The Philosophy of Nyaya-Vaigesika _ and its Conflict with The Buddhist Dignaga School tGRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM) * DHARMENDRA NATH SHASTRI M.A., M.O.L., D.Litt, Professoy of Sansksut and Adviser, The Institute of Indclogy, Detht With a Foreword by Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN Formerly President of India BHARATIYA VIDYA PRAKASHAN DELUI-7 . VARANASE-1 (INDIA) :RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN, . New Delhi. FOREWORD In his Critique of Indian Realism, Dr. Dharmendra Nath Shastri makes a refreshingly new approach to the uge-old prob- lems of Indian Philosophy. The book is best described as a full and persuasive account of the inside story of the Nydya-Vaisestka Realism. Instead of giving an exposition exclusively from its own sources, Dr. Shastri presents this important system of Indian thought from a new perspective, from its long encounter with the Buddhist School of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Although the heginnings of the Vaisesika or the Nyéya are pre-Buddbistie and they belong to a different metaphysical background, it was in the course of the philosophical duel sustained for over six centuries with the Dignaga School of Buddhism that the Nydya- Vaikesika attained its characfextstic stamp as a consistent. Realisn. closest to common sense. In this pracess, it also gained in clarity and depth. Many of its basic conceptions, such as Substance, Attribute, Universal (Sdméaya), Inherence (Samacéya), Causa- tion and Perception underwent considerable modification and reformulation as a result of its conflict with Buddhism, and no less from the internal criticism of the schools of Mimditsd. One of the chief merits of the present work is that Dr. Shastri shows, with a wealth of detail and sound reasoning, the nature of the changes made and why the changes were made. He has alsoegaefaeandt fe ge: erara:” araetfafes = NVT. p. 80. Knowledge by its very nature is disposed to Truth vadiaat qaakeaaarrer FeaeTg” ataz NK, p. 200 Right comprehension is the genctic troit of all cognitionsaA: “giem: atageea” aX. 14. 15. BRT ATT A Fea I wed areca aa faorit ateeirer: we Sharacciahesy = agarearaaferar) Sart: aaeaste afar cereal 12 tr oad fearing saaleat watata: diaarafaaern 3 wire wear arerq ofr gy arigafterterdisat = feqa ux u fret arden aired fatto wea anf ara: earssafrerataer nn 4PREFACE The present work was planned in 1944-45 when I stayed for over a year at Banaras, the traditional seat of Sanskrit learning, It had often struck me as a young student of Indian philo- sophy that the Nyaya-Vaifesika school had undergone some significant changes in the course of its development. ‘There was, besides, the old tradition of 2 protracted conflict between the Nyaya- Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga school based on Uddyotakara’s remark that he wrote his great work, Nydyo- odrtika, “in order to dispel the darkness caused by pseudo. philosophers (ie, Dignaga and others)”, I decided to work on the ambitious plan of attempting at a picture of that conflict between the two most important schools, the Ny4ya-Vaisesika which stands at the base of the fabric of Indian philosophy and the Digniga school which marks the culmination of the deve- lopment of Buddhist philosophy, This conflict lasting for six Jong centuries (from the 5th to the 1th) is essentially one between Realism and Idealism which is the basic problem of all philosophy, It would be evident that the Nydya-Vaisesika school developed and formulated most of its theories with a view to defending realism. This study presenting the Nyfya-Vaisesika system, for the first time, in the light of sts conflict with the Digniga school, not yPREFACE x1 J wanted to study these texts with the help of pandits of ortho- dox traditional learning. The portions of these texts with which I was chiefly concerned were those which were related to Bud- dhist theories—their exposition and their refutation. The ortho- dox pandits having no background of the Buddhist theories could not make headway in the interpretation of these texts; and what was worse still, they honestly believed that they under- stood those passages and tried to explain them. I felt miserably disappointed. Sometime afterwards, f read in the preface to oné of the Buddhist works edited by the late Sri Rahul Sankzitya- yan that when he went to Banaras to study the basic Nyaya- Vaisesika works, he also found that none of the pandits was con- versant with those works which had heen outside the scope of traditional study, Had I read this before, I should have been spared so much waste of time and effort and strain on my nerves. It then occurred to me that 1 should start the other way round and should study the theories of the Dignaga school first. I tried a number of expositions of Buddhist philosophy and especially those of Dignaga school, but I did not succeed in assimilating the theories of that system. At this juncture, I came across Stcherbatsky’s Buddhist Logic. Although that book has now been republished, it was not easily available in 1944, and it was with great difficulty that I could procure a copy-of the first value from one library, and that of the second volume from another. The discovery of Stcherbatsky proved a red-letter day in my study of Indian philosophy, Although I had studied Indian philosophy on orthodox lines from my boyhood, for almost thirty years then, I realized only after the study of Buddhist Logic and other works of Stcherbatsky that erthodox Indian philosophy could not be properly understood without the back-ground of Buddhist philosophy. Especially, the study of the Ny.iya-Vai- scsika was meaningless without the understanding of the Dignaga school. I have unreservedly acknowledged my indebt- edness to Stcherbatsky (p. 28). Not only did his works help me in grasping the theories of the Digniga school, hut they also paved the way for interpreting the difficult passages of the texts of the Nyfya-Vaisesika works. In the second volume of Budelhistxii CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM Logic, Stcherbatsky has appended an annotated English transla tion of some of the difficult portions of the texts of Sanskrit philosophical works relating to the controversy between the rthodox schools and the Buddhists, including some of the portions of the Nydyavértike-tatparyatika of Vacaspatimisra for the understanding of which I had formerly made desparate cflorts with the help of the pandits. Now, with the help of Stcherbatsky's translation, I succeeded in grasping those parts of Sanskit tents, and I decided ta embark upon their study once again. Despite my previous disappointment with the orthodox pandits, I folt that they could be of great help in making head- way in the interpretation of these difficult texts; they were con- versant with their peculiar idiom. Luckily, I met one scholar, Pandit Padma Prasad Bhatarai, the head Pandit of the Nyaya at Goenka Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, Banaras (now Principal, Government Sanskrit College Kathmandu, Nepal), who plainly confessed to me that the Nyaya-Vaisesika works in question were outside the scope of orthodox studies, but that he would be willing to try them studiously. ‘This filled me with great hope. We made a plan of studying a particular portion of one of the Nyaya-Vaisesika works separately, and then to meet and exchange notes. This went on for a number of months; I grate- fully acknowledge my indebtedness to Pandit Bhatarai. I also studied somet texts in collaboration with Pandit Raghu Nath ji, now Professor in Sanskrit University, Varanasi and Pandit Vibhuti Bhushan Bhattacharya of the same University. Later, I came to know that the same method of studying in collabora- tion with orthodox Pandits was followed more or less by Stcherbatsky also. In order to present a picture of the conflict between the two schools, I made an exhaustive and extensive study of the four basic Nyaya-Vaiéesika works already named. These works pre- sent a faithful picture of the Buddhist side as well. Besides, I have drawn upon some of the principal works of the Digniga school, viz. Pramana-samuccaya of Dignaga (Pratyaksa-khanda only), Nydya-binds and Pramdna-cartike of Dharmakirti, Tattva- sangroha of Santaraksita with its commentary by Kamalaéila,PREFACE xiii and the Six Buddhist Tracts published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, I have also discussed the theories of Kumarila and Prabhakara whose contribution to the orthodox theory of realism is as great as that of the Nydya-Vaiéesika scholiasts. Other works on Indian philosophy, ancient as well as modern, to which reference has been made in the present work, are listed in the bibliography. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theories having been presented here in a new perspective, I have arrived at some bold conclusions about which difference of opinion may naturally be expected. In the concluding chapter entitled, Nyaya-Vaisesika Theories in a New Perspective, 1 have given a résumé of my conclusions. It might be advisable to read this chapter first to appraise haw far these conclusions have been substantiated in the bady of this work. Far from claiming any originality for this, I are reminded of the characteristic humility of the great Nyaya- Vaisesika writer Jayanta who said, “How should I be capable of striking an original ideaP_ My work may be regarded merely as a new mode of exposition”? What I maintain is simply this, that, as a result of the study of the conflict between the two schools, these theories have been presented in a new light altogether, The work is divided into thirteen chapters. The first chapter is in the form of an introduction giving the nature and scope of the work. The second and third chapters deal respec- tively with the problems of realism in general and its treatment Ja other Indian schools. The fourth chapter gives 2 brief histo- tical survey of the literature of the Nyiya-Vaisesika school including a brief natice of the thinkers of the opposite camp of Dignaga school. The fifth chapter deals with the general problem of the nature of reality. The first five chapters may thus he regarded as of an introductory character; they have also been published in a separate volume for the general reader who is not likely to be interested in the abstruse polemic that follows. The conflict between the two schools has been presented in the order of the Nyaya-Vaigesika categories. ‘The sixth chapter deals with the defence of the substance, and the seventh with the theory 3 See infra, p. 14. n, 237.xiv CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM of causation. ‘The next four chapters, from the eighth to eleventh, deal with the problems associated with the remaining Nyaya-Vaistsika categories. ‘The twelfth chapter deals with some epistemological problems which have a bearing on the theory of yealism. The thirteenth and concluding chapter entitled the Nyaya-Vaisesika Theorics in a New Perspective gives a résumé of this work. A Clossary of technical terms is also given at the end which will prove useful, especially to lay readers. Indian scholiasts evolved for philosophical discourse a. special idiom of Sanskrit which is marked by brevity and precision, To translate the abstruse polemic of Indian phito- sophy into English or for the matter of that in any other modem language presents, therefore, a peculiar difficulty. The idiom of a current language could be retained, in some cases, only at the cost of clarity, The author bas cared more for clarity of the subject matter than for the idiom of the language. In some tases, these translations are, more or Jess, literal; in others, they are rather free; while in still others, only the substance of the passages has been given. As for the extracts from the Sanskrit texts, the smaller ones are given in Indo-Roman script with diacritical marks, but the longer ones from the sixth chapter onward (when we enter into the arguments of the two schools) are given at the end in Text-Appendix in Devanagari script in a serial order of the chapters and pages. In some cases, however, where Sanskrit texts are not quoted in full, references to them are invariably given. OF the important Nyfya-Vaigesika works from which I have quoted copiously, the Nyayakandali has been translated into English by Dr, Ganga Nath Jha; and some important passages oF that bock have also becn translated by Faddegon, a Dutch scholar, in his Vaifesika System. ‘These translations were not of much help to me, and my own renderings are quite independ- ent of them. At places, 1 found them inaccurate—avhich fact I have pointed out in some instances. Stcherbatsky’s translation of two important portions of the Nyayavartikeatparyatika, stands, however, on a different footing and is immensely helpful. 7 A great difficulty in the way of understanding thesePREFACE xv abstruse philosophical texts is that they have been printed with out being properly edited; there are mistakes practically on every page. Whosoever works on these texts intelligently should be able to suggest a number of emendations as Stcherbatsky has done. It appears that he had access to some manuscripts not hitherto utilized. A new edition of the Nydya-daréana, with Bhasya, Nyaya-virtika and Nyiye-vartika-tatparyatika, appear ed in 1936 A.D. from Calcutta. The editor of that work does not seem even to be conversant with the fact that Stcherbatsky hay done so much work to improve the text. It is a pity that the woyk of that great Russian savant of Indian Philosophy has practically remained unknown in this counay*, I have also made some emendations in the text which are pointed out at their proper places, * Besides expressing my indebtedness to the scholars already mentioned, I can hard{y find words to express my gratitude to Dy, S. Datta, author and scholar (formerly Professor of English in Delhi University), who went steadily and meticulonsly through the whole of this work. I am deeply indebted to my friend Prof. Sadhu Ram who not only helped me in the revision, but also in the correction of proofs. My student, Sri G, 5, Gupta also worked very hard, especially in preparing the Index, My students, Dr. Shiva Raj Shastri, Dr. Bharat Singh, Dr. Sri Niwas Shastri, amd Sri K. N. Gupta were helpful in a number of ways. J also take this opportunity of expressing my indebted- ness to the Agra University~to its former Vice-Chancellor, Dr. -K. P, Bhatnagar and to its present Vice-Chancellor, Col. P. D. Gupta—for undertaking the publication of this work, and also to the University Grants Commission for making a grant for its publication. I am also grateful to the New Age Press which undertook the printing of this work despite its many pre occupations. Kuruksheita University, Dharmendra Nath Shastri August 15, 1963. 1 Infra, p. 27.PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION Tt was painful to me, as it would be to every author, that my Hfe work, “Critique of Indian Realism” should not be available in the market, the first edition having been exhausted long before, The Institute of Indology Delhi was Prepared to take up the publication of the second edition, but it was rightly felt that the sale of a work, published by the Institute could not be pushed up. In this situation, Mr. Kishore Chandra Jain, Partner of the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, came forward and offered to publish the Critique within two months, He actually got it printed by photostat method even before two months. Tcanmot adequately be grateful ta Mr. Jain for filing with joy this last stage of my life. 23-4-76 301, Urmila Shastri Road Meerut Cant. D.N. SHASTRICONTENTS Abbreviations and Bibliography CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1. 2. ‘The Advent of Dignaga Confict Between Dignaga School and Nyaya- Vaigesika Realism . The Syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika School - Three-fold Contents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika System + Three Periods im the History of the Nyaya- Vaisesika ~ Dignaga School . The Corner-stone of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Realism . Corollaries from the Basic. Nydya-Vaisesika Principles . Untenability of the Nydya-Vaigesika Realism 10. ll. . Stcherbatsky as an Expositor of the Digniga The Nyaya-Vailesika School! after Gangesa Dignaga School and the Orthodox Schools School PageREALISM xviii CRITIQUE OF INDIAN 13. Present Condition of the NyZya-Vaisesika Studies 14. Significance of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Theories Missed 35. ‘The Aim and Scope of the Present Work CHAPTER II. REALISM VERSUS TOEALISM 1. Theories regarding the Nature of Reality (i) Realism (#) Materialism Gi) Representationism (iv) Subjective Idealism {e) Objective Idealism (vi) ‘Transcendental Idealism (vii) Dislecticism of the Madhyamika 2. Realism and Idealism in Indian Philosophy 3. Two Different Senses of the Term Realism CHAPTER Til. SOME REALIST SCHOOLS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY - Schools of Indian Philosophy: Two Broad Divisions . Demarcation Between the Buddhist and the Orthodox Schools - Four Buddhist Schools . The Vaibhasika School . The Sautrintika Schoo} - Orthodox Account of the Vaibhasika School « Gunaratna’s Account of the Vaibhisika Theory + Jayanta’s Account of the Vaibhasika Theory + Misrepresentation of the School Orthodox Account of the Sautrintika School U1. A Probable Explanation The Pirva-mimisisi School and Realism The Vaisesika grew in the Parva-mimimsa Fold 8 88 39 39 42 43 43 44 46 47 49 BL 52. ZBARSSAARS44 15. 16. 1. 18. 19. CHA’ br aun CONTENTS . Parva-mimimsa and Nyaya Orthodox Systems Divided in two Groups Madhva, the Realist School of the Vedanta Realism of Sarnkhya Contribution of the Pirva-mimimsa to Realism Realism based on Dharma-dharmi-bheda PTER IV, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA LITERATURE Paucity of Chronological Data The Relative Age of the Orthodox Schools and the Stitras . Early Age of the Vaisesika as a School . The Origin of the Nyaya School . Liaison Between the Ny&ya and the Vaisesika Three periods in the History of the Nyaya- Vaisesika %. The Pre-Dignaga Period (i) Kanada (4) Gotama or Gautama {fit) Vatsyayana (iv) Pragastapida (v) Predecessors of Vatsyayana (vi) Ravana-bhasya on the Vaisesika-Satras (vii) Bharadvaja-vrtti 8. Period of Conflict with the Digniga Schoo! (i) Dignaga (#) Uddyotakara (ii) Dharmakirti (io) Kumérila and Prabhikara (2) Vacaspatimisra (vi) Jayanta (vit) Bhasarvajna (vit) Sivaditya (é) Vyomasiva t aes 73 76 97 100 103 103 107 108 108 WW WW Ue 114 lig 116 liyax CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM (x) Sadhara B (si) Udayanicirya Q. The post-Buddhist Period 120 (i) Anticipatory Significance of Udayana- cirya Bhasarvajfia and Sividitya 120 (#) Varadaraja, Vallabhacdrya and Sasadhara = 12 (i!) Gangesa and his Successors 121 (iv) Syncretic Manuals 122 (©) Commentaries on the Siitras 193 (vi) Decadent Tendencies of the Third Period 124 (vit) Climax of Decadence in the Eighteenth Century 124 (vii) Recovery in the Nincteenth Century 124 CHAPTER ¥ THE NATURE OF RCALITY 1. Existence from Non-cxistence 126 2. Cause and Effect Different in their Essence 127 3. The Existence Becomes Non-existent yak 4. The Essence of Non-cternal Substances 133 5. Four Kinds of Eternal Atoms 185 6. Five Exclusively Eternal Substances 138 ‘T. Conception of Substance 137 8. Reality of the Categories other than Substance 140 9, Extreme Realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika School 141 10. Conception of Existence (Satta) in the Nydya- Vaisesika M46 11. Recapitulation 152, CHAPTER Vi. DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE 1. Substance as a Synthetic Principle 154 2. The Theo: ee ae oy of -— as the Hall-mark of s6 3. Four Planks in Defence of Substance 1ST4. 5. 6. T. 8. 9. 18. nh. 12, ESS BSSR RERESES CONTENTS The Atomic Theory of the Vaisesika School Problem of Change in Measure Measure of Atom and Dvy-anuka Atom compared with Ksana of the Buddhist Defence of Atom in the Nyaya-siitras Uddyotakara’s Polemic Vasubandhu answered How Atom is related to Space-quarters Some minor Objections answered . Substance as Distinct from Qualities The Buddhist Viewpoint . Sridhara on Substance as different from Qualities . Argument of Uddyotakara Buddhist Doctrine of Point-instants (Ksanas) Refutation of the Theory of Evanescence Evanescence proved by the Law of Contradiction Evanescence implied in the Notion of Existence Evanescence proved from Destructibility Recognition reconciled with Evanescence . Evanescence and direct Perception . The Law of Contradiction reconciled with Permanence . The Buddhist Conception of Existence refuted . Existence does not prove Evanescence « Polemic of Vaeaspatimisra, . Explanation by Ratnakirti and Santaraksita . Destructibility and Evanescence . The Nyaya-Vaisesika on Constant Decay » Reeognition and Evanéscence 32, Perception and Evanescence 33. Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Avayavin xxi 158 160 162 164 185 167 We 1i6 179 180 18 183 184 187 189 190 191 19s 1 203 205 209 210 215 217 221 226 227 230 233xl CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM CHAPTER Vit. NYSYA-VAISESINA THEORY OF CAUSATION 1. Significance of the Theory 2. Sfurkkhya and Nyaya-Vaisesika Theories of Causation 3. Main Features of Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory 4. Causation-theories of other Schools 53. Some Significant Features of the Four Causal Theories 8. Avayavin as a Synthetic Principle 7. Arguments to prove Avayavin 8. Epistemological Argument of Nyjya 9. Objections to the Theory of Avayavin 10. Theory of Causation in Early Nydya-Vaisesika lL. Earlier Nydya-Vaisesika Theory compared with the Later 12, Buddhist Theory of Pratitya-samutpada 33. Change Inconceivable according to the Nydya- Vaisesika Theory 14, Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory leads to Theory of Evanescence 15. Three Kinds of Causes conceived in the Nyfya- Vaisesika CHAPTER VIII. QUALITIES AND MOVEMENTS AS OBJECTIVE REALITIES L 2, 3 + Qualities Diferent from Substance + Physical and Metaphysical Aspects of Qualities + Qualities: Subjective and Objective + Qualities: Co-existent with their Substance 4 5. Causation of Qualities 6. Qualities existing without Substance 7. Subjective Qualities Objectivized a4 aT 281 285 BER 992CONTENTS 8. The Nature of Measure 9. Sarhyoga, a Crucial Factor in the Theory of Causation 10. Intricate Nature of Disconnection 11. Objective Reality of Movement (Kannan) CHAPTER IX. SAMANYA AND APOHA 1. Significance of the Theory of the Universal 2. Nature of Conflict 3. Historical Retrospect 4, Visesa as conceived by Later Nydya-Vaisesika ; School 5. Visesa as residing in all Eternal Substances 6. The Universal as Objective and Eternal Reality 7. Cross-division nullifies Universal “ 8. Notion of Commonness and the Universal 9. Perception of the Universal 10. Is the Universal Omnipresent? 11, Subsistence of the Universal in its Particulars 12. Epistemology of Dignaga School 13. The Buddhist Theory of Apoha 14. Negative Character of Apoha 15, Refutation of Apoha by the Realist 16. Theories of the Realist and the Buddhist compared 17. Bearing of the two Theories on Epistemology SHAPTER X. SAMAVAYA~—A UNIQUE NYAYA-VAISESIKA CONCEPT . Relation Between Inseparables . Basie Conflict with the Buddhist . Samavaya and the Theory of Causation OD ew xxiii R 828 88 310 314 318 319 SRERRER BERRuniv a. 10 YW 4. 5. 6. 7. 8 CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM Exposition of Samavaya by Stidhara Samavaya distingoished from Samyoge Exposition of Samaviya by Jayanta Proof of Samavaya given by Vacaspatimisra Samavaya does not subsist by any other Relation Perception of Samavaya . Samaviya as One and Eternal . Definition of Inseparableness (Ayute-siddhi) CHAPTER XI. NON-EXISTENCE AS REALITY 1 2 . Negative Reality Conceived . Development of the Theory of Non-existence . The Theory of Non-existence in Difforent Schools 3 A, Different Kinds of Non-existence 6 . Perception of Non-existence (Abhdve) - Mental Factor in Perception of Nen-existence 7. Jayanta on Reality of Nomexistence 8. Sridhara assails Prabhakara CHAPTER XIL EPISTEMOLOGY ADAPTED TO REALISM Ll. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Epistemological Approach in Indian Philosophy ‘The Basic Difference in the Theory of Pramanas Gotama’s Definition of Perception Meaning of the word ‘Avyapadesya’ No Distinction of Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka before Dignaga Dignaga introdueed the Distinction bebveen Whvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception Distinction Between Niryikalpaka and Savikal paka in post-Digniga Period 8. Signi8eance of Savikalpaka Perception 7. 378 379 381 382 386 388 390 395 397 401 404 409 All 416 Alo 421 426 AB0 433 437 A358 AalCONTENTS xxv 9. Refutation of the Ny&ya-Vaisesika Theory of Savikalpaka Perception 442 10. Vacaspatimisra’s Answer 448, 11. Mental Factor in Determinate Perception 456 12. Mental Factor explained through Transcendental Contact 462 13, Theory of Inference of Knowledge 471 14. Repudiation of Error by Prabhakara Att CHAPTER XII. A RESUME; NYAYA-VAISESIKA THEORIES IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE 488 Glossary 502 Text Appendix 513 545 IndexABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ATV. I. TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES Abhidharma-kosa by Vasubandhu, Banaras. Apoha-siddhi included in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts. Atmatattva-viveka. by Udayanicirya (Biblio- theca Indica, Calcutta, 1939). Avayavi-Nirakarana by Pandlita Asoka, publish. ed in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (Biblio. theca Indica, Calcutta 1910). Brahmasiitra-simkarabhasya or Sarirakabhasya with the commentaries, Ratnaprabhi, Bhimati and a commentary by Anandagiri (Bombay, 1909). Brhati of Prabhikaramisra (Madras University, 1934), Dasapadartha-sistra edited by H. Ui (Royal Asiatic Society London, 1918). Dinakexi a commentary on NyfAyasiddhinta- muktavali, Dipika, a commentary on Tarkasamgraha,xxviti MS. NB, NBT. NBh. NSM. NS. CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM Hetubindu-tika of Bhatta Arcata with the sub- commentary Aloka (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1949). Kiranavali, edited by M. M. Vindyesvari Prasad Dyivedi (Banaras, 1919). Kiranfivali-bhiskara by Padmanibhamisra. Kiranivali-prakisa Part 1 (Banaras, 1933). Ksanabhanga-siddhi of Ratnakirti, included in ‘The Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (See SBNT.). Kusumafijali (Calcutta), Mimimsi-siitra. Nyayabindu, edited by Peterson (Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 1929). Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara included in NB, Nyayadarsana with Vatsyiyana-bhasya- {con- taining Uddyotakara’s Vartika, Vacaspati- misra’s Tatparyatika and Visvanatha’s Vrtti— wwe volumes), Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944, Nyaya-Kandali or Sridhara with Prasastapada- bhisya (Banaras, 1895). Nyayakosa, by M. M. Bhimdcirya Jhalakikar Bombay, 1893). Nyayailavati by Vallabhacirya (Nimaya Sager edition). Nyiya.mafjart of Jayantabhatta, edited by Pt. Surya Narayan Shukla (Banaras, 1936). Nyiyasira of Bhisarvajfia (Poona, 1922), Nyayasiddhinta-muktivali (Karikavali) Nyaya- sci-nibandha. Nyfyasiitra (See NBh.). Nyya-vartika (See NBh.).ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRATHY wrix NVT. Nyjiyavartika-tatparyatika (See NBh.) NY. Nyfya-Vaisesika Schoo}. Nyayavartika-tatparyatika-parisuddhi of Udaya- nicdrya (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911). Podarthatattva-nirapana by Raghunatha Siro- mani, PP. Prasastapada-bhasya (Banaras, 1895, see NK.) SDSm. Saddarsana-samuceaya by Haribhadra, with the commentary of Gunaratna, SK. Samkhya-karika of Isvarakrsna. Samkhyapravacanabhasya of Vijfianabhiksu, SPS. Simkhyapravacana-siitra. STK. Samkhyatattva-kournudi with the cormmentary of Balarama Udasina, Saptapadarthi edited by V. S. Ghate (Bombay, 1919), SDS. Sarvadarsana-samgraha of Madhava, edited by Abhyankara (Poona, 1924), SBNT. Six Buddhist Nyfya Tracts, edited by M. M. Har Prasad Shastri, M.A. (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1910). Sv. Slokavartika by Kumirila Bhatta- (Chow- khambha Sanskrit Series). TB. Tarkabhasa of Kesavamiira (Poona, 1937). TK, ‘Sarkn-kaumudi of Laugaksibhiskara (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1928). Tarkamrta by Jagdifa Bhattacirya. Tarka-sarhgraha (Bombay Sanskrit Series, No LV,, 1918). Tarkikasraksi by Varadaraje, Banaras, 1903. Te. Tattva-cintamant by Gangefa (Pratyaksa- khanda) published by Asiatic Society, Cal cutta, 1884.xxviii MS. NBT. NBh, NE, NM. NSM, NS. CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM Hetubindu-tika of Bhatta Arcata with the sub- commentary Aloka (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1949). Kiranavali, edited by M. M. Vindyesvari Prasad Dvivedi (Banaras, 1919). Kiranfivalibhaskara by Padmanabhamisra. Kiranivali-prakisa Part 1 (Banaras, 1933). Ksanabhanga-siddhi of Ratnakirti, included in The Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts (See SBNT.). Kusumafijali (Calcutta). Mimimsi-sitra. Nyayabindu, edited by Peterson (Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 1929), Nyaya-bindutika of Dharmottara included in NB, Nyayadarsana with Vitsyayana-bhasya- (con- taining Uddyotakara’s Vartika, Vacaspati- misra’s Tatparyatiki and Visvanatha’s Vriti- two volumes), Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944. Nyaya-Kandali or Sridhara with Prasastapida- bhisya (Banaras, 1895), Nyayakosa, by M. M. Bhimiearya Jhalakikar Bombay, 1893). Nyfyalilavati by Vallabhacirya (Nimaya Sagar edition). Nyayamafijari of Jayantabhatta, edited by Pt. Surya Narayan Shukla (Banaras, 1936). Nyayasiira of Bhasarvajfia (Poona, 1922). Nyiyasiddhanta-muktivali (Karikavali) Nyaya- sicinibandha, Nyayasiitra (See NBh.). NyAya-vartika (See NBh.).ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY xxix NVT. Nydyavartika-tatparyatika (See NBh.) NV. Nyaya-Vaisesika School, Nydyavartika-tatparyatiki-parisuddhi of Udaya- nicarya (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911). Padarthatattva-niripana by Ragbunatha Siro- mani, PP, Prasastapida-bhasya (Banaras, 1895, see NK.) SDSm. Saddarsana-samuccaya by Haribhadra, with the commentary of Gunaratna. SK. Samkhya-karika of Isvarakrsna. Sarbkhyapravacanabhasya of Vijiinabhiksu. SPS. Simkhyapravacana-sitra, STK. Siunkhyatattva-kaumudi with the coramentary of Balarama Udasina. Saptapadarthi edited by V. S. Ghate (Bombay, 1919), sps. Sarvadarsana-samgraha of Madhava, edited by Abhyankara (Poona, 1924). SBNT. Siy Buddhist Nyfya Tracts, edited by M. M. Har Prasad Shastri, M.A. (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1910). sv. Slohavartika by Kumirila Bhatta- (Chow- khambha Sanskrit Series). TB. arkabbisa of Kesavamigra (Poona, 1937). TK Taka-kaumudi of Laugiksibhiskara (Nimaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1928). Tarkamrta by Jagdifa Bhattacirya, Tarka-samgraha (Bombay Sanskrit Series, No LY., 1918). ‘Tarkike-raksi by Varadaraja, Banaras, 1903, TC. Tattva-cintamani by Gangefa (Pratyaksa- Khanda) published by Asiatic Society, Cal cutta, 1884.TS. ‘TSP. VS. YS. Bodas Faddegon CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISI Tattwasamgraha by Santaraksita with the com. mentary of Kamalasila (Gackwad Oriental Series, No. XXX, Baroda, 1926). Tattva-sarhgraha-paiijika of Kamalasila (See TS.). ‘Vaisesikadarsana-prasastapada-bhisya with Upa- skara of Sarnkaramisra (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1923). Vaisesika-sittra. Vedinta-sira of Sadananda, edited by Colonel G. A. Jacob (Nimaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1926). ‘Vyomavati, a commentary on Prasastpada- bhisya by Vyomasivacarya. Yoga-siitra. Tl. Movers Worss Bhaduri, S: Studies in the Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics, (Poona, 1947). Bhattacharya, V. S.: The Basie Conception of Buddhism (Caleutta University, 1934). Bodas, M. R.: A Historical Survey of Indian Logie (JBBRAS, Vol. XIX). Chatterjee, S. C.: The Nyaya Theory of Know- ledge (Calcutta University, 1939). Dasgupta, S. Nz History of Indi i (Cambridge, 1932), % naan Philosophy Dvivedi, V. P.: Introduction to Nyaya-kandali (Vizionagram Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1895). Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by Hastings, ° Feddegon: Vaisesika 1918), System (Amsterdam, Gopinatha, Kavirija: History and BibliographyABBREVIATION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY xxxi of © Nyaya-Vaisesika Literature (Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, Vol, UT.). Hall, Fiteward: Index to the Bibliography of the Hindu Philosophical Systems. Hiriyanna, M.: Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Jacobi: (i) Dates of the Philosophical Sitras of the Brahmanas (JAOS. XXXI, 1911). (ii) Early History of Indian Philo. sophy (Indian Antiquary, April 1918). (iit) Indische Logik. Jha, Ganganath: The Prabhikara School of Pirva-mimamsa, JAOS, Journal of American Oriental Society. JBBRAS. Journal of Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Jwala Prasad (Dr.): Indian Epistemology (Lahore, 1939). ILA. Keith, A.B.: Indian Logic and Atomism. Mookerjee, Satkari: Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta University, 1935). Murti, T. R. V.: Central Philosophy of Buddh- ism, London, 1955, Radhakrishnan, S.: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol, I. (Landon, 1941.). Randle, Randle: Indian Logie in the Early Schools, , Oxford, 1930. Russell, Bertrand: Problems of Philosophy. SBS. Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, Vol. IIL Seal, B. N.: Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus. Shastri, D. N.: (é) Distinction between Nirvi- kalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception (ABORL Vol. XXXII. 1952).xaaii CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM (#) Stcherbatskys Contribution to Indian Philosophy Modem Review, February, 1953). Sinha, J. N= Indion Psychology-Perception (London, 1934). Sogen, Yamakami: Systems of Buddhist Thought. Buddhist Logic, tcherbatsky: (i) Buddhist Logic (two Vols.), Leningrad, 1930. Central Conception, (ii) Central Conception of Buddhism (London, 1923). Nirvana, (Hi) Conception of Buddhist Nisvina (Leningrad, 1927). (io) Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the IJater Buddhists. Thomas, E. j.: History of Buddhist Thought. ¥. Ui, ‘Ui, H. The Vaisesika Philosophy, also containing Dasapadarthasistra (See H. Ui). ALL. Vidyabhiisana, §. €.: History of Indian Logic (Galeutta University, 1921). Indian Literature, Wintemitz, M.: History of Indian Literature, Vol. II (Calcutta University, 1927).Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 3, THE ADVENT OF DIGNAGA! Sometime during the fifth century av, there appeared in the firmament of Indian philosophy a brilliant star in the person of Dignaga, the founder of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Regarded by the Tibetans as an ornament of Jambidvipa,? he was one of the greatest thinkers that India has ever produced. Subsequent philosophical thought in India was dominated by him direetly or indirectly for six long centuries, He revolutioniz. ed Indian philosophy by introducing into it the theory of Tadical distinction between two mutually exclusive sources of knowledge—direct senseapprehension’ (grahana) and ‘intellect or ‘thought’ (vikalpa or adhyavasdya)®, which may be compared 1 Both the forms ‘Dignaga’ ond ‘Ditiniga’ are correct. Although the latter is more in vogue amonget Sanskrit echoliasts, the form ‘Dignige’ has been preferred being oasy of pronunciation. 2 The trio, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Aeanga, together with the trio, Vasubandhu, Dignage and Dharmakirti, are regarded by the Tibetans as the six ornaments of Jambidvipa (India), of, Winternitz ; Indian Litera. ture, Vol, IT. p. 363. n. 3. 8 The terms need for theno two sources of knowledge by the Digniga achool sre ‘perception’ and ‘inference’ (pratyaksa and anumina), but that ig aecording to the usage in Login, Mpistemologically, however, ‘prsatyaksa' of Digndga is pure sens9-apprehension or sensation, and ‘anamAna’ ia used in a wider end broader sense then ordinarily understood by that term. It inelndes all forms of thought—al} intellection (see pp. 62-63),2 CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM (ca. to sensibility and understanding of Kant. The new approach introduced by Kant in westem philosophy was compared by Kant himself to the Copernican revolution in Astronomy. Before Copemicus, it was assumed that the heavenly bodies were in movement, and that the earth (from which a spectator observed these heavenly bodies) was stationary. Copernicus reversed the notion and declared that the earth itself was moving. Before Kant, it was assumed that our knowledge must conform to objects of experience, but Kant reversed the order and declared that it was the object that conformed to knowledge. Kant holds that the formless sensedata are received posterior’ through the senses to which forms are given a priori by the intellect. These forms are of two Kinds. In the first instance, the data supplied by the sense are presented in tho form of Space and Time. Space and Lime are not, according, to Kant, objective realities, but are only the subjective ways io which we cognize realities. Realities in themselves are non- spatial and non-temporal. The other kind of subjective forms are the categories of understanding, which are classified under four heads—quantity, quality, relation and modality. We are here concerned, however, only with the broad fact that, according to working of our thought on mal source, the transeendent external reality. Kant thus stands midway be i realist who holds that the external Nd eriets oot ee f and the ideati is nothing but an eters : ¢ idealist who holds that it Dignaga, likewise, holds that the external reality, which is nas), has no exten-n INTRODUCTION 3 tion is immediately followed by another form of Imowledge called judgment or determinate knowledge (adhyavasdya) which is of the form of the universal (sdmanya-lcksana). The universal is only a generalized form imposed by our mind on the data (sva-leksanas or unique particulars) grasped in pure sensation. Form is given to objects of experi- ence by the intellect, for, according to Dignaga, the universal or the generalized form (siméngelaksana) is no extemal reality, but a mere mental construction‘. Comprehension of objects, as having extension in space and duration in time, is nothing but generalization (simdnya-laksana). The extension of an object means imagining a ‘whole’ (avayacin) or a sub- stance which is common to all its parts, i.e., many reals (sva- taksanas) which are contiguous. And the duration of an abject means imagining an abiding object which is common to many reals (seelaksapas) coming in momentary succession, There is, in both cases, a generalization which is purely subjective and has no counterpart in the external world. Similarly, all attri- utes such as qualities, movements, etc., are nothing but genera- lizations. A pure sensation {pratyakse or grahana), that grasps the transcendent reality as it is in the form of unique particulars (sca-laksanas), is followed by determinate knowledge (adhya- vasdya). And it is this that gives a generalized form to the data of pure sensation (grahaua) and converts it into a consefous experience, All our conscious knowledge, according to Digniga, is thus restricted to the generalized form which is the work of the intellect. It never touches the reality which is transcendent. 4 Cf, the following extract from Kant with the one from Dign3ge : There are two atoms of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and undorstonding, which perhaps spring from & eommon, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought.” (Critique of Pure Reason, N. K. Smith's Trenslotion, 1856 edition, p-61.} . ‘Atrs pramigath dvividham eva, kuta§ cet, dvi-laksagoth prameyath, sve-eaminya-laksapSbhydih = bhinnalehsanata = prameyAntarat neti (PS. p. 4). The Tika of Jinendtabuddhi adds: sva-laksana-vizayakats pretyaksom ova, BAminye-laksane-visayalam eanuminam eva, Jbéd. p. 6. Dharmakirti says: tetys (pratyaksasya} vigayeh sve-faksanam......tad ova paramarthe-sat, anyat eiminya-lakqanarh so’numinarya vigayah. (NB. last 3 portion of Chap. I.)4 ORITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM eu. The so-called determinate perception (savikalpaka-pratyakse) of the Nyaya-Vaisesika is for Dignaga only a pseudo-perrer tion, because it comprehends a generalized form (which is merely a mental factor) as an external real object. Deter- minate perception, hawever, has a core of reality, for it follows immediately in the wake of 0 sensation® which grasps the exter- nal transcendent reality (sva-leksana)* It is thus clear that Digniga, like Kant, occupies a positior midway between the noive realists (e.g. of the Nyfya-Vaiiesika school) and the idealists (eg., the Buddhist Yogiesra school). It would thus appear that, although in the aetails of their metaphysical analysis, Dignaga and Kant naturally differ, similarity between them is not superficial; it is based on the intrinsic structure of their epistemology. Surprisingly enough, even the terms used by both the thinkers for ultimate reality have a similar connotation; the term sva-laksana used by Dignaga connotes, ‘of its own kind’ or ‘as it is’, and the expres- ston thing-initself (ding an sich) also means ‘as it is. Such a striking similarity between the key-words used by two thinkers so remote in time and place is a proof positive that both of them had struck upon a great metaphysical truth. It shows how human mind moves in the same grooves in reaching an eternal truth. This striking similarity of the connotation of the two words escaped the notice of Stcherbatsky who was the first {o point out the resemblance between the two thinkers.? Not only is there a close similarity in their epistemology, but even the background of the two thinkers, so remote in time and place, is strinkingly alike. Kant came when the subjective idealism of Berkeley had discarded the reality of the external world, and the scepticism of Hume had challenged all the basic human con- cepts such as those of Self, Substance and Causality. Digniga was preceded by the schools of the Yogicara and the Midhyamika 5 eget Praths:-Dhavityat, e i . . and XIt¢, ory of Digniga is further discussed in IT. 1. (vi): IX, 12 7 Rosomblance betwosn the theorles of Digng, ¥ . a fi quite obvious, was pointed out by Prof. Stsherbntehy, the sete henna Doat of Dignaga in his Buddhiet Logie, Vol. 1. p. 200. =qq INTRODUCTION 6 whose similarity with Berkeley and Hume respectively cannot be missed by any student of comparative philosophy. On the ontological side, Kant and Dignaga differ with regard to the nature of ultimate reality. Digniga, in conformity with the general Buddhist doctrine, maintains that reality or the unique particular (sva-laksana or ksana) is being born every moment and dying the very next. His theory was diametrically opposed to the static conception of the realist schools which conceived the universe as composed of stationary and isolated objects. Against them, Dignaga posited his kinetic conception of the universe as a constant forward movement of interlinked and interrelated point-instants of reality (sarnshpta dharmas). Thus, while in his theory of knowledge, Digniga anticipated Kant who came thirteen hundred years later, in his ontology, he almost foreshadowed, in one of its aspects, modern Marxist materialism which holds that all things are interlinked and inter. related and are “in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change.”* So far as Indian philosophy is con- cerned, Digniga’s contribution is unique. Before him the Nyaya- Vaisesika had developed a realistic structure based on common sense or rather common experience (see section 7 of this chap- ter). Dignaga focussed on it the search-light of criticism, and shattered it to pieces. In these pages it has been shown that the Buddhist theories of evanescence and causation are just a logical culmination of the basic principles accepted hy the NySya-Vaiéesika. The scholiasts of the Jatter school fought a desperate battle to defend themselves against the Digniga school, The present work contains ample evidence to show that the Npiya-Vailesika schoo} lost that hatile. The advent of Dignaga is indeed one of the greatest events in the history of Indian philosophy. He can as a matter of right claim a place among those pioneers of human thought wha discovered an eternal truth and made a lasting contribution to human knowledge. & F, Engels: Dialectica of Nature, quoted in Dialectical and Historteat Moterialiem by Stelin, p, 5.6 . CRITIQUE OF INDIAN RDALISM (CH, 2, CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DIGNAGA SCHOOL AND THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA REALISM In his magnum opus, the Pramane-samuccaya, Digndga propounded his new doctrine and also attacked the naive realism of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school. He refuted the Nyaya- sétra and the commentary of Vatsydyana on it. For a time, the orthodox realism reeled before the onslaught of Dignaga and his successors, Uddyotakara Bhiradvaja, about the close of the sixth century, took up the gauntlet on behalf of the Nyaya- Vaisesika and wrote his famous work, Nydya-vartika, with “the object of dispelling the darkness caused by the pseudo-philoso- phers”? by which he meant those of th ‘aya position.”** A battle royal igniga school on one side and the Nyfya-Vaifesika and the two Piirva-Mimarhsa It lasted for a long- , Le, up to the eleventh century ists Practically disappeared, irti, the Ereat continuator of the work of Digniga (Brst half of the seventh century), also one of the six Ornaments idvipa, answered Uddyotakara, Dharmakirti was followed by hi id by Sintaraksita, produced ie | The Nyaya school, however, MS greatest exponent, V4, atimisra, roughly 250 Years after Uddyotakara, During the inten the crusade against the Buddhists was carried on by the Pirva-Mimathsi school, an ally of the Nyaya-Vaitesika in the battle against the ‘ormer, ‘The Pirva-Mimimasi school Produced two of the grestest luminaries of Indian philosophy, namely, Kumarila and Concemed mainly with’ sacrificial matters, this 8 Katathi3iiins-nivzttibe atark tuh. NV. o Kutarkikaiy Dignaga-prabhrtibhih, NVT.p Jo ‘The term yaya stands for the syn (see section 3 of this chapter), 1 Nytys-sthitim ¢ edition, peasy Veldyotakara.n pening stanzs. 2 eretio Nyaya-Vaigesika schoot Veriipam, (Vasavedetts, Hall'sYu INTRODUCTION 7 school had not much to do with metaphysics or epistemology. Its realistic structure was more or Jess the same as that of the Nyaya-Vaisesika from which it was adopted. There is little doubt that the Pirva-Mimarhsi developed its epistemology under the stimulus given by the Digniga school, and that its object was to defend orthodox realism. Prabhakara and Kuma- vila, however, in the course of their defence of realism, evolved certain epistemological theories which were strikingly bold and original in conception. OF these two great thinkers, Prabhikara has been called a ‘bastard son of Buddhism’ by Stcherbatsky,?” because he was influenced by the Buddhists to a great extent. He is, therefore, still more interesting for our study. For an understanding of the conflict of the orthodox realists with the Buddhists, the study of Kumarila and Prabhikara, so far as they deal with topics relating to the theory of realism, is essential. During the ninth and tenth centuries, the Ny&ya-Vaisesika school produced four or five eminent scholiasts. The greatest of them is Vacaspatimigra who occupies the highest position as an exponent not only of the Nyaya-Vaisosika system, but of all other systems of Indian philosophy, the Buddhist not excluded. Vacaspatimigra laid the Nyaya-Vaisesika realism on a firm foundation. In his Nydyavartikatdtparyatika, the Nyfya-Vai- Sesika realism reaches its high watermark. Jayanta, whose priority or posteriority to Vacaspatimisza is uncertain, is marked, more than any other ancient writer on Indian philosophy, by his rare wit, sharp repartee and delightful Jucidity. Next to them come two great masters, Udayana and Sridhara, both commentators on Pragastapada. The former is also the authon of several independent treatises. Both of them belong to the clase of the tenth century, These thinkers are among the Jumi- naries of the brightest period of Indian philosophy which covers some six hundred years, ie, from the Sifth to the tenth or eleventh century. During this period, as a result of protracted8 CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM (cH conflict between the Buddhists and the orthodox realists, Indian genius reached its zenith in the development of metaphysics and epistemology. As far as the problem of realism versus idealism is concerned, the philosophers of the two schools left no possible avenue of thought unexplored.t¢ 3 THE SYNCRETIC NYAYA-VAISESIKA SCHOOL OF all Indian philosophical systems, Vaisesika school is the chief exponent schools, the Nyaya and the VaiSesika, were separate in their origin as well as in the early course of their development. The former, although a metaphysical school, was chiefly concerned with the method of debate and syllogism. ‘The latter formulated its ontological structure on the bass of the six categories which have been accepted as the basis of realism not only by the syncrelie Nyaya-Vaisesika school, but also by other orthodox realist schools with slight modifications, A close liaison between the two schools seems to the syncretic Nyjya- of realism. The two nology3 From the tenth century onwards, we have treatises in which the subject matt er of both the systems has been formally amalgamated, * The two schools wi the Vaisesika represen’ side of the combined 5 ere complementary to each other, While ts the positive, constructive or creative i chool, the Nyaya represents its defensive side. As noted above, the Vaigesika supplied the ontological structure to the synerctic system. So far as the Vaitesika-sitra and its earliest commentary by PraSastapada (which is, in fact, an independent treatise) are concerned, they contain no contro- versial matter by way of refutation of other schools. Contro- versles with other schools make their appearance only in the vor niin ea tet para amnareessen gel aathyoga, samyukta-samavaya, te. (te and sambyukte- conception. "Ss: ANY. pp. 04-05), are the torme of the Vaitesiiony INTRODUCTION 8 commentaries on Pragastapada, such as Nyaya-kandali and Kiranavalt, which belong to 4 period when the Vaigesika had already combined with the Nyjya school. On the other hand, in the case of the latter, we find the refutation of other schools right from the Nyaya-siitra,'* and the same continues in its great commentary by Vatsyayana and in all the Nyaya treatises such as Nyaya-vartike, Nydyavdrtike-tatparyattha, Nyaya-manjart and Udayana’s Pariguddhi. The syncretic Nyaya-Vaidesika school is usually designated, specially in the later period, as Nyaya, and an adherent of the school as naiyayikas* For example, Sridhara’s commentary oD Pragastapida's treatise, 2 purely Vaisesika work, is named Nydya-kandali; and likewise, the Nydyasiddhanta-muktavall is primarily © manual of the ‘Vaigesika system. It should not, how- ever, be overlooked that the realistic structure based on the six categories belongs to the Vaisesika which, for that reason, is more important than the Nyaya for a study of realism of the combined school. It is therefore appropriate that the syncretic school should be designated as the Nyaya-Vaisesika—a term not much in vogue in Indian tradition. The syneretic Nyaya-Vaigesika school occupies a unique the development of Indian philosophical thought. position in ‘The terminology of this school has played an important réle in giving shape to Indian philosophical thinking in general. A pre- liminary study of a ‘Nyaya-Vaisosilea manual like Tarka- samgraha or Nydyastddieanta-rnuktavclt js considered essen- tial for introduction to any other system of Indian philosophy. Nyaya phraseology, and to some extent even ideology, scem to have influenced all other schools2° The study of ‘Nyfya-Vai- 16 Forexemple, the ye Buddhiet MAdbyarnike theory in the Nyayo~ tre )s . 17 For the use of the term nyaye’ in different senses, 8ce infra, UL44. 1g Asan instance of the domination of the Nyaya-Vaisesike ideology over other systems, the following ated out ; Vijdanabbibsu, des eribing the nature tt, anttva, ete. BAY 8 vmattyadini dravyani, na vais a Jo ia perfectly right that sattva, ef6., OF not the gun ities) of the Vaisesike conception, but to say that they Bre dravyss jg to introduce & Nyaya-Vaidesihe concep- tion inte the Simkhyo systern to which it is quite foreignTo CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM (cu, fesika realism is, therefore, of §reat importance for the under- standing of Indian philosophy. 4. THREE-FOLD CONTENTS OF THE NYAYA-VAISTSIKA SYSTEM There are three main divisions of the subject matter of the Nydya-Vaisesika school: (i) logic and the methed of debate, Ali) physico-chemical theories relating to the four atomic cle. ments, and (iii) metaphysics based on the six categories. It would appear that the first of these divisions, viz., logic, is the Principal subject of the Nyiya, while the remaining two chiefly belong to the Vaisesika school, But in the manuals of the syn- cretic school, whether primarily belonging to the Nyjya or to the Vaigesika school, alt the three topics are treated, Of the three divisions of the subj metaphysics, he concentrated on logic and developed very subtle f the components of inference, (oyapti), It is only this line of development of logic called complete exclusion of metaphysics, It is Primarily for 5 be known as the Nyaya school, and the term Vajé,