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ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.

SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
(G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
Facts:
This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The Court en banc deliberated on the petition and the votes gathered were equally
divided with no majority vote obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss the petition.
Seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. After re-deliberation, the voting
remained the same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, was dismissed.
Issues and Ruling:
I. Whether or Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of Republic Act
No. 8371 (IPRA) and its IRR are unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving
the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals, and
other natural resources therein, violating the regalian doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

Justice Kapunan: No. Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples
of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition: lands held in
private ownership since time immemorial) do not diminish the States ownership of lands
within the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as
private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid
down in Cario v. Insular Government. Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any
right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional
and not declarative of a right or title. Section 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs
in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State
retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural
resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said rights exclude non-
indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains
upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency.
Justice Puno: No. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of
lands in the public domain under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution does not
include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or
recognize the land as private and not public. The right of ownership to ancestral domain
under Section 7(a) involves lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains, not waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the State. Small-scale
utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in
Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution since only priority rights (which does not necessarily mean
ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs. However, by including natural resources,
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section 7(a) and
therefore unconstitutional.
Justice Panganiban: Yes. Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain
encompasses natural resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those
possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial] contravene Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, which declares that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals,
and natural resources none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In
addition, mere possession or utilization of land, however long, does not automatically
convert them into private properties. IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral
lands and domains. IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the States power under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands and
ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights without any time
limit. In addition, they are also given the right to negotiate directly the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources under Section 7(b), a right vested by
the Constitution only to the State.
Justice Vitug: Yes. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law
and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State
authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony
II. Whether or not Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA,
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, violate the due process clause of the Constitution

Justice Kapunan: No. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples
does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary
laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution
Justice Vitug: Yes, but only on making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second paragraph of
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this statement as saying that
Congress may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws shall govern
and end it there.
III. Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination, infringes upon
the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution

Justice Kapunan: No. Since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA
expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the
Presidents control and supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However,
insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are
concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and
the SEC.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

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