In criminal law, strict liability is liability for which mens rea (Latin for "guilty mind") does not

have to be
proven in relation to one or more elements comprising the actus reus (Latin for "guilty act") although
intention, recklessness or knowledge may be required in relation to other elements of the offense. The
liability is said to be strict because defendants will be convicted even though they were genuinely
ignorant of one or more factors that made their acts or omissions criminal. The defendants may
therefore not be culpable in any real way, i.e. there is not even criminal negligence, the least
blameworthy level of mens rea.

Strict liability laws were created[where?] in the 19th century to improve working and safety standards in
factories. Needing to prove mens reas on the part of the factory owners was very difficult and resulted
in very few prosecutions. The creation of strict liability offenses meant that convictions were i ncreased.
Common strict liability offenses today include the selling of alcohol to underage persons.

These laws are applied either in regulatory offenses enforcing social behaviour where minimal stigma
attaches to a person upon conviction, or where society is concerned with the prevention of harm, and
wishes to maximise the deterrent value of the offense. The imposition of strict liability may operate very
unfairly in individual cases. For example, in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain (1986) 2
ALL ER 635, a pharmacist supplied drugs to a patient who presented a forged doctor's prescription, but
was convicted even though the House of Lords accepted that the pharmacist was blameless. The
justification is that the misuse of drugs is a grave social evil and pharmacists should be encouraged to
take even unreasonable care to verify prescriptions before supplying drugs. Similarly, where liability is
imputed or attributed to another through vicarious liability or corporate liability, the effect of that
imputation may be strict liability albeit that, in some cases, the accused will have a mens rea imputed
and so, in theory, will be as culpable as the actual wrongdoer.

Discussion of English law

Under the common law the rule is that crimes require proof of mens rea except in cases of public
nuisance, criminal and blasphemous libel, and criminal contempt of court. Where the liability arises
under a statute, there has been considerable inconsistency, with different rules of construction in
statutory interpretation producing varying assessments of the will of Parliament. But, in Sweet v Parsley
[1970] AC 132, Lord Reid laid down the following guidelines for all cases where the offens e is criminal as
opposed to quasi-criminal:

Wherever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will
of Parliament, words importing mens rea must be read into the provision.

It is a universal principle that if a penal provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations, that
interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be adopted.

The fact that other sections of the Act expressly require mens rea is not in itself sufficient to justify a
decision that a section which is silent as to mens rea creates an absolute offense. It is necessary to go
outside the Act and examine all relevant circumstances in order to establish that this must have been
the intention of Parliament.[1]
Hence, the literal rule is qualified, and there is a rebuttable presumption that Parliament intended a
mens rea to be a requirement in any section which creates an offense where the social stigma following
conviction and the punishment available to be imposed show this to be a truly criminal offense. In
Gammon v AG for Hong Kong (1985) AC 1, Lord Scarman rebutted the presumption because public
safety was threatened. Hence, statutes involving pollution, dangerous drugs, and acting as a director
while disqualified have been interpreted as imposing strict liability. In Environment Agency (formerly
National Rivers Authority) v. Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd. (1998) 2 WLR. 350, examples are given of
cases in which strict liability has been imposed for "causing" events which w ere the immediate
consequence of the deliberate acts of third parties but which the defendant had a duty to prevent or
take reasonable care to prevent. If words like "knowingly" or "wilfully" appear in the section, the
inference is that Parliament intended a mens rea requirement in that section. But, if words implying a
mens rea are present in some sections but not others, this suggests that Parliament deliberately
excluded a mens rea requirement in those sections which are silent.

In considering offenses created in the Children Act 1960, Lord Hutton in B (a minor) v DPP (2000) 1 AER
833, states the current position at p855:

the test is not whether it is a reasonable implication that the statute rules out mens rea as a constituent
part of the crime the test is whether it is a necessary implication.

As to the meaning of "necessary implication", Lord Nicholls said

Necessary implication connotes an implication that is compellingly clear. Such an implication can be
found in the language used, the nature of the offense, the mischief sought to be prevented and any
other circumstances which may assist in determining what intention is properly to be attributed to
Parliament when creating the offense. Necessary implication may arise from not only the statutory
provision under review but also from the rules governing that provision to be deduced from other
provisions.

Thus, the court must examine the overall purpose of the statute. If the intention is to introduce quasi -
criminal offenses, strict liability will be acceptable to give quick penalties to encourage future
compliance, e.g. fixed-penalty parking offenses. But, if the policy issues involved are sufficiently
significant and the punishments more severe, the test must be whether reading in a mens rea
requirement will defeat Parliament's intention in creating the particular offense, i.e. if defendants might
escape liability too easily by pleading ignorance, this would not address the "mischief" that Parliament
was attempting to remedy.

Sexual Offences Act 2003

In R. v. G. (2005), a 15-year-old boy was convicted of statutory rape of a child under 13, a crime under
Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The prosecution accepted the boy's claim that he had
believed the 12-year-old girl to be 15, but he was nevertheless sentenced to 12 months detention. This
was reduced on appeal to a conditional discharge, but, in a 3-2 decision, the House of Lords declined to
reverse the conviction.[2]