Game Trees with Imperfect Information

Bernhard von Stengel

reading material:
Chapter 4 of Game Theory Basics

1
 Plan

Example: buyout bluff game

Definition of extensive games
Structure of information sets
Perfect recall
Mixed versus behaviour strategies
Kuhns Theorem: behaviour strategies suffice

2
Example of an extensive game
chance
1/2 1/2

I I
T B C D
0 0
16 16
II

a b a b

12 4 12 20
4 20 4 4
3
 Extensive game and its strategic form3

chance
II
1/2 1/2
I a b
I I 16 16
T,C
T B C D 0 0
0 0 10 6
T,D
16 16 6
10
II 10 18
B,C
6 2
a b a b
4 8
B,D
12 8
12 4 12 20
4 20 4 4

4
 Extensive game and its strategic form

chance
1/2 1/2

I I II 1/4 3/4
T B C D I a b
10 6
0 0 1/2 T,D 6 10 9
16 16
II 4 8
1/2 B,D
12 8 9
a b a b
7 7
12 4 12 20
4 20 4 4

4
Information sets can encode simultaneous moves

I
II
I l r
T M B
0 1
T
1 2
9 8 II
M
3 4
7 6 l r l r l r
B
5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1 9 8 7 6

5
 Extensive games with imperfect information
Game tree with decision nodes, chance nodes, terminal nodes
(payoff for each player)
Chance nodes are labelled with probabilities
Decision nodes have outgoing edges are labelled with moves
Decision nodes are partitioned into information sets:
only one node in information set = perfect information
same player to move in one information set
same set of moves for each node in one information set
Structure of information sets needs restrictions, e.g.:
Perfect recall: any two nodes in an information set are
preceded by same sequence of own earlier moves

6
 Nodes in an information set sharing a path:
not allowed
Example of an illegal game:

L R
chance I
1
1/2 1/2
3 L R
0 2

7
 The absent-minded driver
Only one player I, with strategies E for exit and K for keep
going but player I forgets if he has passed the exit or not, and
only knows when he has driven too far (payoff 1), too early the exit
leads to a disastrous area (payoff 0), only the second exit is right
(payoff 4).
I
E K
0

E K
4 1
Also an illegal game: Not clear what a strategy is.

8
 Strategies in extensive games

Pure strategy: one move for each information set of the player

Mixed strategy: selects randomly a pure strategy at the beginning

of the game, execute that strategy throughout

Behaviour strategy: select randomly at each information set the

move to be made (can delay coin-toss until getting there)

A pure strategy is a special case of a behaviour strategy.

A behaviour strategy is a special case of a mixed strategy: moves
are made with independent probabilities at information sets. Not
all mixed strategies can be seen as behaviour strategies.

9
 Reduced strategies

A reduced strategy in an extensive game specifies a move for

each information set of the player, except for those information
sets that are unreachable due to an own earlier move.
With a fixed order of the information sets, a pure strategy specifies
a move for each information set.
At an unreached information set, that move is left unspecified,
writing instead of the move at that information set.

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 Example: three information sets for player II
II r c
I@@ la lb rd
5 4 3 0
h T
II 1 3 0 1
l r 0 2 3 4
B
0 0 2 0
I
T B T B
h h
II II
a b a b c d c d

1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0
5 4 0 2 3 0 3 4

Reduced strategies of player II: la, lb, rc, rd.

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Two information sets for player II, imperfect recall
II
I@@ la lb ra rb
5 4 3 0
h T
II 1 3 0 1
l r 0 2 3 4
B
0 0 2 0
I
T B T B
h
II
a b a b a b a b

1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0
5 4 0 2 3 0 3 4

Reduced strategies of player II: la, lb, ra, rb.

12
 Upper envelope: mixed strategy equilibria

payoff to II
II
I la lb ra rb
5
la 5 4 3 0
T
4 rb 1 3 0 1
lb ra 0 2 3 4
3 B
0 0 2 0
2
1
0 prob(B)
0 1/2 3/4 1

13
 A mixed strategy that is not a behaviour strategy
II lb: 25 ra: 35 r b:0
I@@ la:0
1 5 4 3 0
T : 2 6
1 3 0 1 5

1 0 2 3 4
B: 6
II r,a:
2 0 0 2 0 3/5
5
5
2
3 3 2 l r

I
T B T B

II
a b a b a b a b

1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0
5 4 0 2 3 0 3 4
14
 Perfect recall

Player i in an extensive game has perfect recall if for every

information set h of player i, all nodes in h are preceded by the
same sequence of moves of player i.

15
 Behaviour strategy

In an extensive game, a behaviour strategy of player i is

defined by a probability distribution on the set of moves Ch for
each information set h of player i. It is given by a probability (c)
P c Ch , that is, a number (c) 0 for each c Ch so
for each
that cCh (c) = 1.

In a reduced behaviour strategy, these numbers are left

unspecified if h is unreachable because all earlier own moves by
player i that allow her to reach h have probability zero under .

16
Behaviour strategies are simpler than mixed strategies

1
0I
0
1
C1 C2 Cm
II 1
0 II 1
0 11
00
00
11
00
11
00
1100
11
00
11 1II
0
0
1 0
1 0
1
l1 r1 l2 r2 lm rm

Here: m moves for player I,

2m strategies for player II
2m 1 independent mixed strategy probabilities for player II,
but only m independent behaviour strategy probabilities.

17
 Kuhns Theorem

If player i in an extensive game has perfect recall, then for any

mixed strategy of player i there is an equivalent behaviour
strategy of player i.

equivalent = all nodes of game tree reached with same

probabilities with either strategy

payoff equivalent (same expected payoffs)

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 Kuhns Theorem proof4
Given: mixed strategy II
Want: equivalent behaviour strategy l r

Idea: = observed behaviour under I

(c) = observed probability (c) of L R
making move c. What is (c)? II
Look at sequence ending in c, here lbc. a b a b
[lbc] = probability of lbc under
= (l, b, c) (prob. pure strategy l, b, c). h u II v
sequence lb leading to info set h
c d c d
[lb] = (l, b, c) + (l, b, d)
[lb] = [lbc] + [lbd] w

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 Kuhns Theorem proof
[lbc]
(c) = =: (c) II
[lb]
l r
[lb]
(b) = =: (b) I
[l] L R
first info set: [] = 1 = [l] + [r] II
[l] a b a b
(l) = =: (l)
[]
h u II v
[l] [lb] [lbc]
(l)(b)(c) = c d c d
[] [l] [lb]
= [lbc]
w
equivalent to

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 Subgames
II

l r

I @ II la lb r
3 I@
3 6 5 3
T B
T
1 3 3
II 0 2 3
B
a b a b 3 1 3

1 3 3 1
6 5 0 2

subgame = subtree that includes all its information sets

20
 Subgame perfect equilibria

Only in a game with perfect information (singleton information

sets), a SPNE is found by backward induction.
This cannot be done in a game with imperfect information.
In a game with imperfect information, a SPNE is a profile of
(unreduced) behaviour strategies which defines a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame of the game.
A subgame is a subtree where every player knows that they are
in the subgame.

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 Subgame perfect equilibrium

Example
This subgame has a unique II
mixed NE with payoffs 2, 4:
l r

I
@ II a b 3
I@ 2
3
6 5 T 4 B
T
1 3
II
0 2
B a b a b
3 1

1 3 3 1
6 5 0 2

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