INTRODUCTION

1. Cariaga v. people GR no. 180010

Cenita was the Municipal Treasurer of Cabauatan, Isabela with a salary grade of 24, was convicted for three counts
of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Through counsel, Cenita filed a Notice
of Appeal of the RTC decision, stating that he intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan
which has appellate jurisdiction on Cenitas case.Cenita elevated his case to the Supreme Court, invoking the liberal
interpretation of the rules and admitted the procedural lapse committed by his former counsel, and requests the Court
to transmit the records of the cases to the Saniganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.

The Issue: Whether or not the appeal which was wrongly taken to the Court of Appeals, should be given due course
and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,1 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:2
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade `27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural
lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the
Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict
application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.3
In Ulep v. People,4 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to
be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be
dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the
Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the
wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower
than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law
and the rules of procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be
forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially
in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the law effectively
conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.5
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in
criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so
require.6 It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense as well as a
proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage
petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the
records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is warned against
committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative sanction.

2. Trenas v. People

3. Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive
relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No.
0193, a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.

The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias allegedly acquired and
amassed. Then Republic then filed with the Sandiganbay through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those alleged
unlawfully acquired properties of the Garcias. The case was docketed as Civil Case 0193(Forfeiture I) and
subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(Forfeiture
II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but
subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case
raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both
Forfeiture I and II.

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the the plunder case and the
Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the 2nd division of SB pursuant to RA 8249.

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.

Petitioner argues that the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4thDivision of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case
and that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.

Issue:
Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her three sons
considering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have
been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder case Crim. Case No. 28107 has already been
filed and pending with the 2nd division of the SB.

Held:
The court ruled that the forfeiture cases and plunder cases have different causes of action. The former is civil in
nature and the latter is criminal. On the matter of double jeopardy the court held that:

Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are,
to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a
criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant
in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

The court also said that RA 7080(plunder) did not repeal RA 1379(forfeiture) stating that:

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA
1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself
or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime
the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which
were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

However on the matter on Jurisdiction over the person of Clarita Garcia and his sons the court said that the 4th
division of SB did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children for the reason that there was also no
voluntary appearance since they questioned the jurisdiction of the 4th division of SB through their motion to dismiss
and quashal for lack of jurisdiction into their person . And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases,
insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order
declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For
the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias
summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

4. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Quisumbing, December 21, 1998)

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination independent of that of the
prosecutor of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his
witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and
the special prosecutor should be examined by the court
FACTS:
1.January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of
their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a
donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and
prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
2.Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
3.In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
4.Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of
the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.
5.In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as
contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.
6.August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of
the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.
7.In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend
proceedings be granted.
8.On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the
Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial
question.
9.On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.
10.On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation
stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For
Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.
11.In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the
country except upon approval of the court.
12.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information.
13.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil
found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The
recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
14.On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier
findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent
Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant case.
ISSUES:
1.WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially
valid? YES
2.WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES
RATIO:
1.Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the
accused:
a.the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the
filing of the Information and
b.the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial
question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its
resolution.
2.The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody elses
determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.
3.In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the
records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
4.In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without
determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.
5.With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption
effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing
the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative
reliefs.
6.In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,
"[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose,
the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the
court jurisdiction over the person.

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;

As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioner.
The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the issuance of the warrant for his
arrest should not be equated with "voluntary appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his
person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon learning of the
filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a]
Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said
Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable cause. It was
essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person.
When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that such was "without prejudice to
his Opposition.

RULE 110
9. People v. Madali
Facts:

An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellants guilty
of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. The body of
Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. An autopsy conducted by Dr.
Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of death is intracranial
hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.

Three years after Reynaldos death, the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor,
surfaced and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness, the accused-
appellants were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and
discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credible the
testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseor.

The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file, by way
of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion was denied. The OSG subsequently filed a
Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position taken by the OSG,
complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestation and Motion to File
Brief) which was noted by the Court.

Ruling and Reasoning:

Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment
or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It has been held that the word party in the
provision includes not only the government and the accused but other persons who may be affected by the judgment.

The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. Hence, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.

Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the
State, represented by the SolGen, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would be a
mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where
 the OSG takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the
complainants right to be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.

Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants conviction. Mercy Villamors testimony
is riddled with inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to material points. Evidence, to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible.

10. MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge
Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had
been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7
April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997,
Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release
of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of
the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."
On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to
Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual
intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts
of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail in the 9
cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal
Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been made in
accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and
that the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount of
P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-
97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May
1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in
separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and
then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in
the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June
1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order,
dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the
conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides,
bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be
present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed
to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these
cases before the bail can be granted.
RULING:
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence
of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the
arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.

11. SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA
Facts: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple
gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set
by the judge. However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order directing the trial
prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged
in the information, which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The prosecutor
entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in
the opening parafraph of the Information. On the date scheduled for pre trial, the accused was to be re-arraigned for
the crime of murder. Petitioner objected on the ground that he will be placed in double jeopardy. Petitioner then filed a
motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of double jeopardy. He alleged that he was
validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court I the information for homicide, and the case was terminated
without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the
subsequent filinf of information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. Said Motion to Quash
was denied by the responded judge ruling that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double
jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was
merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the
allegation of aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder. Petitioner
then filed for a Motion for reconsideration alleging that contrary to respondent judges conclusion that disregard of
rank qualifies the killing to murder, it is a general aggravating circumstance only which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of penalty. , and that the amendment ordered by the judge was substantial and is therefor not
allowed byt the Rules of Court as the petitioner has already been arraigned. Motion for reconsideration was
granted,and ruled that the original information charging the crime of homicide stands. A petition for certiorari was filed
by the petitioner alleging among others that the motion was not really reconsidered as the prayer was for the judge to
grant the Motion to Quash.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder.
Held: NO. Sec 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper to wit;

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his
express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a newInformation charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different
from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the
information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same
offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection,
the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead,
which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

RULE 111
12. Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pe Chin Lee- NO DIGEST :(

RULE 112
RULE 113
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO

Facts:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC
in criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and aquitting him of 3
charges filed against him
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding
no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all
pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court
dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that inasmuch as it has been
shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in
the accused possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then
the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the
occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily
permissible and lawful. In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the
warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior
to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his
BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on
the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He
was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not
committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established
from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he
was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu
they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on
the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be
found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso
jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

RULE 114

DAVID vs AGBAY

FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential
house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public
land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3
(MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General
of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in
fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondents family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which
held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant
indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a
third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.

ISSUE: WON has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying
petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27
In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the
distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

Lavides vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination,
providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result
of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie
San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for
an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently,
this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of
Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the
police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him.
Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were
submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-
70550. Edp
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2)
For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In
the Event of Adverse Resolution of the A
bove Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged."[1]
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman,
and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the
cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse
with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment
for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse."
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
ISSUE: Should bail be granted

RULING: it was held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should be
understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to
quash the informations filed against him. It was explained that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on
his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore
not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail.

LACHICA V. TORMIS
Facts:
In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged Rosabella M Tormis of the Municipal
Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV, with abuse of authority. On July 2, 2003, accused Domugho was
apprehended by the police at around 8:45pm and was brought to the police station for booking and custody
at 9:30pm.
On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused that she was released from
confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm. Complainant inquired from the police station if an order of release was
issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released because of the phone call the
respondent judge made telling the desk officer that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant
checked the case records but the expediente contained no copies of the order of release. She was only
shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was only on 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found
The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by the police. Only a notation that
there was a posting of the cash bail bond was entered therein.
Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the
function belonged exclusively to the office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said judge committed
an act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the release of the accused.
Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order of release at 7pm after accused
posted the cash bond. She claimed that such accused was released because of the order of release and not
because of the phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report recommending that respondent judge
be fined in the amount of P20,000 or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and
recommended the suspension of 3 months.

Issue:
WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally receiving the cash bail bond for the
accused.
Held:
Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector or
internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case.
Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive such bail bond. A judge is not
one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of
the judge.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she
personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately misleading the court by making
false representations. She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary and other benefits and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt more seriously.