THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.

ALFONSO GUINUCUD and ROSARIO TAGAYUN

FACTS:

1.) The husband, Ramon Palattao, in April 1930, abandoned and deserted his wife, Rosario Tagayun, then
aged 21, and their child. After that abandonment, Rosario lived with her mother but made repeated efforts
to win back her husband, but Ramon refused.

2.) At the request of the mother of Rosario, the barrio lieutenant, Mariano Tumaliuan, took Rosario and her
child to Ramon's house but was refused admission by the said Ramon.

3.) Thereafter, the husband, Ramon, induced his wife, Rosario and her mother, to sign a document. The
document provides that:

the couple mutually agrees to separate from each other and that they can love or marry another
person
they are bound to support baby Leslie jointly, it is their right to have him by turn
they have to find their own means of existence and neither of them has the right to bother the other
as to his or her livelihood;

4.) There is no evidence of any misconduct on Rosarios part at that time or that she contemplated any illicit
relations with any other man. On the other hand, from the conduct of Ramon, it was clear that he solicited
the signature of Rosario to said agreement in his own interest and because he desired to have "the privilege
to love or to marry another woman".

5.) Subsequently, Ramon filed a complaint against Rosario of the crime of adultery.

6.) The accused pleaded not guilty but presented evidence to prove that Ramon Palattao consented to the
adultery, which fact, if established, bars any prosecution under article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The
pertinent paragraphs of said article are as follows:

ART. 344. Prosecution of all crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

7.) Ramon admitted that, for more than a year before he filed the complaint, he knew that his wife and her
coaccused Alfonso were living together in the same house. During all that time he took no action to vindicate
the honor or his name or to resent the open offense to the integrity of his home, doubtless, because he felt
bound by the alleged agreement to give his consent to Rosario's conduct or because he expected her to
reciprocate.

ISSUE: W/N the consentment of Ramon with regards to the adulterous acts through their written
agreement, bars him from instituting a prosecution

Held/Ratio: YES.

While their agreement is void in law, it is nevertheless competent evidence to explain the husband's inaction
after he knew of his wife's living with the coaccused and to show that he acquiesced in her conduct. The
expression "if he shall have consented" in article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which bars the "offended"
husband from instituting a prosecution, has no reference to any consent or agreement prior to the
commission of the offense but relates to an express or implied acquiescence subsequent to the offense.
This consent or acquiescence need not be express but may be inferred from the conduct or the long
continued inaction of the husband after learning of the offense.

The husband who is truly "offended", within the meaning of the statute, will not sit passively by and allow
his name and the honor of his family to be flagrantly sullied by the notorious adultery of his wife. Apart from
that, the fact that he abandoned and deserted his wife and child, in spite of all her efforts to maintain their
home intact, shows indifference to every moral duty imposed upon him as her husband and the father of
their child. In this case, the very thing happened which he might have foreseen when he abandoned his
wife and deceived her into believing that she was free when she signed the said agreement a year and a
half before the offense was committed. His consent to the offense before it was committed was void but his
tolerance of and acquiescence in the offense after it was committed demonstrate that it is a hypocritical
pretense for him now to appear in court as the "offended party" and bar his right to prosecute his wife.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,
and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse
during the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby
Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered
the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same
court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.

Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that,
if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should
he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that
his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by
him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that
this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt
the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.