1.
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE;
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002.]
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
Ramon R. Teleron and Rex Reynaldo C. Sandoval for petitioner.
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for respondent Hon. Ma. V.A. Locsin.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Artemio A. Adasa Jr. and Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr. for petitioner Hon. De Venecia.
Leonardo B. Palicte for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., filed the present Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto
directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto
P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision
of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to
petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and
(b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding
into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void
proclamation. aTEHIC
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Commission on Elections Second Division gravely
abused its power when it suspended petitioner's proclamation. Under Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not
make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in
suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in
the petition for disqualification. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin
which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and
their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the
election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. The Court also ruled
that the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of
Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts
are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC
Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has
not been challenged before the Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory. AECcTS
SYLLABUS
DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS; PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
DURING THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS LEADING TO THE PROCLAMATION OF
RESPONDENT. Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the
Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with
a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the
petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the
opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure
compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return
of the summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
when service has been completed. Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10)
days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to
submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within
five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with
the complete records of the case. The records of the case do not show that summons
was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly
served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly
notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received summons.
Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second
Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his
proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the
COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on
May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on
May 24, 2001. DcaECT
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RULES OF PROCEDURE
REQUIRING NOTICE AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS TO ALL PARTIES; NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, petitioner has not been
disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The
Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his
disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of
17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for
the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a
statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through registered mail.
The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service. This
violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all
parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS POWER
WHEN IT SUSPENDED PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION ABSENT ANY FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS STRONG. Under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not
make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in
suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in
the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads: "Without giving due
course to the petition . . . the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 . . . and
considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further
orders." We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is
strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his
proclamation. cITaCS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER IS NOT BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; THE COMMISSION GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING
THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE BASED ON SECTION 261 (a) AND (o), AND NOT ON
SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. The Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence.
It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As
stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without
hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly
observed: "Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its
decisions based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits.
With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission
(Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified." Worse, the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner,
failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged. Petitioner
allegedly violated Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. To be disqualified under
the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate,
personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material
consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration must be
for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions. In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged
that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and
(b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte
to vote for him. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for
disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to
disqualify the petitioner based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the
ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the
COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts
of justice. The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the
disqualification case based on Section 261 (a) and (o), and not on Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. EDISTc
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED "STRAY" CONSIDERING THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED
DISQUALIFIED BY FINAL JUDGMENT. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of
the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes
cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him
bonafide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that
the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government. This principle applies with greater force in the
case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence,
could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and
Resolutions. cIHDaE
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT VIOLATES THE SETTLED
DOCTRINE THAT THE SECOND PLACER COULD NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF THE
DISQUALIFIED WINNER. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin
which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and
their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the
election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. Respondent Locsin
proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such
as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She
contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like
those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated
because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the votes cast in his
favor should not be considered. This contention is without merit. In the recent case of
Trinidad v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a
candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of
the disqualified winner.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ORDER SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION IS
UNENFORCEABLE AS IT HAS NOT ATTAINED FINALITY AND THEREFORE
CANNOT BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR RESPONDENT'S ASSUMPTION IN OFFICE.
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
EaHIDC
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. A petition for quo warranto may be filed only
on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the
case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if
she won, to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against
one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number
of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident
that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.
She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent
nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo
warranto proceeding.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; THE ADMINISTRATION OF
OATH AND REGISTRATION OF PETITIONER IN THE ROLL OF MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS NO LONGER A MATTER OF DISCRETION ON
THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus "when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown
that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a
well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The distinction between
a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration
of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing
the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered
71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14,
2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the
order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision
of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent
Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is
the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled
by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The
rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no
alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. EcDATH
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people
cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not
subject to the discretion of any official of the land. HcTDSA
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose
De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on
Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against
respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and
exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position
of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin
was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001,
one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the
COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification 1 against the petitioner for indirectly
soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation
of Section 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used
the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul
and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the
petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates, 2 Danilo D. Maglasang, 3 Cesar A.
Laurente; 4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera; 5 (c) Extract
Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho; 6
and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and
portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the
respondent. 7 The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the
COMELEC's Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and
reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director
of Region VIII. 8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram
informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the
petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation. 9
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for
district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was
the winning candidate. cHDaEI
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor
in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second Division. 10 Respondent
Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and
unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the
disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the
respondent "so as not to render the present disqualification case moot and academic." A
copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry
receipt was attached thereto. 11
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing
that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains
unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the
corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. 12 The records, however,
do not show the date the petitioner received the motion. SIDTCa
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order 13
directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness
of the allegations in the petition for disqualification." 14 It also directed the Regional
Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the
complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the
Commission. 15 As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the
final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin's 53,447 votes. 16
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation,
the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither
has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was
able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with the Regional Election
Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the copy of
the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the
COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that
the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and receive evidence
therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office
No. 8 at his own instance. 17 Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were
undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He
attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; 18 (b) Copy of the
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico; 19 (c) Affidavit
of Wilfredo A. Fiel; 20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; 21 and (e) Affidavit
of Arnel Y. Padayao. 22
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, 23 alleging that (a) he did
not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied
the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a
copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a
copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c) that he
received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his
proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of
his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a
hearing on his Motion. 24
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties
were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. 25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner
submitted his Memorandum 26 in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his
proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has
no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the
purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning
congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case
against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following additional
evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector
Benjamin T. Gorre; 27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; 28
(c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc; 29 (d) Joint
Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto; 30 and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,
31 Igmedio Rita 32 and Gerardo Monteza. 33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum also
contained additional affidavits of his witnesses. 34
Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June
14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution 35 in SPA No. 01-
208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his
disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered
the highest number of votes . . . ." A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the
counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day. 36
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray
even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin
was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of
FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes
representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative district for said
office." 37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed
office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration 38 from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for
Reconsideration. 39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the
COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of
the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto
the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the
resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate
proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-
petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.
40
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Proclamation, 41 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the
proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of
votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that
any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken
cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case
should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not
directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid
because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being
stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation 42 stating that he was deprived of a
fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence
adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the
suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled on the
main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be
conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses
43 which he claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of
petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply, 44 Rejoinder 45 and Sur-Rejoinder 46 were
respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No.
01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for
resolution. cCaSHA
From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B.
Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla. 47 Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting opinions 48 to the
Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of
petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he
concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth
mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding
Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's
motion for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I
respect the electorate's will. . . ." 49
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion
and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring
the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to
REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1,
2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of
losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla,
promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208),
I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla,
Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated
on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the
Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing
and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus,
null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the
concurrent order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately
reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered
stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and
contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution,
to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its ministerial
duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for that position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the
office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives
through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the
proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election
laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the
Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been
issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner
Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of
the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of
respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of
Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being
violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla
are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an
inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution,
to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative
district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through
the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance. CAacTH
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration
of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable
consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the proclamation
of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the
three (3) Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION
of the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3)
Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda
G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the
MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORITY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the
majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority
decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will
write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned
Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on
his vote." 50
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph
C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. 51
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she
filed a "Comment and Manifestation" 52 with the COMELEC en banc questioning the
procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent
Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive
Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken
her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House. 53 Relying on this opinion,
respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular
session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but
will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate
her position. 54
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order 55 constituting the members of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It
likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives . . . ,
based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte . . . ."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte,
having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in
the district. 56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. 57
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent
Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc
resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. 58 Petitioner also
served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of
the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and
proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges
intended for the position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be
accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this
letter, a Memorandum 59 dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy
Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that
"there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and
executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 . . . ." SDHCac
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the
COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, 60 no action was taken by the
House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his
party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter 61 addressed to respondent Speaker
De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman
Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on
the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should their
action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter 62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However,
Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the
HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the
COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the decision would result in
the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a
legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take
action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a
matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which,
hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (italics supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become
final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become
the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its
Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the
records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House
and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that
respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges
that the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to
assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment, 63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to
compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial
duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House
considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in
the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the House Speaker
to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment, 64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the
name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath
before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of
Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with the opinions 65
rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo
C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation
of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the
determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, 66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot
issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly
violating the principle of separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing
who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be
compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be
directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the
authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the COMELEC. aTHASC
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it
after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was
vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of Representatives.
Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy
and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-
proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the
questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar
manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been
categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed
against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma.
Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper
grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late." 67
In his Reply, 68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC
decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an
opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the HRET
has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based
not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner
did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of
proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 69 and Section 3,
Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself
recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to
the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final
decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the
legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as Member
of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the
COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of
said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent
Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 70 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications
or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day
for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered
political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate who in
an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of.
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; EHTSCD
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices
concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which must be
consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as
SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001;
SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to
file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies,
serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised
as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall
submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences including
their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the
answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission
through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports and recommendations
within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence
together with the complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of
the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the
case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a
member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification.
Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the
allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this requirement,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the
proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been
completed, viz:
"Rule 14. Summons
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5.Return. When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall
give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return
the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof
of service.
Section 6.Proof of Service. Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner
provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be
conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his
findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the
hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of
summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation. TaDSCA
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not
contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding
proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated
assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because
he never received summons. 71 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed
Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District
Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor
furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of
the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally
going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of Section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall
give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which
the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office." (italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections
were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct
hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in
office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a
Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent
Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner
through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to
prove such service. 72 This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and
service of the motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice. Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially
on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the
hearing of the motion.
Section 5.Proof of Service. No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof
of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that
the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected."
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of
motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter
which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 73 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant or
any intervenor," viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial
or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (italics supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the
lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of
paper. 74 It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division. aEcADH
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., 75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion
for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the
Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt 76 was attached evidencing
service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when
the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division
issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was
not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for
disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent
Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent
Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by
registered mail.
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when
evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC
Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is
strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness
of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition . . . the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to
Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646
. . . and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning,
until further orders." 77 (italics supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the
COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his
proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to
adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in
gross violation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
"continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to
complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the
Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5)
days from completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001.
Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file
their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC
Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the
petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the
Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the
respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension
cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically
linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main
disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to
present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence
which are unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension
but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the
disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the COMELEC en
banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of
the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to
disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held: IcaHTA
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second
Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of
Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion. This would explain
the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the
order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the
urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of
the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the Commission (Second
Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to
consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus,
completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both sides." 78 (italics
supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in
support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner
raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due process, and
consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order
of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt
on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his
proclamation. 79 He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress
hearing on the main disqualification case should the suspension be lifted. 80
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not
based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on
substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition
for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the
affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en
banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based
mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided
evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no
choice. Codilla was disqualified." 81
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming
from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was
charged. 82
Petitioner allegedly violated Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, . . . shall be
disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a)
the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other
material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration
must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions. AIDcTE
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the
extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to
induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him.
Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current
elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the
prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City
Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the
residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within
the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed
without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting
various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for
the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent." 83
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations.
For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump
trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting
and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the
Codilla family. 84
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw
white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the
road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and
gravel unloaded by the white trucks. 85
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of
Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City
Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the
source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr.
Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who
ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to
deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla." 86
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner.
He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking "City Government of
Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and
that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during
election." 87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the supposed
order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters
to vote for him. The same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin, 88
Alfredo C. De la Pea, 89 Miguel P. Pandac, 90 Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez,
Glicerio Rios, 91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr., 92 Abner Casas, 93 Rita Trangia, 94 and Judith
Erispe 95 attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses 96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded,
which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San
Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be
held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification.
More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the petitioner
based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the
petitioner, particularly Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or
anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public
or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or community in
order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination
or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
caIACE
xxx xxx xxx
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled
by the government for an election campaign. Any person who uses under any guise
whatsoever directly or indirectly, . . . (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or
paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies
including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity . . . ."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. 97 They are criminal and not administrative
in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of
the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular
courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with
the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case
based on Section 261(a) and (o), and not on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner
the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding
the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest
number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15,
2001 98 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to
contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that
basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent
cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions:
(1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of
Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of
due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the
petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division
to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this
basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes.
DAHCaI
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final
judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered
"stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during
the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray.
To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during
the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 100
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the
elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner
did not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special
Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a
Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings,
following its promulgation." (italics supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, 101 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions
or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission,
RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases
shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship,
violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the
resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for
such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be
counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate. CAIaHS
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner
and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration
shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2.Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (italics supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 102 In every election, the people's
choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given
effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the
highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared
elected in his place. 103 In Domino v. COMELEC, 104 this Court ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be
considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
xxx xxx xxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election
fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner
to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in
favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the
defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection
by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect
officials of their choice." 105
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal
circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on
election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based
on election offenses like those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such,
the votes cast in his favor should not be considered. 106
This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC, 107 this Court ruled
that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based
on personal circumstances or Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the
second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc has been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to
question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the
COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses
for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing
therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter."' (italics supplied)
HTScEI
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive
for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and executory." 108 Clearly, the
validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en
banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en
banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule
on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion
for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on
motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.
Section 1.Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration may be filed
on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or
that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2.Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3.Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration. The motion shall be verified and
shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or
ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making
express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4.Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the
period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5.How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. Upon the filing of a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
Section 6.Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing. The Clerk
of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof." (italics supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was
not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not
attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution.
It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as
the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction
in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility
should be brought before the HRET pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. 109
We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet
been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter. IEaCDH
In Puzon vs. Cua, 110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation
has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has
jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives,
could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the
very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo
warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. 111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There
is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and
proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in
question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be
the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature
assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void
from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell
petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as
the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent
Locsin.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 112 For a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right
to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial
act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment." 113
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of
Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts
are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC
Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has
not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has
been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.,
as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public
respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.
This decision shall be immediately executory. EHSADa
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142038. September 18, 2000.]
ROLANDO E. COLUMBRES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HILARIO DE
GUZMAN JR., respondents.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for petitioner.
Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz for private respondent.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. were candidates
for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan during the May 11, 1998 elections.
After canvassing, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
with 4,248 votes as against petitioner's 4,104 votes. Subsequently, petitioner filed an
election protest with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner contested 42 precincts and
prayed for the revision of ballots in the said precincts. The trial court rendered its
decision, declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with
4,037 votes against 3,302 votes of private respondent. Private respondent appealed the
decision to the respondent COMELEC. The Second Division promulgated its Resolution
reversing and setting aside the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court and,
instead, affirmed the election and proclamation of private respondent. Private
respondent was declared to have won by sixty-nine (69) votes. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner claimed that the Second
Division erred in totally disregarding his other objections and therefore urged the
COMELEC en banc to review the findings of the Second Division. Respondent
COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and affirming the ruling of the Second Division. In denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the respondent COMELEC en banc ruled that the finding by its Second
Division that the 111 questioned ballots were written by the same person is a finding of
fact that may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Protestant-appellee is
not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this instance but the appreciation
thereof by the Second Division. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the COMELEC en banc for it
to physically re-examine the contested ballots and ascertain their validity. The Court
ruled that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the
COMELEC Second Division's findings on the contested ballots are findings of facts that
may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. According to the Court, in order
to determine the winning candidate, the application of election law and jurisprudence in
appreciating the contested ballots is essential. Any question on the appreciation of the
ballots would directly affect the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the declared
winner and any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed
decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper subject of a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The Court further ruled that the
COMELEC en banc should have examined the questioned ballots and determined for
itself their validity, i.e., whether they were marked ballots or not and to ascertain the real
nature of the alleged markings thereon. HCETDS
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; THE
COMMISSION EN BANC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DECLARING THE
DIVISION'S FINDING ON THE CONTESTED BALLOTS NOT PROPER SUBJECT OF A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; ANY QUESTION ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE ASSAILED DECISION, ORDER OR RULING OF
A DIVISION IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
BEFORE THE COMMISSION EN BANC. To determine the winning candidate, the
application of election law and jurisprudence in appreciating the contested ballots, is
essential. Any question on the appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the declared winner. As the Solicitor General
submits in his comment on the petition, any question on the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the assailed decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper
subject of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. Moreover, the
opposing conclusions of the trial court and the COMELEC Second Division should have
prompted the COMELEC en banc to undertake an independent appreciation of the
contested ballots to see for itself which of the conflicting rulings is valid and should be
upheld. Be that as it may, it is our considered opinion, and we rule, that the COMELEC
en banc gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the COMELEC Division's findings
on the contested ballots are findings of facts "that may not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration".
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMMISSION EN BANC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
PRESUMING THAT THE MARKINGS FOUND ON THE BALLOTS HAVE BEEN MADE
BY THIRD PERSONS, ABSENT CONCRETE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THEY
WERE PLACED BY THE VOTERS THEMSELVES. Petitioner alleges that
respondent COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in presuming that the
markings found on the ballots have been made by third persons, absent concrete
evidence showing that they were placed by the voters themselves. Petitioner is correct
that there is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is that the
sanctity of the ballot has been protected and preserved. Where the ballot, however,
shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in the writing of the names of some candidates
from the rest, the ballot is void for having been written by two hands. A ballot appearing
to have been written by two persons is presumed to have been cast "as is" during the
voting, and this presumption can only be overcome by showing that the ballot was
tampered with after it was deposited in the ballot box. If the COMELEC Second Division
found markings in the contested 111 ballots that were placed by persons other than the
voters themselves, then it should not have validated them. To rule the way it did, would
require a showing that the integrity of ballots has not been violated. Otherwise, the
presumption that they were placed "as is" in the ballot box stands. DIETHS
DECISION
BUENA, J p:
This petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
January 25, 2000 which affirmed the Resolution of the Second Division setting aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Election Case No. D-
31-98 annulling the election and proclamation of private respondent Hilario de Guzman,
Jr. as Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. aDIHTE
Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. were candidates
for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan during the May 11, 1998 elections.
After canvassing, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
with 4,248 votes as against petitioner's 4,104 votes. Subsequently, petitioner filed an
election protest with the Regional Trial Court docketed as Election Case No. D-31-98.
Petitioner contested 42 precincts and prayed for the revision of ballots in the said
precincts.
On December 7, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, declaring petitioner as the duly
elected mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with 4,037 votes against 3,302 votes of
private respondent.
Private respondent appealed the decision to the respondent COMELEC. The case was docketed
as COMELEC EAC No. A-20-98 and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.
On October 5, 1999, the Second Division promulgated its Resolution reversing and setting aside
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court and, instead, affirmed the election and
proclamation of private respondent. Private respondent was declared to have won by
sixty-nine (69) votes.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the ruling of the COMELEC Second
Division, validating 120 marked ballots in favor of private respondent, despite absence
of evidence, to prove that the marks have been placed on the ballots by third persons
other than the voters themselves. Petitioner likewise moved for a reconsideration of the
decision with respect to the 111 ballots found by the trial court to have been written by
two persons, but not so ruled upon by the Second Division, again in favor of private
respondent. Lastly, petitioner claimed that the Second Division erred in totally
disregarding his other objections and therefore urged the COMELEC EN BANC to
review the findings of the Second Division. EcAHDT
On January 25, 2000, the respondent COMELEC En Banc issued its Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the Second Division.
In resolving petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the respondent COMELEC En Banc, in the
herein assailed Resolution, said:
". . . Protestant-appellee alleges that there were 124 ballots which were written by two (2)
persons, and as such they should all be annulled. Instead, the Commission (Second
Division) annulled only 13 ballots while validating 111 ballots in favor of protestee-
appellant Hilario de Guzman, Jr. Movant contends that the 13 ballots commonly
invalidated by both the COMELEC (Second Division) and the trial court as having been
written by two persons were no different from the 111 ballots validated by the
Commission (Second Division) but invalidated by the trial court.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . The finding by the Commission (Second Division) that the 111 questioned ballots were
written by the same person is a finding of fact that may not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. Movant protestant-appellee is not challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence in this instance but the appreciation thereof by the Commission (Second
Division)." 1
". . . Movant protestant-appellee (also) contends that there were 120 ballots erroneously
validated by the Commission (Second Division) which were admittedly marked. He
argues that whenever ballots contain markings very obvious and visible on their faces,
the presumption is that the said markings on the ballots were placed thereat by the voter
themselves - thus nullifying the said ballots. Stated otherwise, protestant-appellee
argues that the purported markings on the questioned ballots are presumed to have
been placed there by the voters themselves and, unless proven otherwise, nullifies the
ballots. SHIETa
"We disagree. The movant is relying on an erroneous and misleading presumption. The rule is
that no ballot should be discarded as marked unless its character as such is
unmistakable. The distinction should always be between marks that were apparently,
carelessly, or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely
placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification of the ballot,
which invalidate it. (Cacho vs. Abad, 62 Phil. 564). The marks which shall be considered
sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on
his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter (Valenzuela vs. Carlos, 42 Phil. 428).
In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a person other than the voter himself
does not invalidate the ballot as marked. (Tajanlangit vs. Cazenas, 5 SCRA 567)" 2
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises two issues:
1. Whether or not, the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially so in matters of
appreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc; and
2. Whether or not, in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent
any evidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by a third
person, and therefore, should not invalidate the ballot. ACIDSc
On the first issue, indeed, the COMELEC erred when it declared that
". . . it is emphatic that the grounds of motion for reconsideration should consist of insufficiency
of evidence to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order or
ruling is contrary to law. Nowhere in the provision can finding of fact be the subject of
motion for reconsideration. The finding by the Commission (Second Division) that the
111 questioned ballots were written by the same person is a finding of fact that may not
be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Movant protestant-appellee is not
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this instance but the appreciation thereof
by the Commission (Second Division)." 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads:
"Section 1. Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration may
be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or
ruling; or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law."
Commissioner Dy-Liacco, in her Dissenting Opinion, correctly opined, and we quote:
"I dissent in part from the majority conclusion that finding of facts on the one hundred eleven
(111) questioned ballots cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
considering that the movant protestant-appellee 'is not challenging the sufficiency of
evidence in this instance but the appreciation thereof by the Commission (Second
Division.)' Protestant-Appellee in his discussion of his motion for reconsideration (p. 205
of the records of the case/p. 24 of the MR pleading) imploring the Commission En Banc
to review, re-examine and re-inspect the 111 ballots where the Trial Court and the
Division disagreed and make its own final findings and determination, in effect disputes
the ruling of the Second Division implying that the appreciation is contrary to law. Rule
19, Sec. 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure enumerates the grounds that may be
raised in motions for reconsideration and one of which is that the decision, order or
ruling is contrary to law. Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision, order, or ruling
is not the only ground for the filing of motions for reconsideration. . . . ADHcTE
"When protestant-appellee argued that the appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is the
implication that such finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper
subject of a motion for reconsideration."
To determine the winning candidate, the application of election law and jurisprudence in
appreciating the contested ballots, is essential. Any question on the appreciation of the
ballots would directly affect the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the declared
winner. As the Solicitor General submits in his comment on the petition, any question on
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed decision, order or ruling of a
COMELEC Division is also a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc.
Moreover, the opposing conclusions of the trial court and the COMELEC Second Division should
have prompted the COMELEC en banc to undertake an independent appreciation of the
contested ballots to see for itself which of the conflicting rulings is valid and should be
upheld.
Be that as it may, it is our considered opinion, and we rule, that the COMELEC en banc gravely
abused its discretion in declaring that the COMELEC Division's findings on the
contested ballots are findings of facts "that may not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration." cAHITS
On the second issue, petitioner argues that the findings, both by the trial court as well as the
COMELEC's Second Division, are similar that said 120 ballots (Exhs. "R," "R-1" and
series) indeed, had markings but the trial court and the COMELEC Second Division
differed in their conclusion. The trial court nullified the ballots (supposedly in favor of
herein private respondent) for being admittedly marked. On the other hand, the Second
Division declared the ballots valid because the marks were allegedly placed by third
person/s, purposely to invalidate the ballots. Petitioner alleges that respondent
COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in presuming that the markings found
on the ballots have been made by third persons, absent concrete evidence showing that
they were placed by the voters themselves.
Petitioner is correct that there is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is
that the sanctity of the ballot has been protected and preserved. Where the ballot,
however, shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in the writing of the names of some
candidates from the rest, the ballot is void for having been written by two hands. 4 A
ballot appearing to have been written by two persons is presumed to have been cast "as
is" during the voting, and this presumption can only be overcome by showing that the
ballot was tampered with after it was deposited in the ballot box. 5
If the COMELEC Second Division found markings in the contested 111 ballots that were placed
by persons other than the voters themselves, then it should not have validated them. To
rule the way it did, would require a showing that the integrity of ballots has not been
violated. Otherwise, the presumption that they were placed "as is" in the ballot box
stands.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General raised the following significant questions: "In the absence
of showing that the ballot boxes were violated and that somebody else had access to
the ballots, how was the COMELEC able to conclude that indeed said marks were
placed by persons other than the voters?" Indeed, the poll body is mum on how third
persons were able to access the questioned ballots. Furthermore, the COMELEC
Second Division neither made a categorical finding as to whether the different markings
on the ballots were deliberately placed so as to sufficiently identify them or not. Yet, the
COMELEC en banc simplistically concluded that there was "nothing left for . . . [it] but to
affirm the VALIDITY of the questioned 120 ballots in favor of protestee-appellant Hilario
de Guzman, Jr." HDATSI
In view of the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the COMELEC en banc was remiss in its
duties to properly resolve the Motion for Reconsideration before it. It should have given
a close scrutiny of the questioned ballots and determined for itself their validity, i.e.,
whether they were marked ballots or not. There is truly a need to actually examine the
questioned ballots in order to ascertain the real nature of the alleged markings thereon.
One has to see the writings to be able to determine whether they were written by
different persons, and whether they were intended to identify the ballot.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby remanded to the COMELEC en banc for it to physically re-
examine the contested ballots and ascertain their validity. It is further directed to resolve
this case within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision in view of the proximity of
the next elections. HaDEIc
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 176211. May 8, 2007.]
MAYOR IBARRA R. MANZALA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JULIE R.
MONTON, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), or status quo ante order, and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
HcSCED
Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala seeks to annul the resolution, dated August 24, 2006, of the Former
Second Division 1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), declaring private
respondent Julie R. Monton to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang,
Romblon in the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections, and the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, 2 dated January 24, 2007, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the Resolution of August 24, 2006 with modification as to
the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-appreciation.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Ibarra R. Manzala and private respondent Julie R. Monton were mayoralty candidates
in the Municipality of Magdiwang, Romblon, during the May 10, 2004 National and Local
Elections. On May 13, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with 2,579 votes, or a margin of 13
votes, over petitioner's 2,566 votes.
On May 19, 2004, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Branch 81 (Election Protest Case No. 7), seeking recount in the 10 precincts of
Magdiwang on the grounds of fraud, serious irregularities, and willful violation of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) and other pertinent COMELEC
rules allegedly committed by the voters and the Chairman and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors during the election. EcSCAD
Private respondent filed an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, averring that the
election was held peacefully with no irregularity whatsoever. By way of counter-protest,
private respondent contested the election in certain precincts, to wit: Precincts 41A, 40A,
39A, 38A, 37A, 36A and 35A of Barangay Tampayan; Precincts 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A,
7A, 8A, 9A and 9B of Barangay Poblacion; Precinct 16A of Barangay Agutay; Precinct
24A of Barangay Dulangan; and Precinct 32A of Barangay Jao-asan.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to the Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.
A revision of ballots was later conducted. In its decision of December 8, 2005, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestant IBARRA R. MANZALA is hereby proclaimed as
the duly-elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon during the election of May 10,
2004 who won over protestee JULIE R. MONTON with a majority of 137 valid votes and
is entitled to occupy said position. The proclamation by the MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS of Magdiwang, Romblon that JULIE R. MONTON was the duly-elected
MAYOR is hereby ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioner moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal which the trial court granted
on December 16, 2005. TSIDEa
On appeal, private respondent raised the following assignment of errors: that the trial court
seriously erred in invalidating 144 votes of private respondent ostensibly on the ground
of pattern voting; that sets of ballots were marked, as well as written by two persons;
that the trial court erred in not considering and appreciating the objections raised by
private respondent involving the counter-protested precincts, and in arriving at its
decision, it considered only the objections and/or exhibits of the petitioner; and that the
trial court seriously erred when it declared petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor
of Magdiwang, Romblon despite the patent defects in the appealed decision.
On August 24, 2006, the Former Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution which
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It found that private respondent
obtained 2,560 votes, or a margin of 17 votes, over petitioner's 2,543 votes. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The December 8, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon in Election
Protest Case No. 7 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (Former Second Division) hereby DECLARES protestee-
appellant JULIE E. MONTON, the duly-elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang,
Romblon during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution of
January 24, 2007. It affirmed the earlier Resolution dated August 24, 2006 which
proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor with modification as
to the number of votes obtained by both parties after re-appreciation, i.e., private
respondent garnered 2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over petitioner's 2,475 votes.
Meanwhile, acting on private respondent's Motion for Immediate Execution and Issuance of an
Entry of Judgment, the COMELEC en banc issued a writ of execution on February 28,
2007 declaring its Resolution of January 24, 2007 as final and executory as of February
26, 2007. Consequently, in the Order dated March 1, 2007, the COMELEC en banc
directed the implementation of the writ of execution ordering petitioner to cease and
desist from discharging the powers and functions of the Office of the Municipal Mayor of
Magdiwang, Romblon; to relinquish and vacate the post in favor of private respondent;
and to cause the smooth turn-over of the office to the latter. ACcHIa
On February 1, 2007, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring private respondent as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Magdiwang, Romblon with a prayer that the COMELEC be directed to cease and desist
from implementing the challenged Resolutions of August 24, 2006 and January 24,
2007.
Private respondent maintains that "to allow the arguments of the petitioner to prevail would make
him assume office by the grace of impropriety and misappreciation of ballots by the
lower court, whose decision has already been reversed and set aside by the Former
Second Division of the COMELEC and affirmed by the Commission en banc."
The petition should be dismissed.
Petitioner argues that the motion for reconsideration filed with the Former Second Division of the
COMELEC "has thrown the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de novo in a
criminal case," yet the COMELEC en banc failed to conduct a thorough review of the
contested ballots.
This argument has no basis. Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution provides the
COMELEC with quasi-judicial power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or
rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. Section 3 thereof states
the administrative power of the COMELEC, either en banc or in two divisions, to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. HaTSDA
Clearly, from the decision of the trial court, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction to
review, revise, modify, or even reverse and set aside the decision of the former and
substitute it with its own decision. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers, the Constitution also mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by
division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Election cases
cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a
conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate
court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings. In the present
case, the COMELEC en banc had thoroughly reviewed the decision of its Former
Second Division and affirmed the findings thereof with modification as to the number of
votes obtained by both parties after re-appreciation, that is, private respondent obtained
2,535 votes, or a margin of 60 votes, over petitioner's 2,475 votes.
Petitioner further contends that the trial court's "judicial appreciation of the contested ballots
[should be] honored, respected, and given the importance it deserves by [this] Court."
This contention has no merit. Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC, the aggrieved party, herein
petitioner, may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, in a special civil action of
certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65, the only question that may be raised and/or
resolved is whether or not the COMELEC had acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 Such fact does not exist in the present
case.
Moreover, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question
of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with
the supervision of elections all over the country. To reiterate, the COMELEC is the
constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election
contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction
over election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Consequently,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law,
the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the said
Commission on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court. 6
Finally, to justify the issuance of an injunctive relief, petitioner claims that there had been a
"misinterpretation and misapplication of the law" by the COMELEC and that "should the
facts and circumstances presented in this petition be sufficiently persuasive, . . . a writ of
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent the public
respondent COMELEC from disrupting the stability of governance in the Municipality of
Magdiwang, Province of Romblon, in the meantime that the petition is being reviewed."
DAEaTS
As a consequence of the dismissal of the instant petition, petitioner's prayer for any form of
injunctive relief, perforce, has no factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of showing that the Commission on Elections
committed any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution, dated
August 24, 2006, by the Former Second Division and the Resolution, dated January 24,
2007, by the Commission en banc, which declared private respondent Julie R. Monton
to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Magdiwang, Romblon in the May 10, 2004
National and Local Elections.
Accordingly, the Commission on Elections en banc is DIRECTED to forthwith cause the full
implementation of the Writ of Execution it issued on February 28, 2007 and the Order of
March 1, 2007.
In view of the proximity of the next National and Local Elections on May 14, 2007, this Decision
is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. CDScaT
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 167033. April 12, 2006.]
ESTRELITA "NENG" JULIANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MUSLIMIN
SEMA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
This resolves the petition for certiorari, filed by Estrelita "Neng" Juliano (petitioner), seeking to
set aside the Order of the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC En Banc)
dated February 10, 2005 which affirmed the Resolution dated October 13, 2004 of the
COMELEC 2ND Division dismissing the pre-proclamation controversy filed by petitioner
Estrelita "Neneng" Juliano. cCaIET
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the narration of the antecedent facts set forth in
the COMELEC 2nd Division Resolution is undisputed; hence, portions thereof are
reproduced hereunder:
The factual allegations of both parties reveal that Cotabato City has a total of five hundred
seventy-seven (577) clustered polling precincts distributed among thirty-seven (37)
barangays; that the first City Board of Canvassers chaired by Atty. Yogie Martirizar
convened on May 10, 2004 and conducted its proceedings until May 16, 2004; that on
May 12, 2004, however, petitioner filed an ex parte petition to replace membership of the
first CBOC and was granted by the Commission; that the second CBOC was chaired by
Atty. Jubil Surmieda and conducted canvassing proceedings from May 16 to 22, 2004;
that petitioner also sought the transfer of the canvassing from the Session Hall of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to the 6th ID camp, Awang, Maguindanao; that the Surmieda
Board also failed to finish the canvassing and was replaced by another CBOC chaired
by Atty. Lintang Bedol, which conducted the canvassing from May 24 to May 29, 2004;
that this canvassing was interrupted by another petition filed by Juliano praying for the
transfer of the canvassing from Awang, Maguindanao to the Comelec main office in
Manila, which was again granted by the Commission; that the new venue of the
canvassing was held at the Session Hall of the Comelec main office in Manila; that a
notice was issued on May 29, 2004 by the Bedol Board stating that the resumption of
canvassing in Manila will be on "Wednesday, June 2, 2004, at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon"; that despite the notice, the Bedol Board resumed its canvassing on June 1,
2004 at 1:45 p.m. at the Comelec Session Hall, promulgated its rulings on all contested
returns, denying all petitions for exclusion from canvass of the contested returns,
canvassed the election returns, then entered and tallied into the statement of votes the
figures and proclaimed the winning candidates; that the Bedol Board proclaimed
respondent Sema as the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City; that petitioner filed on
June 2, 2004 a consolidated petition to nullify canvass proceedings and/or proclamation
undertaken by the CBOC on June 1, 2004. cIHCST
Petitioner raised the following issues as a ground to nullify respondent's proclamation, to wit:
1. Petitioner was never notified of the new and advanced schedule of the resumption of
canvassing in the Comelec Main Office, Manila, hence, the proceedings was illegal;
2. There are 108 contested election returns which petitioner alleged to be spurious and
manufactured, and will adversely affect the result of the election if the respective votes
of the parties be deducted from the final tally;
3. In relation to issue number 2, CBOC should have suspended the proclamation as
prescribed in Section 36, par. f of Resolution No. 6669 of the Commission;
4. There are 54 election returns included by the CBOC in the canvassing but which were
not part of the inventory conducted by the Surmieda Board; 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The COMELEC 2nd Division issued its Resolution dated October 13, 2004 ruling that:
. . . the allegations of the petitioner in relation to the 108 returns cannot be properly resolved in
this pre-proclamation controversy as it would require the Commission to go beyond the
face of the election returns, in order to find out that the same were really manufactured
and spurious. Furthermore, upon perusal of the returns, We find the same to be in order.
This finding is, however, without prejudice to the filing of the proper election protest in
order that a thorough evaluation of the returns will be conducted, which may include the
examination of the signatures of the Board of Election inspectors." 2
With regard to the alleged lack of notice to petitioner of the June 1, 2004 canvassing, the
COMELEC 2nd Division held that petitioner should be deemed notified of the June 1,
2004 canvassing because during said proceedings, one of petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Javines, was present along with petitioner's watchers. HIACEa
Thus, the dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present pre-proclamation controversy praying for the
nullification of the proclamation of respondent Muslimin Sema is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the proper election protest. 3
On October 23, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 17, 2005, she
filed her own Affidavit of Disavowal, stating that she never engaged the legal services of
Atty. Ronald Javines (Annex "H") 4 and the Affidavit of Atty. Ronald Javines,
corroborating petitioner's statement in her affidavit (Annex "I"). 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc and
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier was assigned as ponente. A Resolution under the
ponencia of said Commissioner was issued on February 10, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated last October 13, 2004 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proclamation of Respondent Muslimin Sema is
ANNULLED as the proceedings attendant thereto is illegal. The Election Records and
Statistics Division is hereby directed to conduct an examination whether or not the one
hundred eight (108) election returns involved in this case are, as claimed by the
petitioner, written by one. The examination must be done within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof and the ERSD should submit its report to the Commission en banc on the
matter within ten (10) days from termination of the examination. Thereafter, the
Commission en banc shall immediately evaluate the report and set the case for hearing
if there is a need therefore. Forthwith, we shall issue a Resolution on the issue of
exclusion of the contested election returns. In the meantime, the vice-mayor shall
temporarily assume the position of Mayor of Cotabato City. 6
However, only three members 7 of the COMELEC En Banc voted in favor of granting the Motion
for Reconsideration, three members 8 dissented, and one 9 member took no part.
AIHECa
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard,
and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied.
After "re-consultation", the members chose to maintain their votes. Upon failing to obtain a
majority vote on the Resolution dated February 10, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the Order also dated February 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, after due re-consultation of the results of the en banc voting which
remains to be 3:3:1, pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the
resolution of the Second Division subject of the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
AFFIRMED. AHSaTI
SO ORDERED. 10
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LACK OF NOTICE BY THE BEDOL BOARD TO PETITIONER
AND/OR PETITIONER'S COUNSEL ON THE RESUMPTION OF CANVASS ON JUNE
1, 2004 TO THE TRANSFERRED VENUE AT THE SESSION HALL OF THE MAIN
OFFICE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN INTRAMUROS, MANILA WAS CURED BY THE
PRESENCE OF PETITIONER'S WATCHER AND ATTY. RONALD B. JAVINES, WHO
APPEARED AS COUNSEL FOR KNP/PMP CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE BAI ZENY
G. DILANGALEN AND KNP/PNP [sic] SENATORIAL CANDIDATE DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN; and
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS THE POWER TO (i) DETERMINE
AUTHENTICITY OF ELECTION RETURNS; (ii) INVESTIGATE BEYOND THE
RETURNS; AND (iii) ADOPT MEANS AND METHODS TO ASCERTAIN AUTHENTICITY
OF ELECTION RETURNS. HAEIac
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the petition should be dismissed outright because
petitioner failed to allege grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En
Banc and its 2nd Division.
Indeed, it is well settled that "unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of
discretion, its decision will not be interfered with by this Court." 11 Considering, though,
that the Resolution of COMELEC 2nd Division dated October 13, 2004 was affirmed
merely because the voting of the COMELEC En Banc on the Resolution dated February
10, 2005 penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier (which reversed and set aside the
Resolution dated October 13, 2004), was equally divided, this Court is compelled to look
deeper into this case.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of
the Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes,
however, that the Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated
that what was conducted was a mere "re-consultation."
A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing".
A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" 12 hence, a re-consultation means
a second deliberation of persons on some subject. acEHSI
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court's or
administrative board's attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. A
retrial of issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to
be heard" 13 (Emphasis supplied). But as held in Samalio v. Court Of Appeals, 14
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose
of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their
arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and
arguments already on hand only by the members of the tribunal, without the participation
of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, 15 when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an order
setting the case for hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda before voting anew on therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. This
should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc to act on herein petitioner's
motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its own Rules of
Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the
Comelec En Banc of the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to
give petitioner the rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body
acted with grave abuse of discretion. DAaIEc
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the
COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc is ORDERED to conduct forthwith the
rehearing required under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and render the appropriate
decision thereon.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170678. July 17, 2006.]
ROMMEL G. MUOZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CARLOS IRWIN G.
BALDO, JR., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by petitioner Rommel G. Muoz
assailing the Resolution 1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the Resolution 2 dated October
25, 2004 of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition of private respondent
Carlos Irwin G. Baldo, Jr. to annul petitioner's proclamation as mayor of Camalig, Albay.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of Camalig, Albay in the May 10,
2004 election. 3 At 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) convened and canvassed the election returns (ER). 4
On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs from
various precincts based on the following grounds: 1) eight ERs lack inner seal; 2) seven
ERs lack material data; 3) one ER lack signatures; 4) four ERs lack signatures and
thumbmarks of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors on the envelope
containing them; 5) one ER lack the name and signature of the poll clerk on the second
page thereof; 6) one ER lack the number of votes in words and figures; and 7) four ERs
were allegedly prepared under intimidation. 5
On May 13, 2004, the MBC denied the objections and ruled to include the objected ERs in the
canvass. Private respondent appealed the said ruling to the COMELEC on May 18,
2004 and was docketed as SPC No. 04-087 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
6 FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE 25 OCTOBER [2004] RESOLUTION OF THE
Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May 19, 2004 by the MBC as
the winning candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay. 7
On May 21, 2004, private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the
proclamation of the petitioner for being premature and illegal. The case was docketed as
SPC No. 04-124 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division. 8
On October 25, 2004, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution in SPC No. 04-124
granting the petition to annul the proclamation. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby GRANTS
the Petition. The proclamation of . . . ROMMEL MUOZ as winning candidate for mayor
of Camalig, Albay is ANNULLED for having been made in an irregular proceeding and
for being precipitate and premature.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was denied for lack of merit by the COMELEC En
Banc in a Resolution dated December 15, 2005, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc hereby DENIES the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by . . . Muoz for lack of merit. Accordingly, the ANNULMENT and
SETTING ASIDE, by the First Division, of the proclamation of . . . ROMMEL MUOZ as
the duly elected Mayor is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Regional Election Director of Region V, Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., is hereby
DIRECTED to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers from among the Election
Officers in the Region.
Accordingly, the new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Camalig, Albay is hereby DIRECTED to:
a) RECONVENE, and after due notice to all parties/candidates concerned,
b) RE-CANVASS all the election returns of Camalig, Albay, and on the basis thereof,
c) PREPARE a new Certificate of Canvass, and forthwith
d) PROCLAIM the winning candidates for Mayoralty position.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, petitioner files the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
On January 17, 2006, the Court issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and
ordered the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the
December 15, 2005 Resolution in SPC No. 04-124. 12
Petitioner relies on the following grounds in support of his petition:
I
THE PUBLIC [RESPONDENT] COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DENYING FOR LACK OF MERIT PETITIONER'S MOTION
PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S FIRST DIVISION, FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW,
RULES AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE PROCLAMATION OF
PETITIONER AS DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF CAMALIG, ALBAY WITHOUT FIRST
RESOLVING THE PENDING APPEAL FIRST INITIATED, SPC 04-87;
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
CAMALIG, ALBAY, TO RECONVENE AND RE-CANVASS ALL ELECTION RESULTS
OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW. 13
The foregoing issues may be summarized into two: 1) whether or not the COMELEC First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided only the Petition to Annul
Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to consolidate private respondent's
appeal from the ruling of the MBC since both cases were raffled to the same Division
and the issue in the latter case was connected to, if not determinative of, the merits of
the former case; and 2) whether or not the COMELEC En Banc correctly ordered the
new MBC to re-canvass all the ERs and to proclaim the winner on the basis thereof
despite the pendency of the appeal with the First Division.
The petition is partly granted.
Anent the first issue, we find no merit in petitioner's contention.
While Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "when an action or
proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of
another action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or
proceeding bearing the lower docket number," however, this rule is only permissive, not
mandatory. We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a
right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right,
he must comply with the conditions attached thereto, 14 which in this case require that
the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact.
In the case at bar, the consolidation of SPC No. 04-087 with SPC No. 04-124 is inappropriate as
they do not involve similar questions of law and fact. SPC No. 04-087 assails the
inclusion of the 26 ERs by the MBC on the ground that these were incomplete,
contained material defects and were prepared under intimidation, issues which are
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 243
of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, SPC No. 04-124 is a petition for the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation for allegedly being prematurely done, in violation
of Section 36(i) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669 15 which instructs the board of
canvassers "not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission
after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party;
[a]ny proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested
returns/certificates will not affect the results of the elections." In fine, SPC No. 04-087
pertains to the preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation controversy, while
SPC No. 04-124 refers to the conduct of the MBC in proclaiming the petitioner without
authority of the COMELEC.
Mere pendency of the two cases before the same division of the COMELEC is not a ground for
their outright consolidation. The discretion to consolidate cases may be exercised only
when the conditions are present. In any event, the records are bereft of evidence that
the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or that the COMELEC First Division had
granted the same.
Further, we find that the COMELEC First Division correctly annulled the proclamation of the
petitioner. Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that
COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally
made. 16 At the time the proclamation was made, the COMELEC First Division had not
yet resolved SPC No. 04-087. Pursuant to Section 36(i) of COMELEC Resolution No.
6669, which finds basis in Section 20(i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, 17 the MBC
should not have proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate absent the authorization
from the COMELEC. Any proclamation made under such circumstances is void ab initio.
18
We likewise do not agree with petitioner's contention that the proclamation was valid as the
contested ERs will not affect the results of the election.
Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166 reads:
Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.
xxx xxx xxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized
by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by
the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless
the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase "results of the election" is not statutorily defined. However, it had been
jurisprudentially explained in Lucero v. Commission on Elections 19 to mean:
[T]he net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the
margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less
than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then
such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election." 20
Although the Lucero case involves a failure of election, the definition of "results of election"
applies to the disposition of contested election returns under Section 20(i) of R.A. No.
7166. In both situations, the law endeavors to determine the will of the people in an
expeditious manner in that if the total number of votes in the precinct where there is a
failure of election or in case of the contested ERs, is less than the lead of a candidate
over his closest rival, the results of the election would not be adversely affected. Hence,
a proclamation may be made because the winning candidate can be ascertained.
Otherwise, a special election must be held or an authorization of the COMELEC is
necessary after ruling on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party in
order to determine the will of the electorate. Proclamation made in violation of the rules
is void ab initio as it would be based on an incomplete canvass of votes. It is well settled
that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the
board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. 21
In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762 votes over the private respondent based
on the canvass of the uncontested ERs whereas the total number of votes in the 26
contested ERs is 5,178, which is higher than the 762-lead of the petitioner over the
private respondent. Clearly, the results of the election would be adversely affected by
the uncanvassed returns.
As aptly held by the COMELEC First Division:
The votes obtained by petitioner and private respondent tallied in the contested election returns
can not be the basis of the partial proclamation. The objected election returns cannot be
considered, even provisionally, as the true and final result of the elections in the
contested precincts. The possibility remains, remote thought (sic) it may be that they
could be excluded and the results reflected therein disregarded. The contested election
returns involved 5,178 votes as this is the number of voters who actually voted in the
precincts covered by the objections. The lead of [petitioner] over [private respondent] as
shown in the uncontested returns was less than this number. Clearly, the results of the
elections could be adversely affected by the uncanvassed returns. Truly, the Board erred
in its perception that its partial proclamation was warranted. 22
While the COMELEC En Banc correctly affirmed the October 25, 2004 Resolution of its First
Division in SPC 04-124 insofar as it annulled petitioner's proclamation, however, we find
that it exceeded its authority and thus gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the
new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First Division could decide on SPC No.
04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the ruling of the MBC to include the 26
contested ERs in the canvass.
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
In Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections 23 and Zarate v. Commission on Elections, 24 the
Court similarly held that "election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of
the Commission," and that the "Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority
to hear and decide the same at the first instance."
Thus, in Acosta v. Commission on Elections, 25 the Court held that the COMELEC En Banc
violated the foregoing Constitutional mandate when it affirmed the trial court's decision
that was not the subject of the special civil action before it, but of the appeal filed by
therein petitioner, which was still undocketed at the time and the parties have not yet
submitted any evidence in relation thereto.
Clearly, by ordering the re-canvass of all the ERs in SPC No. 04-124, the COMELEC En Banc in
effect rendered a decision on the merits of SPC No. 04-087, which up to the present is
still pending before its First Division, in violation of the rule that it does not have the
authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at
the first instance. As the proclamation of the winning candidate has been delayed for
more than two years now due to these cases, the COMELEC First Division is directed to
expeditiously resolve SPC No. 04-087, which is summary in nature.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The December 15,
2005 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the
annulment and setting aside by its First Division of the proclamation of petitioner
Rommel G. Muoz as Mayor of Camalig, Albay for being premature, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the order to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers to
re-canvass all the election returns of Camalig, Albay; to prepare a new Certificate of
Canvass; and to declare the winning candidate for mayoralty position is SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER issued on January 17, 2006 is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003.]
REYNATO BAYTAN, REYNALDO BAYTAN AND ADRIAN BAYTAN, petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Topacio Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assail Comelec En Banc's resolutions denying their motion to reconsider its order
directing its Law Department to file the proper information against them for double
registration. HEcaIC
As defense, petitioners claimed honest mistake and good faith in registering twice.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on certiorari, ruling: that the assailed resolutions were
issued only in the preliminary investigation stage; that the finding of probable cause in
the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion; that there
were certain circumstances in this case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable
cause; that double registration is malum prohibitum, thus, their claim of lack of intent to
violate the law is inconsequential; and that the election offense in this case has not
prescribed because the prescriptive period was interrupted when COMELEC initiated
proceedings against petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of the case.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE; SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANTING A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CASE AT BAR. A preliminary
investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be
charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause. All that is
required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify
the holding of petitioners for trial. . . . There is no question that petitioners registered
twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous
registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in
the case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause. The COMELEC noted that
petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T.
Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City. However, in Precinct No. 129-A
of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents of No. 709 Magcawas St., Barangay
28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits
submitted by petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that
Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to register. However, Ignacio's affidavit stated that
while he led them to the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not
knowing that petitioners registered in the wrong barangay. . . . All told, a reasonably
prudent man would readily conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners
for trial for the offense of double registration. aEACcS
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; DOUBLE REGISTRATION IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM; CASE AT BAR. The COMELEC also pointed out that since "double
registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners' claim of lack of intent to violate the law is
inconsequential.
3. ID.; ID.; COMELEC; FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES RESTS IN COMELEC'S SOUND DISCRETION. It is also
well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses
rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional
authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion. IaEHSD
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME; INTERRUPTED WHEN PROCEEDINGS
ARE INSTITUTED AGAINST THE OFFENDER; CASE AT BAR. Prescription of the
crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender
after the lapse of a certain time. Section 267 of the Election Code provides that "election
offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission." In this case,
the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when petitioners
registered for a second time in a different precinct without canceling their previous
registration. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
offender. Specifically, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the
complaint even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation.
The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu
proprio under Sections 3, 4 and 5, Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
CAHTIS
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Challenged in this petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is the Resolution dated June 3, 2002 2 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity) en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. In its assailed
Resolution, the COMELEC en banc denied the motion to reconsider Minute Resolution
No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000 3 ordering the Law Department to file criminal
cases for "double registration" against petitioners Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan
and Adrian Baytan ("petitioners" for brevity). cAEDTa
The Antecedents
On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when
they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio ("Ignacio" for brevity), in
Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-
A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this precinct as evidenced by Voters
Registration Records Nos. 41762473, 41762472 and 41762470.
When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked
unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study
the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated
within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of
Barangay 28 and registered anew on June 22, 1997 as evidenced by Voters
Registration Records Nos. 42662969, 42662968 and 42662917.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC Assistant
Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC
Registrar Francisco Trias. In this letter, petitioners requested for advice on how to cancel
their previous registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances of their
second registration and expressed their intention to redress the error. SECAHa
On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners'
Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V.
Ravanzo ("Ravanzo" for brevity), for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the
Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department endorsed the case to
Ravanzo for resolution.
On January 10, 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration
against petitioners. In an en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the COMELEC
in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc denied the motion and
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the En Banc resolution dated November 9, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Law Department is hereby directed to file the proper
information against respondents for violation of Art. XXII, Sec. 261, par. (y) sub-par. (5)
of the Omnibus Election Code."
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
1. Recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite clear and
convincing evidence on record that they had no intention of committing said election
offense;
2. Not considering the letter dated August 21, 1997 addressed to the COMELEC Assistant
Director of Cavite City as substantial compliance with the requirement of the law for
cancellation of previous registration; and
3. Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in violation of Section 3, Article IX-C
of the Constitution.
In sum, petitioners insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing in their act of registering twice on
different days in two different precincts. Petitioners argue that they did not intend to
perpetrate the act prohibited, and therefore they should be exculpated. They claim
honest mistake and good faith in registering twice. Petitioners claim they made the first
registration because of the intervention and instigation of Ignacio. STHAaD
Petitioners theorize that their August 21, 1997 letter to the election registrar of Cavite City
informing him of the lapse and asking how to rectify the same constitutes substantial
compliance with the Omnibus Election Code's requirement of cancellation of prior
registration. They further implore a liberal construction of the laws on election offenses
since almost five years had lapsed from the date of the commission of the offense on
June 15, 1997. They claim the case is about to prescribe under the Election Code.
Lastly, petitioners fault the COMELEC en banc for assuming original jurisdiction over the case in
contravention of Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that this
constitutional provision requires that election cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division before assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First and Second Issues: Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack
of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous
registration.
In Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
recommendation of the investigating officer. The COMELEC thus directed its Law
Department to file the necessary information against petitioners for violation of Article
XXII, SEC. 261 (y) (5) of the Election Code which reads:
"SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(y) On Registration of Voters:
(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to which the COMELEC en banc issued the
assailed Resolution dated June 3, 2002 affirming the Minute Resolution.
The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of "free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." This grant is an adjunct to the
COMELEC's constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws. Failure by
the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in the frustration of the true will of the
people and make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen
to vote. 4
Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary
investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the
means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to
determine probable cause. 5 All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the
determination of probable cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. By definition,
probable cause is
". . . a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded . . . such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so.
The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of
the prosecution in support of the charge." 6
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts
without canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found
certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable
cause. The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct No.
83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite
City. However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents
of No. 709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC
noted further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners contained glaring
inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to
register. However, Ignacio's affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct
of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that petitioners registered in
the wrong barangay. Contrary to petitioners' sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of
petitioners, had another version. She claimed in her affidavit that on June 15, 1997,
Ignacio went to their house to inform them about the redefinition of their barangay's
territorial jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her sons to Barangay 18 to
register. CSaHDT
The COMELEC also pointed out that since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners'
claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did the COMELEC
consider petitioners' letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application to cancel their
previous registration. The COMELEC explained that this letter was sent after their
second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had
already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.
All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists probable cause to
hold petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration. SECAHa
Moreover, petitioners' claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the
Election Code's requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of
defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation. 7
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
the accused is probably guilty thereof. 8
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses
rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional
authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices.
9 Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the
COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise
be provided by law. 10
We also cannot accept petitioners' plea for a liberal construction of the laws on the ground of
prescription. Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the
State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. 11
Section 267 of the Election Code provides that "election offenses shall prescribe after five years
from the date of their commission." In this case, the offense of double registration
allegedly occurred on June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a
different precinct without canceling their previous registration. At this point, the period of
prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the offender.
Specifically, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint even if
it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation. 12
The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu proprio
under Sections 3, 13 4 14 and 5, 15 Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies
of petitioners' Voters' Registration Records for evaluation to Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo,
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cavite City, who was also tasked to investigate the
case. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution. The
Regional Director forwarded the case to the Law Department and the latter re-endorsed
the same to the office of Ravanzo for resolution. A preliminary investigation hearing was
conducted on January 19, 1998 where petitioners were instructed to submit their
counter-affidavits. After the preliminary investigation and based on the affidavits and
other evidence submitted in the case, Ravanzo recommended the prosecution of
petitioners for the offense of double registration. Ineluctably, the prescriptive period of
the offense was interrupted upon the COMELEC's initiation of proceedings against
petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of the case. SDHCac
The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the prescription of offenses cannot be
invoked to prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute election offenses, especially
those which the COMELEC described as "ruffling the electoral system." 16
Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc's assumption of original jurisdiction over the case
violated the Constitution.
Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which states:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc."
Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision serves as basis to nullify the proceedings
conducted and orders issued by the COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503.
Petitioners cite Sarmiento v. Comelec 17 and Zarate v. Comelec 18 to support their
stand that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it assumed original jurisdiction over the case without first referring the
same to any of its divisions. In Sarmiento and Zarate, the Court similarly held that
"election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission," and
that the "Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance."
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor General points out that the rulings in Sarmiento
and Zarate were clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC 19 to mean that
"[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is
mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is jurisdictional."
The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of
an information in court does not in any way adjudicate with finality the rights and
liabilities of the parties investigated. A preliminary investigation does not make any
pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of the party involved. Hence, a preliminary
investigation cannot be considered a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding required to be
heard by the Division in the first instance. TCcDaE
On the other hand, petitioners countered that in Cruz v. People, 20 the Court held that the
conduct of a preliminary investigation "is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding since
there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence and a
decision is rendered thereon."
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are
found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. 21 The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative
powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's
administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the
COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can
act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the
practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 22
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-
C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
function:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C
which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa, 23 that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division,
and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to "prosecute
cases of violations of election laws." The prosecution of election law violators involves
the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc
can directly approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal
information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no
constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by
any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable
in administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining
whether probable cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the provision of the
Election Code prohibiting double registration. AHDacC
Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure governing the prosecution of election offenses in meeting en banc in
the first instance and acting on the recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to
file charges against petitioners. The rule reads:
"SEC. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt
of Records. . . .
(b). In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission the
Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the recommendation of said
legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission affirming,
modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the
succeeding meeting en banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing
of an information against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall
prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court."
(Emphasis supplied)
Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 was issued during the en banc meeting held on November 9,
2000 to resolve the recommendation of Ravanzo in the case. DcaSIH
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139853. September 5, 2000.]
FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M.
SAULONG, respondents.
De Mesa and Ochoa Law Offices for petitioner.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin and Martinez Law Offices and The Solicitor General
for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Ferdinand Thomas M. Soller and private respondent Angel M. Saulong were both
candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11,
1998, elections. On May 14, 1998, Soller was proclaimed by the municipal board of
canvassers as the duly elected mayor. On May 19, 1998, Saulong filed with the
COMELEC a petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return. On
May 25, 1998, Saulong also filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Soller moved to dismiss Saulong's protest on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping and failure to state a cause of action. On
July 3, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition filed by Saulong. On the other hand,
the trial court denied Soller's motion to dismiss. His motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Soller then filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC contending that
respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election protest. On August 31, 1999,
the COMELEC en banc dismissed the said petition. Hence, Soller filed the instant
petition. ESAHca
This Court found that petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not referred to a division of
that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission en banc. The
petition for certiorari assailed the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss private
respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory
because it does not end the trial court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other. The authority to resolve a
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned
order of the trial court; falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the
COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first instance. cCaIET
In order to write finis to the controversy at bar, the Court resolved the issues raised by petitioner.
A close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing
fee of P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. A court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Patently,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent's election protest.
Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's
protest case. The Court noted that the verification of aforesaid protest was defective.
Since the petition lacked proper verification, it should be treated as an unsigned
pleading and must be dismissed. Further, the Court found that private respondent did
not comply with the required certification against forum shopping. Private respondent
successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election
return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he
earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
The instant petition was GRANTED.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION; COMELEC EN BANC DOES NOT
HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE ELECTION CASES IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE. Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads: "The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc." Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC and in subsequent cases, we
ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear
and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance.
This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission
en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
DHCcST
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
INVOLVING INCIDENTAL ISSUES OF ELECTION PROTEST FALLS WITHIN THE
DIVISION OF THE COMELEC. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order
denying the motion to dismiss private respondent's election protest. The questioned
order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other. In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving
incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court falls within
the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order
denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the principal
case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of the
COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of
election protest should not be referred first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution.
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
petitioner's petition in the first instance.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; ACQUIRED ONLY UPON PAYMENT OF
THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. Close
scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of
P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00
for which OR 7023752 was issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the
entries in the cash book of the clerk of court. Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478
credited to the general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by private respondent
for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private
respondent's election protest.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ERRORS IN THE PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IN ELECTION CASES
ARE NO LONGER EXCUSABLE. We have in a string of cases had the occasion to
rule on this matter. In Loyola vs. COMELEC, the clerk of court assessed private
respondent therein the incorrect filing fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election
protest. Upon filing his counter-protest, petitioner was assessed to pay the same
amount. Subsequently, the trial court remedied the situation by directing the parties to
pay the balance of P268.00. On review, we held that the lapse was not at all attributable
to private respondent and there was substantial compliance with the filing fee
requirement. The error lies in the Clerk's misapplication and confusion regarding
application of Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this
Court's resolution dated September 4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
An election protest falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, in which case the Rules of Court will apply, and that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is primarily intended to govern election cases before that tribunal. But the
Court declared that this decision must not provide relief to parties in future cases
involving inadequate payment of filing fees in election cases. Our decisions in Pahilan
and Gatchalian bar any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any
failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases. . . . Clearly then, error in the
payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable.
5. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION PROTEST; PETITION THAT LACKS
PROPER VERIFICATION SHOULD BE TREATED AS AN UNSIGNED PLEADING AND
MUST BE DISMISSED. We note that the verification of aforesaid protest is defective.
In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the preparation of
his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations therein. Certainly, this is
insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest
are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Since the petition lacks proper
verification, it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 04-94;
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT
BAR. [W]e find that private respondent did not comply with the required certification
against forum shopping. Private respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment
of the proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns. IcaEDC
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY'S BELIEF THAT HE NO LONGER HAD A PENDING CASE
BEFORE THE COMELEC BECAUSE HE DEEMED THE PRE-PROCLAMATION CASE
ABANDONED UPON FILING OF ELECTION PROTEST IS NOT A VALID REASON
FOR NON-DISCLOSURE. [P]rivate respondent's belief that he no longer had a
pending case before the COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his
protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation
case. Note that the COMELEC dismissed private respondent's pre-proclamation case
only on July 3, 1998. Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT ELECTION PROTEST WAS NOT BASED ON SAME
CAUSE OF ACTION AS THE PRE-PROCLAMATION CASE IS NOT A VALID EXCUSE
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. [T]he fact that private respondent's protest
was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid
excuse for not complying with the required disclosure in the certification against forum
shopping.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDATORY. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by
the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it
has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any initiatory pleading is
required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum shopping.
Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where the parties
themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule,
and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might not have
violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very
purpose of the rule.
10. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES;
SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THE COMELEC AFTER THE WINNING
CANDIDATES WERE PROCLAIMED. It could be argued that private respondent's
petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns was a pre-
proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and
appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the municipal board of
canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the proclamation of petitioner as
the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no longer viable, for pre-proclamation
controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidates have been proclaimed. cCAIES
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on August 31,
1999, in COMELEC special relief case SPR No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed
petitioner's petition to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, dated October 1, 1998 and February 1, 1999, which denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss the election protest filed by private respondent against
petitioner and the motion for reconsideration, respectively. aIcETS
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board
of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a 'petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return". 1 On May 25, 1998, private
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an
election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to
dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-
shopping, and failure to state cause of action. 2
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a
petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's
election protest.
On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The election tribunal
held that private respondent paid the required filing fee. It also declared that the defect
in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not bar the determination of
the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to
speak of. ADSTCI
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is
prohibited except in a case involving an election offense. 3 Since the present
controversy involves no election offense, reconsideration is not possible and petitioner
has no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Accordingly, petitioner properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court.
On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status quo ante prevailing as of
September 17, 1999, the date of filing of this petition.
Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
[I]
. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE HIS (sic) LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME
BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE
REQUISITE FILING FEES.
[II]
. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT'S RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS
PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AND ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION. ADSIaT
[III]
. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST
BELOW ON THE GROUNDS OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE THEREOF. 4
In our view, notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of issues, the principal question presented
for our resolution is whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of
private respondent's election protest.
At the outset, even if not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to resolve the question
concerning COMELEC's jurisdiction. Unless properly resolved, we cannot proceed
further in this case.
Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc." EIDATc
Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC 5 and in subsequent cases, 6 we ruled that the COMELEC,
sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the
divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards
election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC
was not referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to
the Commission en banc. The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying
the motion to dismiss private respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the
trial court is interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of adjudicating the
parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other. 7
In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of
election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order denying the motion
to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the principal case, once decided on
the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no
reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be
referred first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en
banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first
instance.
Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the petition
herein is without doubt meritorious and has to be granted. But in order to write finis to
the controversy at bar, we are constrained to also resolve the issues raised by petitioner,
seriatim.
Petitioner contends that private respondent's protest should have been dismissed outright as the
latter failed to pay the amount of P300.00 filing fee required under the COMELEC rules.
8 Petitioner's contention is supported by Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure 9 and corresponding receipts 10 itemized as follows:
P 368.00 Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 32.00 Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;
P 46.00 Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 4.00 Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;
P 10.00 Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;
P 5.00 Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979
P465.00
Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of
P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00
for which OR 7023752 was issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the
entries in the cash book of the clerk of court. 11 Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478
credited to the general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by private respondent
for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. 12 Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private
respondent's election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the
dismissal of private respondent's protest case. aSIHcT
We have in a string of cases 13 had the occasion to rule on this matter. In Loyola vs.
COMELEC, the clerk of court assessed private respondent therein the incorrect filing fee
of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election protest. Upon filing his counter-protest,
petitioner was assessed to pay the same amount. Subsequently, the trial court remedied
the situation by directing the parties to pay the balance of P268.00. On review, we held
that the lapse was not at all attributable to private respondent and there was substantial
compliance with the filing fee requirement. The error lies in the Clerk's misapplication
and confusion regarding application of Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure and this Court's resolution dated September 4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. An election protest falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, in which case the Rules of Court will apply, and that the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is primarily intended to govern election cases before that tribunal.
But the Court declared that this decision must not provide relief to parties in future cases
involving inadequate payment of filing fees in election cases. Our decisions in Pahilan
and Gatchalian bar any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any
failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases.
In Miranda vs. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of P465.00
as filing fees. Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P10.00 for legal
research fund, P5.00 for victim compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was
regarded as filing fee. The Court considered the amount as partial payment of the
P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required payment of the deficiency in
the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the caveat that in view of
Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in the
payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of
the Loyola decision on March 27, 1997.
Clearly then, error in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. And the
dismissal of the present case for that reason is, in our view, called for. HCEcaT
Besides, there is another reason to dismiss private respondent's election protest. We note that
the verification of aforesaid protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent
merely stated that he caused the preparation of his petition and he has read and
understood all the allegations therein. 14 Certainly, this is insufficient as private
respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest are true and correct of
his personal knowledge. 15 Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be
treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. 16
Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with the required certification against
forum shopping. Private respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
It could be argued that private respondent's petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of
election returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition pertain
to the preparation and appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the
municipal board of canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the
proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no longer
viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the
COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be
claimed with some reason that private respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy,
abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed. 17
Nonetheless, private respondent's belief that he no longer had a pending case before the
COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid
reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that the
COMELEC dismissed private respondent's pre-proclamation case only on July 3, 1998.
Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution. Similarly, the fact
that private respondent's protest was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-
proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required disclosure in
the certification against forum shopping. The requirement to file a certificate of non-
forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the
party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any initiatory
pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum
shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where the
parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of
the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might
not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat
the very purpose of the rule. 18
Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuaded that
respondent Regional Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing
to dismiss private respondent's election protest against petitioner. And to reiterate,
respondent COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent
trial court to dismiss private respondent's election protest. cDCEHa
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public
respondent COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on September 21, 1999, is made permanent. The
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, is hereby ordered to
DISMISS election protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003.]
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA", petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P. JAREO, HON. MAYOR RAYMUND M. APACIBLE,
FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G. CANOVAS, and DIVINA
ALCOREZA, respondents.
Isidro C. Ilao for petitioner.
Solicitor General for public respondent.
Pedro M. Belmi for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in the 15
July 2002 elections. However, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law
Department recommended the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since he was
not a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas. The COMELEC en
banc failed to act on said recommendation before elections. During the elections,
Bautista prevailed over his contender Divina Alcoreza and he took his oath of office.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002 that ordered
the deletion of Bautista's name from the official list of candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay. It further issued Resolution No. 5584 dated 10 August 2002 which
stated the policy on the proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being
registered voters in the place where they were elected. Pursuant thereto, Election
Officer Josefina Jareo issued an order deleting the name of Bautista from the list of
candidates of Punong Barangay. It also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position
and discharging the functions of Punong Barangay. Hence, Bautista filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
TaDSCA
The Court ruled that under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
1992, an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a
"qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a "registered voter." It is thus
clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a
registered voter of the Barangay where he intends to run for office.
In this case, Bautista made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false
statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay
Lumbangan. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a
material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78
refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be
(1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation
of the elections laws. Accordingly, since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of
Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of
his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall
become the Punong Barangay. Petition dismissed. AIcECS
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY TO
QUESTION RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC) ENBANC WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO ELECTION OFFENSES. The
instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc which do not
pertain to election offenses. Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper
remedy in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court[.] aIcETS
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; COMELEC IN
DIVISION HAS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held
that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc which has
jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. In this case, Election
Officer Jareo reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautista's ineligibility for
being a non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department recommended to the
COMELEC en banc to deny due course or to cancel Bautista's certificate of candidacy
The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in Resolution No. 5404 dated
23 July 2002. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The
COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy without
first referring the case to a division for summary hearing. The proceeding on the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative
functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC's quasi-
judicial functions.
3. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS; ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS,
DIFFERENTIATED. The Court discussed the difference between administrative and
quasi judicial functions in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections: "In the concurring
opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148,
he noted that (t)he term "administrative" connotes, or pertains, to "administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. " It does not entail an opportunity
to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution
thereon. While a "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion,
etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. CDAHaE
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IN THE EXERCISE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS, THE COMELEC
MUST HEAR AND DECIDE CASES FIRST BY DIVISION AND UPON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY EN BANC. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first
by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. In Baytan v.
COMELEC, the Court expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the
COMELEC. The Court explained: "Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division.
The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the
"Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in
two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters failing within
its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi
judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C[.] . . . The COMELEC's exercise
of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be
decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be
decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the
COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial powers.
5. ID.; ELECTION LAWS; 1993 COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE; CANCELLATION
OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; MUST BE HEARD SUMMARILY AFTER DUE
NOTICE. Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard
summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the
exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in
division should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings
originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack
of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc
cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a
division because it denies due process to the candidate.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. However, the COMELEC did not
give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. We cannot ignore the
importance of prior notice and hearing. Severe consequences attach to the COMELEC
Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
Bautista but also the annulment of his proclamation as Punong Barangay. What is
involved here is not just the right to be voted for public office but the right to hold public
office. . . . A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away
with the requirements of notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at least given
notice to Bautista to give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the
cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due
process of law when it approved the report and recommendation of the Law Department
without notice and hearing.
7. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS;
EXPLAINED. This Court has explained the nature of due process in Stayfast
Philippines Corporation v. NLRC: "The essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing. " . . . The opportunity to be heard does not only
refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal hearing. There is
due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings.
8. ID.; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 4801; ALLOWS CANDIDATES
WHO ARE NOT REGISTERED VOTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CERTIFIED LIST
OF CANDIDATES UNTIL THE COMELEC DIRECTS OTHERWISE. Respondents
likewise submit that there was no need for presentation and evaluation of evidence
since the issue of whether Bautista was a registered voter is easily resolved by looking
at the COMELEC registration records. This reasoning fails to consider the instances
where a voter may be excluded through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or
misspelled name. Indeed, if it was just a simple matter of looking at the record of
registered voters, then the COMELEC would not have included Section 7 (g) in its
Resolution No. 4801. This Section allows candidates who are not registered voters to be
included in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise.
9. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991;
QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUNONG BARANGAY; MUST BE A
REGISTERED VOTER OF THE BARANGAY WHERE HE INTENDS TO RUN FOR
OFFICE. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
1992, an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a
"qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a "registered voter." . . . These
qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23
May 2002 which prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in
connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. . . . Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are
registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate. . . . It is thus clear
that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a
registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run for office.
10. ID.; ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; FALSE REPRESENTATION OF A
MATERIAL FACT IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS A GROUND FOR THE
DENIAL OR CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; CASE AT BAR.
Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong
Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in
the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a
material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was
a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely
representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very
core of the electoral process. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false
representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial
or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty
of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving,
or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. CIAHDT
11. ID.; ID.; 1993 COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE; CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED THROUGH
THE BALLOT CANNOT CURE THE VICE OF INELIGIBILITY. Indeed, the electorate
cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The fact
that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does
not erase the fact that he lacks one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT PROCLAIM AS WINNER THE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINS THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN CASE THE WINNING
CANDIDATE IS INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED. It is now settled doctrine that the
COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception
to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and
reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC. ETHIDa
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSEQUENT FINDING BY THE COMELEC EN BANC THAT A CERTAIN
CANDIDATE IS INELIGIBLE CANNOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF ELECTIONS SO
AS TO INVALIDATE THE VOTES CAST FOR HIM. Although the COMELEC Law
Department recommended to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Bautista on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act on it before the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. It was only on 23 July 2002 that the COMELEC en banc
issued Resolution No. 5404, adopting the recommendation of the COMELEC Law
Department and directing the Election Officer to delete Bautista's name from the official
list of candidates. Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on
15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that
the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautista's
disqualification. The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the
votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray votes. A subsequent finding by the COMELEC
en banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; IN CASE THE ELECTED PUNONG BARANGAY FAILED TO QUALIFY,
THE HIGHEST RANKING SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY MEMBER SHALL TAKE HIS
PLACE. Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent
disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong
Barangay. aAcDSC
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to nullify Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") en banc. Resolution No. 5404 1 dated 23 July 2002 ordered the
deletion of Raymundo A. Bautista's ("Bautista") name from the official list of candidates
for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas
("Lumbangan") in the 15 July 2002 elections. Resolution No. 5584 2 dated 10 August
2002 provided for the policy of the COMELEC regarding proclaimed candidates found to
be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they ran for office.
The Facts
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan
for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo ("Election
Officer Jareo") refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not
a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for
mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas,
Branch 14 ("trial court"). 3 On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo
to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of
candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 4 mandates Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista
in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. 5 In compliance
with the trial court's order, Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of
candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the
matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law
Department on 5 July 2002. 6 On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not
registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the
COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the barangay elections on 15
July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza
("Alcoreza") were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan.
Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with
522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers
("Board of Canvassers") 7 proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay 8 on 15
July 2002. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay
before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain of the First District of Batangas. On 16
August 2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony
administered by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.
Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584
on 10 August 2002 ("COMELEC Resolutions"). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC
en banc resolved to cancel Bautista's certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc
directed the Election Officer to delete Bautista's name from the official list of candidates.
The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 5404 reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT
the recommendation, as follows:
1. To DENY due course to/or cancel the certificates of candidacy of the following:
A. For Barangay Officials:
1. CONRADO S. PEDRAZA Navotas
2. PIO B. MALIGAYA Sampaga
3. PATERNO H. MENDOZA Sampaga all of Balayan, Batangas.
B. a. RAY OCA A. BAUTISTA, candidate for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Lumbangan,
Nasugbu, Batangas, for not being registered voters of barangays where they are
running for an office;
2. To DIRECT the Election Officers of Balayan, Batangas and Nasugbu, Batangas, to
delete their names in the official list of candidates in their respective Barangays without
prejudice to the filing of complaint against them for misrepresentation under Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code if the evidence so warrants.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressed COMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed
candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their
election, thus:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT
REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or
cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution
did not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the
Commission deleting the name of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was
denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from
taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a
temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-
elected candidates and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.
(b) For a proclaimed candidate who is subsequently declared disqualified by the
Commission in the disqualification case filed against him prior to his proclamation.
1. To DIRECT the proclaimed disqualified candidate to cease and desist from taking his
oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court; and
2. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-
elected candidates and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.
(c) For a proclaimed candidate who is found to be ineligible only after his proclamation (i.e.,
There is no Resolution denying due course to or canceling his certificate of candidacy
and there is no petition for disqualification pending against him before his proclamation.)
1. To DISMISS any and all cases questioning the eligibility of such candidate for LACK OF
JURISDICTION, the proper remedy being a quo warranto case before the metropolitan
or municipal trial court.
In a letter dated 19 August 2002, 9 COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed
Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of
candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of
Canvassers of Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected
Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3) direct the
proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of
office or from assuming the position which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. Consequently, Election Officer Jareo issued on 20
August 2002 an Order 10 deleting the name of Bautista from the list of candidates for
Punong Barangay. The Order also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and
discharging the functions of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolutions. The Board of Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and
after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes,
proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay. 11 Alcoreza thus assumed the
post of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.
On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC requesting the latter for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions.
On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration was still pending with the COMELEC,
Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
The Issues
The issues raised are:
1. Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;
2. Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc
issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584; and
3. Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged
disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.
The Court's Ruling
Before considering the merits of the case, we shall first resolve the procedural questions raised
by respondents. Respondents contend that a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Absent any extraordinary circumstances, a party who has filed a motion for
reconsideration should wait for the resolution of the motion before filing the petition for
certiorari. Respondents allege that the instant petition is premature because Bautista
has a pending motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolutions. Respondents
claim that Bautista filed the instant petition barely two weeks after filing the motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc without waiting for the resolution of his
motion. 12
The contention of respondents is wrong. The case 13 cited by respondents refers to a motion for
reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en banc seeking the reconsideration of a
resolution rendered by a COMELEC division. Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure allows a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
division. However, Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
prohibits a motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases
involving election offenses. As held in Angelia v. Commission on Elections: 14
We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution of the
COMELEC in question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who
disagreed with it only had one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13, 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides:
What Pleadings are Not Allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the
COMELEC denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a
petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.
The instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc which do not
pertain to election offenses. Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper
remedy 15 in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 except as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis
supplied)
Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584
Bautista argues that without any disqualification case formally filed against him, the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of his case. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio
act on the issue of his alleged lack of qualification. Even assuming that there was a
disqualification case filed against him, it is the COMELEC sitting in division which has
jurisdiction and not the COMELEC en banc. 16
On the other hand, respondents allege that the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the power
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
The Constitution thus empowers the COMELEC to pass upon the qualification of
candidates for elective office. Furthermore, respondents submit that the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to cancel the certificate of candidacy of disqualified candidates is already
settled jurisprudence. 17
Respondents cited cases to support their claim that the COMELEC has jurisdiction to cancel the
certificates of candidacy of disqualified candidates. However, the COMELEC heard
these cases first in division and not en banc in the first instance.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 18 the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the
COMELEC en banc which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. The Court held:
. . . The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
"Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election."
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with
the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a
false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence
received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be
decided by the COMELEC itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a
Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number
of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division.
Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is
clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission in Sitting in Divisions. The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions
to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special
cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation
of citizens' arms of the Commission."
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Election Officer Jareo reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautista's
ineligibility for being a non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or to cancel Bautista's
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in
Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002.
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only
act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC
division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the
cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a
division for summary hearing.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the
administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the
COMELEC's quasi judicial functions. The Court discussed the difference between
administrative and quasi-judicial functions in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections: 19
In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56
SCRA 148, he noted that
(t)he term "administrative" connotes, or pertains, to "administration, especially management, as
by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or
conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
While a "quasi judicial function" is
A term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the
COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. 20 In Baytan v. COMELEC, 21 the Court
expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC. The Court
explained:
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both
administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are
found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative
powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's
administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the
COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can
act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the
practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-
C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C
which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and
then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its
quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is
thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial
functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so
in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a
report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the
barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting
on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the
candidate.
Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404
and 5584
Bautista alleges that the COMELEC denied him due process because there was no notice and
hearing prior to the issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. He became aware of
the issuance of the COMELEC Resolutions only when he received a copy of Election
Officer Jareo's Order dated 20 August 2002 ordering him to cease and desist from
assuming the position of Punong Barangay. 22
The Solicitor General submits that the COMELEC did not deprive Bautista of due process.
Bautista had the chance to be heard and to present his side when he filed a letter to the
COMELEC en banc requesting reconsideration of the Resolutions. 23
This Court has explained the nature of due process in Stayfast Philippines Corporation v. NLRC:
24
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearing. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court
during a formal hearing. 25 There is due process when a party is able to present
evidence in the form of pleadings. 26 However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista
such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos.
5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.
We cannot ignore the importance of prior notice and hearing. Severe consequences attach to
the COMELEC Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Bautista but also the annulment of his proclamation as Punong Barangay.
What is involved here is not just the right to be voted for public office but the right to hold
public office. As held in Sandoval v. Commission on Elections: 27
. . . Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC
No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with
illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for
having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands
prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal
show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that
a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case
and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. The facts
show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without benefit of prior
notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private
respondent's allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:
"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot
acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process
in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires
due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in
appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we
had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to
partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without
notice and hearing." (Emphasis supplied)
The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the COMELEC en banc requesting for
reconsideration of the Resolutions is beside the point. To reiterate, the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure prohibit a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC en banc
resolution except in cases involving election offenses.
Respondents likewise submit that there was no need for presentation and evaluation of
evidence since the issue of whether Bautista was a registered voter is easily resolved by
looking at the COMELEC registration records. 28 This reasoning fails to consider the
instances where a voter may be excluded through inadvertence or registered with an
erroneous or misspelled name. 29 Indeed, if it was just a simple matter of looking at the
record of registered voters, then the COMELEC would not have included Section 7 (g)
30 in its Resolution No. 4801. This Section allows candidates who are not registered
voters to be included in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs
otherwise.
Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the twin requirements of prior
notice and hearing, as follows:
Rule 23 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
Section 1.Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. A petition to deny due course to or
cancel, a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political
party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any
material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. The Commission may designate any of its
officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and receive evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements
of notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at least given notice to Bautista to
give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the cancellation
proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due process of law
when it approved the report and recommendation of the Law Department without notice
and hearing. 31
Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan when he filed his certificate of
candidacy
The events 32 that transpired after the 15 July 2002 elections necessitate the early resolution of
this case. The Court deems it proper not to remand the case to the COMELEC to avoid
further delay. The Court will resolve this case based on the pleadings submitted by the
parties.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, 33 one of the qualifications of an elective municipal
officer is that he must be a "qualified voter" in his municipality. Section 2174 of the
Revised Administrative Code reads:
Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. An elective municipal officer
must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have
been resident therein for at least one year, and must not be less than twenty-three years
of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either English, Spanish, or
the local dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370, 34 otherwise known as the Barrio Charter,
a candidate for the barrio council 35 must be a "qualified elector." Section 8 of the Barrio
Charter reads:
Section 8.Qualifications for election to the barrio council. Candidates for election to the barrio
council:
(a) Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the barrio for at least six
months prior to the election; and
(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a crime which
carries a penalty of at least one year imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis, 36 the Court held that a candidate for an elective
municipal office did not have to be a registered voter in the municipality to qualify to run
for an elective municipal office. Citing the earlier case of Yra v. Abao, 37 the Court
ruled that the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had all the qualifications
provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the
same vein, the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a
person must be a registered voter.
However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, 38 which took effect on 1 January 1992,
an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a "qualified
elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a "registered voter." 39 Section 39 of the
Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23
May 2002 which prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in
connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. Section 2 reads:
Sec. 2. Qualifications. (a) Candidates for Punong Barangay and Sangguniang Barangay
Kagawad must be:
(1) Filipino citizens;
(2) At least 18 years old on election day;
(3) Able to read and write Pilipino or any local language or dialect; and
(4) Registered voters of the barangay where they intend to run for office and residents
thereof for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify
whether the candidates are registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a
candidate. Thus, Section 7 (f) and (g) read:
(f) Before the preparation of the certified lists of candidates it shall be the duty of the
Election Officer to: (1) verify whether all candidates for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan positions are registered voters of the barangay where they file their certificates
of candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of candidacy and determine
on the basis of said entries whether the candidate concerned possesses all the
qualifications of a candidate.
(g) If there are candidates who are not registered voters in the barangay where they run for
barangay or sangguniang kabataan positions or do not possess all the other
qualifications of a candidate, he shall make the corresponding report by REGISTERED
MAIL and by RUSH TELEGRAM to the Law Department of the Commission within three
(3) days from the last day for filing the certificates of candidacy, copy furnished the
Provincial Election Supervisor and the Regional Election Director. The names of said
candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of candidates until the
Commission directs otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a
registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run for office.
Bautista admitted in his affidavit 40 dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan, thus:
AFFIDAVIT
That I, RAYMUNDO A. @ OCA BAUTISTA, of legal age, married, Mechanical Engineer by
profession, Filipino citizen and have been residing at Sitio Calamundingan, Barangay
Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, after being duly sworn according to law depose and
say:
1. That I was born at Barangay Tumalim, Nasugbu, Batangas, on Match 15, 1954 and
upon reaching the age of four (4) our family transferred to Sitio Calamundingan,
Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas and I have been permanently residing
thereat since that time up to the present, and this fact can be attested to by our
immediate neighbors.
2. That since the time I reached the age of majority, I have participated both in the National
and Local Elections up to the year 1995 and as matter of fact I ran for the Office of
member of the Municipal Council in the year 1992 Elections.
3. Sometime during the late part of the year 1995, I went to the United States of America
scounting (sic) for a good job but I was not able to find one so I went home in the year
2000 but again believing that I could land a job in the United States, I again went there
but I was not able to get a job therein and so I went back to the Philippines in the year
2001 but I found out that my name was no longer included in the list of registered voters
at Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
4. Sometime in the year 2002, I personally went to the Office of the Local Election
Registrar particularly talking to Miss Josefina P. Jareo in order to register because as I
know, to run for the Office of Barangay Chairman, I have to be a registered voter in our
Barangay.
5. However, I was denied registration because according to her, her Office is not open for
registration at any time and I should wait for the General Registration and for that reason
I was not able to register.
xxx xxx xxx
11. That had I known that there is a provision in Section 52, under paragraph (k) A, when
Miss Josefina P. Jareo denied my request for registration as a voter, I would have filed
a Petition for Mandamus with the proper Court so that she can be ordered to register me
as a voter in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas so that any and all technicality
may be avoided." (Emphasis supplied)
According to Bautista's affidavit, he was practically out of the country from 1995 until 2001.
When the certified list of voters ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay
elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote in any election.
Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of voters conducted
by the COMELEC in 1997 since he was still out of the country during that time. Republic
Act No. 8189 ("The Voter's Registration Act of 1996") provides for a system of continuing
registration of voters. Thus, Bautista should have registered anew in the office of the
Election Officer when he came back to the Philippines in 2001 and learned that his
name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. The pertinent provisions
of RA No. 8189 read:
SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the
existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of
the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recall
subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters
before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and, subject to the
discretion of the Commission, on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of
voters in a precinct of the city or municipality where he resides to be able to vote in any
election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for
registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election
Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for
public office. As early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer
included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that
year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run
for the office of Punong Barangay.
Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan was due to the
refusal of Election Officer Jareo to register him sometime in January 2002. 41 Aside
from his bare allegation that he tried to register in January 2002, Bautista did not proffer
any other proof like a duly accomplished application form for registration to substantiate
his claim that he indeed attempted to register anew. On the other hand, Election Officer
Jareo denies Bautista's allegations in her comment filed on 10 October 2002, thus:
COMMENT
COMES NOW Respondent JOSEPINA P. JARENO (sic) and to this Honorable Supreme Court
by way of comment to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, filed by herein Petitioner, most respectfully
states that:
1. Respondent JOSEPINA P. JAREO (sic) is the Election Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas,
while petitioner, RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA was one of the candidates for the Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, in the recently concluded
barangay elections;
2. Based on the records in our files, petitioner was not and is not a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan or any other barangays in Nasugbu, Batangas;
3. There was never an instance during the period starting June 1997 up to December 26,
2001 when registration of voters for the updating of the Voter's Registration Record had
been undertaken by the Commission on Elections on an "on again/off again" system, did
petitioner RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA come to our office to check or ensure that he is still in
the active list of voters of Barangay Lumbangan, i.e., assuming that he was registered
as a voter thereof, in the first place;
4. The last day of registration of voters (new or transferee) had been last December 26,
2001, and registration shall resume again, this coming September 16, 2002. In the
meantime, no general registration nor special registration had been mandated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for brevity) between the period December 27,
2001 until September 15, 2002;
5. I only met petitioner RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA for the first time when he came to our
office to file his Certificate of Candidacy last June 10, 2002, which was the last day set
by the COMELEC for the filing of Certificates of Candidacy;
xxx xxx xxx
Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay
that he lacked one of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in the
barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material
fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. 42 An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely
representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very
core of the electoral process. 43 Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false
representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial
or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty
of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving,
or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. 44
Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the people's choice expressed in the
local elections deserves respect. Bautista's invocation of the liberal interpretation of
election laws is unavailing. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections: 45
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position as Representative of Makati City's Second
District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one
year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic
government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws
are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly
lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental
law itself.
Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective
office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. 46 The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of
Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he lacks one of the qualifications for
Punong Barangay.
Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of ineligibility of the
winning candidate
Bautista subscribes to the view of the Solicitor General that under the law and jurisprudence, the
COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the second placer in case of ineligibility of the
winning candidate.
The Solicitor General submits that the disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista does not
result in the proclamation of Alcoreza who obtained the second highest number of votes
because Alcoreza was obviously not the choice of the electorate. The Solicitor General
emphasized that the COMELEC declared Bautista ineligible for the post of Punong
Barangay only after his election and proclamation as the winning candidate.
Respondent Alcoreza, however, alleges that her proclamation as the elected Punong Barangay
was legal and valid. Alcoreza claims her case falls under the exception to the rule that
the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the candidate with the next
higher number of votes to be proclaimed winner. Alcoreza cites Grego v. COMELEC 47
which held that the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the
electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate.
This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It is now settled doctrine that the
COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. 48 The
exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
49 and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC. 50 However, the facts warranting the
exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case.
Although the COMELEC Law Department recommended to deny due course or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Bautista on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act
on it before the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. It was only on 23 July 2002 that the
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5404, adopting the recommendation of the
COMELEC Law Department and directing the Election Officer to delete Bautista's name
from the official list of candidates.
Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under
the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to
the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautista's disqualification. 51 The
Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of
Bautista are stray votes. 52 A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en banc that
Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes
cast for him. 53 As held in Domino v. COMELEC: 54
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an
ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was
rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it
was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that
allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be
counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the
votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he
was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said
votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.
The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of
the Punong Barangay, thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor,
mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall
be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as
defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay member, the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent
disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate
to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding
local election. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second
highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay. 55
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan. The proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner
in lieu of Bautista is void. Instead, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member of
Barangay Lumbangan shall assume the office of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan for
the unexpired portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 151216. July 18, 2003.]
MANUEL MILLA, petitioner, vs. REGINA BALMORES-LAXA, respondent.
Manuel V. Mendoza for petitioner.
Cesar Bernard Coloma for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner herein questioned the power of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to annul the
proclamation, due to an alleged error in the tabulation of the statement of votes, of a
winning candidate for municipal councilor who had taken his oath and assumed office as
such.
According to the Supreme Court, following Sec. 3 of Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution a petition
involving pre-proclamation controversy should have first been heard and decided by a
division of the Comelec and then by the En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the
division was filed. Since in this case the Comelec sitting en banc acted on respondent's
petition, which was not first passed upon by a division, it acted without jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. The assailed resolution, therefore, was null and void. The
present petition was granted and the resolution of the Comelec En Banc was set aside.
CAcEaS
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES; SHOULD FIRST
BE HEARD AND DECIDED BY A DIVISION OF THE COMELEC AND THEN BY THE
EN BANC WHEN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED; VIOLATION IN
CASE AT BAR. By his admission, the petition filed by respondent before the
COMELEC involves a pre-proclamation controversy, not an election contest and indeed
it is not, for while the petition alleged fraud and statistical improbability, the remedy
sought was merely for correction of erroneous entries in the Statement of Votes which
were based on the election returns. As the petition then of respondent involves a pre-
proclamation controversy, following Sec. 3 of Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which
provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. It should have first been heard and decided by a
division of the COMELEC, and then by the En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the division were filed. Since, as reflected above, the COMELEC sitting en
banc acted on respondent's petition which was not first passed upon by a division, it
acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
The petition at bar involves the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to annul the
proclamation, due to an alleged error in the tabulation of the Statement of Votes, of a
winning candidate for municipal councilor who had taken his oath and assumed office as
such. HDCAaS
Petitioner Manuel Milla and respondent Regina Balmores-Laxa were candidates for councilor of
Gerona, Tarlac in the May 14, 2001 elections. 1
On May 18, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (BOC) based on the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of
Canvass 2 showing the votes obtained by each candidate as follows:
Daisy Mamba 14,558
Edwin Yamoyam 12,424
Antonio Perez, Jr. 11,607
Orlando Ines 9,764 Petitioner, who in the meantime took his oath of office on June 29, 2001 and thereafter assumed
the position of municipal councilor, 15 prayed in his Answer to respondent's petition
Raul Cruz9,724 before the COMELEC for the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds: (1) the
petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of five (5) days from date of
Francisco de Leon 9,390 proclamation, 16 (2) pre-proclamation cases should be terminated after proclamation
and assumption of office, 17 and (3) padding of statement of votes is not a proper
Ricardo Parazo 8,781 subject of a pre-proclamation case. 18

Manuel Milla 8,052 The BOC, on the other hand, in its Answer 19 with motion for the reconvening of the BOC to
effect the correction of entries in the Statement of Votes, proffered unawareness of, and
Regina Balmores-Laxa 8,006 disclaimed any hand in, any irregularity in the copying of the number of votes from the
election returns to the Statement of Votes, as its role during the canvassing was limited
to appreciating election returns, the canvassing having been done by two sub-
Pastora M. Cucuin 7,669 3
canvassing committees. 20
One month after petitioner's proclamation or on June 18, 2001, respondent filed a petition 4 with
In its Resolution 21 of December 18, 2001, the COMELEC En Banc, found as follows:
the COMELEC against petitioner and the BOC for "correction of entries in [the]
Statement of Votes . . . based on fraud and irregularities in [the] canvassing of votes." 5
The petition, which was docketed as SPC No. 01-311, alleged that the entries for four . . . Milla, on the other hand, does not deny . . . the padding of his votes by three hundred fifty
precincts in the Statement of Votes did not correspond to the election returns for the 350 votes; but instead moved for the dismissal of the petition on the petty ground of a
respective precincts, to wit: technicality that the petition was filed beyond the five (5) day reglementary period for
filing petitions of its sort.
[Manuel Milla and the Municipal Board of Canvassers], by confederating, aiding and helping one
another violating Sections 223, 230 and 231 of the Omnibus Election Code of the xxx xxx xxx
Philippines (B.P. 881) and Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987[)],
padded respondent Manuel Milla's votes by THREE HUNDRED FIFTY (350) VOTES by Given the attendant evidence at hand, specifically the unexplained mismatched inscriptions in
inserting the number "1" figure before the actual votes in three precincts and converting the entries for the questioned precincts in the Statement of Votes, we conclude that the
"1" into "6" in one precinct illustrated as follows: padding of three hundred fifty (350) votes committed by respondent Board in order to
favor respondent Milla is beyond the realm of an honest mistake. As to the correct
Precinct No. Actual votes (ER) 6 Padded votes (SOV) 7 number of votes, it is without question that what appears in the election returns is the
actual number of votes garnered by private respondent.
71A 32 132
xxx xxx xxx
30[A] 29 129
In addition, not a single item in the material averments of the Petition was specifically denied by
either respondent, thus lending credence to the complete truthfulness of petitioner's
21A2 14 64
account of the "dagdag-bawas" scheme which she has already proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
41A 31 131. 8
As such, we cannot leave the "correction" of the "error" in canvassing to the same body [which]
Attached to respondent's petition were photocopies of the election returns from precincts 71A, 9
perpetrated such "error," as they so pray for in their answer. 22 (Italics supplied),
30A 10 and 21A 11 and photocopies of certified true copies of the Statement of Votes.
12
and denied the BOC's motion to reconvene, declared herein petitioner's proclamation null and
void, and proclaimed respondent as the eighth winning candidate.
Respondent likewise alleged that the said entries for the four precincts were statistically
improbable because petitioner "garnered so much higher votes than the other
Hence, the present recourse anchored on the following grounds:
candidates." 13
I
As, by the Certificate of Canvass, petitioner led respondent by 46 votes whereas the
"discrepancy" between the Statement of Votes and the election returns was 350,
respondent prayed before the COMELEC for the correction of errors in the Statement of THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION[S] HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROCLAIM
Votes and Certificate of Canvass, the declaration as null and void of the proclamation of RESPONDENT AS THE EIGHT[H] WINNING CANDIDATE FOR COUNCILOR AND TO
petitioner, and her proclamation as one of the duly elected municipal councilors. 14 DECLARE PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION NULL AND VOID. 23

II

THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 24

Petitioner maintains that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition as it was filed
beyond the reglementary period. For, so petitioner contends, since the proclamation was
made on May 18, 2001, the petition to correct the Statement of Votes should have been
filed within 5 days thereafter conformably with Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure 25 which reads:
Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission.
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the
Commission:
xxx xxx xxx
1) ...
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of
the results during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or
certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two or more copies of the
election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there has been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the
statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and
proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.
b) ...
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of
proclamation and must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected thereby.
xxx xxx xxx (Italics supplied)
In holding that it validly assumed jurisdiction over the petition, the COMELEC asserts that "[a]
proclamation that is based on a clerical or mathematical mistake (or a blatant padding of
votes) is not a valid proclamation [h]ence, the same can be challenged even after the
proclaimed candidate has assumed office." 26
The Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation.
Any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation. 27
If a candidate's proclamation is based on a Statement of Votes which contains erroneous
entries, it is null and void. It is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to annul the
proclamation. 28
In the case at bar, as the Statement of Votes contained erroneous entries, the COMELEC
rightfully assumed jurisdiction over respondent's petition for the correction thereof and
declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation. While our election laws are silent when
such and similar petitions may be filed directly with the COMELEC, 29 the above-quoted
Section 5, Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure sets a prescriptive period of five (5) days
following the date of proclamation. The COMELEC, however, could suspend its own
Rules of Procedure so as not to defeat the will of the electorate. 30 For adherence to
technicality that would put a stamp on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the people's will, cannot be countenanced. 31
Petitioner nevertheless posits that even assuming that the COMELEC may suspend the
application of Section 5, Rule 27 of its Rules of Procedure, it can no longer exercise
jurisdiction after his proclamation, oath and assumption of office 32 in view of Section 16
of Republic Act 7166 33 which states:
Sec. 16. Pre-Proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices. Pre-
proclamation cases involving provincial, city and municipal offices shall be allowed and
shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof. All pre-proclamation
cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of
the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by
the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of evidence
thus far presented, the Commission determined that the petition appears meritorious
and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate
order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. (Italics supplied)
By petitioner's claim, there is no showing that respondent's petition falls under the exception in
the above-quoted provision as "the petition has not been determined by the COMELEC
to be meritorious" and "no order has been issued for the proceeding to continue." 34
The claim does not lie. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 4493 on June 29, 2001
declaring the termination of all pre-proclamation cases except those included in the list
annexed thereto which list included SPC No. 01-311, respondent's petition before the
COMELEC subject of the present petition.
Petitioner additionally claims that the COMELEC, in assuming original jurisdiction over a case
involving municipal officials, acted beyond the limits of its power under the Constitution,
particularly Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article IX-C 35 which provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) ...
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and not appealable.
(3) . . . (Italics supplied)
Petitioner's above-claim does not likewise lie. By his admission, the petition filed by respondent
before the COMELEC involves a pre-proclamation controversy, not an election contest
and indeed it is not, for while the petition alleged fraud and statistical improbability, the
remedy sought was merely for correction of erroneous entries in the Statement of Votes
which were based on the election returns.
As the petition then of respondent involves a pre-proclamation controversy, following Sec. 3 of
Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. (Italics supplied)
it should have first been heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC, 36 and then by the
En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division were filed.
Since, as reflected above, the COMELEC sitting en banc acted on respondent's petition which
was not first passed upon by a division, it acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. 37 The assailed Resolution of the COMELEC dated December 18, 2001 is
thus null and void and it is in this light that the present petition is GRANTED. This leaves
it unnecessary to pass on petitioner's second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
dated December 18, 2001 in SPC No. 01-311 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the COMELEC
is ordered to assign the SPC No. 01-311 to a division, which is hereby directed to
resolve the same with reasonable dispatch. THEDCA
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 166046. March 23, 2006.]
MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and ECELSON
C. SUMAGUE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Sibayan & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; VOTES; PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN
THE STATEMENT OF VOTES; THE COURT FROWNS UPON AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAW OR THE RULES THAT WOULD HINDER IN ANY WAY NOT ONLY THE
FREE AND INTELLIGENT CASTING OF THE VOTES IN AN ELECTION BUT ALSO
THE CORRECT ASCERTAINMENT OF THE RESULTS. In an election case, the
Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command who the real
candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. In the case at
bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votes garnered by
respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to the Comelec
would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than petitioner.
Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle respondent
Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total number of votes
garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the personality of the MBOC
to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed on time. ASEIDH
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC HAS DISCRETION TO LIBERALLY CONSTRUE ITS
RULES AND SUSPEND THE SAME OR ANY PORTION THEREOF IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
explicitly provide that such rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice.
Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same
time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. Disputes in the
outcome of elections involve public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
Laws governing such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MANIFEST CLERICAL ERROR, EXPLAINED. What is involved in
the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the actual total
number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec
Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate as a
manifest error. As correctly cited by the Comelec, a manifest clerical error is "one that is
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to the
eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence
dehors the record be shown to have been committed." AHSaTI
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE LATE FILING OF THE PETITION WILL NOT THWART THE
PROPER DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON SUBSTANTIAL
GROUNDS. Petitioner posits that the Comelec's reliance in the ruling of this Court in
Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections is misplaced since, unlike the present petition,
petitioner therein was an affected candidate who filed his petition on time. The argument
of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
declared that: Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time,
this incident alone will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant
case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the
people's will cannot be countenanced. . . .
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF THE CANDIDATE SHOULD BE ANNULLED WHERE
THE SAME IS BASED ON ERRONEOUS COMPUTATION OF VOTES. Thus, the
Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections, where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. ATaDHC
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PETITIONER MUST
PROVE NOT MERELY REVERSIBLE ERROR BUT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ISSUING THE IMPUGNED ORDER. In fine, the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner. In a
special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave
abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so
grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse
the Resolution 1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209
dated November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguin's motion for
reconsideration of the July 21, 2004 Resolution 2 of the Comelec's First Division. The
Comelec nullified his proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. IHCDAS
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date,
respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for
all the candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson Sumague
received 6,647 votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1A
to 19A, Sumague appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact, he received
844 votes. The MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the winning
candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605 votes. 3
Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and Suliguin in
a Letter 4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding the
figures in the Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially garnered
6,647 votes, as against petitioner's 6,605 votes.
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon review, the
MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes
from Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have been
proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of
petitioner Suliguin.
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical and
mental fatigue which the members of the board experienced during the election and the
canvassing of votes. ADTEaI
In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge Renato B.
Bercades. 5
On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution 6 granting the petition of the
MBOC. The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National
and Local Elections "for being based on an erroneous computation of votes." It then
ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary
corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim Sumague as the 8th duly elected
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. 7
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the
motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondent
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling against him. In support of his petition, he alleges that:
4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES
FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF
TIME, and
4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES
FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE. 8
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35, 9 36(c) and (f) 10 of Comelec Resolution No.
6669 (General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of
Canvassers in Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have
entertained the letter-request of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17,
2004, or four (4) days after the canvassing of votes was terminated and after he
(petitioner) was proclaimed winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent Sumague never entered any objection
during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to
Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on May 26,
2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was terminated. Petitioner maintains that
the Comelec should have denied the petition, since according to the Revised Comelec
Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days following the date of the
proclamation. CDHacE
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before the
Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to
nullify petitioner's proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command who
the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation
of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. 11 In
the case at bar, the simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votes
garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to
the Comelec would readily reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than
petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle
respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the discrepancy in the total
number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the
personality of the MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was not filed
on time.
Sections 3 12 and 4 13 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such
rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the
discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice. 14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve
public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate
in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections. 15
What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the
actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of
Comelec Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any
candidate as a manifest error. 16 As correctly cited by the Comelec, 17 a manifest
clerical error is "one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include
an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
SCETHa
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the voting public,
to occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna. In Carlos v. Angeles, 18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term
'election,' in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of votes." The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality
of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can de declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election." 19
We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition of the
MBOC:
A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed by
petitioner MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which
resulted in the erroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said
office.
"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include
an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."
DAaIEc
The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being filed out of
time cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed
that "a proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to
correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, even if filed out of time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent a stamp
of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on an erroneous tabulation of votes."
Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the
electorate, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be
challenged even after the candidate has assumed office."
There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a grave
abuse of discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
Petitioner MBOC is merely doing its function that is mandated by law to canvass
votes in the election returns submitted to it in due form, adding or compiling the votes
cast for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and eventually proclaim the
winning candidates. Respondent miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibited
manifest bias thereby thwarting his chances of winning the last slot for Sangguniang
Bayan Member. "Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the court must accept the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption." CSTEHI
Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike the
Board of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOC
computes the votes as appeared in the election returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not constitute a
clear violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of.
He was not elected by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was based on an
erroneous proclamation. By any mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be
construed to have obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be sheer
absurdity to proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters. "Where a
proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power
to make such declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannot claim that he was denied of
his right to due process of law since he was given the opportunity to be heard. He was
duly notified by petitioner MBOC of the erroneous computation which resulted in his
proclamation and was afforded the opportunity to be heard by this Commission.
"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the Boards
of Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control
includes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to
do what boards should have done, even if questions relative thereto have not been
elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to initiate motu
proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be required pursuant to law." 20
Petitioner posits that the Comelec's reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections 21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner
therein was an affected candidate who filed his petition on time. cSEaTH
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 22 declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will
not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably
void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be
countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently
observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited
in Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion
to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And
also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35
Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v.
Macalaang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an election case, the court has an imperative duty
to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the
electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs.
Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics ours) cCTESa
In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p.
474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction
of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes
received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither
does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by
private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of
manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical
act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and
diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.
23
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, 24 to wit:
HSTaEC
The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent's assumption of
office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of
votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent's
proclamation was flawed right from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty
tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent Castillo
is concerned. As this Court once said:
". . . Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that
a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of
such power. It, of course, may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the Comelec is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into
this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to Comelec.
xxx xxx xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged
even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that
there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself
is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v.
Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission on
Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]). 25
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections, 26 where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. 27
In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order.
Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so
grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. 28
To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the total number
of votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the
Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for
Councilor. DSIaAE
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC
No. 04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status
Quo Order issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.