Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DOI 10.1007/s11142-013-9232-0
Abstract The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is the
subject of long-standing controversy among accounting academics and regulators.
Nevertheless, the market-based evidence on this subject is limited. We study the
choice of fair value versus historical cost accounting for non-financial assets in a
setting where market forces rather than regulators determine the outcome. In gen-
eral, we find a very limited use of fair value accounting. However, the observed
variation is consistent with market forces determining the choice. Fair value
accounting is used when reliable fair value estimates are available at a lower cost
and when they convey information about operating performance. For example, with
very few exceptions, firms managers commit to historical cost accounting for plant
and equipment. Our findings contribute to the policy debate by documenting the
market solution to one of the central questions in the accounting literature. Our
findings indicate that, despite its conceptual merits, fair value is unlikely to become
the primary valuation method for illiquid non-financial assets on a voluntary basis.
This paper previously circulated under the title: Who uses fair-value accounting for non-financial assets
after IFRS adoption?
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Fair value accounting 735
1 Introduction
The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is one of the most
widely debated issues in the accounting literature. While the debate dates back to
the 1930s (Paton 1932; pp. 739747; Fabricant 1936), it is still unsettled (e.g.,
Schipper 2005; Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Watts 2006; Laux and Leuz 2009; Hail
et al. 2010). One impediment to moving the debate forward is the lack of evidence
on the choice between the two accounting practices, when the choice is determined
by market forces rather than regulators (Kothari et al. 2010). We exploit a quasi-
experiment embedded in the recent mandatory adoption of the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to study the market solution for the choice
between historical cost and fair value accounting methods. Our approach follows
Leftwich (1983), who documents that private markets often differ from regulators in
their accounting method choice.
Our setting has a number of advantages. First, unlike most other accounting
standards, IFRS provides a free choice between fair value and historical cost
accounting for non-financial assets. The second and more important advantage of
the current setting is that IFRS requires ex ante commitment to one of the two
accounting policies.1 It is, ex ante, in managements interest to limit the scope for
future opportunistic actions, e.g., earnings management (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Watts 1977; Watts 1986; Ball 1989). Therefore firms managers have stronger
incentives to respond to market demands and commit to the accounting treatment
that maximizes the value of the firm, i.e., is more efficient.2
We study valuation practices for arguably the most controversial (non-financial)
asset groups: property, plant and equipment (PPE), investment property, and
intangibles. Out of the twenty-nine European countries that mandated IFRS from
2005, we select the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany because they have the
largest financial markets in Europe and are historically at opposite ends of the
spectrum in terms of using fair value accounting under the local GAAP.
Specifically, for non-financial assets, German GAAP allows only historical cost
accounting, whereas UK GAAP either allows (for PPE) or mandates (for investment
property) fair value accounting. As a result, IFRS expands the available valuation
practices in both the UK and Germany. Indeed, under IFRS, both fair value and
historical cost are allowed for PPE and investment property and, if an active market
exists, for intangibles.3 The free choice under IFRS allows managers representing
outside stakeholders to reveal preferences with respect to valuation practices.
1
A number of prior studies have examined settings where firms were not required to commit to either
fair value or historical costs but could ex post revalue non-financial assets. Evidence from the US prior to
1940 is provided in Fabricant (1936) and ARB (1940). Evidence from Australia is provided in Whittred
and Chan (1992), Brown et al. (1992), Easton et al. (1993), Cotter and Zimmer (1995), and Barth and
Clinch (1996, 1998). Evidence from the UK is provided in Amir et al. (1993), Barth and Clinch (1996),
Aboody et al. (1999), Muller (1999), and Danbolt and Rees (2008).
2
Note that distinguishing between opportunism and value maximizing explanations is central to
understanding accounting choices but rarely achieved in practice (Fields et al. 2001).
3
An active market rarely exists for intangibles and hence the managerial choice of valuation policies for
intangibles cannot be consider as free as for PPE and investment property.
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736 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
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Fair value accounting 737
companies that previously recognized all PPE asset classes at historical cost under
the local GAAP, only 1 % switches to fair value for at least one asset group; (2) for
investment property (i.e., property held for the purpose of earning rental income or
for capital appreciation), we find that companies are equally likely to use historical
cost and fair value accounting; (3) for intangible assets, we find that all firms in the
sample pre-commit to historical cost, consistent with the stricter requirements under
IFRS for valuing intangibles at fair value. Overall, our results do not support the
prediction that firms managers find the shift towards fair value accounting to be a
beneficial commitment.
However, further tests do indicate that the choice to use fair value varies
meaningfully with its economic costs and benefits. Consistent with our first
prediction, we find that institutional differences are important determinants of the
choice to use fair value. Consistent with the second prediction, managers use fair
value when the costs of obtaining reliable estimates are relatively low, i.e., for more
liquid (or re-deployable) assets such as property and investment property.
Consistent with our third prediction, fair value is more common when it is
expected to facilitate performance measurement. Specifically, we find that for firms
holding investment property, the fair value choice is positively associated with real
estate being a primary activity. We also find some evidence that companies with
lower investment opportunities use fair value. Finally, the reliance on debt financing
is positively associated with the use of fair value for both investment property and
PPE. This finding is robust and holds both when measuring the reliance on debt by
leverage and the frequency of accessing debt markets. In sum, while our evidence
suggests that market supply (cost) and demand (benefit) factors influence the choice
of fair value versus historical cost accounting, historical cost is by far the dominant
accounting practice when market forces determine the outcome of the choice.
Our paper contributes to the policy debate over fair value accounting by
documenting a market solution for the choice between historical cost and fair value
for non-financial assets. Understanding the market solution provides input into
regulators decision-making. While markets are, generally, more efficient at
coordinating economic choices than regulators, potential market failures should
be considered. First, the choice should be exercised under the principles of free
exchange and in the absence of externalities (e.g., coercion on part of auditors or
industry organizations). Second, if free markets fail to discipline management to
promote the interests of outside investors, e.g., due to governance failure or the
presence of information asymmetry, managers may choose accounting practices
opportunistically (in their private interest). However, for over 95 % of managers to
choose historical cost opportunistically, the governance (market) failure should take
a rather extreme form. Two additional features of our setting render opportunism
unlikely: (1) the IFRS requirement to pre-commit to either fair value or historical
cost and (2) the absence of information asymmetry between the principal (investors)
and the agent (management) with respect to the agents actions (choice of
accounting practice). For these reasons, management is likely to ultimately bear the
cost of opportunism and to be subject to market discipline in our setting.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out opportunism as an explanation for observed
managerial choices. Furthermore, the efficient market solution may take some time
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738 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
The current setting that exploits the IFRS adoption has a valuable distinction from
the Australian, UK, and US settings used in prior research. The choice between
historical cost and fair value must be stated in the accounting policy section of the
annual report following the IFRS adoption and must be applied consistently going
forward (analogous to revenue recognition or inventory valuation methods).6 A
company that chooses to use fair value must revalue assets every time the book
value materially differs from the market value (IAS 16 and IAS 40). A company that
chooses historical cost cannot perform upward revaluations in the future. A switch
between historical cost and fair value is considered a voluntary change in
accounting principles and needs to be justified to auditors, lenders, equity investors,
and potentially to regulators. Therefore the choice between fair value and historical
cost in our setting effectively represents an ex ante commitment and as such is
unlikely to be driven by earnings management considerations. Indeed, the early
studies argued that discretionary revaluations are related to contracting motives
4
Due to the costs of data collection, we only have evidence from the first year of IFRS adoption.
5
Agents have incentives to pre-commit against ex post opportunism if a pre-commitment mechanism
existsotherwise the agent will bear the costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Under IFRS, historical cost is
a pre-commitment mechanism against future revaluations.
6
Note that both the UK and Australia adopted accounting standards in 1999 and 2000 that are similar to
IAS 16. However, the prior literature relies on data before this change.
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Fair value accounting 739
Despite the EUs accounting harmonization efforts that began decades prior to the
mandatory IFRS adoption, the UK and Germany arguably have two of the most
distinct traditions for asset valuation. The differences in their accounting traditions
are due to institutional differences in economic, governance, and legal systems.
Germany was traditionally characterized by the existence of private companies that
raised capital from banks and communicated via private information channels (Leuz
and Wustemann 2004). Accounting was mainly used for profit distribution and tax
purposes; hence accounting regulation was codified and focused mainly on legal
entity statements. As revaluations are often in conflict with the objectives of tax
authorities and are not available for distribution until realized, German GAAP only
allowed historical cost accounting. Today in Germany, there is no formal link
between legal entity reports and consolidated financial statements. Thus financial
reporting choices in the consolidated statements, including the valuation methods
for non-financial assets, have no tax consequences.
In contrast, the UKs accounting practices have historically developed separately
from tax accounting and in the private sector rather than in company law. UK
ownership is dispersed, and even middle-sized companies are commonly listed on
the London Stock Exchange. Such an ownership structure requires that financial
reporting reduces information asymmetry, and in this context revaluations can serve
the purpose of conveying information about the assets current values.
Table 1 summarizes the permitted accounting treatments for non-financial
assetsinvestment property, PPE, and intangible assetsunder UK GAAP,
German GAAP, and IFRS. In brief, German GAAP prescribes historical costs for
all three asset groups, whereas UK GAAP allows a choice between fair value and
historical costs for PPE and intangibles but requires fair value for investment
7
Whittred and Chan argue that asset revaluations reduce underinvestment problems that arise from
contractual restrictions, while Cotter and Zimmer argue that upward revaluations increase borrowing
capacity. While debt contracting is the main explanation for asset revaluations, Brown et al. also find that
bonus contracts, as well as signaling and political cost explanations, play important roles.
123
740 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Table 1 The accounting treatment of long-term non-financial assets under German GAAP, UK GAAP,
and IFRS
Asset type German GAAP UK GAAP IFRS
FV is defined as fair value accounting, and HC is defined as historical cost accounting adjusted for depreciations,
amortizations, and impairments
property. In contrast, IFRS allows a choice between fair value and historical costs
for all three asset groups, although an active market is a requirement for using fair
value for intangibles. See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the accounting
treatments under each accounting regime.
3 Empirical predictions
The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting of accounting standard
setters such as the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
is guided by their conceptual frameworks that emphasize and promote the decision-
usefulness of accounting information. The decision-usefulness perspective faces a
central trade-off between the relevance and the reliability of accounting informa-
tion.8 In recent years, both FASB and IASB have emphasized relevance as more
important than reliability and it has manifested itself in a shift towards fair value
8
See IASBs Framework paragraph 45 and FASBs Conceptual Statement 2 paragraph 15. Phase A of
the IASB-FASB Joint Project was completed in September 2010 and resulted in a statement that
superseded the documents cited in the previous sentence. However, despite changes in definitions the
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Fair value accounting 741
Footnote 8 continued
fundamental trade-off between relevance and reliability remains. For consistency with prior research and
the quote we provide, we use the definitions from the superseded documents cited in this footnote.
9
See for example IASB Discussion Paper July 2006, paragraph BC2.62.
10
Barth et al. (2001) argue that the value relevance tests are joint tests of relevance and reliability,
because a certain degree of reliability is also established by rejecting the null of no association. Although
value relevance tests establish a minimum level of reliability of observed revaluations, the level is
presumably below the reliability of historical cost where the accounting treatment is generally
inexpensive to verify.
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742 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
11
IAS 16 does not apply to assets classified as held for sale. They are accounted for in accordance with
IFRS 5.
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Fair value accounting 743
4 Results
We manually verify the accounting standards that a given company follows in either
the accounting policy section or the auditors opinion section of its annual reports.
To identify the asset valuation practice a company follows, we read the accounting
policy section of its annual reports. We begin with all the UK and German
companies (active and inactive) available in Worldscope and further restrict the
sample to the companies that comply with IFRS in either 2005 or 2006. For
inclusion in the German and UK cross-sectional samples, we further require that a
company has an annual report under IFRS in Thomson One Banker. We construct a
12
Cotter and Richardson (2002) and Muller and Riedl (2002) document that fair value estimates
produced by independent valuators are viewed by capital markets as being more reliable than fair value
estimates produced by managers.
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744 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
cross-sectional sample to examine the valuation practices after the mandatory IFRS
adoption and a switch sample (UK only) to examine whether companies use the
IFRS adoption to switch their accounting practices. For inclusion in the UK switch
sample, we also require that a company has an annual report (prepared according to
UK GAAP) before the IFRS adoption.13
Table 2, Panels A and B, present the distribution by industry of the companies in
Worldscope as well as in the German sample, the UK cross-sectional sample, and
the UK switch sample. The industry distribution in each sub-sample approximates
that of Worldscope.
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Table 2 Sample selection process
Panel A: UK samples
Companies that Worldscope does not classify as complying with IFRS in 2005 or 2006 (mainly inactive companies) 6,464
IFRS companies 1,445
Companies not domiciled in the UK 270
UK companies subject to mandatory IFRS 1,175
Companies for which we cannot identify an IFRS annual report or companies with more than one security listed on LSE 241
UK cross-sectional sample 934
Companies for which we cannot identify a UK GAAP annual report 231
UK switch sample 703
123
Table 2 continued
746
123
All All Excl. N/A
Obs. % % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Companies that Worldscope does not classify as complying with IFRS in 2005 or 2006 (mainly inactive companies) -10,117
IFRS companies 1,446
Companies not domiciled in Germany -635
German companies subject to mandatory IFRS 811
Companies for which we cannot identify an IFRS annual report -206
German sample 605
123
Table 2 continued
748
123
All All Excl. N/A
Obs. % % Obs. % Obs. %
40 Electronics 1,832 16 20 95 12 78 13
43 Financial 1,430 12 15 131 16 96 16
46 Food 154 1 2 11 1 8 1
49 Machinery and equipment 324 3 3 69 9 54 9
52 Metal producers 251 2 3 1 0 1 0
55 Metal product manufacturers 108 1 1 10 1 6 1
58 Oil, gas, coal, and related services 323 3 3 9 1 5 1
61 Paper 69 1 1 9 1 6 1
64 Printing and publishing 78 1 1 6 1 6 1
67 Recreation 371 3 4 30 4 25 4
70 Retail 350 3 4 23 3 17 3
73 Textile 46 0 0 8 1 5 1
76 Tobacco 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 Transportation 148 1 2 10 1 7 1
82 Utilities 497 4 5 25 3 20 3
85 Other industries 1,816 16 19 187 23 156 26
Total 11,563 100 100 811 100 605 100
Table presents the sample selection process and industry distribution. Panel A presents the selection process for the UK samples. The cross-sectional sample consists of
companies for which we can identify an annual report according to IFRS. Our switch sample further requires that an annual report (according to UK GAAP) be available
prior to mandatory IFRS adoption. Panel B presents the selection process for the German sample. To be included in the German sample, companies must have available an
annual report according to IFRS. Percentages are rounded and thus may not exactly sum to 100 %
H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Fair value accounting 749
Table presents the valuation practices among companies in the UK cross-sectional sample (defined in
Table 2). The industry classification is based on Worldscopes major industry groups. The With PPE
(With intan.) column presents for each industry how many companies have property, plant, and
equipment (intangible assets). The historical cost (fair value) columns present how many companies use
historical cost (fair value) for at least one asset class within property, plant, and equipment and intangible
assets
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Table 4 UK companies valuation practices before and after IFRS adoption
750
123
Switch With Fair value Switch to Switch to fair Cross- With inv. Keep fair Move to
sample PPE historical cost value sectional prop. value historical
UK IFRS samplec cost
13 Aerospace 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 5 2 1 50 1 50
16 Apparel 6 6 1 17 1 17 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
19 Automotive 5 5 1 20 0 0 1 100 0 0 6 1 1 100 0 0
22 Beverages 5 5 1 20 1 20 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 1 100
25 Chemicals 18 18 1 6 1 6 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
28 Construction 49 49 6 12 4 8 3 50 1 2 54 10 7 70 3 30
31 Diversified 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 6 1 1 100 0 0
34 Drugs, cosmetics, 31 31 1 3 0 0 1 100 0 0 44 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
and healthcare
37 Electrical 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 10 1 1 100 0 0
40 Electronics 90 89 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 109 3 1 33 2 67
43 Financial 105 90 13 14 10 11 6 46 3 4 140 66 65 98 1 2
46 Food 21 21 2 10 1 5 1 50 0 0 23 2 1 50 1 50
49 Machinery and equipment 16 16 0 0 1 6 0 N/A 1 6 22 1 0 0 1 100
52 Metal producers 23 22 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 49 1 0 0 1 100
55 Metal product manufacturers 11 11 0 0 1 9 0 N/A 1 9 12 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
58 Oil, gas, coal, and related services 29 29 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 52 3 3 100 0 0
61 Paper 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 6 1 0 0 1 100
64 Printing and publishing 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 19 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
67 Recreation 32 32 2 6 1 3 1 50 0 0 41 1 0 0 1 100
H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Table 4 continued
Switch With Fair value Switch to Switch to fair Cross- With inv. Keep fair Move to
sample PPE historical cost value sectional prop. value historical
UK IFRS samplec cost
Fair value accounting
70 Retail 43 42 4 10 2 5 2 50 0 0 51 9 1 11 8 89
73 Textile 6 6 1 17 1 17 0 0 0 0 8 2 1 50 1 50
76 Tobacco 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 3 0 0 N/A 0 N/A
79 Transportation 14 14 0 0 1 7 0 N/A 1 7 17 2 2 100 0 0
82 Utilities 23 23 1 4 0 0 1 100 0 0 31 3 1 33 2 67
85 Other industries 135 135 8 6 4 3 4 50 0 0 192 14 10 71 4 29
Total sample 703 685 44 6 31 5 20 44 7 1 934 124 96 77 28 23
Table presents valuation practices among companies in the UK switch sample (defined in Table 2). The industry classification is based on Worldscopes major industry
groups. The With PPE (With inv. prop.) column presents for each industry how many companies have property, plant, and equipment (investment property). The
historical cost (fair value) columns present how many companies use historical cost (fair value) for at least one asset class within property, plant, and equipment and
investment property
a
As a percentage of companies that use fair value accounting under UK GAAP
b
As a percentage of companies that use only historical cost under UK GAAP
c
Given that UK GAAP requires that investment property be recognized at fair value, the application of historical cost always constitutes a switch. Therefore, in Table 4,
we use the UK cross-sectional sample for investment property
751
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752 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Thus the switches observed upon the IFRS adoption are voluntary in the sense that
IFRS did not force a switch to historical cost. If managers find historical cost to be
more beneficial, why did these firms not switch to historical cost under UK
GAAP?14 One explanation is that switching accounting principles is uncommon and
costly due to consistency requirements.15 The costs of switching accounting
principles include renegotiating contracts (which require consistency in GAAP),
convincing auditors that the new practice better reflects the underlying economics of
the company, and communicating and justifying the change to financial statement
users. Most of these costs are fixed (i.e., they are independent of the number of
accounting principle changes), so the incremental cost of voluntary changes is lower
when combined with a mandatory change such as IFRS adoption. Even if these
managers did want to switch to historical cost before IFRS adoption, the associated
costs could have made switching unattractive. However, the observation that a
switch is more likely from fair value to historical cost than from historical cost to
fair value is inconsistent with a shift in the market solution towards fair value.
We do find, however, that, after IFRS adoption, fair value is more common for
investment property, for which UK companies had to use fair value under local
GAAP, than it is for PPE. Nevertheless, managers of 23 % of the companies reveal
preferences for historical cost by switching from fair value to historical cost once
they are no longer constrained to the use of fair value by the accounting regulation.
Significant industry variation is present: whereas only 2 % of the financial
companies switch to historical cost, 45 % of the non-financial companies switch.
Table 5 documents the valuation practices in the German sample. As in the UK, we
find no use of fair value accounting for intangible assets in Germany. For PPE, 1 %
of companies switch to fair value for at least one asset class upon IFRS adoption
(note that under German GAAP fair value was not allowed). Only one company
applies fair value to all asset classes in PPE, while all other companies use historical
cost for at least one asset class. These findings document that the market solution
generally reveals preferences for historical cost accounting. Consistent with
prediction H1, fewer German than UK firms commit to fair value accounting.
For investment property, we find that the managers of 23 % of the German
companies reveal preferences for fair value by switching from historical cost to fair
value once they are no longer constrained to historical cost by the accounting
regulation. The German evidence is in contrast to the 77 % of UK companies that
14
We contacted those non-financial companies that switched to historical cost and received several
replies indicating that IFRS was a convenient opportunity for them to make the switch.
15
Consistency in accounting policies across time is highly regarded by the accounting profession.
Comparability is a qualitative characteristic expressed in IASBs Framework (paragraph 39): the
measurement and display of the financial effect of like transactions and other events must be carried out
in a consistent way throughout an entity and over time for that entity. In US literature, consistency is
expressed in several places, including the Accounting Research Study No. 1 of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (postulate C-3). See Ball (1972) for an extensive discussion of the
accounting professions reliance on consistency.
123
Table 5 German companies valuation practices after IFRS adoption
No. Industry name Property, plant and equipment Investment property Intangible assets
Sample With Fair value Historical With inv. Fair value Historical With Fair value Historical
PPE cost prop. cost intan. cost
123
Table 5 continued
754
No. Industry name Property, plant and equipment Investment property Intangible assets
123
Sample With Fair value Historical With inv. Fair value Historical With Fair value Historical
PPE cost prop. cost intan. cost
Table presents the valuation practices among companies in the German sample (defined in Table 2). The industry classification is based on Worldscopes major industry
groups. The With PPE (With inv. prop.) [With intan.] column presents for each industry how many companies have property, plant, and equipment (investment
property) [intangible assets]. The historical cost (fair value) columns present how many companies use historical cost (fair value) for at least one asset class within
property, plant, and equipment, Investment property, and intangible assets
H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Fair value accounting 755
commit to fair value for investment property, which is also in line with H1.
However, we observe substantial industry variation. Among financial companies,
49 % switch to fair value, while only 6 % of the non-financial companies switch.
In summary, we find that a small number of companies use fair value accounting
for at least one asset class under PPE after the IFRS adoption. The absence of fair
value accounting for intangibles and its limited use for PPE in both the UK and
Germany suggests that only a small subset of managers perceive net benefits of fair
value accounting in their setting. In contrast to the expectation, there is virtually no
shift towards fair value accounting for non-financial assets, with the exception of
investment property among German financial institutions. However, the shift
towards fair value for investment property is consistent with benefits of fair value
often outweighing the costs for this asset class. Next, we provide evidence on H2 by
exploiting variation in the valuation practices within the PPE group.
4.2.3 Does the choice to use fair value for PPE vary with asset liquidity?
In this section, we collect evidence on specific asset classes within the PPE asset
group that are recognized at fair value as opposed to historical cost. Table 6 presents
the distribution of the use of fair value across the three asset classes. We find that 69
companies in the sample use fair value accounting either before the mandatory
adoption of IFRS, after the adoption, or both. Of these companies, 93 % use fair
value accounting for property. Only 3 % use fair value for plant, and only 4 % use
fair value for several asset classes in PPE. The distributions of fair value use in the
UK and Germany are rather similar. The evidence suggests that the application of
fair value accounting is, in practice, not only limited in terms of the number of
companies using it but also in terms of the assets to which it is applied: fair value is
Companies that use fair value for PPE 62 100 7 100 69 100
Divided according to asset classes
Property 58 94 6 86 64 93
Plant 2 3 0 0 2 3
Equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0
PPE in general 2 3 1 14 3 4
Table presents evidence regarding which asset classes under property, plant, and equipment are recog-
nized at fair value. The No. columns present the number of companies that recognize assets at fair value
within the respective asset classes. The % columns present the values in the No. columns as a percentage
of those companies in the UK, Germany, and the full sample that use fair value for any class of assets
under property, plant, and equipment
a
Includes companies that use fair value under UK GAAP or IFRS, or both
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756 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
largely limited to property. This result supports H2 and suggests that the existence
of liquid markets decreases the costs of committing to fair value accounting.
In this section, we examine the determinants of the decision to use fair value
accounting by using regression analysis. We revisit H1 more formally and further
test H3 and H4. Our analysis draws on two different subsamples and controls for
common company-specific characteristics. First, we analyze the sample of
companies that hold investment property as it offers a richer variation in accounting
method choice than PPE. Second, we examine the choice to use fair value for PPE
because, relative to investment property, PPE is applicable to a broader set of firms.
Table 7 reports the summary and correlation statistics for variables used in this
analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.
4.3.1 What are the determinants of the commitment to fair value for investment
property?
IFRS gives managers of both German and UK companies an option to move to the
asset valuation method not previously available under local GAAP in these
countries. (Recall that UK companies face the first opportunity to switch to
historical cost for investment property, whereas in Germany the opposite is the
case.) In such a setting, observing switches from historical cost to fair value in
Germany and from fair value to historical cost in the UK is difficult to reconcile
with factors other than the existence of net benefits associated with the alternative
accounting treatment (e.g., as opposed to opportunism).
Our sample consists of the 275 companies (124 UK companies; 151 German
companies) that hold investment property. Depending on the specification,
additional data requirements limit the sample further. We begin with a basic
regression that examines whether accounting methods vary based on country of
domicile and whether real estate is a primary industry,
Fair b1 UK b2 UK Sic65 b3 Germany b4 Germany Sic65
b5 Leverage Rbk Controlk e 1
where Fair indicates that a company uses fair value for investment property fol-
lowing IFRS adoption; UK (Germany) is an indicator variable that takes the value of
one for UK (German) companies and zero otherwise; Sic65 is an indicator that takes
the value of one when a company has the SIC code 65 (real estate) among its first
five SIC codes and zero otherwise; Leverage is one of the proxies for reliance on
debt financing; and Control denotes other control variables such as log of market
capitalization and an IFRS early adoption dummy (Muller et al. 2011). H1 predicts
that the institutional differences across the UK and Germany, as opposed to only
accounting standards, influence the market solution to the choice of accounting
practice. Thus under H1, we expect to find the country differences reflected by
significant b1 and b3 coefficients. The coefficients b2 and b4 measure country
123
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for logistic regression analysis
Variable Mean SD Q25 Median Q75
123
Table 7 continued
758
Variable/Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
123
Panel B: Correlation table
1. Fair PPE 1.00
2. Fair IP 0.06 1.00
3. IP 0.00 0.45 1.00
4. Germany -0.07 -0.13 0.17 1.00
5. Sic65 0.07 0.30 0.28 0.01 1.00
6. Early -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.61 0.00 1.00
7. Size -0.10 -0.03 0.12 -0.19 0.02 -0.02 1.00
8. PPEadj 0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.10 1.00
9. Btm 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.39 0.14 1.00
10. MktLev 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.07 -0.05 -0.15 0.17 0.43 1.00
11. MktLevShort 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.14 -0.03 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 0.37 0.80 1.00
12. MktLevLong -0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.15 -0.13 0.02 0.39 0.20 0.54 -0.07 1.00
13. LevBook -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.16 0.07 -0.23 0.68 0.51 0.41 1.00
14. LevBookShort 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 -0.20 -0.18 0.46 0.77 -0.31 0.68 1.00
15. LevBookLong -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.09 -0.17 0.16 0.33 -0.09 0.34 -0.24 0.90 0.50 -0.29 1.00
16. DebtToOI -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.51 0.13 0.67 0.41 -0.10 0.65 1.00
17. Coverage 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 0.00 0.17 -0.21 -0.28 -0.62 -0.34 -0.55 -0.42 -0.07 -0.47 -0.76 1.00
18. Current -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.16 0.07 0.16 -0.09 -0.32 0.05 -0.39 -0.30 -0.22 -0.50 -0.38 -0.21 -0.25 0.30 1.00
19. Convertible -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.11 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.04 1.00
20. FairInvPr 0.06 1.00 0.45 -0.13 0.30 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.03
Table, Panel A presents the summary statistics for our pooled (largest) sample. Panel B reports Pearson correlation statistics. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. Information regarding the
use of fair value is hand-collected from companies annual reports in Thompson One Banker. All other data is collected from the Worldscope database as of December 2005
H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Fair value accounting 759
16
We exclude leverage because these variables are highly correlated with leverage and therefore capture
aspects of the same construct.
123
760 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
123
Fair value accounting 761
Table 8 continued
Table presents the estimates from the logistic regression of the IFRS fair value indicator on a set of
company-specific variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. Information on the use of fair
value is hand-collected from companies annual reports in the Thompson One Banker. All other data is
collected from the Worldscope database as of December 2005. The sample consists of 275 companies
(124 UK companies; 151 German companies) that hold investment property. Requiring non missing
values for explanatory variables further limits the sample in some specifications. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at less than 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
add a proxy for reliance on convertible debt (i.e., column 3). We find that short-term
leverage is as important as long-term debt in explaining the use of fair value. (Both
coefficients have similar economic magnitudes and exhibit no statistically
significant differences.) The coefficient on convertible debt is also significantly
positive. As accounting-based covenants are uncommon in short-term and
convertible-debt contracts, the results are inconsistent with the conclusion that
companies use fair value opportunistically to avoid covenant violations.
We provide further evidence on the non-directional prediction H4 by examining
whether companies that use fair value access debt markets more frequently
following IFRS adoption. If indeed the availability of reliable fair value estimates
relates to debt financing activities, fair value choices should predict more frequent
debt market access. Based on Worldscope data for 2006 and 2007, we construct
several proxies for debt financing. Specifically, we proxy for future debt financing
with the following variables: DebtIss1 (DebtIss2) indicates whether by 2007 total
debt (long-term debt) had increased by more than 10 % of the current market value
of assets; FtrLev1 (FtrLev2) proxies for the level of future total debt (long-term
debt) in 2007 while controlling for the level of current debt in the regression; and
DbtGrow1 (DbtGrow2) indicates growth in total debt (long-term debt). We regress
these financing proxies on the fair value indicator variable and the controls for the
company characteristics, which include country, size, leverage, and an SIC code 65
indicator.
Table 9, Columns (1) through (6), present regressions with the six proxies for
debt issuance used as the dependent variables. The fair value indicator is significant
for all proxies for debt issuance and indicates a positive relation between fair value
use and future debt financing.17 The relation between fair value use and future debt
17
While we have no strong prior for why equity market access should relate to fair value use, it can
correlate with debt market access. To rule out the possibility that our debt proxies are picking out equity
issuance, we use two proxies for future equity financing activity (first, an indicator of whether combined
net proceeds of equity issuance less proceeds from stock options exceed 10 % of market value of current
assets and second, the ratio of net proceeds to current market value of assets) and find that they are
insignificantly related fair value use. The results are untabulated.
123
762 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Table presents the estimates from OLS regressions of future financing choices on the IFRS fair value
indicator and a set of company-specific controls. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. Information
on the use of fair value is hand-collected from companies annual reports in the Thompson One Banker.
All other data is collected from the Worldscope database between December 2005 and 2007. The sample
consists of 275 companies (124 UK companies, 151 German companies) that hold investment property.
Requiring non missing values for explanatory variables further limits the sample in some specifications.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at less than 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively
issuance is in line with the costs of recognizing fair value estimates being lower
when firms regularly access debt markets (H4).
4.3.2 What are the determinants of the commitment to fair value for PPE?
123
Fair value accounting 763
the ratio of PPE to total assets (PPEA) to examine whether PPE-heavy companies
are more likely to use fair value.
Table 10 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for our pooled
cross-sectional sample. In line with the prior results for H1, German firms are
significantly less likely to use fair value for PPE (despite low economic
magnitudes). The coefficient on book-to-market indicates that companies with
relatively low investment opportunities are more likely to use fair value. Recall that
H3 indeed suggests that fair value facilitates performance measurement for
companies lacking investment opportunities.
In line with the evidence for investment property, we find a positive and
significant association between market leverage as well as book leverage and the
commitment to fair value accounting. Further analysis in column (3) reveals that,
once again, short-term debt is at least as important as long-term debt in this
association. The portion of convertible debt now exhibits no significant relation with
the fair value choice. As earlier, the evidence supports our conjecture that the
incremental costs of committing to fair value accounting decrease with the reliance
on debt financing.
Finally, two additional results are worth mentioning here. First, consistent with
the costs of fair value outweighing the benefits when an asset represents a small
portion of the balance sheet, we find a positive coefficient on PPEA. Thus the
likelihood of using fair value increases with the proportion of PPE to total assets.
Second, the positive coefficient on FairInvPr (Column 5) suggests that companies
applying fair value to investment property are more likely to also apply fair value to
PPE. Controlling for this effect, however, does not alter our findings with respect to
leverage or book-to-market.
Whether fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting in a free market
for accounting policies is an important question that has been subject to much
controversy among academics and regulators. We study the choice between fair
value and historical cost for non-financial assets when market forces, rather than
regulators, determine the outcome of this choice. In light of the long-standing
debate over fair value accounting, understanding this choice is useful from both
regulatory and academic perspectives. Under the assumption of free market
discipline, the choices by management should be informative as to whether the net
firm-specific economic benefits associated with fair value accounting outweigh
those of historical cost. The key advantage of our setting is that IFRS, which
provides a choice between historical cost and fair value accounting for non-financial
assets, requires pre-commitment to either practice.
We collect and analyze data on accounting policies for intangible assets,
investment property, and PPE for a sample of 1,539 companies. With very few
exceptions, we find that fair value is used exclusively for property. We find that 3 %
of the companies use fair value for owner-occupied property, compared with 47 %
for investment property. The striking lack of companies that use fair value for all
123
764 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Table presents the estimates from the logistic regression of the IFRS fair value indicator on a set of
company specific variables. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. Information on the use of fair
value is hand-collected from companies annual reports in the Thompson One Banker. All other data is
collected from the Worldscope database as of December 2005. The sample consist of 1,508 companies
(903 UK companies; 605 German companies) that hold PPE. Requiring non missing values for other
explanatory variables further limits the sample. Standard errors are clustered at industry level. ***, **,
* indicate statistical significance at less than 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
123
Fair value accounting 765
other non-financial assets is inconsistent with large net firm-specific benefits of fair
value accounting relative to historical cost for those assets. The use of fair value for
property alone is likely explained by lower costs to reliably measure fair values in
the presence of relatively liquid property markets. Among the strongest cross-
sectional determinants of fair value for both investment property and PPE is the
reliance on debt financing. When fair value estimates are constructed for financing
purposes, they are likely to be relatively reliable, and the incremental costs of also
recognizing them in financial reports are low.
Our findings suggest that, for non-financial assets, the market solution for the
choice between the two valuation methods lies with historical cost accounting:
firms managers, who represent outside stakeholders, generally reveal preferences
for historical cost accounting for a broad range of non-financial assets. The limited
cross-sectional variation in the choice between fair value and historical cost
indicates that market forces determine this managerial choice. The evidence broadly
suggests that managers resistance to the use of fair value is likely to be driven by
the costs of establishing reliable fair value estimates rather than a disagreement with
standard setters on the potential benefits of fair value accountingfirm managers
appear to view fair value accounting for non-financial assets as costly.
While markets are generally more effective at resource allocation than regulators,
possible externalities and market failure must be considered. Yet there are several
reasons to believe that market failures are not a major concern in our setting. First,
we do not see compelling externalities caused by either historical cost or fair value
accounting. For example, a positive network externality implies that a choice of fair
value by one firm increases the benefit of fair value to other firms. Hence if positive
network effects associated with fair value outweighed firm-specific costs, we would
not observe switches from fair value to historical cost in a setting where fair value
was used prior to IFRS adoption. Our evidence is rather inconsistent with positive
network effects because we observe that switches from fair value to historical cost
upon IFRS adoption are common in the UK among firms that used fair value under
UK GAAP.18 Second, as Germany and the UK are among the countries with the
most developed capital markets in the world, the principles of free exchange are
likely to be satisfied, and there is no straightforward source of market failure due to
coercion.19
Perhaps the most plausible source of market failure is the failure of atomistic
investors to discipline the management to act on their behalf. We do not view this to
be a compelling explanation for the observed choices for four reasons. First, the UK
and Germany have well-developed institutions and often rely on governance by
large stakeholders that should not fail at disciplining managers behaving oppor-
tunistically. Second, because the choice of accounting practices is fully observable,
the costs of coordinating atomistic investor action, which is typically caused by the
18
Among UK firms that hold investment property (PPE), 23 % (44 %) switch to historical cost. Yet only
1 % of UK firms that used historical costs for PPE under UK GAAP switched to fair value under IFRS.
19
For example, suppose auditors are not willing to audit fair value estimates due to high audit costs.
Companies should then be willing to compensate auditors for their services if fair value is sufficiently
beneficial to investors. It is not clear why auditors would fail to respond to such monetary incentives in
developed audit markets.
123
766 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
lack of incentives or ability to acquire information, are relatively low. Third, the
requirement to ex ante commit to one of the two accounting practices, as discussed
earlier, suggests that the choice is unlikely to be driven by opportunism even if
governance is imperfect. A commitment is made ex ante (in contrast to the literature
on asset revaluations), and the management therefore has incentives to commit to an
efficient accounting practicea practice that limits ex post opportunism (Watts
1986). Finally, the governance (market) failure should be rather extreme to explain
our finding that over 95 % of companies elect historical cost.
That said, we cannot empirically assess the extent to which market failures, e.g.,
due to managerial opportunism and externalities, affect the managerial choices we
observe and draw inferences from. Furthermore, in the presence of market frictions,
the efficient market solution may take some time to evolve, and we only have
evidence from the first year after IFRS adoption. Hence we caution the reader to
interpret our results carefully. More research is needed to fully understand potential
sources of market failures regarding the choice between fair value and historical
cost.
Overall, our evidence indicates that standard setters need to be careful in
requiring fair value accounting for certain non-financial assets. Unless compelling
reasons exist to believe that there is a market failure, a regulatory move towards
fair-value-based accounting standards is likely to impose costs on the economy.
Acknowledgment This research was funded in part by the Initiative on Global Markets at the
University of Chicago Booth School of Business. We benefited from helpful comments from two
anonymous referees, Ray Ball, Philip Berger, Jannis Bischof, Alexander Bleck, Christof Beuselinck,
Johan van Helleman, S.P. Kothari, Laurence van Lent, Christian Leuz, Thomas Linsmeier (discussant),
Paul Madsen, Karl Muller, Scott Richardson, Edward Riedl, Douglas Skinner, Richard Sloan (editor),
Abbie Smith, Stephen Zeff, Ross Watts, Li Zhang, participants at the Review of Accounting Studies
Conference 2012, EAA 2009 Annual Meeting, University of Chicago, University of North Carolinas
GIA Conference, Harvard Universitys IMO Conference, ISCTE, and Tilburg University. Michelle Grise,
SaeHanSol Kim, Shannon Kirwin, Ilona Ori, Russell Ruch, and Onur Surgit provided excellent research
assistance.
123
Fair value accounting 767
The only valuation method for PPE permitted under German GAAP is historical
cost less depreciations (German HGB, para. 253). Under both IFRS and UK GAAP,
PPE is initially recognized at cost but at each subsequent balance sheet date is
valued at either historical cost or fair value (IAS 16 and FRS 15). In either case,
these assets are subject to depreciation. When fair value is applied, positive changes
in an assets value are credited to the revaluation reserve, which constitutes part of
shareholders equity. Revaluations, therefore, only affect net income through future
depreciation charges (unlike for investment property). Finally, under IFRS, the
choice of valuation method must be consistent for all assets in the same asset class
(IAS16.29).
Under German GAAP, historical cost is the only valuation method permitted for
intangible assets (German HGB, para. 253). Under both UK GAAP and IFRS,
however, intangible assets are to be carried at either historical cost or fair value less
any amortization and impairment charges (IAS 38 and FRS 10). Under fair value,
the accounting treatment is similar to that of PPE; that said, a company may only
apply fair value to an intangible asset in the rare circumstances where the intangible
asset has a readily ascertainable market value from an active market. The definition
of an active market is rather narrow, and for many intangible assets, such as brands,
patents, and trademarks, it is non-existent, due to their uniqueness and the
specificity of their application (IAS38.78). Hence for most intangible assets,
managers are in practice restricted to historical costs accounting, and the valuation
choice for intangibles therefore cannot be considered free to the same extent as it
can for investment property and PPE.
This appendix presents examples of fair value and historical cost accounting from
the accounting policy section of annual reports of companies in our samples. Panel
A presents an example of a switch from fair value under UK GAAP to historical
cost under IFRS. Panel B presents an example of fair value accounting under both
123
768 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
UK GAAP and IFRS. Panel C presents an example of a German company that uses
fair value accounting under IFRS.
Panel A: Switch from fair value to historical cost
Annual report according to UK GAAP for 2004
AMEC PLC
All significant freehold and long leasehold properties were externally valued as at
31 December 2004 by CB Richard Ellis Limited in accordance with the Appraisal
and Valuation Manual of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors.
For the United Kingdom, the basis of revaluation was the existing use value for
properties occupied by group companies and the market value for those properties
without group occupancy. For properties outside the United Kingdom, appropriate
country valuation standards were adopted that generally reflect market value.
No provision has been made for the tax liability that may arise in the event that
certain properties are disposed of at their revalued amounts.
The amount of land and buildings included at valuation, determined according to
the historical cost convention, was as follows:
123
Fair value accounting 769
properties is impaired and as such, they have been charged to the income
statement as impairment charges in 2004. This reduces the profit for the year
ended 31 December 2004 and the value of property, plant and equipment as at
31 December 2004 by 1.8 million.
123
770 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Fair One if a company uses fair value for at least one asset class within
a specific asset group following the adoption of IFRS and zero
otherwise
UK One if a company is domiciled in the UK and zero otherwise
UkSic65 One if a company has SIC 65 (real estate) among its first five SIC
codes and is domiciled in the UK and zero otherwise
Germany One if a company is domiciled in Germany and zero otherwise
GermanySic65 One if a company has SIC 65 (real estate) among its first five SIC
codes and is domiciled in Germany and zero otherwise
Early One if a company adopted IFRS before 2005 and zero otherwise
Size Log of market value of equity
PPEA Property, plant, and equipment less revaluation reserve divided by
total assets less revaluation reserve
MktLev Total liabilities divided by market value of assets (defined as book
value of liabilities plus market value of equity) as of December
2005
MktLevLong Long-term debt divided by market value of assets (liabilities plus
market value of equity) as of December 2005
MktLevShort Short-term liabilities defined as total liabilities less long-term debt
divided by market value of assets (liabilities plus market value of
equity) as of December 2005
123
Fair value accounting 771
LevBook Book leverage defined as total liabilities divided by total assets net
of fair value revaluation reserve
LevBookLong Long-term debt divided by total assets net of fair value revaluation
reserve
LevBookShort Ratio of total liabilities minus long-term debt to total assets net of
fair value revaluation reserve
Convertible Ratio of convertible debt to long-term debt
DebtToOi Total liabilities divided by operating income
Coverage Operating income divided by interest expense
Current Current assets divided by current liabilities
Dividend One if company pays dividends and zero otherwise
FairInvPr One if a company holds investment property recorded at fair value
and zero otherwise
DbtIss1 Change in total liabilities that took place from 2005 to 2007 scaled
by beginning-of-period market value of assets (liabilities plus
market value of equity)
DbtIss2 Change in long-term debt that took place from 2005 to 2007 scaled
by beginning-of-period market value of assets (liabilities plus
market value of equity)
FtrLev1 Total liabilities as of 2007 scaled by beginning-of-period market
value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity)
FtrLev2 Long-term debt as of 2007 scaled by beginning-of-period market
value of assets (liabilities plus market value of equity)
DbtGrow1 Logarithmic growth in total liabilities from 2005 to 2007
DbtGrow2 Logarithmic growth in long-term debt from 2005 to 2007
Note: Unless otherwise stated, variables are measured as of December 2005 using
the Worldscope database.
Companies that follow historical cost accounting must periodically test their assets
for impairment. An asset is considered impaired under the IFRS when its carrying
amount is higher than (1) its fair value less costs to sell and (2) the present value of
the future cash flows it is expected to generate (IAS36.18). Thus under historical
cost accounting, companies in practice value assets close to fair value if the
depreciated historical costs exceed the fair value. In contrast, under fair value
accounting, companies revalue assets either upward or downward depending on the
change in the fair value estimate. This revaluation implies that the book values of
assets (equity) are likely to be higher for companies that use fair value accounting.
To provide evidence on the differences in balance sheet amounts of fair value versus
historical cost companies, we carry out the following analysis.
Table 11 compares the book value of total assets (book value of equity) divided
by the market value of total assets (market value of equity) for companies that use
fair value with that of companies that use only historical cost. We compute the
123
772 H. B. Christensen, V. V. Nikolaev
Table illustrates the differences in the book value of assets for fair value versus historical cost companies.
Information regarding the use of fair value is hand-collected from companies annual reports in
Thompson One Banker. All other data is collected from the Worldscope database as of December 2005.
Panel A presents a sample of 275 companies (124 UK companies, 151 German companies) that hold
investment property. Panel B is based on a matched sample of companies that began using fair value after
IFRS adoption. We match each fair value company with a historical cost companies on country, two-digit
industry group, and the log of market value of equity and take the closest match. This procedure, which
requires non missing market value of equity, yields 90 observations. BTM is book value of equity divided
by the market value of equity; TA is total value of assets; MKT(TA) is market value of equity plus book
value of liabilities; ROA is return on assets; and PPE/MKT(EQUITY) is book value of property, plant, and
equipment divided by the market value of equity
123
Fair value accounting 773
market value of total assets by the sum of the market value of equity and the book
value of liabilities. Panel A of Table 11 presents the evidence for investment
property, and Panel B of Table 11 presents the evidence for property, plant, and
equipment (PPE). Each company that recognizes PPE at fair value is matched on
country, industry, and market capitalization with a company that recognizes all
assets at historical cost. For investment property, we include all of the companies
that hold investment property because there is no pronounced imbalance between
the fair value and historical cost subgroups. We find that, on average, the ratio of
book value of total assets to market value of total assets is 16 % higher for
companies that recognize investment property at fair value; the ratio of book value
of equity to market value of equity is 27 % higher. Among companies that apply fair
value to PPE, we find that the ratio of the book value of total assets to the market
value of total assets and the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of
equity are, respectively, 31 and 87 % higher than those of matched companies that
use only historical cost. The differences in the book values of assets and equity in
both the investment property and the PPE samples are all significant at the 1 %
level. We also examine how the return on assets (ROA) differs between fair value
and historical cost companies. We find a lower ROA in the PPE sample among
companies that recognize assets at fair value. In the investment property sample, we
also find a lower ROA among companies that use fair value accounting; this
difference, however, is statistically insignificant. (It is not surprising that fair value
accounting for property decreases ROA because while, on average, fair value
accounting increases the book value of assets, upward revaluations do not affect the
net income. For investment property this effect is smaller because upward
revaluations increase both net income and total assets. See Appendix 1.)
The evidence in Table 11 indicates that the decision to use the fair value method
is associated with economically significant differences in companies balance
sheets, which makes companies that use fair value accounting appear less
conservative in terms of their book-to-market ratios. We emphasize that one should
not interpret these results as causal because they are conditional on the companys
decision to use fair value.
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