Arned Transfer Syria

Arms Transfers
to
The Syrian Arab Republic
Practice and Legality
Mlanie De Groof
2013/9
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Arms Transfers to The Syrian Arab Republic Practice and Legality
Table of Content
1. Introduction 5
2. The Internal Actors Involved in the Syrian Conflict 8
2.1. State Armed Forces 8
2.2. The Opposition Groups: Myriad of Actors 11
2.3. Territorial Control 17
2.4. The Violations of International Human Rights Law
and International Humanitarian law 18
3. The International Responses to the Situation in Syria 20

3.1. Condemnations, Sanctions and Arms Embargoes 20
3.1.1. The United Nations 20
3.1.2. The European Union 25
3.2. International Recognition 28
3.2.1. The United Nations 28
3.2.2. Regional Organisations and Individual States 29
4. Panorama of Weapons Used by Internal Actors 31

4.1. Conventional Weapons 31
4.2. Chemical Weapons 32
5. Arms Transfers to Syria: Practice 35

5.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces 35
5.2. Arms Transfers to the Opposition Groups 38
6. Arms Transfers to Syria: Legality 42

6.1. EU Law 42
6.1.1. Council Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons 42
6.1.2. Council Common Position on Exports
of Military Technology and Equipment 43
6.2. Public International Law, International Human Rights Law
and International Humanitarian Law 44
6.2.1. International Humanitarian Law 45
6.2.2. International Human Rights Law and ILCs Articles
on State Responsibility 46
6.2.2.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces 46
6.2.2.2. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups 47
6.2.3. The Principles of Non-Intervention and Non-Use of Force 48
6.2.3.1. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups 48
6.2.3.2. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces 49
6.2.4. Self-Defense, Security Council Authorization
and the Responsibility to Protect 51
7. Concluding Observations 54
Rapport du GRIP 2013/9
But we can hardly be satisfied with destroying chemical weapons while the wider war
is still destroying whole Syria. The vast majority of the killings and atrocities
have been carried out with the conventional weapons. I appeal to all States to stop fuelling
bloodshed and to end arms flows to all the parties.
Address to the UN General Assembly by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
24 September 2013
Source: UN doc. A/HRC/18/53

1. Introduction
Early in 2011 Syria fell under the spell of the Arab Revolution. In February and March
2011, the Syrian people stepped into the streets and claimed more political, social and
economic rights. The Syrian regime announced several political and legal reforms,
but part of the population experienced them as unsatisfactory. The demonstrations
became more vicious and the regime of President Bashar Hafez al-Assad broke up
the crowds with military action. The States suppression of dissent was followed by
defections and the formation of armed opposition groups. Violence soon escalated and
transformed into a still-ongoing civil war, in which the parties conduct has become
increasingly radicalized and militarized, at the expense of both the Syrian people and
both regional and international peace and security.
Recent figures are revelatory of the growing cycle of violence: according to reports
released in September 2013 over 110,000 people have been killed; many thousands have
been wounded during the armed hostilities; there are more than 2.4 million refugees;
4 million have been displaced internally (IDPs); and more than one-third of Syrians
urgently need humanitarian aid. Economic conditions in Syria are deteriorating and
the Syrian currency is severely depreciated.10 Furthermore, most basic infrastructure
including schools, hospitals, power and water utilities and houses have been, and still
are being, destroyed.11 Both government and non-governmental forces are regularly
blamed for perpetrating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law.12 Therefore, many States13 and
. This revolution is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring; yet the term revolution is preferred because it is
more neutral than spring.
. For an overview of the reforms announced by the Syrian Government, and the results thereof, see UN Report
of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter: UN Report
Commission of Inquiry), A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 31-34; UN Report Commission of
Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 14; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August
2012, 15-16.
. See UN Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523,
6 July 2012, at p.1.
. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 17.
. In July 2012, the ICRC for the first time labeled the Syrian conflict as a non-international armed conflict. In
August 2012, the UN Commission of Inquiry reported that during the reporting period (February 2012-August
2012) the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the increased organizational capabilities of anti-
Government armed groups, had met the legal threshold of a non-international armed conflict. See also BBC
(2012), Syria in civil war, Red Cross says, 15 July 2012; Aljazeera (2012), Red Cross declares Syria conflict a civil
war, 16 July 2012.
. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at p.1.
. See UN Under-Secretary-General Valerie Amos remarks to the press, Beirut/New York, 6 September 2013; The
Economist (2013), Syrias war. An unlikely band of brothers, 21 September 2013.
. Ibid; Reliefweb (2013), Syria: Humanitarian Snapshot, 17 September 2013.
. Ibid; See also WFP, Syria-overview, last consulted on 31 October 2013.
10. Reuters (2013), Syria lets pound float to save foreign reserves, 24 April 2013; The Daily Star (2013), Syria to
activate $1B loan to stabilize pound, 19 June 2013.
11. See for example UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie
Amos Security Council briefing on Syria, New York, 25 October 2013; The Telegraph (2013), Syria: more than
half of hospitals destroyed or damaged, 16 September 2013; The Daily Star (2013), Op.cit.
12. See Section 2.4.
13. Amongst others, France, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Argentina, Australia and South Korea. According to
Human Rights Watch, in March 2013 64 States in total had called on the Security Council to refer the situation in
Syria to the International Criminal Court (See Human Rights Watch (2013) UN Security Council: Seize Chance
for Justice in Syria, 17 September 2013).
civil society groups14 urge for the immediate reference of the Syrian situation to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and for the Security Council to adopt effective
measures.
Since the chemical attack in the Ghouta area on 21 August 2013, which killed an
estimated 1,400 men, women and children, high level diplomatic negotiations have
resumed. But still, the prospects for peace and stability on the ground seem remote.
While the immediate threat of an international military intervention has been lifted,
the fighting between the forces of Assad and the rebel groups, as well as the combats
between the dozens of armed opposition groups, continues unabated. It is estimated
that several thousands of Syrians have been killed by conventional weapons since the
Ghouta chemical attack.15
After more than two years of internal conflict in Syria, a pressing question relates to
the legality of arms transfers to both the groups opposing the regime of Assad and
the Assad regime itself. Since the beginning of the conflict, regional and international
players are arming one side or the other, which brought the UN Secretary-General
to qualify the conflict as a proxy war.16 The latest report of the UN Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter: UN
Commission of Inquiry) unambiguously observed that [m]ore regional actors were
sponsoring flows of fighters and equipment, increasingly along sectarian lines, leading
to a rise in corresponding violence.17 In light of the lift of the EU arms embargo earlier
this year, and the growing tensions at the regional and international level on the Syria
question, there is no likelihood of decreasing arms transfers in the near future, which
triggers the discussion on the permissibility of such arms transfers.
Therefore, this research paper outlines the normative and practical framework which
governs arms transfers to the myriad of actors involved in the Syrian armed conflict.
The practical analysis concentrates on past and present arms transfers to Syria and
the risks of proliferation of these arms in Syria and beyond. This examination is based
on official reports of the UN and EU, a wide variety of media sources, contacts with
experts, writings of legal and political scholars and reports from governments and
non-governmental sources. The legal analysis focuses on the most important inter-
national and European legal standards governing the transfer of military material and
technology, as well as the international treaty and customary law rules regulating the
threat or use of force in international relations. The main purpose of this report is
to offer an in-depth legal and factual analysis on arms transfers to Syria.
This report is structured as follows: Hereafter, Section 2 focuses on the internal
actors involved in the Syrian conflict. It analyses the various components, internal
structure, territorial control and conduct of both State and non-State actors in Syria.
Section 3 examines the various international responses to the situation in Syria. More
14. Amongst others, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Global R2P. See also, UN HRC (hereafter:
HRC) Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, 4 June 2012; UN HRC Res. 20/22, A/HRC/RES/20/22, 16 July 2012;
EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 18 February 2013, 8. For information on the ICC and Syria, see Human Rights
Watch (2013), Syria and the International Criminal Court, September 2013.
15. See The Economist (2013), Syrias war. An unlikely band of brothers, 21 September 2013.
16. UN Secretary-General Remarks to the General Assembly, 3 August 2012.
17. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 23; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 27; The Economist (2013), Hit him hard, 31 August 2013.
particularly, it analyses the condemnations, sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by

influential international and regional actors, as well as the status attributed by the UN,
regional organizations and different single States to the different parties involved in
the conflict. Section 4 offers a panorama of the conventional and non-conventional
weapons used in Syria and Section 5 gives a detailed overview of the most important
arms transfers to both the Syrian State armed forces and opposition groups. Section
6 analyses the legality of arms transfers to Syria, taking into account all the elements
revealed in Sections 1 to 5. Finally, Section 7 concludes with summary observations
and assesses the legitimacy of arms transfers to Syria.
This report was completed on 1 November 2013.
2. The Internal Actors Involved

in the Syrian Conflict
The dynamics of the conflict have become increasingly complex. The war has become coloured
by sectarianism, permeated by opportunistic criminality and aggravated by the presence
of foreign fighters and extremist groups.18
The actors fighting for territorial and political control in Syria are numerous and di-
verse. The current discussion on the permissibility of arms transfers to Syria requires
an analysis and understanding of the myriad of actors which do, or may, benefit from
arms transfers. This is because the structure, territorial control and conduct of both
State and non-State armed groups are factors that should be taken into account in all
decisions relating to the advisability and legality of providing support a fortiori lethal
support to armed entities abroad. This section examines, firstly, the structure and
organization of the government armed forces and the most influential armed op-
position groups. This part also briefly looks at the support both sides involved in the
conflict receive from foreign fighters. Secondly, this section also assesses the territorial
control of the different parties to the conflict. Lastly, this section concludes with an
overview of the documented violations of human rights law and humanitarian
law perpetrated by the different actors.
This overview of the different facets of the internal actors involved in the Syrian
conflict is first and foremost based on UN reports, with particular attention for the
reports of the UN Commission of Inquiry, which was tasked, amongst others, to estab-
lish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such [i.e. human rights] violations
and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible.19 In
view of the independence and high-quality of the members of the UN Commission of
Inquiry, the UN Commission of Inquiry reports are a valuable and important source
of information. The data thus obtained have been verified with, and complemented
by, an open source analysis of press articles and reports of NGOs, Think Tanks and
independent academics.
2.1. The State Armed Forces

The Syrian State forces include (1) the Syrian Armed Forces, (2) the Security and Intel-
ligence Forces, and (3) the Shabbiha and Peoples Army militia, affiliated with the Syrian
Government.20 The core of the command structure of the States armed and security
forces are formed by Alawites, a Muslim minority group that accounts for around 12
per cent of Syrias population and to which the Assad family belongs.21 All army divi-
18. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 120.

19. For the mandate, features and composition of the UN Report Commission of Inquiry, see ohchr website.
20. UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253 B, 7 August 2012, at p.2; See also UN Report of the Secretary-General
on Children and Armed Conflict, A/66/782-S/2012/261, 26 April 2012, at p.22; UN Report Commission of
Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at p.1.
21. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 March 2013, Issue 8, at p.3.
sions, all security services, and all militias of the State have been engaged in military
operations during the conflict.22
While State armed forces remain fully operational and very powerful, there have
been numerous casualties, defections and desertions, especially during the first two
years of the civil war.23 While in early 2011 the Syrian State armed forces still numbered
around 300,000,24 in a 2013 study the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated
that [t]he nominal pre-war strength of the army has likely been reduced by half .25 In
addition to the continuous reduction of staff, the Syrian armed forces have also ex-
perienced significant losses of armour, combat aircraft and helicopters.26 This section
briefly analyses the composition and structure of the Syrian State forces:
1. The Syrian Armed Forces comprise the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
The Syrian Armed Forces are organized into twelve divisions: seven armoured, three
mechanized, one Republican Guard and the Special forces.27 The Syrian Elite units,
which are responsible for countering any threat from dissident military forces, include
both the Republican Guard (originally 10,000-man) and the Fourth Division (originally
20,000-man).28 The Army in particular has been affected by the civil war; at present
most formations are understrength and several have been disbanded.29 The Syrian
President is the supreme commander of the Syrian Armed Forces.30
2. The Syrian Security Apparatus is composed of a multitude of security forces
and intelligence agencies. More precisely, it has four security directorates: Military
Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, State Security, and Political Security.31 The Syrian
security apparatus has been known for playing a powerful role in Syrian society and
being large and effective.32 While it is difficult to estimate the actual strength of the
security apparatus, there is no doubt that it has greatly complemented the army during
the civil war.33
22. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 22 and 24.

23. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 September 2012, Issue 5, at p.3; J. Hol-
liday (2013), The Syrian Army. Doctrinal Order of Battle, Report by the Institute for the Study of War, February
2013; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 29; UN Report Com-
mission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 25; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46,
16 August 2013, 28 (defections continued to spare the core of military and security forces and steadily declined,
even among the less-trusted units).
24. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (hereafter: IISS)(2011), The Military Balance 2011, Routledge,
London, at p.330; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 18.
25. IISS (2013), The Military Balance 2013, at p.403. For the year 2010, the Military Balance evaluated the strength of the
army as follows: Active 295,000 (Army 220,000; Navy 5,000; Air 30,000; Air Defence 40,000) and Paramilitary
108,000. For the year 2011, the Military Balance evaluated the strength of the army as follows: Active 295,000
(Army 220,000; Navy 5,000; Air 30,000; Air Defence 40,000) and Paramilitary 108,000. For the year 2012, The
Military Balance evaluated the strength of the army as follows: Active 178,000 (Army 110,000; Navy 5,000; Air
27,000; Air Defence 36,000) and Paramilitary not known. This discloses that it is especially the Army that suffered
defections, casualties and desertions.
26. IISS (2013), The Military Balance 2013, at p.403.
27. J. Holliday (2013), Op.cit, at p.6; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011,
18.
28. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 18. According to the IISS, [t]he
most capable and most reliable of those remaining are mainly Alawite Special Forces, the Republican Guard, and
the elite 3rd and 4th divisions: perhaps 50,000 troops in total. See IISS (2013), The Military Balance 2013, at p.403.
30. Article 105 of the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic 2012.
31. A.A. Hendi (2011), The Structure of Syrias Repression, Foreign Affairs, 3 May 2011. See also UN Report Com-
mission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 19.
32. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 19.
10 Rapport du GRIP 2013/9
3. The State Militia includes the Shabbiha34 and the Peoples Army.35 While in 2011,
Syrian paramilitary forces were estimated at some 100,000, the present number of pa-
ramilitary group members is unknown.36 State Militia is actively involved in the Syrian
conflict and have been identified as the perpetrator of many abuses (see below). While
the internal organization and chain of command of the militias remains unclear,37
they are, at least partly, armed by the government. State Militias have generally acted
in concert with, or with the acquiescence of, government forces.38 However, according
to a number of sources, Assad is losing control over its militias. According to a Syrian
regime official, [t]he longer the war goes on, the more difficult it will be for Assad to
control his own paramilitary forces.39
4. Even though they cannot be qualified as either a de jure or de facto organ of the
State, during the civil war many pro-government communities have formed armed
self-defence groups, also known as popular committees.40 The raison dtre of these
self-defence groups is to protect their neighbourhoods and localities from anti-govern-
ment armed forces.41 Typically, these neighbourhood watches establish checkpoints
and conduct night patrols.42 They are reportedly equipped and armed by either the
government or external sympathisers.43 The Syrian government has gradually more
relied on these armed groups, which have been involved in extrajudicial killings and
other abuses (see Section 2.4).44
In view of the numerous defections and casualties, the regime of Assad has in-
creasingly relied on armed militia (3) and self-defence groups (4), and has sought to
reinforce their cohesion by organizing them better.45 To this end, hundreds of popular
committees and militias were merged into a new paramilitary force in 2012, which
became known as the National Defence Army.46
34. The Shabbiha is an umbrella term for militias supporting Assad; they are composed of around 10,000 civilians,
and are widely used to crush anti-Government demonstrations alongside national security forces. See in this
regard UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 20; A. Lund (2013),
The non-State militant landscape in Syria, CTC Sentinel, 27 August 2013.
35. The Peoples Army is a Baath party militia composed of an estimated 100,000 reservists. This paramilitary group
is designed to provide additional security and protection in cities in times of war. See in this regard UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 20; IISS (2012), The Military Balance 2012,
at p.350; IISS (2013), The Military Balance 2013, at p.405.
36. IISS (2011), The Military Balance 2011, at p.330; IISS (2012), The Military Balance 2012, at p.350; ISS (2013), The
Military Balance 2013, at p.405.
37. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2012), R2P Monitor, 15 September 2012, Issue 5, at p.3; Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2012), R2P Monitor, 15 November 2012, Issue 6, at pp.2-3; UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 24 and 133.
38. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, 20; UN Report Commission
of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at pp.1 and 2.
39. See for example, Time (2013), Syrias Assad may be losing control over his deadly militias, 11 September 2013.
40. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 20.
41. Reuters (2012), Insight: Minority militias stir fears of sectarian war in Damascus, 7 September 2012.
42. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
43. Reuters (2012), Insight: Minority militias stir fears of sectarian war in Damascus, 7 September 2012; UN
Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at 22; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 31.
44. See for example Reuters (2012), Insight: Minority militias stir fears of sectarian war in Damascus, 7 September
2012.
46. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 22; UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 27.
Arms Transfers to The Syrian Arab Republic Practice and Legality 11
5. Lastly, foreign militias and fighters, primarily from Lebanon, Iran and Iraq,
have joined the Syrian State armed forces.47 While some such as the Iranian Revolu-
tionary Guard operate under the instructions of foreign governments, other armed
fighters such as those belonging to Iraqs Asaib Ahl al-Haq cannot necessarily be
identified as being associated with a third State government.48 The latest report of
the UN Commission of Inquiry observed that government forces benefited from
wide logistical support and personnel provided by allies, including the deployment
of military advisers.49 This significant involvement of foreign forces, in particular
the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard, in certain strategic areas
revitalized the Syrian army at a crucial point in the fighting, when armed opposition
had gained steady ground against the State armed forces.50 To illustrate, in May 2013
the Hezbollah military presence reached a peak; reportedly there were 1,200 Hezbollah
military personnel involved in a ground assault of the Syrian armed forces in the town
of Al Qusayr.51 And in June 2013, several sources reported that Iran had sent 4,000
troops to Syria in order to aid the forces of Assad.52
2.2. The Opposition Groups: Myriad of Actors

The Syrian opposition is deeply divided, fractured, and diverse, and includes numerous
armed groups. In fact, the Syrian opposition is no more than an umbrella term for
groups calling for the fall of the Assad regime; today, this call is mostly the only ele-
ment binding all rebel groups. Still, as will be developed below, several armed groups
have tried to form coalitions to unite opposition forces and increase the oppositions
credibility both inside and outside Syria. As over time the Syrian opposition received
greater external support, it has become increasingly capable of militarily engaging with
the government armed forces.53 This section gives an overview of both the political
and armed opposition in Syria, and offers a rough panorama of the most influential
armed opposition groups.
1. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces
(National Coalition) is an opposition umbrella group that was created at a conference
of opposition groups held in Qatar in November 2012. At this conference, various
groups from the Syrian political opposition decided to unify in order to gain more
legitimacy and obtain substantive international political, logistic, financial and military
support.54 The stated objectives of the National Coalition are ousting the Assad regime
and dismantling the security services; unifying and supporting the Free Syrian Army;
holding accountable all groups and individuals responsible for the atrocities in Syria;
47. In this regard, see also UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013, 5 and 10.
48. See for example The Wall Street Journal (2013), Fighters, Flowing to Syria, Guard Shiites, 23 May 2013.
49. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 27.
50. See UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 23; A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.; Reuters (2013),
Special Report: Hezbollah gambles all in Syria, 26 September 2013; BBC (2013), Footage claims to show Iranians
in Syria, 15 September 2013; Al Arabiya (2013), Report: Iranian military advisors in Syria seen in online foot-
age, 16 September 2013; Al Arabiya (2013), Report: Iran to send 4 000 Revolutionary Guards to bolster Assads
forces, 16 June 2013; Aljazeera (2013), Hezbollah reaffirms support for Syrias Assad, 17 August 2013.
51. Charles Lister in an interview on Janes website, 3 July 2013.
52. The Independent (2013), Iran to send 4,000 troops to aid President Assad forces in Syria, 16 June 2013.
53. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 September 2012, Issue 5, at p.3; BBC
News (2013), Guide to the Syrian opposition, last consulted on 9 October 2013.
54. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 March 2013, Issue 8.
and rejecting dialogue or negotiation with the criminal regime.55 The National Coali-
tion also emphasized in a Facebook-message that it plays an important role in liaising
between the needs of the Syrian people and the international community.56
The National Coalition is made up of representatives of external Syrian opposition
groups and internal revolutionary forces and receives support from the Free Syrian
Army, the Syrian National Council and the Supreme Joint Military Command
Council (see below).57 Yet, other opposition groups have criticised the National Coalition
and have sometimes rejected its legitimacy.58 At the international level, the National
Coalition has received wide international support (see Section 3.2) and functions as the
main political interlocutor with the international community today. Several States
have recognized the National Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian
people.59 However, the other side of the picture is that reflective of the different
opposition movements it assembles the National Coalition has been plagued by
internal divisions since its inception.60 These internal frictions, fuelled by the struggle
for influence over the Syrian opposition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has greatly
contributed to the National Coalitions inability to assert overall command over the
Syrian armed opposition.61
2. The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed in August 2011. It was the first
significant coalition of Syrian opposition groups created in order to offer a credible
alternative to the regime of Assad.62 Before the creation of the National Coalition,
of which the SNC is now part, the SNC was the main political interlocutor with the
international community.63 The SNC is a political opposition group,64 but it has strong
connections with the Free Syrian Army, which is the main armed opposition group
in Syria. The SNC comprises a diverse set of members, ranging from the Muslim
55. Local Coordination Committees (2012), The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces,
12 November 2012, last consulted on 1 November 2013.
56. BBC News (2013), Guide to the Syrian opposition.
57. Ibid. See also UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 14.
58. See for example Statement Issued by the Revolutionary Movement in Syria, 29 May 2013, last consulted on 1
November 2013; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 14.
59. UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013.
60. The National Coalitions first president, Moaz al-Khatib, resigned in April 2013, in protest of the lack of international
support to the Syrian opposition and because multiple actors were trying to hijack the Syrian revolution to advance
their own interests (See The Guardian (2013), Moaz al-Khatibs resignation plunges Syiran opposition into chaos, 24
March 2013; New York Times (2013), Syrian Opposition Leader Quits His Post, 24 March 2013). It is commonly
accepted, however, that the election a few days earlier of Ghassan Hitto as Prime Minister of the interim government
formed by the National Coalition was an important trigger for al-Khatibs departure as well (See NewYork Times
(2013), Syrian Rebels Pick U.S. Citizen to Lead Interim Government, 18 March 2013; The Guardian (2013), Syrian
rebels elect prime minister, 19 March 2013). Until the election of Ahmed Jarba in July 2013, George Sabra served
as acting president of the National Coalition (See Al Jazeera (2013), Main Syrian opposition elects new president,
6 July 2013; RFI (2013), Syrie: Ahmad Assi Jarba, nouveau president de la Coalition nationale syrienne, 6 July
2013). In July 2013, the first interim Prime Minister Hitto resigned as well, reportedly because he had been unable
to form a cabinet, and because Saudi Arabia a principal backer of the Syrian opposition coalition had uttered
its discontent with Hitto (See New York Times (2013), Another Leader Quits Post in Syrian Exile Group, 8 July
2013; New York Times (2013), Syrian opposition group elects new prime minister, 14 September 2013). Finally, in
September 2013, the National Coalition elected Ahmad Tomeh as the oppositions new transitional prime minister,
hoping that this would both improve the Coalitions standing inside Syria and attract greater international support
(see New York Times (2013), Syrian Opposition Group Elects New Prime Minster, 14 September 2013).
61. BBC News (2013), Guide to the Syrian opposition.
62. Ibid.
63. UNGA Res. 62/262, A/RES/67/262, 4 June 2013, 26; See for example EU Observer (2012) France recognizes
Syrian council, proposes military intervention, 24 November 2011; RFI (2012), Syrian National Council a le-
gitimate interlocutor, says France, 24 February 2012; Al Arabiya (2012), Friends of Syria recognize SNC as a
legitimate representative of Syrians, 1 April 2012.
64. The SNC is thus unarmed, but it has close relations with the Free Syrian Army (see below).
Brotherhood to secular formations and representatives of local committees.65 The

SNC leadership largely resides abroad, and it is currently headed by Georges Sabra.66
It must be stressed that just like the National Coalition the Council has had in-
ternal frictions since its creation. Also, its legitimacy has been contested by other
parts of the opposition.67 Criticisms often voiced include: the SNCs failure to equip
the armed groups on the ground; its inadequacy to mobilize global effective support
for the opposition; its poor efforts to provide humanitarian and relief efforts to the
Syrian people; and its lack of transparency.68 Due to its decreasing popularity and
being under increased international pressure, the SNC unified with other opposition
groups in November 2012 in order to form a broad, new and more effective National
Coalition (see above).69
3. The main armed opposition group is the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It was set
up by the military defector Colonel Riad Assad and is composed predominantly of
armed civilians and army defectors.70 The FSA on the one hand and the SNC/Natio-
nal Coalition on the other are two separate entities and mainly operate independently,
but their respective leaderships have also cooperated and coordinated actions.71 Even
though the FSA assembles many armed groups that are actively engaged in the Syrian
conflict, the level of control and command of the FSA leadership over the different
FSA groups remains limited.72 In fact, while some groups expressly recognize the FSA
leadership, other so-called FSA groups seemingly only adopt the name to underline
their revolutionary aspirations.73 Many reports have stressed this absence of a func-
tioning chain of command within the FSA as well as the lack of control over, and
effective accountability mechanisms for, the different factions operating under the FSA
umbrella.74 One report unambiguously noted that the armed factions widespread use
of the FSA brand gave the impression of a unified movement, but no nationwide FSA
structure was ever created to match the name.75
65. Geneva Academy Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, Syria, last consulted on 31 October 2013; UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 16.
66. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 16; V. Szybala (2013), The Islamic
Alliance Emerges, Institute for the Study of War, 26 September 2013; Al Arabiya (2013), Syrian opposition group
refuses to attend Geneva peace talks, 13 October 2013.
67. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, 22 February 2012, 16; Al Arabiya (2012), Syrian army overruns Idlib as
leading figures quit rebel council citing chaos, 14 March 2012; BBC News (2013), Guide to the Syrian opposi-
tion, Op.cit.
68. Al Arabiya (2012), Syrian army overruns Idlib as leading figures quit rebel council citing chaos, 14 March
2012.
69. Reuters (2012), Syrian opposition agrees deal, chooses preacher as leader, 11 November 2012.
70. Geneva Academy Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, Syria; Report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 4; Global Centre for the Re-
sponsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 10 January 2012, Issue 1, at p.2; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 17; T. Pierret (2013), External support and the Syrian Insurgency, Foreign
Policy, 9 August 2013.
71. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 17; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 18; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013,
Annex II, 12.
72. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 17; See also E. O Bagy (2013), The
Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report, Nr. 9, March 2013.
A./HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 27; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013,
Annex II, 12.
74. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 108-109; UN Report Commission of
Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 24; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February
2013, Annex II, 12.
75. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
In December 2012, there was an ambitious attempt to set up a more efficient FSA
leadership, which resulted in the creation of the Supreme Joint Military Command
Council (SJMCC), also referred to as the Supreme Military Command (SMC). Since
that date, FSA and SJMCC/SMC are used interchangeably. The principal task of the
SJMCC, led by General Salim Idris, was to unify all opposition fighting forces under
one single command at the national level. The SJMCC, while it improves upon previous
attempts at armed opposition unification,76 has not become the effective institution
international and national policy makers had hoped for.77 In June 2013, the UN Com-
mission of Inquiry observed that the SJMCC failed to centralise different sources of
logistical support, integrate command networks and alleviate the influence of radical
groups.78 Indeed, the SJMCC does not function as a conventional military organiza-
tion since member groups retain their separate identities and operation autonomy and
proclaim loyalty to their own commanders.79
On the other hand, it is recognized that the SJMCC facilitates the coordination
between all its member groups and functions as a unified distribution channel for
military supplies and funds.80 In April 2013, Gulf States declared that they would
link the supply of weapons to allegiance to the FSA/SJMCC.81 This conditional supply
system, which aims at preventing arms from falling into the hands of radical groups
such as Al-Nusra, has reportedly also been applied by western States such as France,
the United Kingdom and the United States.82 As a result, many rebel groups in Syria
eager to be adequately equipped have aligned with the FSA/SJMCC.83 Practically,
according to Reuters, the commanders of the various armed groups which pledge
allegiance to the FSA/SJMCC just submit a list of the weapons and ammunition nee-
ded to Military Command Council which, in turn, forwards the request to the backing
States, in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar.84 Once the weapons are delivered to the
FSA/SJMCC, they are dispatched to the different armed units in Syria.85 All in all, the
influence of the FSA/SJMCC after it had trended downwards during the second
half of 2012 has increased again 2013.86
4. In the current context, it is also important to stress the presence of other non-
State armed groups, which are not affiliated to the main political and armed opposition
movements discussed above. These so called independent military alliances mostly
76. O Bagy (2013), Op.cit, at p.6.

77. See for example Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at Annex II, 15.
78. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 25; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 30.
79. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit. In the same sense, see UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February
2013, at Annex II, 15; The National (2013), Gulf states put new conditions on arms supplies to Syrian rebels,
27 August 2013 (Disparate and largely autonomous armed groups hold sway); For an overview of most important
pro-FSA armed groups, see A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
80. Ibid. See also Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination of arms flows to Syria, 14 May 2013; O Bagy
(2013), Op.cit, at p.6.
81. The National (2013), Gulf states put new conditions on arms supplies to Syrian rebels, 27 August 2013.
82. Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination of arms flows to Syria, 14 May 2013.
83. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit. See also Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination of arms flows to Syria, 14 May
2013. The reported number of fighters that operate under FSA/SJMCC umbrella differs from source to source;
whereas some speak of about 80,000 fighter, others claim that there are over 300,000 in FSAs member groups.
In this regard, see A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
85. See for example Reuters (2013), U.S. providing some lethal aid to Syrian opposition spokesman, 10 September
2013.
86. Le Soir (2013), Les djihadites deveinnent majortaires dans la rebellion syrienne, 19 September 2013.
regroup armed movements in a specific area and they all have a common goal, i.e. the
collapse of the actual regime.87 Independent military alliances range from moderate
to extremist groups,88 and some have on several occasions cooperated operationally
with the FSA/ SJMCC.89 Radical and extremist armed groups on Syrian territory
have become more and more visible and influential. Most renowned radical armed
groups are the Jabhat Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (Al-Nusra)90 and
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but there are dozens of other hard-line Sa-
lafi factions. However, the precise number of radical and extremist armed groups in
Syria is highly contested.91 The UN Commission of Inquiry has reported in that the
discipline and operational abilities of radical fighters, combined with better access to
reliable sponsors, allowed them to outmatch the fractious moderate groups.92 Many
individuals fighting for extremist groups have come from abroad; not all of them have
Syrian nationality (see Foreign fighters). Radical groups have predominantly been
funded and armed by private donors, not by Gulf States.93
5. Foreign fighters have increasingly reinforced rebels ranks.94 For the most part,
they come from States in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, but there are
also several credible accounts of European and American young men joining armed
opposition in Syria.95 Even though their number is hard to assess,96 foreign fighters have
87. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 16 and 25; UN Report Commission of
Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 30.
88. See for example, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) and the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF). See UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at 25; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/
HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 30.
89. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 25; For an overview of the existing al-
liances, which include all major blocs in Syria such as the FSA and the Al-Qaeda affiliates, see V. Szybala (2013),
Op.cit.; Reuters (2013), Arabs battle Syrian Kurds as Assads foes fragment, 26 September 2013.
90. In view of the better organization, discipline, efficiency and often better access to external (private) support of
Al-Nusra, this rebel group has been part of most of the major operations conducted by other anti-Government
armed group (see A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, 29). In November 2012, Al-Nusra was declared by the USA to
be a foreign terrorist organization and an affiliate of Al Qaida in Iran. See UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 15; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 29.
91. According to a study published in September 2013, half of the approximately 100,000 rebels could be qualified as
being radical or extremist (IHS Janes, referred to in Le Soir (2013), Les djihadistes deviennent majoritaires dans
la rbellion syrienne, 19 September 2013). Other analysts, on the other hand, have contested this and observe
that only 10 to 15 per cent of the Syrian rebels can be qualified as jihadists. (See for example P. Puchot (2013),
En Syrie, relativiser limportance du phnomne djihadiste, Mediapart, 12 September 2013; E. O Bagy (2013),
Report from Syria: There are moderates and they do control territory, Israel Matzav, 2 September 2013). Accord-
ing to some sources, Jihadist groups close to Al-Qaeda would represent about 10,000 fighters; another 35,000 to
40,000 fighters would belong to radical armed groups with purely national goals (See, T. Pierret (2013), Op.cit.)
92. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 33; See also T. Pierret (2013), Op.cit. (the
one main reason for the success of hard-line Salafists throughout 2012 was a matter of superior material resources.
As illustrated in numerous press reports at that time [2012] such resources make them inherently more appealing
but also more disciplined compared with groups that sometimes had to finance themselves through looting and
other criminal activities.)
93. T. Pierret (2013), Op.cit.
94. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at Annex II, 18; UN Report Commission
of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 31.
95. Most cited countries home to the foreign fighters are Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt.
However, many foreign fighters do also originate from European States, including Belgium, The Netherlands,
France and the UK. See Bloomberg (2013), Foreign Fighters Flocking to Syria Stirs Terror Concerns, 20 July 2013;
Euronews (2013), Family fears for Belgium foreign fighters in Syria, 18 October 2013; Jamestown Foundation
(2013), Foreign Fighters Bring a Global Agenda to Syria, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 10, 13 September 2012; BBC
(2013), Britons fighting with extremist groups in Syria, warns Hague, 24 April 2013.
96. According to the EUs counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, in July 2013 about 600 fighters had
gone to Syria from Europe. In an interview with the Bloomberg center, he added that the number of foreign
fighters grows to several thousand if those from the Balkans and North Africa are counted as well. See Bloomberg
(2013), Foreign Fighters Flocking to Syria Stirs Terror Concerns, 20 July 2013.
integrated armed groups all over the country and contributed to the radicalisation of
anti-Government insurgents.97
6. Finally Kurdish armed groups add to the complex cartography of Syrian ar-
med groups.98 Kurds comprise about 10 per cent of Syrias population, and they are
concentrated in the northwest of Syria, in parts of Damascus and in the north-eastern
oil-producing area of Qamishli.99 The main Kurdish militia has been engaged in clashes
with both government and anti-government forces over control of Kurdish areas in
northern and north-eastern Syria.100 In fact, the Kurds have, albeit without success,
tried to stay out of the civil war, and they have refused to align officially with either
the Assad regime or the opposition. 101
Before turning to the next issue of the actual territorial control of the different
parties to the armed conflict, it seems appropriate to make two short comments: First,
it must be emphasized that the disintegration, radicalization and fragmentation of
both the political and armed opposition has worsened, amongst others because of the
interference of third actors.102 According to the UN Commission of Inquiry, the
fragmentation was aggravated by if not the result of the fact that the financial and
material external support delivered by different sponsors, instead of promoting integra-
tion, has generated divisions and exacerbated competition among different groups.103
In the same report, it is also observed that the intervention of external sponsors has
contributed to the radicalization of the insurgency as it has favoured Salafi armed groups
such as the Al-Nusra Front, and even encouraged mainstream insurgents to join them
owing to their superior logistical and operational capabilities.104 The intensification
of the conflict, which has become lawless, is often directly linked; first, with
the increased involvement of both foreign fighters and extremist groups, but
also with the arms transfers from third States to Syria (see Section 5).105 Second, all
these disparate opposition groups are increasingly involved into a power struggle
amongst themselves, which has resulted in heavy clashes.106 Several powerful armed
opposition groups actively oppose the umbrella FSA/SJMCC107 and areas which are
nominally under the control of armed opposition groups are often characterized by
fierce rebel fighting in the course of the war.108 This persistent division has subs-
tantially limited the operation capacity of the armed opposition, which has lost
97. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, Annex II, 18.
98. For a good overview of the Kurds in Syria and the Syrian war, see International Crisis Group (2013), Syrias
Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle, Middle East Report, N 136, 22 January 2013.
99. Reuters (2013), Al-Qaeda, Kurdish militia clash on Syrian border with Turkey, 25 September 2013.
100. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 31; See also Reuters (2013), Arabs battle
Syrian Kurds as Assads foes fragment, 26 September 2013.
101. A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
102. The Economist (2013), The hard men on both sides prevail, 18 May 2013; UN Commission of Inquiry, A/
HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 29.
104. Ibid. 26.
105. Ibid. 134.
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 29-30; The Economist (2013), Syrias war: an unlikely band of brothers, 21
September 2013.
107. V. Szybala (2013), Op.cit; A. Lund (2013), Op.cit.
108. New York Times, Rebels view Coalition leadership Outside Syria as detached from the suffering, 22 September
2013; The Economist, Syrias war: an unlikely band of brothers, 21 September 2013.
control over certain strategic areas regained by the government forces.109 Worse still,
this fragmentation of the opposition has also fuelled the perpetration of war
crimes and crimes against humanity without an effective accountability mechanism
being available. This will be discussed further below.
2.3. Territorial Control

Since the beginning of the civil war battle lines have been constantly changing.110 Both
the armed opposition groups and the Assad regime have known military victories and
defeats. The last report of the UN Commission of Inquiry summarized the military
situation on the ground as follows:
Fighting continued, with both sides consolidating forces in their primary strongholds.
Government forces continued to control major cities and lines of communications, while anti-
government armed groups reinforced their presence in large swathes of the northern and eastern
governorates, and areas along the Jordanian border.111
The Assad regime holds most strategic military positions, economically important
areas, air force bases and main lines of communication across the country.112 While the
government forces were able to recapture some opposition strongholds in 2013, several
analysts observe that the territorial gains of the government are owed to the military
assistance of foreign fighters, in particular of the Hezbollah and the Iranian guard.113
Still, the Assad regime has lost control over substantive parts of the Syrian territory,
which are ruled by various rebel groups at present. And, to illustrate the fissured grip
of the Assad regime over the Syrian territory, it must be noted also that even in the
areas under the regimes control, the government is struggling to provide the most basic
services and ensure security.114 The provision of basic services by the opposition varies
across areas under rebel control but, in general, the civilian population is suffering from
a lack of access to food, water, shelter and medical assistance.115 In addition to this
basic division between government-controlled areas on the one hand and opposition-
controlled areas on the other, some areas are also under Kurdish control.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to map territorial possession,116 it aims at
demonstrating that control of the Syrian territory is deeply divided. This, in turn,
has a major impact on the lawfulness of outside assistance provided by States to either
of the warring parties (see Section 6.2.3.2).117 This territorial division, it is observed, is
unlikely to be resolved soon because in the words of the Syrian deputy prime minister,
Qadri Jamil neither the armed opposition nor the regime is capable of defeating the
other side and this zero balance of forces will not change for a while.118
110. See for example UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 24.
111. Ibid. 23.
112. Ibid. 24.
113. See for example, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 September 2013, Issue
11, at p.2.
115. See Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2013), Factsheet: SDC Syria Crisis, 18 July 2013.
116. For a more detailed analysis, see BBC (2013), Syria: Mapping the conflict, 5 September 2013; Institute for the
Study of War (2013), Update: Syrias southern battlefront, 11 October 2013; Institute for the Study of War
(2013), The opposition advances in Damascus, 9 August 2013.
117. C. Gray (2008), International law and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press, at p.81.
118. New York Times (2013), Kerry Presses Security Council to Act on Syrian Arsenal, 19 September 2013.
2.4. The Violations of International Human Rights Law

and International Humanitarian Law
Anti-Government armed groups conduct their operations from within densely populated civilian
areas, putting civilians in the line of fire and forcing them to flee their homes. Government forces
conduct their military operations in disregard of the distinction between civilians and persons
directly participating in hostilities.119
In view of the massive violations of the law of war and the most fundamental human
rights, the war in Syria is often qualified as one of the most ferocious wars in recent
history. While initially it was especially the Assad regime that was accused of mass
atrocities, rebel armed groups have been catching up and are heavily contributing to
this lawless war.
Firstly, there are numerous, credible and consistent reports that document widespread
and systematic gross violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and war crimes, committed by all State
armed forces in Syria, i.e. military forces, security and intelligence forces, and pro-
government militia. The regime of Assad has been particularly criticised because of
its widespread attacks directed against the civilian population.120 The UN Commission
of Inquiry refers to brutal tactics adopted during military operations, particularly by
Government forces.121 More specifically, the following prohibited acts are reported:
(1) arbitrary detentions; (2) enforced disappearances; (3) torture and other inhuman
and degrading treatment; (4) sexual violence; (5) extrajudicial executions; (6) murder;
(7) indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks; (8) pillage and destruction of property;
(9) attacks of protected objects and persons; (10) and use of prohibited weapons.122
Several sources observe that these abuses are committed pursuant to a State policy,123
and that the unrestrained violence often aims at spreading terror among the civilian
population, which in se is a violation of international humanitarian law.124
Secondly, there are also abundant documented instances of gross human rights
violations and war crimes committed by anti-government armed groups. Among
others, besides the torturing and killing of captured members of the State armed

120. See for example, Human Rights Watch (2013), Syria: Aerial Attacks Strike Civilians, 10 April 2013; UN Report
Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 44.
122. UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December 2012; UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253 B, 7 August
2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011; UN Report Commission
of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August
2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 121-129; UN Report Commis-
sion of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, at p.1 and 41-44, 55-60, 64, 67-74, 76-88, 96-100, 101-105,
114-126, 138-148, 150, 156-157, 161-168, 170. See also Human Rights Watch (2013), Syria: Political Detainees
Tortured, Killed, 3 October 2013; Human Rights Watch (2013), Syria: Mass Executions by Government Forces,
13 September 2013; Amnesty International (2012), Syria: Indiscriminate bombing in residential neighbourhood in
Damascus, 22 October 2012; Amnesty International (2012), Syrian: All sides must protect captured or detained
individuals in their custody, 11 October 2012; New York Times (2012), U.N. Panel Accuses Syrian Government
of Crimes Against Humanity, 23 February 2012.
123. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at pp.12 and 15; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August
2013, 44.
124. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 126-127. EA Worldview (2013), Syria
Video Feature: The Assad Regimes Terror Bombing, 17 August 2013.
forces and informers,125 there are more and more reports of opposition forces indis-
criminately shelling government controlled neighbourhoods and executing civilians.
More specifically, the anti-government armed groups have reportedly committed the
following prohibited acts: (1) murder; (2) extrajudicial executions; (3) hostage-taking;
(4) torture; (5) recruitment and use of child soldiers; (6) indiscriminate attacks; (7)
attacking protected objects and persons.126 Some sources suggest that the armed oppo-
sition may have been guilty of using prohibited chemical weapons,127 but this has not
been confirmed. For a long time, it was reported that the frequency, gravity and scale
of these abuses was much lower than the ones committed by State armed forces.128
However, the exponential increase of accounts of mass executions and atrocities com-
mitted by the anti-government armed groups may have started to tilt the balance.129
The number of reported violations by the opposition is constantly increasing both in
gravity and in scale130 and according to several eye-witnesses, the opposition is as guilty
of international crimes as the State armed forces.131
Thirdly, Kurdish armed groups have also been accused of having recruited and
used child soldiers in hostilities.132 There are accounts of violations of international
human rights law and humanitarian law, albeit on a lower scale than the armed oppo-
sition groups and armed forces of Assad.133
In summary, all parties to the conflict act in defiance of international law
when it comes to the treatment of civilians and hors de combat, as well as
the utilized means and methods of war. Regarding the latter, government and
anti-government forces have massively exposed civilians to the dangers of war and
maximized the risks of civilians being killed during armed attacks. Moreover, sprea-
ding terror has become a regular practice of both the government forces and several
armed opposition groups.134 For instance, there are many reports that both parties use
snipers to control both the movement of people and assert control over areas, and
that these snipers regularly fire at civilians.135 Last but not least, the documented use
of chemical weapons (see Section 4.2) is also revelatory of the inhuman character of
the armed conflict in Syria.
125. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 58-60; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 112, 114 and 117; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5
February 2013, 53-57.
126. Amnesty International (2012), Syrian: All sides must protect captured or detained individuals in their custody,
11 October 2012; Human Rights Watch (2013), You Can Still See Their Blood, October 2013 and the response
letter of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 11 October 2013; New York Times
(2012), Syrian Insurgents Accused of Rights Abuses, 20 March 2012; The Economist (2012), Syrias rebels.
Fewer Innocents, 6 November 2012. See also UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/19/69, 22 February
2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 134; UN Report Commission of
Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 130-133; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16
August 2013, at p.1 and 45- 52, 61, 65, 89-93, 106-109, 127-133, 149, 151-152, 158-159, 169, 170.
127. See for example Global Research (2012), Syria: Chemical Attack or Provocation by Opposition Rebel Forces,
20 September 2013.
128. See for example, UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 89.
129. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at p.2.
130. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 61 and 73.
131. Ibid. 75; Human Rights Watch (2013), You Can Still See Their Blood, October 2013.
133. Ibid. 53, 62, 94, 110.
134. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at 134.
135. Ibid. 20; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 42, 44, 132, 133.
3. The International Responses

to the Situation in Syria
Positions varied in the international community on how to deal with the conflict. Some States
demanded the immediate departure of the President; others focused on preventing any form of
outside intervention. Others continued to provide military supplies to the Government. Still others
called for funding, and provided communication and material support to anti-Government armed
groups. The alleged presence of foreign advisers was also a point of contention among States,
as was the use of sanctions. The uncertain international context undermined the efforts
of the joint special envoy to achieve a political solution to the conflict.136
This section gives an overview of the international responses to the situation in Syria.
In particular, it examines (1) the UN condemnations and EU arms embargoes and
sanctions, as well as (2) the legitimacy attributed to both the armed opposition and the
regime of Bashar al-Assad by the EU, the Arab League, the UN and individual States.
These specific international actions and reactions do have a particular value for they
have to be taken into consideration when assessing the legality of arms transfers to
Syria (see Section 6).
3.1. Condemnations, Sanctions and Arms Embargoes

The use of armed force by the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition, as well as the
use of chemical weapons, has been condemned by both regional and international
organizations, as well as by single States, which have all adopted different measures.
The accountability for atrocities has been attributed to the Syrian government or the
opposition in different instances over time. Some institutions have stressed that some
parties in the conflict have been more responsible than others in committing human
rights and humanitarian law violations, however as demonstrated below the go-
vernment is more often blamed for such activities.
3.1.1. The United Nations

At the global level, General Assembly, the Security Council, the Human Rights Council,
as well as several other UN entities, have all at regular intervals condemned the massive
abuses in Syria and called upon the political leaders of both the Syrian government and
the armed opposition to fulfil their responsibility to the Syrian people. However, the
current analysis indicates that the UN has been unable to agree upon coercive measures
to be adopted against the different entities responsible for violations of international
law, such as an arms embargo, or to foster a sustainable and unified international res-
ponse to the crisis in Syria.
The UN General Assembly has adopted five resolutions on The situation (of
human rights) in the Syrian Arab Republic since the beginning of the uprising.137 The
137. UNGA Res.66/176, A/RES/66/176, 19 December 2011; UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253, 16 February
2012; UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August 2012; UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 De-
cember 2012; UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May 2013.
first resolution was adopted in December 2011 and condemned the violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the use of violence by the Syrian
authorities.138 It remained silent on the role and conduct of the Syrian opposition and
armed groups.139 As from the second resolution onwards, the General Assembly called
upon both the Government and all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, including
armed groups to stop all violence, reprisals and human rights abuses immediately.140
For the first time, the General Assembly qualified some behaviour in Syria as terrorist
acts in August 2012.141 In December and May 2013, the General Assembly strongly
condemned the escalation of violence, the continued widespread and systematic gross
violations of human rights, and the continued use of heavy weapons and aerial bom-
bardments by the Syrian authorities against the Syrian population.142
It is noticeable that according to the terminology of the five General Assembly
resolutions, the abuses perpetrated by the government forces including the Syrian
armed forces, intelligence forces and shabbiha militias143 are more serious both in scale
and in nature than those perpetrated by the opposition.144 Even in the last resolution,
the General Assembly almost exclusively referred to, and specified, the misconduct
of the Syrian authorities, especially its increased use of heavy weapons; the General
Assembly neither mentioned the opposition by name, nor pointed to specific repre-
hensible acts of the rebellion.145
In August 2011, only few months after the start of the uprising, a Presidential
Statement by the UN Security Council condemned the human rights violations and
the use of force by the Syrian authorities and urged all sides to end all violence.146
In the same document, the Security Council also expresse[d] profound regret at the
death of many hundreds of people.147 Seven months later, in March 2012, the Presidential
Statement of the Security Council stipulated that the Council regretted the death of
many thousands of people in Syria and expressed its full support of the six-point pro-
posal outlined by the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States,
Kofi Annan, to which the Syrian government committed itself on 25 March 2012.148
138. UNGA Res.66/176, A/RES/66/176, 19 December 2011.

139. Ibid.
140. UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253, 16 February 2012; UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August
2012; UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December 2012; UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May
2013, 3 and 4.
141. UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August 2012, 3; See also UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15
May 2013.
142. UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December 2013, 1; UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May
2013, at p.1.
143. A UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August 2012, at p.2; See also Report of the Secretary-General on
Children and Armed Conflict, A/66/782-S/2012/261, 26 April 2012, at p.22.
144. For example, in resolution 66/253B the General Assembly refers to the continued widespread and systematic viola-
tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities and pro-Government militias () while it
only referred to any human rights abuses by armed opposition groups. See UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3
August 2012, 2. See also UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December 2012, 3.
145. UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May 2013; See also UN News Centre (2013), Outraged by rising death
toll in Syria, General Assembly demands halt to all violence, 15 May 2013.
146. Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2011/16, 3 August 2011; See also Statement
by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012.
147. Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2011/16, 3 August 2011.
148. Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012. This document also
contains an overview of the six-point proposal submitted to the Syrian authorities by the Joint Special Envoy
(for an overview of this six-point proposal, see Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of
UN Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 6). On 25 March 2012, the Syrian government
On 5 April 2012, the Security Council adopted its third Presidential Statement on the
situation in Syria in which it called upon all parties, including the opposition, to cease
armed violence in all its forms.149 More than one year later, on 2 October 2013, the
Security Council adopted its fourth statement, in which it unambiguously condemned
the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by both
the Syrian authorities and armed groups.150 It also referred to the increased terrorist
attacks () carried out by organisations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda,
which it condemned.151 In this last Presidential Statement, the Security Council in
contrast with the UN General Assembly clearly puts both sides of the conflict on an
equal footing in the sense of committed abuses and the obligation to stop behaviour
prohibited under international law immediately. This trend of holding both the Syrian
regime and the armed opposition accountable is found also in some resolutions of
the Security Council.
More than one year after the start of the hostilities in Syria, on 14 April 2012, the
Security Council adopted a first resolution on the situation in Syria. In Resolution
2042, it condemned the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian autho-
rities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups.152 The wording of this
resolution clearly indicates an imbalance in the perpetration of atrocities, which seemed
to be heavier for the Syrian government than for the opposition. The Security Council
called upon (1) the Syrian government to urgently (a) cease troop movements towards
population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin
pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres;153 (2) all parties
in Syria, including the opposition, to cease all armed violence;154 and (3) the Syrian
authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel
to all populations in need.155
Only one week later, on 21 April 2012, the Security Council adopted its second
resolution on the situation in Syria. In Resolution 2043, the Security Council once
again condemned the human rights abuses perpetrated by both the Syrian authorities
and armed groups;156 asked all parties to immediately cease all armed violence in all its
forms;157 and importantly authorized the establishment of the UN Supervision Mis-
sion in Syria (UNSMIS). This peacekeeping supervision operation, set up for an initial
90-day period, was to comprise of 300 unarmed military observers and an appropriate
civilian component.158 It was mandated to monitor a cessation of armed violence by all
parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Envoys six-point
committed to implement the six-point proposal. See also Statement by the President of the Security Council,
S/PRST/2012/10, 5 April 2012, in which the Security Council reiterates its support for the six-point proposal
of the Envoy. The six-point proposal was never implemented, however.
149. Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/10, 5 April 2012.
150. Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2013/15, 2 October 2013, at p.1.
151. Ibid.
152. UNSC Res 2042, S/RES/2042 (2012), 14 April 2012, at p.1.
153. Ibid, at pp.1 and 2; See also UNSC Res. 2043, S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012, 2. The latter Resolution also called
upon to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centers to their barracks or temporary deploy-
ment places to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence.
154. UNSC Res. 2042, S/RES/2042 (2012), 14 April 2012, 3.
155. Ibid. 10.
156. UNSC Res. 2043, S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012.
157. Ibid. 4.
158. Ibid. 4.
proposal.159 UNSMIS was fully operational on 30 May 2012, but it was compelled to
suspend its activities mid-June 2012 following the intensification of armed violence
across the country which had rendered operational activities unworkable.160
In Resolution 2059, adopted on 20 July 2012, the Security Council renewed the
mandate of UNSMIS for 30 days. This resolution reported that any further exten-
sion of the mandate of UNSMIS thereafter would be possible only in the event of a
cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all
sides sufficient to allow UNSMIS to implement its mandate.161 The UNSMIS mandate
finally came to an end on 19 August 2012, since the conditions for renewal of the
mandate were not met.162
After the adoption of Resolution 2059, the Security Council was again characterized
by a stalemate lasting over a year within the P-5 over the Syria crisis. In September 2013,
the UN Secretary-General said at a press conference that [t]wo and a half years of
conflict in Syria have produced only embarrassing paralysis in the Security Council.163
The deadlock in the negotiations at the Security Council was overcome on 27 Septem-
ber 2013, when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 following
a chemical attack in Syria one month earlier (see Section 4.2).164 The Security Council
qualified this use of chemical weapons as a threat to international peace and security,
condemned it in the strongest terms,165 and stressed that those responsible for any use
of chemical weapons must be held accountable.166
In this Resolution, the Security Council also (a) welcomed the Framework for Eli-
mination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14 September 2013 between Russia and
the USA167 with a view to ensuring the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons
program;168 (b) endorsed the timetable and special procedures for the destruction of
the chemical weapons in Syria established by the Executive Council of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on 27 September 2013;169 and (c)
decided that the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the OPCW
decision of 27 September and cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations
to that end.170 It underscored that no party in Syria i.e. neither the Syrian government
nor any non-State actor should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or
transfer chemical weapons.171 Hence, the Security Council did not assign blame for the
chemical attack which killed more than 1,400 people.
159. Ibid. 6; See also Preliminary Understanding between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the
United Nations of 19 April 2012, S/2012/250, 23 April 2012.
160. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523,
6 July 2012, 16.
161. UNSC Res. 2059, S/RES/2059, 20 July 2012, 3.
162. On this issue, see UN website on peacekeeping missions.
163. National Review (2013), Ban Ki Moon Laments Embarrassing Paralysis of U.N. Security Council, 9 September
2013.
164. See B. Rouppert (2013), La conference sur une zone exempte darmes de destruction massive et leurs vecteurs au
Moyen-Orient, Rapport du Grip N 2013/8, at pp.26, 27, 31, 32.
165. UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118 (2013), 27 September 2013, 1 and 2.
166. Ibid. at p.2.
167. On this issue, see Annex to the letter dated 19 September 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of the Rus-
sian Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
A/68/398-S/2013/565, 24 September 2013.
168. UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118, 27 September 2013.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid. 6.
171. Ibid. 4, 5, 11, 14, 18, 19.
Non-compliance with Resolution 2118, the Security Council agreed, would be sanc-
tioned with the adoption of measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including
the use of force.172 Many States welcomed the unanimous adoption of Resolution
2118,173 which gave fresh hopes for a renewed role of the Security Council.174 But all
in all, the Security Council has been very weak in responding to the crisis in Syria, and
has been unable to agree on coercive measures arms embargoes, sanctions, the use
of force, etc. to be adopted.
The UN Human Rights Council has adopted several resolutions on Syria, in
which it unequivocally condemns the use of lethal violence and gross and systematic
violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, members of the Syrian military
and security forces, and its affiliated militias.175 The Human Rights Council, in its reso-
lutions, especially pointed to, and deplored, the Syrian regimes use of heavy artillery,
tanks, warplanes and Scud missiles to attack residential areas of cities and towns.176 In
June 2012, the Human Rights Council for the first time called upon all parties to put
an end to violence in all its forms.177 In April 2013, it also condemned terrorist acts
and acts of violence that may foment sectarian tensions,178 and explicitly referred to
abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups while stressing that they did
not reach the intensity and scale of violations committed by government forces and
its affiliated militia.179 In May and June 2013, the Human Rights Council condemned
all violence () irrespective of where it comes from and called upon all parties to
immediately put an end to all forms of violence.180 Yet, it is notable that the Human
Rights Council once more stressed that the human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups were less pervasive than
the atrocities of the Assad regime.181
All in all, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Human Rights
Council, as well as several other UN entities,182 have been unable to firmly respond
172. Ibid. 21.

173. See in this regard, General Debate of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, 24 September-1 October
2013, last consulted on 1 November 2013. Many speakers have welcomed and stressed the importance of the
adoption of Resolution 2118.
174. Global Observatory (2013), 1950s UN Resolution Could Break Security Council deadlock on Syria, 27 September
2013; UN News Centre (2013), Remarks to the press following adoption of Security Council vote to rid Syria of
chemical weapons, 27 September 2013; Bloomberg (2013), Syria Chemical-Arms Resolution Passes UN Security
Council, 28 September 2013.
175. UNHRC Res. S-16/1, A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, 4 May 2011; UNHRC Res. S-18/1, A/HRC/RES/S-18/1, 5 December
2011; UNHRC Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, 4 June 2012; UNHRC Res. 19/22, A/HRC/RES/19/22, 12 April
2013; UNHRC Res. 21/26, A/HRC/RES/21/26, 17 October 2013; UNHRC Res. 22/24, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 12
April 2013; UNHRC Res. 23/1, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 19 June 2013;UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26,
25 June 2013.
176. UNHRC Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, 4 June 2012; UNHRC Res. 19/22, A/HRC/RES/19/22, 12 April
2013; UNHRC Res. 21/26, A/HRC/RES/21/26, 17 October 2013.
177. UNHRC Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, 4 June 2012; See also UNHRC Res. 20/22, A/HRC/RES/20/22, 16
July 2012, 6; UNHRC Res. 21/26, A/HRC/RES/21/26, 17 October 2013, 6.
178. UNHRC Res. 22/24, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 12 April 2013; See also UNHRC Res. 23/1, A/HRC/RES/22/24,
19 June 2013; UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013.
179. UNHRC Res. 22/24, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 12 April 2013, 3 and 4; UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26,
25 June 2013.
180. UNHRC Res. 23/1, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 19 June 2013; UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June
2013.
181. UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013, 8.
182. See for example Appeal by heads of leading UN humanitarian agencies for the people of the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 April 2013; Six-point Proposal submitted to the Syrian authorities by the Envoy to the Security Council, 16
March 2012, Annex to S/RES/2042; Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security
to the crisis in Syria or to agree upon coercive measures to be adopted against

the different entities responsible for violations of international law, such as an
arms embargo. This paralysis at the UN level contrasts sharply with the firm approach,
at times, of other instances such as the European Union and some single States.
3.1.2. The European Union

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the EU has responded decisively to the
violent repression of demonstrations by Syrian armed forces and security forces and
has condemned the widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law in
Syria. Initially, the EU only referred to the serious abuses, including war crimes and
crimes against humanity of the Syrian regime,183 but over time it also mentioned the
war crimes committed by anti-government armed groups.184 Nevertheless, several EU
documents stress that the abuses of the rebels do not reach the intensity and scale of
those committed by the regime forces and affiliated militias.185
As violence and repression continued, the EU adopted 23 sets of restrictive measures
against Syria which imposed an arms embargo, the freezing of funds and economic
resources, travel bans, import and export restrictions, etc.186 This section focuses on
the imposition and subsequent lifting of the EU arms embargo on Syria, which are
considered in chronological order.187 A good understanding of the history and content
of the EU sanctions is necessary to assess the consequences and prospects of Euro-
pean arms transfers to Syria.
In May 2011, the EU for the first time condemned the violent repression of peaceful
protest and imposed sanctions on Syria.188 The EU adopted Decision 2011/273 and
Regulation 442/2011 prohibiting all EU Member States from supplying, transferring
or exporting arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammuni-
tion, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the
aforementioned, as well as equipment which could be used for internal repression in
Syria.189 The prohibition did not apply to, amongst others, non-combat vehicles, non-
lethal military equipment or equipment which could be used for internal repression,
if they were intended solely for humanitarian or protective use.190
Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012; Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights
of internally displaced persons, A/67/931, 15 July 2013; UN Press Release, UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child appalled by killing of Syrian children in alleged chemical attack, 26 August 2013; UN Press Release,
Pillay says Syrian chemical weapons allegations exceptionally grave, investigation essential, 22 August 2013.
183. See for example, EU Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011; EU Council Regulation No 36/2012
of 18 January 2012; EU Council Regulation No 509/2012 of 15 June 2012; Remarks by EU High Representative
Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria, 13 March 2013; The European Union and Syria-Factsheet, 22 April
2013; Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the recent massacre in
Bayda in Syria, 4 May 2013.
184. See for example EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 27 May 2013.
185. Ibid.
186. The European Union and Syria-Factsheet, 22 April 2013, at p.1 in combination with The European Union and
Syria-Factsheet, 18 October 2013.
187. See in this regard also SIPRI, EU arms embargo on Syria, last consulted on 21 October 2013.
188. EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 and Council Regulation 442/2011 of 9 May 2011.
189. Article 1.1 EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 and Articles 2 and 3.1 EU Council Regulation
442/2011 of 9 May 2011. See also Article 1.2. EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 and Articles
2 and 3.1 of EU Council Regulation 442/2011. See also EU Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December
2011.
190. Article 2 EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011; Article 3.2 EU Council Regulation 442/2011
of 9 May 2011. See also EU Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011.
In January and June 2012, the Council adopted two particularly important regula-
tions which detailed the items and services banned under the arms embargo, thereby
strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo.191 Regulations 36/2012 and 509/2012
still contain the same derogations as those referred to above, but they also prohibit,
amongst others, the supply of equipment, technology or software that could be used
for the monitoring or interception of communications by the Syrian regime.192 Also,
they prohibit the supply of certain goods that might be used for the manufacture or
maintenance of material which might be used for internal repression.193 One month
later, in July 2012, in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the arms embargo, the
Council adopted Decision 2012/420 which compelled EU Members States to inspect
all vessels and aircraft bound for Syria in their seaports, airports and territorial sea, to
confirm whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels
and aircraft contains sanctioned items.194
In November 2012, the Council renewed the restrictive measures, including the
arms embargo, until 1 March 2013.195 At the end of February 2013, the Council agreed
to renew the restrictive measures against Syria for a further three months, amending
them so as to provide greater non-lethal support and technical assistance for the Syrian
civilians and opposition.196 The arms embargo was eased accordingly, as it enabled the
delivery of (1) non-lethal military equipment for the protection of civilians or for the
Syrian National Coalition, (2) the delivery of non-combat vehicles manufactured or
fitted with materiel to provide to the Syrian National Coalition, (3) the provision of
technical assistance and services197 to the Syrian National Coalition of the protection
of civilians.198
Whereas in March 2013, Ashton still declared that no member state has proposed
that it [i.e. arms embargo] be lifted to arm the opposition,199 several Member States
have since then advocated for lifting the arms embargo. In April 2013, the Council once
more eased certain EU sanctions against Syria and decided, amongst others, to allow
the supply of certain equipment to the Syrian National Coalition.200 Yet, France and
the UK considered this relaxation of the arms embargo as unsatisfactory and started
lobbying for a total lift of the arms embargo in order to be able to supply lethal arms
to the Syrian opposition forces.201
In late May 2013, when the Council had to decide upon the renewal of the res-
trictive measures which expired on 1 June, the 27 EU Members States were unable
to agree about allowing the supply of arms to the armed opposition in Syria. France
and the UK argued that the option of resorting to arms transfers would put pressure
191. See EU Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 and EU Council Regulation 509/2012 of 15 June 2012. See
also SIPRI (2012), EU arms embargo on Syria. See also Council Decision 2012/206/CFSP of 23 April 2012.
192. See Article 4 of EU Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012.
193. Article 2, 3 and Annex 1 of Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012; Article 2a of Council Regulation
509/2012 of 15 June 2012.
194. Article 1 EU Council Decision 2012/420/CFSP of 23 July 2012. See also SIPRI, EU Arms Embargo on Syria.
195. EU Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012, at p.1.
196. See also EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 18 February 2013, 7.
197. This also includes brokering services.
198. Article 1 EU Council Decision 2013/109/CFSP of 28 February 2013.
199. Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria, 13 March 2013.
200. EU Council Regulation 325/2013 of 10 April 2013.
201. See for example New York Times (2013), Seeking to aid rebels in Syria, France urges end to arms embargo,
14March 2013.
on the regime. Another argument of both countries was that Western States could no
longer adopt a wait and see attitude in the face of the massacres in Syria, and that
arms transfers would at the very least allow the opposition to defend itself as well as
the civilians.202 On the other hand, the other EU Member States stressed the risks of
arming the Syrian rebellion, such as the illicit proliferation and diversion of weapons
in Syria and the whole region; increased Russian arms transfers to the Assad regime;
an inadequate use and storage of weapons; the escalation of the armed violence; etc.
Austria also emphasized that [t]here are more than enough weapons in Syria and that
[l]ifting the EU arms embargo undermines the US-Russia understanding that opens
a window of opportunity towards a new political process.203 The impact of this disa-
greement was not insignificant, as it implied the almost total lift of the arms embargo
to Syria. While the vast majority of the EU Member States opposed this major shift
in EU policy, they assented in order to preserve the other set of restrictive measures
(financial, economic, etc.) against Syria.204 But at the same time, several Member States,
including Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Romania, Finland, the Czech Republic and
Austria, immediately declared they had no intention of arming the Syrian rebels.205
The lift of the European arms embargo was not synonymous with an immediate
and unconditional transfer of arms to the Syrian opposition. This is because the EU
Member States committed to several conditions with regard to the possible export of
arms to Syria, conditions which were articulated in a Council declaration on Syria of
27 May 2013.206 First, Member States would not proceed with the delivery of military
equipment until August 2013. Second, arms can be transferred only to the National
Coalition. Third, arms transfers are intended for the protection of civilians. Fourth,
Member States must require adequate safeguards concerning the end-user and final
destination of the delivery. And fifth, decisions on arms exports must be based on the
EU Common Position (see Section 6.1.2).207 Council Decision 2013/255 concerning
restrictive measures against Syria took note of these commitments by Member Sta-
tes.208 The Council decision applied until 1 August 2013.
Summarized, unlike the United Nations the EU has adopted a whole set of coercive
measures, including a temporary arms embargo, against Syria. The EU has been unable
to uphold a common position with regard to arms transfers to the Syrian opposition
as well as regarding the possibility of the use of force on the Syrian territory by EU
Member States. Nevertheless, at the internal level, the EU has constantly tried to
find negotiated solutions in order to preserve its cohesion. With regard to the Syrian
regime, the EU has continued to apply diplomatic pressure and imposed targeted
202. Ibid.
203. The Guardian (2013), The Austrian position on arms embargo in Syria-official document, 15 May 2013; The
Independent (2013), Syria arms embargo lifted: Britain and France force EU to relax ban on supplying weapons
to rebels, 28 May 2013.
204. Without an agreement, all EU measures against Syria, including asset freezes and travel bans, would have expired
on 1 June 2013. See also The Guardian (2013), UK forces EU to lift embargo on Syria rebel arms, 28 May 2013;
M. De Groof (2013), La leve de lembargo europen sur les armes destines la Syrie: quelles implications?,
RTBF Opinions, 29 May 2013.
205. The Guardian (2013), UK forces EU lift embargo on Syria rebel arms, 28 May 2013.
206. EU Council Declaration on Syria, Brussels, 27 May 2013; Bruxelles2 (2013), Lembargo sur les armes lev, non
sans conditions, 28 May 2013.
207. EU Common Position Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and
Equipment, 2008/844/CFSP, 8 December 2008.
208. EU Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013, at p.1.
sanctions on a growing number of individuals and entities. And finally, at global level
the EU, through the High Representative Catherine Ashton, from the early beginning
of the crisis in Syria, has called upon to move forward on a diplomatic process and
urged all international players to move beyond our differences.209
3.2. International recognition

3.2.1. The United Nations
At the global level, the UN has consistently referred to the regime of Bashar al-As-
sad as the Syrian authorities, Syrian government, Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic or Syrian regime.210 And while many UN Member States have stressed
that they see the future of Syria without Bashar al-Assad,211 UN documents time af-
ter time qualify this individual as the President i.e. the head of State of Syria.212
The Permanent Representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in both Geneva and
New York still belong to the Bashar al-Assad government.213 Also, the Assad regime
still occupies the seat for Syria at the General Assembly and the other UN treaty and
charter based bodies.
On the other hand, the groups opposing the regime have been referred to as the
Syrian opposition, armed opposition groups and anti-Government armed groups.214
209. Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the high urgency of a political solution on the Syrian
conflict, 23 August 2013. See also F. Santopinto (2013), LEurope face la crise syrienne: Londres, Paris et
les autres, RTBF Opinions, 6 September 2013.
210. UNGA Res.66/176, A/RES/66/176, 19 December 2011; UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253, 16 February 2012;
UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August 2012; UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December
2012; UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May 2013; Statement by the President of the UN Security Council,
S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012; Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/10, 5 April
2012; Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2013/15, 2 October 2013; UNSC Res 2042,
S/RES/2042 (2012), 14 April 2012; UNSC Res. 2043, S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012; UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118
(2013), 27 September 2013; Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League
of Arab States, Annexed to Resolution S/RES/2042; Letter dated 19 April 2012 from the UN Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2012/238, 19 April 2012; Report of the UN Secretary-General
on Children and Armed Conflict, A/66/782-S/2012/261, 26 April 2012, at p.22; Report of the UN Secretary-General
on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 40; UNHRC Res. Resolution
16/1, A/HRC/RES/16/1, 4 May 2011; UNHRC Res. S-18/1, A/HRC/RES/S-18/1, 5 December 2011; UNHRC
Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/19/1, 10 April 2012; UNHRC Res. 19/22, A/HRC/RES/19/22, 12 April 2013; UNHRC
Res. 19/1, A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, 4 June 2012; UNHRC Res. 22/24, A/HRC/RES/22/24, 12 April 2013; UNHRC
Res. 23/1, A/HRC/RES/23/1, 19 June 2013, 1; UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013, 8.
211. See for example France24 (2013), World meeting on Syria agrees no role for Assad, 24 October 2013; CNN
(2013), Hague: No role for Bashar al-Assad in future Syria, 23 October 2013.
212. See for example Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/18/53, 15 September 2011, at p.7 and 46; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, 31; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012,
16; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at p.5; Declaration of the UN Secre-
tary-General, SG/SM/14753, 7 January 2013; UN Secretary-General Receives Letter from Syrian Government,
SG/SM/15274, 12 September 2013;
213. For the UN Permanent mission in Geneva, see UN Office at Geneva website. For the UN Permanent mission in
New York, see Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the UN website.
214. UNGA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253, 21 February 2012; UNGA Res. 67/262, A/RES/67/262, 15 May 2013;
Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012; Statement by the President
of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/10, 5 April 2012; Statement by the President of the UN Security Coun-
cil, S/PRST/2013/15, 2 October 2013; UNSC Res 2042, S/RES/2042 (2012), 14 April 2012; UNSC Res. 2043,
S/RES/2043, 21 April 2012; UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118 (2013), 27 September 2013; Letter dated 19 April 2012
from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2012/238, 19 April 2012;
Report of the UN Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, A/66/782-S/2012/261, 26 April 2012, at
p.22. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523,
6 July 2012, 40; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at p.1; UNHRC Res. 22/24,
A/HRC/RES/22/24, 12 April 2013, 4; UNHRC Res. 23/26, A/HRC/RES/23/26, 25 June 2013, 8.
In other words, whereas the Assad regime is seen as a State actor, the UN still qualifies
the opposition groups as non-State actors.
Interestingly, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council,
the Secretary-General, as well as the Joint Special Envoy, have all at regular intervals
referred to the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the people of the Syrian Arab
Republic.215
3.2.2 Regional Organizations and Individual States

At the regional level, the EU has not formally rejected the actual Assad government
in Syria. EU documents still refer to the Assad regime as the Government of Syria
and the Syrian Authorities, which still functions as the official representative organ
of the Syrian State.216 It must be emphasized, however, that the EU has consistently,
from 2011 onwards, called for Bashar al-Assad to leave power and promotes a future
without Assad.217
While the EU accepts the Syrian National Coalition as legitimate representatives
of the Syrian people,218 it has not given any official status to this entity, which is still seen
as a Syrian opposition movement.219 Thus in fact the EU has adopted a biased policy
as it actually sees the Assad regime as the entity representing the Syrian State, while it
sees the National Coalition as the entity representing the Syrian people. It is important
to note that the EU calls for a swift establishment, by mutual consent, of a transitional
government body with full executive powers and control of all governmental and all
security institutions.220
In November 2012 the six member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait
were first to recognize it as the legitimate representative of the brotherly Syrian
people.221 This initiative was followed by the League of Arab States, which recognized
215. GA Res. 66/253, A/RES/66/253, 16 February 2012, 7; UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December 2012,
4; 2011; See also Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012; State-
ment by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2013/15, 2 October 2013, at p.4; Six-point Proposal
submitted to the Syrian authorities by the Envoy to the Security Council, 16 March 2012, Annex to S/RES/2042;
Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523,
6 July 2012, at p.1 (the legitimate political, economic and social demands of its people, as well as its position in a
complex region); Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqu, 30 June 2012, 3 and 4; UNHRC Res. Resolution
16/1, A/HRC/RES/16/1, 4 May 2011; HRC Resolution 20/22, A/HRC/RES/20/22, 16 July 2012, 8.
216. EU Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012, at p.1 (in view of the continued brutal repression and violations
of human rights by the Government of Syria); EU Council Regulation No 509/2012 of 15 June 2012, at p.1 (ibid.);
EU Council Decision 2012/206/CFSP of 23 April 2012 (Syrian regime); Remarks by EU High Representative
Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria, 13 March 2013, at p.2 (I strongly appeal to the Syrian Authorities to
()); EU Council conclusions on Syria, 18 February 2013, 5 (the regime in Damascus); The European Union and
Syria-Factsheet, 28 February 2013, at p.1 (the government of President Bashar al-Assad); The European Union
and Syria-Factsheet, 22 April 2013 (the Syrian Government and the representatives of the Syrian regime); The
European Union and Syria-Factsheet, 18 October 2013 (the Syrian authorities; the regime of President Bashar
al-Assad; the Syrian government); EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 21 October 2013, 5.
217. See for example Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria, 13 March 2013;
EU Council conclusions on Syria, 18 February 2013, 3; The European Union and Syria-Factsheet, 22 April 2013, at
p.2; EU Council conclusions on Syria, 23 January 2012, 1; EU Council conclusions on Syria, 10 October 2011, 2
218. EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 10 December 2012; The European Union and Syria-Factsheet, 18 October
2013.
219. EU Council Conclusions on Syria, 21 October 2013.
220. Ibid. 2.
221. BBC (2013), Syria crisis: Guide to armed and political opposition, 17 October 2013; Aljazeera (2013), GCC
recognizes new Syrian opposition bloc, 12 November 2012.
the coalition as the representative and main interlocutor with the Arab League and
granted Damascus a seat in the National Coalition at the 2013 Arab League Summit
in March.222
Various individual States, including France, the UK, the US, Turkey and various
Gulf States, have recognized the National Coalition as the sole legitimate representa-
tive of the Syrian people.223 Likewise, the Group of Friends of the Syrian People,
which assembles more than 100 countries, repeatedly recognized the coalition as the
legitimate representative of the Syrian people.224 Libya seems to be the only State
which formally recognized the Syrian opposition group as the sole legitimate govern-
ment in Syria.225 In contrast, several other influential States, including China, Iran
and Russia, have rejected the National Coalitions legitimacy and have continued to
back President Assad and his regime.
Last, it must be emphasised that several States have proposed a mixed solution
and see the future Syrian government as comprising both representatives from the
opposition and the actual government. To illustrate, the Final Communiqu of the
Action Group for Syria, which is a group of influential organizations and countries,226
observed that the transitional governing body it proposes to establish could include
members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall
be formed on the basis of mutual consent.227
222. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 14; Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect (2013), R2P Monitor, 15 March 2013, Issue 8.
223. Le Monde (2012), La France reconnat la nouvelle entit de lopposition syrienne, 14 Novembre 2012; Reuters
(2012), France recognizes new Syria opposition, 13 November 2012; Washington Post, (2012), Obama admin-
istration formally recognizes Syrian opposition group, 11 December 2012; The Guardian (2012), UK: Syrian
opposition sole legitimate representative of the people, 20 November 2012; Euronews (2012), Friends of Syria
officially recognise opposition coalition, 12 December 2012; Report of the Secretary-General on the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 4.
224. Al Arabiya (2012), Friends of Syria recognize SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians, 1 April 2012;
Aljazeera (2012), Friends of Syria recognize opposition, 12 December 2012.
225. Khaleej Times (2011), Libya NTC says recognizes Syrian National Council, 11 October 2011.
226. On 30 June 2012 the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the United States of America, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait
(Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-
up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States) and the High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Action Group for Syria,
chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to Syria. On this issue,
see Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6
July 2012, 44.
227. Action Group Syria, Final Communiqu, 30 June 2012, 6; Report of the UN Secretary-General on the imple-
mentation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 44.
4. Panorama of Weapons
Used by the Internal Actors
This section gives an overview of the arms and military material reportedly detained
and used by the different parties involved in the conflict. A basic distinction is made
between conventional and chemical weapons. This glossary of weapons used by the
different actors in Syria is based mainly on the findings of the UN Independent In-
ternational Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.228
4.1. Conventional Weapons

The term conventional weapon refers to weapons that are neither nuclear, nor bio-
logical, nor chemical weapons. Conventional weapons include small arms and light
weapons, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat
aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles/missile launchers.229
State armed forces in Syria are equipped with a wide variety of conventional wea-
pons. Between 2001-2005 and 2006-2010, Syrias imports of conventional weapons
had increased by more than 300 per cent.230 Hence, when the crisis began, the Syrian
regime was well-equipped and particularly strong. Moreover, during the Syrian armed
conflict, these governmental stockpiles strongly reduced because of the hostilities
have been supplied by foreign sources, as discussed below (see Section 5.1). Here,
it suffices to stress that the whole panoply of conventional arms were brought into
action to put a stop to armed opposition. State armed forces have used heavy weapons
including tanks, artillery, helicopters, and warplanes in the bombardment of cities and
villages.231 There are clear indications that strategic missiles, cluster and thermobaric
bombs, and other military materials were used in densely populated areas qualified as
being pro-opposition.232
Since the very start of the Syrian civil war, armed opposition groups have been
able to improve their access to weaponry, albeit unequally.233 They have looted military
equipment from several government army bases in Syria and set up clandestine arms
production factories, but important amounts of weapons and ammunitions have also
been provided to them by external sources, i.e. foreign States, commercial entities,
criminal organizations, and wealthy individuals.234 While section five further analyses
228. See in particular UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, at p.129.
229. See in this regard UNODA, Fact Sheet. Transparency: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, last
consulted on 1 November 2013.
230. SIPRI (2013), Trends in international Arms Transfers, 2012, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2012, at p.8.
231. UNGA Res. 66/253 B, A/RES/66/253 B, 3 August 2012, 7; UNGA Res. 67/183, A/RES/67/183, 20 December
2012; 2011; See also Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/6, 21 March 2012;
Report of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523,
6 July 2012; UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 26.
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 26.
233. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 28; UN Report Commission of Inquiry,
A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 28.
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 31. See also Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination of arms flows
to Syria, 14 May 2013.
the most important foreign arms providers, as well as the main transit routes through
which the arms are delivered, the question that arises here is: what type of weapons do
the rebels detain? Armed opposition groups are mainly equipped with small arms and
light weapons (SALW).235 However, during 2013 they have increased their equipment
and use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, as well as indirect fire assets.236 They have
also employed mortars and artillery guns to target military and security positions, as
well as pro-government localities (see also Section 5.2).237 Several sources report the use
of improvised explosive devices by the Syrian opposition, which caused both Syrian
military and civilian casualties.238
4.2. Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction.239 The term chemical weapon is
applied to any toxic chemical or its precursor that can cause death, injury, temporary
incapacitation, or sensory irritation through its chemical action,240 and the use of che-
mical weapons is prohibited as a matter of customary international law.241 The use of
chemical weapons is absolutely forbidden because their use is inherently indiscriminate:
conventional weapons can at least notionally be targeted to avoid collateral civilian
casualties in a way that is just about impossible for weapons-of-mass-destruction use,
certainly in urban warfare as distinct from an isolated battlefield context.242
In April 2013, the armed opposition and the government in Syria a State suspected
of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare capabilities243 accused each
other of using chemical weapons.244 Following these mutual accusations and disturbing
reports of victims displaying neurotoxic symptoms, the UN Secretary-General deci-
ded to establish a UN Mission with the mandate to ascertain the facts related to the
allegations of use of chemical weapons and to gather relevant data and undertake the
necessary analyses for this purpose and to deliver a report to the Secretary-General.245
The mission members arrived in Syria on 18 August, three days before another reported
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 32; Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination of arms flows to Syria,
14 May 2013.
A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 32.
237. Ibid.
238. See UN website on peacekeeping missions, last consulted on 1 November 2013; Report of the UN Secretary-
General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2043, S/2012/523, 6 July 2012, 11 and 14.
239. See Preamble of Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction. See also W. H. Boothby (2012), Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford
University Press, at pp.129-131.
240. See in this regard OPCW website, last consulted on 1 November 2013.
241. J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press,
Rule 74; See also ICTY, Tadic case (Interlocutory Appeal), 2 October 1995, 120.
242. G. Evans (2013), R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria, Open Democracy, 9 September.
243. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Syria: country profile, last consulted on 18 September 2013; New York Times (2013),
With the World Watching, Syria Amassed Nerve Gas, 7 September 2013.
244. These alleged attacks were perpetrated in Saraqeb (29 April 2013), Jobar (mid April) and Ghouta (21 August). See in
this regard Prsidence de la Rpublique franaise (2013), Programme chimique syrien: Cas demploi passs dagents
chimiques par le rgime, Synthse nationale de renseignement dclassifi, at p.6; Mdecins sans Frontires (2013),
Syrie: des milliers de patients souffrant de symptmes neurotoxiques soigns dans les hpitaux soutenus par MSF,
24 August 2013; New York Times (2013), U.S. Sees No Conclusive Evidence of Chemical Arms Use by Syria, 24
April 2013; Nuclear Threat Initiative (2013), Syrian Envoy: Rebel Chemical Materials Cache discovered, 9 July 2013.
245. UN Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Goutha Area of Damascus on 21 August, 13 Sep-
tember 2013, 1, last consulted on 1 November 2013.
chemical attack in the Ghouta area on 21 August, during which several hundreds of
persons (some sources even speak about 1,400 deaths) died. The Secretary-General
therefore instructed the mission members to focus their investigation efforts on the
Ghouta allegations, and so this is what they did.
The Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of
Damascus was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 13 September. The report conclu-
des that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties
in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large
scale.246 While the report of the UN Mission247 remains silent on those responsible for
the chemical attack, both independent experts and Western governments have observed
that forensic details in the report suggest that the attack was ordered and executed by
the Assad regime.248 For example, the delivery systems used are described as surface to
surface rockets capable of delivering significant chemical payloads.249 Even though the
origin of these weapons still is to be identified, both the size and high sophistication of
these weapons250 may be indicative of the responsibility of the Assad regime, especially
since the Syrian armed opposition is not known to possess such weapons, or to have the
capacity to handle them.251 Another significant element would be the trajectory followed
by two munitions identified by the inspectors, which suggests that they were launched
from government-controlled areas.252 However, the inspectors have pointed out the limits
of their survey; first, because the time necessary to conduct a detailed survey () as well
as take samples was very limited, and second because [f]ragments and other possible
evidence have clearly been moved prior to the arrival of the investigation team.253
It must be noted that the international community in the end remains divided on
the question of guilt. While, amongst others, France and the United States blame the
Assad regime for the chemical attack,254 Russia and Syria supported by several experts
maintain that the rebels (i.e. one of its components) were behind this attack in order
to elicit a foreign intervention.255
246. Ibid. at p.5. The inspectors continued by saying that [i]n particular, the environmental, chemical and medical
samples we have collected provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the
nerve agent sarin were used.
247. See in this regard the Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Goutha Area of Damascus on
21August, 13 September 2013, at pp.1-3.
248. See for example J.P. Zanders in an interview on Terzake, 16 September; O. Lepick, in an interview on TF1, 17
September 2013; See also Human Rights Watch (2013), Attacks on Ghouta. Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical
Weapons in Syria, at pp.1-9; Arms Control Association (2013), Hard Evidence from the UN Inspectors Point
to Assads CW Use, 16 September 2013; The Economist (2013), Syrias war: An unlikely band of brothers,
21September 2013.
249. UN Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Goutha Area of Damascus on 21 August, 13 Sep-
tember 2013, at p.4.
250. In this regard, see ibid. and Human Rights Watch (2013), Attacks on Ghouta. Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemi-
cal Weapons in Syria, Appendix 5.
251. See Human Rights Watch (2013), Attacks on Ghouta. Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria.
at p.1. See also New York Times (2013), Forensic Details in U.N. Report Point to Assads Use of Gas, 16 Sep-
tember 2013; Arms Control Now (2013), Hard Evidence from the UN Inspectors Point to Assads CW Use,
16September 2013.
252. Based on the orientation of the impact craters, orientation of certain surviving munitions components and other
damage in the areas, the Inspectors concluded that the rockets are believed to have arrived from the northwest. At
the time of the Goutha attack, the northwest of Damascus was dominated by the Assad regime. See Report on the
Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Goutha Area of Damascus on 21 August, 13 September 2013, at p.19.
253. Ibid. at pp.18 and 22.
254. See for example Prsidence de la Rpublique franaise (2013), Programme chimique syrien: Cas demploi passs
dagents chimiques par le rgime, Synthse nationale de renseignement dclassifi, at pp.8-9.
255. See the interview of Bashar Al-Assad on Fox News Channel on 18 September , last consulted on 1 November 2013;
After the release of the UN Report, the Secretary-General, followed by various States,
condemned the use of chemical weapons, which it qualified as being a war crime and a
grave violation of international law, in particular the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary international law.256 Finally,
the Secretary-General observed that the international community has a moral respon-
sibility to hold accountable those responsible for the chemical attack.257 Following the
heated debates at the international level on the possible implications of the use of
chemical weapons in Syria, and the threat of a military intervention which would be
orchestrated by the United States of America, on 14 September 2013 Syria acceded to
the Convention on the Chemical (CWC). That same day, Russia and the United States,
who have continually clashed over how to respond to the Syrian civil war, reached an
agreement on a framework for the identification, securitization and elimination of the
Syrian chemical weapons arsenal,258 which was welcomed by important international
players such as the EU and the UN.259 Syria agreed to abide by the plan,260 which has
been formalized by Security Council Resolution 2118 that was unanimously adopted
on 27 September 2013.261 This Resolution imposes a strict and compelling timeline for
the destruction of the chemical weapons and production facilities in Syria,262 a process
which has been elaborated with the support of the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The destruction of Syrias chemical weapons arsenal
began on 6 October 2013 and on 31 October, the Joint Mission of the OPCW and the
UN confirmed that Syrias chemical weapons facilities are inoperable.263 All in all, it is
important to stress that the chemical attack and resulting threat of a military strike in
Syria264 have become a catalyst for a new diplomatic determination at the international
level to resolve the Syrian conflict.265
See the interview of the Russian diplomat Rjabkov cited in De Morgen (2013), Rusland: Syri heeft bewijzen dat
rebellen gifgasaanval uitvoerden, 18 September 2013; W.R. Polk (2013), Your Labor Day Syria Reader, Part 2: Wil-
liam Polk, The Atlantic, 2 September 2013 (Clearly, Assad had much to lose and his enemies had much to gain. That
conclusion does not prove who did it, but it should give us pause to find conclusive evidence which we do not now
have). On the existing controversy, see amongst others Le Vif (2013), Syrie: Les attaques chimiques sont un coup
mont, 27 August; The Economist (2013), Syrias war: An unlikely band of brothers, 21 September 2013.
256. Note by the UN Secretary-General annexed to the Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Goutha
Area of Damascus on 21 August, 13 September 2013, at p.1; See also Global Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect (2013), Statement on Todays Reported Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria, 21 August 2013.
257. Ibid. at p.1. It is important to note that the UN Secretary-General believes that an effective mechanism to investi-
gate allegations of the use of chemical weapons can serve as an important deterrent against their employment.
258. For the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, see U.S. Department of State, last consulted on
1 November 2013. See also Arms Control Now (2013), U.S.-Russian Joint Framework for Elimination of Syrian
Chemical Weapons, 14 September 2013.
259. Europe Diplomatie & Dfense (2013), UE/Syrie: Le SEAE se prpare coordonner laide europenne lOIAC,
N 637, 19 September 2013; B. Rouppert (2013), Op.cit. at pp.31-32.
260. As argued by The Economist, [f]ormer Western intelligence officials have expressed deep skepticism that Syria
intends to abandon an arsenal long seen as its only deterrent against its main declared enemy, nuclear armed
Israel. See The Economist (2013), Syrias war: An unlikely band of brothers, 21 September 2013.
261. UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118 (2013), 27 September 2013. See also New York Times (2013), Security Council
Returns to Role in Syria Conflict, 27 September 2013; New York Times (2013), Kerry Presses Security Council
to Act on Syrian Arsenal, 19 September 2013.
262. UNSC Res. 2118, S/RES/2118 (2013), 27 September 2013.
263. UN News Centre (2013), Syria meets deadline, renders chemical weapons facilities inoperable OPCW-UN
mission, 31 October 2013.
264. The U.S. government has repeatedly warned that the use of chemical weapons would constitute a red line that
would involve the U.S. to take action. See in this regard New York Times (2012), U.S. Warns Syria on Chemical
Weapons, 3 December 2012.
265. New York Times (2013), Forensic Details in U.N. Report Point to Assads Use of Gas, 16 September 2013.
5. Arms Transfers to Syria: Practice
The fluctuating and erratic support provided by a number of countries and wealthy individuals
to the armed groups was sufficient to escalate hostilities, but is unlikely to fundamentally
determine the course of the conflict.266
The arms transfers to Syria are reflective of the deep division that exists at the interna-
tional level on how to respond to the Syrian crisis. Whereas some States have funnelled
an important amounts of weapons to the Assad regime since the early days of the
crisis, others have supplied arms to the armed opposition forces, and still others have
imposed (and subsequently lifted) an arms embargo against Syria. This section aims at
providing a brief overview of the most important States involved in the transfers of
arms and military material to Syria. A basic distinction is made between arms transfers
to State armed forces on the one hand, and to armed opposition groups on the other. It
also gives an insight as to the main transit routes through which the arms are delivered.
Importantly, this section focuses on the delivery of arms by States; albeit important,
the transfer of weapons by other actors such as commercial entities, terrorist orga-
nizations, individuals goes well beyond the scope of the present report.267
5.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

The government stockpiles of weapons have been supplied mainly by Russia and Iran,
as well as several other States such as China, North Korea, Belarus and Venezuela,
albeit on a smaller scale. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), during the years 2008-2012, Russia supplied 71 per cent of Syrias
imports of major conventional weapons, followed by Iran and Belarus, who respectively
supplied 14 and 11 per cent of Syrias major weapons.268
Russia has supplied arms throughout the entire period of the crisis in Syria, despite
increasing international pressure and repeated calls from several States, regional and
international organizations to stop delivering weapons to the Syrian government.269 Even
if, at certain times, Russian officials issued declarations according to which some deli-
veries would be suspended and/or limited to defence systems,270 there is clear evidence
of important arms transfers of both combat and defence systems.271 These reported
deliveries have, for the most part, not been contradicted by the Russian authorities,
which have always insisted on the importance of fulfilling its contractual obligations with

267. In this regard, see amongst others Human Rights First (2013), Enablers of the Syrian Conflict, March 2013.
268. SIPRI (2013), Trends in international Arms Transfers, 2012, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2012, at p.8.
269. See for example Al Arabiya and Reuters (2012), U.S. says Russia arms shipment to Syria reprehensible: ship docked
at Syrian port last week: rights group, 31 May 2012; Time (2013), Top Russian Diplomat Explains Reasons for
Syrian Arms Sales, 17 May 2013.
270. See in this regard, P.D. Wezeman (2013), Arms transfers to Syria, SIPRI Yearbook 2013, at p.269-270; Associated
Press (2013), Russian arms trader: Syria Shipments will continue, 13 February 2013; Defense Industry Daily
(2013), Syrias Russian Weapon Buys, 2 September 2013; RIA Novosti (2013), All contracts with Russia on
track Syrias Assad, 26 August 2013.
271. See for example, Private letter from the Army Supply Bureau of the High Command of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the Russian arms dealer Rosoboronexport, released by Human Rights First on 13 May 2013.
Syria.272 It must be emphasized also that on several occasions, Russia qualified the arms
embargoes in place against Syria as dishonest, because in practice they would cut off
military supplies to the government, but allow opposition forces to obtain weapons.273
Russias weapons sales to Assad, it is argued, aim at giving the regime a good chance
for defending itself against the opposition forces, but also as declared by a Russian
diplomat against Western powers if the latter would decide to attack Syria.274
The following Russian arms transfers have been addressed in depth in the media.
In early 2012, a Russian-operated ship reportedly laden with four containers about
60 tons of ammunition docked at a Syrian port.275 According to various sources,
since April 2013 the number of ships travelling to Syria from a port in Ukraine used
by Russian arms exporters increased sharply.276 In May 2013, it was reported that
Russia delivered sophisticated S-300 antiaircraft systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, and
highly advanced rocket launchers to the Syrian armed forces.277 In July 2012, Moscow
insisted that it would deliver Mi-25 helicopter gunships to Syria in the face of Western
disapproval.278 In August 2013, Reuters reported that Syrian payments to Russia have
increased in recent months.279 A Russian defence industry source said that the Assad
regime had started paying off a nearly $1 billion contract for four S-300 anti-aircraft
missile systems, as well as another $550 million order for 36 Yak-130 trainer fighter
planes.280 These are but a few examples of the overload of Russian arms and military
material transfers to the Syrian regime.
Besides Russia, Iran has remained one of Assads most loyal allies throughout the
crisis. In 2012, the UN Panel of Experts on Iran concluded that [t]he Syrian Arab
Republic continues to be the central party to illicit Iranian arms transfers.281 In addition
to sending Revolutionary Guards and military advisors (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3) to
Syria, Iran has evidently also supplied arms and military material to the regime forces.
However, it must be noted that in spite of the many accusations against Iran, the number
of confirmed arms transports into Syria are limited.282 Therefore, the precise amount
and type of weapons funnelled from Iran to Syria is opaque and contested.
To illustrate this, in February 2011, the Turkish authorities seized a truck containing
explosives that originated in Iran and was bound for Syria,283 and in March 2011 Turkish
272. RIA Novosti (2013), Op.cit. See also UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/23/58, 18 July 2013, 16.
273. France24 (2012), Russian-operated arms ship docks in Syrian port, 14 January 2012.
274. Ibid. See also interview in Time (2013), Top Russian Diplomat Explains Reasons for Syrian Arms Sales, 17 May
2013.
275. France24 (2012), Op.cit.
276. Reuters (2013), Insight: Syria pays for Russian weapons to boost ties with Moscow, 29 August 2013. See also Le
Figaro (2013), Syrie: des cargaisons darmes russes arrivent tous les deux jours, 22 June 2013; The China Post
(2013), Syria buys Russian weapons to boost ties with Moscow, 31 August 2013.
277. New York Times (2013), Russia sends more advanced missiles to aid Assad in Syria, 16 May 2013; Le Soir (2013),
Des missiles S-300 pour Bachar: Moscou opte pour lescalade, 29 May 2013; Time (2013), Top Russian Diplomat
Explains Reasons for Syrian Arms Sales, 17 May 2013; M. Snyder (2013), Russia has equipped Syria with their
most advanced anti-ship missiles, 3 September 2013; RIA Novosti (2013), All contracts with Russia on track
Syrias Assad, 26 August 2013.
278. The Telegraph (2013), Russian ship with helicopters for Syrian regime sets sail again, 13 July 2012; RIA Novosti
(2012), Russia will deliver first Mi-25 Gunships to Syrian on time Arms official, 28 June 2012.
279. Reuters (2013), Insight: Syria pays for Russian weapons to boost ties with Moscow, 29 August 2013.
280. Ibid.
281. UN Panel of Experts on Iran, Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2012/395, 120.
282. See for example Reuters (2012), U.N. points finger at Iran over arms supply to Syria, 22 August 2012.
283 UN Panel of Experts on Iran, Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2012/395, 37 and 104.
authorities seized 19 crates containing assault rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and
mortar shells from an Ilyushin-76 cargo aircraft operated by an Iranian cargo airline
destined for Syria.284 The latter transfer was confirmed by the UN Panel of Experts on
Iran. However, the UN Panel of Experts could not confirm the multiple accusations
by several States that Iran has started providing weapons to Syria through Iraq in the
course of 2013.285
Western diplomats have reported that Iran stepped up military support to Assad in
2013,286 and, according to Middle Eastern intelligence officials, Iran has also provided
surveillance drones to the forces of Assad.287 Both allegations have been confirmed
by Syrian armed opposition.288
North Korea is also known for being an ally of the Assad regime, albeit a quiet
one. According to an investigation of Human Rights First, North Korea has provided
missile technology, arms, and technical assistance to the Syrian regime.289 In April 2012,
France seized an illicit shipment of arms-related material originating in North Korea
and destined for Syria.290 The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea observed that
in May 2012, South Korea had seized an illicit shipment of missile-related items (10
metric tons of graphite cylinders), destined for a branch of a sanctioned North Korean
enterprise in Syria.291 In June 2013, the UN Panel of Experts also underscored that
Syria was involved in one third of all weapons of mass destruction and arms-related
incidents of non-compliance investigated by the Panel.292 In August 2013, Turkey
reportedly seized a ship that originated in North Korea carrying gas masks, 30,000
rounds of ammunition and 1,400 pistols and rifles.293 These, as well as several other
incidents,294 are evidence that North Korea has attempted to strengthen the military
forces of the Assad regime.295
In May 2013, the Lebanese Hezbollah a pro-regime and pro-Iran Shiite armed
militia clearly acknowledged its involvement in the Syrian conflict.296 Hezbollah
forces have been fighting alongside the Syrian regime inside Syria, and their leader
284. Ibid. 33 and 102. See also Human Rights First (2013), Enablers of the Syrian Conflict, March 2013, at p.11;
P.D. Wezeman (2013), Op.cit. at p.270.
285. UN Panel of Experts on Iran, Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2013/331, 5 June 2013, 106. See also
Reuters (2012), Exclusive: Western report-Iran ships arms, personnel to Syria via Iraq, 19 September 2012;
Agence France Presse (2013), Iraq inspects Iranian cargo plane bound for Syria, 15 April 2013; Human Rights
First (2013), Enablers of the Syrian Conflict, March 2013, at p.11; New York Times (2013), Flows of arms to
Syria through Iraq persists, to US dismay, 1 December 2012.
286. Reuters (2013), Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons lifeline to Assad, 14 March 2013.
287. Washington Post (2013), Russian, Iranian technology is boosting Assads assault on Syrian rebels, 2 June 2013;
The Times of Israel (2013), Syrian government aided by Iranian, Russian tech, 2 June 2013.
288. Washington Post (2013), Op.cit; See also World Tribune (2013), Assad using drones from Iran, Russia against
Syrian rebels, 7 June 2013; Wired (2012), Syrian rebels put captured Iranian drones on YouTube, 16 August
2012.
289. Human Rights First (2013), Enablers of the Syrian Conflict, March 2013, at pp.14-15.
290. UN Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2012/422, 14 June 2012,
67.
291. UN Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2013/337, 11 June 2013,
44-46
292. Ibid.
293. Global Post (2013), North Korea attempts to sell gas masks to Assad, 28 August 2013; Global Post (2013),
Syrias other key ally: North Korea, 8 September 2013.
294. See for example UN Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2012/422,
14 June 2012, 57, 58, 66.
295. Human Rights First (2013), Enablers of the Syrian Conflict, March 2013, at p.14.
296. See CNN (2013), Hezbollah leader acknowledges fighters presence in Syria town, 27 May 2013.
declared in an official video that Hezbollah will continue that fight until the end.297
This Hezbollah-Syria partnership goes together with arms transfers from Syria to
Lebanon and back.298
Other States such as Belarus, China and Venezuela, have also been referred to as
providing military assistance to the Assad regime.299 However, the news coverage on
weapon transfers from these States is quite poor and contradictory.
5.2. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

The four main sources of weapons for Syrian rebel groups are (1) captured government
stockpiles; (2) local and regional black markets; (3) the clandestine artisanal manufac-
ture of weapons; and (4) arms transfers from third States.300 This part focuses on the
latter source and more specifically on arms transfers supported and/or organized by
the governments of foreign States. It is important to note that the substantial supply of
weapons from outside Syria has become a conditio sine qua non for the survival of the
armed opposition groups in Syria.
The years 2012 and 2013 have been characterized by repeated requests from the
Syrian opposition for foreign governments to supply them with arms and military
equipment, such as small arms and light weapons and anti-aircraft weaponry to take
out the regimes helicopters and combat airplanes.301 The heated debates following
these demands are reflective of the unease of several States about the legality and
appropriateness of arming Syrian non-State actors. States supportive of the revolution
and subsequent rebellion in Syria have been unable to agree on a common policy on
the transfer of arms to the opposition forces.302 To illustrate, whereas the EU and the
USA at some point imposed an arms embargo against Syria, other States have always
been actively involved in arming Syrian rebels. Moreover, for several States there has
also been a major discrepancy between the official policy (i.e. against supplying arms)
and the quiet practice (i.e. organizing important arms transfers).
This section, without aiming at being exhaustive, provides an overview of most
important States involved in enabling the opposition to pursue its fighting, i.e. Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, and Croatia. Importantly, other States amongst
others USA, UK, Iraq and Turkey have also played a crucial role and have facilitated
the transfer of weapons from the above-mentioned States to the Syrian opposition.
297. See Youtube, Hezbollah leader acknowledges fighters presence in Syria, last consulted on 31 October 2013.
298. See for example CBS News (2013), Hezbollah says its getting game-changing weapons from Syria, 9 May 2013;
The Australian (2011), Syrian missiles arm Hezbollah, 16 July 2011; Al Arabiya (2013), Video shows Hezbollah
fighters executing wounded Syrian Rebels, 10 October 2013; The Guardian (2013), Hezbollah shows strain of
Syria war, 1 November 2013.
299. See for example, The Atlantic (2012), Belarus may be providing Syria with deadly military technology, 14 June
2012; Reuters (2012), Belarus denies planning to sell weapons to Syria, 20 September 2012; IRIB World Service
(2013), La Chine envoie des navires de guerre en Syrie, 6 September 2013; New Europe (2012), China rejects
accusations of selling arms to Syria, 10 February 2012; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013),
R2P Monitor, 15 May 2013, Issue 9.
300. See P.D. Wezeman (2013), Op.cit. at p.271; D. Spleeters (2013), Les rebelles syriens recyclent les bombes, La Libre
Belgique, 18 March 2013; New York Times (2013), In turnabout, Syria rebels get Libyan Weapons, 21 June 2013;
N. Daisse and C. Poitevin (2013), Conflit en Syrie Qui arme qui?, Paper on track with the author.
301. P.D. Wezeman (2013), Op.cit; Huffington Post (2013), CIA Delivering Light Weapons to Syrian Rebels: AP
Sources, 12 September 2013.
302. See also P.D. Wezeman (2013), Op.cit.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken a lead in arming the Syrian opposition, with
a sharp increase in weapon supplies in 2013.303 To illustrate, in March 2013, the New
York Times (NYT) reported more than 160 military cargo flights by Saudi, Qatari and
Jordanian military-style cargo planes. SIPRIs Hugh Griffiths, estimated the payloads
of these flights at 3,500 tons of military material.304 In an interview with NYT he also
added that the intensity and frequency of these flights [are] suggestive of a well-planned
and coordinated clandestine military logistics operation.305 This military equipment was
brought into Syria via Turkey and Jordan, where the planes landed.306 Later reports,
press articles and interviews with State officials confirm the organized character of
weapons supplies mostly small arms and light weapons, including AK-47 rifles, rocket
propelled grenades, hand grenades307 by both States.308 Given the large number of
flights into Jordan, Turkey and later also Iraq, and subsequent transports over land
into Syria, it is difficult to imagine that respective governments would not have been
involved in one way or another.309 Many weapons funnelled by Saudi Arabia, but also
by Jordan, originated from Croatian stockpiles, part of an undeclared surplus of arms
left over from the 1990s Balkan wars.310 According to some officials cited in the media,
multiple planeloads with thousands of rifles and hundreds of machine guns have left
Croatia.311 Agence France Presse refers to some 75 civilian transport planes transporting
some 3,000 tons of weapons and ammunition.312 Importantly, several sources report
that Washington and some European States played a role in organizing this traffic
from Croatia to Syria.313
Great numbers of arms have been smuggled from Libya to opposition forces in
Syria.314 In June 2013, a NYT article reported that many of the same people who
chased the colonel [Qaddafi] to his grave are busy shuttling his former arms stockpiles
to rebels in Syria.315 This news has been confirmed by various former Libyan rebels.316
These arms flows have been qualified as an important source of weapons for the upri-
sing and as an important multinational effort, financed largely by Qatar, to transport
303. While Saudi Arabia reportedly sends arms mainly to opposition groups in southern Syria, Qatar mostly sends
arms to rebels in the north. See on this issue, amongst others Reuters (2013), Qatar, allies tighten coordination
of arms flows to Syria, 14 May 2013.
304. New York Times (2013), Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid from CIA, 24 March 2013.
305. Ibid.
306. Ibid; See also New York Times (2013), In turnabout, Syria rebels get Libyan Weapons, 21 June 2013.
308. The National (2013), Gulf states put new conditions on arms supplies to Syrian rebels, 7 April 2013; BBC (2013)
Who is supplying weapons to the warring sides in Syria?, 14 June 2013.
309. In this regard, see also BBC (2013), Who is supplying weapons to the warring sides in Syira?, 14 June 2013; N.
Daisse and C. Poitevin (2013), Op.cit.
310. See New York Times (2013), Saudis step up help for rebels in Syria with Croatian arms, 25 February 2013;
Huffington Post (2013), Saudi Arabia arming Syrian rebels with Croatian Weapons since December 2012, 26
February 2013; La Libre (2013), La Croatie contourne lembargo vers la Syrie, 27 February 2013.
311. Huffington Post (2013), Saudi Arabia arming Syrian rebels with Croatian Weapons since December 2012, 26
February 2013.
312. Al Arabia and AFP (2013), Croatia transit point for Syrian rebel arms: report, 9 March 2013; The Telegraph
(2013), US and Europe in major airlift of arms to Syrian rebels through Zagreb, 8 March 2013.
313. See for example The Telegraph (2013), US and Europe in major airlift of arms to Syrian rebels through Zagreb,
8 March 2013; Centre for Research on Globalization (2013), The Syria Gun-Running Program: US and Britain
Channel Large Shipments of Weapons to Al-Qaeda Terrorists, 11 March 2013.
314. Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya,
S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, 158. Time World (2013), Arming Syrias rebellion: How Libyan weapons and know-
how reach anti-Assad fighters, 29 May 2013.
315. New York Times (2013), In turnabout, Syria rebels get Libyan Weapons, 21 June 2013.
316. Foreign Policy (2013), Comrades in Arms, 10 July 2013.
arms from Libya to Syrias opposition fighters.317 The UN Panel of Experts on Libya
observed in this regard that [t]he Syrian Arab Republic has presented a prominent
destination for some Libyan fighters and Libyan military material and that [t]ransfers
have been organized under the supervision, or with the consent, of a range of actors
in Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic and in countries neighbouring the Syrian Arab
Republic.318 Weapons stockpiles have reportedly been supplied by boat and airplane,
and have contained tons of humanitarian items and military material including; vehi-
cles, heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, ammunition
and SAM-7 missiles.319 According to Foreign Policy, these Libyan surface-to-air systems
have brought down several aircrafts belonging to the Syrian regime.320
The Sunni communities in Iraq and Lebanon have reportedly supplied explosives,
arms and ammunition to the Syrian opposition as well.321 However, it is doubtful that
the official authorities of these two States whose majorities are of a different faith
than the Sunni Syrian opposition played a role in the transfer of arms to the rebellion.
Conversely, Sudan is an entirely different story. In August 2013, the NYT reported
that Syrian rebels found a supplier in an unlikely source: Sudan, a country that has
been under international arms embargoes.322 According to Syrian rebels and Western
officials, the government of Sudan sold Chinese and Sudanese arms including anti-
aircraft missiles and small-arms cartridges to Qatar, which in turn arranged their
transfer to the rebels.323
According to numerous sources, from the second half of 2013, the United Sta-
tes CIA began delivering light machine guns and other small arms and light weapons
and munitions to the Syrian opposition.324 The CIA has reportedly also arranged the
supply of anti-tank weaponry such as rocket-propelled grenades through a third party,
presumably one of the Gulf countries.325 While the USA has been delivering non-
lethal material to the rebels for a longer time,326 it thus seems that this opposition ally
317. New York Times (2013), Op.cit.

318. Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya,
S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, 158.
319. Foreign Policy (2013), Comrades in Arms, 10 July 2013. See also Final Report of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya, S/2013/99, 9 March 2013, 114.
320. Foreign Policy (2013), Comrades in Arms, 10 July 2013.
321 BBC (2013), Who is supplying weapons to the warring sides in Syria?, 14 June 2013; New York Times (2013),
Syrian rebels tied to Al-Qaeda play a key role in war, 8 December 2008; Aljazeera (2012), Arms flowing between
Lebanon and Syria, 9 May 2012.
322. New York Times (2013), Arms Shipments Seen from Sudan to Syria Rebels, 12 August 2013.
323. Ibid.; Sudan Tribune (2013), Sudan becomes the newest player in Syrias protracted conflict: NYT, 13 August
2013.
324. The Wall Street Journal (2013), U.S. Begins shipping arms for Syrian rebels, 26 June 2013; Huffington Post
(2013), CIA Delivering Light Weapons to Syrian Rebels: AP Sources, 12 September 2013; Slate.fr (2013), La
CIA livre enfin aux rebelles syriens les armes promises par Washington, 12 September 2013; New York Times
(2013), CIA said to aid in steering arms to Syrian opposition, 21 June 2012.
325. CNN (2013), Officials says CIA-funded weapons have begun to reach Syrian rebels; rebels deny receipt, 12
September 2013; Huffington Post (2013), CIA Delivering Light Weapons to Syrian Rebels: AP Sources, 12
September 2013.
326. See for example France24 (2013), La CIA et des forces spciales amricaines entranent les rebelles syriens, 22
June 2013; New York Times (2013), Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid from CIA, 24 March 2013;
New York Times (2013), In turnabout, Syria rebels get Libyan Weapons, 21 June 2013.
finally decided to effectively327 provide them with lethal aid as well.328 The USA, as
well as France and the UK, have always urged caution with regard to the transfer of
arms to the splintered Syrian opposition, raising questions about the final destination
of these arms, which could as it is regularly reported end up in the hands of ex-
tremist groups.329
Europe has remained divided on the question of whether to provide lethal military
support to the Syrian opposition. Several European States among others Sweden,
Belgium, and the Netherlands have always opposed the transfer of arms to the
armed opposition in Syria outside UN framework. They have stressed the risk that such
transfers would undermine the conditions for a political process; that such transfers
may trigger the escalation of violence in Syria and the entire region; that weapons may
end up on the black market or in hands of terrorist groups and criminal gangs; and
that these weapons may be inadequately used and stocked.330 Other criticism often
heard is that the way to peace is not through arms deliveries, and that the transfer of
lethal material would be illegal under international law. Yet, other States, including
France and the UK two countries that have long since been sending non-lethal
military support to the opposition have lobbied to drop the EU arms embargo, with
success (see 3.1.2). However, after the lift of the EU arms embargo against Syria, the
UK government decided to put the clock back, and stressed it had no plans to arm
the Syrian opposition immediately.331 Despite persistent contradictory rumours in the
press, there is no evidence of UK lethal arms supplies to Syria. France, on the other
hand, announced in mid-September that it was in favour of sending arms to the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) but only with a number of States and a framework which can be
controlled, in order to prevent that weapons end up with Islamists.332 Late October
2013 there is still no official declaration that French arms transfers effectively occurred.
Still, it must be mentioned that several sources have reported French arm transports
to Syria, even at a time when the arms embargo was not yet lifted.333
327. Following the chemical attack(s) in Syria, US Congress approved the supply of weapons to the opposition, but
until September 2013 there was no reported progress towards physically supplying the rebels. See CNN (2013),
Official says CIA-funded weapons have begun to reach Syrian rebels; rebels deny receipt, 12 September 2013;
The Washington Post (2013), Congressional panels approve arms aid to Syrian opposition, 22 July 2013; BBC
(2013), US says it will give military aid to Syria rebels, 14 June 2013.
328. Washington Post (2013), U.S. weapons reaching Syrian rebels, 11 September 2013; The Telegraph (2013), Syria:
Britain, US and France in urgent talks on arming rebels, 14 June 2013.
329. New York Times (2013), Britain said to step back from push to arm Syrian rebels, 16 July 2013; Daily Mail
(2013), France moves close to arming Syrian rebels as it considers hi-tech tracking scheme to stop guns falling
into terrorist hands, 7 June 2013.
330. See in this regard also M. De Groof (2013), La leve de lembargo europen sur les armes destines la Syrie:
quelles implications?, RTBF Opinions, 29 May 2013 and M. De Groof (2013), Wapenleveringen aan Syri:
praktische & juridische beschouwingen, Wereldbeeld, Issue 167, 2013/3, at p.44.
331. Action on Armed Violence (2013), Arming rebels in Syria (and beyond): What next for the UK government?,
12 July 2013; Al Arabiya (2013), UK and France say can arm Syria rebels now but no immediate plans, 28 May
2013; New York Times (2013), Britain said to step back push to arm Syrian rebels, 16 July 2013.
332. See Le Monde (2013), Syrie : Hollande pour une livraison darmes contrle pour les rebelles, 20 September
2013; Fox News (2013), Hollande in favour of controlled arms shipments to Free Syrian Army, 19 September
2013.
333 See for example, LExpress (2013), La France livre dj des armes lopposition syrienne, 21 March 2013
6. Arms transfers to Syria: Legality
This section examines the legality of arms transfers to both the Syrian State armed
forces and opposition groups. The permissibility of arms transfers is analysed in view
of the most important rules of both European law and public international law which
apply to the supply of weapons and the use or threat of force. Bearing in mind the
factual situation in Syria as well as the status, characteristics and behaviour of the dif-
ferent parties to the civil war, the purpose of this analysis is to provide a legal analysis
on arms transfers to Syria.
6.1. EU Law
Within the EU context, several documents must be taken into account when a State
considers exporting arms to irregular armed groups or official governments abroad.
For several years now, the EU has played a key role when it comes to arms export
control, both in regional and international context. This section looks at two EU key
instruments which may limit the lawfulness of arms transfers to Syria.
6.1.1. Council Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Council Joint Action on the EUs contribution to combating the destabilizing accumulation and
spread of small arms and light weapons334 is a first important instrument which recognizes
the devastating effects of uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons
(SALW). It must be stressed that this EU instrument only considers the export of
small arms and light weapons (which are listed and defined in the Council Joint Actions
Annex), and thus it excludes from its scope of application the export of other types
of weapons.
In essence, one of the important principles articulated in this Council Joint Action
is that EU Member States are committed to supply small arms only to governments.335
The Council Joint Action thus urges EU Member States not to export SALW to non-State
actors. Since this Joint Action commits the EU Member States in the positions they
adopt, and in the conduct of their activity,336 EU Member States should not transfer
SALW to the armed opposition groups in Syria, except of course if they recognize
the opposition movement as the new legitimate government of the Syria (and thus
officially rejecting the Assad regime as the organ representing the Syrian State). Still, if
an EU Member State considers arming the (newly recognized) government in Syria, it
must also take account of other European and international rules that may legitimize
or delegitimize such arms transfers, as explained in the next sections.
334. This Joint Action was adopted in 1998 and renewed in 2002. In this regard, see eeas website.
335. Article 3 (b) 2002 Council Joint Action.
336. Preamble EU Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP in combination with Article 14 Treaty of Maastricht.
6.1.2. Council Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment

The 2008 Common Position Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military
Technology and Equipment articulates the EU export control standards.337 In effect, this
binding document recognizes the responsibility of each EU Member State which
exports military technology and equipment,338 and determines that States are to pre-
vent the export thereof which might be used for internal repression or international
aggression or contribute to regional instability.339 Therefore, each EU Member State
is compelled to assess the export licence applications for items on the EU Common
Military list against eight criteria, which can be summarized as follows:340
1) Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States,
in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European
Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other
international obligations.
2) Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect
by that country of international humanitarian law.
3) Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the exis-
tence of tensions or armed conflicts.
4) Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
5) Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community,
as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and
respect for international law.
6) National security of the Member States and of territories whose external rela-
tions are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and
allied countries.
7) Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted
within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
8) Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the
desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs
with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.
Moreover, States are not only compelled to assess applications for physical exports
against these eight criteria, but also applications for brokering licenses, transit or tranship
ment licenses, and applications for licenses for intangible transfers of software and
technology.341
Careful reading of the Common Position allows for the conclusion that an EU
Member State is compelled not to export or to deny export licenses for military techno-
logy and equipment (see EU Common Military List) to Syria:
337. EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP, 8 December 2008. The Users Guide serves as a guidance to assist
Member States in implementing the Common Position.
338. EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP, indent 3.
339. EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP, indent 4. See in this regard also EUEA, Arms Export Control, last
consulted on 1 November 2013.
340. Article 2 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP, 8 December 2008. This summary is taken from the EU External
Action Service website, Op.cit.
341. Article 1.2 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP.
(1) if this would be inconsistent with its international obligations and commit-
ments;342
(2) if there is a clear risk that this military technology and equipment might be used
for internal repression;343
(3) if there is a clear risk that this military technology and equipment might be used
for serious violations of international humanitarian law;344
(4) if this would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions
or conflicts;345
(5) if there is a clear risk that this would endanger regional peace, security and
stability.346
Even though the language of the 2008 Common Position is not very precise, the
correct application of the rules of interpretation of the European Court of Justice
allows for the conclusion that, in view of the actual situation in Syria as described
above, EU Member States are not allowed to export weapons to either of the parties of
the armed conflict in Syria. Legal interpretation at the Court of Justice is governed by
the text, context, and purpose: [t]hese are the three methods indicated early on in the
Van Gend en Loos judgment by the reference to the spirit, the general scheme and the
wording of the legal provisions which the Court has to interpret.347 The exports to
both the armed opposition and the Assad government would automatically activate
all five risks articulated above, which the EU precisely wanted to avoid through the
adoption of the obligatory Common Position, and is thus proscribed. Public interna-
tional law, and the obligations it imposes upon States, confirms this conclusion as will
become apparent in the analysis below.
6.2. Public International Law, International Human Rights Law

and International Humanitarian Law
In addition to EU law, the legality of arms transfers to armed groups that are involved
in armed conflict is also conditioned by international human rights law, international huma-
nitarian law, and international law governing the use of force. Analysis of a States obligations
under these different branches of international law allows for the conclusion that a
State will, under certain circumstances, violate its international obligations if it transfers
arms to both State and non-State actors that are involved in armed conflict abroad.
Considering the ongoing armed conflict in Syria, and the actual and future arms flows,
this section first assesses the risks for a State to incur international responsibility if
abuses are committed with military equipment and technology transferred to Syria by foreign States.
342. See Article 2.1 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (shall be denied).

343. Article 2.2(a) EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (deny).
344. Article 2.2(c) EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (deny).
345. Article 2.3 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (shall deny).
346. Article 2.4 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (shall deny).
347. M.P. Maduro (2007), Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism,
European Journal of Legal Studies, at p.4; ECJ Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963], at p.1. On the rules of treaty
interpretation see also Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). According
to Article 31 VCLT [a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Article 31 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties forms part of the EU legal order (yet, the VCLT only governs primary
legislation of the EU) as a rule of customary international law (see, by analogy, Case C-386/08 Brita [2010], par.
42 and Case C-466/11 Curr and Others [2012], par. 22).
This analysis will be based on (i) international human rights law, (ii) international
humanitarian law, and (iii) the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State
responsibility. Next, this section also examines if, and under what conditions, arms
transfers may be contrary to the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force.
This is because the international lawfulness of arms transfers depends not only on
humanitarian law and human rights law but also on the international law governing
the use of force and relations between States. Last, this section assesses whether the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) argument, which has regularly been invoked by Sta-
tes to justify the use of force in third States that are involved in internal crises, could
legitimize arms transfers to Syria.
6.2.1. International Humanitarian Law

A first question that arises is whether, and under what circumstances, international
humanitarian law prohibits arms transfers to actors involved in an armed conflict. Inter-
national humanitarian law in the first place articulates the rights and obligations of the
parties to the conflict. Thus, if a State becomes directly involved in the Syrian armed conflict,
it is by definition bound to respect any applicable international humanitarian law rules.
Moreover, and this is important for the actual question of the legality of arms transfers,
international humanitarian law also creates obligations for States which are not a party
sensu stricto to the armed conflict.348 This means that a State, even though it is not directly
involved in the armed conflict, is compelled to abide by international humanitarian law
in its relations to the actors involved and/or affected by an armed conflict.349
This obligation of non-State parties to the conflict is clearly articulated in Article
1 Common to all Four Geneva Conventions which provides that [t]he High Contrac-
ting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.350 This twofold obligation means (1) that a State has the negative duty
to refrain from itself, i.e. through its State organs or State agents, violating the law of
war, but also (2) that a State must abstain from aiding and assisting in the commission
of violations of international humanitarian law.351 On that account, the International
Court of Justice has observed that a State is under the obligation not to encourage
persons or groups engaged in the conflict to act in violation of international huma-
nitarian law.352 The ICJ also ruled that every State, whether or not it is a party to a
348. ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Judgment (Merits)(hereafter: Nicaragua Case), 27 June 1986, 220; ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (herafter: Wall Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, 158.
349. Common Article 1 to the 1949 Four Geneva Conventions, 1949; Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli
(2000), Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests, IRRC, Vol. 82,
No. 837; D. Fleck (2008), The law of non-international armed conflicts, in D. Fleck (ed.)(2008), The Handbook
of International Humanitarian Law, Second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.605-635, at p.631-632.
350. It is important to stress that Common Article 1 is applicable to both international and non-international armed
conflicts.
351. See in this regard D. Fleck (2008), at pp.631-632; J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (2005), Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Volume II, at pp.3289-3301. M.A. Babiker (2007), Application of International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law to the Armed Conflicts of the Sudan, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, at p.227. It must be stressed
that the obligation to ensure respect, besides requiring States to abstain from certain behaviour, also creates the
positive obligation to react when confronted with abuses perpetrated abroad. However, this particular content of
the obligation to ensure respect will not be analysed here.
352. ICJ, Nicaragua Case, 220, 255, 256.
specific conflict,353 is under the obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining
an unlawful situation.354
Thus, all States that do, or consider to, provide military support to either of the
parties355 to the armed conflict in Syria must make sure that this assistance is not used
for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law. Under international
humanitarian law, it is prohibited to transfer arms or related material to both State and
non-State armed groups which are notorious for committing war crimes and other
violations of the law of war. If not, that State commits an internationally wrongful
act that may trigger its international responsibility.
6.2.2. International Human Rights Law and ILCs Articles on State Responsibility
Does international human rights law impose similar restrictions on the permissibility
of arms transfers to actors involved in an armed conflict? The answer here is less
straight forward, and requires the consideration of (1) the theory of the extraterrito-
rial application of human rights treaties, and (2) the distinction between positive and
negative human rights obligations.356
6.2.2.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

The obligation to respect human rights and ILCs Articles on State Responsibility The tripartite
typology of human rights obligations distinguishes between the obligation to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights.357 The obligation to respect human rights means that
States must abstain from destroying human rights and freedoms.358 This negative duty
not to interfere with rights and freedoms exists both in a States own territory and
outside the States territory. To illustrate, in an extraterritorial context the obligation to
guarantee the right to liberty prohibits a State to send a State agent abroad to kidnap
a person. Today, the prohibition of a State to itself perpetrate abuses abroad is widely
acknowledged by both international practice and legal doctrine.359 Several States have
been condemned for having intentionally killed persons in foreign States, or for ha-
ving violated other human rights abroad. However, the more pressing question in this
actual context is whether human rights law also prohibits the facilitation, contribution or
support to human rights violations abroad, for example through the transfer of arms
and other military material to the different actors on the ground.
353. ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 158.

354. Ibid. 159.
355. Contrary to for example Article 16 ILCs Articles on State Responsibility, Common Article 1 prohibits third
States to support, aid or assist in the violations of international humanitarian law irrespective whether they are
perpetrated by State or non-State actors. See also B. Kessler (2001), The duty to ensure respect under Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: its implications on international and non-international armed conflicts,
GYIL, at pp.49-56.
356. This section only analyses the legality of aid and assistance to armed groups in light of civil and political rights.
It leaves out of consideration the economic, social and cultural rights.
357. For an overview of the tripartite typology, see O. De Schutter (2010), International Human Rights Law, Cambridge
University Press, at pp.264-256.
358. M. Gondek (2008), The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Trea-
ties, Intersentia, Antwerp, at p.60; S. Skogly (2006), Beyond national borders: states human rights obligations in international
cooperation, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, at p.67.
359. For an in-depth analysis, see M. De Groof, State collapse. Searching for legal protection for persons living in a collapsed State.
Somalia and beyond, book to be published at Intersentia, Antwerp, in 2014.
If a State knowingly aids or assists the government of another State in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act (such as gross human rights violations and
other international crimes) it may be internationally responsible.360 This is explicitly
acknowledged by Article 16 of the ILCs Articles on State responsibility.361 Thus,
when Russia, China or Iran transfer weapons to the Syrian regime of Bashar
al-Assad, knowing that these arms may be used for the commission of inter-
national crimes (such as massacre, torture, etc.), they may incur international
responsibility.362
6.2.2.2. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

Since Article 16 of the ILCs Articles only concerns relations between States (go-
vernment to government), a more complicated and controversial question that arises
is whether there exists a similar responsibility when aid or assistance is provided to
armed opposition groups. If so, on what legal basis can a State be held accounta-
ble if it transfers military equipment and technology to irregular armed groups? The
States obligation to secure human rights and the principle of non-use of force and
non-intervention are successively analysed in view of the legality of arms transfers to
non-State armed groups in Syria.
The obligation to secure human rights States are compelled not only to respect human
rights, but also to ensure and secure human rights recognized in international
human rights treaties. This means that States, in addition to being obliged to refrain
from certain behaviour, must also guarantee that human rights are respected and act
accordingly.363 For example, the obligation to respect the right to life prohibits a State
from assassinating its citizens, but it also compels States to stop, prosecute and punish a
murderer. This obligation also necessarily prohibits the State from providing a weapon
to an individual who would in all probability use it to kill someone.
It is undisputed that the facilitation or contribution to such abuse is the responsibility
of the State if it is perpetrated within the territory or jurisdiction of the State party to the
human rights treaties. However, it is controversial whether a State may be condemned
solely on account of substantive human rights law if it only supports, influences, or
facilitates human rights abuses by non-State actors in an extraterritorial context.
The jurisdictional provisions of most important treaties regarding civil and politi-
cal rights contain explicit references to the territory and/or jurisdiction of the State
party.364 In view of these jurisdictional provisions, the territorial application of these
treaties has often been interpreted as preventing the expansive interpretation according
to which, also in situations falling short of jurisdiction or control, a State would be
compelled to refrain from facilitating human rights violations by other actors abroad.
360. Article 16 ILCs Articles.

361. Article 16 ILCs Articles only concerns relations between States and is not applicable inasmuch as the aid or as-
sistance concerns entities that have no international status. See for example ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),
Judgment, 26 February 2007, par. 420.
362. Article 16 ILCs Articles.
363. See L. Zegveld (2002), The accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge University Press,
at p.166.
364. Article 2.1 ICCPR; Article 1 ECHR; Article 1.1 ACHR.
Some legal authors have adopted a more ambitious approach, and argue that any
States activity that interferes or deprives people in other states of their human rights
will represent violations of the obligation to respect,365 but this is not the generally
accepted position. In view of the law as it stands, it is doubtful whether States
such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, France, and the UK if they supply arms to the
rebels in Syria can incur international responsibility on the basis of interna-
tional human rights law. International courts, for the most part, have recourse to
other obligations under international law when establishing that the transfer of arms
and other support to armed groups in foreign States constituted wrongful conduct.366
Especially the principles of the non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention
are of important value in assessing the legality of arms transfers abroad, which brings
us to the next section.
6.2.3. The Principles of Non-Intervention and Non-Use of Force

The international lawfulness of arms transfers also depends on the international
law governing the use of force and relations between States. Whereas international
humanitarian law and human rights law determine the lawfulness of eventual arm
transfers to Syria with respect to the Syrian citizens, international law on the use of force
determines the lawfulness of arms transfers with respect to the Syrian territorial State.367
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the central rule on the prohibition of the threat or use
of force in international relations368 and provides that [a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations. In view of the situation in Syria, the question that
arises is whether the principle of non-use of force limits the right of foreign States to
arm the actors involved in the Syrian armed conflict.
6.2.3.1. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

Non-intervention and non-use of force The case-law of the International Court of Justice
is particularly instructive when analysing the principles of non-intervention and non-
use of force, and the impact of both principles on the legality of arms transfers to
actors involved in an armed conflict. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held the United
States responsible for training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces
[i.e. a paramilitary group which aimed at overthrowing the government of Nicaragua]
or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua.369 These conducts, the Court concluded, constitute (1) a breach
of the States obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another State, (2) a breach of
365. S. Skogly (2006), Op.cit, at pp.68 and 69.
366. See for example ICJ, Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda)(herafter: Congo v.
Uganda Case), Judgment, 19 December 2005, 181-221 and 345 (3). In this case, the ICJ rules that Uganda
violated its human rights and humanitarian obligations because, amongst others, it had incited ethnic conflict
and failed to take measures to end the conflict. However, the ICJ in its final considerations does not say that the
support given to irregular forces constitutes a human rights violation.
367. See also N. Melzer (2013), Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union Policy Department Study, May 2013, at p.21.
368. C. Gray (2008), Op.cit, at p.30.
369. ICJ, Nicaragua Case, 292.
a States obligation not to use force against another State, and (3) a breach of the States
obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another State.370 In the DRC v. Uganda case, the
ICJ considered that Uganda, which had given military support to armed groups in
Congo, had violated its international obligations. The Courts wording is very clear
in this regard, and worthy of being quoted: the Republic of Uganda () by actively
extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having
operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in interna-
tional relations and the principle of non-intervention.371 This ICJ case-law is also echoed in
various Security Council resolutions urging States to cease providing financial, military,
intelligence and non-military assistance to non-State actors abroad, for this would
destabilize States and threaten (internal and/or regional/international) peace, security
and stability.372 Is sum, as they stand, the commanding principles of the non-use
of force and non-intervention do not permit the transfer of military equipment
and technology to armed opposition groups in Syria.
6.2.3.2. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

Since the above case-law and practice only concern military and other support pro-
vided to non-State actors, the remaining question to be answered is whether such sup-
port, if provided to State actors (i.e. the government), also constitutes a violation of
the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force. This is an important issue
in the Syrian context; first, because various States (Russia, Iran, etc.) provide military
support to the Assad government, and second, because States may recognize (France,
UK, etc.), or already have recognized (Libya), the Syrian opposition as the legitimate
and only government of the Syrian State.373
Intervention by invitation or with the consent of the government Under international law, the
government of a State has the right to request assistance from other States to preserve
internal law and order or to defend its borders from outside armed attack.374 For these
two purposes, a State can validly consent to a foreign military presence on its territory,
or allow this foreign State to use force or to send military material and technology.375
However, such intervention based on the invitation or consent of the government of
a State is allowable only if certain conditions are observed.376
In order to be considered lawful, arms transfers to the Syrian government must
therefore fulfil the following criteria, at least if the arms suppliers base these transfers
370. Ibid.
371. ICJ, Congo v. Uganda Case, 345 (1).
372. See for example, UNSC Res. 1907, S/RES/1907, 23 December 2009; UNSC Res. 1844, S/RES/1844, 20 November
2009; UNSC Res. 2023, S/RES/2023, 5 December 2011. These resolutions condemned the financial, military,
intelligence and non-military assistance to armed groups as both a violation of the arms embargo and a threat to
peace, security and security.
373. See Section 3.2.2.
374. See UNSC Res. 387, S/RES/387, 31 March 1976 whichf stipulates that it is the inherent and lawful right of
every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other State or group of States; ICJ,
Nicaragua Case, 246 (intervention is allowable at the request of the government of a State); ICJ, Congo v. Uganda
Case, 42 and 53.
375. R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts (1992), Oppenheims International Law, Longman, London, at p.437; C. Gray (2008),
at pp.84 and 85.
376. ICJ, Nicaragua case, 246. See also P. Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law, at p.6.
on the theory of intervention by invitation or with the consent of the government.377

First, the request must be made, or the consent for an intervention, must be given ad
hoc or in advance to the arms transfers. Second, consent must be given freely to the
intervening State and must not be the product of hidden influence or pressure by the
State which provides arms or other support to the government. Third, the request for
the intervention is to be made by the lawful government of the State. This means that this
government is still representing the population and has not yet lost effective control
over the territory.378 This is a factual matter which needs to be decided in light of
the particular evidence of the situation in a State; however, in view of the civil war
in Syria the least one can say is that the Assad regime as much as, obviously,
the Syrian opposition, no longer represents part of the population and has lost
control over part of the territory. This brings us to the principle of non-interven-
tion in a civil war.
Principle of non-intervention in a civil war When local unrest reaches the threshold
of a civil war, third States are prohibited from intervening in favour of one party or
another,379 even upon request of the internationally recognized government.380 This
duty of non-intervention reflects an inherent right of self-determination through
revolution: when there is an internal armed conflict, third States must abstain from
any interference because in situations of a closely contested civil war, foreign nations
cannot guarantee which regime reflects the will of the people.381 In sum, when internal
armed opposition challenges the governments control over the State, the presumption
that the government speaks for the State may become untenable.382 This means that,
in principle, the Assad regime cannot legally invite foreign States to assist it in
repressing the Syrian opposition. Foreign States can therefore neither send troops
nor transfer arms or military equipment in support of the Assad regime.
Intervention in response to prior foreign intervention There is, however, an exception to the
rule prohibiting intervention in internal armed conflicts. When an attack from internal
armed groups against the government receives assistance from foreign forces, other States
may assist the government if it requests so.383 In other words, the Assad regime can
377. P. Kunig, Op.cit, at p.7.

378. Ibid. at p.6.
379. On this issue, R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts (1992), Op.cit, at p.428; C. Gray (2008), Op.cit, at p.67; D. Fleck (2008),
Op.cit, at p.10; O. Corten (2007), La licit douteuse de laction militaire de lEthiopie et Somalie et ses implica-
tions sur largument de lintervention consentie, Revue gnrale de droit international public, Vol. 111, at pp.522-523;
I. Detter (2000), The Law of War, Cambridge University Press, at pp.75-76; M.N. Shaw (2008), International Law,
Cambridge University Press, at p.1152.
380. The prohibition of forcible intervention in civil conflict is explicitly referred to in some legal rules that are ac-
cepted to be declaratory of customary law and can thus not be set aside on the grounds of a request or consent
thereto by the government of the territorial State. On this issue, see amongst others ICJ, Nicaragua Case, 191 and
ICJ, Congo v. Uganda Case, 162. See also C. Gray (2008), at p.68.
381. L.F. Berger (2000-2001), State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS
Intervention in Sierra Leone, Ind. Intl & Comp. L. Rev., Vol. 11, at pp.623-624. See also A. Ofodile (1994), The
Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, Columbia Journal of Transnational law, Vol. 32, at p.407; O. Schachter
(1984), International law: the right of states to use armed force, Mich. L. Rev, Vol. 82, 1620, 1629, at pp.136-137;
O. Corten (2007), Op.cit, at pp.522-523.
382. D. Wippman (2000), Pro-democratic intervention by invitation, in G.H. Fox and B.R. Roth, Democratic Governance
and International Law, Cambridge University Press, at p.299.
383. C. Gray (2008), Op.cit, at pp.81 and 92; M.N. Shaw (2008), Op.cit, at p.1150; R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts (1992),
Op.cit, at p.438; A. Cassese (2005), International Law, Oxford University press, at pp.368-371; D. Wippman (1996),
Change And Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal Conflict, Colum.Hum.Rts.
L.Rev., Vol. 27, at p.446.
only lawfully be assisted by a third State to repress the Syrian opposition, if this
opposition previously received substantive assistance from foreign forces. This,
of course, raises the difficult question of which States were the first to send weapons
to Syria; the States supporting the Assad regime or the States supporting the Syrian
opposition? This study makes no claim to having a definitive answer to this question.
However, this study would like to stress that if the arms suppliers base these transfers
on the theory of intervention in response to prior foreign intervention, they are still
compelled to end all arms transfers if they know, or should have known, that
these arms may used for the commission of international crimes.384
6.2.4. Self-Defense, Security Council Authorization

and the Responsibility to Protect
Under international law, there are several circumstances under which the use of force,
including the transfer of military material and/or the sending of troops, becomes
lawful. This section briefly analyses the concepts of self-defense and Security Council
authorization, and concludes with examining whether the concept of responsibility
to protect could legitimize arms transfers to Syria.
Self-defense and Security Council authorization A Security Council authorization385 and
a situation of self-defense386 are justifications recognized in international law for inter-
vention within the sphere of sovereignty of another State. Thus, if the Security Council
authorizes this, the transfer military equipment and technology to the Syrian opposition
or the Syrian government (depending on the wording of the Security Council Resolu-
tion) may become lawful. Likewise, an armed attack387 by Syria may justify the use of
force, including through the transfer of arms, against Syria by the attacked State.388
Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect The term humanitarian inter-
vention covers the use of military force by a State, or a group of States, into another
State without that States consent and primarily for halting or preventing gross human
suffering.389 Several States have on various occasions argued that on the basis of the
concept of humanitarian intervention or Responsibility to Protect (R2P), both a
military action in Syria and arms transfers to the Syrian opposition were necessary,
legal, and legitimate, even without UN Security Council approval.390 Especially after
the attack with chemical weapons, the Western dilemma about intervention in Syria
deepened.391 The United States and several of its allies drew up plans for a military
384. See Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.

385. See Chapter VII UN Charter.
386. Article 51 UN Charter.
387. This armed attack must fulfill various conditions if it is to justify use of force. See in this regard P. Kunig, Op.cit,
at p.6.
388. This use of force is admissible only if it responds to certain conditions, such as the principle of proportionality.
389. E.A. Heinze (2009), Humanitarian Intervention in D. Forsythe, Encyclopedia of Human Rights, Oxford University
Press, at p.443; F. Grnfeld (2009), Humanitarian Intervention: Policymaking, in D. Forsythe, Encyclopedia of
Human Rights, Op.cit, at p.456; R. Thakur (2007), Humanitarian Intervention, in T. Weiss and S. Daws, The Oxford
Handbook on the United Nations, at p.387.
390. See for example CBS News (2013), U.S. broadens target list for Syria strike, 6 September 2013; CNN (2013),
Obama seeks support for attacking Syria while pursuing diplomacy, 11 September 2013; The Guardian (2013),
Syria crisis: British military chief to set out options for strikes, 27 August 2013.
391. See The Guardian (2013), Does the UNs Responsibility to Protect necessitate an intervention in Syria?, 28 August
2013.
action on the Syrian territory and declared that the Syrian opposition had to be armed
properly and immediately.392 The question that thus arises is whether the use of chemical
weapons, or the large-scale abuses of both international humanitarian and human rights
law, provide grounds for exceptionally legitimizing such intervention in Syria which
is not authorized by the UN Security Council (hereafter referred to as unauthorized
humanitarian intervention, as opposed to UN authorized interventions). The doctrine
of humanitarian intervention, as well as the R2P-concept, require a differentiation
between legality on the one hand, and legitimacy393 on the other.394
When assessing the legality of an unauthorized humanitarian intervention in
Syria, it must be noted, first, that there exists no legal instrument that plainly author-
izes military intervention for humanitarian purposes. Much to the contrary, legal texts
are often quoted as evidence for a prohibition of such forcible intervention.395 The
UN Charter, to which we have referred above, only articulates two exceptions to the
prohibition of the use of force, and humanitarian intervention is not one of them.
The principle of non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter has been reaffirmed
in later resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, often referred to as further
evidence prohibiting humanitarian intervention.396 Summarized, international legal
instruments reveal a strong reluctance when it comes to forcible interventions for
humanitarian purposes.397
Analysis of international practice discloses no unequivocal answer as to the legal-
ity of humanitarian intervention either.398 Unauthorized humanitarian intervention,
it is argued, has been controversial both, when it happens and when it has failed to
happen.399 However, a close analysis of the most important cases of unauthorized
humanitarian interventions of the recent past such as in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo
(1999) allow for the conclusion that the vast majority of these interventions have
been controversial and their legality disputed. Similarly, the argument of the US
and several European States that there was a legal right to use military means in Syria
to stop the atrocities was rejected by the majority of governments and legal experts
worldwide.
392. See Sections 3.1 and 5.2.

393. For an analysis of the legitimacy issue, see Section 7.
394. See on this issue, M. Brenfors and M.M. Petersen (2000), The legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention,
Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, at p.476. See also J. Wouters and T. Ruys (2013), Militair ingrijpen in
Syri: Lessen uit een recent verleden, Wereldbeeld, Issue 167, at p.50.
395. See in this regard, O. Corten (2008), Le droit contre la guerre, Pedone, at pp.741-777; A. Roberts (2000), The so-called
right of humanitarian intervention, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 3, at pp.7-12; M. Byers and
S. Chesterman (2003), Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of
international law, in J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: ethical, legal and political dilemmas,
Cambridge University Press, 2003, at pp. 177-203.
396. For example, the UNGA Inadmissibility Declaration (1965) stipulates that [n]o State has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State (); The
UN GAs Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) prohibits forcible intervention and makes no exception as to
military intervention for humanitarian purposes; The UNGAs Definition on Aggression (1974) provides that no
consideration of whatever nature, whatever political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification
for aggression.
397. A. Roberts (2000), at p.8.
398. For an in-depth analysis, see M. De Groof, State collapse. Searching for legal protection for persons living in a collapsed State.
Somalia and beyond, book to be published at Intersentia, Antwerp, in 2014.
399. K. Naumann (2004), The responsibility to protect-humanitarian intervention and the use of military force,
Keynote Address at the 20th Annual Seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, 26
February 2004.
The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) does not change this conclu-
sion.400 The core idea behind R2P can be explained as follows: each individual State
is primarily responsible for the protection of its population, but if the home State is
unable or unwilling to care for its people the onus of protection falls upon other ac-
tors. The R2P concept was designed to enable the international community overcome
the dilemma between the imperative to act in situations of mass atrocity and the need
to respect the conventional norm of non-interference401 and encapsulates the idea
that sovereignty must not protect States that lack the will or capacity to protect their
people.402 However, the R2P concept as endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005,
first, does not primarily focus on military responses to grave humanitarian problems.403
Moreover, it allows no opening for coercive measures unless they are authorized by the
Security Council.404 Summarized, the law as it stands does not allow a conclusion
that an unauthorized military intervention or the sending of arms to Syria for
humanitarian purposes passes the legality test.405
400. J. Wouters and T. Ruys (2013), Op.cit.

401. A. Giorgis (2012), The UNs Approach to R2P Issues in Africa, Wereldbeeld Tijdschrift voor de Verenigde Naties,
Issue 163, at p.5.
402. F. Deng (2009), JISB Interview: The Responsibility to Protect, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 4, at
pp.83-89.
403. UN GA, World Summit Outcome Document, 15 September 2005, A/60/L.1, 138-139.
404. Ibid.
405. Ibid.
7. Concluding Observations
The detailed analysis of both the actual situation on the ground in Syria and the most
important European and international legal rules regulating the transfer of arms and
the use of force in international relations disclose that the legality and the legitimacy
of arms transfers to Syria may be fallacious.
In order to be internationally lawful, the transfer of military material and technology
to Syria must be justified with respect to both the territorial State and the affected
persons.
First, regarding the territorial State, international law on the use of force severely
limits the possibility for foreign States to transfer arms to Syria lawfully. In essence, all
arms transfers to the armed opposition groups would be unlawful; and arms transfers
to the government are lawful only if that government still represents the Syrian people
and controls the Syrian territory, quod non.
Second, regarding the Syrian citizens who are the primary victims of the armed
conflict in Syria, arms transfers to Syria are lawful only if these transfers do not harm
their rights under international humanitarian law and international human rights law
applicable during armed conflicts. Analysis of the situation on the ground has revealed
the clear risk that arms in Syria be they in the hands of the Assad regime or in the
hands of the opposition forces may be used for the perpetration of human rights
and humanitarian law violations, which again casts a shadow over the legality of arms
transfers to Syria.
Third, it is erroneous to invoke the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and
responsibility to protect as a legal justification for either targeted strikes on the Syrian
territory or arms transfers to the different Syrian parties.
If one moves away from the legal considerations and comes into the sphere of the
moral and/or political considerations, the question arises whether sending arms to Sy-
ria and/or a military intervention in Syria can be legitimate. Several experts and expert
bodies such as ICISS have elaborated some strict criteria which must be satisfied for
such unauthorized humanitarian intervention to be legitimate and wise,406 such as: (a)
seriousness of threat; (b) proper purpose; (c) last resort; (d) proportional means; and
(e) balance of consequences.407 These criteria are indeed the absolute minimum for a
humanitarian intervention or the transfer of arms to be legitimate. But still, one must
remain very sceptical regarding claims that arms transfers ought to protect civilians.
This is because the unintended consequences, including further civilian casualties, tend
to be severe.408 In addition to the direct civil casualties that such interventions may
406. G. Evans (2013), R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria, Open Democracy, 9 September 2013.
407. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, at p.32;
Report of the Secretary-Generals High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), A More Secure
World, A/59/565, at p.67; B. Akinrade, Human rights and State Collapse in Africa, Eleven International Publishing,
at pp.199-200; M. Brenfors and M.M. Petersen (2000), Op.cit, at pp.476-486; L.F. Berger (2000-2001), Op.cit, at
pp.613-615; A. Roberts (2000), Op.cit, at pp.33-44. For a discussion of the limits of criteria in legitimizing military
intervention and the lack of any consensus thereon by States, see A.J. Bellamy (2008), The Responsibility to Protect
and the problem of military intervention, International Affairs, Vol. 84, at pp.625-630.
408. J. Holmes (2013), Does the UNs Responsibility to Protect necessitate an intervention in Syria?, The Guardian,
28 August 2013.
provoke, important arms transfers to Syria in the name of the responsibility to protect
involves additional important risks, such as (a) a deficient stockpile management by the
recipients of the weapons; (b) an illicit proliferation and diversion of the arms inside
and outside Syria; (c) an increased level of violence and increased violations of most
basic rules of international law; (d) an arms race between the supporters and oppo-
nents of the Assad regime; (e) a militarization of the armed conflict; and (f) placing
into jeopardy the regional and international peace and security.
To conclude, this report would like to underline the following important statement
by the authoritative Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic: There is no military solution to this conflict. Those who supply arms
create but an illusion of victory.409

Arms Transfers to
The Syrian Arab Republic
Practice and Legality
After more than two years of internal conflict in Syria, a pressing
question relates to the practice and legality of arms transfers to both
the groups opposing the regime of Assad and the Assad regime itself.
Since the beginning of the conflict, regional and international players
are arming one side or the other, which brought the UN Secretary-
General to qualify the conflict as a proxy war. In light of the lift of
the EU arms embargo earlier this year, and the growing tensions at
the regional and international level on the Syria question, there is
no likelihood of decreasing arms transfers in the near future, which
triggers the discussion on the permissibility of such arms transfers.
Therefore, this research paper outlines the normative and practical

framework which governs arms transfers to the myriad of actors
involved in the Syrian armed conflict. The practical analysis
concentrates on past and present arms transfers to Syria and the risks
of proliferation of these arms in Syria and beyond. The legal analysis
focuses on the most important international and European legal
standards governing the transfer of military material and technology,
as well as the international treaty and customary law rules regulating
the threat or use of force in international relations. The main purpose
of this report is to offer an in-depth legal and factual analysis on arms
transfers to Syria.
Mlanie De Groof is a researcher at GRIP.
Chausse de Louvain, 467

B-1030 Bruxelles
Tl.: (32.2) 241 84 20

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Arms Transfers

the Ministry of the Region of Brussels-Capital (ACTIRIS)

Groupe de recherche et d'information

3. The International Responses to the Situation in Syria 20

4. Panorama of Weapons Used by Internal Actors 31

5. Arms Transfers to Syria: Practice 35

6. Arms Transfers to Syria: Legality 42

Source: UN doc. A/HRC/18/53

particularly, it analyses the condemnations, sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by

2. The Internal Actors Involved

2.1. The State Armed Forces

18. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 120.

22. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, 22 and 24.

2.2. The Opposition Groups: Myriad of Actors

Brotherhood to secular formations and representatives of local committees.65 The

76. O Bagy (2013), Op.cit, at p.6.

2.3. Territorial Control

2.4. The Violations of International Human Rights Law

119. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, 119.

3. The International Responses

3.1. Condemnations, Sanctions and Arms Embargoes

3.1.1. The United Nations

138. UNGA Res.66/176, A/RES/66/176, 19 December 2011.

172. Ibid. 21.

to the crisis in Syria or to agree upon coercive measures to be adopted against

3.1.2. The European Union

3.2. International recognition

3.2.2 Regional Organizations and Individual States

4.1. Conventional Weapons

4.2. Chemical Weapons

5. Arms Transfers to Syria: Practice

5.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

266. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, 31.

5.2. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

317. New York Times (2013), Op.cit.

6. Arms transfers to Syria: Legality

6.1.1. Council Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

6.1.2. Council Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment

6.2. Public International Law, International Human Rights Law

342. See Article 2.1 EU Common Position 2008/844/CFSP (shall be denied).

6.2.1. International Humanitarian Law

6.2.2.1. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

353. ICJ, Wall Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, 158.

6.2.2.2. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

360. Article 16 ILCs Articles.

6.2.3. The Principles of Non-Intervention and Non-Use of Force

6.2.3.1. Arms Transfers to Opposition Groups

6.2.3.2. Arms Transfers to State Armed Forces

on the theory of intervention by invitation or with the consent of the government.377

377. P. Kunig, Op.cit, at p.7.

6.2.4. Self-Defense, Security Council Authorization

384. See Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.

392. See Sections 3.1 and 5.2.

400. J. Wouters and T. Ruys (2013), Op.cit.

409. UN Report Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, at p.1.

Therefore, this research paper outlines the normative and practical

Chausse de Louvain, 467

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