SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136818. December 19, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN BAYOTAS y IMPERIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated December 1, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Malabon,
Metro Manila, finding accused-appellant Edwin Bayotas y Imperio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of
Ricardo Cao and sentencing him to pay the latters heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P60,000.00 as actual
damages, and the costs.[2]

The information against accused-appellant charged

That on or about the 11th day of August, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a fan knife (balisong), with intent
to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and with the use of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, hit/stab RICARDO CAO hitting the latter on the left side of his body and right hand,
thereby inflicting upon the victim stab wounds, which caused his immediate death.[3]

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial proceeded.[4]

The stabbing of Ricardo Cao took place on August 11, 1997, at around 8:30 p.m. along M.H. Del Pilar Street,
Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila. It appears that the victim had an altercation with accused-appellant. The victim
fled to the barangay hall, but accused-appellant followed him and tried to attack him. Barangay tanods who were
present at that time intervened and tried to pacify the two. Through their efforts, the victim and accused-appellant
signed an amicable settlement.

After the two shook hands, accused-appellant departed, while the victim stayed behind. Jessie Soriano, a barangay
tanod, was asked by the barangay captain to accompany the victim until he could find transportation. The victim
boarded a jeepney. As the jeepney moved away, however, accused-appellant, who emerged from a dark corner of
the street, managed to board it and, once inside, stabbed the victim with a fan knife (balisong). Upon seeing the
incident, Jessie Soriano ran after the jeepney. He pulled accused-appellant off the jeepney by grabbing the back of
accused-appellants pants and slammed him on the pavement. Accused-appellant fell on his back, still clutching the
fan knife. Upon seeing that accused-appellant was armed with a knife, Soriano backed off. Then he heard the victim
say, Pare, may tama ako! (Pal, Ive been hit!) This made him turn to the victim. On the other hand, accused-appellant
took advantage of the momentary distraction of Soriano and fled. When Soriano saw that accused-appellant was
fleeing, Soriano shouted at the policemen for help. As a result, accused-appellant was apprehended, although not
before he had thrown the fan knife away.

One of the policemen handcuffed accused-appellant, while Jessie Soriano searched the area for accused-appellants
fan knife. When Soriano found it, he turned it over to the policemen. The fan knife was subsequently marked Exh.
D[5] for the prosecution.[6]

The postmortem examination of the victim shows that he sustained the following:

1) Stab wound, right infraclavicular region, measuring 1.8 x 0.8 cm., 6 cm. from the anterior midline, 132 cm. from the
heel, 7 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, fracturing the 2nd right thoracic rib, piercing
the upper lobe of the right lung.

2) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 2 x 0.8 cm., 15 cm. from the anterior midline, 125 cm. from the heel.
3) Stab wound, left anterior axillary region, measuring 2.5 x 1.1 cm., 24 cm. from the anterior midline, 117 cm. from
the heel, 8 cm. deep directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, fracturing the 7th left thoracic rib, piercing
the lower lobe of the left lung.

4) Incised wound, proximal phalanx, right thumb, measuring 1 x 0.3 cm.

5) Incised wound, right hand, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm., 3.5 cm. lateral to its posterior midline.[7]

Dr. Maria Cristina B. Freyra, who conducted the postmortem examination, testified that stab wound no. 3 was fatal,
and that, like the other wounds sustained by the victim, it was caused by a single-bladed weapon.[8]

On the other hand, Pacita Samaniego, a representative of the victims parents, testified that the latter spent
P50,000.00 to P60,000.00 for the victims wake and burial.[9]

The defense presented accused-appellant as the sole witness. He admitted having stabbed the victim but alleged he
did so in a fit of anger. He claimed that his wife, Gina Aber, a beautician, and the victim were having an affair. He
said he knew the victim because of their common interest in cockfighting: he (accused-appellant) maintained fighting
cocks, while the victim sold taris (spurs attached to the legs of fighting cocks so that they could maim each other
during cockfights). They met at a place where fighting cocks are unloaded from Cebu.

According to accused-appellant, on June 15, 1997, he went to the beauty parlor where his wife was working without
letting her know he was there. After the beauty parlor had closed, he saw his wife going to the drugstore and making
a telephone call. Later, the victim arrived and picked her up in a taxi. Accused-appellant said he got a taxi and
followed the pair. He saw the two check in a motel in Meycauayan, Bulacan. When she arrived home at 11:00 oclock
that evening, however, she told accused-appellant that she had come from a clients house for home service.

On another occasion, on June 18, 1997, accused-appellant claimed that he asked his wife, as the latter was leaving
the beauty parlor, where she was going because he suspected that she was going to meet the victim. His wife replied
that she was going to have her nipper sharpened, but when accused-appellant offered to accompany her, she said
she did not have the nipper with her after all. Accused-appellant claimed he also noticed his wife was wearing jewelry
which he had not bought for her. When he confronted her about this, his wife replied she had bought them herself on
credit. That same day, accused-appellant said he told the victim to stay away from his wife.

Despite this incident, accused-appellant said he still offered to sell taris for the victim. Accused-appellant claimed
that, as he was having drinks with friends on August 11, 1997, he saw the victim pass by. He told the victim that he
had sold two dozens of the latters taris to a certain Wilbur for P7,000.00. The victim replied that accused-appellant
should have sold them at P7,000.00 a dozen, or P14,000.00 for two dozens. This led to a quarrel. The two were
taken to the barangay hall for reconciliation. Apparently, the two were able to patch up their differences although
accused-appellant disputed that he left ahead of the victim, claiming that it was he who was told by the barangay
captain to stay behind. After five minutes, accused-appellant said he was allowed to leave. He went back to have
drinks with his friends. After a while, they decided to continue their drinking session in Monumento. When they
boarded a jeepney to go there, they saw the victim inside the vehicle. Accused-appellant said the victim smiled at him
and sarcastically told him that the P7,000.00 which he (accused-appellant) lost in the deal with Wilbur would be the
payment for accused-appellants wife whom he (the victim) was going to see that night. Accused-appellant got angry,
drew his knife, and stabbed the victim. Afterwards, he alighted and surrendered to the police.[10]

On December 10, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Edwin Bayotas y Imperio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

Likewise, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cao the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the death of the said victim and P60,000.00 as actual damages plus cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF PASSION AND
OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

III.ASSUMING THAT PASSION AND OBFUSCATION CANNOT BE APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE
COURT A QUO SHOULD HAVE APPRECIATED THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VINDICATION OF A
GRAVE OFFENSE.[12]

From the foregoing, it appears that accused-appellant does not deny stabbing the victim. Be that as it may, a
resolution of his appeal turns on the determination of the circumstances surrounding the said stabbing.

It must be noted that the prosecution and the defenses narration of events differ in several respects. From the
testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Jessie Soriano, it appears that despite the apparent reconciliation of the
victim and accused-appellant at the barangay hall, the latter still harbored resentment against the former. Hence,
after leaving the barangay hall ahead of the victim, accused-appellant armed himself with a fan knife and waited for
the victim to emerge. Upon seeing the victim board a slow-moving jeepney, he attacked the victim.

Accused-appellant claims he could not have waylaid the victim because he (accused-appellant) left the barangay hall
later than the victim; that it was by mere chance that he boarded the jeepney which the victim was also riding; and
that he only stabbed the victim after the latter called his (accused-appellants) wife a prostitute.

Between the self-serving testimony of accused-appellant and that of Jessie Soriano, the trial court correctly found the
latter more credible. Soriano is a disinterested witness. He was, at the time of this incident, a barangay tanod, and it
was as such that he got involved in this case. No evidence has been shown that he had any motive to testify falsely.
We, therefore, give full credence to the following findings of the trial court:

As borne by the record, [accused-appellant] left the barangay hall ahead of the victim. He then armed himself with a
fan knife before taking refuge at the dark portion of the street to await for the arrival of the passenger jeepney where
[the victim] was on board. And as soon as he caught glimpse of the vehicle, the [accused-appellant] emerged from
the dimly lit portion of the street, ran after passenger jeepney, and lunged at the helpless victim.[13]

Indeed, it is well-established that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to respect as the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during the
trial.[14]

In the light of the foregoing factual scenario, the Court now resolves the arguments raised by accused-appellant in
his appeal.
First. Accused-appellant claims he should have only been convicted of homicide, not murder, because the
prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He contends that the following circumstances
negate the presence of treachery: (1) he stabbed the victim in a jeepney in the presence of other passengers who
could have rendered assistance to the victim or served as eyewitnesses; (2) barangay tanod Jessie Soriano saw him
stab the victim and even pulled him off the jeepney and slammed him to the ground; and (3) the incident took place
early in the evening (8:30 p.m.) on a busy street (M.H. Del Pilar, Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila).

This contention is without merit.

There is treachery when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim and (2)
the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.[15]

In this case, the very circumstances which accused-appellant claims negate treachery in fact prove the same
because the victim could not have expected that, despite his being in a jeepney that was moving on a busy street
with people around, accused-appellant would suddenly appear and stab him.[16] Indeed, the victim had reason to
believe that he and accused-appellant had already settled their differences at the barangay hall.

This case is similar to People v. De la Tongga.[17] In that case, the accused suddenly appeared from nowhere and
then stabbed the victim while the latter and his companions were inside a tricycle. The Court found treachery,
explaining that

[the] essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected assault on an unarmed victim which renders him unable to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the aggression. Here, the weapon used, the nature of
the injury inflicted, and the defenseless stance of the victim when attacked confluently lead to the inevitable
conclusion that appellant deliberately adopted the murderous mode of commission to ensure the consummation of
the offense with impunity.[18]

In this case, the manner of the attack, the number of the wounds sustained by the victim (five), and the location of the
fatal wound which indicates that accused-appellant deliberately and consciously aimed at a vital spot of the victims
body show treachery in the killing of the victim.[19]

Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength so that even if the same is present, there is no need to appreciate it as
an independent generic aggravating circumstance.[20] In this case, however, the trial court correctly held that abuse
of superior strength was absent. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior strength
if the prosecution failed, as in this case, to demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the build of the victim
and the accused-appellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim.[21] Anent the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the trial court also correctly held that such circumstance is absent
in this case because the prosecution failed to establish (1) the time when accused-appellant determined to commit
the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination, and (3) the lapse of an interval of
time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof sufficient to allow accused-appellant
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[22]

Second. As accused-appellant admits the commission of the crime, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the alleged mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave
offense, let alone sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim.[23]

We find none of these mitigating circumstances present in this case. To begin with, we find it strange that accused-
appellant would have any business relationship with the victim if he suspected the latter of carrying on an affair with
his wife.
Accused-appellants claim that he stabbed the victim because the latter practically called accused-appellants wife a
prostitute is also belied by Jessie Sorianos testimony that accused-appellant actually waylaid the victim by boarding
the jeepney which the victim was riding with his fan knife already drawn and then stabbing him inside the vehicle. It
would thus appear that it was not any remark made by the victim to accused-appellant in the jeepney which caused
him to attack the former but resentment which the accused-appellant still harbored despite their apparent
reconciliation at the barangay hall.

Nor can the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant. For this
circumstance to be taken into consideration, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender was not actually
arrested, (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority, and (3) his
surrender was voluntary.[24] In this case, however, Jessie Soriano testified that accused-appellant was fleeing when
he was arrested by law enforcers who heard his (Sorianos) cry for help.[25] The police had to shout before accused-
appellant stopped running away. Had it been his intention to surrender, accused-appellant would not have thrown his
fan knife away.

Third. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court should not have given credence to Jessie Sorianos affidavit
(Exh. B) as a perusal of his testimony shows that he merely affirmed that he had made the affidavit but did not
confirm its truthfulness and veracity.[26] This is mere hairsplitting. By identifying his affidavit and affirming its
contents,[27] Jessie Soriano thereby attested to the veracity of the contents therein.

Considering the facts of this case, we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of murder. Under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In accordance with
Art. 63(2), in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty (reclusion perpetua) was
correctly imposed by the trial court.

However, we find no basis for the trial courts award of P60,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses of the victims
wake and funeral considering that no receipts were presented to substantiate the same.[28] On the other hand, an
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should have been given to the heirs of the victim in line with the recent
rulings of this Court.[29]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Malabon, Metro Manila is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00 is deleted but accused-appellant is
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of the victim Ricardo Cao, in addition to the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded to them as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 200302

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as

yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then
and there stabbing him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was
terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.

The CA summarized the parties evidence as follows:

The Prosecution[s] Evidence

Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00
p.m., she was in her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She
was about to leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry Lipata and a certain
[Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from
the incident. Shocked at what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to stop, but
they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres

cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the
knife away from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon
seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the help of some neighbors,
Mercelinda rushed the victim to a hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy
Lipata [stab] her father to death in front of their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado,
which was located only a block away from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.

Upon coming home from her aunts house, the victim was attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run
away. Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the
Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away from the scene. She further
testified that she had no knowledge of any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her fathers death brought
her pain and sadness and anger against the perpetrators of her fathers killing.

The Defense[s] Evidence

The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his
house in Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when
two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told him to help his brother, Larry Lipata.
He immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously
assisted his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground. Thereafter, appellant
managed to grab the knife from the victim and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he
was wounded. Appellants sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment of
his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers.6

The RTCs Ruling

The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically
admitted the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC
found that the defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression on the part of Cueno. There
was no actual or imminent danger to the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata
brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)7 employed treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they
attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the
Lipata brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with
appellants theory of defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive
proof of evident premeditation.

The dispositive portion of the RTCs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused
GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following amounts:

(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;

(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death
plus 12% interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;

(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the
death of Rolando Cueno; and

(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.

The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.8
Appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted
appellants notice in an Order10 dated 19 April 2010.

The CAs Ruling

The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTCs ruling that
appellants claim of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or
of his brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was outnumbered by the Lipata
brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab
wounds that Cueno sustained.

The CA disagreed with appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out
that Cueno was not forewarned of any impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-
laws house to gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand, were readily armed with tres
cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers attack
made it impossible for Cueno to retaliate.

The CA also disagreed with appellants contention that there was no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata
brothers were all armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused
to stop stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious.

The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of
the trial court convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation
of the records to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution.13

Appellants Death Prior to Final Judgment

This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau
of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed
this Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15
this Court required the Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report
compliance within ten days from notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012,16 informed
this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC
about appellants demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were
photocopies of appellants death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail Wardens
letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7 January 2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City
Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so
desire.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2013,19 which stated that it had already
exhaustively argued the relevant issues in its appellees brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief
on 26 March 2013.20

In view of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25
September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution."21

The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November
2013.22 According to the Public Attorneys Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased
appellant have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its office on 29 September 2010. The PAO
sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellants next of kin per official records. Despite receipt
of the letter, the relatives of appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.

In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

xxxx

9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e.
murder, the same does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling
[People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R.
No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of
the deceased as party does not arise.23

On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal
representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of
this case."24

The Courts Ruling

At the outset, we declare that because of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs decision, there is no
further need to determine appellants criminal liability. Appellants death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal
liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellants death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court,
in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal."26

We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then
applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil
action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of action. If the act or omission complained
of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription.30
(Emphases supplied)

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said
estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.1wphi1

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these
rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAOs Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died
because of appellants fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellants civil liability
ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellants death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of
final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent
designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of
representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in

Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue
their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which
may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new
provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and
87.38

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the
criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial
retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to
the conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.

However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study
and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive
resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in cases
where an accused dies after conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.

In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence. This Courts pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal
is due to that ground.

We also turn to the Code Commissions justification of its recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in
these cases:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where
the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social
order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious
defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of
innumerable persons injured or wronged.40

In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity.
This reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.

Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative
Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section
13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading
to the filing of the Informations are the following:

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in
I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly,
the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp
belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is 26,250.00. The fines of
500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of 500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan
Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure
to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.
After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and
value which is 26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of 500.00 and the declamping fee of 500.00 were
not paid by the respondents.2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed
two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was
eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent
Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.

In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged
further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece
of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor
Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding
the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:

We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of
Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.

xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the
cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or
Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file
the corresponding informations against them in Court.6

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25,
2003, stating:

That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered
immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the
damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such
clamp worth 26,250.00 and other consequential damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or
Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of
charges on respondents with more than one offense.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the
crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen
from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003,
almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in
this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9

In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order11 to
argue among other points that:

6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on
May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12

Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.

The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents'
Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion
to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.

These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.

Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the
date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992,
En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT
TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).

Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case
was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously
saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of
the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office
of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution
of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:

the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal
information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in
these cases had prescribed.

xxxx

The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a
City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and
procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as
required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by
information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.

Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in
this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should
have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand,
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be
commenced only by information."18

Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.

In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They
held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the
Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F.
Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only
be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent
judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang,
"John Does," and "Peter Does."

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does
not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In
any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charters.

In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash,
namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one
offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal
personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order
and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private
complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.

In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription,
since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated
but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x
may file a verified petition"26 before the court.

The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing
the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute
that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special
law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not
argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:

xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:

SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent
component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual
Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known
as the charter of Baguio City.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the
rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues
with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on
May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This
Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall
be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a
matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31
categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred
to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special
laws but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in
the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They
had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the
subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information.
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of
the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:

SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.

The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that

a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and

d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:

SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime
charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a
prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a
"polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of
domicile."

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman;
or

b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its
merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only
by the filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the
complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff and established Regional
State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions
where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located
in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan,
and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information
within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the
case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia
also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond
their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought
to be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.