Presumptions

7.46 People v Ruelan 231 SCRA 650

FACTS:
Fordito Ruelan (appellant) killed Rosa Jardel and immediately escaped. However, after 2 days he surrendered
but they could not conduct an investigation because the appellant wanted to seek the assistance of a lawyer. Atty.
Cortez as the available lawyer represented him and during the investigation he was reminded by his constitutional
rights, more particularly the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and that anything he would say might be
used against him and even used his own dialect to clearly understand each question. During the investigation
appellant answered all the questions in a straightforward manner. After the investigation, Atty. Cortez consulted
appellant that his declarations if signed will admit his guilt and the appellant said yes.
It is the contention of appellant that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because he was never apprised
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his confessions were fabricated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of appellant is presumed to be voluntary?
RULING:
Yes. The contention of appellant that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible is untenable. Well-settled is
the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the burden of proof is upon the
person making the confession. In the case at bar, the presumption has not been overcome. Not only is the appellants
confession replete with details only he could have supplied, but the circumstances surrounding its execution belie his
claim.

7.47 People v Aquino GR 123550-51 July 19, 1999

FACTS:
Catap gave a sworn statement implicating a certain Reynaldo Magpili as having raped and killed the young
Angelita Anillo. Subsequently, Catap intimated to Atty. Campanilla that he wanted to give another confession,
whereupon Atty. Campanilla asked him to write it down himself, which he did. This was followed by another sworn
statement wherein Catap confessed that he and accused Leonardo Aquino raped Angelita Anillo and that Aquino
killed her. He was reminded by his constitutional rights, more particularly the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, and that anything he would say might be used against him.
Appellant Aquino claimed that he saw how Catap was manhandled and abused by PO1 Fidelino and SPO1
Mansibang eventually forced Catap to point to him as one of those who participated in the commission of the crime.
Consequently, apellant Catap likewise denied any involvement in the crime. According to him, he never saw Atty.
Campanilla sign his extra-judicial confession and that even if he signed his extra-judicial confession, the same was
not in the presence of said lawyer. For this reason, he claimed that his extra-judicial confession was taken in violation
of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether Cataps confession was extracted in violation of his constitutional rights?
RULING:
No. For as long as constitutional safeguards are adequately complied with, a confession constitutes evidence
of the highest order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately
and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. But since voluntariness in making
such confession gives it its probative weight, it is the courts duty to determine in every case that no undue pressure
of whatever nature would taint it and render the same inadmissible in evidence. Voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language, such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending
to cast doubt on its integrity, it being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied, the confession may be considered as having been given voluntarily. In the case at bar,
Catap confession were given voluntarily and with the reminders of Atty. Campanilla of his constitutional right.

7.48 People v Tolentino 423 SCRA 448

FACTS:
The victim of rape Mylene Mendoza who was just 8 years old stand as a witness on her case. However, during
the narration of events there was an inconsistency on how she was brought to the place of the crime. She said, that
when she reached the house of her Lola Asiang nobody was home, but there was a man standing near the terrace who
approached her. The appellant insisted that a careful scrutiny of the testimony should be conducted before he should
be declared guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether the child testimonies be given credit despite some inconsistency?
RULING:
Yes. Although she was unused to judicial proceedings and in fact shy when she testified. Ample margin of
error and understanding should be accorded to her who would naturally be gripped with tension due to the novelty of
the experience of testifying in court. Of course, this condition arising from her youth and immaturity should not be
taken against her. As a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit, for youth and
immaturity are badges of truth. Furthermore, OSG said that the inconsistencies the appellant stresses refer to minor
matters, which are trivial and have nothing to do with the elements of the crime.

7.49 People v De Vera GR 128966 August 18, 1999

FACTS:
Prosecution presented an eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, he identified Garcia and pointed that appellant as
among the companions of Florendo in killing. Thus, based on the testimony of Cacao, RTC convicted appellant as a
principal, however, because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and substantially
confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused, namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de
Vera, and Roderick Garcia.
Apellants contend that the trial court erred in relying the conspiracy on the testimony of Cacao alone.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in relying the judgment of conspiracy on the testimony of Cacao alone?
RULING:
Yes. Although it is well established that eyewitness testimonies are highly appreciated during the trial. Cacaos
testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act
was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder.
Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly stated, criminal
conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. Clearly, Cacaos testimony does not establish
appellants culpability.

7.50 People v Santos 283 SCRA 443

FACTS:
Appellant Mercy who was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention denied the allegations and
insisted that her extrajudicial confession was extracted in violation of her constitutional rights. She claimed that she
was not able to confer with any Atty. Uy and she might have merely signed the affidavit but she just signed the Exhibit
C only because she was threatened and maltreated by NBI Agent. Furthermore, Atty. Uy did not show any competency
as her counsel nor preferably as her own choice.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession is admissible in evidence?
Whether the extrajudicial confession has presumption of constitutionality?
RULING:
No. The extrajudicial confession must be struck down as inadmissible. A confession is not admissible in
evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits imposed by Sec 12, Art 3 of
PH Constitution. If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness. Any effort falling short of this standard is a denial of this right. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting
appellants extrajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Uy was indeed the competent and independent
counsel of appellants own choosing. The Court notes appellants insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing Atty.
Uy, much less of retaining him as her counsel of choice. The prosecution failed to present Uy as a witness to show his
role in the taking of the alleged confession.
No presumption of constitutionality may be accorded in any extrajudicial confession until the prosecution
convincingly establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance with the Constitution. This is the price the
prosecution has to pay before it can be allowed to use such formidable evidence against the accused.

7.51 Santos v Sandiganbayan GR 71523-25 December 8, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Valentino and Estacio confessed and testified against themselves and their co-accused in the
separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents. The defense attempted to prove that
Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions.
But before signing their statements, they never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of
maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are admissible in evidence as
violation of their constitutional rights?
RULING:
No. It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confessions of Valentino and petitioner Estacio against their co-accused, the Court declares that although an
extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative
evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. Furthermore, that where the confession is
used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is
receivable as evidence against a co-accused.

7.52 People v Magdamit 279 SCRA 423

FACTS:
Appellants confession was executed in the presence and with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Romeo Fortes,
who was then the IBP Chapter President, and was sworn to before Judge Tagum. It also contained details which only
he could have supplied. Later on, appellant contend that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because it was
obtained involuntarily.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession is admissible as evidence?
RULING:
Yes. It is well settled rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
burden of proof is upon the person making the confession. In the case at bar, the presumption has not been overcome.
7.53 People v Aquino GR 130742 July 18, 2000
FACTS:
Aquino who was one of the accused of the crime of estafa, testified and confessed her knowledge. She even
presented the checks wherein was used as an evidence for their conviction. The other accused argued that Aquino was
forced and maltreated that is why the evidence obtain was involuntary produced thus, inadmissible as an evidence.
However, they failed to prove of their claimed, just a mere contention.
ISSUE:
Whether the checks produces is admissible as evidence?
RULING:
Yes. It is well settled rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
burden of proof is upon the person making the confession. As long as there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue.

7.54 People v Hernandez (supra-Warrantless Arrests)

FACTS:
Accused TUMANENG disowned his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "A"). He charged that he was coerced by
the CIS agents to confess. He was forcibly taken from his aunt's house in Maysilo, Malabon, and brought to the CIS
detention cell where he was tortured. Then, he was ordered to sign an extrajudicial confession without the assistance
of a lawyer. When he was presented to Fiscal Lugtu for inquest, he confirmed his confession for he was afraid of the
CIS agents who were present. Thus, Tumaneng impugn his conviction on the grounds that: (a) their warrantless
arrests were illegal; and, (b) his extrajudicial confessions were obtained without the benefit of a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest may be ground for the inadmissible of evidence in extrajudicial confession?
RULING:
No. There is no question that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under
circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated the
Constitution. However, jurisprudence is settled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his
arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. In the case at bar,
by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial, appellants waived their right to challenge the legality of
their warrantless arrests. We rule that appellants' extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence.

7.55 People v Sabalones 294 SCRA 751

FACTS:
Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The convictions arose
from a shooting incident, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others which were
allegedly ambushed by appellants. Confession was made by Beronga and other 2 survivors.
Appellants insist that Berongas extrajudicial statement was obtained through violence and intimidation.
Citing the res inter alios acta rule, they also argue that the said statement is inadmissible against Sabalones. But
such violence never proven.
ISSUE:
Whether there is violation of rights in extrajudicial admission during custodial investigations?
RULING:
No, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases
in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. In
the case at bar, the appellants were convicted based primarily on the positive identification of the two survivors and
not only on the extrajudicial statement.

7.56 People v Calvo 296 SCRA 676

FACTS:
Appellant claims that Atty. Ferraren utterly failed to protect his rights during the custodial investigation by
said lawyer which, to borrow appellant's counsel's words, "threatened the accused and further pushed him deep to the
mud. Appellant stated that Atty. Ferraren told him that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth, thus,
induced him.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Ferraren induced the appellant to confess?
RULING:
No. We cannot see how this kind of advice rendered Atty. Ferraren incompetent, or could ever be considered
as telltale sign of the involuntariness of the confession. It was nothing more than a straight-forward exhortation for
appellant to tell the truth as to his participation in the crime, if he indeed had something to do with it. A confession
is not rendered involuntary merely because defendant was told that he should tell the truth or that it would be better
for him to tell the truth. Stated elsewise, telling the accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth
does not furnish any Inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained,
unless threats or promises are applied. These threats or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order
to make his confession inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of reward or leniency.

7.57 People v Del Rosario GR 131036 June 20, 2001

FACTS:
Donato del Rosario, convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide by burning the house of Paragua and
covered Raquel with a pink raincoat and around her neck was a CATV wire. After the incident, Del Rosario hid but
after few weeks he surrendered to police officer Morales, the brother-in-law of his common-law wife. Del Rosario, even
without being asked, told them that he really surrendered to Morales because he was being bothered by his conscience
and that he was very willing to accompany them to recover the stolen items. He also volunteered the information as
to where he sold the jewelries that he took from the house of Paragua and even signed the confession assisted by Atty.
Dela Cruz. However, he changed his statements and said that it was Morales who had informed him that he was
suspect for the incident and threatened to kill him if he will not stay in their custody. Furthermore, he was forced to
sign a document, but not before being mauled with a rattan stick and a chair. While he was being mauled he was
forced to admit that he committed the arson.
Accused-appellant claims that his arrest was violative of his constitutional rights and that all the evidence
obtained thereat were fruits of the poisonous tree and therefore inadmissible in any proceeding of whatever nature
and for any purpose. He alleged that he was mauled to force him to sign a confession.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession is admissible as an evidence?
RULING:
Yes. The accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police and admitted his guilt by way of the
waiver/confession he had signed. Circumstantial evidence had no place in this case. A confession to be admissible must
be: (1) express and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance
of his act; (3) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; (4) in writing, and in the language known to and
understood by the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumb marked
by him.

To Whom Such Confession Can Be Used Against

7.58 People v Lising 285 SCRA 595
FACTS:
Appellants were convicted of the double crime of murder of Cochise and Beebom.
Extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by their counsel
and properly sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extra-judicial statements and did
not take the witness stand during the trial.
Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial statement
but nothing appears on record that such extrajudicial statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on
his person. Lising did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges against his
alleged tormentors which would necessarily buttress the claim of torture in the absence of such evidence. There are
in fact indicia of voluntariness in the execution of his extra-judicial statements, to wit: (a) it contains many details
and facts which the investigating officer could not have known and could have supplied, without the knowledge and
information given by Lising himself; (b) it bears corrections duly initialed by him; (c) it tends to explain or justify his
conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili. Moreover, the claim that Lising was not assisted by counsel is
belied by the fact that the signature of his counsel Atty. Yabut appears in all the pages of his extrajudicial statements.
Lising, claimed that their confessions should not be used against them.
ISSUE:
Whether the confessions of the appellants could be used against themselves?
RULING:
Yes. A mans act, conduct and declaration wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against
him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not.
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon
the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true.
The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person making it, also recognizes various
exceptions. One such exception is where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several persons charged
with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the facts that the
statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is
admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime
and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons
had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as interlocking confessions.

7.59 Santos v Sandiganbayan GR 71523-25 December 8, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Valentino and Estacio confessed and testified against themselves and their co-accused in the
separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents. The defense attempted to prove that
Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions.
But before signing their statements, they never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of
maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI. Furthermore, they claimed that such
extrajudicial confessions could not be used against them.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions could be used against themselves?
RULING:
Yes, provided they are voluntary. In the case at bar, the appellants failed to prove that they were forced.
Hence, the extrajudicial confessions could be used against themselves. A mans act, conduct and declaration wherever
made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not. Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as
against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself, unless such declarations were true.
7.60 Tan v People GR 134298 August 26, 1999
FACTS:
Witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from
complainant Rosita Lim to petitioner Ramon Tan who was accused with fencing but without knowledge that what he
bought was stolen. The extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel.
However, the theft was not proved because complainant did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from
the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission of Mendez can be used against Tan?
RULING:
No, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the
person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of
counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Thus, without
petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of fencing. Consequently, the prosecution has
failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.

Lawyer Given by Police Investigator; Valid Confession

7.61 Aquino v Paiste 555 SCRA 255
FACTS:
When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR to be investigated for selling the fake gold
bar, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights has set in. Since
she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed. Amicable
settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures in the
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
Petitioners contention that her constitutional rights were breached when she was provided with counsel by
NBI whose interest are not adverse to her. Thus, such counsel is incompetent.
ISSUE:
Whether a police investigator may give to the accused a counsel/lawyer?
RULING:
Yes. When the accused never raised any objection against the lawyers appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before swearing officer, the
accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer. In the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy
when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his
presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioners
counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty.
Uy, was provided petitioner.

Exceptions
When Custodial Investigations May Not Apply
A. Preliminary Investigation
7.62 People v Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216
FACTS:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was
alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,
000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months
after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer and denied the right to remain silent during the course of preliminary
investigation. However, Respondent Judge did not accept those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is under custodial interrogation?
Whether during the preliminary investigation the accused has the right to remain silent?
RULING:
No. The defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His
interrogation by the police, if any there had been, would already have been ended at the time of the filing of criminal
case in court or public prosecutors office. Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending there
is no occasion to speak of his rights while under custodial interrogation.
Yes. The right of an accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor),
in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right to refuse to answer a
specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court
has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness.
All criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled, among others:
1. To be exempt from being a witness against himself; and
 2. To testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any prejudiced or be used
against him.
Custodial interrogations - questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

B. Voluntary Surrender
7.63 People v Taylaran 108 SCRA 373
FACTS:
Accused killed Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing using his small bolo and stabbed the deceased several times causing
her to fall on the floor dead. After killing the deceased, accused proceeded to the house of the son of the deceased for
the purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not accomplish his purpose because the deceased's son refused
to left him enter his house. After that the accused surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad
who was then on guard at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the deceased who was also his
grandmother-in-law, accused answered, 'because she promised to kill me with a 'barang', hence killed her first.
ISSUE:
Whether voluntary surrender by the accused may exempt him to custodial investigation?
RULING:
No. The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the present where no
written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What was
testified to be only what appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who
surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such
circumstance, the surrenderee is already under investigation, within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As
the Sol Gen correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and
it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed
of his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.

C. Audit Examination
7.64 Navallo v Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175
FACTS:
Accused who is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, who was
holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the government of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust
public funds with all freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and intent of gain, did then and there voluntarily and
without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in
trust for the Government. He failed to account during an audit and to restitute despite demands by the office of the
Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the amount misappropriated.
A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, and he was arrested. During the
custodial investigation he signed the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime. Later on, he claimed that his been
pressured to sign. Thus, deprived of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared by State
Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
RULING:
No. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. Accused-petitioner claims
to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled
is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation, or is in custody
investigation, which we have since defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. A person under a
normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to
be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule.

7.65 Kimpo v Sandiganbayan 232 SCRA 53

FACTS:
Sandiganbayan found Petitioner Luciano Kimpo y Nianuevo, a Special Collecting Officer of the Bureau of
Domestic Trade at General Santos City, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds. That an audit-
examination of the cash and accounts of the accused was conducted on April 30, 1985; that the corresponding Report
of Examination (Exhibit B), Statement of Accountability for Accountable Forms without Money Value (Exhibit B-1),
and Reconciliation Statement of Accountability (Exhibit B-3) were made and signed, and that the signatures
appearing on the dorsal side of Exhibits B and B-1 are those of the accused, all these admissions being subject to the
qualification that the accused is questioning the validity of the audit examination and the accuracy of the results
thereof on constitutional grounds;
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for having considered Exhibits B to B-3, inclusive, despite what he
claims to be an impairment of his constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3), and Section
17, of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, he appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has been deprived of the constitutional prerogatives?
RULING:
No. Petitioner, not being at the time under investigation for the commission of a criminal offense, let alone
under custodial investigation, clearly cannot be said to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogatives he
invokes.
 D. Administrative Investigation
7.66 Manuel v NC Construction 282 SCRA 326
FACTS:
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents counsel conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding
petitioners involvement in the theft. Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in the
series of thefts committed at respondent company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being
positively identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal
of any criminal charge against them.3 Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while petitioners
Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally.
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they
were not informed of the charge against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute the same. They also
alleged that their admission made regarding their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not
voluntary but were obtained by private respondents lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. He held
that private respondents failed to show a just cause for the termination of petitioners services. He declared that
petitioners admission regarding their involvement in the theft was inadmissible in evidence as it was taken without
the assistance of counsel, in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He also held that petitioners
were not afforded due process before their services were terminated.
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether NLRC erred in favoring petitioners contention of Sec 12, Art 3 of the BIR.
RULING:
Yes. The exclusionary rule under paragraph (3), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.We also reject petitioners
argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal
case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody
by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation.
Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

7.67 Remolona v CSC GR 13747 August 2, 2001

FACTS:
In a letter, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports at
Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as to the status of the civil service eligibility of
Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of 81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for
Teachers. Mr. America likewise disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee
of P8,000.00 per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations. Mr. Remolona admitted that he
was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it
because he wanted them to be together. However, Mr. Remolona imputes a violation of his right to due process during
the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by counsel. He claims that the extra-judicial admission
allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank form. He also avers that his
motion for new trial should be granted on the ground that the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
hearing of the case before the Regional Office of the CSC was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Remolona alleged
that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as
required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the right of the petitioner under Sec 12, par 3 of the BoR was violated?
RULING:
No. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has
the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of
Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline)
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries
are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing
conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution

7.68 Sebastian v Garchitorena GR 114028 October 18, 2000

FACTS:
An information for the crime of Malversation of Public Funds was filed against Salvador Sebastian Sr. (a letter
carrier), Rosita Pada (Regional stamps custodian) and other public officers in the Postal Services Officer in Zamboanga
City. This was in relation to the misuse and embezzlement of funds (P649,290.05) from the misuse/disappearance of
postage stamps in custody of Pada. Sworn statements by the accused were offered as evidence, which was all admitted
by the Sandiganbayan through a Resolution. Appellant objected to this and filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also denied by a 2nd resolution by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to annul said
Resolutions.
ISSUE:
WON sworn statements of Salvador Sebastian and co-accused are admissible in evidence as part of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesss
WON his rights under Section12 were violated
RULING:
Yes, statements are admissible Sworn statements are not hearsay evidence as contended by Sebastian. It is
otherwise as its purpose was to merely establish the fact that such written statements were actually made.
No, his rights under Sec 12 were not violated. Petitioner claims to have been deprived of his Constitutional
rights under Section 12 and 17, Art III of the Constitution. For Section 12: The court held that the rights provided in
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is
"in custody investigation." Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. In the present case, the fact-finding investigation was an administrative investigation, hence accused may or
may not be assisted by counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea that the right to counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
** Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. **Additionally, a Petition for Certiorari is the wrong choice of action
in the instant case. Resolutions are interlocutory in nature and from which no appeal lies.

7.69 Escleo v Dorado AM P-99-1312 July 31, 2002

FACTS:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint instituted by Ms Ermelinda Escleo against Ms Maritess
Dorado. Respondent is alleged to have solicited from complainants sister the amount of P2,000.00 as down payment
of an unauthorized facilitation fee to expedite the latters marriage. During the investigation, respondent claims that
she had a right to be informed of her right against self-incrimination, pursuant to Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct?
RULING:
No. This provision is not applicable because respondent was not under investigation for the commission of an
offense; hence, the rights granted by said provision did not attach. Judge Ulibarri was under no constitutional
obligation to inform respondent of such right.

E. Not in Police Custody

7.70 People v Tobias 266 SCRA 229
FACTS:
All the assailants confessed participation in the killing claiming that they did it because they were being
mocked by the inmates of 3-a there was a time when these inmates threw human waste on their brigade shouting that
'you Commando members could not do anything', and then they would laugh at them. In order to avenge this mockery
the accused headed by Tobias Ribadajo called up a meeting in the afternoon, and they planned to kill any prisoner
from brigade 3-a in the evening and they would do the killing at the time they were waiting for their 'rancho'.
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons, all the accused executed
statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo Cutamora. However, at the presentation of
evidence for the defense, accused withdrew their pleas of guilty and denied their participation in the killing. They
submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had been exposed for more or less one
day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of the rain, and had been subsequently beaten up and placed
in a "bartolina "
Appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during custodial
investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused
during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the accused is correct?
RULING:
No. The presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession
of an accused in a criminal case. Concrete evidence of compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their claim
of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put forward. No report of such maltreatment was made to the prison
authorities nor to the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation and during cross-examination.
No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, even if
presented after January 17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial
investigation does not have any retroactive effect.