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Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order
Author(s): G. John Ikenberry
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2009), pp. 71-87
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40407217
Accessed: 22-10-2015 14:30 UTC
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Articles
Liberalinternational order- both its ideas and real-worldpoliticalformations - is not embodied in a fixedset of
principlesor
practices.Open markets, internationalinstitutions, democratic
cooperativesecurity, community, progressive change,collectiveprob-
lemsolving,theruleoflaw- theseareaspectsoftheliberalvisionthathavemadeappearancesinvariouscombinationsand changing
waysoverthelastcentury. I arguethatitis possibleto identify
threeversionsor modelsofliberalinternational order- versions1.0,
2.0, and 3.0. The firstis associatedwiththeideas ofWoodrowWilson,thesecond is theCold War liberalinternationalism ofthe
post-1945 decades,and thethirdversionis a sortof post-hegemonic liberalinternationalism
thathas onlypartiallyappearedand
whosefullshapeand logicis stilluncertain.I developa setofdimensionsthatallow foridentifying different logicsofliberalinter-
nationalorderand identify variablesthatwillshapethemovementfromliberalinternationalism 2.0 to 3.0.
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Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorldOrder
72 Perspectiveson Politics
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Figure1
Dimensions of liberal internationalorder
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Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorldOrder
74 Perspectiveson Politics
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principleof nationalself-determination withgreatcau- ism. Wilsonianinternationalism did not call upon the
tion.He didnotundermine British ruleinIreland,Egypt, international to
community organizeto promoteexpan-
and India,or Frenchrulein Indochina.Wilson recog- sivenotionsof humanrights, socialprotections, or eco-
nizedonlynewnationsthatemerged fromthecollapseof nomicdevelopment. To be sure,therewas an underlying
theRussian,German,Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman assumption thattheinternational system was moderniz-
empires."11 Wilsons notion of national self-determination ing in a liberal direction. But liberal internationalism dur-
was decidedlydevelopmental - and patronizing. Sover- ing thisperioddid not containan explicitagenda of
eignself-rule required theemergence ofan "organic" nation building international capacities todefend oradvanceambi-
in whichthe peoplewerepolitically matureenoughto tioussocial ends. Indeed,theVersailles treatyhas been
independently govern themselves. Hence the mandate widelydepicted as a flawed for
blueprint postwarorder
- a
system League of Nations innovation to replace for- with litde of the
understanding economicandsocialunder-
malcolonialrule- thatwouldoperateto maintainorder pinningsofstableorderand progressive change.14
in backward areasuntilnationalself-rule was possible. Takentogether, theWilsonianvisionofliberalinterna-
The Wilsonianconceptionof liberalinternationalism tionalism wasbothbreathtakingly ambitiousand surpris-
similarlyembraced the notion of sovereign equality of ingly limited. It sought to transform theold globalsystem
states.
Among the established nation-states - most of whom based on the balance of power,spheresofinfluence, mil-
wereWestern - therewas littleformalinstitutional hier- itaryrivalry, and alliancesinto a unifiedliberalinter-
archyin thepostwarorder.The LeagueofNationswasto nationalorderbasedon nation-states and theruleoflaw.
be an organization ofstatesthatcametogether as equals. Powerand security competition would be decomposed
The Leaguedid nothavetheinstitutional framework for and replacedbya community ofnations.The Wilsonian
specialgreatpowerauthority andrights ofthelaterUnited visionwas universal in scopeand celebrated thesovereign
Nations.It did havean ExecutiveCouncilbut,adhering equalityof nation-states. The resulting orderwould be
closelyto theprinciple oftheequalityofstates,itspowers boundtogether bytheinternational ruleoflaw.ButWil-
weresimplyto initiateinvestigations and makerecom- sonianliberalinternationalism did not involvethecon-
mendations to thebodyofthewhole.The hierarchies of struction ofdeeplytransformative legally-binding political
Wilsonianliberalinternationalism weremoreimplicit and institutions. Liberalinternational orderwas to be con-
informal, manifest in notionsof racialand civilizational structed aroundthe"softlaw"ofpublicopinionandmoral
superiority. Wilson himself was notoriously unenlight- suasion. The LeagueofNationswas,according toWilson,
ened in these respects. Hierarchical arrangements of to "operate as the organizing moral force ofmen through-
Wilsonian-style international orderwerealso manifest in out theworld"thatwillturnthe"searching lightofcon-
thewaysin whichthemajorpowersoftheLeaguewould scious"on wrongdoingaroundtheworld."Justa little
remainresponsible forsupervision of post-colonial terri- exposurewill settlemostquestions,"Wilson optimisti-
tories.Again,Wilsonsprogressive developmental vision callyasserted.15
providedtheintellectual coherence. The liberalinternationalism envisagedbyWilsonwas
Regarding of
therule law, Wilson of course champi- an historical failure. This was not simplybecausetheSen-
oneda worldorderedby international law. As Wilson put ate of the United States failed to ratify theVersailles Treaty.
it, "thesame law thatapplies to individuals applies to It was really a failure of the emergence oftheunderlying
nations."12 Yethe had a verynineteenth-century viewof conditions neededfora collective security system to func-
international law. That is, Wilson did not see inter- tion. As noted earlier, the Wilsonian version of liberal
nationallawprimarily as formal, legally-binding commit- internationalism was built around a "thin" set of institu-
mentsthattransferred sovereignty upwardtointernational tionalcommitments. Butitwasalsobuilton theassump-
or supranational authorities. International law had more tion that a "thick" set of normsand pressures - public
ofa socializing dynamic, creating normsand expectations opinion and the moral rectitude of statesmen - would acti-
thatstateswouldslowlycometo embraceas their own. As vate sanctions and enforce the territorial peace. Wilson
Thomas Knock notes,"Wilsonemphasizedthatinter- gotaroundtheproblemof sovereign autonomy - which
nationallaw actuallywas 'not made/as such. Rather it the United States Senate would not -
giveup byempha-
wastheresult oforganicdevelopment - 'a bodyofabstract sizingtheinformal normsthatwouldtakeholdandbring
"
principlesfounded uponlongestablished custom/13Inter- countries together to maintaina stablepeace.The sover-
nationallawandthesystem ofcollective security anchored eignty of states - sovereignty as it relatedto both legal
in theLeagueofNationswouldprovidea socializing and
role, independence equality - would notbe compromised
gradually bringing statesintoa "community power." of or transformed. States would just be expectedto act
liberalinternationalism 1.0 hada relatively nar- better- which for Wilson meant thattheywouldbe social-
Finally,
rowviewaboutthedomainofinternational cooperation. izedintoa "community power." of
It was essentially a systemof collectivesecurity and free Lookingback, it is clear thatthe securitycommit-
tradeboundtogether byrulesand normsofmultilateral- mentsweretoo thinand the normsof complianceand
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Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorldOrder
76 Perspectiveson Politics
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arounddemocratic solidarity withintheAtlanticregion. sovereignindependencebut gain new governmental
This shiftwas twofold.One was themovement toward capacities.20
morespecific andexplicit security commitments. Alliance Similarly,thenormsofsovereign equalityembodiedin
partnerships entailedobligations but theywerealso lim- Wilsonianinternationalism gavewaytoa muchmorehier-
itedliabilityagreements. Commitments werenotuniver- archicalformofliberalorder.The UnitedStatestookon
sal and openedended;theyweretiedto specificsecurity specialfunctional-operational roles.It positioneditselfat
challenges withtreaty-based understandings about roles thecenter oftheliberalinternational order. Itprovided pub-
and responsibilities.18 Second,theywerecommitments lic goods of securityprotection, marketopenness,and
thatwerebackedbya politicalvisionofa Western security sponsorship ofrulesandinstitutions. TheAmerican dollar
community. The sensethatAmericaand Europewere becameaninternational currency and the American domes-
imperiled bya commonthreat strengthened thefeeling of ticmarketbecamean engineofglobaleconomicgrowth.
Westernsolidarity. But thenotionof a Westerncoreto The Americanalliancesystemand theforward-deployed
liberalinternational orderalso suggestedthatunusual militaryforces inEuropeandEastAsiagavetheUnitedStates
opportunities existed- becauseof commoncultureand a directand ongoingsuperordinate rolein thecapitalist-
democratic institutions - to cooperateand buildpostwar democratic world.Otherstatesestablished clientalistic
and
institutions. with
"specialrelationships" Washington. NATO, the In
Liberalinternationalism 2.0 also movedbeyondthe UnitedStateswas first amongequals.It led and directed
Wilsonianvisionwithitsmorecomplexnotionsofsover- securitycooperation across theregionsoftheworld.The
eigntyand interdependence. Westphaliansovereignty UnitedStatesexported security and imported goods.The
remained at thecoreofTruman-era liberalinternational- resulting order was hierarchical - the United Stateswas
ism.Buttherewerenewunderstandings aboutthedangers themostpowerful statein theorder.It occupieda super-
and opportunities of economicand security interdepen- ordinate positionmanifest inroles,responsibilities, author-
dence.The economiccalamities ofthe1930sand thesuc- and
ity, privileges within the liberal international order.
cessesofNewDeal regulation andgovernance informed these Butthehierarchical character oftheorderwastobemore
newviews.Advancedsocieties wereseento be deeplyand liberalthanimperial. The UnitedStatesdidengageinpub-
mutually vulnerable tointernational economicdownturns licgoodsprovision, supported andoperated withinagreed-'
and thebad policiespursuedby other states.Stateswould upon rules and and
institutions, opened itselfup to "voice
needtogetmoreinvolved inmoreintense andinstitution- opportunities" from subordinate states. To be sure,these
of of the
alizedforms jointmanagement globalsystem. Jacob liberalfeatures ofhierarchy differed acrossregions andover
Viner,a leadinginternational economist andpostwar plan- time.The UnitedStateswas morewillingto makemulti-
nercaptured thisview."Thereiswideagreement todaythat lateralcommitments to WesternEuropeanpartners than
majordepressions, massunemployment, aresocialevils,and to others.In EastAsia,theUnitedStatesbuilta "huband
the of
thatitis obligation governments. . . toprevent them." spoke"setof security pactsthatmadetheregionalorder
Moreover, there is "wide agreement also that it is extraor- moreclient-based thanrule-based.21 Generally speaking,
dinarilydifficult, ifnotoutright impossible, foranycoun- Americasdominantglobalpositionmadede factohierar-
tryto copealonewith problems cyclicalboomsand
the of chyaninevitable feature ofthepostwar order.ButAmericas
. . whilethereisgoodprospect thatwithinter- dominant -
globalposition together with Cold Warbipolar
depressions.
nationalcooperation. ... theproblem thebusiness
of cycle competition - also gaveWashington strategicincentivesto
andofmassunemployment canbe largely solved."19New buildcooperative relations withallies,integrate Japanand
institutionswouldbe neededin whichstatesworkedside Germany, sharethe"spoils"ofcapitalism and moderniza-
bysideona continuous basetoregulate andreducethedan- tion,and,generally, operatethesystem inmutually accept-
gersinherent in increasingly interdependent societies. ableways.22
Therewereseveralaspectsto thisemerging viewthatit The rule-based character ofliberalorderalsoevolvedin
wasnecessary toreducestatesovereign independence. One the1940sbeyondtheWilsonianvision.As notedearlier,
isthatitwasessentially an intergovernmental - rather than in theaftermath ofthewarand depression fthe1930s,
supranational - vision.Atleastintheadvanced world,gov- Americanliberalinternationalists had a new appreciation
ernments wouldremaintheprimary sourcesofauthority of thewaysin whichcapitalist modernization and inter-
and decision.But governments would bargain,consult, dependence hadcreated growing functional needsforcoop-
andcoordinate theirpolicieswithothergovernments, facil- eration.So toodidtheyhavenewviewsabouttheroleand
itatedthrough international institutions. The other aspect importance of rulesand institutions.23 Wilsonianinter-
was thatthe new international institutional machinery . nationalists had strongconvictions aboutthemoraland
wouldbe created inlargeparttobolster rather thandimin- politicalvirtuesof international law and its socializing
ish the abilityof governments to deliveron theireco- impactson states.Truman-era internationalists had con-
nomicand politicalobligationsto theirsocieties.States victionsabout the utilityand functions of institutions
withinliberalinternationalism 2.0 would giveup some and rule-basedorder.More so thanin earlierdecades,
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together in a protracted politicalprocess.Its logic and Third,a moregradualshiftin theglobalsystem is the
operationemergedgraduallyfromthe shifting impera- unfolding human rights and to
"responsibility protect"
tives,negotiations, and adaptations duringtheearlypost- revolution. The resultis an erosionover the postwar
war decades.Eventually, in the contextof a weakened decadesin normsofWestphalian sovereignty. The inter-
Europe and threatening Soviet Union,theUnitedStates nationalcommunity is seenas havinga legitimate inter-
founditselftakingresponsibility fororganizing and oper- estinwhatgoeson withincountries. Thisgrowing interest
the
ating system - and the liberal hegemonic order took on thepartoftheinternational community in thedomes-
shape. tic governance practices of states is driven by bothcon-
ButAmericanliberalhegemony no longerappearsto siderations of humanrightsand security.32 The resultis
be an adequateframework to supporta liberalinter- thatnormsof sovereignty are seen as morecontingent.
nationalorder.Shiftsin theunderlying circumstances of This gradualerosionin normsofstatesovereignty means
worldpoliticsareagainforcing change in the organizing thattheinternational system has created a new "license"
ideasand institutions oftheliberalproject.The authority forpowerful statesto intervene in thedomesticaffairs of
of theUnitedStates,itshegemonicbargainswithother weak and troubledstates.Westphaliansovereignty has
states,andtherulesandinstitutions ofliberalinternation- been in manywaysoverthe past severalcenturiesthe
alism2.0 areincreasingly contested.28 Whathaschanged? singlemost universaland agreed-uponnormof inter-
First,most obviously, the end of the Cold Waraltered nationalpolitics.33It underliesinternational law, the
thehegemonic logic.During the decades ofbipolarcom- UnitedNations,and the greathistorical movements of
petition, the United States provided "system-function" ser- anti-colonialism andnationalself-determination. So when
vicesas itbalancedagainstSovietpower.Underconditions thenormweakens,it is notsurprising thatit has conse-
ofbipolarity theUnitedStateswas a globalsecurity pro- quences. But the erosion of state sovereignty normshave
vider.American powerwasfunctional forsystem stability not been matchedby theriseof new normsand agree-
and security, and it disciplinedand restrained the way mentsabout who the international community should
Washington exercised power. It made the United States make good on humanrightsand the responsibility to
morewillingto undertake globalresponsibilities, provide protect. Unresolved disagreements mount regarding the
publicgoods,and supportand operatewithina system of standardsof legalityand legitimacy thatattachto the
rulesand institutions. Othercountriesreceivedservices actionsof powerful statesactingon behalfof theinter-
and benefits fromAmericasbipolarglobalpowerposi- nationalcommunity.
tion.Americaneededalliesand alliesneededAmerica. As a result,the erosionof normsof sovereignty has
Thisprovided thebasisforbargains - anditcreatedincen- ushered ina newglobalstruggle overthesourcesofauthor-
tivesforcooperation in areasoutsideofnationalsecurity. ityin theinternational community. Thisproblemis made
The endoftheCold Wardidnoteliminate thesesecurity- worsebytheriseofAmerican unipolarity. OnlytheUnited
driven incentives forcooperation - -butitaltered andweak- Statesreallyhasthemilitary to
power systematically engage
enedtheseincentives.29 in large-scaleusesofforcearoundtheworld.The United
Second,the rise of unipolarity has made American Nationshas no troopsor military capacityof its own.
power more controversial and raised thelevelof uncer- Whatprecisely isthe"community ofstates" andwhospeaks
tainty around the world about the bargainsand institu- forthem?The problemof establishing legitimate inter-
tions of liberal order. With the end of the Cold War, nationalauthority grows.
Americasprimacy in the global distribution of capabili- Fourth,thesourcesofinsecurity in worldpoliticshave
tiesbecameone of themostsalientfeatures of theinter- also evolvedsincetheearlydecadesofliberalinternation-
nationalsystem.No othermajorstatehas enjoyedsuch alism2.0. The threat to peaceis no longerprimarily from
advantages in materialcapabilities - military, economic, great powers in
engaged security competition. Nuclear deter-
technological, geographical. unipolardistribution
This of rence,democraticpeace,and thedeclinein gainsfrom
is and it has ushered in a new conquest - thesearekeyexplanations forthepersistence of
power historically unique,
setof dynamicsthatarestillworkingtheirwaythrough stablepeace amongthe majorstatesoverthe past half
theorganization ofworldpolitics.30 But theriseof uni- century - thelongesteraofgreatpowerpeacein themod-
polarity brings with it a shift in the underlying logicof ernera.34The resulthasbeena shiftin thewaysin which
orderand rule in world politics. In a bipolar multi-
or violenceis manifest. In thepastonlypowerful stateswere
polarsystem, powerful states "rule" in the processoflead- abletogainaccesstoviolence capabilities that could threaten
inga coalition of states in balancingagainstotherstates. othersocieties. Today it is possible to see technology and
When thesystem shifts to unipolarity, thislogicof rule theglobalization oftheworldsystem creating opportuni-
disappears. Power is no longer based on balancingor ties for non^-state actors- or transnationalgangs of
buton thepredominance one state.Thisof individuals- to acquireweaponsof massdestruction.35
equilibrium,
is new and different - and potentiallythreatening to Asa result,itisnowtheweakness ofstatesandtheirinabil-
weakerand secondary state.31 ityto enforcelawsand orderwithintheirown societies
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intothehandsofdangerous groups.Thesedevelopments to risingand non-Western countries suchas Japan,India,
suggest that the liberal international order will increas- Brazil, and South Africa. Other bodies thatwouldgrowin
inglyfind itselfconcerned with the internalgovernance of importance would include the G-20, which - unlikethe
states.Unlessglobalization and theadvancement and dif- G-8- includesrepresentatives frombothdevelopedand
fusionof technology is reversed, it is almostinevitable emerging states. The Bretton Woodsinstitutions - theIMF
thattheerosionofWestphalian sovereignty will continue. and World Bank - would also expand and reapportion
Nonetheless, finding consensus on thenormsofinterven- rights andmembership. Countries suchas ChinaandIndia
tionin a post- Westphalian worldis deeplyproblematic - wouldgainsignificant votingsharesin thegovernance of
yet short of establishing such legitimate authority, the these institutions while the United Statesand Europe would
international orderwill continueto be troubledand see theirvotingsharescontract.
contested. Liberalinternational order3.0 wouldalsoseea further
A thirdissuerelatesto democracy and theinternational erosionofnormsofWestphalian sovereignty andthecon-
ruleof law.Here thequestionis: how do you buildup tinuing rise in the notion of a "responsibility to protect."
and
authority capacity at the international level- in inter- The idea that the international community a right
had -
nationalbodies and agreements - withoutjeopardizing and indeeda responsibility - to intervene insideofstates
popularruleand accountability builtintoliberaldemo- forhumanrightsand security reasonswouldbe increas-
craticstates? Can theauthority and capacityoftheinter- inglyembracedworldwide. But thismovement toward
nationalcommunityto act be strengthened without post-Westphalian normsofsovereignty leavesunanswered
sacrificing constitutional democracy at home?This is a thequestionofwhichstates - and international bodies-
deep unresolved problem in the liberal international would acquire the and
rights authority to decide where
project.39Liberals a
anticipategrowing rolefor the "inter- and how to act. Who will speak for the international com-
nationalcommunity" in thefunctioning oftheglobalsys- munityon questionsoftheresponsibility to protect? It is
tem.The postwareraitselfhas seena radicalincreasein difficult to see a liberalinternationalism 3.0 thathas set-
thenormsand cooperative efforts launchedon behalfof tledthisquestion.The logicalmovewouldbe to turnto
theinternational community. humanrightsrevolu- theauthority
The ofa reformed UnitedNationsSecurity Coun-
tion and the riseof international normsof "deviance" cil. But if the recentpast is a guide,the abilityof the
carrywiththemexpectations thattheoutsideworldwill SecurityCouncil to actuallyreachagreement and sanc-
actwhengovernments failto actproperly.40 The growing tiontheuse of forceis highlyproblematic.41 Otherless
interdependence of statesalso createsrisingdemandsfor universal bodies- suchas NATO ora proposedLeagueor
norms and institutions. But how do yousquare Concert of democracies - mayprovidealternative sources
governance
thedomesticand international liberalvisions? of authority forintervention but thelegitimacy of these
Out ofthesetensionsand dilemmas, thenextphaseof bodiesis onlypartialandcontested.42 Liberalinternation-
theliberalinternational project will be shaped. There are alism 3.0 might solve this problemby fostering greater
atleastthreepathways awayfromliberalinternationalism agreement amongtheSecurity Councilpermanent mem-
2.0. Each pathwayinvolvesa different mix in the way ber statesoverthe rightsand obligationsof the inter-
sovereignty, rules,institutions, and authority arearrayed. nationalcommunity to act.Morelikely, questionsabout
The first possibilityis liberal internationalism 3.0. This intervention and the use of force will remain contested.
wouldbe a far-reaching reworking of the American liberal Regional bodies and non-universal groupingsof like-
hegemonicorder. This would be an order in which the minded states will continue to offer alternative sourcesof
UnitedStatesexercised lesscommand and control of the authority on these questions.
rulesand institutions. Americasspecialrightsand privi- Beyondquestionsof humanitarian intervention and
legeswouldcontractas otherstatesgainedmoreweight "responsibilityprotect," to security threats coming from
and authority at thehightableofglobalgovernance. The thepotentialdiffusion of violencetechnologies intothe
"private"governancethat the United Statesprovided hands of terrorist groups will continue to generate incen-
through NATO andits dominance of multilateral institu- tives for more intrusive international arms control and
tionswouldgiveway to more "public" rules and institu- counter-proliferation capacities. The International Atomic
tionsof governance. At thesametime,theintrusiveness EnergyAgencyis theleadingorganization edgeof these
and reachofliberal order would also continue to expand, international efforts. In the last two decades,theIAEAhs
placingdemandson governance institutions to forge con- developed scientific and technical competence and legal
sensualand legitimate forms of collective action. frameworks for and
monitoring inspections of nuclear pro-
In this3.0 liberalorder,authority wouldmovetoward gramsaroundtheworld.As nuclear, biological, andchem-
universalinstitutions - or at leastto international bodies ical weaponstechnologies growmoresophisticated and
thatincludedwiderglobal membership. These would diffuse intotroubled partsoftheworld,governments will
includea reformed UnitedNations- witha reorganized no doubtseekto expandIAEA-type capacitiesformoni-
Security Councilthatexpandedpermanent membership toring, inspection, verification, andsafeguarding. Pressures
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remainunattached to themultilateral, rule-based system. nerships withkeyalliesthatremaintiedtoAmerican secu-
In theend,thiswasa bargainthattherestoftheworlddid rityprovision.
not accept.48 The questionis whethera different set of A secondvariableis thedegreetowhichAmericassecu-
be
bargainsmight acceptable, bargains where the United ritycapacitiescan be leveraged intowidereconomicand
Statesdoesprovidefunctional services - particularly secu- politicalagreements. The United Stateshasextraordinary
rityprotection - but also to
agrees operate within a rene- in
advantages military Its
power. expenditures on military
gotiatedsystem of rules and institutions. The Bush are
capacity equal to the rest of the world s expenditures
administration triedto use Americasunrivaledmilitary combined.It operatesa world-wide systemof alliances
capabilities to reduce itsexposure to rule-based order.Is it and security partnerships. It "commandsthecommons"
possible for the United States to increase itsexposureto in thatitalonehasthepowertoprojectforceinall regions
rule-based orderas a way to retainaspectsof authority oftheworld.Thissituation willnotchangeanytime soon,
and privilege withina renegotiated hegemonicorder?If evenwiththerapideconomicgrowth ofcountries suchas
so, thiswouldbe liberalorder2.5. Chinaand India.The questionis,towhatextentdo these
A finalpossibilityis a breakdownof liberalinter- advantages anddisparities in military capabilities translate
nationalorder.This would occur if the orderwereto intobargaining power over the wider array globalrules
of
becomesignificantly lessopenandrule-based. The system and institutions. If the answeris verylittle,the United
of open,multilateral tradecould collapseusheringin a Stateswill increasingly need to reconcileitselfto a 3.0
1930s-style worldofmercantilism, regional blocs,andbilat- world.But if othercountriesdo in factvalue security
eralpacts.The politicalandsecurity rulesand institutions protection, thisgivestheUnitedStatesmoreopportuni-
of liberalinternationalism 2.0 could also fragment into tiesto negotiate a modified hegemonic system.
competing geopolitical blocs. Such a breakdown does not A thirdvariableis thedegreeofdivergence amongthe
necessarily need to entail a completecollapse of order - it leading states in theirvisions ofglobalgovernance. Europe
simply means there is an end to itsopen,rule-based, multi- is clearlymoreinterested in movingto a worldof liberal
lateralcharacter. The Americanhegemonicordercould internationalism 3.0 thanthe Chinese- at leastto the
simply yieldtoan international system whereseverallead- extentthatthisentailsfurther reductions in Westphalian
ing states or centers of power - for example,China,the sovereignty. But the question really whethernon-
is
UnitedStates,and theEuropeanUnion- establishtheir Westerncountriessuchas China and India willseekto
owneconomic andsecurity spheres. The globalorderwould use theirrisingpowerto usherin a substantially different
becomea less unifiedand coherentsystemof rulesand sortofinternational order.One possibility is thattheyare
institutions, whileregional ordersemergeas relatively dis- not as inclinedto embracetheopen,rule-based logicof
and
tinct,divided, competitive geopolitical spheres.49 liberalinternationalism - whether it is 1.0, 2.0, or 3.O.50
Thereareseveralfactors - orvariables - thatwillshape But anotherpossibility is thattheyactuallysee thattheir
thepathway awayfromliberalinternationalism 2.0. One interests are well servedwithina liberalinternational
istheactualwillingness oftheUnitedStatestocedeauthor- order.51 Ifthissecondpossibility is thecase,thecharacter
itybackto theinternational community and accommo- ofthenegotiations on movement awayfromliberalinter-
date itself
to a system of more binding rulesand institutions. nationalism 2.0 willbe morefocusedon participation and
ofa
Short radical shift in the international distribution of thesharing ofauthority - andlesson shifts inthesubstan-
the
power, United States will remain the worlds most tivecharacter ofliberalorder.
powerful stateforseveraldecadesto come. So thereis
reasonto thinkthatothercountries wouldbe willingto
see the UnitedStatesplay leadingrole- and provide
a Conclusion
functional services - ifthetermsareright.Underalmost The liberalinternational projecthas evolvedoverthelast
anycircumstances, thesetermswouldentaila reduction century- and it appears be evolving
to againtoday.In the
in Americashegemonicrightsand privileges whileoper- past, shiftsin the logic and character of liberalinter-
atingwithin agreed-upon rules and institutions.The United nationalordercame in the aftermath of war and eco-
Statesmightalso come to believe thatthis renegotiated nomicupheaval.In contrast, thecurrent troubles thatbeset
hegemonic arrangement is betterthananyofthealterna- American-led liberalinternationalism arenotmanifesting
tives.So thequestionis, could theUnitedStatesin fact in the breakdown of the old order.The crisisof liberal
makethepoliticalcommitments implicitin thisrenego- internationalism 2.0 is a crisisof authority. It is a crisis
tiatedliberalinternational order?If thereis uncertainty overthewayliberalinternational orderis governed. It is
whether theUnitedStatescan makecompromises neces- a crisisthatis generating pressures and incentives fora
saryto moveto liberalinternationalism 2.5, thereis even reorganization in thewaysovereignty, rules,institutions,
moreuncertainty aboutwhether it can reconcileitselfto hierarchy,and authority are arrayedin theinternational
liberalorder3.0. It might,in.the end, opt fora more system. The Americanhegemonicorganization ofliberal
fragmented system in whichitbuildsmoreselective part- orderno longerappearsto offer a solidfoundation forthe
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Articles | Americaand the Dilemmasof LiberalWorldOrder
84 Perspectiveson Politics
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27 See Borgwardt 2005. 47 The beststatement ofthisvisionis President George
28 Fordiscussions ofthedilemmasand troubledchar- W. Bushsspeechat the2002 WestPoint
acterofliberalinternationalism, see Hoffmann commencement.
1998,Hurrell2007, Bernstein and Pauly2007. 48 Forcritiques oftheBushdoctrine, see Daalderand
29 See Ikenberry in LefflerandWestadforthcoming, Lindsay2003; and Shapiro2008.
vol.3. 49 The fragmented ordermighthavecharacteristics
30 On thecharacter and consequences ofunipolarity, similarto theAmericanairlinesindustry in which
see Ikenberry, Mastanduno,andWohlforth 2009. themajorpowercenters(airline)havetheirown
31 Ikenberry 2006. distinct and competing hub and spokesystems. See
32 Fora survey oftheshifting normsofstatesovereignty, Aaltola2005.
seeHaass2003.The emerging doctrine ofthe"respon- 50 See Leonard2008; and Khanna2008.
of
sibility protect" is themost systematic notion 511 makethisargument in Ikenberry 2008.
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