Henry of Harclay on the Infinite

Author(s): Richard C. Dales

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1984), pp. 295-301
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709293
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 HENRY OF HARCLAY ON THE INFINITE

BY RICHARD C. DALES

The infinite was frequently discussed by medieval scholars, but seldo

mathematicians. Commentators on Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and P
to's Timaeus1 usually had something to say about it: from the thirteenth ce
on, any master who commented on Aristotle's Physics, and to a lesser e
the De caelo and Metaphysics, was required to discuss it; and divine infinity
often a concern of theological authors.2 But hard, rigorous thought, ba
mathematical principles, is not in evidence until the late thirteenth century
it arose not among mathematicians but among theologians concerned wi
possibility of an infinite duration of the world. One of the most interestin
innovative of these theologians is Henry of Harclay, a secular master wh
Chancellor of Oxford University from 1312 to his death in 1317. Henry has
been much studied by modem scholars, perhaps because he did not belo
an order and so no one today has a vested interest in his reputation. B
was an important figure in his own day, and after nearly five centuries of al
total neglect, he is once again attracting the scholarly attention that his wr
merit.3
See, for example, Saeculi noni auctoris in Boethii Consolationem philosophiae com-
mentarius, ed. E. T. Silk. Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome
9 (Rome, 1935); William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, ed. Edouard Jeauneau
(Paris, 1965) and In Consolationem philosophiae commentarius in J. M. Parent, ed., La
Doctrine de la creation dans 1' ecole de Chartres (Paris and Ottawa, 1938); and Richard
C. Dales, "Discussions of the Eternity of the World During the First Half of the Twelfth
Century," Speculum, 57 (1982), 495-508.
2See, e.g., Leo Sweeney, S. J. and Charles J. Ermatiger, "Divine Infinity According
to Richard Fishacre," The Modern Schoolman, 35 (1958), 191-235.
3There is a summary biography and bibliography to 1957 in A. B. Emden, A Bio-
graphical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-1959),
I, 874-75. The most important modem works are Franz Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay,
Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quastionen," Studi e testi 37 (1924), 307-56 "Theologisch
und philosophisch bedeutsame Qudstionen des W. von Macclesfield O. P., H. von Harclay
und anonymer Auctoren der englischen Hochscholastik in cod. 501 Troyes," Scholastik,
23 (1953), 222-240; G. Gal, "Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de Significato Conceptus
Universalis," Franciscan studies, 31 (1971), 173-234; J. Kraus, "Die Universalienlehre
des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay und ihre Mittelstellung zwischen skoti-
stischem Realismus und ockhamistischem Nominalismus," Divus Thomas 10 (1932), 36-
58; 11 (1933), 76-96, 288-314; A. Maurer, "Henry of Harclay's Question on the Univocity
of Being, Mediaeval Studies, 16 (1954), 1-18, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Im-
mortality," Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957), 76-107, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on the
Divine Ideas," Mediaeval Studies, 23 (1961), 163-93, and "St. Thomas and Henry of
Harclay on Created Nature," III Congresso internazionale de filosofia mediovale (Milan,
1966), 542-49; C. Balic, "Henricus de Harcley et Johannes Duns Scotus," Melanges offerts
a Etienne Gilson (Toronto and Paris, 1959), 93-121, 701-02; H. Schwamm, "Das g6ttliche
Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhanger," Philosophie und Grenz-
wissenschaften (Innsbruck, 1934), V, 186-206; Anneliese Maier, "Discussionen iiber das
aktuell Unendliche in der ersten Halfte des 14. Jahrhunderts," Divus Thomas 25 (1947),
147-66, 317-37 and Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome, 1949), 155-79, 196-
215; John E. Murdoch, "Henry of Harclay and the Infinite," Studi sul XIV secolo in
memoria di Anneliese Maier, edd. A. Maieru and Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani (Rome,
1981); and Mark Henninger, "Henry of Harclay's Questions on Divine Prescience and
Predestination," Franciscan Studies.

295
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296 RICHARD C. DALES

The question of the eternity of the w

thirteenth century on. No Latin author argu
but several (e.g., Boethius of Dacia,4 Sig
Brabant6) said that the principles of na
conclusion, and a somewhat larger numb
and Henry of Harclay9) held that even thou
if God had wished to make it eternal, He
number of masters, largely Franciscans l
this, holding that an eternal world implied
even an omnipotent God could not do th
Since Bonaventure's thought lay behind
of this last position, and Henry will be arg
conclusions, it might be useful at this p
Doctor's arguments which became commo
of the next generation. First was his conte
infinite to be added to, since an addition m
can be greater than the infinite. But if the
existed for an infinite time, and therefore
this is false, because a revolution (i.e., of th
the world had a beginning. Then he conside
"If you say that it is infinite only in th
finite at the present, and therefore in the
possible for it to be made greater, I show
the past: because if the world is eternal, th
of the sun; but for every revolution of the
therefore more of the moon than of the su
the sun. Therefore, it is possible to find
quantity in the direction in which it is inf
infinites are equal, therefore, et cetera."11

Another of his arguments, based on A

infinite cannot be traversed.12 To the poss

4Boethius of Dacia, De aeternitate mundi,

SSiger of Brabant, De aeternitate mundi, e
6Siger de Brabant Questions sur la Physiqu
Philosophes Belges 15 (Louvain, 1941), 197-20
7Guide of the Perplexed, 1,70; II,15,17,18,1
seu director dubitantium aut perplexorum (Par
8De aeternitate mundi in Opera omnia, XV
319-20.
9 Utrum mundus potuit fuisse ab eterno, M
149r-152r (A) and Vatican, Borghese 171, fol
referred to by their sigla only. I am presently
which this article is based.
0 Commentary on the Sentences, II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 1, q.2, in S. Bonaventurae Opera
theologica selecta (Quaracchi, 1938), II, 12-17. The following summary of Bonaventure's
doctrine is based on this text.
"Comm. in Sent., II, dist.l, pars 1, art.l, q.2, ed. cit., 13.
12Aristotle, Physics, III, 7 (207b).

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 HENRY OF HARCLAY ON THE INFINITE 297

could be traversed in an infinite time, he asks whether some r

today's by an infinite time or whether none did. If none, th
distance from today and therefore had a beginning. But if
infinitely distant from today's, then what about the one w
followed it? If it is not also infinitely distant, then neither wa
there is a finite distance between them. "But if it is infinitely
the same question about the third and fourth and so on to infi
one would not be further distant than another from today
consequently be simultaneous, which is impossible."13
Another of Bonaventure's arguments is borrowed f
Metaphysics'4 and appeared in every medieval discussion of the
world with which I am familiar, despite the fact that Algaz
consider it to be demonstrative. If the world were eternal,
actually infinite number of departed human souls; but it is
actual infinite to exist simultaneously; therefore, et cetera. Thi
ened at the outset by Algazel's refutation of it, was strengthene
successors who pointed out that an infinite multitude of so
infinite power; but no creature can be infinitely powerful.
version of the argument to which Henry replied.
The basic assumption behind these arguments of Bonaven
cessors is that all infinites are equal. On the basis of this
Pecham, the Franciscan developed a very clever argument
infinite time led to the impossible consequence that the part is
whole. He postulates tht a quantity which contains a given q
thing more besides is a whole with respect to that quantity, an
are equal. Then he says: "Let us take the instant at noon to
and let all the time before it be called 'A past' and all the time
Then let us take another instant B at noon tomorrow and let the whole time
before it be called 'B past' and the time after it 'B future.' Now 'A past' equa
'A future' and 'B past' equals 'B future.' But 'B past' is greater than 'A past
and is a whole with respect to it. Therefore it is greater than 'A future.' But 'B
past' and 'B future' are equal. Therefore 'B future' is greater than 'A future
But 'A future' is a whole with respect to 'B future.' Therefore the part is greate
than the whole if we assume that time was without a beginning."15 Henry restate
and refutes this argument twice in his quaestio, once as we have presented i
and once in a slightly different form.
Henry of Harclay was much occupied in his writing with the problem o
the possible eternity of the world and with the properties of the infinite. H
composed one quaestio on the possible future eternity of the world. John
Murdoch'6 has studied this work and is preparing an edition of it. Henry's work
is ultimately unsatisfactory intellectually partly because Henry did not distin-
guish sufficiently between mathematical and physical entities and because h

3 Bonaventure, loc. cit., 14-15.

14Algazel's metaphysics: A Medieval Translation, I, 6, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto,
1933), 41-42.
SIgnatius Brady, "John Pecham and the background of Aquinas' De aeternitate
mundi," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies (Toronto, 1974), 171.
6 John Murdoch, "Henry of Harclay and the Infinite," as cited above, n. 3.

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 298 RICHARD C. DALES

analysis of a continuum was inadequate.

second form of the quaestio we are concern
to be subsequent to the one studied by M
Near the end of his lengthy refutation
entails infinitely many souls which would
a mathematical argument which was sugges
of God. Henry's argument is: "Here is a
infinity is not inconsistent with a multitu
that now there are infinitely many num
they are numbers. For number does not de
numbered; but the number by which we
in the mind, and when we number by it w
thing; and there are now infinitely many s
I say that there is no reason why the m
although there is a reason why the power o
I say that if there were infinitely many so
infinite in power, because all the souls do n
that these infinite souls do not constitute
of infinite numbers. In this multitude w
consequently it would not be any one numb
number should contain every number. As A
of infinite numbers, for then it would cont
so, by invoking a basic property of wh
disposed of the infinite power argument.
He then proceeds to attack the basic as
Franciscans and proves: that the infinit
which it is infinite; that all infinites a
subtracted from; that there is nothing abo
is inconsistent with its being infinite, and
linearity; finally that there can be order in
can be actually traversed.
To Bonaventure's assertion that the infinite cannot be exceeded in the di-
rection in which it is infinite, Henry simply says that it can, and claims tha
the contradiction which Bonaventure thought it implied was no contradictio
at all. He gives the following example. Let us suppose that my father and th
sun preceded me in duration, and his father and the sun preceded him, and s
on backwards to infinity. It will always be true that the sun (the ultimate cause
of all generation on earth) preceded any given generation of a man, and it
behaves toward an infinite number of generated and generating men just as
does toward two. If it precedes each act of generation separately, it also precedes
them collectively, and so an infinite duration (i.e., of generated and generating
men) can be exceeded (i.e., by that of the sun) in the direction in which it wa
infinite.
He then goes on to show that all infinites are not equal, but can be added
to and subtracted from without affecting their infinity. "The position that the
infinite cannot be added to," he says, "proceeds from a false imagination. The

17 Augustine, City of God, XII, 19.

18Henry of Harclay, op. cit., A fol. 150v, B fol. 23D (My translation here and below).

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 HENRY OF HARCLAY ON THE INFINITE 299

argument which tries to prove that on the assumption of infin

is greater than the whole is invalid because the infinite onl
respect to a certain designated portion of it, not with respect t
the same assumption, I can prove that two equals one hundred,
abandon the position that all infinites are equal.... It follows
to one revolution of the sun are added twelve revolutions of the moon for an
infinite time, there would now be a greater number of revolutions of the moon
than of the sun, and similarly that there are potentially more numbers exceeding
two than exceeding 100. This argument holds even if one proceeds to infinity
This is confirmed, because the principle: 'parallel lines do not intersect' is not
more necessary than 'if you take equals from equals,' etc.; but the principle
holds even if the lines were actually infinite." 19
Furthermore, Henry claims, there can be proportionality, though not a strict
proportion, between infinites, "as brother Thomas [i.e., Aquinas] concedes.20
Just as eight is in double proportion to four, thus infinite eights are in double
proportion to infinite fours. Therefore, one infinite is greater than another. It
is certain that I can subtract some quantity from the infinite, or understand it
to be subtracted. Make that subtraction not at one terminus or the other, since
it does not have termini, but anywhere you wish. After the subtraction, what
remains will still be infinite, for the infinite is not made finite by the subtraction
of a finite quantity. Now I ask whether this infinite quantity is still equal to the
one it was equal to before the subtraction was made, or less than it. If it is less,
I win the point; and to say that it is still equal is not intelligible." 21
The infinite then is not inconsistent with inequality. To those who object
that Euclid's principles hold for finite quantities but not for infinite, Henry
replies that equality is a property of quantity not by reason of this or that
quantity or this or that multiple, but by reason of having equal multiples in
common and equal quantities in common. Therefore it is a property of everything
for which the law of equal multiples holds.
"I concede," he says, "that there would be more revolutions of the moon
than of the sun, and similarly, if the world had existed from eternity, that the
duration of the sun would be greater than the total duration of all men, and
that one infinite can be greater than another infinite of the same kind of quantity,
such as one line than another line or one multitude than another multitude if
both are infinite. And it seems to me that there is no doubt that in any infinite
quantity, we can speak of part and whole only with respect to certain designated
portions of it, for the reasons given above. For if two parallel lines, infinite in
one direction, were to be terminated at different points at the other end, then
one whole infinite line would be shorter than the other. Furthermore, let us
take one line eight feet long and another four feet long, and divide them into
equal parts. There will be eight in the one and four in the other. Then divide
those parts in half, and there will be sixteen in the one and eight in the other.
If you continue to infinity there will always be twice as many parts of the same
size in the eight-foot line as in the four-foot line. Therefore, one infinite exceeds
another." 22

19A fol. 151r, B fol. 24A.

20Cf. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, q.2, art.3 (ed. Parma, 1852), IX, 30.
2A fol. 151r, B fol. 24A.
22A fol. 151v, B fol. 24B.

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300 RICHARD C. DALES

Having made his main point, that all i

by analogy from straight lines to time. He
in general, namely lines, surfaces, and sol
straight and curved. He concedes that a
and that if a line constituted the termi
extended inside a natural body, it could n
is not inconsistent with a straight line in
parallel lines, since they would not defi
says, the dimension of time has no wid
straight rather than curved since it is crea
straight from the past into the future
inconsistent with infinity does not exis
only, and it is not the terminus of a surfa
namely a line's existence inside a natur
infinity of time, since it does not have it
time is simultaneous with another in an
the other departs. Therefore, there is no
be actually infinite, that is, actually trave
"I say that the whole infinite time has
having attacked Aquinas' argument 24 tha
versal of an infinite series. "And I say t
defined the infinite as that of which, n
there will always be more.25 Whence, if t
for eternity, the proposition: 'infinite tim
false. And the reason is that the infinite
can have one." 26 And so, having made
in case of the world's future eternity, he
its infinite extent in the past. "Therefore
eternity it would not have had a beginnin
terminus in the other direction." 27 And
that an infinite time has been actually tr
This point led Henry to consider the con
distant, they all are. "Just as a father pre
amount," he answers, "and a month pr
a year is], and morning precedes noon by t
has always preceded noon by three hours;
the noon of this day, by that much the w
preceded the infinite multitude of noons.
two years is an infinite number of year
some given or designated year, nor is i
year; just as if the world, starting now, w
multitude of all the revolutions of the m

23A fol. 152r, B fol. 24C.

2Cf. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, II,
2Aristotle, Physics, III, 7 (207b).
26Henry of Harclay, op. cit., A fols. 150v-
27A fol. 151r, B fol. 24A.

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 HENRY OF HARCLAY ON THE INFINITE 301

of the revolutions of the sun by twelve months, or eleven, a

that eleven months, but eleven." 28
Henry's views on infinity did not cause a great stir in the ac
He had a small following, and his views were attacked seve
notably by William of Alnwick,29 through whom Henry is bett
through his own writings. He seems quite soon after his dea
into the oblivion which awaits most of us. He nevertheless deserv
and respect. In spite of his position as an academic administ
intellectual nonconformist, who was able to take hints from the
men, alter them significantly, use them to subject accepted not
criticism, and arrive at some valuable conclusions of his ow
from Robert Grosseteste the contention that infinites are no
used this idea in a drastically different way and established it o
dialectical foundation. From Augustine he took the insight that
a member of itself,31 although he used it in a way which wo
annoyed the bishop of Hippo. From Aquinas he took the no
portionality between infinite quantities,32 but he pushed the im
position far beyond what "brother Thomas" had done. And f
and his followers he derived some of his most telling arguments,
only by refusing to concede that the implication of unequal
contradiction.
But, as is the case with Henry's analysis of the infinite, so it is with his debt
to his predecessors, that the sum of the parts is something other than the whole.
It was Henry's own tough and creative mind, working its way from initial
insights, through tentative and faulty formulations,33 to the mature and intel-
lectually impressive thought contained in this quaestio, which merits our respect
and admiration today.
University of Southern California.

28A fol. 152r, B fol. 24C.

29William of Alnwick, Determinationes, MS Vatican, Palat. lat. 1805, fols. 9A-10A.
30 Robert Grosseteste, Commentarius in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Richard
C. Dales (Boulder, Colo., 1963), book 4, 91-93.
31Augustine, City of God, XII, 19; see above, note 17.
32 Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, q.2, art.3; see above, note 20.
33E.g., as in his quaestio on the possible future eternity of the world studied by
Murdoch; see above, note 3.

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