1

People v amminudin

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He
was Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while
he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles
kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result
of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did
not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had
not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and
dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record.
But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he
was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he
was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
 2

of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have
already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by
Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25,
1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming
of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before
June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of
Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel

Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,

maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.
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ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with

marijuana was received by you many days before you received the
intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin
was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was

coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we
have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and
shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was

mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984,
you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was
coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of
the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive
result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do
not need a search warrant anymore?
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A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and
not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject
to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
 5

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in
the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities,
however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

People v. Barros

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information which read as follows:

That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to

Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in a Dangwa Bus with Plate
No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport
about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and
sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a]
source of [a] prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 1

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.

Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine

Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:

(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the
accused;

(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation
conducted by four (4) soldiers one after the other under intimidating circumstances; and

(3) misappreciation of facts. 3

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The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate
No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan,
who were seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus
continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they
alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton
under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it
contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was]
but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt.
Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning
as accused was the suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C.
officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton
when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment the
carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was
asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. That when
accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the
bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of
marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership
of the carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried
marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General
Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical examination and a Medico Legal
Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered no
physical injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana. That
Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and
accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That after accused was medically
examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C. detachment at
Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was also
brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit
"C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were
from accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused
(Exhibit "C-1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That
in connection with the confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the
apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this case
namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly
executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").

. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked
Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in four separate envelopes, following
an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian
to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa,
the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court
and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I"
and "I-1"). 4

The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession
of the carton box containing the four (4) kilos of marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of the
accused in the following manner:

That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad,
Baguio City. That on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer
Arsenio Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from one Billy
Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, accused looked for the residence of Billy
Cuanguey and he was pointed to a house where someone was tending a store. That
accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man answered that he did
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not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room the tapes
and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter, accused asked the man to
stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the instruction of his
manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking breakfast, accused,
was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6, 1987, accused Bonifacio
Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for
Baguio City. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went
inside the bus and checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a carton under the
seat of [the] accused and shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered.
Thereafter, the soldier went down with the carton and moments later returned to the bus
and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from the bus. That Mr. Barros was
surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage which consisted
of apasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the soldiers to a house
where his pasikingwas taken and his clothes removed and his wallet taken. Accused
was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he refused.

. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted
accused to the hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded to the Municipality of
Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the
P.C. Camp and there he saw someone typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented to
accused some papers which he was asked to sign but accused refused. That accused
was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that something will happen to him.
That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a gun to him
and told him to sign the paper and because of fear, he had to sign the document
marked Exhibit "C." Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and
asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana.
Exhibit "X" for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at
Tadian for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to
the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5

Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police authorities
had impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation, "under
intimidating circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The accused complains that he
was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an
accused person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without the assistance of
counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is inadmissible as evidence against him.

We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. For
the trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements
which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted by the police officers.
The trial court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits "C", "E" and
"B-5," the alleged uncounselled confessions. The trial court made very clear the bases of its
conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged; those bases
did not include the alleged confessions:

First M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the
accused carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the
checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain Province. That accused is the owner of the carton
(Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four packages of dried
marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4") was fished out from under the
seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself.

Second That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio
Barros and that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that the accused was
in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and this fact was also admitted by
accused to the effect that he was never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. Dra.
Aleta also found that the accused was under the influence of drug[s] and that the
accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked marijuana. This is clear evidence
that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said prohibited drugs.
(See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN Page 24 Orpecio).
 8

Third The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court
for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of marijuana
per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos Figueroa, forensical
expert.

Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the
ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this
respect said:

The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear,
positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs.
Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)." 6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros i.e., that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police
authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted
constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 8

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and
seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which
relates to the search of moving vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving
vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a
judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. 10 In carrying out warrantless searches of moving
vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles
being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 11 the Court stated:

[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which
is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light
therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense. 12
 9

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; 13 (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; 14 (3) Narcom agents were
informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought
into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; 15 (4) Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do
16
so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. 17

In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance
which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by appellant
onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan either that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the
subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common
practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute
the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received any
information or "tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or
during the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they had detected the odor of dried
marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a
seat during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box
later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers
who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had
searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the
presence of any such probable cause.

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no circumstance
which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same
bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the
box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be
carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show
that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a
crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the two (2)
police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros
boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at
the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no "personable
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it."
There was, in brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the
carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid. 22The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure
i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against
appellant Barros.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which
may have attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros
has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four (4) packages of dried
marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of

appellant, still the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the
doctrine laid down in the case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later
reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that "posting
of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and
estops him from questioning its validity." Here, appellant had in fact posted the required
bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his application was subsequently denied (see
TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 65). Consistent with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be
 10

deemed to have waived any irregularity attending his arrest, if any there be, and cannot
now be heard to assail the same. 23

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a
priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a
defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so
as to estop as accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure
to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter (by,
e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former
an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-
admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is
not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to
retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly
objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of
marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. 24 We consider that
appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that,
under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred
from his conduct before or during during the trial.

In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had waived
his rights by his "stoic deportment" consisting of failure to object to the search by the police
authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box:

. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and
asked accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership of
the box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3, Decision). His
demeanor should therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search
inasmuch as the objection thereto is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs.
Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1 Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . . 25

It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it
is People vs. Burgos,26 promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable.
In Burgos, this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search
conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object"

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.
de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case
of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S. 458).27 (Emphasis supplied) .

Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found that
there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a Chinese merchant
 11

was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture
and proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman.
Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim was found, still alive, and upon being
asked who had attacked him, laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui
Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was conducted without objection from the
accused. Before the body search of the accused was carried out, the accused voluntarily surrendered
to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and when asked if he
had anything else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police
thereupon conducted a body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search
resulted in the production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Under
these circumstances, the Court ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or
premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless
search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel during trial, it is
relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when objections to
admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by
appellant Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the warrantless search should not be lightly
taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by the Court in Burgos, 28 and as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4)
kilos of marijuana. His guilt must, however, be established by constitutional means. The non-
admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of
such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by
the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which this Court has no choice but to apply in the
instant case.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being
sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.

Rolito Go v. CA

ROLITO GO V. CA
Facts:

A witness identified Rolito Go as the person who had shot Eldon Maguan after a near vehicular
collision at the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., San Juan, Metro Manila.
Six days after the police launched a manhunt for Go, petitioner, accompanied by two (2) lawyers,
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted
by the police. The police detained him then and filed a complaint against him for frustrated homicide,
which was later modified to murder, since the victim Maguan died of his gunshot wound.

Issue:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner.

Ruling:

NO. There was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113;
in fact, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied
by two lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that
 12

he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had
slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the
killing of Eldon Maguan. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant,
he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.

Almonte v. Judge Bien, 461 SCRA 218

In a verified, sworn administrative complaint[1] directly filed with this Court, herein complainant,
Thelma Almonte, charges herein respondent, Judge Fred A. Bien,incumbent Acting Presiding Judge
of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jacinto-Monreal, 5th Judicial Region, San
Jacinto, Masbate with gross ignorance of the law in connection with respondents preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 4598, a prosecution for robbery filed with respondents court at the
instance of Isauro Lique against the complainant and her husband, Jaime Almonte.
Complainant alleges that after conducting a semblance of a preliminary investigation by an ex-
parte inquiry on Isauro Lique, the respondent judge, in his order of April 24, 2002, [2] directed the
arrest of complainant and her husband and fixed their bail for provisional liberty at P40,000 each.
Complainant avers that respondent judge disregarded the procedure for preliminary investigation,
as provided under Section 3(b) and (c), Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Court. She claims that she
and her husband were deprived of their right to due process because they were not given copies of
the complaint for robbery, nor were they summoned by the respondent judge to appear before him
and present their counter-affidavits and other supporting documents.
On May 20, 2002, complainant, through counsel, filed in Criminal Case No. 4598 a Motion To
Quash Or Cancel The Order Dated April 24, 2004 Directing The Issuance Of The Warrant Of Arrest
Of Accused Herein And Fixing The Bail Bond For Their Provisional Liberty And The Warrant Of Arrest
Itself.[3] However, in his order of June 25, 2002,[4]the respondent judge denied the motion, relying on
the ruling of this Court in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals[5] that once an accused posted his bail bond,
he thereby waived his right to question any defect in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Complainant asserts that the respondents denial of their aforementioned motion is another
manifestation of the latters ignorance of the rules of procedure, arguing that Section 26, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court provides that admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, provided that he raised them before
entering his plea. Not having been arraigned yet, complainant argues that she has all the right to
question the validity of the warrants of arrest issued against her and her husband.
In the same administrative complaint, complainant further avers that prior to the filing of the
robbery case against her and her husband by Isauro Lique, they had caused the filing against Lique
of a criminal case for acts of lasciviousness for molesting their 9-year old daughter, Brenda Almonte,
which case is still pending with the Regional Trial Court at Masbate, Branch 48 (Family Court).
Complainant asserts that Lique maliciously filed the complaint for robbery in order to compel her and
her husband to drop the earlier criminal case for act of lasciviousness they filed against him.
In his COMMENT[6] dated March 10, 2003, respondent judge wants it placed on record that he is:
(1) the Acting Presiding Judge of the MCTC of both San Jacinto and San Fernando, Masbate; (2) the
Judge-Designate of some of inhibited cases in the MTCC, Masbate and MCTC of Aroroy, Masbate;
and (3) the Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Dimasalang, Masbate, his permanent station.
In the same COMMENT, respondent admits having conducted on April 24, 2002 the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 4598; that after finding the existence of a probable cause, he
issued the warrant of arrest against complainant and her husband and fixed a bail bond of P40,000
each for their provisional liberty, as required under the first stage of preliminary investigation; that
although no subpoenas were issued to the accused, such an omission was an honest mistake on his
part in the performance of his duties, and not due to his ignorance of the law or procedure, adding
that he had been extra-careful and diligent in the discharge of his duties, dispensing justice without
delay, fear or favor; that in fact, his April 24, 2002 order was even affirmed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Masbate City which eventually filed an information for Robbery against
complainant and her husband before the Regional Trial Court at San Jacinto, Masbate.
 13

As regards his denial of the Motion To Quash Or Cancel The Order dated April 24, 2002, etc.,
(supra) filed by complainant and her husband, thru counsel, in Criminal Case No. 4598, respondent,
by way of explanation, reproduced in his COMMENT the full text of his denial Order of June 25,
2002,[7] to wit:

This is a Motion to Quash or Cancel the Order dated April 24, 2004 Directing the Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest Herein and Fixing the Bail Bond for their Provisional Liberty and the Warrant of
Arrest Itself, filed by accused thru counsel Atty. Ruben Joel A. Puertollano in the above-entitled case.

Accused alleged that this Court did not observe the provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 6 (b) of Rule 112
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended relative to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Records of the case would readily show that when this instant motion was filed on May 20, 2002, the
Court also received an Order of Release issued by the Hon. Cristobal M. Bailon of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 50, San Jacinto, Masbate commanding the Jailer of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology, San Jacinto, Masbate to release from custody accused Thelma Almonte for having
posted the required bail bond.

In the case of People vs. Rolito Go, the Supreme Court held that once an accused has posted his bail
bond, he waives his right to question any defect in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. For this
reason, the instant Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest issued by this Court has now become moot
and academic.

As to the allegation that the Court did not observe the provisions in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of warrant of arrest, it is worth recalling that basically the preliminary
examination has two phrases or stages. The first is the preliminary examination. It is here where the
Court conducts an ex parte inquiry on the prosecution witnesses based on their sworn statements in
the form of searching questions and answers. After this, if the Court believes that there is a probable
cause that the crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, then the
Court will issue a warrant of arrest in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

When the accused has already been arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest issued by the
Court, and has been committed for detention, the Court immediately issues a subpoena to the
accused requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence for the
evaluation of the Court. This is the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

It is submitted that the Court has correctly applied the rules on the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant of arrest, and it finds no justifiable reason to quash or
cancel the order dated April 24, 2002 and the warrant of arrest itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to DENY the instant Motion to Quash
or Cancel the Order dated April 24, 2002 and the Warrant of Arrest.

SO ORDERED. (Underscoring by respondent himself).

Respondent judge submits that the aforequoted Order is in accordance with law and with what he
honestly believed as correct and proper, and not on his alleged ignorance of the law and procedure,
as charged by complainant.
In her Reply to Comment,[8] complainant expresses the belief that respondent judge issued the
warrants of arrest in Criminal Case No. 4598 without giving her and her husband notice and chance
to file their counter-affidavits to favor Isauro Lique. Elaborating thereon, complainant asserts that if
respondent judge is truly not ignorant of the law, as he claims, then it could well be that his intention
in forthwith issuing the warrants is for her and her husband to be immediately arrested and detained,
such that if they could not post bail, Lique would have a bargaining leverage for the dropping of the
case for acts of lasciviousness then pending against him. Complainant also points out that Liques
complaint for robbery was directly filed by the latter with the Municipal Trial Court of San Jacinto,
Masbate without reporting the alleged robbery incident with the local barangay authorities or with the
Philippine National Police of San Jacinto, Masbate.
 14

Complainant also contends that respondent judges argument to the effect that a preliminary
investigation has two stages or phases is misplaced. She asserts that respondent judge obviously
applied Section 6, Rule 112 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure which has been already amended
by the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. She posits that
under the new rules, respondent judge cannot take cognizance of the crime of robbery since it is not
within the jurisdiction of the MTC or the MCTC, hence improper for him to issue a warrant of arrest
without waiting for the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, explaining that only when the
offense charged is within the original jurisdiction of the MTC or MCTC that a judge thereof may issue
warrant of arrest without waiting for the termination of the preliminary investigation if he finds after
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which initially acted on
the subject administrative complaint recommended that: (1) the same be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; (2) respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000 for gross ignorance of
the law; (3) he be reprimanded in his capacity as a member of the Philippine Bar for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and this be reflected in his record at the Office of the Bar
Confidant; and (4) respondent judge be sternly warned that repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
In separate resolutions both dated February 23, 2004,[9] we redocketed the present case as a
regular administrative matter and required both parties to manifest whether they are amenable to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In their respective manifestations,
complainant and respondent judge expressed their willingness to submit the case based on the
pleadings filed, which manifestations were noted by us in our Resolution of July 19, 2004. [10]
After a thorough examination of the OCAs evaluation report and the records on hand, the Court
finds merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator.
Doubtless, the root of the controversy is respondent judges unfamiliarity with the rules applicable
in cases requiring preliminary investigation.
It is the stance of respondent that there are two stages or phases of preliminary investigation; that
he was only in the first or the preliminary examination stage when he issued the warrants of arrest
against the Almonte spouses after examining the complaining witness Isauro Lique and after finding
the existence of probable cause that a crime had been committed; and that the issuance of
subpoenas to the accused requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and other evidence would
only be after they shall have been arrested (the second stage or the preliminary investigation proper).
Obviously, the respondent judge failed to keep track with the developments in law and
jurisprudence.
In Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Judge Efren Albano[11] and reiterated
in Bagunas vs. Fabillar,[12] this Court ruled that under the new rules of procedure, preliminary
investigation has only one stage, viz:

[U]nder the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two stages:
(1) the preliminary examination stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there
is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the
preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his
arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is
allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the
present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the
preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one stage.

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for conducting a preliminary
investigation:

Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
 15

probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it
if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent,
and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by
him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a
counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party
or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the
party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other
documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five
(5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Here, respondent judge disregarded the procedure for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case
No. 4598. As it were, he merely took the statement [13] of therein complainant Isauro Lique, and, on
that very same day, terminated his investigation and issued warrants of arrest [14] against the couple.
The spouses Almonte were not furnished with the copies of the complaint for robbery, thereby
denying them the chance to examine the same and the evidence submitted by Lique. Nor were they
given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and supporting documents. If anything else,
the respondent judges actuations in the premises only betray his ignorance of procedural rules and
reckless disregard of the accuseds basic right to due process.
Further demonstrating respondents deliberate disregard of the law, if not his gross ignorance of
the same, is his misplaced reliance in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals. According to respondent judge,
he denied the Almontes motion to quash the warrant of arrest because of this Courts ruling in Rolito
Go that once an accused has posted bail, he waived his right to question any defect in the issuance
of the warrant of arrest.
Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the New Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, application for bail
or the admission to bail is no longer considered as a waiver of the accuseds right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest as regards its attendant illegalities or irregularities. The provision reads:
 16

Sec. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack or irregular preliminary investigation. - An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest
or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start
of the trial of the case.

We are not unmindful of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment which judges may commit. In
the same breath, however, judges are expected to show more than a mere cursory acquaintance with
elementary rules of procedure as well as settled authoritative doctrines.
For sure, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence.[15] As advocates of justice and visible representation of the law, they are
expected to keep abreast with the developments in law and jurisprudence, and to be proficient in their
application and interpretation thereof. When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; anything less than that is gross ignorance of the law. [16]
The OCA recommends that we impose a fine of P10,000 upon the respondent judge. Given
respondents proven gross violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, we are in
full agreement with the recommended penalty.
WHEREFORE, herein respondent Judge Fred A. Bien, incumbent Acting Presiding Judge,
MCTC, San Jacinto, Masbate is hereby declared GUILTY of gross violation of Section 3, Rule 112,
Section 26, Rule 114, of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule 3.01, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and, as recommended, is hereby meted the penalty of fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Chimel v. California,

Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant, were admitted to petitioner's
home by his wife, where they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the
warrant. Although he denied the officers' request to "look around," they conducted a search of the
entire house "on the basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken
from his home were admitted over objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His
conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite their acceptance of
petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had
procured the warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient information to
constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search
was justified as incident to a valid arrest.

Held: Assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of petitioner's house cannot be
constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. Pp. 395 U. S. 755-768.

(a) An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and remove weapons and to
seize evidence to prevent its concealment or destruction, and may search the area "within the
immediate control" of the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence. Pp. 395 U. S. 762-763.

(b) For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs, or for searching desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself, absent well recognized exceptions, a
search warrant is required. P. 395 U. S. 763.

(c) While the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest depends upon "the facts and
circumstances -- the total atmosphere of the case," those facts and circumstances must be viewed in
the light of established Fourth Amendment principles, and the only reasoned distinction is one
between (1) a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach, and (2) more extensive
searches. Pp. 395 U. S. 765-766.

Page 395 U. S. 753

 17

(d) United Ste v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, and Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, on their facts,
and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with this decision, are no longer to be
followed. P. 395 U. S. 768.

(e) The scope of the search here was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
as it went beyond petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained a
weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him, and there was no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area. P. 395 U. S. 768.

68 Cal.2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, reversed.

People v. Mortos

In the afternoon of January 5, 1990, an informant reported to the Criminal Investigation Service in
Cainta, Rizal a certain person who was selling marijuana in Sitio Ruhat, Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal.
Accordingly, a buy-bust team composed of C1C Rogelio Dado, Sgt. Romeo Savillo, C1C Manuel
Mercader, and C2C Ronald Villacruzes was organized. Thereafter, the team accompanied by the
informant proceeded to the aforementioned place where informant identified the person who was
sought to be arrested. Afterwards, the group carried out the plan for the arrest of the suspected
pusher.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

C1C Manuel Mercader alighted from the vehicle, walked towards Rogelio Mortos who was then in a
sari-sari store where several people were present, and acting as the poseur-buyer, inquired from the
latter if he was selling marijuana. When Rogelio Mortos answered in the affirmative, Mercader
handed him five (5) marked twenty (20) peso bills. He was then asked to wait while Rogelio Mortos
got the marijuana from the sari-sari store. Upon his return, Rogelio Mortos handed to Manuel
Mercader a plastic bag containing 50 grams of marijuana. Upon receipt thereof, he scratched his
head, the pre-arranged signal to the rest of his team who thereupon approached the two and arrested
Rogelio Mortos. They confiscated from him the marked money and tea bags of marijuana. These
were later presented as evidence against accused-appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Rogelio Mortos, however, denied selling marijuana. He claimed that he was buying cigarettes from
the sari-sari store when he was arrested and brought to the police station where he was allegedly
forced to sign a document and five (5) twenty peso bills. 2He also averred that no marijuana or
marked bills were ever seized from him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After trial, the lower court pronounced the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion of the appealed decision reads as follows:

ALINSUNOD SA MGA NASABI, dahilan sa napatunayan ng taga-usig nang walang bahid alinlangan
na si Rogelio Mortos y Tolentino, ang nasasakdal ay nagkasala ng krimeng Paglabag sa Pangkat 4
ng Artikulo II ng Batas Republika 6425 (na sinusugan noong 1972, 1980, at 1982), siya ay
pinapatawan ng Hukuman, sang-ayon sa nasabing batas ng parusang habang buhay na
pagkabilanggo; at magbayad ng multang DALAWAMPUNG LIBONG PISO
(P20,000.00).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Dahil sa siya ay isang bilanggo, ang panahong inilagi ni Rogelio Mortos y Tolentino sa piitan ay
ibabawas sa nasabing parusa kung siya ay sasang-ayon sa mga disciplinary rules na inilalapat sa
mga bilanggo alinsunod sa Artikulo 29 ng Bagong Kodigo Penal na sinusugan Batas Republika 6127
at Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WALANG KOSTAS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ITO ANG IPINAG-UUTOS. 3chanrobles virtual law library

As basis for the judgment of conviction, the trial court relied upon the testimony of the apprehending
officers, namely Manuel Mercader, Domingo Dado, and Romeo Savillo, all of whom identified Rogelio
Mortos as the drug-pushing suspect who was apprehended during the buy-bust operation and
 18

testified that Rogelio Mortos was caught in the act of selling marijuana to Rogelio Mercader. It held
that the testimonies of the above-mentioned officers sufficiently established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding his denials in his testimonies. According to the trial court,
the accused did not succeed in imputing malice on the part of the arresting officers for arresting and
testifying against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, the trial court applied the rule that public officers are presumed to have performed their
duties in accordance with the law. Furthermore, the trial court held that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the officers were minor and instead of destroying the credibility of their testimonies,
buttressed the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Rogelio Mortos now appeals his conviction with this sole assignment of error, to wit:

The Court a quo committed a reversible error in admitting the tea bags of marijuana and the twenty
peso bills adduced in evidence by the prosecution. 4chanrobles virtual law library

The assignment of error goes beyond the issue regarding the admissibility as evidence of the marked
money and marijuana. In effect, it questions the manner by which accused-appellant has been
arrested and brought to trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the Appellant's Brief, Rogelio Mortos argued that the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Courts 5regarding warrantless arrests are not applicable because he has not committed, nor was he
committing, nor was he about to commit a crime when he was arrested. For his arrest and for the
search to be valid, therefore, a warrant of arrest and a search warrant were
necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We find no reason to reverse the trial court's judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual

law library

After a careful review of the records, we are convinced that the prosecution successfully overcame
the initial presumption of innocence enjoyed by the accused and proved the latter's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To recall, the arresting officers, including the officer who acted as the poseur-
buyer, positively testified that Rogelio Mortos was caught selling
marijuana.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To rebut the testimony of the prosecution, the defense presented Rogelio Mortos to testify that he had
been coerced into signing a document and five (5) twenty peso bills. Apart from this testimony,
however, no other evidence was presented to support his denial. Neither the document nor the bills
which were alluded to in Rogelio Mortos' testimony were presented as exhibits for the defense. If
there were any bills on record, they were the ones which were offered as evidence by the
prosecution. Furthermore, accused did not even reveal to the Court the contents of the alleged
document. We find that Rogelio Mortos' denials did not successfully cast doubt on the veracity of the
testimony of prosecution's witnesses. "[T]he absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the
principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper
motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit." 6Paraphrasing this Court's
pronouncement in People v. Arceo, 7we hold that appellant's denial of guilt, uncorroborated by any
reliable evidence, cannot possibly overthrow the clear and convincing testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses as to his culpability. In People v. Cruz, 8we also said: "We sustain the rule that police
officers in buy-bust operations are entitled to the presumption of having acted pursuant to official
duty. Their testimony is entitled to great respect."chanrobles virtual law library

The fact that accused-appellant was arrested during a buy-bust

operation - ". . . a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto 9- has been established. Since accused-appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were not only authorized, but were under obligation to
apprehend him even without a warrant of arrest. 10Thus, the arrest of accused-appellant falls within
paragraph (a) of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court. 11chanrobles virtual law library
 19

[S]ince appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also
valid. 12This is in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court which provides inter
alia:

Sec 12. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof for the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

From the foregoing, it necessarily follows that because the marijuana and the marked money were
taken from the accused during a valid arrest following entrapment, they can be legally admitted as
evidence against herein accused-appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

People v. Malmstedt,

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at
camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accuseds passport and
other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when
accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags
contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
 20

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought
in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.