RISOS -VIDAL V. COMELEC
The 1987
Facts: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada
for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights. In
2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results. In
2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought
to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying
that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides
that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency. It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional
provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain
to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore,
it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. The disqualification
of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. While it
may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local
or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it
is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. If former President Arroyo intended
for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a public office
again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.
TIDCP V. CSC
Facts: On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment
was included in TIDCORPs Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which
was submitted to the CSC Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office.
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De
Guzmans appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was
not included in the DBMs Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORPs Executive Vice
President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzmans appointment to
Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region (NCR). According to
Tambanillo, Republic Act No. (RA) 8494, which amended TIDCORPs charter, empowers
its Board of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and
to approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards.
On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo argued that TIDCORP is authorized to
adopt an organizational structure different from that set and prescribed by the CSC.
Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards, and is thus not bound by the DBMs Index of Occupational
Service. Pursuant to this authority, TIDCORPs Board of Directors issued Resolution No.
1185, s. 1998 approving the corporations re-organizational plan, under which De
Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De Guzmans appointment
was valid because the plan providing for his position followed the letter of the law.
Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzmans appointment as Financial Management
Specialist IV, the position had earlier been occupied by Ma. Loreto H. Mayor whose
appointment was duly approved by Director Bugtong.Thus, Director Bugtongs
invalidation of De Guzmans appointment is inconsistent with her earlier approval of
Mayors appointment to the same position. The CSC-NCR denied Tambanillos appeal
because De Guzmans appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which requires that the position title of an
appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved Position Allocation
List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of
Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service,
then De Guzmans appointment to this position must be invalid. TIDCORP then appealed
to the CSC-CO, but nonetheless, the central office reiterated that TIDCORP misconstrued
the provisions of Section 7 of RA 8494 in its attempt to bypass the requirements of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998. While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP staffing
prerogatives, it would still have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did
not expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil service laws.
The CA denied TIDCORPs petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution
No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari
was an improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Citing Central Bank of the Philippines v.
Civil Service Commission, the CA stood by the CSC-COs ruling that it has authority to
approve and review De Guzmans appointment. The CSC has the power to ascertain
whether the appointing authority complied with the requirements of the law;
otherwise, it may revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a government owned
corporation, it is covered by civil service laws and is therefore bound by the CSCs
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to personnel, including appointments. Hence this
petition to the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether De Guzmans Appointment is valid
Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court ruled that TIDCORP is indeed
exempted from the circular issued by the CSC. The phrase to endeavor means to to
devote serious and sustained effort and to make an effort to do. It is synonymous
with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek.41 The use of to endeavor in the
context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORPs exemption from laws
involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still
strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA
6758. The phrase as closely as possible, which qualifies TIDCORPs duty to endeavor
to conform, recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it
should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress
been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with RA 6758, it would
have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to
endeavor to conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of
this law. These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain reading of Section
7 of RA 8494 itself would confirm, that TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards, including compliance
with Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
REVALDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium
hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the
17th day of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of
P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing
forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and
prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997 convicting
petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber
without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, the petition for
certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in
evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant when they went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in
his possession lumber without the corresponding license
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in
court
Held: When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying
around the vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain
view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner
failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was
intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable
cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity
for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically
admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact
that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use
the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law
may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner
for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.
SAGANA V. FRANCISCO
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to
recover damages alleging that on November 20,1992, respondent with intent to kill him
and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On
January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve
summons at respondents addressat No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was
unsuccessful. In his Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to
give his identity and that respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Court also
attempted to serve summons to the respondents office through registered mail,
however, respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the Trial
Court on account of petitioners lack of interest to prosecute that he did not take action
since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that
respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted
the Motion with a condition upon the service of summon on the respondent within 10
days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar
tried to serve summons at respondent s address but no avail. In his handwritten
annotation, he stated that respondent s brother, Michael Francisco, told him that
respondent no longer lived at the said address, however, Iconar left a copy of the
summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in
Default for failure off respondent to file Answer despite the service of summons. Trial
Court declared that the summons was validly served to respondent, declared that
respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Michael
Francisco, through his lawyer filed a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he
received the summons and he was authorized to receive on behalf of his brother. He
prayed his name to be stricken off the records as having received the copy of summons.
In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and respondent had left the
house since 1993 and respondent would only write or call them without informing his
whereabouts. On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit
prepared by respondent dated December 23, 1992, where declared he was a resident of
No. 36 Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who notarized the affidavit was the
same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit, it rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered
respondent to pay the damages. Respondent received the copy of the Trial Court s
Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals. The appellate court
directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by respondent at
No. 36 Sampaguita St. BausaQ.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in
assuming jurisdiction over the person, despite the irregularity of the substituted service
of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to petitioner.
Court of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside
the decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner
filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent
through his brother.
Held: The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted. Court of Appeals decision was
reversed and set aside, and the Trial Court decision was reinstated and affirmed.
Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other than that authorized
by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the
Rules is not warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well
as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for resolution of this case. The
respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to
give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the
officers of court. Respondent tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the
court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be faulted of the
respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of
justice.
SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
Facts: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative
were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the
matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of
the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices
of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER,
this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part: Ten (10) Members of the Court
reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate
to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative. As such, it is insisted that such
minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
NAVARRO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
Facts: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under
Rule65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,
for being unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population
of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted
by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of
371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of
P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local
Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not
less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or
a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the
income of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was
enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from both the mother
province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was
created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption from
the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to
develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and
purposes of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid
Ruling: No. The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code when it added the italicized portion The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as
it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial
subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT
vs COMELEC.
Facts: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not
being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong
Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
Held: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented
or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major political parties to participate,
albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those
who lack well-defined political constituencies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave
weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers;
and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list
system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the
machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the
legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system
like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-
oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood
to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies
as they are ideologically marginalized.
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY V. LINGAD
US V. TORIBIO
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for
work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was
eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his
carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the said law is valid.
Held: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of
the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not
be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interests of the community.
SY TIONG SHIOU V. SY CHIM & SY
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES
Facts: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After
the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the
donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and
were simply cohabitating.
Issue: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Held: Yes, it is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the
spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the
ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and
Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service
contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it
performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was
brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals
acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition
was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began
drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme
Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review. In its decision, the Supreme
Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was moot
because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the
case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the
Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular
service contract had been terminated.
Issue: Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court
narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards,
have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the
Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws.
Held: As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond
natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in
Philippine jurisprudence moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
court access in environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the need
to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential
Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional
requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract
for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to
congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and
not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation
of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact
assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA
was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a
NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized
through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically
authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration
should be permitted in that area.
COMENDADOR V. DE VILLA
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with
violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial
investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner
applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was
granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending
the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military
officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision
was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court
stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not
apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal
before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on
the right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as
an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national
security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers
will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to
the petitioners was reversed.
LAMB VS PHIPPS
Facts: Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on
Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for
Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under
his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without
incurring criminal liability.
Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled
his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a
civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed
the receipt acknowledging payment from the government. The petition for mandamus,
asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor
because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the
SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.
Issue: W/N Mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate
of clearance of Lamb.
Held: NO. The certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees
and there is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of
government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded
officer. It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to
accept a mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of
Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if
he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the
correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property
represented by such paper accounts or balances.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law,
the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel
action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. In the present
case, however, the mandamus is not for the purpose of the compelling action only. It is
presented for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor.
There is a very wide distinction between the use of the writ of mandamus to compel
action and its use to compel particular action on the part of a public official, board, or
officer upon whom particular duties are imposed by law.
The following are the powers and duties of the Auditor General: First, that the Auditor
for the Philippine Islands has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source of
every governmental entity within the Philippine Islands. Second, that his decision or the
result of his accounting upon such revenues and receipts and accounts is final and
conclusive upon all parties unless an appeal is taken within a period of one year. Third,
that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands (See sec. 36, Act No. 1792) is not
possessed with power to revoke or alter or modify the results of accountings made by
the Auditor without reference to the Secretary of War. Fourth, that when an appeal is
taken to the Governor-General and the latter disapproves of the accounting made by
the auditor, he must at once forward to the Secretary of War for final action the matter
in controversy.
The SC held that since the nature of the Auditors job requires him to exercise
discretion, he may not compelled by mandamus to issue the certificate to Lamb. Also,
there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy afforded to Lamb in that the Auditors
decision may be appealed to the Governor-General. The SC relied on the case of Decatur
vs. Paulding where it was held the the US courts that an Auditor may not be compelled
by mandamus. Also, the SC held that the decision of the executive branch is not
reviewable by the courts.
FARINAS V. BARBA
Facts: The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point
out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.
Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his
Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on
the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers: Sec. 1. Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
Issues: (1) W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider. (2) W/N Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. (3) W/N
Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Held: To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down
the rule that: Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not
be an abstract or index of the Act. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete
index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the
one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress
is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress is achieved. Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it
shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does
not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: ...
the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended. Following Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or
a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in
this case.
MALONZO VS. ZAMORA
PARAS V. COMELEC
Facts: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of
May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
Issue: W/N the SK election is a local election.
Held: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective lochal official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to
include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK
Facts: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of
rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded
Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Held: No. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;
and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice
and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering
that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment
or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,
is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
SANTOS V. PNOC
Facts: PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be
collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of
summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his
last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents
motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused
the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the
affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the
summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte.
Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and
formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer,
alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with
Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because
the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained
the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest
and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.
Issues: (1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to
improper service of summons. (2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not
actions in personam. (3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the
summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court and not respondents
messenger.
Held: (1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with
summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was
granted leave of court to effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by
publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Hence, the petitioners contention that the complaint filed against him is not covered by
the said rule because the action for recovery of sum of money is an action in personam
is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that the
affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial
court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make
the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to
service by publication.
SANTILLON V. MIRANDA
FACTS: son vs mother- after deducting conjugal share, son claims from the remaining
1/2; while mother claims of the remaining .
Pedro Santillon died without a will, leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son,
Claro. 4 years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration
which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales.

Upon partition, Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting
claims of the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting
from the conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be
divided as follows: for her and for him. Perfecta (mother) claimed besides her
conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the remaining
half. Court: Perfecta correct.

ISSUE: WON Art. 892 or Art. 996 applies.

RULING: YES. Art. 996 applies. Article 996 specifically applies to intestate succession
while Art. 892 which is found in the chapter of testamentary succession, applies to such
type of succession. Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-
half of the intestate estate. When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring
with only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the
deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

SNYDERS ESTATE V. DENIT