Firstsem Constirev Edited

Deans Circle
2016
Digested by: DC 2016
Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
REVIEW
First Semester Cases
Political Law Review Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
The Philippine Constitution ............................................................................................................................ 3
General Considerations .................................................................................................................................. 5
National Territory and the Archipelagic Doctrine ....................................................................................... 5
State Immunity ............................................................................................................................................ 7
General Principles and State Policies .......................................................................................................... 9
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances ....................................................................................... 13
Delegation of Powers ................................................................................................................................ 15
Legislative Department................................................................................................................................. 17
Membership, Election and Qualifications ................................................................................................. 17
Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications ............................................................................ 30
Discipline of Members .............................................................................................................................. 31
Legislative Function ................................................................................................................................... 32
Executive Department .................................................................................................................................. 36
Election, Immunity, Privileges and Inhibitions .......................................................................................... 36
Powers and Functions ............................................................................................................................... 39
Judicial Department ...................................................................................................................................... 53
Constitutional Commissions ......................................................................................................................... 59
Bill of Rights .................................................................................................................................................. 62
Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights ........................................................................... 62
Due Process ............................................................................................................................................... 68
Equal Protection Clause ............................................................................................................................ 70
Searches and Seizure................................................................................................................................. 73
Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data ............................................ 79
Freedom of Expression .............................................................................................................................. 85
Freedom of Religion ................................................................................................................................100
Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement ........................................................................................101
Right to Information ................................................................................................................................103
Right of Association .................................................................................................................................105
Eminent Domain......................................................................................................................................106
Rights of Suspects ...................................................................................................................................112
Rights of the Accused ..............................................................................................................................113
Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Data and Kalikasan ...........................................................................116
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Self-Incrimination ....................................................................................................................................120
Double Jeopardy .....................................................................................................................................121
Ex-Post Fact Laws ....................................................................................................................................124
Citizenship ...................................................................................................................................................127
Law on Public Officers ................................................................................................................................135
The Civil Service.......................................................................................................................................135
Accountability of Public Officers .............................................................................................................142
Administrative Law .....................................................................................................................................148
Election Law ................................................................................................................................................149
Local Governments .....................................................................................................................................155
National Economy and Patrimony .............................................................................................................170
Public International Law .............................................................................................................................180
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THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL (MPH) v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION (MHC),

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OGCC
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J.
Sec. 10(2), Art. XII of the Constitution, which gives preference to qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
Facts:
GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only two bidders participated:
Manila Prince Hotel (MPH), a Filipino corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, the
latter giving a higher bid than the former. MPH argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by GSIS, a
gocc, the hotel business of GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is
clearly covered by the term national economy.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution was violated.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable when the Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage.
Moreover, the term qualified Filipinos as used in the Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. Where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
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is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm, the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN v.

Comelec, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO & CARMEN PEDROSA, as founding members of
PIRMA
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution
has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
Facts:
Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with Comelec to amend the Constitution so as to lift
the term limits of elective officials via People's Initiative. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
and others opposed the petition on the ground that the constitutional provision on peoples
initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has
been passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by Delfin, contained
no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 6735 which intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is inadequate to cover that system.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other
better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by
the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII.
Moreover, RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS v. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, CARPIO, J.
An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition

only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
Facts:
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Raul Lambino commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change

the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the Comelec to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Sec 5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735, alleging that
their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered
voters.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lambinos initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The framers intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment
should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The essence of
amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Two essential elements must be
present: (1) The people must author and sign the entire proposal; and (2) It must be
embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of
the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state such fact. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove.
In this case, Lambino merely submitted a copy of a signature sheet which merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
Clearly, the signature sheet is not the petition that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et al. v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.

G.R. o. 187167 August 16, 2011, Carpio, J.
Facts:
RA No. 3046 was passed, demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as
an archipelagic state. In 2009, Congress amended the law by enacting RA No. 9522,
prompted by the need to make RA No. 3046 compliant with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA No.
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9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No 9522 on several grounds: first, it

reduces Philippine maritime territory and logically, the reach of the Philippine states
sovereign power; second, RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security; third, RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen; and fourth, the law fails to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its
use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 9522 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. On the
other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no
role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles. Far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
"Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of
UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Moreover, whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the

Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the
air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, as affirmed by UNCLOS III. The
enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation
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of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore
a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
STATE IMMUNITY
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and
JOSEFINA R. LICUANAN v. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012 Bersamin, J.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Facts:
UP entered into an agreement with Stern Builders for the construction and
renovation of a building in UPLB. Stern submitted three progress billings and UP paid two of
them. The third was not paid by UP. Stern Builders filed a case where the RTC decided in
favor of Stern Builders. UP however, failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The motion for
writ of execution of Stern Builders was granted. The sheriff served notices of garnishment
on UPs depository banks.
Issue:
Whether or not the funds of UP can be subject to garnishment.
Ruling:
No. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action
could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The
adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did
not necessarily mean its liability. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
and its liability. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
UP was correct in saying that the garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment
awards of actual and moral damages (including attorneys fees) was not validly made if
there was no special appropriation by Congress to cover the liability.
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MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of

the US 7th Fleet et al
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia when it ran
aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
US 7th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. Three
months later, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the
grounded ship from the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and
salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who
did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In
such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010, Del Castillo, J.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,

bisexuals or trans-genders. It filed a petition for registration with the Comelec as a party-
list. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as the definition of the LGBT
sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs, even citing passages from the Bible and Koran. In its petition with the Supreme
Court, Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion
by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. It also claimed that the assailed Comelec Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlads application as a party-list should be granted
Ruling:
Yes. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the
Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance
some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects.
The Court also discussed Ang Ladlads invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (The
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity) as a binding principle of international law. The Court said that it was not
prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta Principles contain norms obligatory on the
Philippines, because they are not reflective of the current state of international law and do
not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective
and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true
status. Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, areat bestde lege
ferendaand do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
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contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,

international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, et al.
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, Mendoza, J.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law),
because, among others, it violates the right to life of the unborn. Notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are
abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception;
Issue:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
Ruling:
No. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior
to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. The
clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of
the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination,
at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
However, the section of the RH-IRR allows contraceptives and recognizes as

abortifacient only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb. This cannot be done. Evidently, with the addition of the word
primarily, in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.
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Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Contrary to the OSGs position, these provisions are self-executing. At this point, the Court is
of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the
FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
NB: We recommend reading the full text of this case as it involves many issues aside from
general principles and state policies.
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
RA No. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men
as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
Facts:
Jesus (Petitioner) and Rosalie were married and have three children. Their
relationship broke down when Rosalie discovered that her husband was having an affair. A
series of fights left Rosalie physically and emotionally wounded. Petitioner also beat up
their eldest daughter whom he blamed for squealing on him. Rosalie filed a petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against petitioner pursuant to RA 9262 (Anti
Violence Against Women and Children Act). Jesus then questioned the constitutionality of
RA 9262 on equal protection grounds, claiming that it discriminates against men.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 9262 is based on a valid classification and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
Petitioner argued that by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution
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Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at
hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition,
mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the
petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, Mendoza, J.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
Facts:
David Lee Fringer, an American citizen, and Liberty Albios were married. Two years
later, Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that the marriage
was one made in jest as they never really had any intention of entering into a married state,
thus null and void. Fringer did not attend any proceedings. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void as the marriage was to enable Albios to obtain American citizenship for
$2,000. It ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from inception.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Fringer and Albios made in jest is void.
Ruling:
No. There was real consent between the parties. That their consent was freely given
is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. There is no law
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
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institution. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of

convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation. No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., et al.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The Congressional Pork Barrel violates the principles of separation of powers and
checks and balances.
Facts:
The Pork Barrel System is the collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two kinds of lump-
sum discretionary funds: (1) The Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a
kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds
utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices; and (2) The
Presidential Pork Barrel which is a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization.
Petitioners consider the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), as it

appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power. They
argued that the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles/constitutional
provisions on separation of powers and checks and balances, among others.
Issue:
Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system violates the principle of
separation of powers and checks and balances.
Ruling:
Yes. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. Hence, the Legislative branch of government should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget.
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In this case, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to

identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of
fund release and realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. It is jurisprudential
that from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Thus, the
2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, are violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional
The pork barrel system also impairs the Presidents item veto-power, because the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators
with legitimate projects.
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011, Brion, J.
To amplify the scope of a law would be tantamount to judicial legislation abjured by

the principle of separation of powers.
Facts:
Romarico Mendoza was convicted for violating the Social Security Act of 1997 as he
failed to remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that during his appeal, he had already remitted the contributions;
that during the pendency of his case before the Supreme Court, President Arroyo signed
into law RA 9903 which mandated the withdrawal of all pending case against employers
who would remit their contributions within six months after the laws effectivity; and that
in view of this law, the settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him to an
acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mendoza should be acquitted.
Ruling:
No. It is true that Mendozas case was pending before the SC when RA 9903 was
passed. However, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007, beyond the period
provided for in the law which is 6 months after its effectivity. By paying outside of the
availment period, he placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA 9903. The Court
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cannot amplify the scope of RA 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit Mendoza
and other delinquent employers like him. It would be in essence an amendment of RA 9903,
an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle separation of powers.
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL V. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARIA

CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M No. SCC-13-18-J July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J.
Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the complaint.
Facts:
Baguan Mamiscal had a heated argument with his wide, Adelaidah Lomondot. In the
heat of anger, Baguan decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq). The
repudiation was embodied in an agreement (kapasdan) signed by Baguan and Adelaidah. A
few days later however, Baguan had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his
wife but efforts proved futile. Five months later, Adelaidah filed a Certificate of Divorce
(COD) with the office of Macalinog Abdullah, acting as local civil registrar for muslim
divorces, for registration. Abdullah issued a Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) to
finalize the divorce between Baguan and Adelaidah. Thereafter, Baguan filed an
administrative complaint against Abdullah alleging that the latter should not have acted
upon the COD because according to Muslim law, only males are allowed to file a COD.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction

against Abdullah
Ruling:
No. CA No. 3753 is the primary law that governs the registry of civil status of persons.
With the promulgation of the Local Government Code, the power of administrative
supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the
respective local government units. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, Abdullah is being charged pursuant to his
function as local civil registrar of muslim divorces. Well-settled is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal
can act on a matter submitted to it.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGANEN

G.R. No. 178628 July 16, 2008, Carpio, J.
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Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise.
Facts:
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created by RA 9054.

Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allows ARMMs legislature, the ARMM National Assembly,
to create provinces. Thus it enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao. Comelec and Didagen Dilanganen (Dilanganen) now questions
the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. They alleged that such law entitles
a province to have one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM National
Assembly the power to create provinces is constitutional
Ruling:
No. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Section 19, Article VI of RA

9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION V. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J.
Laws are not bound to be applied in slavish obedience to their language. The court
may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers
Facts:
In line with the restructuring of National Power Corporation (NPC), the NPC board
issued resolutions terminating all of its employees. The resolutions were opposed by NPC
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPCDAMA) by praying to SC to declare null and void
the resolutions. NPCDAMA succeeded with their request; SC declared the resolutions null
and void, issued an injunction to enjoin the implementation of the resolutions, and declared
that all of the terminated employees be paid separation pay with backwages. NPC was not
able to comply with the order of the SC so NPCDAMA sought to enforce the order by way of
garnishment of assets of NPC including but not limited to the assets of Power Sector Assets
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and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). PSALM opposed the garnishment

contending that it is not bound by the judgment as they are only mandated by law to
privatize the transferred NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
to apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of all existing and outstanding NPC financial
obligations. Nothing in law allows garnishment and levy of PSALMs assets to satisfy a
judgment against NPC. NPCDAMA opposed PSALMs contention by saying that it can be
bound to satisfy judgment against NPC since it is privy to NPC because PSALM was
principally organized to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, with the objective of liquidating
all NPC financial obligations. Furthermore, PSALM is now the owner of the financial
obligations and liabilities of NPC and shall be considered as one with NPC and the liability of
the NPC shall attach to PSALM.
Issue:
Whether or not PSALM can be bound by a judgment against NPC.
Ruling:
Yes. PSALM is mandated to take ownership of all existing NPC generation assets,
liabilities, real estate and all other disposable assets. PSALM therefore acquired ownership
over said properties of NPC. PSALM argued that the present judgment obligation of NPC
arising from employer-employee relationship was neither an existing financial liability nor
a contractual liability of NPC at the time the law allowing privatization of NPC took effect.
The interpretation of the word existing should be understood in light of PSALMs purpose
and objective. It would be absurd to interpret the word existing as referring to the assets
and liabilities of NPC only existing at the time when the law mandating the privatization of
NPC was enacted. It would be unfair and unjust if PSALM gets nearly all of NPCs assets but
will not pay for liabilities incurred by NPC during this privatization stage. A law should not
be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Laws are not bound to be applied in slavish obedience to their language.The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Therefore, it is but reasonable for PSALM to assume the liabilities of NPC during the
privatization of the NPCs assets.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
MEMBERSHIP, ELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO V.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED, et al.
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010, Perez, J.
While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about

population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
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Facts:
Pursuant to RA 9716 (An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First and Second
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District from Such Reapportionment), the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to
form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners (President Aquino and Secretary Jesse Robredo) sought the nullification of
RA 9716, contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
prescribing a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district.
Accordingly, petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the first
district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population. On its part, respondents
contend that the 250,000 population requirement applies only to the creation of legislative
districts in a city, and not in provinces.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9716 is Constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, provides: Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative. The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled. Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The
reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is less than 250,000. Population is not the
only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional
district.
VICTORINA B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, AND

MINERVA ALDABAMORADA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188078 March 15, 2010, Carpio, J.
The passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the
question is properly brought before it
Facts:
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RA 9591 was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. As population
indicators to satisfy the constitutional requirement as provided by Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III Director,
of the NSO, projecting that Malolos Citys population in 2010 will reach more than 250,000.
The congress also used 2007 Census of Population Progress Enumeration Report and
Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008. The Comelec insists that these population
indicators are reliable and authoritative and thus cannot be subject to judicial review.
Issue:
Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to judicial review
Ruling:
Yes. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of SCs
judicial review, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting
on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court
must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress
used to comply with the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to
preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly
brought before it. To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, RENE O. MEDINA V. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011, Nachura, J.
Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is

not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province.
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 9355, a law creating the province of Dinagat Islands, the Comelec
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province of
Dinagat under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite resulted in the approval by the
people from the mother province Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat. Thereafter,
petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 9355, contending that the province of
Dinagat did not meet the population and land area requisite for the creation of a province
under the Local Government Code. They alleged that Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, whereas, the LGC requires, among
others, that the territory should atleast be 2000 square kilometers with 250,000
inhabitants.
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Issue:
Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional
Ruling:
Yes. The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population
and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. A perusal of the congressional
debate for the matter reveals that economic viability is the primordial criterion. Land area,
while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of
basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. The spirit rather
than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
ANGEL G. NAVAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA

G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014, Reyes, J.
The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible.
Facts:
From 2004 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a member of
Sanggunian, Second district, Camarines Sur. Sometime in 2009, RA 9716, which
reapportioned the legislative districts of Camarines, was enacted. Eight out of ten towns
were taken from the second district of Camarines Sur to create a third district. The second
district was composed of the remaining two towns, plus the town of Gainza and Milaor from
the first district. In the 2010 elections, Naval ran and won as a member of the Sanggunian of
the third district. In 2013, she ran again and was re-elected for the same position. When
Navals election was question on the ground of the three-term rule, she argued that she only
served as a member of the Sanggunian for two terms. Her theory is that because of the
reapportionment of the province of Camarines Sur, she was, elected by another territorial
jurisdiction and by different inhabitants.
Issue:
Whether or not Navals election for the year 2013 is valid.
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Ruling:
No. RA 9716 created a new second district for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed
the third district which elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the
same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term limit rule provided by
the Constitution is inflexible. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of
political power in the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the
freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008, Brion, J.
No plebiscite is needed for the creation of a legislative district.
Facts:
RA 9371 was enacted to increase Cagayan De Oros district from one to two. However,
Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned the constitutionality of such law as well as Comelec
resolutions to enforce it, because it was being implemented without a plebiscited which is a
requirement for the creation, division, merger or abolition of a local government unit.
Issue:
Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary to create a legislative district.
Ruling:
No. Legislative districts are different from local government units. Legislative districts
are governed by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution while local government units are
governed by Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. The concern that leaps from Article VI,
Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. The aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. Its concern is the commencement,
the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and
territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in
implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code
and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. RA 9371 provides for reapportionment of the legislative district of Cagayan De
Oro, which is guided by Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution. No plebiscite is required for
reapportionment of legislative districts.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

TAN
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013, Perez, J.
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A member of the House of Representatives becomes so, only upon a duly and legally
based proclamation
Facts:
Regina Ongsiako Reyes won the elections and was proclaimed as the representative of
Marinduque. However, before the elections, Comelec cancelled her certificate of candidacy
for not being qualified to run for the position as she was not a Filipino citizen. Regina
opposed the jurisdiction of the Comelec alleging that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications.
Issue:
Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to look into Reginas qualifications as
representative of Marinduque
Ruling:
No. HRETs constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its member, who
becomes so, only upon a duly and legally based proclamation. HRET has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the qualifications of its members. However, Reginas proclamation
is not valid since prior to the elections, the decision of Comelec cancelling her certificate of
candidacy became final. Hence, there is no basis for her proclamation and thus she did not
become a member of the House of Representatives.
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO V. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,

SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
The decision of the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court,
made the administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes name in the roll of members
of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty, which may be compelled by Mandamus.
Facts:
Lord Allan Jay Velasco filed a petition for Mandamus against Hon. Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General Marilyn Barua-Yap to order them, respectively, to
administer the oath of Velasco in the House of Representatives, and to remove the name of
Regina Ongsiako Reyes in the roll of the members of the House of Representatives and
replace it with Velascos name. Before this petition was filed, a Comelec decision was
promulgated cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Reyes because she lacks the
citizenship requirement to be able to qualify to run for the representative of Marinduque in
the House of Representatives. Subsequently, a petition was filed by Reyes with the Suprme
Court, questioning Comelecs jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications as a member of the
House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled against Reyes and enunciated that her
certificate of candidacy was validly cancelled and therefore there was no basis for her
proclamation in the House of Representatives, thus the Comelec has jurisdiction to question
her qualifications.
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Issue:
Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be compelled by mandamus.
Ruling:
Yes. A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof. The decision of the Comelec which attained finality, and that of the Supreme
Court, made the administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes name in the roll of
members of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty. The administration of oath and
the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or
judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec Gen Yap. They are legally bound to
recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by SC and the Comelecs ruling, now
both final and executory.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016 CARPIO. J.
Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed was
reduced to a fine.
Facts:
Philip Pichay was convicted for libel, but in lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced
to pay fine. Later on, he was elected as a congressman. A petition for Quo Warranto was
filed against him but was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) which concluded that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude,
reasoning that Pichay was not the author of the libelous articles but the president of the
publishing company.
Issue:
Whether or not HRET erred in concluding that his conviction for libel did not
involve moral turpitude.
Ruling:
Yes. Libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment
imposed was reduced to a fine. The Revised Penal Codes provision on libel did not
distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the participation of
the persons involved in the crime of libel.
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In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of

candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17
February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is
disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then. Thus, his
representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 CARPIO. J.
Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one
seat.
Facts:
In July and August 2007, the Comelec, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May
2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the
following rules: (1) In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution); (2) Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled
to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at
least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party
be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a

party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questioned if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which would be discuss later on).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a

mere ceiling.
2. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
3. How are party-list seats allocated.
4. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
Ruling:
1. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning,

the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
2. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. Instead, the 2% rule
should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and
not qualified.
3. First, the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. Then, the
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats. There shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-
percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second
round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes
cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
3. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013 CARPIO, J.
Political parties can participate in the party-list system for as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
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Facts:
The Comelec issued in October, November and December of 2012 a resolution

ruling that the party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. The party-list
groups filed a petition to reverse the resolution by the Comelec disqualifying them from the
May 2013 party-list race.
Issue:
Whether or not political parties can participate in the party-list system.
Ruling:
Yes. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Moreover, political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
The Comelec excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the Comelec because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy
for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013, LEONARDO DE-CASTRO. J.
If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the Comelec En Banc. There can be no disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement.
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Facts:
In May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled

Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of
their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the candidates will serve the terms
according to the power sharing agreement. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the
term of Kho as member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos. In line with this, Kho
tendered his resignation to be effective on December 31, 2011. In the interim, Comelec
Resolution was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof
provided that filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed. On March 12, 2012, the Board
of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS issued recalled the resignation of Kho and allowed him to
continue to represent the party-list. Despite of the recall of resignation, Comelec found the
term-sharing agreement contrary to public policy and hence resolved to CANCEL the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List System of Representation.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified

and cancelled the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its
purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing.
Ruling:
Yes. There was no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of
the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and
served his term as a member of the House of Representatives.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the

parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been
unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the Comelec En Banc. Verily, how can there be
disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC

AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST
G.R. No. 205505 September 29, 2015 SERENO, J.
In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a

disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.
Facts:
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After Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups, Isidro
Lico who was the first nominee, subsequently took his oath of office. Several months prior
to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organisations, Ating Koop issued a
Resolution which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the
agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term. Then when held its Second National Convention, it introduced
amendments which would short the three-year term of the incumbent members then was
replaced by the Rimas group. Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, a
petition was filed expelling him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to
honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec Second Division
upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc dismissed the petition holding
that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives,
considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the
House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that
had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the validity of his expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a Member of the
House of Representatives from his party-list organization.
Ruling:
No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office
as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating
Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in
the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the Comelec, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013, REYES, J.
Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to

adduce evidence showing their track record. It is sufficient that the ideals represented by the
sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Facts:
Comelec cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. It pointed

out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged
activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. It further opined that ABANG LINGKOD
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failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that
they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG

LINGKODs registration under the party-list system for the latters failure to prove its track
record.
Ruling:
Yes. Contrary to the Comelec's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as

ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by
the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups
seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010 ABAD, J.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Facts:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the
2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list
seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives,
and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay
party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the
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House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the

marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and
security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his
person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an
internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list
group, not before the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
Ruling:
Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are
representatives of districts and party list.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since a party-list nominees are elected members of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the Comelecs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON

G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, CARPIO, J.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Facts:
Petitioners Liban, et al. were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, they filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent
Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member
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of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Formerly, in its Decision in
2009, the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate.
Ruling:
No. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. A
government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the
case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the
government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the
members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, the government does not own or
control PNRC.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is
duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due
its members.
Facts:
In a complaint filed by Antero J. Pobre, he alleged that the speech delivered by

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor reflected total disrespect towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. As such, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. For her part, Senator Santiago
averred that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity as the statement is aimed to expose an unjust act of the JBC which
calls for future remedial legislation.
Issue:
Whether or not the privilege speech delivered by Senator Santiago is actionable.
Ruling:
No. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
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imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent,
would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to
the motives.
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

AND INVESTIGATIONS
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
Facts:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions for the conduct of an investigation
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal, a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), because
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of
NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
Comelec Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project; (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it; and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. Neri did not appear before respondent
Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications

elicited by the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.
Ruling:
No. The three questions are not critical to the legislatures function. In the case at
bar, we are not confronted with a courts need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a
criminal case but rather with the Senates need for information in relation to its legislative
functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to
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intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information
which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in
instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing
graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary
objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege,
it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not
oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees investigation cannot transgress
bounds set by the Constitution.
Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears

stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather
incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
GRECO BELGICA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies must be confined to

details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.
Facts:
Starting 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for
being unconstitutional and the likely source of the congressmens kickbacks. Unfortunately,
for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF has been a
common exercise of unscrupulous members of the congress, the petition was dismissed. In
July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation began its probe into the allegations that the
government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel. After criminal investigations were filed following the
Napoles controversy, the Commission on Audit released its own results of a three-year audit
covering the legislators PDAF from 2007 to 2009. The total releases amounting to billions
of pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare the Pork Barrel
System as unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the constitutional
provision on the non-delegability of legislative power.
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Ruling:
Yes. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. To understand what constitutes an
act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor held
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in the Bengzon case, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO, et al. v. BENIGNO AQUINO III, et al.

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, J. Bersamin
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury.
Facts:
Responding to Senator Jinggoy Estradas revelation that some senators, including

himself, had been allotted millions as an incentive for voting in favor of Chief Justice Renato
Coronas impeachment, Secretary Florencio Abad explained in a statement that the funds
released to the senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
accelerate economic expansion. The DBM further listed the legal bases for the DAPs use of
savings and that it had been sourced from savings generated by the government and from
unprogrammed funds.
Issue:
Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Ruling:
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No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the
Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget
Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act by which Congress designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to
be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual
purchase or expense. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or
dues from the State to its creditors.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
countrys economic situation. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the
strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in
Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
NB: Notwithstanding the above discussion, certain DAP practices were declared
unconstitutional based on other grounds.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. v. CESAR PURISIMA, et al.

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, J. Corona
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Facts:
The core of this issue is the enactment of R.A. 9335, a law optimizing the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. This law intends encourage the
bureau officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate
and issue IRRs of R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a congressional oversight
committee created for the purpose. The ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their
rights as taxpayers in filing this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335, a tax reform
legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of the oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the
law, the committees creation permits legal participation in an otherwise executive function.
Issue:
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Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the

doctrine of separation of powers as its permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement

and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just
as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ELECTION, IMMUNITY, PRIVILEGES AND INHIBITIONS
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES v. Comelec and ESTRELLA ELAMPARO

G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, J. Perez
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate: First is the fact that unless a
candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility
for the office. Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections, the purpose of which is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President
and Vice President, as the case may be.
Facts:
A day after Senator Grace Poe-Llamanzares filed her COC for the presidency for the
May 2016 elections, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said
COC, contending that Poe committed material representation when she stated in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the May 9, 2016 elections.
Issue:
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Whether or not the COC of Poe should be denied due course on the exclusive ground
that she made a false representation in her certificate.
Ruling:
No. All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of Poe for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, she has complied with both. As to the first
consideration, Poe was legally adopted. Under R.A. No. 8552, Poe was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."
That law also requires that "all records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in
the files of the court, the DWSD, or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." The law therefore allows Poe to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in
her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, Poewas not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
On the issue of residence, it is standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence,

not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with
the constitutional requirement of residency for election as president. It ignores the easily
researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than
that presented by Poe. It ignores, above all else, what We consider as a primary reason why
Poe cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator, which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When Poe made
the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6)
years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as
reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her
declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at
the time the declaration for senator was made, Poe did not have as yet any intention to vie
for the presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by Poe, by
word or action, that she would run for president in 2016.
ATTY. EVILLO PORMENTO v. JOSEPH ESTRADA

G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, C.J. Corona
One of the requisites for the exercise of judicial power is an actual case or controversy.
Facts:
The petition by Atty. Evillo Pormento asks whether Estrada is covered by the ban on
the president from any reelection. It should be noted that Estrada was elected President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Atty. Pormento opposed
this candidacy by Estrada and filed a petition for his disqualification. The same was denied.
Thus, the instant petition for certiorari followed on May 7, 2010.
Issue:
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Whether or not the president shall not be eligible for any reelection.
Ruling:
No. Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the
proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second
(whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case, no definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in
this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011, J. Nachura
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under
the doctrine of necessary implication.
Facts:
In his petition to declare the establishment of the PET unconstitutional, Atty.

Romulo Macalintal invoked the Supreme Courts ruling on the unconstitutionality of the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). He stated therein that if the president cannot create
the PTC, the Supreme Court cannot likewise create the PET in the absence of an act of
legislature.
Issue:
Whether or not the establishment of the PET is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect
under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction
of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant
experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
Constitution readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Courts exercise thereof.
The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election

contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
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conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose. The conferment
of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which We have affirmed on numerous occasions.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
DENNIS FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.

G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, J. Villarama, Jr.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
and assistants. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of
self-enrichment.
Facts:
Dennis Funa argues in his petition that respondent Elena Bautistas concurrent
positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution, as explained in various cases. In their defense, respondents aver that
Bautista was merely designated as the acting head of MARINA, and not appointed as the
MARINA Administrator. Her designation as OIC in a temporary capacity is for the purpose of
preventing a hiatus in the discharge of the posts official functions.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violates the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members
and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On
its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood
as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution
is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself.
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Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was
thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she
cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she
designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in
Civil Liberties Union. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the
Authority, We are hardly persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas
designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her
primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board.
DENNIS FUNA v. ALBERTO AGRA

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, J. Bersamin
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.
Facts:
Dennis Funa alleged that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Alberto

Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Agnes Devanadera. Four
days after which, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a
concurrent capacity. After two days, Funa commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently

with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary

capacity. The text of Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his
Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and
administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is
without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to
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"open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional

disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents
power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."
ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and PRESIDENT GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010, J. Bersamin
The prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Facts:
The petitioners in these consolidated cases, as well as its intervenors, argue that the
proscription against the president or acting president, under Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitute, includes the members of the Supreme Court, as a general rule.
The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the same provision does not apply to the Judiciary
and that the petitions should be dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet
decided at the time of the petitions were filed whether or not the incumbent President has
the power to appoint a new chief justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President
might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any
further complication. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
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ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and

HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015, CARPIO, J.
The concurrence of all the elements of a valid appointment should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban.
Facts:
Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more
than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several government offices. Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for a ban on midnight appointments. For
purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments
and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban. An exception is provided under
such provision which allows temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. None of
the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. President Aquino
issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President
Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban. The officers and employees who
were affected by EO 2 were informed that they were terminated from service effective the
next day. Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as
unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid
Ruling:
No. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint
and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all
these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process
should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the
process lacks even one step.
In this case, petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a
valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit
that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. The President's exercise of
his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
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There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued.
Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the
President's intent of its issuance. For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's
existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks and must
be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO. Also, an appointment can be made
only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The
incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one
could be validly installed to succeed him. Lastly, acceptance is indispensable to complete an
appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the
appointment. The appointments made by President Arroyo are void.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. REYES

G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The doctrine of qualified political agency states that the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Facts:
The Government of the Philippines entered into a contract called GSEC-102 with
JAPEX involving geological and geophysical studies of the Taon Strait. Then, they formally
converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait. Petitioners, the
"Resident Marine Mammals", are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in Taon Strait, joined by stewards. Protesting
the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon Strait,
petitioners aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was
reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the
destruction of the "payao" also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
Respondents claim that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws
cited in the petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is valid.
Ruling:
No. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to PD
No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. While PD No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be
a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are
also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. Under the
doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
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Department, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. While the
requirements in executing service contracts in the 1987 Constitution seem like mere
formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As this Court has held in La Bugal,
our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of
our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. In this
case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in
SC-46. Their arguments, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that
the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any
ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared
null and void.
ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power.
Facts:
A joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees
was held to discuss the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening
of the National Artist Award Secretariat. A final list of four names was agreed upon. Then,
the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors strongly
endorsing private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and submitted a
memorandum recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents.
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring respondents as National Artists.
Petitioners instituted the present petition alleging that by law, it is the exclusive province of
the NCCA and CCP Boards to select those who will be conferred the award.
Issue:
Whether or not the President validly conferred the award to respondents.
Ruling:
No. The CCP and NCCA Board jointly administer the said award and, upon their
recommendation, the President confers the award. Thus, the advice of the NCCA and the
CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion. Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the
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matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
The Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
In this case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents
as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. There was a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents The former Presidents constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and
the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said
award. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore
made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, v. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989, FERNAN, C.J.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion Monsanto, then assistant

treasurer of Calbayog City, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Monsanto appealed to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She
filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
then President Marcos absolute pardon. By reason of said pardon, petitioner made a
request that she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. The letter
was referred to the Finance Ministry which ruled that petitioner may be reinstated. The OP,
however, ruled that she is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the
absolute pardon and that she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. The petitioner claims that when pardon was issued before the final verdict of
guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President
has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on
the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it
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relieves him from nothing more. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. Since
the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. In
this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede
that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give
meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he
were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot
perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in
character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-
abiding citizen. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded
on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character
and purpose of the privilege.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
An absolute pardon fully restores all civil and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder. On
Oct. 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. Then, he ran for the presidency
again but lost. Afterwards, he ran for Manila City Mayor. A petition to disqualify him was
filed on the theory that the pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his
perpetual disqualification.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardon granted to Estrada enables him to run for mayor of
Manila.
Ruling:
Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The pardon extended to former President
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Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which
relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "he is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. The disqualification of former President Estrada
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor

of Sulu, et al.
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012, SERENO, J.
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
Republic.
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped
by the Abu Sayyaf Group. In response thereto, a task force was created by the ICRC and the
PNP, which organized a parallel local group later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee and convened under the leadership of respondent Governor Abdusakur Mahail
Tan. Also, Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force. Governor Tan issued
Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency using the kidnapping incident as a
ground. It also invoked Section 465 of the LGC which bestows on the Provincial Governor
the power to carry out emergency measures. Respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the
CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners filed the present
petition contending that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent governor is authorized to declare a state of

emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the
conduct of general searches and seizures.
Ruling:
No. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency

and the calling-out powers. There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
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speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. There are certain
acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the
State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to
which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers, on
the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress. The Constitution bestows
on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the
President as commander-in-chief. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the
power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the Local Government Code
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as

Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, ABAD, J.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President.
Facts:
The day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news
reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by
the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a
state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred. Petitioners contended that the President
unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP
personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
Ruling:
No. The deployment of AFP and PNP personnel is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The
President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
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places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
Moreover, the Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While
it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court
acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to
the Presidents judgment.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners, v. GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the
Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J.
The President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Facts:
On Nov. 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians in Maguindanao. On Dec. 4, 2009
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. She submitted her
report to Congress stating that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken
up arms in Maguindanao and risen against the government. The Congress, in joint session,
convened to review the validity of the Presidents action. However, two days later or before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners
challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
Ruling:
The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead
horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme
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Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its
own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults
in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Since
President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same, then the petitions
in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial
law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J
The propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the political power is not subject
to judicial inquiry or decision
Facts:
Petitioners are members of Malaya Lolas, an organization established to provide aid

to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War. They narrated that they civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and
slaughtered while the women were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused. They claimed
that since 1998, they already approached the Executive Department requesting assistance
in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women" stations. However, the Executive declined stating
that the individual claims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in

not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.
Ruling:
No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Certain
types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative, 'the political', departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Not
all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, however, the question
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whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to
waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would
be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. Indeed, except as an
agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the
underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. Moreover,
the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims. It is
not within the power of the Supreme Court to order the Executive Department to take up
the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department
to take up petitioners cause.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al., petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ALBERTO G. ROMULO et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines.
Facts:
Petitioners prayed that the Supreme Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision,
and declare that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women. They
also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. They argued that
constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Courts ruling that the foreign
policy prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited and such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party. Moreover, the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the
prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy
powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional
protections that expressly textualize international human rights.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
Ruling:
No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against
the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
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conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
SAGUISAG V. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 212426 and G.R. No.212444, January 12, 2016, SERENO, CJ.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
Facts:
The Philippines and the USA entered into their first military arrangement pursuant
to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA. In view of the impending expiration of
the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of
their defense and security relationship. However, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty.
The expiration of the MBA led to the suspension of the large-scale joint military exercise but
they agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced level. The military
arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when they concluded the first Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Then the two countries entered into a second counterpart
agreement. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) authorizes the U.S.
military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations"
in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to
do so was no longer necessary. The petitioners question the constitutionality of the EDCA
arguing that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an
executive agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in

entering into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement.
Ruling:
No. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power
and is intimately related to the other executive functions which is also self-executory. In
light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal
and necessary for Philippine defense interests. Despite the President's roles as defender
of the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops
or facilities. However, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to
the conclusion that it applies only to a proposed agreement between our government
and a foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry" Philippine territory. It is evident
that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
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Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The
VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines. The power of the
President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is
already well-established in this jurisdiction. One of the distinguishing features of
executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of
Senate concurrence. This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea
Trading (1961) which states that Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress. Thus, no court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive
agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls
squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the
VFA. The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine
territory are already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented
by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to
identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant
to the VF A. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence of U.S.
personnel in the country. Moreover, EDCA does not allow the presence of U.S.-owned or
-controlled military facilities and bases in the Philippines. As it is, EDCA is not
constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing
laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE

PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, 31 July 2012, En Banc, Per Curiam
Under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide who, what, where, when and how the
privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the Courts granted power.
Facts:
The COA found that an underpayment resulted when five retired Supreme Court
Justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal property assigned to them during
their incumbency. The COA attributed the underpayment to the use of the Supreme Court of
the formula by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35
rather than the formula found in COA Memorandum No 98-569-A.
Issue:
Whether the use of the CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 formula was correct.
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Ruling:
Yes. Under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide who, what, where, when and
how the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court
personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is part of the
Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of. Any kind of interference on
how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates
the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to
manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC

ACT NO. 10154 REQUIIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A
CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
A.M. NO. 13-09-08-SC, 1 October 2013, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.
Facts:
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
requested the guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule
III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 10154.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
No. 10154 is applicable to the Judiciary
Ruling:
No. The Rules should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it
otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative
supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the
Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement
contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.
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IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND
(JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
UDK-145143, 21 January 2015, En Banc, Leonen, J.
There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed

bill.
Facts:
Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel the
Supreme Court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress which was raised through a letter addressed to the Supreme
Court. The letter implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President shows
a threat to judicial independence. Two house bills were filed which would require the court
to remit its Judiciary Development Fund to the national treasury and one to create a Judicial
Support Fund under the National Treasury to repeal PD 1949.
Issue:
Whether or not the court should exercise its powers to revoke/abrogate and
expunge whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve
public interest and general welfare of the people.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before the
Supreme Court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Petitioners failure to comply with
the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of the petition.
Before the court may exercise its power of judicial review, there must be an existing
case or controversy that is ripe for determination. There can be no justiciable controversy
involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only after a law is enacted, not before. Even assuming that there is an actual
controversy that the Court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the
validity of the proposed bill. Petitioner has not shown that he has or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is
laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.
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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.

ESCUDERO AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
G.R. No. 202242, 16 April 2013, En Banc, Mendoza, J.
It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half of
its, goes against that mandate.
Facts:
From the creation of the JBC under the 1987 Constitution, Congress designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. The House of
Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In 1994,
the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven members,
an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting
in the JBC, one from each house, with each having one-half of a vote. In 2000 and 2001, the
JBC decided to allow the representatives from both houses one full vote each.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress is valid.
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector. It is clear that the Constitution mandates
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote of half of its, goes against that mandate.
By allowing both houses of Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by

giving each representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other
members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of
judges. It is clear that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote of half
of its, goes against that mandate.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014, En Banc, Mendoza, J.
Due process is the right to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide
the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
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Facts:
Francis Jardeleza was nominated as one of the candidates for the vacated position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Jardeleza was informed that Chief Justice Sereno
was invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 (regarding integrity) against him. He was
directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would
be informed of the objections to his integrity. Jardeleza filed a petition asking the Supreme
Court to direct the JBC to give him 5 working days written notice of any hearing with the
JBC. During the hearing, Jardeleza asked Chief Justice Sereno to execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that the JBC defer its meeting since the Court would meet to
act on his petition. Later that afternoon, the JBC proceeded to vote for the nominees to be
included in the shortlist. Jardeleza was not included due to the invocation of Section 2, Rule
10 of the JBC rules.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist of nominees

submitted to the President
Ruling:
Yes. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic
tenets of due process. The Supreme Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects
in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council.
Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
What set off the lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to
appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an
intelligent defense. However, he was not given a reasonable chance to muster his defense.
He was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be subjected to an inquiry.
Due process is the right to explain oneself, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the
person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, 7 April 2015, En Banc, Reyes, J.
The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and competency to
set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and
independence.
Facts:
MCTC Judge Ferdinand Villanueva assailed a JBC policy which requires five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
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courts on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The JBC did not include him in the list of
candidates for the vacant position of RTC judge since he had been a judge only for more
than a year.
Issue:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. JBCs ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this
pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set uniform criteria in order to ascertain
whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the
qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement
policy applied by the JBC to the petitioners case is necessary and incidental to the function
conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended

appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to
determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.
The JBC is the only constitutional body bestowed with the mandate and competency to set
criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and
independence.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, 11 February 2010, En Banc, Corona, J.
The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress.
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-
owned or controlled corporations under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, invoking Section 39
of its charter.
Issue:
Whether or not the legislature may exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the
Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units.
Ruling:
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No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part
of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
5(5) Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal fees is a jurisdictional
requirement. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees are
required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees in
full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed
or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's
exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less
with the Executive.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, 24 April 2012, En Banc, Velasco Jr., J.
A COA commissioner who serves for a period less than seven years cannot be appointed
as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the seven-year
term of the predecessor. Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the
appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven years under the constitutional ban.
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as Chairman of the

COA, his term starting from Feb. 2, 2001 to end on Feb. 2, 2008. President Arroyo then
appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of the COA, his term starting from Feb. 2,
2004 until Feb. 2, 2011. From the retirement of Carague in 2008, Villar was designated
Acting Chairman and was subsequently nominated and appointed as such. The appointment
papers stated that his term shall be until February 2, 2011, the same as his original term as
commissioner. Villar contested the appointment, arguing that he is entitled to a fresh seven-
year term. Although Villar was already replaced by a new appointee of President Aquino
after his resignation, the Court still acted upon the case since the situation calls for the
promulgation of principles that will guide the bench, the bar and the public should like
circumstances arise.
Issue:
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Whether or not Villars appointment as COA chairman, after having served four
years of his seven-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under the Constitution
Ruling:
No. At the outset, the Constitution does not prohibit a promotional appointment
from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of
seven years, further qualified that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional
appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of
the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed in the Constitution.
In this case, Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA chairman
gave him a completely fresh seven-year term cannot be sustained. No one can be a COA
member, either as chairman of commissioner, or mix of both positions, for an aggregate
term of more than seven years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate seven-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would
wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession. A COA commissioner like
Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot be appointed as chairman when such
position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor.
Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be
allowed to serve more than seven years under the constitutional ban.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T.

DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014, En Banc, Bersamin, J.
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
Constitution.
Facts:
President Arroyo appointed Francisco Duque as Chairman of the CSC. She then
issued EO 864 which orders that the CSC Chairman shall sit as an ex-officio member of the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Petitioner filed the petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864 and the designation of Duque as member of the
Board of Trustees of these entities for being clear violations of the Constitution.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Duques designation impairs the independence of the CSC and
violates the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
Ruling:
Yes. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters
with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created.
While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits
affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked
to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of
these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and
exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when
the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived
from his position as CSC Chairman.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. The
PHILHEALTH and ECC are attached to the DOH and DOLE while GSIS and HDMF fall under
the Office of the President. The corporate powers of these entities are exercised through
their governing Boards, members of which are under the control of the President. As such
the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of
the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
Constitution.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, En Banc, Sereno, J.
There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies.
Facts:
The COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government
financial transactions. After the change of administration due to the People Power in 1986,
COA reinstated the pre-audit of selected government transactions. When the political
system and government operations stabilized, COA again lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions. In 2006, petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana wrote to COA regarding internal pre-
audit service of the Department of Agriculture. The COA informed petitioner of the lifting of
the pre-audit. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court alleging that the pre-audit duty of the
COA cannot be lifted by mere circular since pre-audit is a constitutional mandate in Section
2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
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Issue:
Whether or not the COA is obliged to conduct a pre-audit for all government
transactions for all government agencies
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit
of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to
a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit
is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged
by the Court.
BILL OF RIGHTS
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND

DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), et al.
G.R. NO. 166494, June 29, 2007, J. Azcuna
While the Constitution protects property rights, the State, in the exercise of police
power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.
Facts:
Petitioners, as domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the

Philippines, assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act
which grants a 20% discount in the purchase of medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
citizens. They argued that the law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the
Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. They maintained that the reduction in their total revenues resulting
from the grant of discount is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit, for which they should be entitled to a just compensation,
but the law failed to provide a scheme whereby they will be justly compensated.
Issue:
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Whether the States imposition upon private establishments of the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program violates Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which has general welfare for its
object. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. While the Constitution protects
property rights, the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of
a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover,
in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor. Thus, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because they have not been
able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage.
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF MARIKINA

CITY, et al. v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-
MARIKINA, INC.
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, J. Mendoza
Absent any reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded even under the guise of protecting the
public interest.
Facts:
The City Government of Marikina enacted ordinances which required the fences on
the front yard of educational institutions to be of an open fence type at 80% see-thru, and a
five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. In enforcing the ordinances,
the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to St. Scholasticas College and St. Scholasticas
Academy-Marikina, Inc. ordering them to comply with the aforesaid ordinances. Without
complying with the demand, the schools filed a petition for prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the assailed ordinances are valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
No. The five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area would
tantamount to taking of private property for public use without just compensation, in
contravention to the Constitution, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive
use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public on non-
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school days. Furthermore, the ordinances are unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for
aesthetic purposes. The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
With respect to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance would result in an undue interference with the schools right to privacy
and right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect
their property. Requiring the exposure of the property via a see-thru fence is violative of the
right to privacy, considering that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine
sisters, who were entitled to some sense of privacy in their affairs. More importantly, such
exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a
see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and breach. Finally, there is no reasonable relation
between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON.

MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, et al.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The mayor is empowered to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. Pursuant to the general welfare
clause, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
Facts:
Boracay West Cove applied for the issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a hotel over a parcel of land. However, its application was denied on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone. Meanwhile, it
continued with the construction of the resort hotel. Subsequently, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay issued an Executive Order, ordering the closure and demolition of the hotel.
Issue:
Whether the mayor can order the demolition of illegally constructed establishments
without resorting to judicial remedy.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code empowers the mayor to order
the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the
necessary permits. However, under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned,
the mayor can order their closure and demolition only after satisfying the requirement of
due notice and hearing. In this case at bar, Boracay West Cove admittedly failed to secure
the necessary permits before the construction of the hotel; and, the due process
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requirement is deemed to have been sufficiently complied with since the company received
notices to comply with the ordinance and yet it failed to do so.
In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, J. Peralta
The levy of Socialized Housing Tax is primarily for urban development and housing
program; thus, for the general welfare of the entire city. It is therefore in the exercise of police
power implemented through taxation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government.
Facts:
The Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance which imposes upon real properties a
Socialized Housing Tax which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the
Quezon City Government. Jose Ferrer, a registered owner of a residential property in
Quezon City filed the instant petition for certiorari, assailing the subject ordinance. He
asserts that it does not find basis in the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution.
For him, the SHT cannot be viewed as a charity from real property owners since it is
forced, not voluntary; thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for
housing of informal settlers.
Issue:
Whether the imposition of SHT shall be struck down for arbitrary intrusion into
private rights of real property owners.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a
social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. In this
case, the imposition of SHT on real property is primarily for urban development and
housing program; thus, for the general welfare. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not
only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the
real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and
will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better
consumers of business products.
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Consequently, the levy of SHT is primarily in the exercise of police power for the
general welfare of the entire city. In the exercise of police power, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
the government. In this case, it is taxation that made the implement of the states police
power.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009, J. Corona
While the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is, as a general rule, unlimited
in its range, it must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen
that lays the golden egg."
Facts:
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic corporation with a net worth of
P259 million. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent PHCPI a final assessment notice
demanding the payment of deficiency documentary stamp taxes (DST) amounting to P376
million. PHCPI claimed that the assessed DST to date which amounts to P376 million is way
beyond its net worth of P259 million.
Issue:
Whether the exercise of the power of taxation in this case would be oppressive.
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited
in its range. However, it is so potent that it should be exercised with caution to minimize
injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and
uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg."
Applying the aforesaid principle, imposing the DST on PHCPI would be highly
oppressive, given the reality that the DST is way beyond the companys net worth. It is not
the purpose of the government to throttle private business. On the contrary, the
government ought to encourage private enterprise. PHCPI, just like any concern organized
for a lawful economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate business. Legitimate
enterprises enjoy the constitutional protection not to be taxed out of existence. Incurring
losses because of a tax imposition may be an acceptable consequence but killing the
business of an entity is another matter and should not be allowed.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF CABANATUAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS

CITY MAYOR, HON. HONORATO PEREZ
G.R. No. 177332, October 01, 2014, J. Leonen
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Taxes are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into insolvency. A
reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment and
engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense.
Facts:
The City of Cabanatuan assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) of

franchise tax. NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise
tax. So, the City filed a complaint demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus
25% surcharge and interest. On appeal, the CA held that since the franchise tax due was
computed yearly, the 25% surcharge should also be computed yearly, that means, the
computation of the surcharge would be based on the total unpaid tax for each year (proper
tax for the year + unpaid tax of the previous year/s). Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari. NAPOCOR insisted on a one-time application of the 25% surcharge based on the
total franchise tax due and unpaid, not cumulative.
Issue:
Whether the yearly accrual of the 25% surcharge is unconscionable.
Ruling:
Yes. The imposition of the 25% surcharge in this case resulted in an aggregate
penalty that is way higher than NAPOCORs basic tax liabilities. Furthermore, it effectively
exceeded the prescribed 72% ceiling for interest under Section 168 of the Local
Government Code. The law allows the local government to collect an interest at the rate not
exceeding 2% per month of the unpaid taxes, fees, or charges including surcharges, but in
no case shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof should not exceed
thirty-six months or three years. In other words, the CIR cannot collect a total interest on
the unpaid tax including surcharge that is effectively higher than 72%. Here, the CIR applied
the 25% cumulative surcharge for more than three years. Its computation undoubtedly
exceeded the 72% ceiling imposed under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Hence,
CIR's computation of the surcharge is oppressive and unconscionable.
Taxes and its surcharges and penalties cannot be construed in such a way as to
become oppressive and confiscatory. A healthy balance should be maintained such that laws
are interpreted in a way that these burdens do not amount to a confiscatory outcome. Taxes
are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into insolvency. To a certain extent,
a reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment
and engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, J. Bidin
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
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Facts:
Andre Marti carried four gift wrapped packages to Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders. He informed the clerk therein that he was sending the packages to a friend. He
also assured that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to
his friend. Before delivery to the Customs, the proprietor of Forwarders, following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. So, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing
gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Thereafter, he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the NBI to his place of business. Upon inspection, the NBI agents found
dried marijuana leaves inside the packages. Subsequently, an Information was filed against
Marti for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. On the other hand, Marti contended that the
evidence against him had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence obtained by a private person, allegedly in violation of

constitutional rights may be invoked against the State.
Ruling:
No. The contraband in the case at bar came into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing Marti's rights against unreasonable search and seizure. It
was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made the search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure. Clearly, the
NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Furthermore, the mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by the proprietor
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. In view of the foregoing,
the evidence against Marti is admissible.
In conclusion, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be

extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
DUE PROCESS
JENNY M. AGABON AND VIRGILIO C. AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. AND VICENTE ANGELES
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, J. Ynares-Santiago
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Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures
him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process
found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly
terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Facts:
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon were dismissed for abandonment of work. They
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that their employer refused to give them
assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis. On the other hand, the
employer maintained that both Agabons were not dismissed but had abandoned their work.
After trial and on appeal, it was established that the terminations were for a just and valid
cause. However, the employer did not send the requisite notices to the last known address
of the employees. It argued that the notices would be useless because the employees did not
reside there anymore.
Issue:
Whether the failure to render due notice and hearing prior to dismissal for just
cause constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to due process.
Ruling:
No. The Due Process Clause embodied in the Constitution is a constitutional

restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the
government provided by the Bill of Rights. Constitutional due process protects the
individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and
Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause
after notice and hearing.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects:
substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the
Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process
requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442 of the Labor
Code. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore,
statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional
due process.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al. v. ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL, et al.
G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010, J. Carpio-Morales
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a
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particular defendant. Thus, absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a
vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible.
Facts:
Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007.
They assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrines of
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
Issue:
Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute.
Ruling:
Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically
are invalidated only as applied to a particular defendant. This means that in determining
the constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.
Absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners
have not been charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not
applicable.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA,
FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Facts:
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The Congress enacted RA 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes. A husband, Jesus Garcia, is now before the Court
assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection for
being discriminative against men.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.
In this case, RA 9262 is based on a valid classification. The fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
Furthermore, the distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children. Also, the
classification is not limited to existing conditions only, but to future conditions as well, for
as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence
and abuse. Lastly, the law applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. All told, the assailed statute is constitutional.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month. On the date of his departure,
Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance
and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two
months and seven days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three
days. Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA
8042, which provides: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
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reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Serrano questioned the
constitutionality of the aforecited provision of RA 8042.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on
non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Ruling:
1. No. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police
power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment
and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
2. Yes. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject
clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination
reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact
on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--
vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with
employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with
fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection, hence it is unconstitutional.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The Court is possessed with the constitutional duty to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Facts:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Joy
Cabiles was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. to work as quality control for one
year. Thereafter, without prior notice, that she was terminated. This prompted Joy to sue
Sameer for illegal dismissal, asking for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount
for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages. When the case reached the CA, it applied RA 10022, which reinstated the clause
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less and
awarded Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the three month equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees
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of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered
for her repatriation.
Issue:
Whether or not there is violation of equal protection clause.
Ruling:
Yes. Reiterating the Serrano case, the Court held that the reinstated clause, this time
as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process. In Serrano, the Court identified the classifications made by the reinstated
clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas workers and fixed-period local
workers. It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment contracts of less
than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year. Within
the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a
distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than
a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
AAA v. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27,
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON
G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
Facts:
Judge Carbonell dismissed a criminal case of rape for lack of probable cause on the
ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand to convince
him that there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, citing Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing

the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. The constitutional provision cited by Judge Carbonell does not mandatorily
require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may
opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
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prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the
part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination
of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The
preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense chargedis the function of the investigating
prosecutor.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such
personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an
utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge
may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates
the documentary evidence in support thereof.
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, PER CURIAM
Human remains can be a proper subject of a search warrant.
Facts:
PS/Supt. Fajardo applied with the RTC Manila for a warrant to search caves located
inside the Bienbenido Lauds compound in Davao City where the alleged remains of the
victims summarily executed by the Davao Death Squad was buried. Applicant presented a
witness who testified that he personally witnessed the said killing. The RTC issued the
warrant. Laud filed an urgent motion to quash and suppress illegally seized evidence,
claiming that human remains sought to be seized are not proper subject of a search
warrant.
Issues:
Whether or not human remains are personal property thus subject of a search
warrant.
Ruling:
Yes. Under section 3 rule 126, a search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as a means of committing an
offense.
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Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place
and considering further that they qualify under the phrase subject of the offense (given
that they prove the crimes corpus delicti), it follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under the criminal procedure provision.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the
state's exercise of police power.
Facts:
Sec. 36 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002, requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses. Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the
ground that it violates the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 36(c) and (d) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 violates the constitutional right against unreasonable searches, and therefore
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary
and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random
and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in
the process "the well-being of the citizenry. The right to privacy has been accorded
recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. US jurisprudence
is persuasive. What can be deduced from the US cases of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County,
et al. v. Earls, et al. and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually
fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably
be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by such
jurisprudence, the Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
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compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right
to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The essence of privacy is
the right to be left alone. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. As
the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. The
first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. The employees privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on
the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the
private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Sec. 36 par. c and d are
declared constitutional.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, SERENO, CJ.
The drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165
Facts:
According to the prosecution, the agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon
and Charito that Ariel Escobido was picked up by several unknown male persons believed
to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to them and
they were instructed to go to the Police where they met James who demanded from them
P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The complainants
reported it to the NBI-CEVRO which verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with
fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed
by Corazon. Petitioner underwent forensic examination and was required to submit his
urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs. The
petitioner denied the charges and he said he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused. He was convicted for violating Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165
because the following were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was
subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
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Issue:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
Ruling:
No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for
any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA 9165. Note that
accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Making the phrase "a
person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under RA 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any
crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, which states that mandatory drug testing can never be random and
suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to
privacy. The court cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Petitioner is acquitted.
BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID

G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
Government employees constitutional protection to privacy as to the computers they

used in the work place may vary on a case to case basis. And in cases that there is reduced
privacy expectation search incidental to work-related investigations must comply with the
reasonableness and scope test.
Facts:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee

who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The
employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of misconduct. Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched
pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the office of Chairperson David. Pollo now
assailed the validity of the search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent was reasonable
Ruling:
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No. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the
invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. In our view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct
caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated
into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately to the
public interest. Thus, public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy
interests of government employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Determining the
reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether
the action was justified at its inception; and second, one must determine whether the search
as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a
supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
This to test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar, considering the damaging
nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the
concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable.
Facts:
Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC, alleging that he is the son of his mother Elsie who
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus Lucas in Manila. The RTC dismissed his petition,
because he failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely: (1) a prima facie case; (2)
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affirmative defences; (3) presumption of legitimacy; and (4) physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child.
Issue:
Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing.
Ruling:
Yes. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion
for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana eloquently explained: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal,
the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures
which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory
blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, G.R.

No. 110662 August 4, 1994, J. PADILLA
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200.
Facts:
Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on the ground of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent
were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
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Issue:
Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
No. RA 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping andOther
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Absent a clear showing that both
parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under RA 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996. Mendoza, J.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. One time, she
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed
against her husband.
Ruling:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
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prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife
do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by

making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al.

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Puno, J.
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
these guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees in our
Constitution and laws create zones of privacy.
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople assailed the constitutionality of the AO 308 entitled Adoption of
Computerized Identification Reference System on the following grounds: (1) The
administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere
administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make
laws; and (2) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO 308 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. The Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its
scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy in clear and present
danger if implemented. It also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that
will be gathered from people through biometrics and other means. Thus, AO 308 may
interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
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The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy
by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an inerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006, Carpio, J.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities.
Facts:
President Arroyo issued EO 420 that directs a unified ID system among government
agencies and GOCCs in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang
Mayo Uno and others assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative
powers by the president and it infringes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy
Ruling:
No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have
been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their
right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities
in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
With the exception of eight specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Sec. 6(d) of
EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters
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of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right
to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under
EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be
released to the public or the press.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO
420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities that
already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not
already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v.
Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a
national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data
collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v. ST. THERESAS
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, VELASCO, J.
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself. (US v. Gines-Perez)
Facts:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded on
Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments. The photos reached the STC administration who found
Tan and her classmates to have violated the students handbook and banned them from the
graduation ceremonies. The parents of the girls filed a petition for the issuance of habeas
data. They also prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in
violation of the childrens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Ruling:
No. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he
explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;
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(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals
to control information about themselves. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in
his or her Online Social Networking (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this
case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And
this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world,
of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Thus,
Thus, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy
right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would
be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and accessibility. Such
position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the
confines of his or her private space. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this safety measures
were not utilized.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Facts:
Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee are common law partners. When Ilagan visited Lee
at her condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital camera therein. As Lee found the
said camera, she discovered that a sex video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded
therein, hence she confronted Ilagan about it which the latter denied. Lee further alleged
that during the their confrontation, Ilagan slammed her head against a wall inside his office
and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing criminal and
administrative complaints against Ilagan. Thereafter, Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance
of writ of habeas data on the ground that Lees acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it
to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of
the other woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data
in favor of Ilagan.
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Ruling:
No. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition
must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out
that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful.
In this case, that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest
in the suppression of this video which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or
be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. In fact, even
discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible
due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Francisco Chavez V. Raul M. Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, Puno, C.J.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies
equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Facts:
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition
was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The conversation was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia.
He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
committed or was being committed in their presence. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a
press release giving fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to observe anti-
wiretapping law and pertinent circulars on program standards.
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Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression
and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioners
legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the
fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTCs
mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.It was also stressed that most of the
[television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within
the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP.
Issue:
Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005
warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President
and other personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With
respect to content-based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the
speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence
of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on
speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a
substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As
formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This
rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the
procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the
test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden;
and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar,
respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech
and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great
evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation
of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and
confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger
test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the
voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents
on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
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tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and
other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all
these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and
free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, et. al. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et.
al.
G.R. No. 203335, G.R. No. 203299, G.R. No. 203306, G.R. No. 203359, G.R. No. 203378,
G.R. No. 203391, G.R. No. 203440, G.R. No. 203453, G.R. No. 203454, G.R. No. 203469,
G.R. No. 203501, G.R. No. 203509, G.R. No. 203515, G.R. No. 203518, February 11,
2014, Abad, J.
The cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is

inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium
creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great
masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively
enforce the law.
Facts:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and
facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a
number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs
and crimes. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. But petitioners claim that the means
adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights. Hence, Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the
certain provisions of the cybercrime law.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Cyber Crime Law is unconstitutional as it
poses restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court declared void for being unconstitutional the following provisions of
the Cyber Crime Law:
Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications
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Reason: The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial

communications, also known as "spam." xxx The government presents no basis for holding
that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." These have never been
outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
(2) Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time;
Reason: xxx The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights
that the Constitution guarantees.
(3)Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.
Reason: xxx Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to
be secure in ones papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
Further, the Court DECLARES: A. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
Reason: Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"similar means" for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the
cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article.
B. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as
VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section
4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System. Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID
and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
Reason: Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its
unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the
millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-
guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, MENDOZA, J.
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Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to

achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political
advertising.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, seeking a re-examination of the validity of

11(b) of RA 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from
selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. They contended that when the Court
upheld in NPC v. Comelec the validity of Section 11(b) against claims that it abridged
freedom of speech and of the press, the said law exhibited undesirable effects because the
ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked
to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium which they
can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of
reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 11(b) is unconstitutional as it poses restraint on the exercise

of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
No. The main purpose of Section 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting
equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on
speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. There is no total
ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that
print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest
justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the Comelec under Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution, which provides that the commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They only

prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but require the
Comelec instead to procure space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge,
to the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the Comelec takes over the
advertising page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and
allocates these to the candidates.
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SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza, J.
Under the OBrien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.
Facts:
Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election. Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin Comelec from enforcing
such provision, claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraints.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of

freedom of speech, expression and the press.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court applied the OBrien Test under, under which even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
Applying the OBrien Test in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid,
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of the
Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground
that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited
time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is
only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7)
days immediately before a local election.
GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014, PERALTA, J.
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The adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limitsleveling the
playing fielddoes not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of speech of the candidates.
Facts:
Petitioners GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN),

ABC Development Corporation (ABC), et. al. are owners/operators of radio and television
networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines
representing operators of radio and television stations and said stations themselves. They
sent their respective letters to Comelec questioning the constitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. During
the previous May 2007 and 2010, Comelec issued Resolutions implementing and
interpreting the airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated
number of minutes "per station. For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent Comelec
promulgated Resolution No. 9615, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and
political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a per
station basis, to a total aggregate basis.
Petitioners contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time

violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections. However, Comelec contended that its issuance of the assailed Resolution
is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the Comelec the
power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public
utilities, as well as mass media
Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of the assailed Comelec resolution violates freedom of
speech and of the press.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech
and of the press. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limitsleveling the
playing fielddoes not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in
the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this
particular instance, what the Comelec has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one
has clipped its wings. It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the
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aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not
only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach
out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys
his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of
his political speech.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.
At the heart of democracy is every advocates right to make known what the people
need to know, while the meaningful exercise of ones right of suffrage includes the right of
every voter to know what they need to know in order to make their choice.
Facts:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six
feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: "Conscience Vote" and lists of candidates
as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising "Team
Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay. When the said tarpaulin came
to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the
lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2) by three feet (3);
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the latter.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of
Comelec as unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them
after notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the

Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment
of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
No. It is not election propaganda. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
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election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration
by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored
messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 defining political advertisement or election propaganda.
The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That
petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single
issueand a complex piece of legislation at thatcan easily be interpreted as an attempt to
stereotype the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their
thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to
follow the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is
an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good
conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that
they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, J. Reyes
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible if certain requisites are met.
Facts:
In 2013, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections and subsequent elections. One of the sections enumerates the prohibited forms of
election propaganda including the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material
in public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not, and within the premises of public transport terminals,
such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions which prohibit the posting of any election campaign
or propaganda material in PUVs and public transport terminals are constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Such prohibitions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners
of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them. The
prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.
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A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of

the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech,
provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid
content-neutral regulation.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical

matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The "captive-audience"
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. Thus, a government
regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
"captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015, J. Leonen
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into

speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a
whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
Facts:
Comelec Resolution No. 9674 (Resolution) directed SWS, Pulse Asia and other
survey firms of similar circumstance to submit to Comelec the names of all commissioners
and payors of all surveys published from Feb. 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of
their subscribers. SWS and Pulse Asia assailed the Resolution as having been issued ultra
vires. They contended that the Resolution is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires.
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the
requirement to submit the names of their subscribers
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Ruling:
No. The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including
subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair Election
Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the
constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service. The
nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political
equality, calls into operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-
a-vis equality of opportunities. In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged
speech prevails over regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over
speech.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches

into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that,
taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive
means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place,
and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or
censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech
is made with or on private property.
SWS and Pulse Asias free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair
Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others who
want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand, there are
petitioners' right to publish and publications which are attended by the interests of those
who can employ published data to their partisan ends. On the other, there is regulation that
may affect equality and, thus, strengthen the capacity of those on society's margins or those
who grope for resources to engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals
of deliberative democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the
environment where the survey group's free speech rights should reside.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al.
G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, J. Austria-Martinez
The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the
ambit of the term commercial speech.
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
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protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk
substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRR) should be struck
down
Ruling:
Yes. The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within
the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic
transaction. This is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. An American jurisprudence provided a four-part
analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: (1) The commercial
speech must concern lawful acitivity and not be misleading; (2) The asserted governmental
interest must be substantial. If both of these requirements are met, it must next be
determined whether the state regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the advertisement at
issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both the International Code and the
Milk Code recognize and concede that there are instances when breastmilk substitutes may
be necessary. Second, there is no doubt that the government interest in providing safe and
adequate nutrition to infants and young children is substantial. This interest is expressed as
a national policy in no less than the fundamental law of our land and is also embodied in
various international agreements where we are a party. Third, there is an undeniable causal
relationship between the interest of government and the advertising ban. Unquestionably,
breastfeeding is the tested and proven method of providing optimal nutrition to infants and
young children. The rationale of the absolute ban is to prevent mothers from succumbing to
suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda which may be contained in
advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. Fourth, prescinding from these predicates,
the critical inquiry is: whether the complete suppression of the advertisement and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes is no more than necessary to further the interest of the
state in the protection and promotion of the right to health of infants and young children.
The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further
the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It
ought to be self-evident, for instance, that the advertisement of such products which are
strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent
for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the absolute,
overarching ban.
BAYAN, et al v. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.

G.R. NO. 169838, April 25, 2006, J. Azcuna
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It is a settled principle that the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are not absolute
and may be regulated.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed BP 880 which required a permit for staging a rally, contending
that it is a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argued
that the law requires a permit regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. Moreover, they said that the law is not content-neutral, because it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 880 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It does not curtail or unduly restrict freedom, it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The right to
freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be
so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power,
which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Also, BP 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies.
However, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, AND JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN v.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, J. Carpio Morales
The freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as
is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the state has a right to prevent.
Facts:
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The IBP, through its then National President Jose Cadiz, filed with the Office of the
City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge
on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Mayor Atienza issued a permit
dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein
Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on
June 19, 2006. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge. IBP alleged
that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. The
Manila Police District (MPD) thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for
violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
Issue:
Whether or not the modification by Mayor Atienza of the venue indicated in the
application violates IBPs constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly
Ruling:
Yes. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the
utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing,
as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of
this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If the Mayor is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when
he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of
his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit
adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or
modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render
illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 08, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro
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The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression
in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries
with it a corresponding obligation.
Facts:
Thirty-seven (37) UP law professor were directed to show cause why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The letter written by such professors made known to the
Supreme Court their view that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court, and that in light of
the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, Justice Del Castillo, to resign his position, without prejudice to any
other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate. The professors alleged that with
the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, the Supreme Court has interfered with
respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. They
contended that the Supreme Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court's
decisions and actions, and that it seeks to silence respondent law professors' dissenting
view on what they characterize as a legitimate public issue.
Issue:
Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny the professors their freedom of
expression.
Ruling:
No. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the
fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of
its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the
said pending case for the proper disposition and consideration of the Court that gave rise
to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered as fair or constructive. The insult to the members of the
Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said
case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the
cause of petitioners in the Vinuya case, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of
the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of

expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. Moreover, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain
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portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as
protected free speech. Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance
of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS CHAIR, DANTON REMOTO v.
G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010, J. Del Castillo
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy

of neutrality.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang
Ladlad applied for registration with the Comelec but it was was denied on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Comelec also ruled that Ang Ladlad
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. Furthermore, Comelec held that should
it grant the petition, it will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform
to the teachings of our faith. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion.
Issue:
Whether or not religion is a valid basis for the refusal of Comelec to accept Ang
Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Ruling:
No. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters." Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality. Hence, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
Comelec to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than
relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
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instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond
mere conformity to religious doctrine. A law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,

COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
GEN. LUNA, SURIGAO DEL NORTE
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, J. Brion
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel
abroad.
Facts:
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of judges and court
personnel, regardless of the number of days, must be with prior permission from the
Cuurt. A travel authority must be secured from the OCA. The complete requirements should
be submitted to and received by the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of
travel. Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by
the OCA shall be subject to disciplinary action. Judge Macarine wrote the Court
Administrator requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period
of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. He stated that his
travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the
corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements,
his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. He proceeded with his travel
abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. He was then informed by the
OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved
and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted
from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was
absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.
Issue:
Whether or not the said OCA Circular restricts the right to travel
Ruling:
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No. Although the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of
such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions
on ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no
means be construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision
over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of
court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application
for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification
from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his
docket, based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of
his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3)
months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989, CORTES, J.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II,
Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue travel documents to former
President Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President may impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
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Ruling:
Yes. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is
the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom
of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks
of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such
rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, ET AL.

G.R. No. 130716, DECEMBER 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
The state policy of full public disclosure extends only to transactions involving public
interest and may also be subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The following are
some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information,
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information.
Facts:
Francisco Chavez, in invoking his constitutional right to information, demanded that

the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-
gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of paramount public interest since it has a debilitating effect on the
countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. The PCGG, while admitting that a compromise is in the works, claimed that Chavezs
action is premature, since the proposed terms and conditions of the agreements have not
become effective and binding.
Issue:
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May the PCGG be required to reveal the proposed terms of compromise agreement
with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth?
Ruling:
Yes. The recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a
public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Thus,
there is no question that Chavez has a right to PCGG's disclosure of any agreement that may
be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. The question that
remains is whether the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement. Reviewing the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the Court held that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
OF THE JUDICIARY.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, MENDOZA, J.
The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information
disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.
Facts:
Rowena Paraan and Karol Ilagan sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth (SALN), Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae(CV) of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the year 2008 for the purpose of
updating their database of information on government officials. In response to such request,
the Court created the Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the
functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies
of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for the copies of the SALN and other personal circumstances of
the justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Justices of the Supreme Court are mandated by law to release
their SALN to the public.
Ruling:
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Yes. The Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the
information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other
words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of constitutional origin, the
former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of
members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by
law. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its
companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for
that right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples right to know is limited
to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL A.

EDILLON
A.M. NO. 1928 AUGUST 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory programthe
lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Facts:
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of Marcial
Edillos name from the Roll of Attorneys for his stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues. Edillon questioned the constitutionality of the provisions of the Rules of Court and IBP
By-Laws requiring membership dues, claiming that they constitute an invasionof his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintain
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support to the
said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.
Ruling:
Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional
and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in
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violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction
over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. Thus, the court may
compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues. Marcial Edillon was
disbarred and his name was stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
EMINENT DOMAIN
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL,

ET AL.
G.R. No. 171101, APRIL 24, 2012, VELASCO, JR. J.
In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was
taken from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings,
the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the
complaint.
Facts:
The Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously to dismiss or deny the petition filed
by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP)
and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court
however did not order outright land distribution. The Court noted that there are operative
facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,
give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to
choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not, for the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of
taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs stock distribution plan (SDP).
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Ruling:
Yes. When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were transferred by Tadeco
(former owner thereof) to HLI in order to comply with CARP through the stock distribution
option scheme, sealed with the imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed of the afore-mentioned
attributes of ownership. Notably, Tadeco and HLI are two different entities with separate
and distinct legal personalities. Ownership by one cannot be considered as ownership by
the other. Corollarily, it is the official act by the government, that is, the PARCs approval of
the Stock distributionProgram (SDP), which should be considered as the reckoning point for
the taking of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of ownership
over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs approval, it is this Courts consistent
view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the
stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of taking in determining
just compensation is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLIs stock option plan.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES

TECSON G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013 PERALTA, J.
Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Facts:
Spouses Tecson were the owners of a certain land which was among the properties
taken by the government sometime in 1940 to be used for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway. The land was taken without their consent and without the necessary
expropriation proceedings. The spouses demanded the payment of the fair market value of
the same but the DPWH offered to pay at the rate of P0.70 per square meter only which was
the value of the property at the time of taking. Consequently, the spouses filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession of the disputed land with damages. The RTC dismissed
the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the
trial court for the purpose of determining the just compensation to be awarded to the
spouses. The RTC found the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just
compensation for the subject property which was based on its current market value. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed the determination made by the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the just compensation to be awarded is based on the current market
value of the property.
Ruling:
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No. Just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling for purposes of compensation. Thus, the just compensation due the Spouses
Tecson in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time
of taking, that is, in 1940. The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it
was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken
ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by
the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may
have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value
of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what
he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or
injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x.
The fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it
should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher
value which is P1,500.00.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES

TECSON
G.R. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, PERALTA, J.
The true measure of just compensation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The
word just is used to modify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.
Facts:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Tecson
imploring the Supreme Court to take a second look at its Decision in their complaint for
recovery of possession of the disputed property with damages in which the said court
ordered that the valuation of the subject property owned by them shall be P0.70 instead
of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment. The spouses insist that gross
injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be based simply on the
value of the property at the time of the actual taking. Hence, they suggest that a happy
middle ground be achieved by meeting the need for doctrinal precision and the thirst for
substantial justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses should be
granted.
Ruling:
No. The assailed decision is maintained. The fair market value of the property at the
time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation. Just
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compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per
square meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as
valued by the RTC and CA. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear
inequitable to respondents-movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation
after a very long period, it should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to
reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As
such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value
at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE vs BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 176625, FEBRUARY 25, 2010, NACHURA, J.
The requirements of (1) public use and (2) just compensation in eminent domain
partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Facts:
Bernardo Lozada was the registered owner of Lot No. 88 located in Lahug, Cebu City.
In the early 1960s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation said lot, among others,
in connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport.
The CFI rendered a decision against the land owners, among whom was Lozada. During the
pendency of the latters appeal to the CA, the parties entered into a compromise settlement
to the effect that the subject property would be resold to the original owner in the event
that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport. Thus, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport, however, failed to
materialize because former President Aquino directed the transfer of general aviation
operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority. This
prompted Lozada, et al. to repurchase their property from the Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not Lozada and the other land owners may repurchase the disputed
property after the purpose for which the same was expropriated has been abandoned.
Ruling:
Yes. The decision in the expropriation case provides that the acquisition by the
Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would
continue its operation. The condition not having materialized because the airport had been
abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated
property.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of
eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
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requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect
to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely,
the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the
private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON

G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
The very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed,
for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for
some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other
stage of the proceedings.
Facts:
In 1993, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered a property owned by

the heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for
the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. The entry to the said
property was allegedly made without the respondent heirs consent. In 1995, NAPOCOR
filed a complaint for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the disputed land. The RTC determined the price payable as just
compensation using the date of filing of the complaint, which is May 5, 1995, as its reference
point because the evidence was bereft as to the actual date of the taking. Accordingly,
NAPOCOR was made to pay just compensation for the whole area at the rate
of P550.00/square meter. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. During the pendency of
NAPOCORs appeal before the SC, it filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings on the ground that the property sought to be expropriated was
no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents property. Accordingly, NAPOCOR contends
that the expropriation has become without basis for lack of public purpose as a result of the
retirement of the transmission lines;.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed

pending appeal.
Ruling:
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Yes. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands,
under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it
appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the
action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot
be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true
even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.
In this case, NAPOCOR admitted that the expropriation of the land in question is no
longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case
should have been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff,
that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even
without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of
the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be
dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or
litigation. However, expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of
expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for the period of
such possession.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely:

CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI, MONGKOY*, and AMIR,
all surnamed MACABANGKIT
G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011 BERSAMIN, J.
It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need
not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
Facts:
NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate
electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants. Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and Amir, all
surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land situated in Ditucalan,
Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged, among others, that
they belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC traversed their land;
that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent;
and that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether there was taking of land as to entitle the owners to just compensation.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that NPC was liable
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to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land traversed by
the underground tunnels: Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-
terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owner of the property
thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property.
In this case, there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the
owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of
private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical
possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of
his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the
owner, or in any respect changes hands.
RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO

G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010 PEREZ, J.
Any inquiry he (Bantay Bayan) makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Facts:
Antonio Lauga raped his 13-year-old daughter, AAA. Thereafter, AAA relayed her
harrowing experience to her grandmother. The two sought the assistance of Moises Boy
Banting, a bantay bayan. Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only his underwear. He
invited Lauga to the police station, to which the latter obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga
admitted to Banting that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. RTC found
him guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. The decision of the trial court was
affirmed with modifications by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Laugas extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting without
the assistance of a counsel was in violation of his constitutional right.
Ruling:
Yes. The bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in a certain area organized
for the purpose of keeping peace in their community. It is an accredited auxiliary of the PNP.
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Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309
issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay
shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order
Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee includes, among others:
(1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3)
Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non
Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.
Thus, any inquiry a Bantay Bayan makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of Laug, for being made without the
assistance of a counsel, is inadmissible in evidence.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 BERSAMIN, J.
For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration.
Facts:
The Ombudsman charged Juan Ponce Enrile and several others with plunder with
the Sandiganbayan. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and
his Motion to Fix Bail, claiming that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although
he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must
further be seriously considered. The Sandiganbyan denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles
motion.
Ruling:
No. For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. Admittedly, the
accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
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premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the
evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER
CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June 14, 2011 CARPIO MORALES, J.
The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
Facts:
Fifty-seven (57) people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed
while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. The tragic incident which came to be
known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an
additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later, the National Union
of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network,
Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and
members of the academe filed a petition before the SC praying that live television and radio
coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of
devices.
Issue:
Whether the petition should be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial
court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines
the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is
not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an
adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As
pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for
continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge,
and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise
its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from
the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the
private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom.
Thus, the Court partially granted pro hac vice the request for live broadcast by television
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and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the
guidelines herein outlined.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test
the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of witnesses.
Facts:
Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go (petitioners) were charged before the
MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The private
prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, an old frail businessman
from Laos, Cambodia who is the prosecutions complaining witness. It was alleged that Li
Luen Ping was being treated for lung infection in Laos, Cambodia and that he could not
make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Petitioners opposed the
motion, invoking their constitutional right of confrontation.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion should be granted.
Ruling:
No. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a
witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. The main
and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to
secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent,
according to an eminent authority, demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of
gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross
examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions
and obtaining immediate answers. There is also the advantage of the witness before the
judge, and it is this it enables the judge as trier of facts to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective
moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that
the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may
confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the
witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment
and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge
if the witness testifies orally in court.
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The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to

have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses. The constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to
submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out
the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
credibility.
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO, Petitioners, v.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL.
ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA
G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 SERENO, C.J.
As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in

accordance with and in the manner provided by law.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan found Reynaldo Jaylo, Edgardo Castro, William Valenzona, and
Antonio Habalo (petitioners) guilty of homicide. During the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayans judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Counsel for the
three petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan took no
action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the
convicted accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the three
urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration but to no avail. They argued that the right to file a Motion for
Reconsideration is a statutory grant and not merely a remedy available in the Rules, as
provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their
absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to
have resulted in the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
Yes. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant
or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised
in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, DATA AND KALIKASAN
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-

Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as
Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte
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GR No. 193636 July 24, 2012 SERENO, J.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275

(A.O. 275), creating a body which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission. It
was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a
view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future. It was broadcasted that Marynette R. Gamboa, the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte, was one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Contending
that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, she filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. She alleged, among others, that the PNP Ilocos Norte
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report. The RTC dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data must be granted.
Ruling:
No. Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an
unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The
PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the
body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the
same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally,
Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
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SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY

DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 LEONEN, J.
The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be
granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
Facts:
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo against
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the NBI (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity) in the RTC of Manila. The
judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer and also set the case for
hearing. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda within five (5) working days after hearing. Later, the RTC rendered a
"Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and the interim reliefs prayed for.
The MR filed by De Lima, et al was denied. Thus, they filed before the SC a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a TRO/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether Rule 45 is the proper remedy.
Ruling:
No. The Decision dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the
judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time. This Decision pertained to the
issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment
under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that
temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the
decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs
that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as Decision dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other
hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave
injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
Thus, the Court nullified all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo; and directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his
receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis
of the petition and its attached affidavits.
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Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM v. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and
CELIA C. YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killingsand enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof.
Facts:
Ma. Christina Yusay Caram gave birth to Baby Julian out of an amorous relationship
without the benefit of marriage. Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a
Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD in order to avoid placing her family in a
potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. Christina changed
her mind about the adoption and filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before
the RTC of Quezon City. RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the four respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled and to file their verified written
return to the writ. In one of its orders, it acknowledged that Baby Julian was brought before
the court and the Christina was allowed to see him and take photographs of him. RTC
dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court since Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of
her child Baby Julian.
Issue:
Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child.
Ruling:
No. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killingsand enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of
the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.
In this case, DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the
RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
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afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced disappearance as used in the

context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
SELF-INCRIMINTION
JAIME DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, Sereno, C.J.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all
arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
Facts:
The agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito Escobido
claiming Ariel Escobido, the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by
several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An
errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring,
they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office. In the police office, they met
James who demanded from them P100,000 later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the
release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint
and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI, Charito
received calls supposedly from James instructing her to bring the money as soon as
possible. The investigators at the NBI verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation. The
officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked P500 bill dusted with
fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by James and handed
by Corazon. Dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI where forensic
examination was done. He was required to submit his urine for drug testing which yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result.
Dela Cruz, a Police Officer 2 of the PNP assigned in the Security Service Group, was charged
with a violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon Dela Cruz is a violation of his right
against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
Yes. We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the
allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has
been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest.
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge
of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioners urine for purposes of drug testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
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outside the concept of a custodial investigation. It is incontrovertible that petitioner

refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to
his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile,
because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug
testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is
being made.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO VELSCO AND HONORATO GALVEZ

G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J.
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Facts:
A shooting took place and claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured
his brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was
also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and
burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. Thus,
three informations - one for homicide and two for frustrated homicide - were filed against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and
alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed
against the accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez
was also charged with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his
residence; hence, a fourth information had to be filed. The court found Diego guilty of
murder and double frustrated murder. However, Mayor Galvez was acquitted of the crimes
charged against him for insufficiency of evidence and finding that the act of carrying of
firearm was not a violation of law. The acquittal of Galvez is now challenged by the
Government in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the
Constitution that the exculpation of Galvez from all criminal responsibility by Judge Velasco
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, the judge
deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not elevating the issue of criminal culpability of Galvez despite acquittal
should be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
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Ruling:
Yes. A remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986). Thus, the doctrine that double
jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the
criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in
the criminal case was denied due process. In such case, the remand remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for
the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
In this case, the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent
judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation
and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned
decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These
consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis--
vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the
opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have
resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the
fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act
from the writs limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an
improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of
judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
JASON IVLER v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO AND EVANGELINE

PONCE
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J.
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely
a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged before with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained
by Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of Evangeline's husband Nestor Ponce and damage to the Spouses
Ponce's vehicle. Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Ivler pleaded
guilty to the charge in the first case and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
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Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in the second case for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not Ivlers constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365. Hence, Ivlers prior conviction of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars a subsequent prosecution for the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide as it arises from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL OPULENCIA

G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J.
For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical
elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense.
Facts:
The police and personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System searched and
examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by Manuel Opulencia. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government,
and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. These electric devices and
contraptions were designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said ice and cold storage plant. Opulencia admitted
in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order
to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. An information against Opulencia
was filed for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. Opulencia pleaded
not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime
there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof,
and that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the
offense. Then, the city fiscal filed another information against Opulencia for theft of electric
power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309(1), of the RPC. Before Opulencia could be
arraigned, he filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
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offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second information was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
Yes. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is
said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same
acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. For the
constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements
constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second
offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. By the same token,
acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common
intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented
and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under
municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to
point out that
In this case, the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation
of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
EX-POST FACTO LAWS
SR. INSP. JERRY VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, Reyes, J.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire
the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.
Facts:
Jerry Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under P.D. 1866 in which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court found Valeroso guilty
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4
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years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the
amount of P15,000. The CA affirmed with modification the RTCs decision stating that
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4
years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed.
Ruling:
Yes. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on
July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now
states that the of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the
law is advantageous to the accused. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by
R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which

ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the
prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The
minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period
(two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months).
Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) v. HON. OMBUDSMAN

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al.
G.R. No. 206357, November 25, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable
to the accused is to be adopted.
Facts:
President Ramos issued A.O. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding

Committee on Behest Loans. The Ad Hoc Committee investigated the loans of Resorts Hotel
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Corporation (RHC). RHC was incorporated in 1968 with a paid-up capital of P1 million, was
37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a Marcos business associate. RHC obtained loans to
finance its projects from DBP. RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by
these loans. 40% of the amount were converted into DBP's common shareholding in RHC,
and the balance was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages
of P1.97 million. The Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP's total exposure as of 1986
amounted to P99.1 million. The Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report to the President
where it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. Hence, the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint against
respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections
3(e) and 3(g) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. PCGG filed a MR but was again dismissed by the Ombudsman on the
ground of prescription stating that In as much as the record indicates that the instant
complaint was filed with this office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten years from the
time the crimes were discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had
already prescribed. Aggrieved, PCGG appealed claiming that the prescriptive period should
only commence to run it filed the Affidavit-Complaint Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 sets
the prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen years and not ten years.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period for the filing of the case has already
prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall
prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the
passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. In the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the
accused is to be adopted. As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP
Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending
law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973,
1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA
3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for determination is the reckoning
point for the 10-year period.
As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form
the date of discovery thereof. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception
that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information
relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or
records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the
general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of
the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information
about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies
and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
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In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which We have
recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the
simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. We,
therefore, count the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on
January 4, 1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the
President its findings and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being the case, the filing by
the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6, 2003,
a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON. MARGARITO TEVES, et

al.
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or

members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 9335 which imposed a revenue collection quota for BOC
employees. It also provided a penalty of removal in case of failure to meet the said quota.
The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) question the constitutionality of
the law, saying that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing
their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective
families' prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder and hence, unconstitutional because it
inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial.
Ruling:
No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or

members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
In this case, RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof.
The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned
employee are amply protected.
CITIZENSHIP
ERNESTO MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
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G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, Mendoza, J.
Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.
Facts:
Mercado, Manzano and Daza III were candidates for vice mayor in Makati City in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano garnered the highest votes however the proclamation of
Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US which
was later granted and the cancellation of the CoC on the ground that he is a dual citizen was
ordered. The Comelec's Second Division said that the petition is based on the ground that
Manzano is an American citizen based on the record and misrepresented himself as a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the
Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955
of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the US and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would
appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not Manzano is disqualified from the position of vice-mayor.
Ruling:
No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not

a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before
as a dual citizen. On the other hand, Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves
no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
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RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D. CHING

B.M. No. 914, October 1, 1999, Kapunan, J.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient.
Facts:
Vicente Ching, son of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was born in La Union in
1964. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Ching passed the Bar Examinations
but was not allowed to take his oath and was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship. The OSG commented that Ching, being the legitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship in strict compliance with the provisions of CA No. 625. The OSG also pointed out
that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due
to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation
of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to
taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time.
Ruling:
No. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made within three years from reaching the age of majority. However,
jurisprudence states that the three-year period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, such extension is not indefinite.
In this case, Ching was already 35 years old (or over 14 years after reaching the age
of majority) when he elected Filipino citizenship. Based on the interpretation of the phrase
upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
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right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001, J. Kapunan
The act of repatriation allows one to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Facts.
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1985, he

enlisted in the US Marine Corps, took an oath of allegiance to the US, and as a consequence
lost his Filipino citizenship. In 1990, Cruz became a naturalized US citizen in connection
with his service in the US Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Filipino citizenship
through repatriation under RA No. 2630. Thereafter, he ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Antonio Bengson, his opponent, filed a
case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam before the HRET, claiming that Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
Issue.
Whether or not a natural-born citizen who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held.
Yes. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the law, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
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The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. The authors of the law intentionally
employed the terms re-acquire and retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Facts:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a

Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, David and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot where they constructed a residential house, a part of which
is a public land. Renato David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Agreement (MLA) over the
subject land with the DENR and CENRO. In the said application, David indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents against David. Meanwhile, David reacquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he
filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had
been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in disregarding the fact that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by reacquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225
he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it.
Ruling:
No. The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section
3 is Retention of Philippine Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the
terms re-acquire and retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-
acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends C.A. No. 63 by
doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the

effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the
first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
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country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y

CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, CJ. Sereno
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship as
a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a US citizen. Arnado applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On 3 April
2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Thereafter, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition seeking Arnados disqualification and/or cancellation of Arnados CoC contending
that Arnado is a foreigner. To bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented
evidence indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing
the Philippines even after his repatriation and execution of affidavit of renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Maquiling intervened in the instant case after having garnered the second
highest number of votes during the elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made and affects ones qualifications to run for
public office.
Ruling:
Yes. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act
of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
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In this case, when Arnado used his US passport just eleven days after he renounced
his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
that he divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges
of the United States of America. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ESTRELLA ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD and AMADO V. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos. 221698-221700, 8 March 2016, J. Perez
Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
Facts.
Petitioner Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo, by a certain Edgardo Militar, who took custody of her. When Poe reached the
age of five, celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces formally adopted her via a
petition for adoption with the MTC of San Juan. Poe became a naturalized American citizen
and obtained a US passport after marrying her husband who was a citizen of both the
Philippines and the US. Poe eventually resettled in the Philippines after the untimely
demise of her father and took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic pursuant to R.A. No.
9225. Poe filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections
where she declared that she is a natural-born citizen. Private respondents filed these cases
against her for the alleged misrepresentation Poe made in stating that she is a natural-born
Filipino on account of being a foundling.
Issue.
Whether or not a foundling like Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Held.
Yes. The fact is that petitioners blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
demonstrable. There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that her parents were aliens. Poes admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her
parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
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would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. Deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though the Rafols amendment was
not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit
specific mention. In international law, foundlings are likewise presumed to have the
nationality of the country of birth. While international conventions providing this principle
are yet unratified by the Philippines, they are nevertheless generally accepted principles of
international law.
THE REPUBLIC THE PHILIPPINES v. NORA FE SAGUN

G.R. No. 187567, 15 February 2012, J. Villarama, Jr.
The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election of Filipino
citizenship should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Facts.
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. It was only after she married Alex Sagun, at
the age of 33, did she execute an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This
document was, however, not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar.
Respondent thereafter applied for a Philippine passport but the same was denied due to her
fathers citizenship and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be
ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
Issue.
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve years after

reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made within a reasonable time as
interpreted by jurisprudence.
Held.
No. Respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid
election. Specifically, the execution of a sworn statement of her election of Philippine
citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her
claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the
age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not
within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of CA No. 625. The
phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
generally within three years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no
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satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register
with the nearest local civil registry.
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
THE CIVIL SERVICE
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. ODESLA-IAD, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board
G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department

under EO 292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Facts:
President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 13 abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of
EO 13, alleging that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-
ODESLA, and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial
functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public
office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies
but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature

to create a public office.
Ruling:
No. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive

Department or the offices under him as stated in Section 31 of EO 292 in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry
out his directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to
reorganize his own office pursuant to EO 292.
The Reorganization did not entail the creation of a new, separate and distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct
office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply
transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President
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Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative
structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division (the IAD) through
which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under
E.O. 13. Neither did the President delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agency
by the creation of IAD-ODESLA. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body not vested with quasi-judicial powers. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
office.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999, J. Pardo
To constitute nepotism, where the official is the chief of the bureau or the person
exercising immediate supervision, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the said official.
Facts:
George Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice President, filed with the CSC Quezon City a
complaint against Pedro Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and nepotism.
The CSC conducted a formal investigation and promulgated its resolution finding no
substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct.
Dacoycoy was, however, found guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker,
respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from the service. After his MR was denied, Dacoycoy filed with the
CA a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The CA reversed and set
aside the CSCs resolution, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two
sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is
the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who
performs the prohibited act.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC correctly found the respondent guilty of nepotism and
correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from service.
Ruling:
Yes. One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative

within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four
situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices
that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree
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of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.
It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of
driver and utility worker in Balicuatro. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational
Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. However, Mr.
Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions for short durations
of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS
Regional Director. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of
respondents two sons and placed them under respondents immediate supervision serving
as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. To our mind,
the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of
nepotism.
PRUDENCIO QUIMBO v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO GERVACIO and

DIRECTRESS MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO OF THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE
G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005, J. Carpio-Morales
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. It is not a penalty as such it is not considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension.
Facts:
Provincial Engineer Prudencio Quimbo was administratively charged for

harassment and oppression by Elmo Padaon, a general foreman detailed to the Motor Pool
Division, Provincial Engineering. During the pendency of the administrative case before the
Ombudsman, Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension without pay to commence
upon receipt of the order and until such time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6 months.
The Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension after Quimbo presented on direct
examination his last two witnesses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman in its decision found
Quimbo guilty of oppression; this decision was later on modified to simple misconduct only
and he was suspended from office for a period of two months without pay. Quimbo filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that he was already preventively suspended and
praying that the period be taken into consideration as part of the final penalty imposed.
The Ombudsman found this contention untenable and clarified that preventive suspension
is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; [and that] [i]f after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty
warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Likewise, the
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Quimbo.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed reversible error when it dismissed his petition.
Ruling:
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No. Petitioners argument that the dismissal of his petition is in violation of the
doctrine enunciated in Gloria v. Court of Appeals and the rule on equity that a person should
not be punished twice nor be made to suffer the suspension penalty after [he] had [served]
the same is untenable.
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as

preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose
aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be
achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed
or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section

24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension as
provided under Section 25 of the same Rule XIV.
RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF RETIRED JUDGE MOSLEMEN T.

MACARAMBON UNDER R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 9946
A.M. No. 14061, 19 June 2012, J. Brion
Resignation under RA 910 must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of

the office.
Facts:
Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge who was appointed as Comelec
Commissioner before reaching the optional retirement age of 60. He requested that he be
allowed to retire under Sec. 1 of RA 910. The Judge asserts that Section 1 allows the
payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re: Associate Justice Britanico, he posits
that his appointment as Comelec Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his duties as
an RTC judge on account of his submission to the will of the political authority and
appointing power. As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the
second sentence of Section 1 considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month
and 16 days of judicial service and a total of 35 years of government service. Judge
Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he
believes that the Courts ruling in Re: Pineda is applicable to his case where the Court
brushed aside such requirement and considered the retirees career which was marked with
competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his
judicial office before reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits
under RA 910.
Ruling:
No. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different
meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any
time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified
by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition to
resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. Strict
compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows
seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever
there are ample reasons to grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA 910, as amended must be by reason of

incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Resignation contemplated under the law
must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than
physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring
from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial
employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her
control. In either of the two instances, Judge Macarambons case does not render him
eligible to retire under RA 910.
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT
TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, BRION, J.
Longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of
the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a
judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then
he returned to the judiciary.
Facts:
This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-

Fernando, CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate Justice Vicente Veloso
for their claim of longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as
part of their compensation package. They anchored their claim under Section 42 of B.P. Blg.
129 and the Court's ruling in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case,
Justice Pardo was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman,
and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any
interruption in his service. Accordingly, the court considered Justice Pardos one-time
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service outside of the judiciary as part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of
determining his longevity pay.
Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services rendered outside
the judiciary.
Ruling:
No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be given to the
Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious
service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the
judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the
judiciary.
Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an incumbent MTC Judge,
then she served as Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC, then she was appointed as
Commissioner of COMELEC, then as a consultant of COMELEC, and only then that she was
appointed as Associate Justice of CA. Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened
which did not comply with the requirement of service in a single non-judicial position. On
the other hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as Commissioners of NLRC
before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an agency attached to the DOLE, an
Executive Department, and hence such is not considered as continuous, efficient and
meritorious service in the Judiciary for the purpose of longevity pay.
EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR. v.

G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, BRION, J.
An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on

Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners Fetalino

and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Eleven days
later, Pres. Ramos renewed the their ad interim appointments for the same position.
Congress, however, adjourned before the CA could act on their appointments. The
constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were
no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, they merely served as Comelec
Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, they applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with
the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. Accordingly, the Comelec granted their pro-rated
gratuity and pension. The petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on
the ground that they are entitled to lump sum benefit and not a pro-rated one. But Comelec
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disapproved on the ground that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said
to have completed his term of office so as to entitle him to a lump sum benefit.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No.
1568.
Ruling:
No. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman
or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his
term of office. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim
appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To
hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and
complete the running of a term of office in the Comelec without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of
the Commission on Appointments.
Therefore, in this case, the petitioners can never be considered to have retired from
the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly,
because they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.
MELINDA L. OCAMPO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G. R. No. 188716, June 10, 2013, PEREZ, J.
Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of
double compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same
creditable period. However, in this case, RA 1568, only allows payment of only a single gratuity
and a single annuity out of a single compensable retirement from any one of the covered
agencies.
Facts:
Petitioner Melinda Ocampo was appointed as Board Member of the Energy

Regulatory After serving for two years and four months, she tendered her retirement. She
then availed of the five year lump sum benefit and monthly pension under R.A.1568. After
that, she was again appointed as Chairman of ERB with a term of four years. However, she
was only able to serve two years of such term following the abolishment of ERB. She sought
the same retirement payment and monthly pension.
The Commission on Audit approved her first lump sum benefit and monthly pension
for the position of Board Member. However, as to her second retirement as Chairman, COA
opined that she was only entitled to pro-rated benefits in accordance to the service period
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she actually have served. This decision of COA is anchored on the prohibition against double
pension.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the retirement claims of Ocampo amount to double pension.

2. Whether or not Ocampo is entitled to the payment of two lump sum payments, and
payment thereafter of two monthly pensions.
Rulings:
1. No. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the
receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on
the same creditable period. In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two sets of retirement
benefits for one and the same creditable period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of
retirement benefits for each of her two retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set
of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods, one for
her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of the same agency.
2. No. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 172 extends to members and chairmen of the
ERB similar retirement benefits that retiring members and chairmen of the COA and
COMELEC are entitled to under the law. Accordingly, R.A. No. 1568 provides that a retiring
chairmen and members of COA and of COMELEC are entitled to five year lump sum benefit
and monthly pension. However, It is worth stressing that R.A.No. 1568 is a law that, first and
foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and members of
the COA and of the COMELEC and that it has been the consistent policy of the State to
prohibit any appointment of more than one term in the said constitutional bodies. Hence,
R.A. No. 1568 cannot be said to have sanctioned the payment of more than one set of
retirement benefits to a retiree as a consequence of multiple retirements in one agency. The
mere circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to serve
therein for more than one term does not mean that they would be entitled a set of
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568 for each of their completed term.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA
G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
When Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution includes Ombudsman as one of the

impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office. Therefore, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation
for allegations of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression against Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo Mojica. Consequently, the Office of Ombudsman ordered that a separate criminal and
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administrative case be filed against Mojica. Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition before the CA.
The CA dismissed the complaints against Mojica, holding that Deputy Ombudsman is a
public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held
by him and removable only by impeachment, therefore he cannot be charged with
disbarment during his incumbency. Instead, he should be impeached first before he may be
held answerable to disbarment proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.
Ruling:
No. As enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following
are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme
Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. When it
includes Ombudsman as one of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not
the office. Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE, et. al
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and
the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice.
Facts:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were
based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary
referred the two complaints to the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After
hearing, the House of Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both
complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez
contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article
XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when
it issued the Resolution
Ruling:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment
complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
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filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban
is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the
House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the one-
year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second impeachment complaint
after the first impeachment complaint was filed.
Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the
complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al.
G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
Facts:
This case involves two consolidated petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. The petition of Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales involves the Decision of the Office of the President finding him guilty
of inexcusable negligence and gross violation of rules of procedure by allowing PSI Rolando
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without
any justification. He was then dismissed from his office. On the other hand, the petition of
Special Prosecutor Sulit involves the order of the Office of the President initiating a
Preliminary Investigation and requiring him to submit a written explanation with respect
to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave.
Consequently, they filed their separate petitions assailing the act of the President of
removing them from their office. They both claim that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong
is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to remove and disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.
Ruling:
Yes. Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his

own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the
President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. For, while Section 21
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declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2),
on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
The manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions, Section 8(2) and Section
21, was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would
exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and employees.
Moreover, following the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it
the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are
also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise.
Therefore, in giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied
from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office
of the Ombudsman.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al.
G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, BRION, J.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsmans
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the Supreme Court in the
consolidated case of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit. In such case, Gonzales and Barreras Sulit assailed the power to remove and
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President. In the challenged Decision, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which grants President disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its prior pronouncement and votes to
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence
is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of
the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution.
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Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsmans
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes
its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials
who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office.
However, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor
to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF

APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of Plunder
and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019. Pursuant to this, the Ombudsman issued a
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not
more than six (6) months without pay. Consequently, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for
the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. The CA granted the
application for TRO, and subsequently issued a WPI.
Hence, the Ombudsman filed this present petition assailing the issuance of the TRO on
the ground that of lack of jurisdiction. First, the Ombudsman argues that Section 14 of RA
6770, or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," states that no injunctive writ could be issued to
delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject
matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction. Second, it contends that it was
inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine in the issuance of the
injunctive writ since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed
upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not R.A. 6770 aims to shield Ombudsman from judicial intervention as to
secure its independence.
2. Whether or not CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive order against
the preventive suspension order.
Ruling:
1. No. The independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended

by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. Evidently, its independence intend to protect the Office of the
Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the insidious
tentacles of politics. That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot
be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an
incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive
suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from
political harassment or pressure.
2. No. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs
were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. Thus, by merely following
settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained
good law, it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based
on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order was correctly issued.
On preventive suspension
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive

measure. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him. The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order, under Section 24, RA 6770
are as follows: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following
circumstances co-exist with the first a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; b) The charge would warrant removal
from the service; or c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
On the Condonation Doctrine
The condonation doctrine is a jurisprudential creation, which states that if it were

established the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during
the officials prior term, then he can no longer be administratively charged for such act. The
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office,
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it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
However, in this case, the Court simply finds that it is high time to abandon the condonation
doctrine. It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J.
The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA
to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the
COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
Facts:
COA issued a Circular order which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions.
With that, Petitioner dela Llana, in his capacity as taxpayer, wrote to the COA regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of
Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. However, the COA replied informing him of
the circular order which listed the pre-audit system. Consequently, dela Llana this Petition
for Certiorari alleging that that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by
a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section
2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in the Constitution provision that requires the COA to conduct a
pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that
a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or
equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such
a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to
correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel
the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination.
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ELECTION LAW
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, et. al. v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election.
Facts:
President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters. RA
10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after.
Pursuant to that, the COMELEC issued resolutions which commenced the mandatory
biometric system of registration and implemented the NoBio-NoBoto policy.
Consequently, herein petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the

constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well
as COMELEC Resolutions related thereto. They contend that the said law violates the right
to suffrage on grounds that it rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification
where there is penalty of deactivation and biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification
by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution related thereto,

unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. The State may
therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction,
however, that the same do not amount to a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement. Moreover, the concept of a "qualification" should be distinguished from the
concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a
person's qualifications to vote is determined. The act of registering is only one step towards
voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may
be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registration is a form of regulation
and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage.
Therefore, the State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws
to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. Thus, unless it is shown that a registration
requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement, the
same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
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G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, Sereno, J.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied
registration.
Facts:
Magdalo Sa Pagbabago (Magdalo) filed a petition with Comelec, seeking its

registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party. However, Comelec denied the
petition for registration by taking judicial notice that the party organizer and Chairman of
Magdalo, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the Oakwood
Mutiny thereby employing violence and unlawful means to achieve the goals of the party.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying the
registration of Magdalo.
Ruling:
No. At the outset, the Court held that Comelec properly took judicial notice of the
Oakwood incident, because I was widely known and extensively covered by the media made
it a proper subject of judicial notice. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in
Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
Moreover, the finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of the criminal proceedings against
several member of Magdalo. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the Comelec to register political parties and
ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character. In exercising this authority, the Comelec only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
In the case at bar, the challenged Comelec Resolutions were issued pursuant to its
administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political
parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In arriving
at its assailed ruling, the Comelec only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence
adequate to support this conclusion.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN

ERASMO, SR.,
G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, ABAD, J.
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A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence

or domicile in a particular place. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office.
Facts:
After 26 years of being an Australian Citizen, Rommel Jalosjos returned to the

Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the Republic and renounced his Australian
citizenship. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
However, Dan Erasmo moved to cancel the COC of Jalosjos on the ground of material
misrepresentation since the latter failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code. Apparently, Jalosjos had been a mere guest or
transient visitor in his brothers house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil, Zamboanga
as his domicile.
Issue:
Whether or not Jalosjos has complied with the residency requirement.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with
residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
When Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that he did so with intent to change his domicile for
good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to
that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since
lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot
support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a
particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in
the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G.

CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K.
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SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C.

ATILANO
G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
As petitioners disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a
previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the Comelec En Banc to
cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Facts:
Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts
of lasciviousness. His conviction carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Thereafter, his prison term was commuted by the President to 16 years.
After serving the same, he was discharged from prison. Jalosjos then filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) for mayor. In response thereto, five petitions to cancel his CoC were filed
with the Comelec. Pending resolution of the petitions, the Comelec En Banc issued motu
proprio Resolution No. 9613, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu
proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioners right to due process.
Ruling:
No. Comelec En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued
Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve
any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to
enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioners CoC on the basis of his
perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his
final conviction. In this regard, the Comelec En Banc was exercising its administrative
functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling
under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-
judicial proceedings.
In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the Comelec
En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. As petitioners disqualification to run for public office had already
been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its
duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.
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Also, it was held that Jalosjos perpetual absolute disqualification had not been
removed by the Local Government Code (LGC), because Sec. 40(a) of the LGC would not
apply to cases wherein a penal provisionsuch as Article 41 in this casedirectly and
specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of
two (2) years from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to
suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN

ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the

Philippines.
Facts:
Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballeros certificate of candidacy

(COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that Caballero was actually a
Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor. Caballero argued that he already took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and has renounced his Canadian citizenship.
Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballeros COC for failure to comply with the
one year residency requirement, reasoning that Caballeros naturalization as a Canadian
citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero
insisted that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs
for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior
to his election is a substantial compliance with the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.
Ruling:
Yes. The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition
of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
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In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in
Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a
foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds
true in Caballero's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his domicile
in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver
of such abandonment.
Moreover, it was held that Caballeros retention of his Philippine citizenship under
RA 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must
still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the
time he made it as such.
ALROBEN J. GOH, v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014, CARPIO, J.
When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its Current Operating
Expenditures, such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional
functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
Facts:
Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Mayor Lucilo Bayron due to loss of trust
and confidence anchored on the alleged violations of Bayron of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. The Comelec
promulgated Resolution No. 9864 finding the petition sufficient in form and substance.
However, the Comelec resolved not to continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it
does not have a line item budget or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose.
According to Comelec, until a law is passed by Congress appropriating funds for recall
elections, any proceeding relative to the petition should be suspended.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2014 GAA provided the line item appropriation to allow the
Comelec to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the power to
[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed
the Comelec's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment
items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to
the Comelec Chairman, contrary to what Resolution No. 9882 said. This is found in the
Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the Comelec admits in its Resolution No. 9882
is a line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
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plebiscites. In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the Comelec is to

conduct recall elections. When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its
"Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its
constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v.
Comelec, recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall
elections in the 2002 GAA.
Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall
elections in the 2014 GAA, there is no reason why the Comelec is unable to perform its
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of recall.. Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient,
then the Comelec Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item
appropriation from the Comelec's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly
authorized in the 2014 GAA.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, v. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI,

PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO
DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT
G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, SARMIENTO, J.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments

of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Facts:
Sultan Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly of Central
Mindanao. The Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs invited Limbona to attend the
dialogues regarding the issues affecting the region. Consistent with the said invitation,
Limbona announced that there will be no session for that day as their presence is required
by the Committee. However, the Assembly held session in defiance of Limbona's advice.
After declaring the presence of a quorum, all assemblymen moved to declare the seat of
Speaker Limbona vacant.
Issue:
Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now

constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the
extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Ruling:
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous

governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy
in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-
immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he President
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shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services.
It was also held that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true
that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides
likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals."
Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess
called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short
intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all
intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only
refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk
things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the
Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the
Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules.
Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But
while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason
for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that
instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014, LEONEN, J.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by

local government units.
Facts:
PEZA was created to manage economic zones in the country. The City of Lapu-Lapu
demanded real property taxes from PEZAs properties in Mactan Economic Zone. The City
anchors its demand on the Local Government Code which withdrew the real property tax
exemptions previously granted to entities. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the
National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA
under the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government, hence,

exempt from payment of real property taxes.
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Ruling:
Yes. An instrumentality is any agency of the National Government, not integrated

within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. As an instrumentality of the national
government, the PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress
created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in the
Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed or which have the
potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial tourist/recreational, commercial,
banking, investment and financial centers. By operating, administering, managing, and
developing special economic zones which attract investments and promote use of domestic
labor, the PEZA carries out the policy of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by

local government units. Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the
PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for real property taxes.
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY

GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, AND
THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Facts:
Respondent Province decided to build a Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal at

Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay in the Malay Municipality. However,
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, Malay Municipality, issued a Resolution manifesting its
strong opposition to said application. Consequently, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
respondent Province approved a resolution formally authorizing Governor Marquez to
represent the renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal
Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation of a portion of Caticlan foreshore for
commercial purposes. During the course of the negotiation, respondent Province
deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64
hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources and as a
response to the findings of the Preliminary Geohazard Assessment study which showed that
the recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion and scouring should be
the first major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area. But still, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Malay refused to give the favourable endorsement to the Province of Aklan. As a
result, the petitioner contends that the respondent province failed to conduct the required
consultation procedures as required by the Local Government Code.
Issue:
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Whether or not the prior consultation is a requirement before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented.
Ruling:
Yes. Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects
implementation is illegal. Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior
approval are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent
Province.
The project in this case can be classified as a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities, because the commercial
establishments to be built on phase 1, as described in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause
pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge. Hence, it is
covered by the requirements found in Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
provisions that are quoted below:
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON v. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila,
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, CORONA, J.
The Mayor has the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel Manila Mayor Jose
Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified a certain area from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area and would
be adversely affected are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
Later on, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. The
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002. Thereafter, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
Issue:
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Whether or not the petition for mandamus was proper.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC)
to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027. The court also held that the court need not resolve the issue of
whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the
resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave
it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, Feb. 13, 2008), the
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 was questioned by the oil companies. But the Supreme Court
held that it was a valid exercise of police power, because it was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the
rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular
class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests
which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and

VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO v. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the
City of Manila
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014, PEREZ, J.
There is truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.
Facts:
The present case is a sequel of the Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. (2008). During
the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor
Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187 which repealed
Ordinance No. 8027, thus allowing, once again, the operation of the oil companies in the
Pandacan area.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
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No. Notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil
depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to
this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the
matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or
political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the general
welfare of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true
sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it
wishes to favor. Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has
changed its view on the matter, favoring the citys economic related benefits, through the
continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the
facts on the table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For,
in this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as the will of
Manila insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the

judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang
Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.
In a later case (Social Justice Society v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, March 10, 2015), the
Supreme Court denied the oil companies motion for reconsideration, ruling in this wise:
There are overwhelming reasons stated in the Decision to support the Courts
pronouncement that the very nature of depots has no place in a densely populated area,
among others, the very history of the Pandacan terminals where flames spread over the
entire City of Manila when fuel storage dumps were set on fire in December 194114 and the
other incident of explosion, which were both considered in G.R. No. 156052.
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, et. al.
G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996, HERMOSISIMA, JR.,
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the local government unit.
Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago claiming that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because
its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00).
They contend that in the computation of the average annual income of Santiago, the IRAs
should be excluded. The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of
the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be
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P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not
excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income
but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate,
increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not annual income of a local government unit includes IRAs.
Ruling:
Yes. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local
Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than
twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such,
for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income
of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth
utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is
defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They
thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of
much needed funds.
AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
The Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 under the
Local Government Code to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be
converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such
conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed a resolution requesting

the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the
province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued a Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC
subject to ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in
Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Comelec issued a proclamation
resolving that registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said
plebiscite.
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The governor of Nueva Ecija filed a motion for reconsideration maintaining that the
qualified voters of the province should be included in the said plebiscite. The phrase
"qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to
the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the
component city proposed to be upgraded.
Issue:
Whether or not only the qualified registered voters of Cabanatuan City can
participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city into an HUC.
Ruling:
No. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC
is substantial alteration of boundaries. Creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. The entire
province of Nueva Ecija will be directly affected by Cabanatuan Citys conversion. As a
consequence, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate
of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT, et. al.
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011, NACHURA, J.
The exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of
one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.
Facts:
The President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). After complying with the required plebiscite, the
President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on
January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons
elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. The former
political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 arguing that Dinagat failed to
comply with the required land area based on Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9355 is valid and constitutional.
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Ruling:
Yes. The exemption from the land area requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted
from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail
was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. With the formulation of the LGC-
IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the many
details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to
be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the
LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision
in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh
and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
ARNOLD D. VICENCIO VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO JR.
G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012, SERENO, J.
There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts
on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
Facts:
A city ordinance Ordinance No. 15-2003 was passed granting the Vice Mayor of
Malabon, Jay Jay Yambao, to negotiate and enter into contract for consultancy services for
consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat tasked to function in their respective areas of
concern. Later on, petitioner Arnold Vicencio was elected as Vice Mayor of Malabon, and he
deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and
upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the legislative machinery
of the city. After the funds were appropriated, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM)
was issued disallowing the amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred
eighty pesos (384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The Petitioner appealed to
the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, but the latter denied the petition.
The COA affirmed the decision of the ASB.
Issue:
Whether or not the contracts entered into by Vice Mayor Arnold Vicencio are valid.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 456 of the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority
on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government
unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter
into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
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Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts
for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of
the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a continuing authority for
any person who enters the Office of the Vice- Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar,
contracts.
ROMEO J. GAMBOA JR. VS. MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., AND JUAN Y ARANETA
G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously

exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor
call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. was elected as the Vice Governor of Negros
Occidental while respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected as
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) members. The governor had an official trip abroad and
designated petitioner as acting governor until his return. However, during the regular
session, the respondents questioned the authority of the petitioner and subsequently filed a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. The trial court rendered a decision and
declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the
SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.
Issue:
Whether or not the Vice Governor has the authority to preside over SP sessions
while he is exercising the powers and duties of the Office of the Governor.
Ruling:
No. It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered
effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the
latters absence. This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is
similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to
what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably construed to mean effective
absence, that is, one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to
discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office. There is no vacancy whenever the office
is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when
there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the
office. By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment
or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency. Considering
the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent
vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed
in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. This is so because in the
eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified
person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
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Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously

exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial
Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with
but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing
dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a
temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy
in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such
temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding
officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation
of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a
temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor)
powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under
Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the
sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF

APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
Facts:
A complaint for plunder and violation of RA 3019 was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City
Government of Makati in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City. Therafter, the Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension
order and copy of the preventive suspension order was received by Maricon Ausan, a
member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively
liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative
liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic. The CA issued a TRO he CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-
election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.
Issue:
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Whether or not the condonation doctrine is applicable.
Ruling:
No. the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
Further, Nothing in Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code states that the elective
local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all
events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation

doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, CORTES, J.
The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does
not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220 which created
the Cordillera Administrative Region which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio on the primary ground that it
pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite. During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region was enacted and signed into law. It
recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of RA 6766.
Issue:
Whether or not the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Ruling:
No. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g.
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the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to
create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, et al. v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, BRION, J.
RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in
the ARMM.
Facts:
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed

the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which were
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011, to the second Monday of May
2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to
temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration assailing constitutionality
of R.A. 10153 on the ground that the constitution gave ARMM a special status and is
separate and distinct from the ordinary local government units.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional

elections with national and local elections.
2. Whether or not by granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective
and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices.
3. Whether or not ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective
positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the
Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.
Ruling:
1. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize
the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions
of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which states that the first
elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by
the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress.
It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the Constitution during the deliberation, through
Davide could not have expressed their objective more clearly that there will be a single
election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of
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elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this
constitutional mandate.
2. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates the President shall appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining
to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. The above-quoted provision did not change the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly
preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the
offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily
assume these offices to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.
3. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the
intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within
which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. It is established that elective ARMM
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed
by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending
the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting
a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N.

TALABONG, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, BRION, J.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right
to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter
occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his
functions for reasons established by law.
Facts:
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended
him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the 2007 election, Asilo
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. This prompted Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to
Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-
term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
Commission on Elections (Comelec) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete
service for the full term.
Issue:
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Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his
term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code.
Ruling:
No.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states that the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit
rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office and elective official
must have involuntarily left his office. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term,
while on the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of
an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a
term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office. The office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
In cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing

the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate
and lose title to his office since loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an
eventual finding of guilt or liability. Thus. Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by
the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does
not interrupt an elective officials term.
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a rest period during

which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit.
Facts:
For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal
board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres, who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested and was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then came the 2010 elections where
Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and Torres lost no time in seeking the
formers disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
Comelec First Division ruled in favor of Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action
before the RTCto unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised. The RTC
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declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he has already served
three consecutive terms. Comelecs second division and en banc affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.
Ruling:
No. Pursuant to Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of
time shall not, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
During the period of one year and ten months, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate for only a little over one year and one month. The reality on the ground is
that Abundo actually served less. The almost two-year period during which Abundos
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary
interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in
the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent
since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective
position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election
protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, v.

HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of

the public domain.
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany
but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. The spouses bought a
parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of Elena
Muller. However, due to incompatibilities and Helmut Mullers alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. Helmut Muller filed a
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petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between them. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the Helmut Muller and he cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution. Helmut Muller appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that he is not praying
for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement, that the
funds were given to Elena in trust that the funds paid by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage, and that equity demands that respondent should be
reimbursed of his personal funds. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Helmut Muller.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
Ruling:
No. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut
Mullers disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute under the
Constitution. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it
is likewise proscribed by law.
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, v. PR BUILDERS, INC.,

G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real
property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the
law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the
execution of the final deed transferring ownership.
Facts:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse, Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to
Sell with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's
townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. When PR Builders failed to
comply with its verbal promise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed before the
HLURB a complaint for rescission of contract. HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of
spouses Hulst and order to reimburse the purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R.
Builders with damages and attorneys fees. HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution and
the Sheriff levied on PR Buikder's 15 parcels of land and sold it to an auction sale. CA
reversed the decision and set aside the levy on the ground that the subject properties
cannot be owned by Hulst being a foreign national.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell is valid.

2. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to reimbursement.
3. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to recover damages and attorneys fees.
Ruling:
1. No. Sec. 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the
Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to
Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void.
2. Yes. Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the because
they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault. In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine
which holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract. No suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation and where the
parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions one of which is Uuder Article 1414 which
states that,one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act
has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has
paid.
3. No. Hulst is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00,

representing the purchase price paid to respondent. A void contract is equivalent to
nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical
relation. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract. Being nonexistent,
the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is
not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
WILSON P. GAMBOA, v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al.

G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, CARPIO, J.
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus only to common shares, and not to
the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
The 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial
ownership and the controlling interest.
Facts:
General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a
major PLDT stockholder, sold 26% of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC.
Subsequently, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm,
acquired the remaining 54% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. Aside from that, Inter-
Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would
sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a
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public bidding. First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale
and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125% of the outstanding capital
stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government. With the sale, First Pacifics common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 %to 3 %, thereby increasing the common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This allegedly violates Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital
of a public utility to not more than 40%.
Gamboa submits that the 40% foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities
refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through
voting that control over a corporation is exercised. Gamboa posits that the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the ownership of common capital stock
subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of
PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of directors. It is undisputed that PLDTs
non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens. This arose from
Presidential Decree No. 217, issued on 16 June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos,
requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone line to subscribe to non-voting preferred
shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the telephone line. Secretary Teves, on the
other hand, do not offer any definition of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan of PLDT do
not dispute that more than 40 % of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners.
Issue:
Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the
total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility.
Ruling:
The term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares
of stock that can vote in the election of directors. Section 11, Article XII (National Economy
and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, it
explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding
economic goal of the 1987 Constitution, to conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Thus the
40% foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to
ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, which are common shares, considering that it
is through voting that control is being exercised. However, if the preferred shares also have
the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDTs holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that "each holder of Common
Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all
matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall
have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes." In
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short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only
common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares,
who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT.
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL

SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al.
G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, VILLARAMA, J.
Once water is removed from its natural source, it ceases to be a part of the natural
resources of the country and may be subject of ordinary commerce and may even be acquired
by foreigners.
Facts:
PSALM, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001"
(EPIRA) manages the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets,
real estate and other disposable assets. Thereafter, PSALM commenced the privatization of
the 246-megawatt (MW) AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, a portion of
which is co-owned by NPC. After the post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors
approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, K-Water.
Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction was filed by the Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative
Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS) et al. alleging that K-Water which is a foreign corporation, thus
PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of
water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines limiting
water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
PSALM countered the nationality issue raised, citing previous opinions rendered by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) consistently holding that the utilization of water by a
hydroelectric power plant does not constitute appropriation of water from its natural
source considering that the source of water (dam) that enters the intake gate of the power
plant is an artificial structure.
Issue:
Whether the utilization of water by the power plant to be owned and operated by a
foreign-owned corporation will violate the provisions of the Constitution and Water Code.
Ruling:
No. Art. 15 of The Water Code of the Philippines states that only citizens of the
Philippines, of legal age, as well as juridical persons, who are duly qualified by law to exploit
and develop water resources, may apply for water permits. It is clear that the law limits the
grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities duly qualified by law to
exploit and develop water resources, including private corporations with sixty percent of
their capital owned by Filipinos.
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The nationality requirement imposed by the Water Code refers to the privilege to
appropriate and use water and has interpreted this phrase to mean the extraction of water
directly from its natural source (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 14, s. 1995). Natural is
defined as that which is produced without aid of stop, valves, slides, or other supplementary
means. The water that is used by the power plant could not enter the intake gate without
the dam, which is a man-made structure. Such being the case, the source of the water that
enters the power plant is of artificial character rather than natural. Once water is removed
from its natural source, it ceases to be a part of the natural resources of the country and
may be the subject of ordinary commerce and may even be acquired by foreigners.
NPCs water rights remain an integral aspect of its jurisdiction and control over the
dam and reservoir. That the EPIRA itself did not ordain any transfer of water rights leads us
to infer that Congress intended NPC to continue exercising full supervision over the dam,
reservoir and, more importantly, to remain in complete control of the extraction or
diversion of water from the Angat River. In this way, the States full supervision and control
over the countrys water resources is also assured notwithstanding the privatized power
generation business
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND

DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND MCARTHUR MINING, INC. v. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED
MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580, January 28, 2015, VELASCO JR., J.
Facts:
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. In addition to that since Nara et al. capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI,
they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which
are reserved only for Filipino citizens. In their answer Nara et al. averred that they were
qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of R.A. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
which provides that any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or authorized for the
purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake mineral
resources development and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per cent
(60%) of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines. Provided, That a
legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or
mineral processing permit. Additionally, they stated that their nationality as applicants is
immaterial because they also applied for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements,
which are granted to foreign-owned corporations. Nevertheless, they asserted that though
MBMI owns 40% of the shares of PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the
shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC
(which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro), the shares of MBMI will not make it the
owner of at least 60% of the capital stock of each of corporations. They added that the best
tool used in determining the nationality of a corporation is the "control test. Mining
Adjudication Board ruled in favor of Narra et al. However, RTC and CA reversed the said
ruling. In reaching the conclusion, the court applied the Grandfather Rule as a supplement
to the Control Test.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Grandfather Rule can be applied in determining the nationality
of the corporation.
Ruling:
Yes. The use of the Grandfather Rule as a supplement to the Control Test is not
proscribed by the Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The Grandfather Rule
was originally conceived to look into the citizenship of the individuals who ultimately own
and control the shares of stock of a corporation for purposes of determining compliance
with the constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership. From the excerpts in the Record
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it was shown that the framers of the Constitution
have not foreclosed the Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying the nationality of
corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right to participate in nationalized or partly
nationalized activities. However, it is only when the Control Test is first complied with that
the Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject corporations
Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is immediately considered
foreign-owned, in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears. As a
corollary rule, even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by the
subject or investee corporation, a resort to the Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists
as to the locus of the beneficial ownership and control. On the case at hand, the fact that
MBMI had practically provided all the funds in Tesoro, McArthur and Narra creates serious
doubt as to the true extent of its control and ownership over the said corporations.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. REYES

G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use

of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones.
Facts:
Resident Marine Mammals are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in Taon Strait, joined by stewards.
Initially, the Government of the Philippines entered into a contract with Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) involving geological and geophysical studies of the
Taon Strait. Then, they converted it into a Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) which allowed
the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Taon Strait.
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Taon
Strait, Resident Marine and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center et al. assert that
SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is
100% Japanese-owned. It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a
technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Service Contract No. 46 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the President may enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based
on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.
Foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and

use of natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. SC-
46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. SC-46 did not merely involve
exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be
discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Taon Strait being a
protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234 requires that the exploitation and
utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by
Congress specifically for that purpose. No law was passed by Congress specifically providing
the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for
Taon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-
46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation
and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as Taon Strait shall only
be allowed through a specific law.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006, CARPIO, J.
Land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the
subject of levy and auction sale.
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) located in Paranaque City. The Officers of the City of
Paranaque sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. When MIAA failed
to settle the entire amount, the said officers threatened to levy and subject to auction
the land and buildings of MIAA which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary
period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for a TRO with the Supreme Court
a day before the public auction which the court granted but the TRO was received by
the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA claims that although the
charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA, still, the
ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. That as the said properties are of
public dominion, they cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale.
Issue:
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Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and
thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
Ruling:
Yes. Art 420 of the Civil Code provides, to wit: Art 420. The following things are
property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in
Article 420 of the Civil Code are owned by the State. The term "ports" includes seaports and
airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the State.
Hence, the same are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the
property whether it is of public dominion or not.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the
commerce of man. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport
Lands and Buildings from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion
and are inalienable. Since the disputed properties are of public dominion, they are not
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale.
DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON

G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The PNRCs structure is sui generis.

Facts:
Liban, et al. filed with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate for having been elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator in
violation of Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution. It was advanced by Liban, et al. that the
PNRC is a GOCC. Formerly, the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat. The Court,
however, held further that the PNRC Charter (R.A 95) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC
as a private corporation which the Congress cannot create. Hence, it directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Issue:
What is the nature of PNRC?
Ruling:
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The PNRCs structure is sui generis. Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution that must be organized under the
Corporation Code. In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by
the parties.
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177131, JUNE 7, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation created by law for a public
purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter
and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Facts:
In 1999, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a resolution stating that the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a GOCC subject to auditing jurisdiction of COA. The BSP
argued that the provisions of RA 7278 suggest that governance of BSP has come to be
overwhelmingly a private affair or nature, with government participation restricted to the
seat of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports.
Issue:
Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the auditing
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
Ruling:
Yes. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso
facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of
corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations.
These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government
which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its
departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by
law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports
pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation
which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically viable
to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if
the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the
government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds
of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA VS HON. EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R No. 187167, JULY 16, 2011, CARPIO, J.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise
of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit
the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
Facts:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted (Baselines Law). This law was meant to comply with the terms of
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the
Philippines in February 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona, et al. questioned the validity of
RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means
to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it
comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to
delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. The law did not decrease the demarcation
of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046),
we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered
was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of
the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na.
mi. If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.

ROMULO et al.
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.
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The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
Facts:
As a result of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the Second World
War, Vinuya et al, all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, sought the assistance of the
respondent in filing their claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who are
responsible for the so called "comfort women" system. However, the officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and stated that compensation for
the victims have already been complied with by virtue of the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Dissatisfied, Vinuya et al., filed this present petition for certiorari with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
respondents.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them.
Ruling:
No. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Certain
types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative'the political'departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which
is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would
be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn
the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed.
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Moreover, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse

petitioners claims. Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State,
reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to
exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than
the legal merits of the particular claim. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide
whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It
retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et

al.
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, PUNO J.
Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate and the role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Facts:
In this petition, Senator Pimentel et al, sought to compel the officials of the executive
branch to transmit the text of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine
Mission to the Senate for ratification for the Statute specifically requires that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Senator Pimentel et al., contends
that it is the function of the Senate to ratify treaties pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution and that the executive branch is obliged to transmit the signed copy of
the Statute to the Senate. It further alleged that since the provision of the Rome Statute
forms part of the customary international law, the Senate has the ministerial duty to ratify
the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive branch has a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute even without the signature of the President.
Ruling:
No. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
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petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, Melo, J.
Facts:
The Philippines has an extradition treaty with the USA. In 1999, the DOJ received
from US a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez. Pending
evaluation of the extradition docuements, Jimenez requested copies of the extradition
request, but the DOJ denied such request on the ground that the extradition treaty states
that the formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information
and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under
United States law. According to the DOJ, such denial is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the
interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue:
Whether or not granting Jimenez the rights of notice and hearing would be
considered a breach of the extradition treaty with the US.
are granted to the prospective extraditee despite the silence of the extradition treaty.
Ruling:
No. US. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or
local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause
in the above-cited constitutional provision.
In this case, there is no such conflict between international law and municipal law.
Instead, there is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards the basic due process of the
prospective extraditee. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules
of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not
go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Petitioner contends that the United
States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be
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obtainable during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be
lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, CARPIO MORALES, J.
The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her

powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
Facts:
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners sought to

compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD. Petitioners alleged that respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the President, in the course of peace negotiations may agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
Ruling:
Yes. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has
the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to

them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino
people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and
the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end
and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in
the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for
their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations
with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations
to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have
the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the
recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
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WIGBERTO E. TAADA, et al. v. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al.

G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.
Facts:
The Senate ratified the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, which
improves the countrys access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. The WTO is said to provide new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
Petitioners, however, assailed the ratification, contending that the WTO agreement
impairs the Philippine economic sovereignty, legislative power and the Filipino First
policy under the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate gravely abused its discretion in ratifying the WTO
agreement.
Held:
No. The Philippine Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. Applying the Doctrine of
Incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Moreover, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its charter
members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as
auto-limitation.
What the Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The
act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal
of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed
as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law.
Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
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It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Facts:
Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He
was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal.
Thereafter, MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result, MeTc judge
dismissed the two criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement.
Ruling:
No. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and staff of the Bank including
for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned
therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official
capacity. Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement because
Philippines laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of

the US 7th Fleet et al
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to Indonesia when it ran
aground the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
US 7th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. Three
months later, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the
grounded ship from the coral reef. The petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of
186 | P a g e
2016
a Writ of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials, claiming that the grounding and
salvaging operations caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect several provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident. Only the Philippine respondents filed a comment to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who
did not submit any pleading or manifestation in the case
Ruling:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In
such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been
filed without its consent.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
187 | P a g e

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Deans Circle

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL (MPH) v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION (MHC),

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN v.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition

Raul Lambino commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change

NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et al. v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No 9522 on several grounds: first, it

Whether or not RA No. 9522 is constitutional.

Moreover, whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

Whether or not the funds of UP can be subject to garnishment.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Ang Ladlad is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,

Whether or not Ang Ladlads application as a party-list should be granted

contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,

However, the section of the RH-IRR allows contraceptives and recognizes as

Whether or not RA 9262 is constitutional.

Petitioner argued that by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY ALBIOS

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social

institution. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Petitioners consider the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), as it

In this case, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to

ROMARICO J. MENDOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

To amplify the scope of a law would be tantamount to judicial legislation abjured by

Whether or not Mendoza should be acquitted.

BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL V. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARIA

Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction

BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGANEN

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created by RA 9054.

No. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Section 19, Article VI of RA

NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION V. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). PSALM opposed the garnishment

Whether or not PSALM can be bound by a judgment against NPC.

MEMBERSHIP, ELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO V.

While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about

Whether or not RA 9716 is Constitutional.

VICTORINA B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, AND

Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to judicial review

Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is

Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional

ANGEL G. NAVAL V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA

The three-term limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible.

Whether or not Navals election for the year 2013 is valid.

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

No plebiscite is needed for the creation of a legislative district.

Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary to create a legislative district.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO V. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,

MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a

1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a

1. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning,

2. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to