ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES

ACT
(RA NO 3019)

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT

Corrupt practices of public officers.

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public

officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense
in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any

gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other part, wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any

gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or
for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of
this Act.

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family

accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or within
one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including

the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,

without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in
favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

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 (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with
which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for

personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act
requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if
he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of
the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public
officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful,
inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or
group to which they belong.

( j) Knowingly approving or granting any license,

permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for
or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential

character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his
official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release date.

UNEXPLAINED WEALTH,
MEANING

Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained

wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of RA 1379, a public
official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for
dismissal or removal.

Note: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value

shall be offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or
friendship according to local customs or usage shall be exempted
from the provision of this act.

MEANING OF
CAUSING UNDUE INJURY

The act of giving any private party any unwarranted

benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of
causing any undue injury to any part, although there may be

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instances where both elements concur. (Santiago vs Garchitorena,
et al., 2 Dec. 93).

In Mejoroda v Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court has

ruled that the offender in causing undue injury does not refer only
to those who are in charge of giving permits, licenses or
concessions but all acts of public officers or employees which have
caused undue injury to others.

ELEMENTS OF NEGLECT OF DUTY UNDER

SEC. 3 OF RA 3019

a. the offender is a public officer;

b. the said officer has neglected or has refused to act without
sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made
upon him;
c. reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request
without the public officer having acted on the matter pending
before him;
d. such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining directly
or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested
party or discriminating against another. Coronado v
Sandiganbayan.

WHERE PUBLIC OFFICER ACTED

WITH MANIFEST PARTIALITY,
EVIDENT BAD FAITH, OR INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to

acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (E) OF RA 3019

REQUIRES PROOF OF THE FOLLOWING
FACTS, VIZ:

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a. the accused is a public officer discharging administrative or
official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;

b. the public officer committed the prohibited act during the

performance of his official duty or in relation to his public
position;

c. the public officer acted with manifest partiality evident bad

faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and

d. his action caused undue injury to the government or any

private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.

CAUSING UNDUE INJURY UNDER SEC. 3,

LETTER (e) OF RA 3019. MEANING.

Section 3 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt

practices of any public officer declared unlawful. Its reference to
any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it
specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view
adopted by the Solicitor General that the last inclusion of officers
and employees of offices or government corporations which, under
the ordinary concept of public officer may not come within the
term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of
granting license or permits or other concessions. (Mejorada v
Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 399).

SUSPENSION UNDER R.A. 3019 MANDATORY

BUT COURTS ARE ALLOWED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER INFORMATION IS VALID OR NOT

It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it

mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any
public officer against whom a valid information charging violation
of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in
court. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate
his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. All
that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused
stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-
described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought
for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503
[August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).In the same case, the Court held
that "as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019,
preventive suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only
if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue
for ninety (90) days." (Conducto v. Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-
1147, July 2, 1998)

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PUBLIC OFFICER MAY BE SUSPENDED FROM HIS
PRESENT POSITION EVEN IF THE CRIME WHICH
HE IS BEING CHARGED WAS COMMITTED
DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM

Judge Monzon's contention denying complainant's Motion

for Suspension because "offenses committed during the previous
term (is) not a cause for removal during the present term" is
untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis
Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that "the
rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however,
finds no application to criminal cases . . ."

Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco

vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA
1292, that "The ruling, therefore, that 'when the people have
elected a man to office it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any' refers
only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a
criminal case"

Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was

committed during Maghirang's first term as barangay chairman and
the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 during his
second term, his re-election is not a bar to his suspension as the
suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case.
(Conducto v. Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2, 1998)

RE-ELECTION IN PUBLICOFFICE
EXTINGUISHES ONLY HIS
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY BUT
NOT HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY

As early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez, 17 this

Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official
extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability
incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, that "when the people have

elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had
been guilty of any" refers only to an action for removal
from office and does not apply to criminal case, because a
crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than
mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public
officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not

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 only to a person or group of persons but to the State as a
whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection
to office as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer
is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the
President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.
(Conducto v. Monzon; A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, July 2,
1998)

PRE-CONDITION OF SUSPENSION
(PREVENTIVE) UNDER SEC. 13, RA 3019

It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive

suspension a public officer accused before it. Imposition of
suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-
condition thereof is the existence of a valid information,
determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in
accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-
reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even
before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a
speedy determination of the issues involved in the case. The
purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to determine the
validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a
basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which
impairs its validity. The accused should be given adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the criminal
proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the
right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised
Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court. But once a proper determination of the validity of the
information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The
court has no discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the
suspension of the accused official on the pretext that the order
denying the latter's motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. (Segovia v. Sandiganbayan; GR 124067, Mar.
27, 1998)

GUIDELINES TO BE FOLLOWED
IN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CASES

"In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al.

(L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187), we have set out the
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the
power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to wit:

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 (c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower
courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from
office of public officers charged under a valid information
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant
to section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon
the filing of such information, the trial court should issue
an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to
show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not
be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited
mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of
suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash
the information or challenges the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be
necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly
hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the
validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its
ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension
should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold
such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such

pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against
him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation, the act for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he
may present a motion to quash the information on any of
the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
The mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon
determination of the pendency in court or a criminal
prosecution for violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for
bribery under a valid information requires at the same time
that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted
such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the
Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged
in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be
called upon to issue the suspension order upon its
upholding the validity of the information and setting the
same for trial on the merits.' (Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan)

WHEN MAY A PUBLIC OFFICER

BE LIABLE FOR CAUSING
UNDUE INJURY UNDER
SEC. 3(e) of RA 3019

xxx xxx xxx

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(c) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions."

To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the

following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt
by the prosecution:

"(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person

charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during
the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or
her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."

(Llorente v. Sandiganbayan; GR 122166, Mar. 11,

1998)

MEANING OF BAD FAITH UNDER SECTION 3(e) OF RA

3019

"Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or

negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
(Spiegel v Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series 895, 1007). It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167).
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part
of the accused to do wrong or cause damage."

In Jacinto, evident bad faith was not appreciated because the

actions taken by the accused were not entirely without rhyme or
reason; he refused to release the complainant's salary because the
latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused to approve
her sick-leave application because he found out that she did not
suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla
because she was moonlighting during office hours. Such actions
were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee who
studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.
(Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan)

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WHEN OFFENDER IS NOT
LIABLE UNDER SEC. 3(e) BUT
UNDER SEC. (f) OF RA 3019

It would appear that petitioner's failure or refusal to act on

the complainant's vouchers, or the delay in his acting on them
more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:

"(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or

request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party."

Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time

is the criminal act, not the causing of undue injury. Thus, its
elements are:

"1) The offender is a public officer;

2) Said officer has neglected or has refused to act
without sufficient justification after due demand or request has
been made on him;
3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or
request without the public officer having acted on the matter
pending before him; and
4) Such failure to so act is 'for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of
an interested party, or discriminating against another."

However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec.

3[f]. Hence, further disquisition is not proper. Neither may this
Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating his
constitutional right to due process.
(Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan)

SUSPPENSION (PREVENTIVE) OF
LOCAL OFFICIALS SHALL ONLY
BE FOR 60 DAYS

On the other hand, we find merit in petitioner's second

assigned error. The Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day
suspension upon petitioner for the single case filed against him.
Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code, "any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days." (Rios
v. Sandiganbayan; GR 129913, Set. 26, 1997)
APPROVAL OF LEAVE OF ABSENCE
NOT A BAR TO SUSPENSION

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 Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged
in a valid information with an offense punishable under the
Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the law's
command that he "shall be suspended from office" pendente lite
must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his
preventive suspension for as indicated by the Solicitor General, an
approved leave, whether it be for a fixed or indefinite period, may
be cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent. (Doromal v.
Sandiganbayan; GR 85468, Sepr. 7, 1989)

UNDUE DELAY IN PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATIONS VIOLATIVE OF
DUE PROCESS AND A GROUND TO DISMISS

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this

case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503
should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it
unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner. (Tatad
v. Sandiganbayan)

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