Examen imparcial de las disenciones de la Amrica con la Espaa de los
medios de su reconciliacin y de la prosperidad de todas las naciones, 2nd. ed. (Cdiz, 1812),10.
95. Flrez Estrada, Examen imparcial, 89 and24.
96. Flrez Estrada, Examen imparcial,56.
97. For a vivid description of the adventures of gaditanos in the assembly see Benito Prez
Galds, Cdiz. Episodios Nacionales 8 (Madrid: El Libro de Bolsillo, Alianza Editorial,
1990).
98. Vicente Morales Durez to Francisco Moreyra y Matute. Isla de Len, 28-9-1810. CDIP 4, vol.2,1.
99. There are numerous works on this topic with the bicentennial celebrations of the
Constitution. For a few examples, see Chust Calero, La tribuna revolucionaria; Manuel Chust
(ed.), 1812:el poder de la palabra. See also Mara Teresa Garca Godoy, Las Cortes de Cdiz
y Amrica:el primer vocabulario liberal espaol y mejicano (1810-1814) (Sevilla:Diputacin
Provincial de Sevilla, 1998); Marie Laure Rieu-Milln, Los diputados americanos en las
Cortes de Cdiz: igualdad o independencia (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientficas,1990).
100. Diario de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias, vol. 2, # 97, 8-1-1811. http://www.cervan-
tesvirtual.com/
101. Diario de las Cortes Generales, vol. 2, # 192, 26-1-1811.
102. Diario de las Cortes Generales, vol. 2, # 312, 11-8-1811,1621.
103. Diario de las Cortes Generales, vol. 2, # 398, 4-11-1811,2211.
104. Diario de las Cortes Generales, # 464, 10-1-1812, 2595-6.
105. Diario de las Cortes Generales, 16-1-1812, # 470, 2631-9.
106. It is interesting to see how some Spanish men of letters discussed the text of the constitu-
tion with some British politicians, in particular with Lord Holland. The correspondence of
Lord Holland kept in the British library is revealing. For example. Copy of a letter to Don
Andrs de la Vega. Holland House, 12-10-1812. BL, Add. Mss 51626, N. 71. Also the cor-
respondence between Jovellanos and Lord Holland about the Cortes. Gaspar Melchor de
Jovellanos, Obras completas, vol. 5.
107. El Espaol, 30-11-1811.
108. El Espaol, June 1813, 41920.
109. Blanco White to Lord Holland, Nov., 1810. BL, Add. Mss61645.
110. Respuesta de los espaoles americanos.

111. El Espaol, no.14, 30-5-1811,145.

112. El Espaol, no.14, 30-5-1811,146.
113. On Blanco and Miers exchange see Pons, Blanco White y Amrica, cap.3. Miers texts have
been published in Servando Teresa de Mier, Cartas de un Americano, 1811-1812:prlogo,
seleccin y notas de Manuel Calvillo (Mxico: Secretara de Educacin Pblica, 1987).
On liberal migrs in London see Londres y el liberalismo hispnico, ed. Daniel Muoz
Sempere y Gregorio Alonso Garca (Madrid:Iberoamericana, Vervuert, 2011) and Vicente
Llrens, Liberales y romnticos. Una emigracin espaola en Inglaterra (1823-1824). 2d ed.
(Madrid:Editorial Castalia,1968).
114. Carta de un americano a El Espaol sobre su nmero XIX. Londres, 1811, Cartas de un
Americano.
115. Segunda carta de un Americano a El Espaol sobre su nmero XIX. Contestacin a su
respuesta dada en el nmero XXIV, Londres, 16 de mayo de 1812, Cartas de un Americano,
21516.
116. Contextacion:A la segunda Carta de un Americano al Espaol en Londres, El Espaol, no.28,
30-8-1812.
117. On the role of autonomy in Blancos understanding of independence see Portillo, Crisis
atlntica, 18790.
118. Contextacion:A la segunda Carta, 28183.
119. El Espaol, 20-4-1813.
Chapter6
1. Abascal served in expeditions to Puerto Rico, Algiers in 1775, Sacramento in 1776, and
Jamaica. He was commissioned to guard Santiago from contraband. He then served in
Catalua and in Havana from 1796 to 1799. He was appointed president of Guadalajara
in New Galicia, where after an Indian upheaval he undertook a program of public works.
He was then promoted to the viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1805. See his hoja de servi-
cios in Archivo General Militar de Segovia (AGMS): AG 1a. Seccin. Personal, A-59. See
also Brian Hamnett, El virrey Abascal y sus cinco homlogos novohispanos, 1806-1816:
Un estudio comparativo,Abascal y la contraindependencia de Amrica del Sur, eds. Scarlett
OPhelan Godoy and Georges Lomn (Lima: Fondo Editorial, PUCP, IFEA, 2013), 1951.
2. In recent years, the debates on the liberal era of Cadiz have led historians to pay renewed
attention to this influential character in the history of Peru and South America. Most
studies of Abascal have focused on what he avoided (e.g., the implementation of Spains
liberal decrees, the formation of a junta, and the spread of liberalism in the region). See
James L. Odom Viceroy Abascal versus the Cortes of Cadiz (Ph.D. diss., University of
Georgia, 1968); Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru (Lincoln and
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979); Brian Hamnett, Revolucin y contrarrevo-
lucin en Mxico y el Per:liberalismo, realeza y separatismo (1800-1824) (Mxico:Fondo
de Cultura Econmica, 1978); Vctor Peralta Ruiz, En defensa de la autoridad: poltica y
cultura bajo el gobierno del virrey Abascal:Per, 1806-1816 (Madrid:Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientficas, 2003). The following books address the military organization
established by the viceroy, Fernando Daz Venteo, Las campaas militares del virrey Abascal
(Seville:Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1948) and Julio Mario Luqui Lagleyze,
El ejrcito realista en la Guerra de la Independencia. Estudio orgnico y sociolgico del Ejrcito
Real (Buenos Aires: Instituto Nacional Sanmartiniano, 1995). About the need to study
the military aspects of Abascals rule see Brian Hamnett, La poltica contrarrevoluciona-
ria del virrey Abascal:Per, 1806-1816, Las guerras de independencia en la Amrica espa-
ola, eds. Marta Tern, Jos Antonio Serrano Ortega, (Mxico:El Colegio de Michoacn,
Universidad Michoacana de San Nicols de Hidalgo, Instituto Nacional de Antropologa e
Historia, 2002), 18392. For recent works on Abascal see Abascal y la contraindependencia;
Juan Ignacio Vargas Ezquerra, Un hombre contra un continente:Jos Fernando de Abascal, rey
de Amrica (1806-1816) (Astorga, Spain:Editorial Akrn, 2010). For new laudatory works
see Juan Antonio Vargas Ezquerra, Un hombre contra un continente:Jos Fernando de Abascal,
rey de Amrica (1806-1816) (Astorga, Spain:Editorial Akrn,2010).

3. See Minutas de oficio de Jose Fernando de Abascal 1804. AGI, Diversos 1, 1804810.
4. Copia del papel en que hemos empeado nuestra palabra de honor. Todos los oficiales que
servimos al Rey de Espaa y firmamos avajo apresados el 22 de febrero de 1805 por la fragata
de S.M. B. 1805. AGI, Diversos 1, 1804805, Ramo1.
5. Abascals personal archive includes the exchanges in this respect between Santiago de Liniers
and former Viceroy of Ro de la Plata, Rafael de Sobremonte. AGI, Diversos 1, 1804805,
Ramo2.
6. Declaration of general Whitelocke in his headquarters of Retiro in Buenos Aires, 2-7-1807.
AGI, Diversos 1, 1804-1805, Ramo1.
7. Minutas de cartas u oficios de Abascal sin direccin sobre plan de defensa de Lima. AGI,
Diversos 1, 1804-1805, Ramo2.
8. Socolow, The Bureaucrats of Buenos Aires, 910. On the power of Rio de la Plata elites,
Gabriel Paquette, State-Civil Society Cooperation and Conflict in the Spanish Empire:The
Intellectual and Political Activities of the Ultramarine Consulados and Economic Societies,
c.1780-1810, Journal of Latin American Studies 39, no. 2 (2007):26398. On the key role
of trading networks in the area see Fabrcio Prado, Edge of Empire: Atlantic Networks and
Revolution in Bourbon Rio de la Plata (Oakland:University of California Press,2015).
9. See Ricketts, Spanish American Napoleons.
10. See Rodrguez O., The Independence of Spanish America,56.
11. Liniers was born in France, studied at the Escuela de Guardias Marinas de Cdiz to become a
navy officer, fought in the Mediterranean and in Northern Africa, formed part of a scientific
expedition to South America, and was commissioned to command the naval station of Ro de
la Plata. In 1802 he was appointed governor of Misiones. See Exequiel Csar Ortega, Santiago
de Liniers:un hombre del antiguo rgimen (Buenos Aires:Universidad Nacional de la Plata,
Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educacin,1946).
12. Viceroy Santiago de Liniers to Viceroy Fernando de Abascal. Buenos Aires, 26-5-1807. AGI,
Diversos 1 a, 1804-1810.
13. Gabriel di Meglio, Vaivenes polticos y participacin popular en tierras riopatenses durnate
la dcada de Abascal, 1806-1816, Abascal y la contra-independencia, 36588.
14. In his correspondence with the Junta de Sevilla of 1808, Viceroy Abascal expressed his con-
cerns in communicating that the news and newspapers from Buenos Aires were arriving first
to Cuzco and only later to Lima. See AGI, Lima 736, 1807-1808,N.97.
15. See Brian Hamnetts pioneering work, La poltica contrarrevolucionaria.
16. Carlos Malamud, La consolidacin de una familia de la oligarqua arequipea: los
Goyeneche, Quinto Centenario 4 (1982): 49135. For archival information on the familys
business see AG, legajos 12, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31.
17. Goyeneches final report of 1805 deserves attention, for it illuminates his future decisions as
head of the Royal Army of Alto Peru. The text praised the Prussian and Austrian forces, which
were presented as exemplary, exceeding the French in instruction and discipline though
sometimes committing dishonorable acts. It also highlighted the Austrian Armys relative
lack of massive light infantry forces in comparison with the French Army, but explained that
this enabled the Austrian Army to move quickly and attack by surprise. The report claimed
that Bonaparte was aware of the superiority of Austrian forces in open battles, where tactics
and organization were crucial. Additionally, the text praised the military exercises conducted
by Napoleons troopsthey practiced maneuvers and tactics while his officers put together
military libraries and sessions in their homes to communicate the luces and knowledge of
classic authors in these matters Madrid, Borrador de la Memoria presentada por el Capitan
de Granaderos D.Jos Manuel de Goyeneche acerca de su viaje por Europa. 11 de mayo.
Archivo del Conde de Guaqui (ACG), caja 2, carpeta 7, N.2. Segovia,Spain.
18. Jos Mariano de Cosso informed Juan de Goyeneche about his sons whereabouts.
Montevideo, 20-7-1808. AG, Leg. 26. Documentacin particular, 18051809.
19. Governor of Montevideo, Xavier Elo, reported to the Crown on the suspicions against
Goyeneche. AHN, Estado 56, A. On the power of the cabildo and consulado see Gabriel
Paquette, State-Civil Society Cooperation.
20. Di Meglio, Vaivenes polticos, 368. On the upheavals in Buenos Aires see his Viva
el bajo pueblo! La plebe urbana de Buenos Aires y la poltica entre la Revolucin de Mayo y

el rosismo (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2006); Noem Goldman, El pueblo quiere
saber de qu se trata! Historia oculta de la Revolucin de Mayo (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Sudamericana,2009).
21. Rodrguez O., The Independence of Spanish America, 65. On Charcas see Mara Luisa Soux,
El complejo proceso hacia la independencia de Charcas (1808-1826): Guerra, ciudadana,
conflictos locales y participacin indgenea en Oruro (La Paz: IFEA, Plural editores, ASDI,
IEB,2010).
22. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, El mito de la independencia concedida: Los programas polticos
del siglo XVIII y del temprano XIX en el Per y Alto Per (1730-1814), La independencia
del Per Concedida, conseguida, concebida?, eds. Carlos Contreras and Luis Miguel Glave
(Lima:Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2015):20945.
23. Relacin del virrey de Buenos Aires sobre la conducta de la Real Audiencia, junio de 1809.
AGN, Moreyra, D.1. 91-2096.
24. Abascal, Memoria de gobierno, vol. 2,3743.
25. For explanations on the importance of regionalism to understand the upheavals in La Paz
see OPhelan Godoy, El mito and John Fisher, Etnicidad, insurgencia y sociedad en los
Andes:el acaso curioso del Per, c.1750-1840, Revista Andina 38, ( JanuaryJune 2004),
6585. On Charcas see Mara Luis Soux, El complejo proceso hacia la independencia de Charcas
(1808-1826):Guerra, ciudadana, conflictos locales y participacin indgena en Oruro (La Paz
and Lima:Plural Editores, Instituto Francs de Estudios Andinos,2010).
26. Jaime E. Rodrguez O., El virrey Abascal y el reino de Quito, Abascal y la contraindependen-
cia, 469502; Rossana Barragn Romano, La Tea de la Revolucin: la construccin poltica
del enemigo en Charcas en 1809-1810, Abascal y la contraindependencia, 22770.
27. Abascal, Memoria, vol. 2,4549.
28. Relacion imparcial de los acaecimientos de la Ciudad de La Paz, en la noche del 16 de Julio
de 1809 y dias sucesivos. AHN, Consejos 13150. And Minuta de oficio de Abascal a
sobre sucesos de Quito. Lima, 25-12-1809. AGI, Diversos 1, 1804-1810.
29. Rodrguez O., El virrey Abascal y el reino de Quito, Abascal y la contraindependencia,475.
30. Rodrguez O., The Independence of Spanish America, 68-9 and138.
31. On the failure of creating a junta in Cuba see Sergio Guerra Vilaboy, Las Cortes de Cdiz
y la constitucin gaditana de 1812 en Cuba, Investigacin & Desarrollo 21, no. 2 ( Jul.-Dec.,
2013):47993.
32. Fue preciso crearlo todo, y construir quanto era anezo las armas para transformar esa
colubie [sic] De rudos Paisanos, en hombres militares. Oficio y parte dado al Rey nro. Sr.
Fernando 7 en su Soberana Junta de Espaa Yndias por las dos Vias de Buenos Ayres y
Cartagena en 14 de Noviembre de 1809. ACG, caja 1.c. 4,n.29.
33. In a confidential report to Abascal, the interim president of Cuzco, Pedro Antonio de
Cernadas, praised Goyenches army of Desaguadero and claimed that the general himself
funded it. Goyeneche to the Marquis de las Hormazas In Spain Sobre la necesidad de
organizar un sistema de premios. Que ha cumplido con sus intenciones de intentar orga-
nizar esto. Cuzco, 8-10-1810. AGI, Estado 54, N.36, 1 y 1 bis. Relatives and friends from
the Goyeneche family, such as Domingo and Po Tristn and Mariano de Cosso, occupied
the highest posts. Like Goyeneche, they had received a professional military education
inSpain.
34. Cartas de Goyeneche a Abascal. Potos, 9-12-1812. AGI, Diversos 2, Ramo 1, n2. Abascal
a las Cortes, comunica conducta sospechosa de Domingo Tristan. Lima, 30-12-1813. AGI,
Diversos 3, 1813, Doc. 36 and Cartas del marques de Valde-Hoyos a Abascal. La Paz.
31-8-1813.
35. Goyeneche to the Marquis de las Hormazas In Spain Sobre la necesidad de organizar un
sistema de premios. Que ha cumpido con sus intenciones de intentar organizar esto. Cuzco,
8-10-1810. AGI, Estado 54, N.36, 1 y1bis.
36. Guerra de la America del Sur. Narracion Historica de la Guerra Ynsurreccional de la America
del Sur y de sus Operaciones Militares. Francisco Javier de Mendizabal, Director Subinspector
del Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros. 1824, SHM, FG 2-1-7-12.
37. Carta de Fernando Maria Abascal sobre noticias llegadas de America y sobre sucesos de
Castilla y Asturias. Aviles. 5-3-1813, AGI, Diversos3.

38. En 30 de Diziempre se paso al Exmo Sr. D.Antonio Coronel el parte siguiente. ACG, Caja
1.C. 4,n.75.
39. Oficio y parte dado al Rey nro. Sr. Fernando 7. ACG, caja 1.c. 4,n.29.
40. In his report to the crown about the events of La Paz, Goyeneche requested recompensas
for all his officers. ACG, caja 1.c. 4, n.29. The correspondence of his father clearly reveals how
many in this officer corps formed part of his familiar network. AG, Leg. 26. Documentacin
particular, 1805-1809.
41. Testimonio del gobernador intendente de Puno y comandante militar. Que lo han acusado
de haber traido 4 baules de ropa del saqueo de La Paz. La Paz. Dic, 1814. AGN. Coleccin
Santa Mara,282.
42. Jos Fernando de Abascal, Memoria, vol 1, 36971.
43. Abascal declared in his Memoria that one of his main goals was to employ and care for the mestizos
in Peru. See Abascal, Memoria, vol. 1, 67. See also Mnica Ricketts, The Rise of the Bourbon
Military in Peru, 17681820, Colonial Latin American Review 22, vol. 3 (2012): 413439.
44. Jos Fernando de Abascal, Memoria de gobierno. Edicin preparada por Vicente Rodrguez
Casado y Jos Antonio Quijano (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de la
Universidad de Sevilla, 1944, vol. 1, 35051.
45. Juan Marchena Fernndez, Oficiales y soldados, c hapter5 and see also The Social World of the
Military in Peru and New Granada.
46. Peralta, En defensa de la autoridad,110.
47. Abascal described his military success to his friend Aguirre as follows:El exercito de 6,500
que organiz en los limites de este virreynato, derrot completamente a 15 mil insurgentes del
de Buenos Ayres que contavan con sojuzgar todo el Pays que media asta el Ysmo de Panama;
de cuyas resultas se vendio a las armas del Rey la Ciudad y Provincia de la Paz:en virtud
de otra Vatalla en que fueron igualmente dirigidos 2 mil insurgentes cerca de Cochavamva.
Lima, 23-9-1811. AGI, Diversos Caja 3,N.1.
48. Oficio reservado del presidente interino de Cuzco, Pedro Antonio de Cernadas, adjuntando
otro oficio. Cuzco, 1811. AGI, Diversos 2 A, Doc.4.
49. David T.Garrett, Shadows of Empire,244.
50. El General Goyeneche da cuenta de la forma en que se ha organizado la Real Audiencia de
Chuquisaca, acompaando copia del Parte del General en Gefe del Exercito del Alto Peru
Don Jose Manuel de Goyeneche sobre el asunto. Lima, 4-12-1811. AGI, Charcas432.
51. On the conflicts between Abascal and Limas cabildo see Peralta, En defensa de la autoridad,
chapter3.
52. AGI, Lima 736, N.97e.
53. Quiroz, Deudas olvidadas, 14549.
54. In 1809 Abascal requested Goyeneches father to grant a loan that should not excede 5-6%
interest. AG, Documentacin particular, Leg. 12. 1763815
55. Quiroz, Deudas olvidadas, 147, 200. For a list on the main contributor to the state see pages,
187200.
56. Susy Snchez Rodrguez, El proceso econmico, in Per:crisis imperial e independencia, eds.
Carlos Contreras and Scarlett OPhelan Godoy (Madrid:Fundacin Mapfre/Taurus, 2013),
16264; Carlos Contreras, La transicin fiscal de la Colonia a la Repblica, La independencia
del Per:de los borbones a Bolvar (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per, Instituto
Riva Agero, 2001), 197235. Also Patricia H. Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy: Viceroys,
Merchants, and the Military in Late Colonial Peru (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2007), chapter3.
57. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, La independencia en los Andes:una historia conectada (Lima:Fondo
Editorial del Congreso del Per, 2014), 14155.
58. Copia de una carta del virrey de Lima con objeto de abrir una suscripcin para las tropas
del Empecinado. Cdiz, 31-7-1811. BNM, Mss 18665 (52). The rise of guerrillas in Spain in
the context of the Napoleonic Wars and its destabilizing effects on the political history of the
Peninsula has been the subject of much analysis in Spanish historiography. Unfortunately, this
historiography has not been connected to its Spanish American counterparts. See for example
A.M. Carr, Spain Rule by Generals, in Soldiers and Governments. Nine Studies in Civil-Military
Relations (London:Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957); Eric Christiansen, The Origins of Military

Power in Spain, 1800-1854 (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1967); Pierre Vilar, Hidalgos,
amotinados y guerrilleros. Pueblo y poderes en la historia de Espaa (Barcelona:Editorial Crtica,
1982). For more recent studies see Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: a New History
(London: Allen Lane, 2002) and Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in
Spain, 1808-1814 (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,2004).
59. The argument that Latin American caudillos were a sudden result of independence in places
with weak institutions has a long history that goes back to the framework of civilization vs.
barbarism used by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Facundo in 1845. This perspective sees
caudillos not as military officers but as big patrons of large territories and peoples and has
produced an enduring framework of analysis in the historiography of Latin America. One
of the most influential supporters of this framework has been John Lynch. See John Lynch
Bolvar and the Caudillos, and Caudillos in Spanish America 1800-1850 (Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1992). Although he studied the military, and his evidence shows the contrary, Leon
Campbell also argued the caudillos were a product of independence. See his The Military and
Society in Colonial Peru, 1750-1810.
60. Las siete partidas del Rey Don Alfonso el Sabio, cotejadas con varios codices antiguos por la Real
Academia de la Historia. Tomo segundo, partidas segunda y tercera. ww.cervantesvirtual.com
For the Spanish dictionaries see http://buscon.rae.es and for a corpus of documentation that
allows for specific searches see:http://corpus.rae.es/cordenet.html
61. Fiestas triunfales que consagr el 2 de agosto la Fidelsima Imperial Villa de Potos al invicto general
americano el Sr. Mariscal de Campo don Jos Manuel de Goyeneche. Les dirige y dedica al publico
el coronel de exercito D.Mariano Campero de Ugarte, gobernador intendente de la provincia de
Potos (Lima:Imprenta de los Hurfanos,1812).
62. Elogios academicos en latin, y en romance pronunciados en la real universidad real, y pontificia de
San Francisco Xavier de la ciudad de la Plata provincia de los Charcas en el Alto Peru el dia 22 de
julio de 1812 en honor del siempre glorioso, y nunca vencido general peruano El Sr. D.Jose Manuel
de Goyeneche (Lima:n.p.,1812). El Peruano, 31-12-1811 and 14-1-1812.
63. Fiestas triunfales.
64. El Peruano, 31-12-1811 and 14-1-1812.
65. Correspondence between Abascal and Goyeneche. 1815 AGI, Diversos 4 A, Doc.14.
66. Like Goyeneche, Belgrano was born into a wealthy family of merchants from Buenos Aires
and had been sent to school to the Spanish Peninsula. He studied law in Salamanca and
Valladolid. Memorias del General Guillermo Miller al Servicio de la Repblica del Per traducidas
al castellano por el general Torrijos. Reproduccin de la edicin de Londres 1829 (Madrid:Librera
General de Victoriano Surez, 1910). After becoming one of the leaders of the junta of Buenos
Aires in 1810 and commanding an army in Paraguay in 1811, he set his sights on defeating
Goyeneche, which he achieved in March 1813. Upon his return, Belgrano was appointed
a member of the merchants guild of Buenos Aires. He began his military career by enroll-
ing in the urban militia during the British attack of 1806. Manuel Belgrano, Autobiografa y
memorias sobre la expedicin al Paraguay y batalla de Tucumn (Buenos Aires:Emec Editores,
1942),28.
67. AGI, Diversos4a.
68. Abascal to Goyeneche. Dicember, 1812. AGI, Diversos 2, 1811-12, Doc.2.
69. Goyeneche to Abascal. Potos, 31-1-1813. AGI, Diversos 4 A, Doc. 14. See also Fernando
de Abascal to Jos Manuel de Goyeneche. December, 1812. Doc. 12. Ramo 1, n2. AGI,
Diversos 2, 1811-1812. For the agreements of the Junta de Guerra of Lima see Juntas de
guerra celebradas en esta capital en abril 1, 8 y 24 de Mayo 12 y 25 sobre las ocurrencias del
Alto Per despus de perdida la accin de Salta y el parte dado a la corte en abril 14 de idem.
Lima 1-4-1813. AGI, Diversos 6 bis,exp.5
70. The oidor and substitute president of the audiencia in Cuzco, Pedro Antonio de Cernadas con-
stantly sent Abascal letters and anonymous writings. Cuzco, 11-6-1811. AGI, Diversos 2 A,
R.1. See also Expediente seguido en virtud de unas cartas interceptadas de varios vecinos de
honor de esta ciudad. Ao 1809. AHN, Consejos 21342, N.39. On Abascals counterrevolu-
tionary policies see Brian Hamnett, Revolucin y contrarrevolucin en Mxico y elPer.
71. AGI, Diversos 1 A, R.1, D.1-14; Diversos 2A, R.3, D.12-13; Diversos 4 A1815, R.1, D.25,
54, 109,124.

72. El virrey del Per. Dice ha reencargado la mayor vigilancia con todos los que arriven los
Puertos de aquel distrito, especialmente en Buques Anglo Americanos, como se le previene
en Real Orden de 27-11-1811. Lima, 8-6-1812. AGI, Estado 74,N.5.
73. Abascal, Memoria de gobierno, vol. 1,432.
74. Ascensin Martnez Riaza, La Prensa doctrinal en la independencia del Per, 1811-1824
(Madrid:Ediciones Cultura Hispnica, Instituto de Cooperacin Iberoamericana, 1985), 76.
The Cosmgrafo Mayor was the scientist appointed by the state to assist governors in mat-
ters of climate, geography, cartography, etc. His salary was considered to be part of the mili-
tary expenses. Lizardo Seiner, La historia de la ciencia en el Per:meteorologa y sociedad,
siglos XVIII-XIX (Lima: Masters thesis, 2005), chapters 2 and 3. Paredes held the chair
of mathematics at the university of San Marcos in 1803 and wrote numerous essays on the
atmosphere and sea currents. He became a doctor in 1804 under the mentorship of Unnue.
He published several almanaques and was appointed as cosmgrafo in 1812. See Juan Antonio
Ribeyro, Galera Universitaria, Anales Universitarios del Per, vol. 3 (Lima: Imprenta de
La Epoca, por J.E.del Campo, 1862-1898),1116.
75. Martnez Riaza, La Prensa doctrinal en la independencia del Per, 1811-1824, 70. Unnue, Gua
poltica, XVI. Jos Arias-Schreiber, Hiplito Unnue. Los Idelogos, CDIP, 1, vol. 7.Part
four of this volume offers the rich correspondence that Unnue maintained with European
scientists.
76. Minerva Peruana, 21-1-1809.
77. Minerva Peruana, 28-1-1809. Even if this letter is fictional, it reproduces the editors critique
of censorship.
78. Abascal, Memoria de gobierno, vol. 1, 433. See also Ral Porras Barrenechea, El periodismo en
el Per (Lima:Instituto Ral Porras Barrenechea, 1970),13.
79. Minerva Peruana, 28-1-1809.
80. Todos los espaoles tienen libertad de escribir, imprimir y publicar sus ideas polticas, sin
necesidad de licencia, revisin o aprobacin alguna anterior a la publicacin, bajo las restriccio-
nes y responsabilidad que establezcan las leyes. Art. 371, Ttulo IX De la instruccin pblica.
Constitucin poltica de la Monarqua Espaola:Promulgada en Cadiz 19 de Marzo de 1812
[Precedida de un Discurso preliminary leido en las Cortes al presentar la Comisin de Constitucin
el proyecto della. http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/ On this discussion see also the excellent
analysis of James L.Odom Viceroy Abascal versus the Cortes of Cadiz, chapter3.
81. Ascensin Martnez Riaza, Los orgenes del periodismo doctrinario en Per. El caso conflic-
tivo de El Peruano. Quinto Centenario 3 (1982), 10934.
82. Abascal, Memoria de gobierno, vol. 1, 43233.
83. Abascal, Memoria de gobierno 1, 43334.
84. Advertencias amistosas que dirige don Inocencio Ensea a don Verisimo Cierto sobre la carta
eque este impugna a las reflexiones publicadas por el seor brigadier Don Manuel Villalta en
defensa de los oficios al Excmo. Ayuntamiento (Lima:Imprenta de los Hurfanos por D.Pedro
Oyague,1811).
85. Martnez Riaza, La prensa doctrinal,7879.
87. 1808 Proyecto de Rico, El Patriotismo verdadero. Pensamientos varios acordados con
la razon y la experiencia, que se escriven en Lima por discurrir algo sobre la marcha del
Universo. AGI, Diversos 1 A, R. 3. On Gaspar Rico as representative of the Cinco Gremios
see Carlos Malamud, Las actividades, 18283. For a thorough research on Gaspar Rico see
Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy.
89. El Peruano, 17-12-1811.
90. El Peruano, 19-12-1811.
91. El Peruano, 17-12-1811.
92. Compendio o extracto de las tropelias y excesos verificados por los directores de los 5 gremios may-
ores de Madrid y por la comisin de ellos contra D.Gaspar Rico y D.Antonio Taranco, socios y
apoderados de la Cia del Per (Lima:Imprenta de los Hurfanos, 1811). Rico also criticized
the administration of the tobacco monopoly. See James Odom, Viceroy Abascal versus the
Cortes of Cadiz,68.

93. AGI, Diversos 2 A, 1811-1812. For Patricia Marks Ricos persecution had more to do
with rival commercial factions than with politics. See Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy,
chapter3.
94. Jos Fernando de Abascal, Memoria de gobierno, vol. 1,435.
95. See Jolle Chassin, Lima, sus elites y la opinion durante los ltimos tiempos de la colo-
nia, Los espacios pblicos en Iberoamrica: Ambigedades y problemas. Siglos XVIII-XIX
(Mexico:Centro Francs de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos, Fondo de Cultura
Econmica, 1998), 24169.
96. El Satlite del Peruano, Introduccin, vi. AGI, Diversos 2 a, R.1,N.1.
97. El Satlite del Peruano, Introduccin,viii.
98. El Satlite del Peruano, Introduccin,vii.
99. Among the members of this junta was Toribio Rodrguez de Mendoza, future republican
liberal of Peru. Diversos 2 A, 1812, R.1 N.1, Doc.25.
100. El Satlite del Peruano, no.1, 1-3-1812.
101. See Chassin, Lima, sus elites.
102. El Satlite del Peruano, no.1, 1-3-1812.
103. Peralta, En defensa de la autoridad,67.
104. El Verdadero Peruano, 1-10-1812.
105. El Verdadero Peruano, 1-10 and 8-10-1812.
106. El Verdadero Peruano, 15-10-1812.
108. Porras, El periodismo,1516.
109. El Argos Constitucional, 28-22-1813.
110. El Antiargos, 11-2-1813.
111. El Antiargos, 12-3-1813.
112. Abascal, Memoria, vol.1,433.
113. See Daniel Morn, Educando a los sbditos? Modernidad y tradicin en una pica revolu-
cionaria. El Investigador [del Per] (1813-1814), Historia Crtica ( July, 2010):11033.
114. Draft of a letter from Abascal to Jovellanos, n.p., n.d. AGI, Diversos 1, 1810. Ramo2.
115. Oficio pasado al Exmo. S.Virrey del Peru en 20 de sept. de 1809. ACG, caja 1.C. 4,n.2.
116. Expediente seguido por tres abogados de esta ciudad solicitando se les exonere del servicio
militar. Ciudad de la Plata, 1809. AHN, Consejos 21342,N.72.
117. Informe de Eyzaguirre, Lima 7-11-1807. AGI, Diversos2A.
118. According to Charles Walker, although clearly defending Indians against oppression,
Eyzaguirre maintained a patronizing attitude toward them and did not respect their cul-
ture. Charles Walker, The Patriotic Society:Discussions and Omissions about Indians in
the Peruvian War of Independence, The Americas, 55, n2, (October, 1998):275298. For
Eyzaguirres campaign against the tribute see Jolle Chassin, Protecteur dIndiens contre
ViceRoi:la lutte de Miguel de Eyzaguirre pour labolition du tribut au Prou, Cahiers des
Amriques Latines 13, (Paris, 1992),6174.
119. Informe de Eyzaguirre.
120. Minutas de cartas y oficios de Abascal al secretario de Estado en el Despacho de Gracia
y Justicia sobre la sospechosa conducta del fiscal del crimen Miguel de Eyzaguirre. AGI,
Diversos 2 1812, ramo 2, Doc.10.
122. Manifiesto II. Lima 1-7-1809. AGI, Diversos2A.
124. Ideas de Eyzaguirre acerca de la situacin del indio frente a las instituciones virreynales y
directivas para su educacin. Lima, 5-10-1809. BNP D 214. After the rebellion of Hunuco,
Eyzaguirre fought for the establishment of a school for Indians in Tarma. His struggles lasted
for years. Expediente para escuela de indios en esta capital de Tarma a instancia del Sr.
Fiscal Protector General de Indios. 1811-1816. BNP D 5970. See on this Jolle Chassin,
Protecteur dIndiens contre ViceRoi,69.
125. On Abascals difficult relation with Eyzaguirre and on the viceroys program of taxation, see
Anna, The Fall, chapter3.

126. Abascal to the first secretary of state. Lima, 23-5-1812. AGI, Estado 74, N.17. See also James
Odom, Viceroy Abascal versus the Cortes of Cadiz, chapter4.
127. AGI, Diversos 2 A, Ramo 2, 18111812.
128. Minutas de Cartas u oficios. AGI, Diversos 2 A, Ramo 2, Doc.10.
129. Martnez Riaza, La prensa doctrinal, 276. Also Vctor Peralta Ruiz, El impacto de las Cortes
de Cadiz en el Per. Un balance historiogrfico, Revista de Indias 18, no. 242 (2008):6796.
130. Peralta Ruiz, El impacto de las Cortes, 139. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Abascal y el fan-
tasma de las conspiraciones, Abascal y la contraindependencia, 12146. See also Jorge
Basadre, El azar en la historia y sus lmites:con un apndice, la serie de probabilidades dentro
de la emancipacin peruana (Lima; Ediciones P.L.V., 1973), 125. Jaime Eyzaguirre, Los sos-
pechosos de infidelidad en la Lima de 1813, Mercurio Peruano 333 (Lima, 1954), 95159.
131. Abascal to the Secretary of State and the Indies. Lima 27-3-1815. Diversos 4, 1815, Doc.
1.And Eyzaguirre, Los sospechosos, 95758.
132. Miguel de Eyzaguirre to his friend Alejo. 31- 5-1816. Also Manuel Antonio de
Echeverra to Miguel de Eyzaguirre. Madrid 13-9-1816. Archivo epistolar de la familia
Eyzaguirre:Recopilacin y notas de Jaime Eyzaguirre (Buenos Aires, n.p., 1960), 27879 and
28990.
133. Jos de San Martn to Miguel de Eyzaguirre. Supe, 29-11-1820. Archivo epistolar, 361. See
also letters pp.36263.
134. Eyzaguirre, Los sospechosos,959.
135. Breve descripcin de las fiestas celebradas en la capital de los Reyes con motivo de la promocion del
Exmo. Sor. Jos Baqujano y Carrillo al Supremo Consejo de Estado (Lima:Imprenta de los
Hurfanos por Bernardino Ruiz, 1812). On how viceroy Abascal used public celebrations
see Pablo Ortemberg, Rituales del poder en Lima (1735-1828) de la monarqua a la repblica
(Lima:Fondo Editorial, Pontifica Universidad Catlica del Per, 2014, c hapter3.
136. Underneath Moraless portrait authorities inscribed the following phrase: Con la elo-
qencia y el buril copiando/Tu alma y tu rostro, supo diestramente/Conservarte la Patria
aquella vida/Con quien no mide su poder la muerte. Honores patrios consagrados a la tierna
memoria del Seor Don Vicente Morales y Durez, presidente del augusto congreso de Crtes, por
el excmo. Cabildo de esta capital de Lima, en VII de noviembre de 1812 (Lima:Imprenta de los
Hurfanos,1812).
137. See Marie-Laure Rieu-Millan, Rasgos distintivos de la representacin peruana,515.
138. On the impact of elections in Peru see Gabriella Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y represent-
acin en el Per, c hapter 2, James Odom, Viceroy Abascal versus the Cortes of Cadiz,
chapter1; Vctor Peralta Ruiz, En defensa de la autoridad, chapters3 and 4.On the impact
of elections and liberalism in Quito see Jaime E. Rodrguez O., La revolucin hispnica en
el reino de Quito:las elecciones de 1809-1814 y 1821-1822, Las guerras de independencia en
la Amrica espaola, eds. Marta Tern and Jos Antonio Serrano (Zamora, MI:El Colegio
de Michoacn, Instituto Nacional de Antropologa e historia, Universidad Michoacana de
San Nicols de HidalgoInstituto de Investigaciones Histricas, 2002), 485508. On the
role of elections in strengthening municipal government in Central America see Jordana
Dym, La soberana de los pueblos: Ciudad e independencia en Centroamrica, 1808-
1823, Revolucin, independencia y las nuevas naciones de Amrica, ed. Jaime R. Rodrguez O.
(Madrid:Fundacin Mapfre Tavera, 2005), 30937. Also Peralta Ruiz, El impacto de las
Cortes.
139. Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin, chapter2.
140. For a comprehensive overview of these years, see Anna, The Fall, chapter4.
141. Marie-Laure Rieu-Millan, Rasgos distintivos de la representacin peruana. Apparently,
Abascal also influenced the elections in Guayaquil.
142. On discussions about ethnicity in the Cortes see Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Ciudadana y
etnicidad en las Cortes de Cdiz, Elecciones, 1, n1 (November, 2002):16585.
143. Charles Maier, Among Empires. American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA
and London:Harvard University Press, 2006), 12936.
144. Scarlett OPhelan, Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru
(Kln:Bhlau,1985).

145. For an analysis of the differences between eighteenth and nineteenth century rebellions see
Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, El mito de la independencia concedida.
146. For a study on the strong information networks between the La Plata region and the
Atlantic see Beatriz Dvilo, Travels, Correspondence, and Newspapers in the Constitution
of Transatlantic Political and Intellectual Networks:Rio de la Plata, 1810-1825 (Working
Paper, Atlantic History Seminar,2003).
147. Oficio y parte dado al Rey Nuestro Seor Fernando 7 en su Soberana Junta de Espaa
Yndias por las dos Vias de Buenos Ayres y Cartagena en 14 de Noviembre de 1809. ACG,
Caja 1, c.4, n.29. Andrs Garca Camba also recognized the key role of the revolution in
Charcas for the organization of the army of Alto Peru. See Andrs Garca Camba, Memorias
del general Garca Camba para la historia de las armas espaolas en el Per, 1809-1821
(Madrid:Editorial-Amrica, 1916), chapter1.
148. Minutas de Abascal explicando su actuacin en las fronteras del virreynato. Lima, 8-5-
1811. AGI, Diversos 2, 1811-12, 1811, Ramo 2, Doc.2.
149. Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin,856.
150. Lizardo Seiner, Una rebelin a la deriva: fisuras y repression realista en Tacna, 1811,
Abascal y la contra-independencia,5373.
151. See David Cahill and Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Forging their own History: Indian
Insurgency in the Southern Peruvian Sierra, 1815, Bulletin of Latin American Research 11,
n 2 (May 1992), 13536 and Christine Hnefeldt, Los indios y la Constitucin de 1812,
Allpanchis, 11 (1978):3358.
152. Exhortacion a la sumision y concordia que hizo a sus feligreses en el dia 10 de mayor del presente
ao el Dr.D.Jos Ignacio Moreno, cura de la doctrina de Huancayo, vicario juez eclesiastico de
la doctrina de Xauxa:a consecuencia de la proclama del Excmo. Seor virrey del Peru que se le
remiti por el gobierno de la intendencia de Tarma, para hacerla intimar todos los habitantes de
este dicho partido, y especialmente los indios por medio de los Seores Prrocos (Lima:Imprenta
de los Huerfanos, 1812). On Morenos background see Ascensin Martnez Riaza, La Prensa
doctrinal,6970.
153. Cartas de Goyeneche a Abascal. AGI, Diversos 2, 1812, Ramo 1,n2.
154. Abascal to the secretary of estado y despacho universal de Indias. Lima, 27-3-1815. AGI,
Diversos 4, 1815, Ramo2.
155. Documentacin oficial espaola, CDIP 22, vol. 1,143.
156. AGN, Sup. Gob. Leg. 34,1150.
157. Biblioteca Municipal de Arequipa, Libro de actas capitulares del Cabildo Eclesistico de
Arequipa, 18001834.
158. Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin, 12527 and Vctor Peralta Ruiz, El impacto de
las Cortes de cdiz en el Per:un balance historiogrfico, Revista del Foro 9798, Edicin
Internacional, Bicentenario Constitucin de Cdiz, 18122012, (Lima:Ilustre Colegio de
Abogados de Lima, 2012),1738.
159. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima en el reinado de los bor-
bones (1700-1821):Esquema de un estudio sobre un ncleo dirigente (Sevilla:Escuela de
Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1974), CII. For a different perspective see Burkholder and
Chandler, From Impotence to Authority.
160. Abascal to the secretary of state en el despacho de ultramar. Lima, 31-5-1813. CDIP 22, vol. 1,
300302.
161. See his hoja de servicio. AGMS, 1a. M-4652.
162. Fragmento del expediente promovido ante el superior Gobierno por don Pedro Gamboa
sobre informacion de ciertos movimientos subversivos acaecidos en el pueblo de Caraveli
por un grupo de revoltosos. AGN, Superior gobierno, Leg. 55, cua.994.
163. For narratives of the rebellion see Luis Antonio Eguiguren, La Revolucin de 1814 (Lima:
Ministerio de Justicia, Tipografa La Opinin Nacional, 1914); Evaristo San Cristbal, La
revolucin del Cuzco (Lima: Imprenta Gloria, 1919). For analysis that focus on regionalism
see Basadre, El azar; John Fisher, Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion in Colonial Peru,
1808-1815, Hispanic American historical Review 59, no. 2 (May 1979): 23257 and Scarlett
OPhelan, El mito. For a study on the role of the tribute in the rebellion Nria Sala I Vila, ria

Sala I Vila, Y se arm el tole tole: tributo indgena y movimientos sociales en el virreinato del Per,
1784-1814 (Huamanga, Peru: IER Jos Mara Arguedas, 1996. For an emphasis on Cuzco
politics see Luis Miguel Glave, Antecedentes y naturaleza de la revolucin del Cuzco de 1814
y el primer proceso electoral, La independencia del Per, 7797 and Peralta Ruiz, En defensa.
165. Noticias y documentos que acreditan los procedimientos del coronel D. Domingo
Tristan durante el mando de su gobierno en las tres epocas que lo exercio. AGI, Diversos
3,1813.
166. Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histrico-biogrfico del Per, vol. 6 (Lima: Imprenta
Bolognesi, 1885), vol. 8,1036.
167. Peralta, En defensa,145.
168. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic,126.
169. Fisher, El Per borbnico,291.
170. On the Cuzco rebellion see Peralta, En defensa, chapter4.
171. Peralta, En defensa, 149. See also Mendiburu, Diccionario, vol. 6, 56574.
172. Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin,171.
173. Luis Antonio Eguiguren, La revolucin del 1814 (Lima:Oficina Tipogrfica de la Opinin
Nacional, 1914),29.
174. Eguiguren, La revolucin del 1814,32.
175. Peralta, En defensa, 15758, 16267.
176. Mendiburu, Diccionario, vol. 2, 28. For Basadre, this was a rebellion of the lower middle class.
See Jorge Basadre, El azar en la historia, 130. For San Cristval it was a struggle between
civilian and military power equated with royal power. La revolucin del Cuzco,3637.
177. porque Pumaccagua era Yndio neto, e llevado la clase de brigadier por los servicios
que havia hecho a la corona en tiempo del rebelde Tupucamaro; Los Angulos y Bejar mesti-
zos; Hurtado de Mendoza natural de Santa Fe de corrientes en el virrey de BA, blanco pero
de clase ordinaria; muy pobres todos hasta no tener que comer excepcion de Pumacagua
que en clase de Yndio le sobraban proporciones; todos muy cobardes menos Hurtado que
era naturalmente turbulento. Manuel Pardo to the Ministro de Estado del Despacho Universal
de Gracia y Justicia. Lima, 13-7-1816. AGI, Cuzco 8 bis. See also Garrett, Shadows of Empire,
240,245.
178. San Cristbal, La revolucin del 1814,115.
179. En cuartel general de Arequipa 14-1-Ao primero de la libertad Peruana, signed by
both Pumacahua and Angulo. 1816. Contra el D.D. Manuel Fernandez de Cordova, cura
de Salamanca. AAA, Cura Diocesana, Fuero Eclesiastico, Causas Civiles, 1813-1816. On
the Cuzco rebellion see also Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 97105.
180. San Cristbal, La revolucin del 1814,75.
181. Garrett, Shadows of Empire,251.
182. Guerra de la America del Sur. Narracion Historica de la Guerra Ynsurreccional de la
America del Sur y de sus Operaciones Militares. Francisco Javier de Mendizabal, Director
Subinspector del Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros. 1824, Archivo General Militar de Madrid,
Madrid (hereafter IHCM), Fondo general, 2-1-7-12,76.
183. Abascal to Mariano Osorio, s/f. AGI, Diversos 3, 1814, Ramo 2, Doc.2.
184. Expediente formado sobre la suspension de abogados incursos en la ynsurreccion. Cuzco,
April, 1815. ARC, RA administrativo, Leg. 172, exp.66
185. Manuel Pardo to the Ministro de estado y del despacho universal de Indias. Cuzco, 18-5-1815.
AGI, Cuzco 8 bis. Anna, The Fall, 103.
186. Decreto concediendo recompensas a los individuos del Alto Peru por la Victoria de
Umachiri. April 1815. Diversos 4, 1815, Ramo 2, Doc.2.
187. Sobre la necesidad de tomar los bienes de los rebeldes para reparar daos causados por los
rebeldes. ARC, Intendencia, Leg. 153, 1809-1815. Leg. 1815-1816 contains a large number
of requests for rewards by army men who fought against the rebels. They also show how land
was being distributed. Expediente sobre asignacion y pocecion de tierras a la parte de los
soldados agraciados. 1815. Leg 154. See also Basadre, El azar, 14445.

189. Los militares creyeron /Que el Rey dinero traeria /Y con notable alegra /De su parte se
pusieron /La libertad destruyeron /Al bueno se persigui /El orden se trastorn /Con
extincin de las luces /Y el Rey solo trajo Cruces /Y todos crusific. AGN, Coleccin
Moreyra, Misc. D.1-103.
Chapter7
1. Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1983),216.
2. Charles Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age:From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939 (Malden,
MA:Blackwell, 2000), 4849. According to Esdaile, Riegos troops were suffering from an
epidemic of yellow fever. For joining his insurrection, Riego promised his followers money,
land, and their discharge.
3. On the attraction of foreign fighters and the enthusiasm for the American independences see
Matthew Brown, Adventuring Through Spanish Colonies:Simn Bolvar, Foreign Mercenaries,
and the Birth of the New Nations (Liverpool:Liverpool University Press,2006).
4. On the role of violence in this era, Jeremy Adelman, The Rites of Statehood:Violence and
Sovereignty in Spanish America, 1789-1821, Hispanic American Historical Review 90, n 3
(2010):391422.
5. Carr, Spain.1808-1939, c hapter4. Stites, The Four Horsemen,5760.
6. See Palacio Real, Papeles Reservados de Fernando VII, vols.1667.
7. Historians of Spain have paid a great deal of attention to the history of pronunciamientos in
the Peninsula, making a case for their crucial role in changing the political history of Spain.
For this purpose, some historians have studied the contours of this new political method and
institution with much interest. Jos Luis Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos en Espaa
(Madrid:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientficas, Escuela de Historia Moderna,
1958); Christiansen, The Origins; Carr, Spain:1808-1939; Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age.
On the influence of Riegos pronunciamiento in Europe, see Stites, The Four Horsemen.
8. Few historians, if any, have seen Peninsular pronunciamientos as influenced by their
American counterparts. Anna, Spain and the Loss, xiii and 20918. See Will Fowler (ed.)
Forceful Negotiations: The Origins of the Pronunciamiento in Nineteenth-Century Mexico
(Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press,2010).
9. The following were some of the verses, although they could vary according to the circum-
stances and audience:Los Milicianos/Y Madrileos/La bienvenida/Le dan a Riego
Riego, Quiroga, Agero y Baos;/El servilismo/Van sofocando Antes que esclavos/
Volver a vernos,/Parecer todos,/Jurar debemos Ya no hay vasallos,/Ya no hay esclavos,/
sino Espaoles/Libres y bravos. Alberto Gil Novales, Las sociedades patriticas. Las lib-
ertades de expresin y de reunin en el origen de los partidos polticos (Madrid:Editorial Tecnos,
1975), vol.1, 129 and230.
10. Emilio La Parra, La cancin del Trgala. Cultura y poltica popular en el inicio de la
revolucin liberal en Espaa, La reception des cultures de masse et des cultures populaires
en Espagne: XVIIIe-XXe. Textes runis Serge Salan et Franoise Etienvre n 6 (March,
2009):6886. Alberto Gil Novales, El Trienio Liberal (Madrid:Siglo Veintiuno, 1980),19.
11. Los clubs, que comenzaron siendo ctedras elocuentes y palestras en la discusin
cientfica, salieron del crculo de sus funciones propias aspirando dirigir los negocios
pblicos, amonestar los gobiernos imponerse la nacin. Benito Prez Galds,
La Fontana de Oro (Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles XXXI. Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus,
1872),89.
12. Doceaista referred to the supporters of the Constitution of 1812, who actively participated
in the Cortes. Alberto Drozier, Escritores polticos espaoles (1780-1854) (Madrid:Ediciones
Turner, 1975), 56. About the patriotic societies in Spain see his Lhistoire de la sociedad
del Anillo de Oro pendant le trinat constitutionnel 1820-1823: la faillite du systme liberal
(Paris:Les Belles Lettres,1965).
13. Anecdotes of the Spanish and Portuguese Revolutions by Count Pecchi (London:W.B. Whitaker,
1823).98.

14. Iris Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios (Madrid:Siglo Veintiuno de Espaa Editores,
1971). On the cosmopolitan character of early nineteenth-century Freemasonry see Jessica
Harland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire:Freemasons and British Imperialism, 1717-1929 (Chapel
Hill:University of North Carolina Press,2007).
15. Gil Novales, El Trienio Liberal, 2526. See also Iris Zavala, Romnticos y socialistas. Prensa
espaola del XIX (Madrid:Siglo XXI, 1972) and Pierre Ullman, Marino de Larra and Spanish
Political Rhetoric (Madison:University of Wisconsin Press,1971).
16. El Despertador Jerezano, 15-11-1822.
17. Anecdotes of the Spanish and Portuguese Revolutions,80.
18. El Universal Observador, 17-6-1820.
19. Aurora de Espaa, 8-4-1820.
21. On this issue see, Mara Cruz Seoane, Oratoria y periodismo en la Espaa del siglo XIX
(Valencia:Fundacin Juan March, Editorial Castalia, 1977), 16385.
22. Elocuencia militar arte de entusiasmar y escitar las tropas:escrita en frances por una sociedad
de militares y literatos. Traducida por el teniente coronel Don Jose Maria Paniagua, individuo de
varias sociedades literarias, y secretario de la Capitania General de Aragn, vol. 1 (Zaragoza:En
la Imprenta de Luis Cueto,1821).
23. See Charles Wentz Fehrenbach, Moderados and Exaltados. See also Carr, Spain.1808-1939,
12946.
24. Anna, Spain and the Loss, chapter5.
25. Anna, Spain and the Loss, 1447; Stephen K. Sloan, Pablo Morillo, the War, and the Riego
Revolt; The Wars of Independence in Spanish America, ed. Christon I. Archer (Wilmington,
Delaware:Jaguar Books on Latin America, 2000), 21342.
26. For a fascinating study on the conjunction of romanticism and liberalism se Brian Hamnett,
The Reception of Romanticism in Italy and Spain: Parallels and Contrasts, History of
European Ideas: Special Issue on Iberian liberalism 40, no. 7 (2014): 17684. Also his The
Historical Novel in Nineteenth-Century Europe:Representations of Reality in History and Fiction
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2011). For a different approach on the rise of romanti-
cism and nationalism in Spain in these years see Scott Eastman, Preaching Spanish Nationalism
Across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2012); Jos Alvarez Junco, Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations (Manchester:Manchester
27. Alvaro Flrez Estrada, Representacin hecha a S.M. C.El Seor don Fernando VII en defensa de
las cortes. (London, 1818),7075.
28. Alvaro Flrez Estrada, Constitucin poltica de la nacin espaola por lo tocante a la parte militar
(Cadiz:Imprenta Tormentaria,1818).
29. On the newspapers of the Trienio Liberal see Scott Eastman, America Has Escaped from
Our Hands: Rethinking Empire, Identity and Independence during the Trienio Liberal in
Spain, 1820-1823, European History Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2011):42843.
32. El Universal Observador, 15-5-1820.
33. El Censor, 15-8-1820.
34. El Censor, 7-10-1820.
35. El Censor, 7-10-1820.
36. El Censor, 9-12-1820.
37. El Diario Gaditano, 8-7-1822.
38. El Diario Gaditano, 6-12-1822.
39. Emilio La Parra, La cancin del Trgala, 80 1. Also Jos Joaqun de Clararrosa,
Diccionario tragalolgico y otros escritos politicos (18201821), ed. Fernando Durn Lpez
(Bilbao:Universidad del Pas Vasco, Servicio Editorial,2006).
40. Beatriz Snchez Hita, Libertad de Prensa y lucha de partidos en el Trienio Constitucional:los
procesos constra el Diario Gaditano de Jos Joaqun de Clararrosa, El Argonauta Espaol
n 2 (2005): https://argonauta.revues.org. See also her Jos Joaqun de Clararrosa y su

Diario Gaditano (1820- 1822), Ilustracin, periodismo y revolucin en el Trienio Liberal

(Cadiz:Universidad de Cdiz,2009).
41. BL, Add. Mss 61645. Blanco White to Lady Holland, 6-7-1819.
42. Observaciones sobre varios peridicos y otros impresos hispano-americanos. Variedades
Mensagero de Londres, 1 January1825.
43. Ocios de espaoles emigrados. Vol. III, April 1825,332.
44. For a socioeconomic approach see Carr, Spain:1808-1939, 14752.
45. Carr, Spain: 1808-1939, 204207; Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age, 64; Christiansen, The
Origins of Military Power,7.
46. On the ayacuchos see Carr, Spain: 1808-1939, 20428. And Benito Prez Galds, Los
Ayacuchos, Episodios Nacionales 29 (Madrid:Alianza Editorial,1986).
47. Archivo General Military de Segovia (AGMS), Personal, clebres, caja 27, exp.5 and caja 52,
exp.1 respectively.
48. On the key role of poverty in the breakdown of Spanish rule in Peru, see Anna, The Fall,
chapter 1.
49. Biografa inserta en 1864 en la Revista de Buenos Aires, tomo V sobre la historia americana,
literatura y derecho bajo la direccin de San Miguel Navarro y San Vicente Quesada, aboga-
dos. Firmado por J.A. Lavalle. AGI, Diversos, 6,no.7.
50. AGMS, Personal, clebres, caja 133, exp.1, carpeta1.
51. Quiroz, Corrupt Circles,7879.
52. According to Julio Mario Luqui Lagleyze, the following army units arrived in Peru in the
years 1814 to 1819:Regimiento de Infantera de Talavera in 1814 with 1,000 men under the
command of Colonel Rafael Maroto. Regimiento de Infantera de Extremadura in 1815 under
the command of Colonel Mariano Ricafort. Regimiento de Infantera del Infante Don Carlos
in 1816 with six hundred men under the command of Colonel Juan Monet. The first unit of
the Regimiento de Infanteria de Burgos, led by colonel Jos Mara Beza, arrived with sick and
wounded men in Arica and went directly to Chile. The second unit commanded by Jos de
Canterac was detained by Morillo in New Granada and had to be picked up by ships sent from
Peru. Regimiento de Infantera de Numancia, a militia unit from Maracaibo in 1819. Regimiento
de Infantera de Cantabria. Arrived in 1819 after rebelling in Spain against being shipped to
America. Regimiento de Infantera de Vitoria under the command of Colonel Rafael Maroto
went to Potos in 1819. Regimiento de Infantera Ligera de Gerona in 1816 with 660 men and
went to Arica under the command of Alejandro Gonzlez Villalobos. See Julio Mario Luqui
Lagleyze, El ejrcito realista en la Guerra de independencia, 17891.
53. La Serna took part in famous battles such as the siege of Zaragoza of 1809. He was imprisoned
by the French but managed to escape and return to Spain with glory. He was appointed gen-
eral commander of the army of Alto Peru in 1815. AGMS, Personal, 1a. S-2442.
54. Esposicin que dirige al rey don Fernando VIII el Mariscal de Campo Don Jernimo Valds,
sobre las causas que motivaron la perdida del Per. Desde Vitoria, 12 de Julio de 1827.
La publica su hijo el Conde de Torata coronel retirado de artilleria, Documentos para la histo-
ria de la guerra separatista del Per (Madrid:M. Minuesa de los Ros, 1894-1898), vol.1,20.
55. AGMS, Personal, clebres, caja 25, exp.3.
58. Estado que en el dia de la fecha tienen el Virreynato de Lima; Provincias del de Buenos Ayres
recuperadas y conservadas por el Exercito del Alto Per; y finalmente el [estado] en que se
halla el Reyno de Chile. AGI, Estado 74, no.30.
59. Memoria presentada por don Martn de Garay, ministro de Hacienda, al rey nuestro seor,
sobre los medios de arreglar este ramo de la administracin. AGI, Diversos 5, 18171818.
60. Anna, The Fall, 13839.
61. Jos Morales to Abascal. Lima, 16-6-1818. AGI, Diversos 5, 18171818, Doc.62.
62. Manuel Gonzlez to Abascal. Lima, 12-12-1817. AGI, Diversos 5, 18171818.
63. Manuel Gonzlez to Abascal. Lima, 16-4-1820. AGI, Diversos 5 A, Doc.5.
64. Manuel Gonzlez to Abascal. Lima, 1-4-1818. Reservada. AGI, Diversos 5, 18171818.
For an analysis on Pezuelas trade policies see Patricia H.Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy,
chapter5. According to Marks, after the defeat in Chile Pezuela pursued a policy of free trade
with foreign merchants avoiding the controls of the Peninsular monopolies.

65. Biografas de generales republicanos por Manuel de Mendiburu, edicin y notas de Flix Denegri
Luna (Lima:Publicacin del Instituto Histrico del Per, 1963), 213. La Mars uncle was
the state councilor Francisco Requena.
66. Viceroy Pezuela to the secretary of state in the ministry of finance. Lima, 30-11-1818. AGI,
Lima 761,n2.
67. Memorias del General Guillermo Miller al Servicio de la Repblica del Per traducidas al cas-
tellano por el general Torrijos. Reproduccin de la edicin en Londres 1829 (Madrid:Librera
General de Victoriano Surez, 1910), vol.1,75.
68. Compendio de la Historia de la Revolucion de la America del Sur escrito por el Arcediano
de Chile Don Mariano Ruiz Navamuel, IHCM, 2. 3. Asuntos Generales 2-4. Operaciones
de Campaa, Ministerio de la Guerra, caja 125, 5591, Doc.16.
69. Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histrico-biogrfico del Per, 10:14041.
70. Documentos justificativos que manifiestan las persecuciones que sufri el general Gamarra
del gobierno espaol por su decision por la libertad Mojos, Marzo 18 de 1820. BNP,
D4713.
71. According to Mendiburu, Gamarra had been professionally trained in the units commanded
first by Goyeneche and then by La Serna and Canterac where he excelled in guerrilla exer-
cises. Concurri a las campaas y batallas en que tuvieron mando Goyeneche, Pezuela,
Ramrez, La Serna y otros jefes espaoles Contrjose a la tctica moderna que llevaron
al Alto Per los cuerpos Talavera, Extremadura y el Ligero de Gerona, de tal manera que en
breve se le reput inteligente hasta en los ejercicios de las guerrillas. Biografas de generales
republicanos,8990.
72. Refutacin que hace el Mariscal de campo don Jernimo Valds del Manifiesto que el teni-
ente general don Joaqun de la Pezuela imprimi en 1821 su regreso del Per. La publica
su hijo el Conde de Torata, coronel retirado de Artilleria. Documentos para la historia de la
guerra separatista, vol.2,83.
73. Andrs Garca Camba, Memorias del general Garca Camba para la historia de las armas espa-
olas en el Per, 1809-1821 (Madrid:Editorial-Amrica, 1916), vol. 1,445.
74. With the patriots, Gamarra formed and led his own battalion and marched into Lima. In
1821 he was awarded the Orden del Sol and in 1823 promoted to general by Riva Agero.
Mendiburu, Biografas de generales,8893.
75. Torre Tagle was married to the widow of Bernardo OHiggins cousin. Scarlett OPhelan
Godoy, Sucre en el Per:entre Riva Agero y Torre Tagle, in La independencia del Per.
De los Borbones a Bolvar (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per, Instituto Riva
Agero, 2001),399.
76. Garca Camba, Memorias del general Garca Camba, vol. 1, 49394.
77. Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy, chapter7.
78. For a good analysis of La Sernas circle of power see Alberto Wagner de Reyna, Ocho
Aos de La Serna en el Per (De la Venganza a la Ernestine), Quinto Centenario 8
(1985):3759. According to Wagner, these Peninsular officers were also Freemasons.
The alleged liberalism of these generals is disputed. See Brian Hamnett, Revolucin
y contrarrevolucin en Mxico y el Per, 33132. Vctor Peraltas analysis of La Sernas
faction faces the problem of narrowing liberalism to pure constitutionalism. See his
De absolutistas a constitucionales. Poltica y cultura en el gobierno del virrey Pezuela
(Per, 1816-1820), in Revolucin, independencia y las nuevas naciones de Amrica,
ed. Jaime E. Rodrguez O. (Madrid: MAPFRE Tavera, 2005), 485510. Also Jos de
la Puente Brunke, Todo fue atolondramiento, todo confusin. Los militares realis-
tas en la guerra de independencia del Per y sus desavenencias, En el nudo del impe-
rio:independencia y democracia en el Per, eds. Carmen McEvoy, Mauricio Novoa, Elas
Palti (Lima: Instituto Francs de Estudios Andinos, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos,
2012):187206.
79. General Miller gave La Serna credit for issuing a decree restricting the death penalty to only
severe cases authorized directly by him. Memorias del General Guillermo Miller al Servicio de
la Repblica del Per, vol.1,75.
80. Based on the reports of the Duke of Wellington, Charles Wentz Fehrenbach has argued that
Spaniards, revolutionary officers in particular, had become skeptical of the Constitution
during the restoration of Ferdinand VII. See his Moderados and Exaltados: The Liberal

Opposition to Ferdinand VII, 1814-1823, Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 1
(February 1970):5269.
81. See for example Manifiesto en que el virrey del Per, Don Joaquin de la Pezuela refiere el hecho
y circunstancias de su separacion del mando:demuestra la falsedad, malicia, impostura de inti-
macion de 29 de enero de los gefes del egercito de Lima, autores de la conspiracion; y anuncia las
causas de este acontecimiento (Madrid:En la imprenta de D.Leonardo Nuez de Vargas, Calle
de los Remedios, num. 20, 1821. Edicin facsimilar de la Universidad de Len,2003).
82. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Sucre en el Per:entre Riva Agero y Torre Tagle, 39091. As
in the case of many other members of the elite Torre Tagle possessed large estates dedi-
cated to the production of sugar and wheat. His revenues were seriously weakened with
the independence of Chile. Susy Snchez, Familia, comercio y poder. Los Tagle y su vincu-
lacin con los Torre Velarde (1730-1825), Los comerciantes limeos a fines del siglo XVIII.
Capacidad y cohesion de una elite, 1750-1825 (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del
Per, 1999),2963.
83. Marcos Deneira [Riva Agero] to Juan Garca del Ro. Lima, 1821. BNP, APS, vol.I.
84. Angel Rama, The Lettered City, edited and translated by John Charles Chasteen
(Durham:Duke University Press, 1996),41.
85. Brian Hamnett, Revolucin y contrarrevolucin en Mxico y el Per, 33536.
86. Jorge Basadre, La iniciacin de la repblica. Contribucin al estudio de la evolucin poltica y
social del Per, 2nd ed. (Lima:Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San
Marcos, 2002),67.
88. Bartolom Mire, Historia de San Martn (Buenos Aires:Flix Lajouane, Editor, 1890), vol. 5,
12427.
89. Mitre, 129. Jorge Basadre, La iniciacin de la repblica, vol.1,66.
90. Juan Garca del Ro was a lawyer from New Granada, who arrived as secretary of San Martn
in the Expedicin Libertadora of 1820. He was born to a family of Navarro merchants, trav-
eled to Spain to study, and was working the family business in Cadiz when he met San
Martn, whom he followed to Britain and then to Spanish America. Mariano Felipe Paz
Soldn, Historia del Per indendiente (Lima:18681874), vol.1,200.
91. Brian Hamnett, Revolucin y contrarrevolucin en Mxico y el Per, 34142.
92. First general session, 20-1-1822. Actas de la Sociedad Patritica, Documentos literarios, ed.
Manuel de Odriozola (Lima:Tip. De A.Alfaro, 1877), vol. 11,418.
94. First general session, 20-1-1822. Actas de la Sociedad Patritica,418.
95. Session of 1-3-1822. Actas de la Sociedad, 42226.
96. Session of 8-3-1822, Actas de la Sociedad,431.
97. Session of 22-3-1822. Actas de la Sociedad, 438. For an analysis on how monarchists used
the idea that Indians were not educated enough for liberal rule and how liberals neglected
the Indian issue in their arguments, see Charles F.Walker, The Patriotic Society.
98. Session of 1-3-1822. Actas de la Sociedad, vol.421.
99. Letter of El Solitario de Sayn to the editor of La Abeja Republicana. 6-8-1822. Ral Porras
Barrenechea, Jos Snchez Carrin. El Tribuno de la Repblica Peruana (Lima:Banco Central
de Reserva del Per. Fondo Editorial, 2001), 12021.
100. Paul Rizo Patrn Boylan, Las emigraciones de los sbditos realistas del Per hacia Espaa
durante la crisis de la independencia, La independencia en el Per, 40728.
101. For a description of Monteagudos secuestros see Anna, The Fall, chapter8 and his Economic
Causes of San Martns Failure in Lima, Hispanic American Historical Review 54 (1974):657
81. See also Quiroz, Corrupt Circles,8687.
102. Francisco Javier Maritegui, Anotaciones a la historia del Per independiente (Lima:Imprenta
El Nacional, 1869),129.
103. En el teatro se le han hecho al benemerito del Excmo. Seor La Serna tres funciones mag-
nificas a las que he asistido con Flora y demas familia, y los concurrentes todos no han respi-
rado sino regocijo y contento de que los rija un hombre verdadero, virtuoso y amante de la
humanidad. Anonymous. 16-2-1821. BNP, APS, Vol. 1, 4445. Also Mnica Ricketts, El
teatro en Lima.

104. See, for example. Defensa del coronel don Agustn Gamarra, presentada al consejo de oficia-
les generales en 22 de mayo de 1822, por el H.S. Coronel comandante general de artillera don
Jos Manuel Borgoo, su defensor (Lima, 1822) and Manifestacin de un hecho comunicado al
pblico por el Seor D.D. Hiplito Unnue de un modo diminuto (Lima:En la Oficina de Ruiz,
cargo de D.Manuel Pea,1820).
105. El Depositario, 26-10-1821; 28-10-1821.
106. El Depositario, 2-11-1822.
108. El Tribuno de la Repblica, 12-12-1822.
109. Jorge Basadre, La iniciacin, vol.1,7677
110. See the letters of El Solitario de Sayn in Ral Porras Barrenechea, Jos Snchez Carrin.
111. Basadre, El azar en la historia,166.
112. Basadre, Historia de la repblica, vol.1,12.
113. Basadre, Historia de la repblica, vol.1,13.
114. Ral Porras Barrenechea, Jos Snchez Carrin, 85. For a different interpretation on how the
limeo elite staged Monteagudos fall see Carmen Mc Evoy, El motn de las palabras:la cada
de Bernardo Monteagudo y la forja de la cultura poltica limea (1821-1822), Forjando la
nacin. Ensayos de historia republicana (Lima:Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per, The
University of the South, Sewanee, 1999),160.
115. See La Abeja Republicana.
116. El Periquito, no.1,1822.
117. Jorge Basadre, La iniciacin de la Repblica, vol.180.
118. Scarlett OPhelan Godoy, Sucre en el Per:entre Riva Agero y Torre Tagle, 38088.
119. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la repblica del Per, vol. 1,2628.
120. Basadre, Historia de la repblica, vol. 1,3941.
121. Anna, The Fall, chapters1,69 and Susy Snchez, Clima, hambre y enfermedad en Lima
durante la Guerra independentista (1817-1826), La independencia del Per, 23763.
122. Porras Barrenechea, Jos Faustino Snchez Carrin,94.
124. La Depositaria, 28-1-1823. This was a separate issue published along with El Depositario.
125. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la repblica, vol.1, 5964. For an analysis on the constitution see
Cristbal Aljovn, La constitucin de 1823, La independencia del Per, 35178.
126. Apuntes para la historia de la revolucion del Peru, sacados de los trabajos del Estado-Mayor del
Ejercito de operaciones por el ayudante Jeneral D.Andres Garca Camba (Lima:Imprenta del
Ejercito:Tomada a los enemigos en Lima, 1824),2327.
127. See the prologue by Ella Dunbar Temple to La accin patritica del pueblo en la emanci-
pacin. Guerrillas y Montoneras, CDIP 5, vol. 1, IIIXXXV.
128. Documentos para la historia de la guerra separatista del Per, vol.1,6.
129. Luqui Lagleyze, El ejrcito realista,34.
130. The cabildo and audiencia of Cuzco welcomed La Serna with enthusiasm. Fisher, El Per
borbnico, 21415.
131. See for example the following letter signed by Gaspar Rico in his El Depositario announcing
the arrival of the viceroy in Cuzco i estoy entreviendo que desde la capital del antiguo
imperio de los Yncas ba el seor la Serna espedir probidencias que establezcan para siem-
pre la seguridad, sosiego y prosperidad de nuestros pueblos. Este fausto suceso memorable
se le prepara al Cuzco, y yo boi a ser testigo de ello El Depositario, 15-11-1811. For
a discussion on the use of the Incas by the patriotic press see Ascensin Martnez Riaza,
La prensa doctrinal, 196202.
132. Archivo Municipal de Arequipa, Libro de Actas de la municipalidad 28, 18151820; 29,
1822; 30, 18241825.
133. Hctor Balln Lozada, Historia de la Academia Lauretana de Ciencias y Artes de Arequipa,
Academia Lauretana de Ciencias y Artes de Arequipa, ed. Hctor Balln Lozada, Guillermo
Galds Rodrguez etal. (Arequipa:Edicin del Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa, 2000),
2nd ed., 130. According to Eusebio Quiroz Paz Soldn, the cabildo favored trade with Lima
and opposed the company of the Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid, which supported
La Serna. See his Significado histrico de la Academia Lauretana de Ciencias y Artes
de Arequipa, 22629.

134. Anna, The Fall, 221, 22225.

135. Snchez, Clima, hambre y enfermedad, 23763.
136. Anna, The Fall,229.
137. Los quiteos y los peruanos son la misma cosa:viciosos hasta la infamia y bajos hasta el
extremo. Simn Bolvar to Francisco de Paula Santander, Pativilca, 7-11-1824. Cartas del
Libertador, vol. 4, (Caracas:Banco de Venezuela, Fundacin Vicente Lecuna, 1967),13.
138. Simn Bolvar to Francisco de Paula Santander, Pativilca, 10-2-1824. Cartas del Libertador,
vol. 4,7879.
139. Anna, The Fall,228.
141. These are Timothy Annas calculations in The Fall,2367.
142. Simn Bolvar to Hiplito Unnue. Arequipa, 30-5-1825. Cartas del libertador, vol. 4,
34849.
143. Simn Bolvar to Hiplito Unnue. Arequipa, 30-5-1825. Cartas del libertador, vol. 4,
348349.
144. El Sol del Cuzco, 1-1-1825.
145. Carta de Manco Capac al Libertador, El Sol del Cuzco, 16-7-1825.
146. La Estrella de Ayacucho, 1-10-1826.
147. El Observador de Lima, 7-6-1825.
148. Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histrico-biogrfico del Per, vol. 8, 32526.
149. Bolivar est lauteur de la constitution boliviana, et Mr. Pando natif du Perou et elv
dEspagne a t son conciller intime. Le Monsieur est un homme assez instruit et de moy-
ens; mais que ainsi que Bolivar est prevenu en faveur des formes monarchiques, et pretend
que nous autres les americaines ne pouvons pas etre bouvern par des institutions libera-
les et republicaines. Cet constitution monstreuse a t la veritable forme de discorde que
divid et ruin la Colombia, le Prous et Bolivia. Francisco de Paula Santander to Jeremy
Bentham. 10-7-1830, BL, Add.33546.
150. See, for example, the correspondence between Simn Bolvar and Jos Antonio Paz in 1826,
in which the latter asked Bolvar to return to Venezuela to establish order like Napoleon.
Bolvar rejected the idea and sent Paz his constitution as a proof of his liberal ideas. Cartas
del libertador, vol. 5,2931
151. For a study on the tradition of Spanish American caudillos to legitimize their military powers
with constitutions see Cristbal Aljovn de Losada, Caudillos y constituciones. Per:1821-
1845 (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per,
Instituto Riva-Agero, 2000). For the impact of Napoleons constitution see Carlos Ramos
Nuez, El Cdigo napolenico y su recepcin en Amrica Latina (Lima: Fondo Editorial,
Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per,1997).
152. Simn Bolvar to Francisco de Paula Santander. Magdalena, Lima, 21 February 1826. Cartas
del libertador, vol.5,31.
153. Andrs de Santa Cruz was born in La Paz and Jos de La Mar in Cuenca.
154. Santa Cruz to Gamarra. Chorrillos, 27-12-1827. BNP, APS, Epistolario, vol.3.
155. Santa Cruz to Gamarra. Lima, 27-11-1827. BNP, APS, Epistolario, vol.3.
156. Andrs de Santa Cruz to Agustn Gamarra, 12-12-1827. BNP, APS, vol.4.
157. Trgala perro/Ruin vitalicio/No medraras/Con el perjucio/De la Nacion/Ya se ha
fundado/Atu disgusto/El templo augusto/De la libertad/Trgala perro Pero qu
digo?/Ah! Soy un tonto/Es casi cierto/Que vendr pronto/El gran Simn/Trgala
perro The Chorus:Trgala perro/Ruin vitalicio/No medradras/Con el perjuicio/
De la Nacion/Ya se ha fundado/Atu disgusto/El templo augusto/de la libertad/Trgala
perro etc./Cay y al punto/Triste mudanza!/Lo mismo que humo/Tu alta esperanza/Se
disipo/ Trgala perro etc./Pero qu digo?/Ah! Soy un tonto/Es casi cierto/Que vendr
pronto/El gran Simn/Trgala perro etc./Qu son libres?/Viles hormigas,/Que, sin
engaos/Y sin intrigas/Pereceran/Trgala perro etc./Ahora te ries,/misero esclavo ?/
Deja que venga/Que un chasco bravo/Se va a pegar/Trgala perro etc. Atalaya contra
Vitalicios, 3-12-1828.

159. In 1826, Santa Cruz revealed his pride about his civil and penal codes in a letter to Casimiro
Olaeta, Celebro que el Cdigo Penal est acabado, y deseo que lo sea tambien el Civil. Este
sera en mi concepto el mayor presente que podemos hacer a nuestra Patria. Archivo histrico
del Mariscal Santa Cruz, ed. Andrs de Santa-Cruz Schuhkraft (La Paz:Bolivia:Universidad
Mayor de San Andrs, Instituto de Investigaciones Histricas, 1981), 15860. For an analy-
sis on how these caudillos adhere to free trade or protectionist merchant groups see Paul
Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano:Commercial Policy and the State in Post-independence
Peru (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1989).
160. Statements like the following were common after independence:MERITO PREMIADO.
Una de las principales ventajas de nuestra independencia, es la de que el merito de un ciu-
dadano, sera conocido de cerca por el gobierno y premiado proporcionalmente. As cada
uno tendra un estimulo para la virtud y se desplegarn los talentos y aptitudes con la esper-
anza cierta de la recompenza, El Sol del Cuzco, 16-7-1825.
161. Manuel Aparicio to Antonio Gutirrez de la Fuente. Arequipa, 19-7-1829. BNP, APS, vol. 3,
27. Arequipa Libre, 5-8-1828.
162. Despatches from the United States Ministers to Peru, roll 1, vol. 1, T 52. Report of San
Learned. Lima, 19-11-1829. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,
DC. In their eyes, this situation and the general dislike of republican ideas in Peru had placed
Peru very low in the scale of civilization and public virtue, being in these respects far behind
Chile. Ibid. Lima, 19-12-1829.
163. Jorge Basadre, Los hombres de traje negro, Letras 1 (1929):3051.
164. Santa Cruz ofrece de nuevo su espada Bolivia; esa espada con que dio muerte la Libertad.
Osar Bolivia aceptarla?Bolivianos! El dia que sustituyais un gobierno civil al absoluta-
mente militar, ese dia entrareis en la carrera de la verdadera civilisacion:con la espada se cor-
tan cabezas; no se escriben Leyes! Con ella se derrama la sangre, no se ilustran las naciones;
y el presente siglo lo es de la filosofia, Al publico Americano (Guayaquil:Imprenta de Manuel
Murillo,1838).
165. Que nos libres Seor /De esas cosas que llaman revolucion, /cedicion, faccion, cam-
biamiento, defeccion, /azonada y otras parecidas /Te rogamos, oyenos. El Atalaya,
Cuzco,1833.
Epilogue
1. Claudio Snchez Albornoz, The Drama of the Formation of Spain and Spaniards (Another New
Polemic Venture). (Madrid:Fundacin Universitaria Espaola, 1979),9596.
2. Stendhal, La Cartuja de Parma (Madrid:Alianza Editorial, 2001),159.
3. Vctor Uribe-Urn, Honorable Lives: Lawyers, Family, and Politics in Colombia, 1780-1850
(Pittsburgh, PA:University of Pittsburgh Press,2000).

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Fondo General, 2-1-7-4, 2-1-7-7, 2-1-7-8, 2-1-7-10, 2-1-7-10, 2-1-7-12, 2-1-7-13
RAH:Real Academia de la Historia Coleccin Benito Mata Linares
Estado politico del Reyno del Peru; Govierno sin Leyes:Ministros relajados:Tesores
con pobreza:Fertilidad sin cultivo:Sabiduria desestimada:Milicia Sin
Honor:Ciudades sin Amor Patricio. Madrid, 30 April 1747, vol. 67
(9-9-3/1722).
A RCH IVE S A ND LI BR A R I E S I NLOND ON, UNITED KI NGD OM :

BL:British Library,London
Manuscripts. Add. 20119, 31230, 33545, 33546, 38769, 41544, 51626, 51951, 51621,
51625, 61645, 52193, 52194, 52195,51627
PRO:Public RecordsOffice
FO 72/124, 72/125, 72/138, 72/154, 72/196,72/261
A R C H I V E S A N D L I B R A R I E S I N T H E U N I T E D S TA T E S O F A M E R I C A
USNA:U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. Despatches from
United States Ministers to Peru 1826-1936, microcopy T52, vol.1-5
Yale University, Andean Collection:Boxes 17, 18,32,33
Newspapers
Lima:
La Abeja Republicana (18221823)
Antiargos(1813)
El Argos Constitucional(1813)
Atalaya contra Vitalicios(1828)
El Cometa(1812)
El Conciliador(1830)
Crnica Poltica y Literaria de Lima(1827)
El Depositario (18211825)
La Depositaria(1823)
Diario de Lima (17901793)
Diarios, y memorias de los sucessos principales, y noticias mas sobresalientes enesta
ciudad de Lima, corte del Peru, desde 17 de mayo del ao 1700 hasta fines de Diziembre de
1711 con las que se han recibido por Cartas y gazetas de Europa en el mismo tiempo.
El Duende Republicano(1827)
La Estafeta(1827)
Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima (18101811)
Gaceta de Lima (17431744; 17561765, 17931794)
El Hijo de su Madre(1827)
El Investigador del Per (18111814)
Mercurio Peruano (17911794)
Minerva Peruana (18051810)

El Observador de Lima(1825)
El Pensador del Per(1815)
El Periquito(1822)
El Peruano(1811)
Semanario Crtico(1791)
El Sol del Per (18221823)
El Telgrafo de Lima (18271830)
El Tribuno de la Repblica(1822)
Verdadero Peruano (18121813)
Arequipa:
Arequipa Libre (18271828)
La Estrella de Ayacucho(1825)
El Nacional(1832)
La Primavera de Arequipa(1825)
El Republicano (18251834)
El Restaurador(1834)
El Revisor(1831)
Cuzco:
El Atalaya(1833)
La Brjula(1831)
El Correo de Encomiendas (18321835)
El Depositario (18211825)
El Duende del Cuzco(1830)
Minerva del Cuzco (18291831)
El Observador(1832)
El Rayo de la Justicia(1828)
El Sol del Cuzco (18251832)
Spain:
Aurora de Espaa(1820)
La Aurora de las Espaas(1820)
El Censor (18201822)
El Centinela de la Constitucin Espaola(1813)
El Clarn de los Liberales(1814)
El Conciso (18101814)
El Correo de Sevilla(1820)
Diario de la Corte(1823)
Diario de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias (18101813)
Diario Gaditano (18201822)
El Duende de los Cafs (18131814)
El Espaol (18101814)
El Espaol Libre (18131814)
El Espectador Sevillano (18091810)
El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios que se Publican en Europa (17871791)
Gaceta de Madrid (18181824)
Los Ingleses en Espaa(1813)
Ocios de Espaoles Emigrados(1824)
La Periodicomana (18201821)
El Redactor General de Cdiz (1811, 18131814)
El Restaurador (1834)
El Telgrafo Americano(1811)
El Universal Observador(1820)
Variedades o Mensagero de Londres (18231825)
El Voto de la Nacin Espaola(1809)
El Zurriago(1822)

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INDEX
Note:Page numbers in italics indicate photographs and illustrations.
Abarca de Bolea, Pedro Pablo, conde de Aranda, scholarly attention to,248n2

24, 51, 6667,78,92 and size of army,251n47
Abascal, Fernando de,143 and Spanish counterinsurgency efforts,18283
background,141 and Unnue,196
and Blanco Whites writings,129 Abeja Republicana, 190,191
career summary,248n1 Abreu, Manuel,187
and Charcas upheavals, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, Absolutists, 177,181
149, 152, 163, 164,166 Academia de Guardias Marinas de Cdiz,26
and Chile upheavals, 145, 147, 151, 159, 161,162 Academia de Matemticas de Barcelona,5556
conflicts with caudillos,15253 Academia Lauretana de Ciencias y Artes de
conflicts with lawyers,15962 Arequipa,193
and constitutional elections in Peru,16268 Acadmie Franaise, Paris, France,15,36
and control of newspapers and literature, Acadmie Royale des Sciences, Paris, France,31
15359,249n14 Acebedo, Toms Alvarezde,25
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,139 African slave trade, 910,22
and the Cuzco rebellion, 159, 161,16569 Aguilar, Gabriel de,11112
and enlistment of castas in the army,142, 143, Aguilar Ubalde conspiracy,151
148, 150, 250n34 Alberoni, Giulio (Cardinal),40
and expansion of military in Peru, Alcntara lvarez de Toledo, Pedro de, Duque del
14247,14752 Infantado,128
and factionalism after Peruvian Aldana, Fernando Lpez, 155,15758
independence,18791 Alembert, Jean Le Rondd,59
and Goyeneche, 141, 144, 146, 14850, AlfonsoX,152
15253, 159, 16364, 167, 250n33,251n54 Aliaga, Diego de, 188,195
and Guayaquil upheavals,151 Alto Peru, 146,167
and imperial competition between France and Alvarado, Felipe Antonio,191
England,11920 Alvarez, Jos Leandro de,99
and informants,153 Alvarez, Juan Manuelde,79
and insurgent movements,14647 lvarez de Abreu y Bertodano, Jaime Alberto,53
and legacy of military dictatorship,204 Alvarez del Villar, Antonio,188
and loan requests,251n54 Alzamora, Joaquin,99101
and military successes,251n47 Amat y Junyent, Manuel de, 6768,78
and Quito upheavals,147 American Revolution, 20, 2627,109
and restoration of Ferdinand VII,170 Anchoris, Ramn Eduardo,164
and reward systems,250n33 Aner, Felipe,135
and Rio de la Plata upheavals, 141, 142, 144, 145, Angulo, Jos de,16869
147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 156, 159, 163, 164,166 Angulo, Vicente de,16869
301

302 Index
Anson, George,17 Bacon, Francis,36,37

Anti-argos,15859 Ballesteros, Francisco,171
Antilln, Isidoro,128 Baqujano y Carrillo, Jos, count of Vistaflorida,
Antiteatro crtico (versus Feijo),37 46, 54, 86, 87, 88, 95, 98, 107, 154,162
Aparicio, Manuel,201 Baqujano y Carrillo, Juan,25,32
Arana, Miguel Geronimode,71 Barcelona, Spain, 21, 45, 55, 141, 171,173
Aranda, Count. See Abarca de Bolea, Pedro Pablo, Baroque aesthetic,85
conde deAranda Barreda y Benavides, Mara Josefade,20
Aranjuez mutiny,145 Barroeta, Pedro Antonio de, 50
arbitrios (treaties),1112 Basques,23,26
arbitristas,13 Batalln de Infantera de milicias pardas de
Arce, Mariano Jos de,18889 Guayaquil,73,74
Areche, Antonio de,8789 Batalln de Morenos Libres de la Habana,73
Arequipa,Peru Batalln Numancia, 185
and Abascals military expansion, 148, Battle of Ayacucho, 181,194
14950,152 Battle of Bailn,123
and anniversary of independence,201 Battle of Trafalgar, 113, 11819, 123, 142,148
and battles for independence,184 Bausate y Mesa, Jaime, 29, 30,9397
and Bourbon administrative reforms,20 Bjar, Gabriel de,168
and Bourbon military reforms,78 Belgrano, Manuel, 153, 166,168
and constitutional elections, 163,16566 Bello, Antonio,102
and the Cuzco rebellion, 168,169 Beresford, William Carr, 119,142
and departure of Spanish military,195 Bermejo, Josef, 99100,102
and ecclesiastical reform, 50, 55, 57, 86, 87,108 Black Legend,3839
and legal system reforms,108 Blake, Agustn,155
literacy rates in,231n2 Blanc, Pedro, 100,101
and Napoleonic invasion of Spain,144 Blanco, Jos Mara (BlancoWhite)
and Spanish imperial trade,18 and Aldanas writings,158
and support for La Serna,193 and Cortes of Cadiz debates, 136,13840
Argentina independence,183 and El Espaol, 128130, 13940,245n58
Argos,15859 and Flrez Estrada,178
Argelles, Agustn de,134 influence on Spanish liberalism,12733
Aristotle,36 and Olavarrieta,18081
Arjona, Manuel Mara de,127 Bogot, Colombia,31
Army of Alto Peru. See Royal Army of AltoPeru Bolvar, Simn,194
Artigas, Jos de,17273 campaign against royalist forces,19295
asiento, 9,16,41 and constitution for life,2
Atahualpa Inca in political literature,124 and Espartero,18182
audiencias and military coups,19192
and Abascals conflicts with lawyers,161 and Peruvian independence,19698
and Abascals governance strategy,159 and Riegos mutiny, 171,173
and Abascals military policies, 14546, and Santa Cruz,201
148,151 and Spanish counterinsurgency efforts,178
and Bourbon administrative reforms,1920 and Spanish education system,26
and Bourbon military reforms,78 Bourbon monarchy
and conspiracies and coup attempts,11113 and administrative reforms, 1216,1821
and constitutional elections in Peru,16568 and ecclesiastical reforms, 13, 14, 18, 31, 34, 35,
and Spanish counterinsurgency 37, 39, 47, 49, 50, 103, 107,109
efforts,178 and education reforms,2325
and War of Spanish Succession,13 and financial reforms, 21,42,47
Augustine of Hippo,50 and imperial goals, 1011, 28, 29,3033
Aurora de Espaa, 176,179 and naval reforms, 14,15,41
Austrian War of Succession,42 and scope of study,15
Autoridad soberana,106 and trade reforms,2123
Avils, Gabriel de, 78,149 and War of Spanish Succession,910, 12
avisos (notices),9394 Brevsima relacin de la destruccin de las Indias
ayacuchos, 18183,186 (Las Casas),38

Index 303
Britain Campomanes, Pedro Rodrguezde

and Bourbon administrative reforms,20 and Bourbon military reforms,78
and circulation of subversive literature,90 and the Consejo Extraordinario,24
expansionism, 1617, 141,183 and creation of meritocracy, 4751, 5253,55
and free trade in the Americas,183 and Feijo,221n74
invasions of Buenos Aires, 77, 9091, 119, and Flrez Estrada,132
142,144 and legal system reforms,103
and military resistance in Spain,121 and men of letters as political actors,84
naval power, 19, 142,186 and the newspaper industry,2932
and Spanish counterinsurgency efforts,178 and religious reforms,35
and the War of Spanish Succession,9 and sociedades,30,31
British South Sea Company,9,14 and the War of Spanish Succession,13
Bueno, Cosme,54 Canary Islands, 22,122
Buenos Aires, Argentina Canon law, 103,107
and Abascals career,248n1 Canterac, Jos de, 182, 185, 186, 193,194
British invasions of, 77, 82, 9091, 119, Cauelo, Luis, 57,58,59
142,144 Caracas, Venezuela, 16, 22, 46, 119, 123, 130, 140,
and creation of Consejo de Regencia,159 14445,178
Goyeneches arrival in,145 Caravel, Arequipa,166
and imperial mail system,28 Carbajal, Juan de,168
and independence movements,147 Carbonario,175
and military subsidies,68 carlistas,181
Burges, James Bland,90 Carlota Joaquina, Queen consort of Portugal,
Burke, Edmund, 129,132 Brazil and Algarves,145
Burlamaqui, Jean Jacques, 104,105 Carratal, Jos de,182
Burning of the Town of Payta, The (Muller),17 Cartagena, Colombia, 17, 22, 28, 65, 78,121
Cartas eruditas (Feijo),35
Cartas marruecas (Cadalso),5960
Caballero y Gngora, Antonio,50 Casa de Contratacin,16
cabildos Castaos, Javier, 123, 15253,155
and battles for Peruvian independence, castas
185,193 and Bourbon military reforms, 2, 64, 66,
and Bourbon administrative reforms,19 67,7277
and Bourbon military reforms, 63, 67, and creation of meritocracy,51
79,14445 and expansion of military in Peru,149
and constitutional elections in Peru,165 and the franchise, 131,135
and creation of Consejo de Regencia,159 and franchise debates,135
and creation of meritocracy,55 and military advancement,184
and expansion of military in Peru,15051 Castelli, Juan Jos,147
and factionalism after Peruvian Castillo, Florencio del,134
independence,187 Castro, Ignacio de,54,55
and militarization of political Catalonia, 12,1314
authority,16667 caudillos
caciques and civilization vs. barbarism
and Bourbon administrative reforms,21 framework,252n59
and Bourbon military reforms, 68,74,76 conflicts among,181
and creation of meritocracy, 4344,219n53 conflicts with Abascal,15253
and the Cuzco rebellion,16768 and conspiracies and coup attempts,111
and education reforms,23 and expansion of military in Peru,148
and expansion of military in Peru,15051 and factionalism after Peruvian
Cadalso, Jos de, 5960,105 independence,187
Cadiz Constitution. See Constitution of 1812 and French invasion of Spain,120
(Cadiz Constitution) and loyalism, 14142, 148, 152,185
Caf de Laurencini,175, 176 and military reorganization,184
Cagigal, Franciscode,66 and military rule in Peru, 201,203
Campillo y Cosso, Jos de, 1314, 4041, 4546, and Peruvian independence,198
51, 55, 81, 107,161 and Riegos mutiny,172

304 Index
censorship of the press, 59, 89, 9192, 97, 128, Consejo de Indias,16
129,15557 Consejo de Regencia de Espaa e Indias, 119, 123,
centralization ofpower 125, 129, 130, 133, 138,159
and Bourbon administrative reforms,1314 Consejo Extraordinario,24
and Bourbon military reforms, 62, 63,6568 conspiracies, 10914, 163, 168,203
and the War of Spanish Succession, 10,11,18 constitutionalism, 126, 167, 175, 177, 179,
Charcas province, 79, 108, 124, 141, 14447, 149, 186,261n78
151, 16364,193 constitutional monarchy, 1, 109, 135, 136,138
Charles Iof Spain (V of Holy Roman Empire),11 Constitution of 1812 (Cadiz Constitution), 137,174
Charles II of Spain,9,11 and Abascals governance strategy, 154,15859
Charles III ofSpain abolition of,16970
and Bourbon administrative reforms,1819 arrival in Cuzco,167
and Bourbon military reforms,63,65 and battles for Peruvian independence, 185,193
and the Consejo Extraordinario,2425 Cortes debates on,13340
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,139 and doceaistas, 174,258n12
and creation of meritocracy, 46,48,50 and political revolution in Spanish America,125
and education reforms,23 restoration of,171
and growth of newspaper industry,30,93 and restoration of Ferdinand VII,173
and influence of Freemasonry,32 and tensions with Spanish America,133
and legal system reforms, 103,106 Constitution of 1822,186
and the War of Spanish Succession, 11, consulados, 1516, 2122,151
13,16,18 contraband trade,16,78
Charles IV of Spain, 11, 62, 78, 82, 117, 120, 122, Convictorio de San Carlos, 107, 164,190
15657,158 corregidores,14,43
Charles XII of Sweden,88 Correo de Madrid,59
Charterhouse of Parma, The (Stendhal),203 corruption
Chavaneau, Francisco,53 and Aldanas writings,158
Chvez de la Rosa, Pedro Jos, Bishop of Arequipa and Bourbon military reforms, 64, 67,69,78
and creation of meritocracy, 37, 55,5758 and conspiracies and coup attempts,
and educational reform,50,55 10910,11112
checks and balances, 53, 78, 151, 173, and Cortes of Cadiz debates,138
178,185 and creation of meritocracy, 43,45,60
Chuquicallata, Carlos,7677 and early writings of Spanish Liberals,127
church reforms, 3, 46,4950 and factionalism after Peruvian
Cicero,54,90 independence,190
Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid, 18,156 and Flrez Estradas writings,17879
Cisneros, Diego fray,95,98 and the French invasion of Spain,120
civil courts,7879 and independence movements,156
Cochabamba,164 and limeo elite,194
Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 15, 23,31,40 and Pezuela,182
Colegio de abogados, Lima, Peru (school for and political revolution in Spanish
lawyers),108 America,12324
Comisario Real de Guerra y Marina (Milhau),39 protests against,166
Comisin de Guerra,134 and Riegos mutiny,176
communication reforms,2830 and rise of political oration,88
Compaa de Filipinas, 22,56,96 and subversive literature,91
Compaa de Hsares de Dragones de Tinta,150 and support for independence,181
Comuneros (Spanish Lodge),17577 Corts, Francisco Javier,200
Comuneros, rebellion of (New Granada),26 Corts, Hernn,65
Concordato of 1753,18,48 Cortes ofSpain
Condado, Manuel Joaqun de,105 and Blanco Whites writings,12931
Condillac, tienne Bonnotde,54 and calls for American representation,17880
Condorcanqui, Jos Gabriel, 21. See also Tpac and constitutional elections in Peru,163
Amaru Rebellion and Constitution of Cadiz debates,13340
conquistadors,65,80 and factionalism after Peruvian
Consejo de Castilla, 14, 48 independence,190
Consejo de Estado, 78 and French invasion of Spain, 118,12122

Index 305
and political revolution in Spanish Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 91,
America,12325 110,131
Riegos appointment to,177 deism,53
and Riegos mutiny, 17173,175 derecho natural y de gentes,1058
Corts y Larraz, Pedro,50 Descartes, Ren,37
Cosso, Mateode,26 Devoti, Flix, 158, 187,188
Counter-Reformation,50 Diario Curioso,93
Count of la Vega del Ren,161 Diario de Lima, 29, 92, 9396,98
Count of Revillagigedo,66 Diario de Madrid,92,93
Creoles Diario Gaditano,180
and battles for independence,18486 Daz, Pedro,143
and Blanco Whites writings,132 Daz Porlier, Juan,173
and Bourbon administrative Dez, Juan Martn (El Empecinado), 124,
reforms,1922 152,155
and Bourbon military reforms,8182 Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (Rousseau),91
and creation of sociedades,32 discursos, 3537, 48, 49, 5659, 91,104
and expansion of military in Peru,149 Don Quixote (Cervantes),12
and the fuero militar privilege,229n95 Dutch Republic,9
and growth of newspaper industry,95 economic societies,53
and letrados, 237n127 education systems and reforms
and military advancement,152 and Bourbon military reforms, 36, 81,14445
and Sociedad Patritica,18889 and Cortes of Cadiz debates,13435
and Spanish education system,2627 and creation of meritocracy, 34, 3839, 43,
and unrest in Rio de la Plata,14445 5156,61
and the War of Spanish Succession,10 and early writings of Spanish Liberals,127
criminal punishments,71 and imperial elites,2328
Croix, Teodorode and legal system reforms,1045
background,226n40 and scope of Bourbon reforms,3
and Bourbon military reforms,68,75 and university reforms, 18, 24, 31, 33, 34,
career summary,220n72 3637, 47, 49, 5152, 5455, 60, 8487, 90,
and creation of meritocracy,54 1038,109
and legal system reforms,107 and the War of Spanish Succession,12
and rise of political oration,89
and university curricula, 239n159
Cromwell, Oliver,138 Egaa, Marianode,95, 101
crusades,177 Ejrcito Nacional del Per,192
Cuba El Anillo de Oro,175
and Bourbon administrative reforms,20 El Antimilitar Oficial,125
and Bourbon military reforms, 2, 62, 64, 6668, El clebre Washington,57
6973, 7576,7778 El Censor, 53, 5758, 92,17980
and repression of juntas,14748 El Censor Americano,179
and Spanish trade reforms,22 El Cid, 80,120
Cuzco,Peru El Conciso, 126,132
and Bourbon military reforms, 7677,80 El Depositario,190
and conspiracies and coup El Despertador Jerezano,17576
attempts,11012 El Diario Secreto de Lima,157
and creation of meritocracy,55 elections, 16270, 165, 171, 190,203
and investigations into revolutionary El Empecinado ( Juan Martn Dez), 124,
sentiment,101 152,155
La Sernas control of,19293 El Espaol, 12830, 139,140
and legal system reforms,108 El Espaol Libre,125
rebellion, 159, 161,16569 El Espectador Sevillano,127
El Espritu de los Mejores Diarios que se Publican
en Europa,91,92
Dalrympe, William,69 El Gobierno Poltico,4445
Danton, Georges, 91,110 El Grande Oriente,175
dead letter (letra muerta),64 El Investigador,159

306 Index
Elo, Francisco Javier de, 139, 145, 164,17273 Espoz y Mina, Francisco,173
eloquence, 8586, 90, 91, 133, 158, 160, 162, 173, Estado poltico del Reyno del Peru,45
175, 17677, 190,195 Estatutos de la Universidad de Coimbra,50
El Pensador del Per,159 Estudios Reales de San Isidro, 12,25,26
El Periquito,191 ethnic diversity
El Peruano, 15253, 15657, 159,161 and Abascals military reforms,14243
El Redactor General de Cdiz,126 and Bourbon military reforms, 6364, 67,
El Satlite del Peruano,15758 7273,75,80
El Seminario Patritico,128 eulogies, 85, 8788, 92, 120,154
El Sol del Cuzco, 196,201 exaltados, 17577, 18081,186
El Sol del Per,188 Eximeno, Antoniode,56
El sueo de la razn produce monstruos Eyzaguirre, Agustn de,16162
(Goya),113 Eyzaguirre, Miguel de, 43, 155,16062
El Tribuno,190
El Tribuno de la Repblica Peruana,190
El Tribuno del Pueblo Espaol,133 factionalism
El Universidad Observador,176, 179 and Cortes of Cadiz debates,136
El Verdadero Peruano, 158, 165,188 and the Cuzco rebellion,167
Emile (Rousseau),97 and death of Ferdinand VII,181
Encalada, Manuel Blanco,25 and defeat of Pezuelas expedition,183
Encyclopdie ou Dictionnaire Raisonn des Sciences, and foreign pressures in Peru,203
des Arts et des Mtiers,86,88 and French invasion of Spain,118
England, 9. See also Britain and growth of newspaper industry,9798
Enlightenment and legal system reforms,106
and Bourbon military reforms,80,82 and Peruvian independence, 147, 18586,
and circulation of subversive literature,91 190,197
and creation of meritocracy,38 and restoration of Ferdinand VII,177
and rise of political actors,114 and Riegos mutiny,172
and early writings of Spanish Liberals, 35, and the War of Spanish Succession,10
126,127 Fajardo Saavedra, Diegode,27
and educational reform,49 Family Pact, 16,1819
and freemasonry,32 Feijo y Montenegro, Benito Jernimode
influence on rise of political and creation of meritocracy, 3539, 40, 47, 49,
actors, 203,204 52, 56,5859
and Las Luces, 49, 94, 110,249n17 and growth of newspaper industry,94
and legal system reforms,103 and legal system reforms,1034
and lumires,86 and new military values,8081
and liberal values among soldiers,196 popularity of writings,217n3
and military education,13435 and rise of political oratory, 87
and the newspaper industry,30 (see also discursos)
Peruvian writers, 38,91,98 Feli, Ramn, 107,163
and rise of political oration,85 Ferdinand VI, 11, 13, 18, 37,45,47
and social reform,3 FerdinandVII
South American writers,82 and Abascals expansion of military in Peru,151
Episodios nacionales (Prez Galdos),163 and Cortes of Cadiz debates,140
Eruditos de la violeta (Cadalso),105 counterinsurgency efforts,178
Erudito y Comercial de Madrid,93 death of, 181,203
Escandn, Ignacio,39 and French invasion of Spain, 117,121
Escao, Antonio de,123 imprisonment of Olavarrieta,180
Escobedo, Jorge,45 and military purges,17273
Escuela de San Fernando,154 restoration,16970
Espada y Landa, Juan Jos Daz,32 and Riegos mutiny, 175,177
Espaa despierta (Campillo),42 Fernandez, Juan Antonio,147
Espartero, Baldomero, 181, 182,203 Fernndez de Crdova, Manuel,169
Espinoza, Josef, friar,79 Fernndez de Len, Esteban,123
Espritu de los Mejores Diarios que se Publican en Fierro, Pancho, 199,200
Europa, 57,91,92 Filangieri, 111,112

Index 307
financial reforms, 21,42,47 and Bourbon military reforms, 62, 67, 78,
Flrez, Toms,158 79,8182
Flrez Estrada, Alvaro, 13233, 138,178 and circulation of subversive literature,92
Floridablanca, Jos Moino y Redondo, conde de, and conspiracies and coup attempts, 10910,
13, 53, 92, 98, 103, 106,122 111,113
flotas (convoys),15 and creation of meritocracy, 54,219n53
Foronda, Valentnde,53 and expansion of military in Peru,151
Fournier, Carlos, 99100,1012 and Flrez Estrada,132
Fox, Henry Richard Vassall and French invasion of Spain, 12021,123
(Baron Holland),12830 and fuero militar debate,135
Frederick the Great, 40, 56,67,80 and growth of newspaper industry,98
Freemasonry, 3233, 53, 17577,18788 and imperial mail system,28
free trade, 44, 110, 133, 151,183 and peace treaty with France,118
French Revolution and Spanish education system,25,26
and Aldanas writings,157 Gorrichtegui, Agustn de, 86, 87,107
and Bourbon military reforms,62 Goya, Francisco de,113
and creation of meritocracy,54 Goyeneche, Jos Manuelde
and the Haitian Revolution,118 and Abascals military policies, 141,14445
and investigations into revolutionary background,14445
sentiment,98102 and Charcas upheavals, 149, 150, 153, 159,
and legal system reforms,109 164,168
and the newspaper industry,29 and conspiracies and rebellions in Peru,16364
and Spanish education system,26 and the Cuzco rebellion,16769
Friends of Order (Amigos Del Orden),179 and expansion of army in Peru,14851
fueros and independence movements,
and creation of meritocracy, 34, 44, 14647,15253
49,51 and Manuel Godoy, 144,145
and the fuero militar, 6365, 7071, 73, 7780, and military rule in Peru,201
1089, 13436, 149, 161, and problems with lawyers, 159, 163,164
228n62,229n95 and Pumacahua, 150,152
and legal system reforms,108 and Rio de la Plata upheavals, 145, 148, 153,
and standing of military leaders,172 164,168
and the War of Spanish and Spanish education system,26
Succession,1314 and wealth,149
Funes de Villalpando, Ambrosio, conde de Goyeneche, Juan de, 20,22,81
Ricla,66 Grotius, Hugo,104
Guadalajara, Mexico, 22, 141,248n1
Guamanga,101
Gaceta de Lima, 29, 5657,82,99 Guanajuato, Mexico,139
Gaceta de Madrid,2829 Guatemala,22,31
galleons,15 Guayaquil, Ecuador,151
Glvez, Jos de, 13, 25,47,88 guerrillas, 121,192
Gamarra, Agustn, 64, 148, 18485, 195, guilds,49
197201,203 Guirior, Manuel de, 5455, 75, 100,
Gandara, Miguel Antonio de la,13,23 220n72,227n41
Grate, Tadeo,163 Gutirrez de La Fuente, Antonio, 193, 195,
Garcs Chillitupa, Francisco,76 198,201
Garcs Chillitupa, Jose Mariano,108 Guzmn y Pimentel, Gaspar de. See Olivares,
Garca Camba, Andrs,182 Gaspar de Guzmn, conde-duquede
Garca Carrasco, Francisco de,147
Garca de Len y Pizarro, Ramn,146
Garca del Ro, Juan,188 Habsburg monarchy
gazettes, 45, 5354,8182 and the Papal States,18
Gil de Castro, Jos,197 and the War of Spanish Succession,1012
Glorious Revolution, England, 40,138 haciendas, 142,192
Godoy, Manuelde Haiti,118
and Abascals military policies,14445 Havana, Cuba, 19, 22, 28, 3132, 46,62,65

308 Index
Heineccius, Johan Gottlieb, 104,1067 Jacobinism,140

Hermosilla, Jos de,179 Jansen, Cornelius,50
hidalgo,41 Jansenism, 50, 53, 54, 107,127
Hidalgo de Cisneros , Balthasar,147 Juregui, Agustnde,86
Histoire Philosophique (Raynal),88 Jesuits
Hobbes, Thomas,104 and Bourbon administrative reforms,21
hojas de mrito (merit records),4647 and creation of meritocracy, 35, 4748,
Holy Alliance,177 5051,53
honor, 41, 63, 67, 6970,72,80 expulsion of, 21, 23, 2425, 35, 51,
House of Commons (Britain),6061 53,55,90
Huancayo Peru,164 Joseph (brother of Napoleon),120
Hunuco rebellion, 161,164 Jovellanos, Melchor Gaspar de, 33, 103, 11920,
Hume, David,30 122, 132,158
Hurtado de Mendoza, Manuel,168 Juan, Jorge, 13, 15, 23, 25, 35, 45, 56,158
Junta Central, 119, 12223, 128, 129,
13031,159
Idea General del Per (Rossi y Rub),95 Junta de Censuras,159
Iguan, Jos Flix de,198 Junta de Sevilla, 122,129
Incas (symbolsof) Junta Superior Provisional Gubernativa de las
and battles for Peruvian independence,193 Provincias del Rio de la Plata,147
and Cuzco rebellion,112 Junta Suprema del Reino de Granada,147
and Peninsular propaganda, 193,196 Junta Suprema de Sevilla,155
and wars of independence,187 Junta Suprema de Espaa e Indias,122
Indaburu, Juan Pedro,147 Justinian,107
Indians
and Abascals governance strategies,16061
and Bourbon military reforms, 2, 6364, 6768, La Abeja,190
72,7477 La Corua, Spain, 22, 28, 132,171
and conspiracies and coup attempts,113 Lacy, Luis,173
and conspiracies and rebellions in Peru,16364 La Depositaria,192
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,136 La Estrella de Ayacucho,196
and creation of meritocracy, 39, 4345,51,55 La Fontana de Oro,175
and the Cuzco rebellion,16769 Laguna, Gregorio,135
and denunciations of their mistreatment, 39, 45, La Mar, Jos de, 26, 18386, 191, 198,201
87, 113, 125, 126, 160,161 Larrazbal y Arrivillaga, Antonio,135
and early writings of Spanish Liberals,126 Larriva, Joaqun,154
and enlistment in the army, 67, 72, 74, 75, 76, Las Casas, Bartolom de, 43, 12627,139
77, 148, 149, 184,192 Las Casas, Luis de, 3132,38
and expansion of military in Peru,14850 La Serna, Josde
and growth of newspaper industry,96 background and military career, 182,260n53
and military advancement,184 and battles for Peruvian independence,
and plans of reform, 43,44,55 18486,19294
and political revolution in Spanish America,125 and Domingo Tristn,166
and rise of political oration,8788 and factionalism after Peruvian independence,
and royalist military units,192 187,18990
See also caciques; mestizos and Gamarra,261n71
Inmemorial del Rey infantry units,75 Las Palmas, Canarias,7778
Inquisition Las Siete Partidas,160
and Abascals governance strategy,154 Lavalle, Jos Antoniode,26
censorship,8990 lawyers
and Freemasonry,3233 and Abascals governance strategy, 154,
and restoration of Ferdinand VII,173 15962,16970
insurgents,15354 and Abascals military policies,143
intendancy system, 4344, 49, 68, 79, 103,166 conflicts with Goyeneche,152
Irisarri, Antonio Jos de,179 and conspiracies and rebellions in Peru,
Isabel de Farnesio, Duchess of Parma,40,42 147,163
Isabella II of Spain,181 and the Cuzco rebellion,167
Italy, 16, 17,40,66 and expansion of military in Peru,149

Index 309
and pressure for local autonomy,14547 Mably, Gabrial Bonnot de,133

and public speeches,87,89 Macanaz, Melchor Rafael de, 13, 14, 4041,107
and revolutionary sentiment, 100103, 105, Macchiavelli, Niccol,27,90
1069, 11112,114 mail systems,28,45
and rise of men of letters,8485 Mlaga, Spain,22,47
and subversive literature, 91,157 Malaspina, Alejandro de,32,95
Learned, Samuel,201 mal gobierno (bad government),43
Lechuga, Mariano,11213 Mallorca,1314
Legion of Honor,159 Manila, Philippines, 19, 31,62,65
letrados (lettered men), 1112, 80, 85, 92, Mara Luisa,120
103,146 Maritegui, Francisco Javier, 18889,
Lettre aux Espagnols-Amricains,90 190,191
Leyes de Indias,107 Marin, Joachin, 1034,106
Liberal Constitution (Peru, 1828),198 Mrmol, Manuel Mara de,127
liberalism martial ideals in the eighteenth century,91
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,13340 Martnez Compan y Bujanda, Baltasar
and early writings of Spanish Liberals,12633 Jaime, 37, 43, 4950, 55
and French invasion of Spain, 34, Masiel, Juan Baltasar,89
11718,12023 Masonic lodges. See Freemasonry
and imperial competition between France and Mata Linares, Benito de la, 11213,16667
England,11820 Melgar, Mariano,169
and political unrest in Spanish America,12326 Mendiburu, Manuel de,184
limeos Mendiola, Mariano,135
and Abascals governance strategy,15556 men of arms. See military reforms; military skills
and Abascals governing style,162 and education; specific individuals
and battles for Peruvian independence, 185, men of letters. See specific individuals
19394, 196,198 merchants, 1618,41
and Bourbon military reforms,80 Mercurio Peruano
and creation of meritocracy, 3738, and Bourbon military reforms,81,82
4546,51 and creation of meritocracy, 4243,49,57
and creation of sociedades,32 and growth of newspaper industry, 29,
and factionalism after Peruvian 92,9498
independence,18889 and Spanish education system,27
and newspapers, 29, 9394, 96, 99,235n74 merit and meritocracy
and rise of political oration,86,88 and Bourbon military reforms, 6263, 67,
and Spanish counterinsurgency 6971, 7576,81
efforts,18283 and bureaucratic reforms,4047
Liniers, Santiago de, 82, 119, 142, and education reforms, 3435, 4751,
14447,159 5156
Lista, Alberto, 12627,179 and Enlightenment ideals,3539
literacy rates in Peru,84 and political speech writing,95,96
Llano Zapata, Jos Eusebio del, 35, 3840,54 and public speeches,86,87
Locke, John,30,36 and revolutionaries, 110,112
Lope de Vega, Flix,92 and rise of men of letters,84
Lpez Aldana, Fernando, 155, 157,188 and social tensions,5661
Lo que hay de ms y de menos en Espaa Townsend on,6061
(Campillo),42 Mesa Inca Yupanqui, Bartolom de,2728
Lorenzana, Francisco Antonio (Archbishop of mestizos
Mexico),4950 Abascal on,250n43
Los Reales Ejrcitos del Per,148 and Bourbon military reforms, 6364, 67,
LouisXIV 7476,79
and creation of meritocracy,40 and conspiracies and rebellions in Peru,163
and education reforms,23 and creation of meritocracy,5556
and the War of Spanish Succession, 9,1315 and the Cuzco rebellion,16768
loyalty, 63, 69, 71,113 and defeat of Pezuelas expedition,183
Luna Pizarro, Francisco Javier de, 96, 18889, and education reforms,23
190,198 and expansion of military in Peru, 148,150

310 Index
mestizos (cont.) and political revolution in Spanish

and legal system reforms,108 America,12324
and military advancement,18485 and Spanish reform pressures,62
and Peruvian independence,198 Napoleonic Wars, 148,15455
and royalist military units,192 Nario, Antonio,91
and Spanish education system,27 Narvez, Ramn Mara,18182
Mexico, 5, 65, 67, 135, 138,17172 natural law, 104, 105, 107, 156,160
Mier, Servando Teresa de,13940 natural rights,43
Milhau, Luis,39 natural science,36
military commissions,13 naval officers,15
military reforms Navarra province, 1314,21
and creation of meritocracy,46,47 navos de permiso (licensed merchant ships),9
and French invasion of Spain,6263 Necochea, Pedro Josde,37
and the fuero militar, 6365, 7071, 73, 7780, Neoclassicism,85
1089, 13536, 149,161 nepotism,47
and legislative measures,6469 Netherlands,16
and political revolution in Spanish America,125 New Granada
public regard for military figures,8083 and Bourbon military reforms,229n95
and scope of study,25 and British expansionism,16
social effects of,6977 and expansion of Bolvars army, 192,260n52
military skills and education, 36, 5556, and legacy of military dictatorship,204
81,14445 and patriotic societies,31
Miller, Guillermo,184 and restoration of Ferdinand VII,178
Miano, Sebastin de,179 and Riegos mutiny,171
Minerva Peruana, 82,15455 and Spanish counterinsurgency
Mirabeau, Honor-Gabriel de Riqueti, comte efforts,18283
de,101 and Spanish education system,2628
Miranda, Francisco de, 90, 11819,144 and subversive literature,91
Monet, Jos Antonio,182 and Taboadas vice-regency,220n72
Monteagudo, Bernardo, 124, 18790, 191,19394 newspapers
Montealegre, Josef de,2627 and Abascals governance strategy,15455
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de, 59, and creation of meritocracy, 4243, 4445,
88,1045 5354, 5657,5758
Morales Durez, Vicente, 54, 107, 134, and factionalism after Peruvian
135,16263 independence,18890
Moreno, Jos Ignacio, 164,18889 and French invasion of Spain,12021
morenos, 143,14950 and imperial mail system,2830
Morillo, Pablo, 171, 178, 18082,260n52 and political revolution in Spanish
Moscoso, Jos Gabriel, 165,169 America,12425
Mox y Francol, Benito Mara de, 50, 82,144 and Riegos mutiny, 175,176
mulattos, 63, 73,162 and support for American
Muller, Johann Sebastien,17 independence,181
Muatones y Salazar, Manuel de,102 Newton, Isaac, 36, 37,54,56
Muxia, Miguel,184 Nieto, Vicente,146
Ninavilca (guerrilla leader),198
nobility titles,41,94
Naples,9,16 Northern Italy,17
Napoleon Bonaparte Northern Spain,2223
and Abascals military policies, 142, 144,145 Nueva Granada. See New Granada
and Abascals war policies,15051 Nueva Heloisa,131
Bolvar compared to,19697 Nuevo sistema de gobierno econmico para la
and Bourbon military reforms,8283 Amrica (Campillo),4243
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,138
defeat of,16970
and Flrez Estradas career,13233 Ocios de Espaoles Emigrados,181
and French invasion of Spain, 3,12023 OHiggins, Ambrosio, 27, 79,183
imperial competition between France and oidores, 19, 45, 79, 103, 14546, 155,167
England,11819 Olaeta, Pedro Antonio de, 18485,195

Index 311
Olavarrieta, Juan Antonio, 29, 30, 9698,180 and Pezuela,18384

Olavide, Pablo de, 3233, 48, 52,103 and the War of Spanish Succession,18
Olivares, Gaspar de Guzmn, conde-duque de, 12, Pecchi, Giuseppe, count, 175,176
14, 25, 46,5152 Pelayo, 120,158
Olmedo, Jos Joaqun de, 107, 163,191 Peaflorida, Count of, 26,3031
Oracin apologtica dicha en la Plaza de Toros de Peralta y Barnuevo, Pedro,37
Madrid,10910 Peralta y Rivera, Jos Antoniode,26
oradores (orators), 8590, 177,19091 Pereira, Luis Marcelino,57
oratoria sagrada (sacred oratory),85 Prez Galds, Benito, 163, 175
oratorical styles,8586 Persian Empire,56
Ordenanzas del ejrcito para su regimen, disciplina y Persian Letters (Montesquieu),59,88
subordinacin (1768), 63, 6467, 6972, 76, Persians manifesto (manifiesto de los persas),173
77,134 Peru
Orden de Carlos III,20 and Abascals background,141
Orden del Sol,18788 and Abascals conflicts with lawyers,16062
Orden de Santiago,42 and Abascals governance strategy,15359
OReilly, Alejandro, 66,67,80 battles for independence, 192202
Orry, Jean,14 and Bourbon administrative reforms,19,22
Ortiz, Fernando,32 and Bourbon military reforms, 2, 6264, 6769,
Osorio, Mariano, 169,183 72, 7476, 7778, 7980,8182
Ostolaza, Blas, 135,163 constitutional elections in,16268
and the Cuzco rebellion, 159, 161,16569
expansion of army in,14751
packet boats,4445 and expansion of military in Peru,15152
Paillardele, Enrique,166 factionalism after independence,18692
paisanos,148 liberal opposition to militaryin,4
Palafox, Jos de,120 men of letters in,23
Palafox y Melci, Jos de Rebolledo de, duque de and restoration of Ferdinand VII,16970
Zaragoza, 120, 121,155 and scope of study,45
pamphlets and Spanish education system,27
and Abascals governance strategy,153 Peter the Great,8081
and circulation of subversive literature, 9092,109 Pezet, Jos, 158,191
and critiques of Abascal,157 Pezuela, Joaqun de la, 55, 153, 166, 168,
and factionalism after Peruvian 18286,189
independence,189 Philip II of Spain,65
and junta proclamations,123 Philip IV of Spain,12,46
and men of letters as political actors,85 Philip V of Spain,65
and military rule in Peru,2012 and creation of meritocracy,40,42
Pamplona, Miguelde,26 deathof,18
Pando, Jos Mara de, 196,198 and the War of Spanish Succession, 911,
panegrico /panegiristas, 8587, 89,162 1114,1618
Paniagua, Jos Mara,17677 Philip de Bourbon, Duke of Anjou,9
Papal States,18 Philippines, 19, 28, 31,62,65
pardos, 73, 143,14950 Picoaga, Francisco de,169
Pardo y Aliaga, Felipe,203 Picornell, Juan Bautista Mariano, 91,10910
Pardo y Lavalle, Manuel,203 piracy,65
Pardo y Ribadeneira, Manuel, 167, 168,203 plebeians (plebes)
Paredes, Gregorio, 154,191 and Abascals military expansion,143
Pascal, Blaise,50 and Bourbon military reforms,7475
Patio, Jos, 13, 14, 16,4042 and constitutional elections,165
patronage and creation of meritocracy, 45,5859
and caudillos, 152,252n59 and investigations into revolutionary
and expansion of military in Peru,149 sentiment,100
and factionalism after Peruvian and newspapers, 9394,97
independence,188 Poland,66
and growth of newspaper industry,92 political debate,175
and military rule in Peru,201 political mobility,5
and newspapers, 236n100 political oratory, 8590, 9092,17677

312 Index
political reforms,13 Real Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del Pas,31

poltica y polticos,4 Real Sociedad Econmica de Amigos del Pas,
Polticos de Aristteles,131 Madrid, Spain, 30, 48,127
Pombal, Marquis of,24,50 Real Sociedad of Madrid,31
population declines,11 Reflexiones crtico-apologticas (Feijo),37
Portugal Refutacin (Masiel),89
and French invasion of Spain,117 Regencia, 119, 130, 133,138
and military reforms,66 Regimiento Real de Lima,68,75
and Spanish education system,24 regio patronato,18
and the War of Spanish register ships,17
Succession,9,12 Reglamento para las milicias de infantera y
Potos,164 caballera de la isla de Cuba, 64, 6667,
printing presses, 57, 58,190 6973,7578
privateers,41 Reinoso, Flix,127
professional equality, 6365, 67,69,71 Respuesta de los espaoles americanos a la proclama
professional schools,52 que les han dirigido los nobles sevillanos,138
pronunciamientos, 177,203 Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, ducde,12
propaganda campaigns,151 Rico, Gaspar, 15559, 161, 190, 192, 195,198
Protestantism, 103,104 Riego, Rafael de,137
Proust, Louis,53 and battles for Peruvian independence, 185,198
Proyecto econmico (Ward),4243 mutiny,171
proyectos /proyectistas and Olavarrieta,180
and Abascals conflicts with lawyers,161 pronunciamiento of 1820, 171, 17375,177
and Cortes of Cadiz debates,134 recruitment of soldiers,258n2
and creation of meritocracy, 35, 4043, Rio de laPlata
4547,54,60 and Abascals governance strategies,
and education reforms,23 14245,159
and legal system reforms,107 and Blanco Whites writings,129
and the War of Spanish Succession,13 and Bourbon military reforms,67
Prussia,40,66 and circulation of subversive literature,90
public associations,3132 and conspiracies and coup attempts, 11112,
public schools,38 164,168
Puente Carrillo de Albornoz, Lorenzo de la,102 and expansion of military in Peru,151
Puffendorf, Samuel von,104 and historiography of Latin America,5
Pumacahua, Mateo Garca, 76, 14849, 15052, Riva Agero, Jos de la, 186, 188, 19192,193
166,16769 Rivero, Mariano de, 107,163
Rodil, Jos Ramn, 182, 193,195
Rodrguez, Juan Nepomuceno,102
Quevedo y Quintano, Pedro de,123 Rodrguez de Mendoza, Toribio, 43, 5455,
Quintana, Manuel, 127,128 1078,191
Quito, Ecuador, 139, 147, 150, 191,192 Rodrguez Mohedano, Pedro,39
Rodrguez Mohedano, Rafael,39
Roman Empire,27
Rama, Angel,187 Roman law, 103,107
Ramrez, Juan,169 romanticism,178
Ramrez de Arellano, Rafael de,16768 Rospigliosi, Pablo de,166
Raynal, Guillaume Thomas Franois, 88, 111, Rossi y Rub, Jos, 32,95,97
112,160 Rousseau, Jean Jacques,91,97
Real Academia de Ciencias y Artes de Royal Army of AltoPeru
Barcelona,141 and Abascals military expansion,14850
Real Academia de la Historia, 48,122 and battles for independence,18385
Real Compaa de Comercio de la Habana,17 and consolidation of independence,195
Real Compaa de Filipinas,22 and conspiracies and coup attempts,164
Real Compaa Guipuzcana de Caracas,16 and Espartero,18182
Real Seminario de Nobles de Bergara,26 and Goyeneches final report,249n17
Real Seminario de Nobles de Madrid, 25, and La Serna command,260n53
93,1034 and militarization of political authority,16669

Index 313
and military coups,19192 Seminario de San Carlos, 54,106

and military rule in Peru,201 Seminario de San Jernimo,55
and Pezuelas leadership,153 serviles, 41, 117, 12426, 173, 198,244n45
and sources for study,5 Seven Years War, 18, 40, 61, 62,66,81
royal militias Sicily,16
and Abascals military policies, 14243,14445 siege of Zaragoza,120
and Bourbon military reforms, 6468, 6973, Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, 65,152
73, 74, 7477,7779 situado militar,68
and Castelli,147 Smith, Adam,30
and the Cuzco rebellion,168 social contract,1056
and expansion of military in Peru,14950 social hierarchy, 7172, 80. See alsocastas
and unrest in Rio de la Plata,159 social mobility, 5, 64. See alsocastas
royal navies, 15. See also navalpower social order, concerns about, 84, 134. See
Royal Society of London,31 alsocastas
rules of combat,64 Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del Pas, Spain,
Russia,66 26, 3031,32,53
Sociedad de Amantes del Pas, Lima, Peru, 95,
154,158
Saavedra Fajardo, Diego de, 27,123 Sociedad Econmica de Amigos del Pas,
Salazar y Baqujano, Manuel,191 Guatemala,32
Salazar y Carrillo, Francisco,163 sociedades, 3032, 175,176
sale of public offices,46 Sociedad Patritica, Lima, Peru, 18889,193
Samaniego, Flix Mara,53 societal reform,91
Snchez Albornoz, Claudio,203 Society of Jesus. See Jesuits
Snchez Carrin, Jos Faustino (Solitario de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, Zennde,46
Sayn), 19091, 192, 193,196 Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle),203
San Clemente, Francisco Muoz de,167 subordination to authority, 70. See also loyalty
San Martn, Jos de,162 subsidies (situado militar),99
and battles for Peruvian independence, subversive literature, 91,109
18386,18691 Sucre, Jos de, 19192,19495
and foreign pressures in Peru,203
and Garca del Ro,262n90
and guerrilla warfare,19293 Taboada y Lemos, FranciscoGilde
and military rule in Peru,201 and Abascals governance strategy,154
and political revolution in Spanish America,124 and Bourbon military reforms,7576
Santa Cruz, Andrs de, 64, 148, 18485, 195, career summary,220n72
19798,2012 and circulation of subversive literature,91
Santander, Francisco de Paula,196 and creation of meritocracy,54
Santander, Spain,21,22 and creation of sociedades,32
Santiago de Chile,22 and growth of newspaper industry, 2930, 93,
Santiago de Cuba,17,31 95, 236n100
Savino, Clemente, 100101 and racial inclusion in army,184
scholasticmethod taxation, 11, 21,151
and creation of meritocracy, 34, 3638, Teatro anticrtico (versus Feijo),37
52,5758 Teatro crtico universal (Feijo),35
and early writings of Spanish Liberals,127 Temporalidades tribunal, 99,187
and legal system reforms,104 Tertulia del Campo,155
and political revolution in Spanish America,126 tertulias, 30, 5354, 90,155
and rise of political oration,85 theaters, 84,90,93
scientific method and education, 15, 34, 36, 37, Theorica y Practica de Comercio y Marina,40
40,5556 Thirty Years War,12
secret societies, 17576. See also Freemasonry Thomas, Aquinas, Saint,112
sedition, 7879, 1089, 146,161 Toro y Zambrano, Gregoriode,25
Semanario Crtico, 29, 9293,9698 Torre Tagle, Bernardo de, 186, 188, 191, 193,195
Seminario Conciliar de Trujillo,55 Toussaint LOuverture,118
Seminario de Nobles de Bergara,5253 Townsend, Joseph, 48,6061
Seminario de Nobles de Madrid, 54,105 Trgala, 17375,198
Seminario de San Bernardo,55 Treaty of Basel,92

314 Index
Treaty of Paris,19 Venegas de Saavedra, Francisco Javier,139

Tribunal of Literature,39 Veracruz, Mexico, 18, 22, 28, 65,
Tribunal of War and Navy,136 121,142
tribute, 70, 136, 149, 16061,164 Vernon, Edward, 1617,56
Trienio Liberal era (18201823), 172, 17577, Vidaurre, Manuel Lorenzo de, 169,196
179,196 Villafae, Manuel,135
Tristn, Domingo,166 Villalta, Manuel,15556
Tristn, Po,166 Villanueva, Joaqun Lorenzo,134
Trujillo, Peru,185 Via, Pedro, 100101
Tucuman province,183 Viscardo y Guzmn, Juan Pablo, 90,119
Tpac Amaru Rebellion visitadores, 43, 45, 47, 79,8789
and Bourbon administrative reforms,19,21 visitas generales,44
and Bourbon military reforms, 68, vitalicios, 196,198
7475,76,79 volanderos,126
and expansion of military in Peru,150 Voltaire, 86, 99,101
and history of conspiracies and rebellions,163 Voluntarios Distinguidos de la Concordia
Espaola del Per,150
Ubalde, Jos Manuel, 1089,11112

Ulloa, Antoniode Wall, Ricardo,19
and creation of meritocracy, 40, 45,5456 Ward, Bernardo, 13, 23,4243
and education reforms,23 War of Austrian Succession,18
and Freemasonry,33 War of Jenkins Ear, 1617,41
and the War of Spanish Succession,13,15 War of Spanish Succession
Unnue, Hiplito, 22, 154, 18788, 191,196 and administrative reforms,1215
Union of Arms, Spain,12 and Bourbon military reforms,65
United States, 20, 26, 173,18081 and creation of meritocracy,5051
universalism,30 and historiography of Latin America,5
University of Alcal,25 impact on Spanish America,911
University of Salamanca, 52,10910 and scope of study,13
University of San Antonio Abad,108 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 121,
University of San Marcos, 54, 86,1067 128,155
university reform (education systems and Whitelocke, John,142
reforms), 33, 34, 39, 49, 51, 52, 54, 60, 84, Wolff, Christian,104
104, 105, 106, 107,109
useful knowledge
in associations, 31, 48, 53,193 Xaramillo, Josef Andres, 99,102
as leading concept for reform, 2, 3, 34, 35, 36,
38, 40, 41, 45, 48, 49,50,58
in the press,58,95 Ynfantas, Domingo,184
and reformist priests, 49,51,87 Yupanqui, Bartolom de Mesa Inca, 2728,77
in schools,53 Yupanqui, Dionisio Inca,163
Uztriz, Gernimo de, 1315, 4041,54 Yupanqui, Felipe Camilo Tpac Inca,27
Yupanqui, Manuel Carrasco,76
Valds, Gernimo de, 182, 185,187

Valle, Jos del,75 Zambrano, Gregorio de Toro,25
Van Halen, Juan,173 Zambrano, Mateo de Toro,147
Variedades o Mensagero de Londres (Blanco Zaragoza, Spain, 120, 16566, 171,
White),18081 177,184
Vauban, Sbastien Le Prestre de,4041 Zela, Francisco Antonio de,164
vecinos, 146, 166,195 Zepita, Peru,148

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A Don Alfonso Martn, hijo y nieto deQuiroz

The strongest, most indissoluble, most burdensome, and

PART ONE IMPERIAL REFORM:CONTENTIOUS

1. Toward a New Imperial Elite 9

2. Merit and Its Subversive New Roles 34

3. The Kings Most Loyal Subjects 62

4. From Men of Letters to Political Actors 84

PART T WO IMPERIAL TURMOIL:CONFLICTS

5. Liberalism and War, 18051814 117

6. Abascal and the Problem of Letters in Peru, 18061816 141

7. Pens, Politics, and Swords:APath to Pervasive Unrest,

Someone dear once told me that sometimes it is impossible for us to understand

isolation has been employed in the latest historiography.2 Historians of Latin

Int roduc tion 3

resisted any attempts to curtail their power or prerogatives and undermined

Peru, Fernando de Abascal, the viceroy in the crucial decade of 18061816,

Int roduc tion 5

Toward a New ImperialElite

10 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 11

12 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 13

14 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 15

from Navarra and one of the key reformist thinkers of eighteenth-century

16 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 17

18 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 19

20 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 21

22 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Peninsula and America:La Corua, Santander, and Mlaga (1785); Guatemala

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 23

Basques, Cantabrians, and Galicians transformed the character of the Spanish

According to the Crowns plans, a likeminded imperial elite was to be forged

24 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 25

26 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Americans, particularly Peruvians, also enrolled in the renowned Academia

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 27

American independence, what could happen if insurrection spread south?

28 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

de Mesa, lieutenant of an Indian milita regiment of Lima, wrote a letter to

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 29

courts and to communicate the news, scientific discoveries, advances of com-

30 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

of these newspapersexcept for Olavarrieta, who wrote a more literary

The Enlightenments universalism, which inspired Bourbon reforms, spread

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 31

associations, Campomanes and Peaflorida were imitating the Royal Society of

32 Imperial Reform:Contentious Consequences

Toward a New Imper ial Eli te 33

prestigious men of letters and military officers, such as Melchor Gaspar de

Merit and Its Subversive NewRoles

Mer it and Its Subvers ive Ne w R ol e s 35

that criticized Habsburg society. It also ended up undermining the traditional

The life of Benito Jernimo Feijo y Montenegro (b. 1676d. 1764)represents