Philosophical Review

Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. by John Bishop

Review by: Michael J. Zimmerman
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 687-690
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 BOOK REVIEWS

None of thisshould be taken to detractfrommygeneral warm welcome

for this book.

JONATHAN DANCY
ofKeele
University

Review,Vol. 101, No. 3 (July1992)

ThePhilosophical

NATURAL AGENCY: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION.

By JOHN BISHOP. New York, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989. Pp. xi,
211.

No one I know likes incompatibilism.Even those of us who are inclined

to accept it find it distasteful,since it is so hard to understand how an
event-causallyundeterminedaction could be in the agent's control.If only
someone could successfullydefend compatibilism!But that seems to us
impossible, since compatibilism appears demonstrably false. The key
premise in the demonstrationis (somethinglike) this:ifan event (perhaps
an action),y,is the product of some event,x, and an agent has no control
over eitherx or the factthatx produces y, then thatagent has no control
over y. Compatibilistsreject this,incompatibilists accept it. Stalemate?Not
necessarily.Perhaps an account of controlcan be given that is clear and
convincing and shows the key incompatibilistpremise to be false. Even
incompatibilistswould welcome this.
This is just what Bishop sets out to do. He recognizes that there is an
initialdifficultyin understandinghow the sortof controlover action that
is necessaryfor moral responsibilitycan be reconciled withwhat he calls
scientificnaturalism, which implies that agents are natural organisms
whose behavior is whollycovered by event-causallaws. But, he believes,a
theoryof intentionalaction can in factbe given thatreconcilesthe ethical
and naturalisticperspectives.This is a causal theory,according to which
intentionalaction is behavior (appropriately)caused by (appropriate) men-
tal statesor events. His claim is thatwhen thistheoryis drawn up in all its
detail, the reader will be able to see that it yields all the control that the
ethicalperspectiverequires,even thoughit presupposes thatall agents are
natural organismswhose behavior is compatiblewith(but does not imply)
determinism.(Bishop recognizes thata naturalisticaccount both of inten-
tional statesand of the other componentsof moral responsibility would be
needed to achieve a full reconciliationof the ethical and naturalisticper-
spectives,but that is not part of his project.)
Bishop is aware (2 1ff.)thatsome mightclaim thatFrankfurthas shown
that moral responsibilitydoes not require controlby showing that it does

687

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 BOOK REVIEWS

not require alternate possibilities.' Bishop accepts Frankfurt'sargument

but believes that what it shows is not that responsibilitydoes not require
control,but ratherthat controldoes not require alternatepossibilities.
Bishop's preliminaryanalysis of intentionalaction is roughly this: An
agent,M, intentionallyperformsan action,a, iffM's being in some mental
state,r (for reason),both makes it reasonable forM to do a and causes an
outcome, b (for behavior),that instantiatesthe type of event "intrinsic"to
a-ing (as, forexample, one's arm's risingis "intrinsic"to one's raisingone's
arm) (104). This analysisfaces two major challenges: that of weakness of
will (where one can apparently do something intentionallyeven when
one's action is not reasonable) and that of deviant causal chains (where
one's action can apparentlybe caused by r, but in such a way that one's
action is not intentional).Bishop believes that the firstchallenge can be
almost whollydeflectedby recognizingthat r need not be anythingmore
than a "final stage" intention;in particular,r need not consistin an eval-
uativejudgmentin favorof doing a. To meet the second challenge,Bishop
distinguishesbetween basic and nonbasic action. He claims that nonbasic
action is intentionaljust when r causes b in a way thatconformswithM's
plans, and he givesa detailed account of this( 130-31). He claimsthatbasic
action is intentionaljust when the causal linkbetweenr (in thiscase, a basic
intention)and b is "sensitive"to the content of r and, where necessary,
"sustains"(by means of "feedback loops" throughthe agent's own mental
processes) M's regulationof b, and he gives a detailed account of this too
(chap. 5). On the basis of these accounts Bishop then provides a revised
analysisof intentionalaction (172) and claimsthathe has therebyachieved
the desired reconciliationbetweenthe ethicaland naturalisticperspectives,
or at least that component of the reconciliationhaving to do with an
agent's controlover his or her actions.
Bishop presentshis theoryin great detail. His discussion is alwaysrich,
subtle, insightful,helpfullyrepetitive(he often stops to remind us just
what stage his inquiryhas reached), well written(technicalwithoutbeing
overwhelmingand with a minimum of non-English formulae), well in-
formed (his referencesto the literature,some of it veryrecent,are plen-
tifuland apt), and fair-minded(for a compatibilist,he is admirablysensi-
tive to incompatibilistconcerns). In addition, the book is attractivelyand
carefullyproduced (I noticed veryfewtypographicalerrors,and only one
of any importance:the omissionof 'not' on page 32, ten lines up). In sum,

'See HarryG. Frankfurt,"Alternate and MoralResponsibility,"Jour-

Possibilities
66 (1969): 829-39.
nal ofPhilosophy

688

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 BOOK REVIEWS

itis a book verymuch worthreading. NonethelessI believe thatBishop has

failed in his main endeavor.
I agree withBishop thatFrankfurt'scases do not sever the linkbetween
responsibilityand control.2 I agree that nonbasic intentionalaction in-
volves the action's coming about as the agent intends,although I disagree
withaspects of Bishop's analysisof this. (I question two claims in particu-
lar: thatM must performthe basic actions thatformpart of the plan with
the intentionof attainingthe end thatthe plan was designed to serve (130),
and that the relevantbelief condition is thatM should have been able to
recognize the actual causal route fromr to b as a potentialroute ( 131). The
formerclaim seems too strong:M's plan may involve accommodation of
temporaryamnesia with respect to the final goal. As to the latterclaim:
while Bishop correctlyrejects as a condition of intentionalaction that r
cause b in the way thatM expects, I would rejecthis normativeanalysisin
favor of saying (roughly) that r must not cause b in a way thatM expects
willnot occur.)3 I agree also thatbasic intentionalactionrequires some sort
of sensitivity to intentionalcontentand, possibly,sustenance via feedback
loops, althoughagain I would quarrel withdetailsof Bishop's analysis.But
all this is relativelysmall potatoes compared to the main question: could
Bishop's reconciliationistprojectsucceed, even ifamended along lines that
I prefer? I don't see how.
Despite his sensitivity to incompatibilist concerns, Bishop seems
strangelyunaware thatthe controlthatis typicalof intentionalaction may
not be-indeed, surelyis not-(all) the control that the incompatibilistis
looking for. As Nozick has noted4 and Dennett has reminded us,5 no one
has ever thoughtthata thermostat'scontrolof temperatureis inconsistent
withdeterminism.If it were thissense of "control"-call it regulatorycon-
trol-that was operative in the key incompatibilistpremise cited at the
outset, the premise would clearly be false. But, equally clearly,it is not
(just) thissense of "control"thatthe incompatibilist(or level-headed com-
patibilist)is after.The incompatibilistseeks an account of somethingelse-
call it independent control. For there to be independent control,regula-
torycontrol must be accompanied by two additional elements. First,the

AnEssayonHumanAction
2See 223 of MichaelJ.Zimmerman, (henceforth,
EHA)
(NewYork:PeterLang, 1984).
3EHA, 131ff.
4RobertNozick,Philosophical (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Explanations Press,
1981),315.
5DanielDennett,ElbowRoom(Cambridge:MIT Press,BradfordBooks,1984),
chap. 3.

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 BOOK REVIEWS

subjectof controlmust,unlike a thermostat,be a genuine agent. (Genuine

agents have genuine mental states; theydon't functionmerelyas ifthey
did.) And second? I'm afraid I don't know what this second element is
(except that it has somethingto do withindependence and origination),
but certainlyBishop hasn't provided it. He hasn't even attemptedto. He
has failed to recognize thatthe mere factthatmental statesfeaturein the
causal ancestryof a certainitemof behaviorcannot itselfupgrade the level
of control fromregulatoryto independent.
Let me illustrate.Suppose that Klaus, a kleptomaniac,is literallyunable
to resistthe temptationto steal a certain item and thus steals it. (I don't
know whetherkleptomaniaever in factworksin thisway,but it could do
so.) Did he act intentionally?It would certainlyseem so: he had a plan, and
he put it into effectperfectly.(We can, I think,imagine a case of such
action that satisfiesall of Bishop's conditionsconcerningplanning, sensi-
tivity,and sustenance.) Thus Klaus, a genuine agent, enjoyed regulatory
controlover his action. But did he have independent controlover it? Surely
not-and this is somethingthat the compatibilistought also to recognize.
Whydidn't Klaus have independent control over his action? Here I'm
inclined simplyto invoke the key incompatibilistpremise. Perhaps a dif-
ferent explanation-a compatibilistone-can be given (one that leaves
"ordinary"theftin the agent's independent control,even under determin-
ism). I hope so. But certainlyBishop hasn't given it; according to him (it
seems), the sort of control that Klaus enjoyed is all the controlone needs
for moral responsibility.
It is worthpointingout thatan incompatibilist can accept a mental-cause
theoryof action of a sort very close to, but importantlydifferentfrom,
Bishop's. On Bishop's theory,the mental cause in question is external to
the action and causes it. Accordingto the theoryI favor,6the mentalcause
is partof the action and the behavioritcauses also a part of the action. The
action itself is thus not event-caused (at least, not when the agent has
independent control over it), and the agent exercises his or her control
over it by exercisingcontrolover the mental cause itself.7

MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN
ofNorthCarolinaat Greensboro
University

6See EHA for an extended elaboration of this.

7MythankstoJoshHoffman.

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