V.

DEFENSES IN TORT CASES GOVERNMENT SERVICE Promulgated:

INSURANCE SYSTEM,
SECOND DIVISION Intervenor. August 25, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 170414

INSURANCE SYSTEM, DECISION
Petitioner,

- versus - CARPIO, J.:

PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION,

ELY BUNGABONG, and The Case
MICHAEL GALVEZ,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Before the Court are three consolidated petitions for review[1] of the 28 October 2004
Decision[2] and the 15 November 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 170418 73214. The 28 October 2004 Decision affirmed the 27 July 2001 Decision[4]of the Regional Trial
ROGELIO CASIO, and Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City. The 15 November 2005 Resolution modified the 28 October
RUEL ISAAC, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners,
The Antecedent Facts
- versus - On 2 April 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation
(PAC) arrived at the Manila International Airport[5] from El Nido, Palawan.[6] In command of the
aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong.[7] With Bungabong in the cockpit was Michael F. Galvez as co-
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, pilot.[8]
ELY BUNGABONG and
MICHAEL GALVEZ, Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano
Respondents. Hangar to disembark its passengers.[9] After the last passenger disembarked, PACs pilots
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x started the engine of the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, G.R. No. 170460 end of the airport.[10] At around 7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted ground control to ask for
DANILO ALZOLA, and clearance to taxi to taxiway delta.[11] Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the Air
ERNESTO* LIM, Present: Transportation Office (ATO), issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted again
Petitioners, upon reaching taxiway delta intersection.[12]
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA, PACs pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta at about 7:19 and 19 seconds. [13] Upon
- versus - ABAD, reaching the intersection of taxiway delta, Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway delta,
PEREZ,** and which request was granted.[14] Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez requested clearance to make a right
MENDOZA, JJ. turn to fox 1 and to cross runway 13 in order to proceed to fox 1 bravo. [15] ATO granted the
request.[16] At this point, the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13.[17] Upon
reaching runway 13, PACs pilots did not make a full stop at the holding point to request
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, clearance right before crossing runway 13.[18] Without such clearance, PACs pilots proceeded
ELY BUNGABONG, and to cross runway 13.
MICHAEL GALVEZ,
Respondents, Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casio and Ruel
Isaac, was preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push
and start[19] on runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty at the ATO issued
1
the clearance.[20] Subsequently, at 7:20 and 18 seconds, Linog, Jr. gave PALs Boeing 737
clearance to take off.[21] Pilots Casio and Isaac then proceeded with the take-off
procedure.[22] While already on take-off roll, Casio caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on the
left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13.[23]
While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez noticed the Boeing 737 and told
Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side. [24] Bungabong then
said, Diyos ko po and gave full power to the Twin Otter.[25] The PAL pilots attempted to abort
the take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft.[26] However, the Boeing 737 still collided
with the Twin Otter.[27]
The Boeing 737 dragged the Twin Otter about 100 meters away.[28] When the Twin Otter
stopped, PACs pilots ran away from the aircraft for fear it might explode.[29] While observing
the Twin Otter from a safe distance, they saw passengers running down from the Boeing
737.[30] When PACs pilots returned to the aircraft to get their personal belongings, they saw
that the Twin Otter was a total wreck.[31]
At 7:21 and 2 seconds on that fateful evening, the PAL pilots informed ATOs control tower that
they had hit another aircraft, referring to the Twin Otter.[32] Bungabong suffered sprain on his
shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb.[33] An ambulance brought the two
pilots to Makati Medical Center where they were treated for serious and slight physical
injuries.[34]
On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of
Pasay City a complaint[35] for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Lim,
Linog, Jr., and ATOs traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing 737 that figured in the collision, intervened.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola, Lim,
and Linog, Jr., as ATOs traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic
controller, respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial court further held that the direct
cause of the collision was the negligence of Casio and Isaac, as the pilots of the Boeing 737 that
collided with the Twin Otter. The decretal portion of the trial courts decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants Philippine Air Lines and its pilots, Rogelio Casio and Ruel
Isaac, and Air Transportation Office and its comptrollers, Danilo Alzola,
Rogelio Lim and Ernesto Linog, Jr., jointly and severally, to pay:
a) Plaintiff Pacific Airways Corporation the amount of
Php15,000,000.00 and the further amount of Php100,000.00 a day
from April 2, 1996 until it is fully reimbursed for the value of its RP-
C1154 plane, as actual damages, and the amount of Php3,000,000.00,
as exemplary damages, and the amount of Php1,000,000.00, as and for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation;
b) Plaintiffs Ely B. Bongabong[36] and Michael F. Galvez, the amount of
Php5,000.00 each, as actual damages; the amount of Php500,000.00,
as and for moral damages; Php500,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages, and the amount of Php50,000.00, as and for attorneys fees;
c) Defendants are, likewise, ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to
plaintiffs the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[37]
PAL, Casio, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., all appealed the trial courts Decision to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not commit any reversible error. In its 28
October 2004 decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City dated July 27, 2001 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[38]
PAL, Casio, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied for lack of merit all the motions for
reconsideration except the one filed by Linog, Jr.
The Court of Appeals gave weight to the 20 March 2003 Decision[39] on appeal of the RTC
(Branch 108) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-1979 acquitting Linog, Jr., who was convicted
in the original Decision together with Alzola and Lim, of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the collision.
Since Alzola and Lim did not appeal, the judgment of conviction against them became final.
Alzola and Lim were sentenced to arresto mayor or imprisonment for two (2) months.[40]
The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the trial court in the criminal case has ruled that
Linog, Jr. was not negligent, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
In its 15 November 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the motions for reconsideration is
MODIFIED in that the case against defendant-appellant ERNESTO
LINOG, JR. is dismissed. The decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
2
 SO ORDERED.[41]
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 170418, petitioners PAL, Casio, and Isaac argue that the Court of Appeals should
have applied the emergency rule instead of the last clear chance doctrine. Petitioners claim
that even if the PAL pilots were negligent, PAL had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its pilots. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals awarded damages
without any specific supporting proof as required by law. Petitioners also claim that the Court
of Appeals should have awarded their counterclaim for damages.
In G.R. No. 170414, petitioner GSIS points out that PACs pilots were the ones guilty of
negligence as they violated the Rules of the Air, which provide that right of way belongs to the
aircraft on take-off roll and the aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. GSIS posits that PAC, Bungabong, and
Galvez should be held solidarily liable to pay GSIS the cost of repairing the insured aircraft.
In G.R. No. 170460, petitioners ATO, Alzola, and Lim call our attention to the fact that PAC was
a mere lessee, not the owner of the Twin Otter. They argue that PAC, as mere lessee, was not
the real party-in-interest in the complaint seeking recovery for damages sustained by the Twin
Otter. Petitioners maintain that ground and air traffic clearances were the joint responsibility
of ATO and the pilots-in-command. Petitioners aver that Bungabong and Galvez were negligent
in asking for clearance to cross an active runway while still 350 meters away from the runway.
Petitioners claim that PAL had the right of way and that PACs pilots had the last clear chance
to prevent the collision.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is who among the parties is liable for negligence under the
circumstances.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
In a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions as when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.[42]
After thoroughly going over the evidence on record in this case, we are unable to sustain the
finding of fact and legal conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, we must refer to the applicable
rules governing the specific traffic management of aircrafts at an airport. The Rules of the
Air[43] of the Air Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered in the Philippines. [44] The
Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in this case were both registered in the Philippines. Both are
thus subject to the Rules of the Air. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts, the
Rules of the Air state:
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of collision
between two aircrafts taxiing on the maneuvering area of an
aerodrome, the following shall apply:
a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or approximately so,
each shall stop or where practicable, alter its course to the right so as
to keep well clear.
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the one which has
the other on its right shall give way.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of
the collision. Only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The
Rules of the Air provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an
aerodrome shall give way to aircraft taking off or about to take
off.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, PALs aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because it was
on the right side of PACs aircraft, but more significantly, because it was taking off or about to
take off.
PACs Pilots
For disregarding PALs right of way, PACs pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one
that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[47]
We find it hard to believe that PACs pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked to the
left and to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April
and the Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights,
and logo lights on before and during the actual take-off roll.[48] The only plausible explanation
why PACs pilots did not see the Boeing 737 was that they did not really look to the left and to
the right before crossing the active runway.
Records show that PACs pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested clearance
to cross the active runway.[49] ATO points out that PACs pilots should have made a full stop at
the holding point to ask for updated clearance right before crossing the active runway.[50] Had
PACs pilots done so, ATO would by then be in a position to determine if there was an aircraft
on a take-off roll at the runway. The collision would not have happened.
ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr.
3
The Rules of Air Control govern airplane traffic management and clearance at the then Manila
International Airport. It contains several provisions indicating that airplane traffic management
and clearance are not the sole responsibility of ATO and its traffic controllers, but of the pilots-
in-command of aircrafts as well. The Rules of Air Control state:
1.3 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating
the controls or not, be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in
accordance with the rules of the air, except that he may depart from
these rules in circumstances that render such departure absolutely
necessary in the interest of safety. (Emphasis supplied)
1.5 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as
to the disposition of the aircraft while he is in command.[51](Emphasis
supplied)
3.1 Clearances are based solely on expediting and separating aircraft
and do not constitute authority to violate any applicable regulations
for promoting safety of flight operations or for any other purpose.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
If an air traffic control clearance is not suitable to the pilot-in-
command of an aircraft, he may request, and, if practicable, obtain an
amended clearance. [52] (Emphasis supplied)
10.1.5 Clearances issued by controllers relate to traffic and
aerodrome conditions only and do not relieve a pilot of any
responsibility whatsoever in connection with a possible violation of
applicable rules and regulations.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, even if ATO gave both PALs pilots and PACs pilots clearance to take off and
clearance to cross runway 13, respectively, it remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-
in-command to see to it that the respective clearances given were suitable. Since the pilots-in-
command have the final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, they cannot, in case a
collision occurs, pass the blame to ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable.
The clearance to cross runway 13, premature as it was, was not an absolute license for PACs
pilots to recklessly maneuver the Twin Otter across an active runway. PACs pilots should have
stopped first at the holding point to ask for clearance to cross the active runway. It was wrong
for them to have relied on a prematurely requested clearance which was issued while they
were still 350 meters away. Their defense, that it did not matter whether the clearance was
premature or not as long as the clearance was actually granted, [54] only reveals their poor
judgment and gross negligence in the performance of their duties.
On the other hand, evidence on record shows that the air traffic controller properly issued the
clearance to take off to the Boeing 737. Nothing on record indicates any irregularity in the
issuance of the clearance. In fact, the trial court, in the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the
collision, ruled that air traffic controller Linog, Jr. was not negligent. The Court of Appeals, in
its 15 November 2005 Resolution, absolved Linog, Jr. of civil liability for damages based on his
acquittal in the criminal case.
While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the criminal case for reckless imprudence,
may have been negligent in the performance of their functions, such negligence is only
contributory.[55] Their contributory negligence arises from their granting the premature
request of PACs pilots for clearance to cross runway 13 while the Twin Otter was still 350
meters away from runway 13. However, as explained earlier, the granting of their premature
request for clearance did not relieve PACs pilots from complying with the Rules of the Air.
PALs Pilots
Records show that PALs pilots timely requested clearance to take off. Linog, Jr., ATOs air traffic
controller, duly issued the clearance to take off.[56] Under the Rules of the Air, PALs aircraft
being on take-off roll undisputedly had the right of way.[57] Further, the Rules of Air Control
provide:
2.2.4.1 The aircraft that has the right of way shall maintain its heading
and speed, x x x. [58] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even if Casio noticed from the corner of his eye a small airplane taxiing on the left side
and approaching halfway of fox 1,[59] it was fairly reasonable for PALs pilots to assume that
they may proceed with the take-off because the taxiing aircraft would naturally respect their
right of way and not venture to cross the active runway while the Boeing 737 was on take-off
roll.
Applicable by analogy is the case of Santos v. BLTB,[60] where the Court applied the principle
that a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway, even after he sees
an approaching motorist coming toward him on the wrong side, is generally entitled to assume
that the other motorist will return to his proper lane of traffic.
Proximate Cause
After assiduously studying the records of this case and carefully weighing the arguments of the
parties, we are convinced that the immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross
negligence of PACs pilots. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.[61] In this case, the fact that PACs pilots
disregarded PALs right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an
active runway was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross negligence
on the part of PACs pilots, the collision would not have happened.
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiffs own negligence is the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
4
 Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence,[62] PAC and its pilots, whose own gross negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear the cost of such
injuries. They cannot recover damages. Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages,
which PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog,
Jr. should have been dismissed for lack of legal basis.
PALs Counterclaims
We find supported by law and evidence on record PALs counterclaim for actual or
compensatory damages but only in the amount of US$548,819.93[63] representing lease
charges during the period the Boeing 737 was not flying. The said amount cannot be claimed
against the insurance policy covering the Boeing 737. In this connection, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the
injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PALs right to claim actual or compensatory
damages in connection with the repair of the damaged Boeing 737, is entitled to
reimbursement for the amount it advanced. GSIS claims reimbursement for the amount of
US$2,775,366.84.[64] In support of its claim, GSIS presented statements of account, check
vouchers, and invoices[65] proving payment for the repair of the Boeing 737 in the total amount
of US$2,775,366.84. We find the claim fully supported by evidence on record and thus we
resolve to grant the same.
With regard to PALs other counterclaims, settled is the rule that the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is discretionary based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the
gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels. [66] Understandably,
Casio and Isaac suffered sleepless nights and were temporarily unable to work after the
collision. They are thus entitled to moral damages as well as exemplary damages considering
that PACs pilots acted with gross negligence.[67] Attorneys fees are generally not recoverable
except when exemplary damages are awarded[68] as in this case. We thus deem the amounts
of P100,000 in moral damages, P100,000 in exemplary damages, and P50,000 in attorneys fees
to be in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence and appropriate given the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. We SET ASIDE the 28 October 2004 Decision and the
15 November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73214 affirming in
toto the 27 July 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City. However,
we SUSTAIN the dismissal of the case against Ernesto Linog, Jr.
Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages, filed by Pacific Airways Corporation
(PAC), Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez, is DISMISSED for lack of legal basis.
Pacific Airways Corporation, Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez are ORDERED to
solidarily pay:
(1) Philippine Airlines, Inc. actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
US$548,819.93;
(2) Rogelio Casio and Ruel Isaac individually moral damages in the amount
of P100,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000, and attorneys fees
in the amount of P50,000; and
(3) the Government Service Insurance System, as insurer subrogee of
Philippine Airlines, actual or compensatory damages in the amount
of US$2,775,366.84.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground
conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
5
the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered.2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should
be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent
contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system.3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.4 In
answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident
involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with
PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work
site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations.5
On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the
plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff Antonio Esteban the sum of
P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as exemplary damages, with
legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully
paid. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever
amount the defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With
costs against the defendant. 6
From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the latter appealing only as
to the amount of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal.
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the
decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that
respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from
the claim for damages.7 A copy of this decision was received by private respondents on
October 10, 1979. 8 On October 25, 1979, said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
dated October 24, 1979. 9 On January 24, 1980, the Special Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals denied said motion for reconsideration.10 This resolution was received by
respondent spouses on February 22, 1980.11
On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals received private respondents' motion for
leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated February 27, 1980. 12 On
March 11, 1980, respondent court, in a resolution likewise penned by Justice Agrava, allowed
respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration, within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by private respondents on April 1, 1980 but prior
thereto, private respondents had already filed their second motion for reconsideration on
March 7, 1980. 14
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or motion to dismiss said second
motion for reconsideration. 15 The Court of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the
resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, designated two additional justices to
form a division of five.16 On September 3, 1980, said division of five promulgated its
resolution, penned by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated September
25, 1979, as well as the resolution dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision
of the lower court.17
On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside and/or for
reconsideration of the resolution of September 3, 1980, contending that the second motion
for reconsideration of private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision
of September 25, 1979 penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It further submitted
therein that the relationship of Barte and petitioner PLDT should be viewed in the light of the
contract between them and, under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the
acts of an independent contractor.18 On May 11, 1981, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its resolution denying said motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration and
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court dated October 1, 1974. 19
Coming to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following
errors:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying private respondents' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision of the Special Second Division, dated
September 25, 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated January 24, 1980,
are already final, and on the additional ground that said second motion for reconsideration
is pro forma.
2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid decision and resolution and in
misapplying the independent contractor rule in holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban
spouses.
A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the respondent court, as shown by the
records and admitted by both parties, may be graphically presented as follows:
(a) September 25, 1979, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
with Justice Agrava asponente;
6
 (b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said decision was received by private
respondents;
(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private
respondents;
(d) January 24, 1980, a resolution was issued denying said motion for
reconsideration;
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said denial resolution was received by
private respondents;
(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration was filed by private respondents
(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by
private respondents;
(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was issued allowing respondents to file a
second motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt; and
(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution was issued, penned by Justice Zosa,
reversing the original decision dated September 25, 1979 and setting
aside the resolution dated January 24, 1980.
From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that both the motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and, consequently, said second motion for
reconsideration itself were filed out of time.
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had procedural governance at the time,
provided that a second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been
pending. 20 Private respondents having filed their first motion for reconsideration on the last
day of the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so, they had only one
(1) day from receipt of the order denying said motion to file, with leave of court, a second
motion for reconsideration. 21 In the present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of
the resolution denying their first motion for reconsideration, private respondents had two
remedial options. On February 23, 1980, the remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid
reglementary period, they could have filed a motion for leave of court to file a second motion
for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer for the extension of the period within which to
do so. On the other hand, they could have appealed through a petition for review on
certiorari to this Court within fifteen (15) days from February 23, 1980. 22 Instead, they filed a
motion for leave to file a second motion 'for reconsideration on February 29, 1980, and said
second motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of which motions were by then
time-barred.
Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 of the original fifteen (15) day
period, the running of which was suspended during the pendency of the first motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take further proceedings on the
merits of the case, much less to alter, modify or reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or
resolution. The filing of the motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration by
herein respondents on February 29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of the motion itself on
March 7, 1980, after the expiration of the reglementary period to file the same, produced no
legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing or reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final
order or judgment sought to be re-examined. 23
The consequential result is that the resolution of respondent court of March 11, 1980
granting private respondents' aforesaid motion for leave and, giving them an extension of ten
(10) days to file a second motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period for filing a
second motion for reconsideration had already expired when private respondents sought
leave to file the same, and respondent court no longer had the power to entertain or grant
the said motion. The aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private respondents to file their
second motion for reconsideration was of no legal consequence since it was given when
there was no more period to extend. It is an elementary rule that an application for extension
of time must be filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of respondent court to grant said extension for filing
a second motion for reconsideration is conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion
seeking the same.
No appeal having been taken seasonably, the respondent court's decision, dated September
25, 1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of
respondent court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing private
respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration and reversing the original decision
are null and void and cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction to
respondent court. This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a decision has become
final and executory it is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it.25 The decision rendered anew is
null and void.26 The court's inherent power to correct its own errors should be exercised
before the finality of the decision or order sought to be corrected, otherwise litigation will be
endless and no question could be considered finally settled. Although the granting or denial
of a motion for reconsideration involves the exercise of discretion,27 the same should not be
exercised whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but prudently in conformity with law,
justice, reason and equity.28
Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case, we
find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident
which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such
findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the evidence on
record, as evidenced by the respondent court's resolution of January 24, 1980 which we
quote with approval:
7
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If
it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was
hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside
lane. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the
accident, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by
plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but
to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That
may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to
hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture
showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been
covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was
located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the
ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a way as to
allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles.
The situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT
MOUND for which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing
south was taken.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as
plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the
vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not
have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the
tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the
jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have
been thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered
their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to
swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT
MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not
have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which
should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was
running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights,
his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was
negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and
visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the
ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning sign
either. He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND,
having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should
have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the
ACCIDENT MOUND.29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not
only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages.30 The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall
into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty,
such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate
cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. 31 It is
basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure
to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and
necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid
the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of
Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to
danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original decision
that there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for
consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and the
unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a
police report of the incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital
where private respondents were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily
explained.
As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extended resolution of January 24,
1980
(a) There was no third party eyewitness of the accident. As to how the
accident occurred, the Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence of
plaintiffs themselves, and such evidence should be very carefully
evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged, being given the
8
 benefit of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to
plaintiffs, another person could have deliberately engineered a similar
accident in the hope and expectation that the Court can grant him
substantial moral and exemplary damages from the big corporation that
defendant is. The statement is made only to stress the disadvantageous
position of defendant which would have extreme difficulty in contesting
such person's claim. If there were no witness or record available from the
police department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able to determine
for itself which of the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to
the report or non-report of the accident to the police department.32
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.33 Whosoever relies on negligence
for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the
same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and
September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September
25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO CRUZ, SR., EDGAR
HERNANDEZ AND VIRGINIA MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court dated December 28, 2011, of petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc.
assailing the Decision1 dated May 16, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 10, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modifications the Decision3 dated January 30, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Angeles City finding petitioner jointly and solidarity
liable for damages incurred in a vehicular accident.
The facts follow.
Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Passenger Jitney (jeepney) that he owns
with plate number DSG-944 along Angeles-Magalang Road, Barangay San Francisco,
Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9, 1998, around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile,. a Daewoo
passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines) with plate number NXM-116, owned by petitioner Travel and
Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar Calaycay travelled in the same direction as that of
respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped the rear portion of the
jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr.
and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Muoz.
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muoz and Alberto Cruz, Sr., father of the
deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 9006
before the RTC claiming that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent and imprudent
manner by which Edgar Calaycay was driving the bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic
laws, rules and regulations, and praying that judgment be rendered ordering Edgar Calaycay
and petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. to pay the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. For plaintiff Alberto Cruz, Sr.
a. The sum of P140,000.00 for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred for coffin, funeral
expenses, for vigil, food, drinks for the internment (sic) of Alberto Cruz, Jr. as part of actual
damages;
b. The sum of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as moral, compensatory and consequential
damges.
c. The sum of P6,000.00 a month as lost of (sic) income from January 9, 1998 up to the time
the Honorable Court may fixed (sic);
2. For plaintiff Virginia Muoz:
a. The sum of P40,000.00, Philippine Currency, for the reimbursement of expenses for
hospitalization, medicine, treatment and doctor's fee as part of actual damages;
b. The sum of P150,000.00 as moral, compensatory and consequential damages;
3. For plaintiff Edgar Hernandez:
a. The sum of P42,400.00 for the damage sustained by plaintiffs Isuzu Passenger Jitney as
part of actual damages, plus P500.00 a day as unrealized net income for four (4) months;
b. The sum of P150,000.00, Philippine Currency, as moral, compensatory and consequential
damages;
4. The sum of P50,000.00 pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees, plus P1,000.00 per
appearance fee in court;
5. Litigation expenses in the sum of P30,000.00; and
6. To pay the cost of their suit.
9
 b) the sum of P250.000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the decedent Alberto Cruz, Jr.;
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For its defense, the petitioner claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a c) the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr.;
family in the selection and supervision of its employee Edgar Calaycay and further argued
that it was Edgar Hernandez who was driving his passenger jeepney in a reckless and d) the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
imprudent manner by suddenly entering the lane of the petitioner's bus without seeing to it
that the road was clear for him to enter said lane. In addition, petitioner alleged that at the 2. To plaintiff Virginia Muoz -
time of the incident, Edgar Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an
unauthorized line/route and that the jeepney was overloaded with passengers, and the a) the sum of P16,744.00 as actual damages; and
deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. was clinging at the back thereof.
b) the sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages.
On January 30, 2008, after trial on the merits, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
respondents, the dispositive portion of the decision reads: 3. To plaintiff Edgar Hernandez -
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants a) The sum of P40,200.00 as actual damages.
Edgar Calaycay Ranese and Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. to jointly and solidarity pay the
following: 4. The award of attorney's fees (P50,000.00) and cost of litigation (P4,470.00) remains.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. 1. To plaintiff Alberto Cruz, Sr. and his family - SO ORDERED.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a) the sum of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; Hence, the present petition wherein the petitioner assigned the following errors:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
b) the sum of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the decedent Alberto Cruz, Jr. and; I.

c) the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. THE PETITIONER'S BUS WAS NOT "OUT OF LINE;"
2. To plaintiff Virginia Muoz -
a) the sum of P16,744.00 as actual and compensatory damages; and II.

b) the sum of P150,000.00 as moral damages. THE FACT THAT THE JEEPNEY WAS BUMPED ON ITS LEFT REAR PORTION DOES NOT
3. To Edgar Hernandez - PREPONDERANTLY PROVE THAT THE DRIVER OF THE BUS WAS THE NEGLIGENT PARTY;
a) the sum of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
II. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and III.

III. The sum of P4,470.00 as cost of litigation THE DECEASED ALBERTO CRUZ, JR. WAS POSITIONED AT THE RUNNING BOARD OF THE
SO ORDERED. JEEPNEY;

Angeles City, Philippines, January 30, 2008.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary IV.

Petitioner filed its appeal with the CA, and on May 16, 2011, the appellate court rendered its
decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: THE BUS DRIVER WAS NOT SPEEDING OR NEGLIGENT WHEN HE FAILED TO STEER THE BUS TO
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary A COMPLETE STOP;
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the RTC,
Branch 61, Angeles City, dated January 30, 2008, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The V.
defendants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following:
THE PETITIONER EXERCISED EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN
1. To plaintiff Alberto Cruz, Sr. and family - ITS SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF DRIVER CALAYCAY; AND
a) the sum of P25,000.00 as actual damages;
VI.

10
THERE IS NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THE VARIOUS AWARDS OF MONETARY
DAMAGES.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
According to petitioner, contrary to the declaration of the RTC, the petitioner's passenger bus
was not "out-of-line" and that petitioner is actually the holder of a PUB (public utility bus)
franchise for provincial operation from Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila, meaning the
petitioner's passenger bus is allowed to traverse any point between Manila-Ilocos
Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Petitioner further asseverates that the fact that the driver of the
passenger bus took the Magalang Road instead of the Bamban Bridge is of no moment
because the bridge was under construction due to the effects of the lahar; hence closed to
traffic and the Magalang Road is still in between the points of petitioner's provincial
operation. Furthermore, petitioner claims that the jeepney was traversing a road way out of
its allowed route, thus, the presumption that respondent Edgar Hernandez was the negligent
party.
Petitioner further argues that respondent Edgar Hernandez failed to observe that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance that his role as a public utility called for when he allowed the
deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., to hang on to the rear portion of the jeepney.
After due consideration of the issues and arguments presented by petitioner, this Court finds
no merit to grant the petition.
Jurisprudence teaches us that "(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals x x x is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered
in the proceedings below.8 This rule, however, is not without exceptions."9 The findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals, which are, as a general rule, deemed conclusive, may admit of
review by this Court:10
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
The issues presented are all factual in nature and do not fall under any of the exceptions
upon which this Court may review. Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence
that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to
the Petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in
full agreement with what the trial court found.11
Nevertheless, a review of the issues presented in this petition would still lead to the finding
that petitioner is still liable for the damages awarded to the respondents but with certain
modifications.
The RTC and the CA are one in finding that both vehicles were not in their authorized routes
at the time of the incident. The conductor of petitioner's bus admitted on cross-examination
that the driver of the bus veered off from its usual route to avoid heavy traffic. The CA thus
observed:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First. As pointed out in the assailed Decision, both vehicles were not in their authorized
routes at the time of the mishap. FRANCISCO TEJADA, the conductor of defendant-
appellant's bus, admitted on cross-examination that the driver of the bus passed through
Magalang Road instead of Sta. Ines, which was the usual route, thus:
xxx
Q: What route did you take from Manila to Laoag, Ilocos Sur?
A: Instead of Sta. Ines, we took Magalang Road, sir.
Q: So that is not your usual route that you are taking?
A: No, sir, it so happened that there was heavy traffic at Bamban, Tarlac, that is why we
took the Magalang Road.
xxx
The foregoing testimony of defendant-appellant's own witness clearly belies the contention
that its driver took the Magalang Road instead of the Bamban Bridge because said bridge was
closed and under construction due to the effects of lahar. Regardless of the reason, however,
the irrefutable fact remains that defendant-appellant's bus likewise veered from its usual
route.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner now claims that the bus was not out of line when the vehicular accident happened
because the PUB (public utility bus) franchise that the petitioner holds is for provincial
operation from Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila, thus, the bus is allowed to traverse any
point between Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Such assertion is correct. "Veering away
11
from the usual route" is different from being "out of line." A public utility vehicle can and
may veer away from its usual route as long as it does not go beyond its allowed route in its
franchise, in this case, Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Therefore, the bus cannot be
considered to have violated the contents of its franchise. On the other hand, it is indisputable
that the jeepney was traversing a road out of its allowed route. Necessarily, this case is not
that of "in pari delicto" because only one party has violated a traffic regulation. As such, it
would seem that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code is applicable where it provides that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
The above provision, however, is merely a presumption. From the factual findings of both the
RTC and the CA based on the evidence presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the
negligence of the driver of petitioner's bus. The jeepney was bumped at the left rear portion.
Thus, this Court's past ruling,13 that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle
are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, can be
applied. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full
control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.14 Thus, as
found by the CA:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Second. The evidence on record preponderantly shows that it was the negligence of
defendant-appellant's driver, EDGAR CALAYCAY, that was the proximate cause of the
collision.
Even without considering the photographs (Exhibit "N", " " and "N-2") showing the damage
to the jeepney, it cannot be denied that the said vehicle was bumped in its left rear portion
by defendant-appellant's bus. The same was established by the unrebutted testimonies of
plaintiffs-appellees EDGAR HERNANDEZ and VIRGINIA MUOZ, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
EDGAR HERNANDEZ
xxx
Q: Now, according to you, you were not able to reach the town proper of Magalang because
your vehicle was bumped. In what portion of your vehicle was it bumped, Mr. Witness?
A: At the left side edge portion of the vehicle, sir.
Q: When it was bumped on the rear left side portion, what happened to your vehicle?
A: It was bumped strongly, sir, and then, "sinulpit ya", sir.
Q: When your vehicle was "sinulpit" and hit an acacia tree, what happened to the acacia
tree?
A: The jeepney stopped and Alberto Cruz died and some of my passengers were injured, sir.
xxx
VIRGINIA MUOZ
xxx
Q: what portion of the vehicle wherein you were boarded that was hit by the Travel Tours
Bus?
A: The rear portion of the jeep, sir.
Q: It was hit by the Travel Tours Bus?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to you when the vehicle was bumped?
A: I was thrown off the vehicle, sir.
xxx
It has been held that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are
presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." The
rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the
situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant failed to overturn the foregoing presumption.
FRANCISCO TEJADA, the conductor of the bus who was admittedly "seated in front, beside
the driver's seat," and thus had an unimpeded view of the road, declared on direct
examination that the jeepney was about 10 to 15 meters away from the bus when he first
saw said vehicle on the road. Clearly, the bus driver, EDGAR CALAYCAY, would have also been
aware of the presence of the jeepney and, thus, was expected to anticipate its movements.
However, on cross-examination, TEJADA claimed that the jeepney "suddenly appeared"
before the bus, passing it diagonally, and causing it to be hit in its left rear side. Such
uncorroborated testimony cannot be accorded credence by this Court because it is
inconsistent with the physical evidence of the actual damage to the jeepney. On this score,
We quote with approval the following disquisition of the trial court:
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x x x (F)rom the evidence presented, it was established that it was the driver of the RCJ Line
Bus which was negligent and recklessly driving the bus of the defendant corporation.
Francisco Tejada, who claimed to be the conductor of the bus, testified that it was the
passenger jeepney coming from the pavement which suddenly entered diagonally the lane of
the bus causing the bus to hit the rear left portion of the passenger jeepney. But such
testimony is belied by the photographs of the jeepney (Exhs. N and N-1). As shown by Exh. N-
1, the jeepney was hit at the rear left portion and not when the jeepney was in a diagonal
position to the bus otherwise, it should have been the left side of the passenger jeepney near
the rear portion that could have been bumped by the bus. It is clear from Exh. N-1 and it was
even admitted that the rear left portion of the passenger jeepney was bumped by the bus.
Further, if the jeepney was in diagonal position when it was hit by the bus, it should have
been the left side of the body of the jeepney that could have sustained markings of such
bumping. In this case, it is clear that it is the left rear portion of the jeepney that shows the
impact of the markings of the bumping. The jeepney showed that it had great damage on the
12
center of the front portion (Exh. N-2). It was the center of the front portion that hit the acacia
tree (Exh. N). As admitted by the parties, both vehicles were running along the same
direction from west to east. As testified to by Francisco Tejada, the jeepney was about ten
(10) to fifteen (15) meters away from the bus when he noticed the jeepney entering
diagonally the lane of the bus. If this was so, the middle left side portion of the jeepney could
have been hit, not the rear portion. The evidence is clear that the bus was in fast running
condition, otherwise, it could have stopped to evade hitting the jeepney. The hitting of the
acacia tree by the jeepney, and the damages caused on the jeepney in its front (Exh. N-2) and
on its rear left side show that the bus was running very fast.
xxxx
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the jeepney was in a "stop position," as claimed by
defendant-appellant, on the pavement of the road 10 to 15 meters ahead of the bus before
swerving to the left to merge into traffic, a cautious public utility driver should have stepped
on his brakes and slowed down. The distance of 10 to 15 meters would have allowed the bus
with slacked speed to give way to the jeepney until the latter could fully enter the lane.
Obviously, as correctly found by the court a quo, the bus was running very fast because even
if the driver stepped on the brakes, it still made contact with the jeepney with such force that
sent the latter vehicle crashing head-on against an acacia tree. In fact, FRANCISCO TEJADA
effectively admitted that the bus was very fast when he declared that the driver "could not
suddenly apply the break (sic) in full stop because our bus might turn turtle xxx." Incidentally,
the allegation in the appeal brief that the driver could not apply the brakes with force
because of the possibly that the bus might turn turtle "as they were approaching the end of
the gradient or the decline of the sloping terrain or topography of the roadway" was only
raised for the first time in this appeal and, thus, may not be considered. Besides, there is
nothing on record to substantiate the same.
Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations
in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving a vehicle, and evidence of the
extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed
of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. From the evidence presented in this case, it cannot
be denied that the bus was running very fast. As held by the Supreme Court, the very fact of
speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and
drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which
will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
From the above findings, it is apparent that the proximate cause of the accident is the
petitioner's bus and that the petitioner was not able to present evidence that would show
otherwise. Petitioner also raised the issue that the deceased passenger, Alberto Cruz, Jr. was
situated at the running board of the jeepney which is a violation of a traffic regulation and an
indication that the jeepney was overloaded with passengers. The CA correctly ruled that no
evidence was presented to show the same, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That the deceased passenger, ALBERTO CRUZ, JR., was clinging at the back of the jeepney at
the time of the mishap cannot be gleaned from the testimony of plaintifff-appellee VIRGINIA
MUOZ that it was she who was sitting on the left rearmost of the jeepney.
VIRGINIA MUOZ herself testified that there were only about 16 passengers on board the
jeepney when the subject incident happened. Considering the testimony of plaintiff-appellee
EDGAR HERNANDEZ that the seating capacity of his jeepney is 20 people, VIRGINIA'S
declaration effectively overturned defendant-appellant's defense that plaintiff-appellee
overloaded his jeepney and allowed the deceased passenger to cling to the outside railings.
Yet, curiously, the defense declined to cross-examine VIRGINIA, the best witness from whom
defendant-appellant could have extracted the truth about the exact location of ALBERTO
CRUZ, JR. in or out of the jeepney. Such failure is fatal to defendant-appellant's case. The only
other evidence left to support its claim is the testimony of the conductor, FRANCISCO
TEJADA, that there were 3 passengers who were clinging to the back of the jeepney, and it
was the passenger clinging to the left side that was bumped by the bus. However, in
answer to the clarificatory question from the court a quo, TEJADA admitted that he did not
really see what happened, thus:
Q: What happened to the passenger clinging to the left side portion?
A: He was bumped, your Honor.
Q: Why, the passenger fell?
A: I did not really see what happened, Mam [sic], what I know he was bumped.
This, despite his earlier declaration that he was seated in front of the bus beside the driver's
seat and knew what happened to the passengers who were clinging to the back of the
jeepney. Indubitably, therefore, TEJADA was not a credible witness, and his testimony is not
worthy of belief.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Consequently, the petitioner, being the owner of the bus and the employer of the driver,
Edgar Calaycay, cannot escape liability. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 which states the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible x x x.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry x x x.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a
negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused
by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there
was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a
clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape
13
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care.17 In this case, the petitioner failed to do
so. The RTC and the CA exhaustively and correctly ruled as to the matter, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Thus, whenever an employee's (defendant EDGAR ALAYCAY) negligence causes- damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer (defendant-
appellant) failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that
it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee. The failure of the defendant-appellant to overturn this
presumption was meticulously explained by the court a quo as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The position of the defendant company that it cannot be held jointly and severally liable for
such damages because it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, that (sic) does
not merit great credence.
As admitted, Edgar Calaycay was duly authorized by the defendant company to drive the bus
at the time of the incident. Its claim that it has issued policies, rules and regulation's to be
followed, conduct seminars and see to it that their drivers and employees imbibe such
policies, rules and regulations, have their drivers and conductors medically checked-up and
undergo drug-testing, did not show that all these rudiments were applied to Edgar Calaycay.
No iota of evidence was presented that Edgar Calaycay had undergone all these activities to
ensure that he is a safe and capable drivers [sic]. In fact, the defendant company did not put
up a defense on the said driver. The defendant company did not even secure a counsel to
defend the driver. It did not present any evidence to show it ever counseled such driver to be
careful in his driving. As appearing from the evidence of the defendant corporation, the
driver at the time of the incident was Calaycay Francisco (Exh. 9) and the conductor was
Tejada. This shows that the defendant corporation does not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employees. It does not even know
the correct and true name of its drivers. The testimony of Rolando Abadilla, Jr. that they do
not have the records of Edgar Calaycay because they ceased operation due to the death of
his father is not credible. Why only the records of Edgar Calaycay? It has the inspection and
dispatcher reports for January 9, 1998 and yet it could not find the records of Edgar Calaycay.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in a line of cases, the evidence must not only be
credible but must come from a credible witness. No proof was submitted that Edgar Calaycay
attended such alleged seminars and examinations. Thus, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helper
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry. The liability of the employer for the tortuous acts or negligence of
its employer [sic] is primary and solidary, direct and immediate, and not conditional upon the
insolvency of prior recourse against the negligent employee. The cash voucher for the alleged
lecture on traffic rules and regulations (Exh. 12) presented by the defendant corporation is
for seminar allegedly conducted on May 20 and 21, 1995 when Edgar Calaycay was not yet in
the employ of the defendant corporation. As testified to by Rolando Abadilla, Jr., Edgar
Calaycay stated his employment with the company only in 1996. Rolando Abadilla, Jr.
testified that copies of the manual (Exh. 8) are given to the drivers and conductors for them
to memorize and know the same, but no proof was presented that indeed Edgar Calaycay
was among the recipients. Nobody testified categorically that indeed Edgar Calaycay
underwent any of the training before being employed by the defendant company. All the
testimonies are generalizations as to the alleged policies, rules and regulations but no
concrete evidence was presented that indeed Edgar Calaycay underwent such familiarization,
trainings and seminars before he got employed and during that time that he was performing
his duties as a bus driver of the defendant corporation. Moreover, the driver's license of the
driver was not even presented. These omissions did not overcome the liability of the
defendant corporation under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. x x x
The observation of the court a quo that defendant-appellant failed to show proof that EDGAR
CALAYCAY did in fact undergo the seminars conducted by it assumes greater significance
when viewed in the light of the following admission made by ROLANDO ABADILLA, JR.,
General Manager of the defendant-appellant corporation, that suggest compulsory
attendance of said seminars only among drivers and conductors in Manila, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Q: How many times does (sic) the seminars being conducted by your company a year?
A: Normally, it is a minimum of two (2) seminars per year, sir.
Q: In these seminars that you conduct, are all drivers and conductors obliged to attend?
A: Yes, sir, if they are presently in Manila.
Q: It is only in Manila that you conduct seminars?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Moreover, with respect to the selection process, ROLANDO ABADILLA, JR. categorically
admitted in open court that EDGAR CALAYCAY was not able to produce the clearances
required by defendant-appellant upon employment, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, do you know this Edgar Calaycay who was once employed by
your company as a driver?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you seen the application of Edgar Calaycay?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: From what I have seen, what documents did he submit in applying as a driver in your
business?
Atty. De Guzman: Very leading, your Honor.
Q: Before a driver could be accepted, what document is he required to submit?
A: The company application form; NBI clearance; police clearance; barangay clearance;
14
mayor's clearance and other clearances, sir.
Q: Was he able to reproduce these clearances by Mr. Calaycay?
A: No, sir.
x x x18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service records. 19 On the other hand, due diligence in the
supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees, the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and
the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as
may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.20 In this case, as shown by the above findings of the RTC, petitioner was not able
to prove that it exercised the required diligence needed in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
Be that as it may, this doesn't erase the fact that at the time of the vehicular accident, the
jeepney was in violation of its allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the
owner and driver of the jeepney likewise, are guilty of negligence as defined under Article
2179 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for the damages caused to the
victims. The petitioner must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.21 It is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its driver.
The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case.22 The Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG &
P;23 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court24 and LBC Air Cargo,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals;25 and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals26 and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.27cralawred
In the present case, it has been established that the proximate cause of the death of Alberto
Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of petitioner's bus driver, with the contributory negligence of
respondent Edgar Hernandez, the driver and owner of the jeepney, hence, the heirs of
Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only 50% of the award from petitioner and its
driver. Necessarily, 50% shall be bourne by respondent Edgar Hernandez. This is pursuant
to Rakes v. AG & P and after considering the circumstances of this case.
In awarding damages for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., the CA ruled as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For the death of ALBERTO CRUZ, JR. the court a quo awarded his heirs P50,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages; P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and another
P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, as pointed out in the assailed Decision dated
January 30, 2008, only the amount paid (P25,000.00) for funeral services rendered by
Magalena Memorial Home was duly receipted (Exhibit "E-1"). It is settled that actual
damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove
expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim. As such, the award for actual
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 must be modified accordingly.
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the damages for death caused by a quasi-delict shall, in
addition to the indemnity for the death itself which is fixed by current jurisprudence at
P50,000.00 and which the court a quo failed to award in this case, include loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased and moral damages for mental anguish by reason of such death.
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of
gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased)
Evidence on record shows that the deceased was earning P6,000.00 a month as smoke house
operator at Pampanga's Best, Inc., as per Certification (Exhibit "K") issued by the company's
Production Manager, Enrico Ma. O. Hizon, on March 18, 1998, His gross income therefore
amounted to P72,000.00 [P6,000.00 x 12]. Deducting 50% therefrom (P36,000.00)
representing the living expenses, his net annual income amounted to P36,000.00. Multiplying
this by his life expectancy of 40.67 years [2/3(80-19)] having died at the young age of 19, the
award for loss of earning capacity should have been P1,464,000.00. Considering, however,
that his heirs represented by his father, ALBERTO CRUZ, SR., no longer appealed from the
assailed Decision dated January 30, 2008, and no discussion thereon was even attempted in
plaintiffs-appellees' appeal brief, the award for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
P250,000.00 stands.
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is adequate and reasonable, bearing in mind
that the purpose for making such award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to
compensate them however inexact for injuries to their feelings.
xxx28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In summary, the following were awarded to the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) P25,000.00 as actual damages;
2) P250,000.00 for the loss of earning;
3) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr.; and
4) P50,000.00 as moral damages
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in awarding an amount for the loss of earning capacity
of Alberto Cruz, Jr. It claims that the certification from the employer of the deceased stating
that when he was still alive - he earned P6,000.00 per month was not presented and
15
identified in open court. a) P12,500.00 as actual damages;

In that aspect, petitioner is correct. The records are bereft that such certification was b) P25,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., and
presented and identified during the trial. It bears stressing that compensation for lost income
is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of the damages suffered; there c) P25,000.00 as moral damages.
must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income.29 2. To respondent Virginia Muoz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Therefore, applying the above disquisitions, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall now be a) P8,372.00 as actual damages;
awarded the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary b) P15,000.00 as moral damages.
1) P12,500.00 as actual damages; 3. To respondent Edgar Hernandez:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2) P25,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., and a) P20,100.00 as actual damages, and
4. The sum of P2,235.00 as cost of litigation.
3) P25,000.00 as moral damages. Respondent Edgar Hernandez is also ORDERED to PAY the following:
In the same manner, petitioner is also partly responsible for the injuries sustained by chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
respondent Virginia Muoz hence, of the P16,744.00 actual damages and P30,000.00 moral 1. To respondent Alberto Cruz, Sr. and family:
damages awarded by the CA, petitioner is liable for half of those amounts. Anent respondent chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Edgar Hernandez, due to his contributory negligence, he is only entitled to receive half the a) P12,500.00 as actual damages;
amount (P40,200.00) awarded by the CA as actual damages which is P20,100.00.
b) P25,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., and
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the
exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party c) P25,000.00 as moral damages.
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to 2. To respondent Virginia Muoz:
litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable a) P8,372.00 as actual damages;
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the
latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for b) P15,000.00 as moral damages, and
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of 3. The sum of P2,235.00 as cost of litigation.
damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 220830 of the Civil Code. As SO ORDERED.
such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case
within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all
cases it must be reasonable.31 In this case, the RTC, in awarding attorney's fees, reasoned out G.R. No. 164749
that [w]hile there is no document submitted to prove that the plaintiffs spent attorney's fees,
it is clear that they paid their lawyer in the prosecution of this case for which they are entitled
ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR, Petitioners
to the same.32 Such reason is conjectural and does not justify the grant of the award, thus,
vs
the attorney's fees should be deleted. However, petitioner shall still have to settle half of the
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC., Respondents
cost of the suit.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated December 28, 2011, DECISION
of petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. is DENIED. However, the Decision dated May 16,
2011 of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED as follows: BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioner and Edgar Calaycay are ORDERED to jointly and severally PAY the following: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the
1. To respondent Alberto Cruz, Sr. and family: race. The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the
16
participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an
efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to
the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning
capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.
The Case
By this appeal, the parents of the late Rommel Abrogar (Rommel), a marathon runner, seek
the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on March l 0, 2004,1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered in their favor on May 10, 1991
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83, in Quezon City2finding and declaring
respondents Cosmos Bottling Company (Cosmos), a domestic soft-drinks company whose
products included Pop Cola, and Intergames, Inc. (Intergames), also a domestic corporation
organizing and supervising the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 in
Quezon City, solidarily liable for damages arising from the untimely death of Rommel, then a
minor 18 years of age,3 after being bumped by a recklessly driven passenger jeepney along
the route of the marathon.
Antecedents
The CA narrated the antecedents in the assailed judgment,4 viz.:
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized
an endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be
held on June 15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the
premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads and
streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the
defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and after complying with defendants'
requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an official number.
Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the
other participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the
plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and
precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their
undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and protect the participants of the marathon from
the vehicular and other dangers along the marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a
jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A
venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng
Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.
On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon City) to recover various damages for the untimely death of
Rommel (i.e., actual and compensatory damages, loss of earning capacity, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation).5
Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the organizer of the marathon, but only
its sponsor; that its participation had been limited to providing financial assistance to
Intergames;6 that the financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer
of the marathon, had been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help
promote sports development and physical fitness;7 that the petitioners had no cause of
action against it because there was no privity of contract between the participants in the
marathon and Cosmos; and that it had nothing to do with the organization, operation and
running of the event.8
As counterclaim, Cosmos sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation from the
petitioners for their being unwarrantedly included as a defendant in the case. It averred a
cross-claim against Intergames, stating that the latter had guaranteed to hold Cosmos
"completely free and harmless from any claim or action for liability for any injuries or bodily
harm which may be sustained by any of the entries in the '1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon' or
for any damage to the property or properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the
course of the race."9 Thus, Cosmos sought to hold Intergames solely liable should the claim of
the petitioners prosper.10
On its part, Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively
caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver; that it was not responsible for the accident;
that as the marathon organizer, it did not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the
safety of the participants; that it nevertheless caused the participants to be covered with
accident insurance, but the petitioners refused to accept the proceeds thereof;11 that there
could be no cause of action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's
application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights and causes
of action arising from his participation in the marathon;12 that it exercised due diligence in
the conduct of the race that the circumstances called for and was appropriate, it having
availed of all its know-how and expertise, including the adoption and implementation of all
known and possible safety and precautionary measures in order to protect the participants
from injuries arising from vehicular and other forms of accidents;13 and, accordingly, the
complaint should be dismissed.
In their reply and answer to counterclaim, the petitioners averred that contrary to its claims,
Intergames did not provide adequate measures for the safety and protection of the race
participants, considering that motor vehicles were traversing the race route and the
participants were made to run along the flow of traffic, instead of against it; that Intergames
did not provide adequate traffic marshals to secure the safety and protection of the
participants;14that Intergames could not limit its liability on the basis of the accident
insurance policies it had secured to cover the race participants; that the waiver signed by
Rommel could not be a basis for denying liability because the same was null and void for
being contrary to law, morals, customs and public policy;15 that their complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action because in no way could they be held liable for attorney's fees,
litigation expenses or any other relief due to their having abided by the law and having acted
honestly, fairly, in good faith by according to Intergames its due, as demanded by the facts
and circumstances.16
17
At the pre-trial held on April 12, 1981, the parties agreed that the principal issue was
whether or not Cosmos and lntergames were liable for the death of Rommel because of
negligence in conducting the marathon.17
Judgment of the RTC
In its decision dated May 10, 1991,18 the RTC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and
Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc.,
ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the
amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (28,061.63) as
actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total
amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos
(178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(17,806.16) as attorney's fees.
On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames, Inc,
is hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may be recovered
by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as
called for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened
because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence;19 that
the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be
effective for risks inherent in the marathon, such a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack
during the race, severe exhaustion and similar occurrences;20 that the liability of the
respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the
sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived
benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants
and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been
an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third persons; and that Cosmos
had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the petitioners
from Cosmos.21
Decision of the CA
All the parties appealed to the CA.
The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding damages for loss of earning
capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due
to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to award
such damages upon the assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed.22
On their part, Cosmos and Intergames separately raised essentially similar errors on the part
of the RTC, to wit: (1) in holding them liable for the death of Rommel; (2) in finding them
negligent in conducting the marathon; (3) in holding that Rommel and his parents did not
assume the risks of the marathon; (4) in not holding that the sole and proximate cause of the
death of Rommel was the negligence of the jeepney driver; and (5) in making them liable,
jointly and solidarily, for damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.23
The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames was negligent in its conduct of the "1st Pop Cola
Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate
cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarily liable with appellant
Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to
have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of
earning capacity" of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary
damages granted to them by the Trial Court.24
In its assailed judgment promulgated on March 10, 2004,25 the CA ruled as follows:
As to the first issue, this Court finds that appellant Intergames was not negligent in organizing
the said marathon.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct to human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The whole theory of negligence presuppose some uniform standard of behavior which must
be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment good or bad, of the
particular actor; it must be, as far as possible, the same for all persons; and at the same time
make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor for his capacity to meet it, and for
the circumstances under which he must act.
18
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and of the acts
involved in the particular case.
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant Intergames failed to
satisfy the requirements of due diligence in the conduct of the race.
The trial court in its decision said that the accident in question could have been avoided if the
route of the marathon was blocked off from the regular traffic, instead of allowing the
runners to run together with the flow of traffic. Thus, the said court considered the appellant
Intergames at fault for proceeding with the marathon despite the fact that the Northern
Police District, MPF, Quezon City did not allow the road to be blocked off from traffic.
This Court finds that the standard of conduct used by the trial court is not the ordinary
conduct of a prudent man in such a given situation. According to the said court, the only way
to conduct a safe road race is to block off the traffic for the duration of the event and direct
the cars and public utilities to take alternative routes in the meantime that the marathon
event is being held. Such standard is too high and is even inapplicable in the case at bar
because, there is no alternative route from IBP to Don Mariano Marcos to Quezon City Hall.
The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance of an obligation that which is expected of a good father of the
family shall only be required. Accordingly, appellant Intergames is only bound to exercise the
degree of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent man in the same
position and circumstances and not that of the cautious man of more than average prudence.
Hence, appellant Intergames is only expected to observe ordinary diligence and not
extraordinary diligence.
In this case, the marathon was allowed by the Northern Police District, MPF, Quezon City on
the condition that the road should not be blocked off from traffic. Appellant Intergames had
no choice. It had to comply with it or else the said marathon would not be allowed at all.
The trial court erred in contending that appellant Intergames should have looked for
alternative places in Metro Manila given the condition set by the Northern Police District,
MPF, Quezon City; precisely because as Mr. Jose Castro has testified the said route was found
to be the best route after a careful study and consideration of all the factors involved. Having
conducted several marathon events in said route, appellant Intergames as well as the
volunteer groups and the other agencies involved were in fact familiar with the said route.
And assuming that there was an alternative place suitable for the said race, the question is
would they be allowed to block off the said road from traffic?
Also, the trial court erred in stating that there was no adequate number of marshals, police
officers and personnel to man the race so as to prevent injury to the participants.
The general rule is that the party who relies on negligence for his cause of action has the
burden of proving the existence of the same, otherwise his action fails.
Here, the appellants-spouses failed to prove that there was inadequate number of marshals,
police officers, and personnel because they failed to prove what number is considered
adequate.
This court considers that seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5) motorcycle policemen, fifteen
(15) patrolmen deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boyscouts, twelve (12) CA Ts, twenty
(20) barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3) medical teams were sufficient to
stage a safe marathon.
Moreover, the failure of Mr. Jose R. Castro, Jr. to produce records of the lists of those
constituting the volunteer help during the marathon is not fatal to the case considering that
one of the volunteers, Victor Landingin of the Citizens Traffic Action (CTA) testified in court
that CTA fielded five units on June 15, 1980, assigned as follows: (1) at the sphere head; (2) at
the finish line; (3) tail ender; (4) & (5) roving.
The trial court again erred in concluding that the admission of P/Lt. Jesus Lipana, head of the
traffic policemen assigned at the marathon, that he showed up only at the finish line means
that he did not bother to check on his men and did not give them appropriate instructions.
P/Lt. Lipana in his testimony explained that he did not need to be in the start of the race
because he had predesignated another capable police officer to start the race.
In addition, this Court finds that the precautionary measures and preparations adopted by
appellant Intergames were sufficient considering the circumstances surrounding the case.
Appellant Intergames, using its previous experiences in conducting safe and successful road
races, took all the necessary precautions and made all the preparations for the race. The
initial preparations included: determination of the route to be taken; and an ocular
inspection of the same to see if it was well-paved, whether it had less corners for easy
communication and coordination, and whether it was wide enough to accommodate runners
and transportation. Appellant Intergames choose the Don Mariano Marcos Avenue primarily
because it was well-paved; had wide lanes to accommodate runners and vehicular traffic;
had less corners thus facilitating easy communication and coordination among the organizers
and cooperating agencies; and was familiar to the race organizers and operating agencies.
The race covered a ten-kilometer course from the IBP lane to the Quezon City Hall
Compound passing through the Don Mariano Marcos A venue, which constituted the main
stretch of the route. Appellant Intergames scheduled the marathon on a Sunday morning,
when traffic along the route was at its lightest. Permission was sought from the then Quezon
City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez for the use of the Quezon City Hall Grandstand and the street
fronting it as the finish line. Police assistance was also obtained to control and supervise the
traffic. The Quezon City Traffic Detachment took charge of traffic control by assigning
policemen to the traffic route. The particular unit assigned during the race underwent
extensive training and had been involved in past marathons, including marathons in highly
crowded areas. The Philippine Boy Scouts tasked to assist the police and monitor the
19
progress of the race; and Citizens Traffic Action Group tasked with the monitoring of the
race, which assigned five units consisting of ten operatives, to provide communication and
assistance were likewise obtained. Finally, medical equipments and personnel were also
requested from Camp Aguinaldo, the Philippine Red Cross and the Hospital ng Bagong
Lipunan.
Neither does this Court find the appellant Intergames' conduct of the marathon the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar. Proximate cause has been defined as that
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
It appears that Rommel Abrogar, while running on Don Mariano Marcos A venue and after
passing the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, was bumped by a jeepney which
apparently was racing against a minibus and the two vehicles were trying to crowd each
other. In fact, a criminal case was filed against the jeepney driver by reason of his having
killed Rommel Abrogar.
This proves that the death of Rommel Abrogar was caused by the negligence of the jeepney
driver. Rommel Abrogar cannot be faulted because he was performing a legal act; the
marathon was conducted with the permission and approval of all the city officials involved.
He had the right to be there. Neither can the appellant Intergames be faulted, as the
organizer of the said marathon, because it was not negligent in conducting the marathon.
Given the facts of this case, We believe that no amount of precaution can prevent such an
accident. Even if there were fences or barriers to separate the lanes for the runners and for
the vehicles, it would not prevent such an accident in the event that a negligent driver loses
control of his vehicle. And even if the road was blocked off from traffic, it would still not
prevent such an accident, if a jeepney driver on the other side of the road races with another
vehicle loses control of his wheel and as a result hits a person on the other side of the road.
Another way of saying this is: A defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of
plaintiffs damage if that damage would have occurred just the same even though the
defendant's tort had not been committed.
This Court also finds the doctrine of assumption of risk applicable in the case at bar. As
explained by a well-known authority on torts:
"The general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is that a plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm. The defense may arise where a plaintiff, by contract
or otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a risk or harm arising from the defendant's conduct,
or where a plaintiff who fully understands a risk or harm caused by the defendant's conduct,
or by a condition created by the defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to
permit his property to enter or remain, within the area of such risk, under circumstances
manifesting his willingness to accept the risk.
xxxx
"Assumption of the risk in its primary sense arises by assuming through contract, which may
be implied, the risk of a known danger. Its essence is venturousness. It implies intentional
exposure to a known danger; It embraces a mental state of willingness; It pertains to the
preliminary conduct of getting into a dangerous employment or relationship, it means
voluntary incurring the risk of an accident, which may or may not occur, and which the
person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid; and it defeats recovery because it is a
previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.
"Of course, if the defense is predicated upon an express agreement the agreement must be
valid, and in the light of this qualification the rule has been stated that a plaintiff who, by
contract or otherwise, expressly agreed to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's
negligent or reckless conduct, cannot recover for such harm unless the agreement is invalid
as contrary to public policy.
xxxx
"The defense of assumption of risk presupposes: (1) that the plaintiff had actual knowledge
of the danger; (2) that he understood and appreciated the risk from the danger; and (3) that
he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk. x x x
"The term 'risk' as used in this connection applies to known dangers, and not to things from
which danger may possibly flow. The risk referred to is the particular risk, or one of the risks,
which the plaintiff accepted within the context of the situation in which he placed himself
and the question is whether the specific conduct or condition which caused the injury was
such a risk."
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar,
surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before the race.
Consequently, he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that
the said road would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was already
eighteen years of age, had voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents'
consent, and was well aware of the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all
the risks of the race. This is precisely why permission from the participant's parents,
submission of a medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and causes of action arising from
the participation in the marathon which the participant or his heirs may have against
appellant Intergames were required as conditions in joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the waiver signed by
Rommel Abrogar only involved risks such as stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and
other similar risks. It did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the
said waiver.
20
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and
obvious condition of the place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included
vehicular accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by
vehicles. Thus, it cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track
race which is held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is
always the risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train or compete. That risk is
inherent in the sport and known to runners. It is a risk they assume every time they
voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or contest, he assumes
the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the promoter or
operator of the game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not insurers of safety of the
public nor of their patrons.
In McLeod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was held that a boy, seventeen
years of age, of ordinary intelligence and physique, who entered a race conducted by a
department store, the purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in
for cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and was barred from
recovering against the department store for injuries suffered when, within catching distance,
he stopped to catch a guinea, and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or
eight others falling upon him. The court further said: "In this (the race) he was a voluntary
participant. xxx The anticipated danger was as obvious to him as it was to appellant (the
department store). While not an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary
intelligence, and perfectly able to determine the risks ordinarily incident to such games. An
ordinary boy of that age is practically as well advised as to the hazards of baseball, basketball,
football, foot races and other games of skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 was a race the
winner of which was to represent the country in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon
Classic in Greece, if he equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 10-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his parents' consent,
assumed all the risks of the race.
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that appellant Cosmos must also be absolved from
any liability in the instant case.
This Court finds that the trial court erred in holding appellant Cosmos liable for being the
principal mover and resultant beneficiary of the event.
In its decision it said that in view of the fact that appellant Cosmos will be deriving certain
benefits from the marathon event, it has the responsibility to ensure the safety of all the
participants and the public. It further said that the stipulations in the contract entered into by
the two appellants, Cosmos and Intergames, relieving the former from any liability does not
bind third persons.
This Court does not agree with the reasoning of the trial court. The sponsorship contract
entered between appellant Cosmos and appellant Intergames specifically states that:
1. COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION shall pay INTERGAMES the amount of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (55,000.00) representing full sponsorship fee and in consideration
thereof, INTERGAMES shall organize and stage a marathon race to be called '1st POP COLA
JUNIOR MARATHON.
xxxx
3. INTER GAMES shall draw up all the rules of the marathon race, eligibility requirements of
participants as well as provide all the staff required in the organization and actual staging of
the race. It is understood that all said staff shall be considered under the direct employ of
INTERGAMES which shall have full control over them.
xxxx
5. INTERGAMES shall secure all the necessary permits, clearances, traffic and police
assistance in all the areas covered by the entire route of the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR
MARATHON.
12. INTERGAMES shall hold COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION, completely free and
harmless from any claim or action for liability for any injuries or bodily harm which may be
sustained by any of the entries in the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR MARATHON', or for any
damages to the property or properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the course
of the race.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to
providing financial assistance in the form of sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was
merely in pursuance to the company's commitment for spo1is development of the youth as
well as for advertising purposes. The use of the name Cosmos was done for advertising
purposes only; it did not mean that it was an organizer of the said marathon. As pointed out
by Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not even have the right to
suggest the location and the number of runners.
To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is the proximate cause
of the harm done to the plaintiff. The nexus or connection of the cause and effect, between a
negligent act and the damage done, must be established by competent evidence.
21
In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the
appellant Intergames considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has
conducted at least thirty (30) road races.
Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship
and the death of Rommel Abrogar. The singular act of providing financial assistance without
participating in any manner in the conduct of the marathon cannot be palmed off as such
proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never relied on any representation that
Cosmos organized the race. It was not even a factor considered by the appellants-spouses in
allowing their son to join said marathon.
In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar,
appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the
"loss of earning capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and
academic.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be, as it
hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo.
The appellants shall bear their respective costs.
SO ORDERED.26
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that the CA gravely erred:
A.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that respondent Intergames was not
negligent considering that:
1. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and
2. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal during
the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its
participants.
B.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk
finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an
inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such
waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being
against public policy.
C.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in absolving respondent Cosmos from liability to
petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent
Intergames contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.
D.
x x x m reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding respondents free from liability,
(and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary damages for the death of
their child, Rommel Abrogar.27
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I
Review of factual issues is allowed because of
the conflict between the findings of fact
by the RTC and the CA on the issue of negligence
The petitioners contend that Intergames was negligent; that Cosmos as the sponsor and
Intergames as the organizer of the marathon both had the obligation to provide a reasonably
safe place for the conduct of the race byblocking the route of the race from vehicular traffic
and by providing adequate manpower and personnel to ensure the safety of the participants;
and that Intergames had foreseen the harm posed by the situation but had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the risk;28 hence, for such omission, Intergames
was negligent.29
Refuting, Cosmos and Intergames submit that the latter as the organizer was not negligent
because it had undertaken all the precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the race;
and that there was no duty on the part of the latter as the organizer to keep a racecourse
"free and clear from reasonably avoidable elements that would [occasion] or have the
probable tendency, to occasion injury."30
The issue of whether one or both defendants were negligent is a mixed issue of fact and law.
Does this not restrict the Court against reviewing the records in this appeal on certiorari in
order to settle the issue?
22
The Court can proceed to review the factual findings of the CA as an exception to the general
rule that it should not review issues of fact on appeal on certiorari. We have recognized
exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 31 Considering that
the CA arrived at factual findings contrary to those of the trial court, our review of the
records in this appeal should have to be made.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.32 Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the
"omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."33 The Civil Code makes
liability for negligence clear under Article 2176,34 and Article 20.35
To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-honored test has been set
in Picart v. Smith:36
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences.37 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant
witnesses, in accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion
that the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the
diligence demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration.
Hence, Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence.
The race organized by Intergames was a junior marathon participated in by young persons
aged 14 to 18 years. It was plotted to cover a distance of 10 kilometers, starting from the IBP
Lane,38 then going towards the Batasang Pambansa, and on to the circular route towards the
Don Mariano Marcos Highway,39 and then all the way back to the Quezon City Hall
compound where the finish line had been set.40 In staging the event, Intergames had no
employees of its own to man the race,41 and relied only on the "cooperating agencies" and
volunteers who had worked with it in previous races.42 The cooperating agencies included
the Quezon City police, barangay tanods, volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
the Philippine National Red Cross, the Citizens Traffic Action Group, and the medical teams of
doctors and nurses coming from the Office of the Surgeon General and the Ospital ng Bagong
Lipunan.43 According to Jose R. Castro, Jr., the President of Intergames, the preparations for
the event included conducting an ocular inspection of the route of the race,44 sending out
letters to the various cooperating agencies,45 securing permits from proper
authorities,46 putting up directional signs,47 and setting up the water stations.48
We consider the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet
the requirement of due diligence.
For one, the police authorities specifically prohibited Intergames from blocking Don Mariano
Marcos Highway in order not to impair road accessibility to the residential villages located
beyond the IBP Lanc.49
However, contrary to the findings of the CA,50 Intergames had a choice on where to stage the
marathon, considering its admission of the sole responsibility for the conduct of the event,
including the choice of location.
Moreover, the CA had no basis for holding that "the said route was found to be the best
route after a careful study and consideration of all the factors involved."51 Castro, Jr. himself
attested that the route had been the best one only within the vicinity of the Batasan
Pambansa, to wit:
23
COURT ATTY. VINLUAN

q Was there any specific reason from ... Was there any specific reason why you used this q Following the observation of the Court, considering the local condition, you will agree with
route from Batasan to City Hall? Was there any special reason? me the risks here are greater than in the United States where drivers on the whole follow
traffic rules?
a We have, your Honor, conducted for example the Milo Marathon in that area in the
Batasan Pambansa and we found it to be relatively safer than any other areas within the a That is correct.
vicinity. As a matter of fact, we had more runners in the Milo Marathon at that time and
nothing happened, your Honor.52 q And because of that fact, it is with all the more reason that you should take all necessary
precautions to insure the safety of the runners?
The chosen route (IBP Lane, on to Don Mariano Marcos Highway, and then to Quezon City
Hall) was not the only route appropriate for the marathon. In fact, Intergames came under no a That is correct.54
obligation to use such route especially considering that the participants, who were young and
inexperienced runners, would be running alongside moving vehicles.
xxxx

Intergames further conceded that the marathon could have been staged on a blocked-off
COURT:
route like Roxas Boulevard in Manila where runners could run against the flow of vehicular
traffic.53 Castro, Jr. stated in that regard:
xxxx
COURT TO WITNESS
Q In your case in all the marathons that you had managed, how many cases have you
encountered where the routes are blocked off for vehicular traffic?
q What law are you talking about when you say I cannot violate the law?

A These are the International Marathon, Philippines Third World Marathon and the Milo
a The police authority, your Honor, would not grant us permit because that is one of the
Marathon. We are blocking them to a certain length of time.
conditions that if we are to conduct a race we should run the race in accordance with the
flow of traffic.
Q What was the purpose of blocking the routes? Is it for the safety of the runners or just a
matter of convenience?
q Did you not inform the police this is in accordance with the standard safety measures for a
marathon race?
A In blocking off the route, Your Honor, it is light easier for the runners to run without
impediments to be rendered by the people or by vehicles and at the same time it would be
a I believed we argued along that line but but (sic) again, if we insist the police again would
also advantageous if the road will be blocked off for vehicle traffic permitted to us by the
not grant us any permit like ... except in the case of Roxas Boulevard when it is normally
traffic authorities.
closed from 8 a.m. when you can run against the flow of traffic.

Q So, in this case, you actually requested for the traffic authorities to block off the route?
q You were aware for a runner to run on the same route of the traffic would be risky because
he would not know what is coming behind him?
A As far as I remember we asked Sgt. Pascual to block off the route but considering that it is
the main artery to Fairview Village, it would not be possible to block off the route since it will
a I believed we talked of the risk, your Honor when the risk has been minimized to a certain
cause a lot of inconvenience for the other people in those areas and jeepney drivers.
level. Yes, there is greater risk when you run with the traffic than when you run against the
traffic to a certain level, it is correct but most of the races in Manila or elsewhere are being
run in accordance with the flow of the traffic. Q In other words, if you have your way you would have opted to block off the route.

xxxx A Yes, Your Honor.

24
Q But the fact is that the people did not agree.
A Yes, Your Honor, and it is stated in the permit given to us. 55
Based on the foregoing testimony of Castro, Jr., Intergames had full awareness of the higher
risks involved in staging the race alongside running vehicles, and had the option to hold the
race in a route where such risks could be minimized, if not eliminated. But it did not heed the
danger already foreseen, if not expected, and went ahead with staging the race along the
plotted route on Don Mariano Marcos Highway on the basis of its supposedly familiarity with
the route. Such familiarity of the organizer with the route and the fact that previous races
had been conducted therein without any untoward incident56 were not in themselves
sufficient safeguards. The standards for avoidance of injury through negligence further
required Intergames to establish that it did take adequate measures to avert the foreseen
danger, but it failed to do so.
Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy of the personnel to man
the route. As borne by the records, Intergames had no personnel of its own for that purpose,
and relied exclusively on the assistance of volunteers, that is, "seven (7) traffic operatives,
five (5) motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen deployed along the route, fifteen (15)
boy scouts, twelve (12) CATs, twenty (20) barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three
(3) medical teams"57 to ensure the safety of the young runners who would be running
alongside moving vehicular traffic, to make the event safe and well coordinated.
Although the party relying on negligence as his cause of action had the burden of proving the
existence of the same, Intergames' coordination and supervision of the personnel sourced
from the cooperating agencies did not satisfy the diligence required by the relevant
circumstances. In this regard, it can be pointed out that the number of deployed personnel,
albeit sufficient to stage the marathon, did not per se ensure the safe conduct of the race
without proof that such deployed volunteers had been properly coordinated and instructed
on their tasks.
That the proper coordination and instruction were crucial elements for the safe conduct of
the race was well known to Intergames. Castro, Jr. stated as much, to wit:
ATTY. LOMBOS:
xxxx
Q You also said that if you block off one side of the road, it is possible that it would be more
convenient to hold the race in that matter. Will you tell the Honorable Court if it is possible
also to hold a race safely if the road is not blocked off?
A Yes, sir.
Q How is it done.
A You can still run a race safely even if it is partially blocked off as long as you have the
necessary cooperation with the police authorities, and the police assigned along the route of
the race and the police assigned would be there, this will contribute the safety of the
participants, and also the vehicular division, as long as there are substantial publicities in the
newspapers, normally they will take the precautions in the use of the particular route of the
race.
Q Let me clarify this. Did you say that it is possible to hold a marathon safely if you have this
traffic assistance or coordination even if the route is blocked or not blocked?
A It is preferable to have the route blocked but in some cases, it would be impossible for the
portions of the road to be blocked totally. The route of the race could still be safe for runners
if a proper coordination or the agencies are notified especially police detailees to man the
particular stage.58
Sadly, Intergames' own evidence did not establish the conduct of proper coordination and
instruction. Castro, Jr. described the action plan adopted by Intergames in the preparation
for the race, as follows:
COURT
a Did you have any rehearsal let us say the race was conducted on June 15, now before June
15 you call a meeting of all these runners so you can have more or less a map-up and you
would indicate or who will be stationed in their places etc. Did you have such a rehearsal?
WITNESS
a It is not being done, your honor, but you have to specify them. You meet with the group
and you tell them that you wanted them to be placed in their particular areas which we
pointed out to them for example in the case of the Barangay Tanod, I specifically assigned
them in the areas and we sat down and we met.
COURT
q Did you have any action, plan or brochure which would indicate the assignment of each of
the participating group?
WITNESS
a Normally, sir, many of the races don't have that except when they called them to meeting
either as a whole group or the entire cooperating agency or meet them per group.
COURT
25
q Did you have a check list of the activities that would have to be entered before the actual a The Citizens Traffic Action Group, your honor, had been with me m previous races.
marathon some kind of system where you will indicate this particular activity has to be
checked etc. You did not have that? COURT

WITNESS q I am asking you a specific question. I am not interested in the Citizen Traffic Action Group.
The marathon was on June 15, did you meet with him on June 14, June 13 or June 12?
q Are you asking, your honor, as a race director of I will check this because if I do that, I won't
have a race because that is not being done by any race director anywhere in the world? a We met once, your honor, I cannot remember the date.

COURT q You don't recall how many days before?

I am interested in your planning activities. a I cannot recall at the moment.

q In other words, what planning activities did you perform before the actual marathon? q How about with Mr. Serrano, how many times did you meet with him before the race?

a The planning activities we had, your honor, was to coordinate with the different agencies a If my mind does not fail me, your honor, I met him twice because he lives just within our
involved informing them where they would be more or less placed. area and we always see each other.

COURT q How about with Panelo, how many times did you meet him?

q Let us go to ... Who was supposed to be coordinating with you as to the citizens action
group who was your ... you were referring to a person who was supposed to be manning
these people and who was the person whom you coordinate with the Traffic Action Group?
WITNESS
a With Mr. Panelo, I did not meet with them, your honor.
q Was there an occasion where before the race you met with these three people together
since you did not meet with Panelo anytime? Was there anytime where you met with
Serrano and Esguerra together?

a I can only remember his name ... his family name is Esguerra. WITNESS

q How about with the Tanods? a No, your honor.

a With the Tanods his name is Pedring Serrano. COURT

q And with the Boys Scouts? (sic) g When you met once with Esguerra, where did you meet? What place?

a And with the Boys Scouts of the Phils. (sic) it is Mr. Greg Panelo. a I cannot recall at the moment, your honor, since it was already been almost six years ago.

COURT g How about Serrano, where did you meet him?

q When did you last meet rather how many times did you meet with Esguerra before the a We met in my place.
marathon on June 15?
q From your house? He went in your house?
WITNESS

26
a Yes, your honor. q You did not meet with him?

q So you did not have let us say a ... you don't have records of your meetings with these a I did not meet with him.
people?
q In fact, ever before or during the race you had no occasion to talk to Lt. Depano. Is that
WITNESS correct?

a With the Citizens Traffic Action, your honor? a That is correct, sir.

COURT ATTY. VINLUAN

a Yes. Based on the question of the Court and your answer to the question of the Court, are you
trying to say that this planning before any race of all these groups who have committed to
WITNESS help in the race, this is not done in any part of the world?

a I don't have, your honor. WITNESS

COURT a In the latter years when your race became bigger and bigger, this is being done now slowly.

q Because you are familiar, I was just thinking this is an activity which requires planning etc.,
what I was thinking when you said this was never done in any part of the world but all
activities it has to be planned. There must be some planning, now are you saying that in this
particular case you had no written plan or check list of activities what activities have to be
implemented on a certain point and time, who are the persons whom you must meet in a
certain point and time.
WITNESS
a Normally, we did not have that, your honor, except the check list of all the things that
should be ready at a particular time prior to the race and the people to be involved and we
have a check list to see to it that everything would be in order before the start of the race.
ATTY. VINLUAN
q But for this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it when you have to
coordinate and even have a dry run of the race you failed to do all of that in this particular
race, yes or no?
a Because there was ...
COURT
It was already answered by him when I asked him. The Court has ... Everybody has a copy
how of this time planner. Any activity or even meeting a girlfriend or most people plan.

COURT A TTY. F .M. LOMBOS

Proceed. If your honor please, before we proceed ...

ATTY. VINLUAN WITNESS

q Following the question of the Court Mr. Castro, did you meet with Lt. Depano of the Police In the latter years, your honor, when your race became bigger and bigger, this is being done
Department who were supposed to supervise the police officers assigned to help during the now slowly.
race?
q For this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it?
a I did not meet with him, sir.
27
a Because there was no need, sir.59
Probably sensing that he might have thereby contradicted himself, Castro, Jr. clarified on re-
direct examination:
ATTY. LOMBOS
Q Now, you also responded to a question during the same hearing and this appears on page
26 of the transcript that you did not hold any rehearsal or dry run for this particular
marathon. Could you tell the Court why you did not hold any such rehearsal or dry run?
A Because I believe there was no need for us to do that since we have been doing this for
many years and we have been the same people, same organization with us for so many years
conducting several races including some races in that area consisting of longer distances and
consisting of more runners, a lot more runners in that areay (sic) so these people, they know
exactly what to do and there was no need for us to have a rehearsal. I believe this rehearsal
would only be applicable if I am new and these people are new then, we have to rehearse.
ATTY. LOMBOS
q You also stated Mr. Castro that you did not have any action plan or brochure which you
would indicate, an assignment of each of the participating group as to what to do during the
race. Will you please explain what you meant when you said you have no action plan or
brochure?
WITNESS
a What I mean of action plan, I did not have any written action plan but I was fully aware of
what to do. I mean, those people did not just go there out of nowhere. Obviously, there was
an action on my part because I have to communicate with them previously and to tell them
exactly what the race is all about; where to start; where it would end, and that is the reason
why we have the ambulances, we have the Boy Scouts, we have the CT A, we have the police,
so it was very obvious that there was a plan of action but not written because I know pretty
well exactly what to do. I was dealing with people who have been doing this for a long period
of time.60
While the level of trust Intergames had on its volunteers was admirable, the coordination
among the cooperating agencies was predicated on circumstances unilaterally assumed by
Intergames. It was obvious that Intergames' inaction had been impelled by its belief that it
did not need any action plan because it had been dealing with people who had been manning
similar races for a long period of time.
The evidence presented undoubtedly established that Intergames' notion of coordination
only involved informing the cooperating agencies of the date of the race, the starting and
ending points of the route, and the places along the route to man. Intergames did not
conduct any general assembly with all of them, being content with holding a few sporadic
meetings with the leaders of the coordinating agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the
actual duties to be performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not
instruct the volunteers on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in manning the
race, despite such being precisely why their assistance had been obtained in the first place.
Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers had already been aware of what
exactly they would be doing during the race. It had the responsibility and duty to give to
them the proper instructions despite their experience from the past races it had organized
considering that the particular race related to runners of a different level of experience, and
involved different weather and environmental conditions, and traffic situations. It should
have remembered that the personnel manning the race were not its own employees paid to
perform their tasks, but volunteers whose nature of work was remotely associated with the
safe conduct of road races. Verily, that the volunteers showed up and assumed their proper
places or that they were sufficient in number was not really enough. It is worthy to stress
that proper coordination in the context of the event did not consist in the mere presence of
the volunteers, but included making sure that they had been properly instructed on their
duties and tasks in order to ensure the safety of the young runners.
It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly
minors aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The combined factors
of their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent organizer
on higher guard as to their safety and security needs during the race, especially considering
Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as
of similar events in the past organizer. There was no question at all that a higher degree of
diligence was required given that practically all of the participants were children or minors
like Rommel; and that the law imposes a duty of care towards children and minors even if
ordinarily there was no such duty under the same circumstances had the persons involved
been adults of sufficient discretion.61 In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree
of care necessary as the organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has
emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Company,62 where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances. 63
The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what Intergames
undertook in staging the race. Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent
organizer of the race participated in by young, inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct
the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for the safety and security not
only of the participants but the motoring public as well. Since the marathon would be run
alongside moving vehicular traffic, at the very least, Intergames ought to have seen to the
constant and closer coordination among the personnel manning the route to prevent the
foreseen risks from befalling the participants. But this it sadly failed to do.
II
28
 The negligence of Intergames as the organizer
was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
As earlier mentioned, the CA found that Rommel, while running the marathon on Don
Mariano Marcos A venue and after passing the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission
Building, was bumped by a passenger jeepney that was racing with a minibus and two other
vehicles as if trying to crowd each other out. As such, the death of Rommel was caused by
the negligence of the jeepney driver.
Intergames staunchly insists that it was not liable, maintaining that even
assuming arguendo that it was negligent, the negligence of the jeepney driver was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel; hence, it should not be held liable.
Did the negligence of Intergames give rise to its liability for the death of ommel
notwithstanding the negligence of the jeepney driver?
In order for liability from negligence to arise, there must be not only proof of damage and
negligence, but also proof that the damage was the consequence of the negligence. The
Court has said in Vda. de Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing:64
x x x Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and in American cases was
carefully considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage." (Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 15.)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a person may be
held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on
the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by
the said act or omission.65 (Emphasis supplied)
We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite the intervening
negligence of the jeepney driver.
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred."66 In Vda.
de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina,67 the Court, borrowing from American Jurisprudence, has more
extensively defined proximate cause thusly:
"* * * 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom."68
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event
closest in time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to
the injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately
in the damage.69 According to an authority on civil law:70"A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and
efficient cause, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no damage exists in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause."
Bouvier adds:
In many cases important questions arise as to which, in the chain of acts tending to the
production of a given state of things, is to be considered the responsible cause. It is not
merely distance of place or of causation that renders a cause remote. The cause nearest in
the order of causation, without any efficient concurring cause to produce the result, may be
considered the direct cause. In the course of decisions of cases in which it is necessary to
determine which of several causes is so far responsible for the happening of the act or injury
complained of, what is known as the doctrine of proximate cause is constantly resorted to in
order to ascertain whether the act, omission, or negligence of the person whom it is sought
to hold liable was in law and in fact responsible for the result which is the foundation of the
action.71
xxxx
The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the existence or non-
existence of intervening events, but by their character and the natural connection between
29
the original act or omission and the injurious consequences. When the intervening cause is
set in operation by the original negligence, such negligence is still the proximate cause; x x x
If the party guilty of the first act of negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause,
the connection is not broken; x x x. Any number of causes and effects may intervene, and if
they arc such as might with reasonable diligence have been foreseen, the last result is to be
considered as the proximate result. But whenever a new cause intervenes, which is not a
consequence of the first wrongful cause, which is not under control of the wrongdoer, which
could not have been foreseen by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and except for which
the final injurious consequence could not have happened, then such injurious consequence
must be deemed too remote; x x x.72 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts supports the
conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of
Rommel; and that the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening
cause.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from
vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the
marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. The submission that
Intergames had previously conducted numerous safe races did not persuasively demonstrate
that it had exercised due diligence because, as the trial court pointedly observed, "[t]hey
were only lucky that no accident occurred during the previous marathon races but still the
danger was there."73
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the
route was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been
avoided if only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a
blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient
supervision of the race through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not
efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and
the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered
efficient, must be "one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it,
and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful
cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the
original wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong
of its character as the proximate cause of the final injury."74
In fine, it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed
to do so.
III
The doctrine of assumption of risk
had no application to Rommel
Unlike the R TC, the CA ruled that the doctrine of assumption of risk applied herein; hence, it
declared Intergames and Cosmos not liable. The CA rendered the following rationalization to
buttress its ruling, to wit:
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar,
surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before the race.
Consequently, he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that
the said road would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was already
eighteen years of age, had voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents'
consent, and was well aware of the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all
the risks of the race. This is precisely why permission from the participant's parents,
submission of a medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and causes of action arising from
the participation in the marathon which the participant or his heirs may have against
appellant Intergames were required as conditions in joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the waiver signed by
Rommel Abrogar only involved risks such as stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and
other similar risks. It did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the
said waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and
obvious condition of the place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included
vehicular accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by
vehicles. Thus, it cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track
race which is held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is
always the risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train or compete. That risk is
inherent in the sport and known to runners. It is a risk they assume every time they
voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or contest, he assumes
the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the promoter or
operator of the game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not insurers of safety of the
public nor of their patrons.
In Mc Leod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was held that a boy, seventeen
years of age, of ordinary intelligence and physique, who entered a race conducted by a
department store, the purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in
for cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and was barred from
recovering against the department store for injuries suffered when, within catching distance,
he stopped to catch a guinea, and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or
eight others falling upon him. The comi further said: "In this (the race) he was a voluntary
30
participant. x x x The anticipated danger was as obvious to him as it was to appellant (the
department store). While not an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary
intelligence, and perfectly able to determine the risks ordinarily incident to such games. An
ordinary boy of that age is practically as well advised as to the hazards of baseball, basketball,
football, foot races and other games of skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 was a race the
winner of which was to represent the country in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon
Classic in Greece, if he equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 19-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his parents' consent,
assumed all the risks of the race.75
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result
therefrom.76 It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a
known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial.77 In
other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a
known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the
defendant's negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he
does not know and appreciate.78 As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine
requires the concurrence of three elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk
is present; (2) he must further understand its nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be
free and voluntary.79 According to Prosser:80"Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of
assumption of risk."
Contrary to the notion of the CA, the concurrence of the three elements was not shown to
exist. Rommel could not have assumed the risk of death when he participated in the race
because death was neither a known nor normal risk incident to running a race. Although he
had surveyed the route prior to the race and should be presumed to know that he would be
running the race alongside moving vehicular traffic, such knowledge of the general danger
was not enough, for some authorities have required that the knowledge must be of the
specific risk that caused the harm to him.81 In theory, the standard to be applied is a
subjective one, and should be geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than
that of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence who appears in contributory
negligence.82 He could not have appreciated the risk of being fatally struck by any moving
vehicle while running the race. Instead, he had every reason to believe that the organizer had
taken adequate measures to guard all participants against any danger from the fact that he
was participating in an organized marathon. Stated differently, nobody in his right mind,
including minors like him, would have joined the marathon if he had known of or appreciated
the risk of harm or even death from vehicular accident while running in the organized
running event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free from foreseeable risks was
the reasonable expectation of every runner participating in an organized running event.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied
consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited in
Prosser,83 to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known
situation because of his youth,84 or lack of information or experience,85 and thus will not be
taken to consent to assume the risk.
Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
IV
Cosmos is not liable for the negligence
of Intergames as the organizer
Nonetheless, the CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race. Cosmos did
nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual
conduct of the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr.,
who declared as follows:
COURT
q Do you discuss all your preparation with Cosmos Bottling Company?
a As far as the Cosmos Bottling Company (sic) was a sponsor as to the actual conduct of the
race, it is my responsibility. The conduct of the race is my responsibility. The sponsor has
nothing to do as well as its code of the race because they are not the ones running. I was the
one running. The responsibility of Cosmos was just to provide the sponsor's money.
COURT
q They have no right to who (sic) suggest the location, the number of runners, you decide
these yourself without consulting them?
a Yes, your honor.86
We uphold the finding by the CA that the role of Cosmos was to pursue its corporate
commitment to sports development of the youth as well as to serve the need for advertising
its business. In the absence of evidence showing that Cosmos had a hand in the organization
of the race, and took part in the determination of the route for the race and the adoption of
the action plan, including the safety and security measures for the benefit of the runners, we
cannot but conclude that the requirement for the direct or immediate causal connection
between the financial sponsorship of Cosmos and the death of Rommel simply did not exist.
31
Indeed, Cosmos' mere sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the
efficient and proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
V more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and
Damages
Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a suit upon crimes and
quasi-delicts can recover from the defendant, viz.:
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant.
Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the natural and probable
consequences of its negligence. In its judgment, the RTC explained the award of damages in
favor of the petitioners, as follows:
As borne by the evidence on record, the plaintiffs incurred medical, hospitalization and burial
expenses for their son in this aggregate amount of 28,061.65 (Exhibits "D'', "D-1" and "D-
2"). In instituting this case, they have paid their lawyer 5,000 as initial deposit, their
arrangement being that they would pay attorney's fees to the extent of 10% of whatever
amount would be awarded to them in this case.
For the loss of a son, it is unquestionable that plaintiffs suffered untold grief which should
entitle them to recover moral damages, and this Court believes that if only to assuage
somehow their untold grief but not necessarily to compensate them to the fullest, the
nominal amount of l00,00.00 should be paid by the defendants.
For failure to adopt elementary and basic precautionary measure to insure the safety of the
participants so that sponsors and organizers of sports events should exercise utmost
diligence in preventing injury to the participants and the public as well, exemplary damages
should also be paid by the defendants and this Court considers the amount of 50,000.00
as reasonable.87
Although we will not disturb the foregoing findings and determinations, we need to add to
the justification for the grant of exemplary damages. Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates
that exemplary damages are to be awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted
with gross negligence. The foregoing characterization by the RTC indicated that Intergames'
negligence was gross. We agree with the characterization. Gross negligence, according
to Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez,88 is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed, the failure of Intergames to
adopt the basic precautionary measures for the safety of the minor participants like Rommel
was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless when it is an extreme departure
from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent; it must be
more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention.89 The RTC did not
recognize the right of the petitioners to recover the loss of earning capacity of Rommel. It
should have, for doing so would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court has
unhesitatingly allowed such recovery in respect of children, students and other non-working
or still unemployed victims. The legal basis for doing so is Article 2206 (l) of the Civil
Code, which stipulates that the defendant "shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death."
Indeed, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the heirs of a deceased non-
working victim simply because earning capacity, not necessarily actual earning, may be lost.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,90 damages for loss of earning
capacity were granted to the heirs of a third-year high school student of the University of the
Philippines Integrated School who had been killed when she was hit and run over by the
petitioner's passenger bus as she crossed Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. The Court
justified the grant in this wise:
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to
earn money. Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of
death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. In People v.
Teehankee, no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the heirs
of a college freshman because there was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the
victim would eventually become a professional pilot. But compensation should be allowed
for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a minor who has not yet commenced
employment or training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is presented to
establish the amount thereor.91 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In People v. Sanchez,92 damages for loss of earning capacity was also allowed to the heirs of
the victims of rape with homicide despite the lack of sufficient evidence to establish what
they would have earned had they not been killed. The Court rationalized its judgment with
the following observations:
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country's leading
educational institution in agriculture.1wphi1 As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both
victims would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them
of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to
compensation. xxxx. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated
in due time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in 1993
they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court
32
believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would have
earned in 1993 at 8,000.000 per month (or 96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and
other incidental expenses at 3,000.00 per month (or 36,000.00/year).93 (bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
In Perena v. Zarate,94 the Court fixed damages for loss of earning capacity to be paid to the
heirs of the 15-year-old high school student of Don Bosco Technical Institute killed when a
moving train hit the school van ferrying him to school while it was traversing the railroad
tracks. The RTC and the CA had awarded damages for loss of earning capacity computed on
the basis of the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. Upholding said findings, the
Court opined:
x x x, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should not be taken against
his parents and in favor of the defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and
his right to work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence
and his services as well. x x x. Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of the
indemnification for Aaron's loss of earning capacity despite him having been unemployed,
because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for loss
of the deceased's power or ability to earn money.
The petitioners sufficiently showed that Rommel was, at the time of his untimely but much
lamented death, able-bodied, in good physical and mental state, and a student in good
standing.95 It should be reasonable to assume that Rommel would have finished his schooling
and would turn out to be a useful and productive person had he not died. Under the
foregoing jurisprudence, the petitioners should be compensated for losing Rommel's power
or ability to earn. The basis for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would
have become or what he would have wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the
minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. The formula for this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income less Necessary Living
Expenses ]96
Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the difference of 80 and the age of the
deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at the time of his death, his life expectancy was
41 years. His projected gross annual income, computed based on the minimum wage for
workers in the non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of his death,97then fixed at
l4.00/day, is 5,535.83. Allowing for necessary living expenses of 50% of his projected gross
annual income, his total net earning capacity is l13,484.52.
Article 2211 of the Civil Code expressly provides that interest, as a part of damages, may be
awarded in crimes and quasi-delicts at the discretion of the court. The rate of interest
provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code is 6% per annum in the absence of stipulation to
the contrary. The legal interest rate of 6% per annum is to be imposed upon the total
amounts herein awarded from the time of the judgment of the RTC on May 10, 1991 until
finality of judgment.98 Moreover, pursuant to Article 221299 of the Civil Code, the legal
interest rate of 6o/o per annum is to be further imposed on the interest earned up to the
time this judgment of the Court becomes final and executory until its full satisfaction.100
Article 2208 of the Civil Code expressly allows the recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation when exemplary damages have been awarded.1wphi1 Thus, we uphold the RTC's
allocation of attorney's fees in favor of the petitioners equivalent to 10% of the total amount
to be recovered, inclusive of the damages for loss of earning capacity and interests, which we
consider to be reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 10, 2004 to
the extent that it absolved COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY, INC. from
liability; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision as to INTERGAMES, INC., and REINSTATES as
to it the judgment rendered on May 10, 1991 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, in
Quezon City subject to the MODIFICATIONS that INTERGAMES, INC. is ORDERED TO PAY to
the petitioners, in addition to the aw3:rds thereby allowed: (a) the sum of l13,484.52 as
damages for the loss of Rommel Abrogar's earning capacity; (b) interest of 6% per annum on
the actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and loss of earning capacity
reckoned from May 10, 1991 until full payment; (c) compounded interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (d) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
VI. CAUSATION
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996]
MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR.* and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC., AMYLINE ANTONIO,
JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V. QUE, JR., ICLI CORDOVA,
ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD BAUTISTA, JOCELYN
GARCIA, YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO NARCISO,
ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPEZ, JULIUS CAESAR GARCIA,
ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C. CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-
MARA, TERESITA REGALA, MELINDA TORRES, MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA
CABATINGAN, MARA NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA, MAYETTE JOCSON,
ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO, CARLOS RANARIO, ROSAMARIA T. RADOC and
BERNADETTE FERRER, respondents.
33
 DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-
GR No. 28245, dated September 30, 1992, which affirmed with modification the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay
damages to private respondent Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda
minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children
which they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in
1981, after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the
St. Scholasticas College in Malate, Manila.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon. However, as several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the
Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 oclock in the
evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the
bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area
(it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the
highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as siete. The road was
slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and
sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed
on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the
road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on
the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being
unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this position. She was in great pain
and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said
he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he
took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he
saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to
30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the
basis of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case
was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
P1,500.00 for the damage to the latters fence. On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance
the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati,
Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is
permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she
underwent and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment and
therapy. Immediately after the accident, she was taken to the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay,
Lingayen. As this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was transferred to the Sto. Nio
Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An x-ray was taken and the
damage to her spine was determined to be too severe to be treated there. She was therefore
brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati Medical
Center where she underwent an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a
long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being
admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act
of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline
Antonio were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim for damages, the
Court is therefore not in a position to award damages to the other plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendants
Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to the plaintiffs the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees;
6) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
34
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline
Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to
prove their respective claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner Cabil failed to
exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the
place of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves
presumptively negligent.Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
III. WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP TO
WHAT EXTENT.
Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages in the
amount of P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable, an
award of P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that
she was a casual employee of a company called Suaco, earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer
of Avon products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that as casual
employees do not have security of tenure, the award of P600,000.00, considering Amyline
Antonios earnings, is without factual basis as there is no assurance that she would be regularly
earning these amounts.
With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on
the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals held, for although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin
and nature, nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. [2] In either case,
the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who
owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual
findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the
evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as
a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his
failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his
bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when he noticed the curve
some 15 to 30 meters ahead.[3] By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the
road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabils first one outside
of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony[4] that
the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour,
so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it
was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal
speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was
grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent
Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant
possessed a professional drivers license. The employer should also examine the applicant for
his qualifications, experience and record of service.[5] Due diligence in supervision, on the other
hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with the rules.[6]
In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently
did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes
to the St. Scholasticas College in Metro Manila.[7] They had hired him only after a two-week
apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could remember
the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his
qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union
was his first.The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.[8]
Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made
impossible by the congregations delayed meeting) could have averted the mishap and (2)
under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of
these contentions hold water. The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been,
the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident. With respect to the second
contention, it was held in an early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the
driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for
injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the
negligence either of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver.[9]
35
 As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the
Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions
of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held:[10]
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained
from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe
transportation of the passengers to their destination.This duty of care is not excused by proof
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial court and of
the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully
justify finding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of
the Civil Code.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we
think the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages because
private respondents did not question this award as inadequate. [11] To the contrary, the award
of P500,000.00 for compensatory damages which the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable
considering the contingent nature of her income as a casual employee of a company and as
distributor of beauty products and the fact that the possibility that she might be able to work
again has not been foreclosed. In fact she testified that one of her previous employers had
expressed willingness to employ her again.
With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are
nevertheless supported by evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi
delict,this case falls squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of
moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of
contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2220, since Cabils gross negligence amounted to bad faith.[12] Amyline Antonios testimony, as
well as the testimonies of her father and co-passengers, fully establish the physical suffering
and mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also properly made. However,
for the same reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the award of
compensatory damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral
damages and reduce the award of attorneys fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in whose
favor the awards were made, have not appealed.[13]
As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the
theory of quasi delict or on that of breach of contract.The question is whether, as the two
courts below held, petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to
respond jointly and severally to private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa
Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[14] on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the
bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a
passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[15] a driver found negligent in
failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as a
result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered injuries, was held
also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured passengers.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was
the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo,[16] Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[17] and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[18] the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the
driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latters
heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,[19] thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from
contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-
delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case
of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are
jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the view
that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.[20]
It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[21] this Court
exonerated the jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families while
holding the owners of the jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was
expressly tried and decided exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there
explained:
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo [the driver] and spouses Mangune
and Carreon [the jeepney owners] were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune
and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be
held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
36
carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is
between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April
29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742) . . .[22]
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake
out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that
of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of
action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action[23] so long as private
respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from
the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver,
thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
to the award of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private
respondent Amyline Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorneys fees; and
6) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27972 October 31, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Fausto C. Cuizon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape
and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one
day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the
offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, requiring him also to recognize and maintain, at P15 per month, the
offspring, if there should be any, as consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to
pay the costs.
The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18, who was the
injured girl in this case. She is therefore appellant's niece by marriage, and she calls him
uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On
November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was them about 18 years of age, to
accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river
together into the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the appellant
conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway where tall grass and
other growth hid them public view. In this spot the appellant manifested a desire to have
sexual intercourse with the girl, but she refused to give her consent, and he finally
notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his uncle,
Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about 11 a. m., and remained for
several hours. In the course of the afternoon Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant
minister who went through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the
appellant gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened, a this prosecution
for rape was started.
The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above stated, and the
marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the
criminal consequences of his act. We concur in this view of the case. The manner in which
the appellant death with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had
no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential
consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.
The Attorney-General suggest that, in fixing the penalty, it would be proper to take into
account the aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in an uninhabited
place. But the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that crime was
committed en despoblado. The incident occurred only a few paces from the Manila North
Road, and it appears that there was an unoccupied house nearby to which the girl was taken
and where food was procured from Florentina Cuizon who lived not far away. It is the
constant doctrine of the court that an aggravating circumstance must be as clearly proved as
any other element of the crime (U. S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil., 23, 31; Albert, Law on Crimes, pp.
88-89); and we cannot feel certain, upon the proof before us, that the place of the
37
commission of this offense was remote enough from habitation or possible aid to make
appropriate the estimation of the aggravating circumstance referred to. 1awph!l.net
The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. So ordered,
with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump
truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on
the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in
the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights
nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front
or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U.
Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work
scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to
avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner
in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's
injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought
to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and
ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for
hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss
of expected income for plaintiff brought about the accident in
controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral
damages for the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his
lifetime career as a marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling,
serious anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of
economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life
experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in controversy
up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as
damages for the wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably this
case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a smaller
amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as
and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R.
No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the
following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory
damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being
the only amount that the appellate court found the
plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected
income was reduced to P100,000.00, basically
because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such
that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of
38
 income "was not solely attributable to the accident in
question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was
held by the appellate court as excessive and
unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs remained
untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to
the manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of
which both courts drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the
dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and
Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised
by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the
way in which the dump truck had been parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio
had driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate
Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some way,
negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's negligence and made no
further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record
sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the appellate court could have
and should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in which
Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there
was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness
constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this case,
without having to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels us to address
directly the contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine for ourselves the
record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear upon the liability, or
extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private
respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether
Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c)
whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump
truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision;
and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on
the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio,
unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the
accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined
them along with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private
respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he
offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a
certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes
of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila.
This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass.
This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of
effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable
to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the
preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The
relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends
to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he
had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection
and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of
curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night both the
trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at
the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he
was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had
gathered at the scene of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did
not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a
moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of General
Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed
just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did
not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified
to were not acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the
informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account
of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records
exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence
under this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion
of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the
normal reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous
reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary
object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather
than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The
39
testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should
have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been
ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio was travelling just before
impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his
headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate
Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed
the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention
that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a
more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio i.e., that he
had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on
again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that
private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car
and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This testimony has
to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two"
of liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We do not believe that this evidence is
sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough
evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his
physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one
shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that
night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at
or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see
the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the
other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with
the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and
static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient
intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal
and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note
that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in
various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these
arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United
States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have
us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this
quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between
the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which
that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static
condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing
the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter
are the result of other active forces which have gone before. The
defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition,"
but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about
the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant
has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation
by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and
some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck
driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more
than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In
other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
40
were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from
Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which
the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent
only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee
that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions
to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or
explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire
from some independent source. ... In all of these cases there is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the
result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to
protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that
the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the
defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the
usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such
as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one
who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee
that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the
foreseeable negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct
may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional
negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and
therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk
and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be
exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is
run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved
of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The
theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his
injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it
has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that
doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine
or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's
negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see
what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its
common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction
like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is
to determine whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's
and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and
therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence
because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act
or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental
principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of
his employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The
respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that Phoenix was not
able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be
41
done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the
part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of
private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the
other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating
most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as
attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of
80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable
therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall
be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made
by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages
private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117954. April 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant
Orlando Acuram guilty of murder. Supreme
On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant
with the crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows: Sjcj
"On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
treachery did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one Orlando[1] Manabat who
was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus,
hitting and wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his
death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.[3] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered
judgment, disposing as follows: Scjj
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by
the prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by
treachery, and is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the
jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the
suit.
SO ORDERED."[4]
The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando
Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work,
proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was
available at that time, they decided to head for home instead. They went to the national
highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City and
waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which,
however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at
the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo " (You devils, why did you try to run
over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why?
Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by
sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was
shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro
City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de
Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion
and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Hospital in the same city. Jjsc
Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found
the victim's blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim's right leg was
heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when the latter's blood pressure
stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery.
42
Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the cause
of Rolando's death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss,
secondary to gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He
stated that under normal circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in
this case where the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He
clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front
portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds.[5]
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that
appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San
Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He
was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the only one among its passengers
who was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the camp effective
July 1, 1991, upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.[6] Appellant
was later surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of
the warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.[7] On motion by the prosecution and
without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the service and
ordered his detention at the provincial jail.[8]
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a
gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle
during that time since he was sitting at the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between
the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he said that the rifle was locked and
wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver.[9]
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as
charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant readily filed his notice of appeal.[10] In his brief,
appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: Edpmis
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED
APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE
INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS
ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE
ALLEGED WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE
POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS,
THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM."[11]
We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and
sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and
credibility of his defense.
To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find
that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at
the time the shooting happened. Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the
unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he should have inquired about
it. However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way.[12] That a policeman could
display such indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it
was true that he reported for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was
ordered by his commanding officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the
case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had received a
radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial court noted, no superior officer
will hold back from any of his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these, appellant did
not present himself before the police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was
conveniently nowhere to be found. Misoedp
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, in our view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[13] In this
case, it was appellant's commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the
court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the
investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as
contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant's favor. Misedp
On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that
the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point,
we agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof
that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the
killing without risk to himself.[14] In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the
43
moment. As observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver
and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the
cursing, as appellant correctly claimed.[15] Treachery cannot be appreciated where the
accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a
deliberate act of the will.[16]
Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of
the crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not
positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one
who fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime
is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of
guilt.[17] It is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that
the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[18] Circumstantial
evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct
evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by
a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some
other facts may be validly inferred.[19] No greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there
be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed the crime.[20]
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is
replete with details, duly proven by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the
defense, enough to sustain the guilt of appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former
member of the Philippine Constabulary and, during the incident, was a member of the
Philippine National Police. He was skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a
firearm (armalite rifle) by his command, which he was then carrying with him before, during
and after the incident. (3) At the particular date, time and place of the incident, appellant
was carrying his duly issued armalite rifle inside the jeepney from where the gunfire came
from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the jeepney where the
sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. (5) There were no other
persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty shells of an
armalite riflewere recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7) The
appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present himself until after a warrant of
arrest was issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest.[21]
The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a
reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the
victim's death. They constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the
perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on appellant's part to insist that
there should be an eyewitness to the precise moment the shot was fired considering the
sudden and completely unexpected shooting of the victim.[22] Here, circumstantial evidence
suffices. Edp
Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests,
in our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the
paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun. The absence of
nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he
thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.[23]
Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the
lack of prompt and proper medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper
medical attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts
him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant
never introduced proof to support his allegation that the attending doctors in this case were
negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the
attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by
applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was
immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the
doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim's
blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main blood vessel of
the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of blood. The surgery was finished
in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending
doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to
the victim does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the
appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening
cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the appellant. It
is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal
act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured
did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal
responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a
convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were
otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death.[24]
To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime
committed is only homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown after a review of the records, the
penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of reclusion temporal, which ranges
from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months.
Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the
range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The span
of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. Edpsc
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is
hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the
medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years and 10 months and 1 day of the
44
medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
VII. DEFENDANTS IN TORTS CASES
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016
GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR., Petitioners, v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION AND NISSIN UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside; a) the September 26, 2012
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No, 96961 affirming the April 4, 2011
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 in Civil Case No.
SPL-0969; and b) the CA's December 28, 2012 Resolution4 denying herein petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.5chanrobleslaw
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Greenstar Express, Inc. (Grepistar) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation, while petitioner Fruto L. Sayson, Jr. (Sayson) is one of its
bus drivers,
Respondents Universal Robina Corporation (URC) and Nissin Universal Robina Corporation
(NURC) are domestic corporations engaged in the food business. NURC is a subsidiary of URC.
URC is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number WRN 403 (URC
van).6chanrobleslaw
At about 6:50 a.m. on February 25, 2003, which was then a declared national
holiday,7 petitioner's bus, which was then being driven toward the direction of Manila by
Sayson, collided head-on with the URC van, which was then being driven Quezon province-
bound by NURC's Operations Manager, Renante Bicomong (Bicomong). The incident
occurred along Km. 76, Maharlika Highway, Brgy. San Agustin, Alaminos, Laguna. Bicomong
died on the spot, while the colliding vehicles sustained considerable damage.
On September 23, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint8 against NURC to recover damages
sustained during the collision, premised on negligence. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. SPL-0969 and assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, An Amended
Complaint9 was later filed, wherein URC was impleaded as additional defendant.
URC and NURC filed their respective Answers,10 where they particularly alleged and claimed
lack of negligence on their part and on the part of Bicomong.
After the issues were joined, trial proceeded. During trial, only Sayson was presented by
petitioners as eyewitness to the collision.
Riding of the Regional Trial Court
On April 4, 2011, the RTC issued its Decision, which decreed thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
During the trial on the merits, plaintiffs11 presented five witnesses namely Josephine Gadiaza,
Miguel Galvan, SPO3 Ernesto Marfori, Fruto Sayson and Lilia Morales.
xxxx
Plaintiff Fruto Sayson testified that on that fateful day, he was driving the plaintiff passenger
bus from Lucena City going to Manila at a speed of more or less 60 kilometers per hour when
he met a vehicular accident at Barangay San Agustin, Alaminos, Laguna. He saw from afar an
L-300 UV coming from the shoulder going on the opposite direction to Lucena City. Said
vehicle was already near his bus when it (UV) managed to return to ifs proper lane, then hit
and swerved his vehicle.- "He tried to prevent the collision by swerving to the right but it was
too late. As a result, the left front portion of the bus was damaged while the front portion of
the L-300 UV was totally wrecked- He and his conductor, one.Mendoza, managed to get but
of the bug by forcibly opening the automatic door which was also damaged due to the impact
After getting out of the bus, he looked for the driver of the L300 UV but he was informed by a
bystander that he was thrown in a canal arid already dead. For fear of possible reprisals from
bystanders as experienced by most drivers involved in an accident, he boarded smother bug
owned by bis employer. Before he left, he indorsed the matter to hip conductor and line
inspector. Thereafter, he reported to their office at San Pedro, Laguna. He executed a
statement on the same day x x x and submitted the same to their operations department. He
likewise testified that before the incident, he was earning P700.00 to P900,00 a day on
commission basis and he drives 25 days in a month. However, after the incident, he was not
able to drive for almost two months.
On cross-examination, it was established that the incident happened along the Maharlika
Highway along Kilometer 72. There were no structures near the site of the incident, The
highway ha two lanes which can accommodate the size of the bus about 3 meters wide and
a. light vehicle. He was bound for Manila and had about ten passengers. He saw the L-300 UV
on the shoulder of the opposite lane about 250 meters away from, his bus while he was
driving [at] a speed of 60 kilometers per hour. He did not sense any danger when he saw the
vehicle from afar. He cannot drive fast as there were five vehicles ahead of his bus. When the
45
L-300 UV managed to return to it? proper lane coming from the shoulder, it was heading
directly towards his direction, at a distance of more or less five, meters away from his bus, He
noticed that the L-300 UV was running at full speed as he saw dust clouds. "The point of
impact happened on his lane. He tried to swerve his bus to prevent the impact but lie
admitted that at his speed, it was difficult for him to maneuver his vehicle
Investigator SPO3 Ernesto Marfori of the Alaminos Police Station testified that at about 7:00
in the morning, he received a report from the Barangay Chairman of a vehicular accident that
occurred at Brgy. an Agustin, Alaminos, Laguna. He proceeded to the site with SPO2
Rolando Alias. Upon arrival at the scene of the accident, he attended to the victim, but found
him dead inside the L- 300 UV. He came to know later that he was Renante Bicomong. He
immediately called up his office and requested that funeral services for the dead man. be
arranged. Thereafter, he photographed the damaged vehicles (Exhibits "F" and sub-markings)
and interviewed some witnesses. He made a sketch depicting the damages suffered by both
vehicles (Exhibit "D-2"), the L-300 IV at the front portion (Exhibit "D-4") while the bus at the
left side of its front portion (Exhibit "D-3"). Based on the sketch he prepared, the impact
happened almost at the right lane which was the bus lane (Exhibit "D-6"). He likewise noticed
some debris also found at the bus lane. He was able to interview the bus conductor and a
fruit store owner in [sic] the names of Apolinar Devilla and Virgilio Adao, He did not see the
driver of the bus at the scene of the accident and he was told that he had left the place.
Based on, his investigation, the possible cause of the accident was the swerving to the left
lane [by] the driver of the L-300 UV which resulted in me encroaching of the bus' lane. He
reduced bis findings into writing in a Report dated February 28, 2003 (Exhibits "D" and sub-
markings).
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he was not present when the vehicles
collided. The entries he made in the blotter report were mainly based on the accounts of the
witnesses he was able to interview who however did not give their written statements. When
he arrived at the scene of the accident, the L-300 UV was already on the shoulder of the road
and it was totally wrecked. According to reports, the van spun around when it was bit causing
the metal scar found on the road.
On the other hand, the defendants12 presented three witnesses: its employees Alexander
Caoleng and John Legaspi and deceased Renante Bicomong's widow, Gloria Bicomgng, These
witnesses were presented to prove that deceased Bicomong was acting in his personal
capacity when the mishap happened on February 25, 2003 as that day had been declared an
official holiday and the L-300 UV he was driving had not been issued to him, among others.
Alexander Caoleng, HR. Manager of defendant NURC, testified that deceased Bicomong
worked as the Operations Manager of defendant NURC until his death as evidenced by a
Certificate of Employment dated December 9, 2008 (Exhibit "I"), His last assignment was in
First Cavite Industrial Estate (FCEB). He died in a vehicular accident in Alaminos, Laguna on
February 25, 2003 which was declared a holiday by virtue of Proclamation No. 331 (Exhibit
"2"). Despite having been issued his own service vehicle (Exhibits "3", "4" and "5"), he used
the L-300 UV which was not officially issued to him but in the name of Florante Soro-Soro,
defendant NURC's Logistics Manager at that time (Exhibits "7" and "B"). The said vehicle was
used mainly to transport items coming from their office at Pasig to Cavite and vice versa
(Exhibit "9").
John Legaspi, Project Manager of defendant NURC, testified that he was first assigned in its
Cavite Plant in 1999 with deceased Bicomaog as his immediate supervisor being the
Production Manager then. He last saw him in the afternoon of February 24, 2003 at about
6:00 pm when they had a short chat He (Bicomong) was then transferring his things from his
executive vehicle which was a Toyota Corolla to the L-300 UY which was a company vehicle.
He (Bicomong) shared that he would go home to Quezon Province the following day
(February 25) to give money to his daughter. He knew that his trip to Quezon was not work-
related as February 25, 2003 was declared a holiday. Besides, there exists no plant owned by
defendant NURC in the provinces of Quezon, Laguna or Bicol as attested to by the General
Manager of defendant NURC in a Certification to that effect (Exhibit "11").
On cross-examination, he distinguished the use of an executive vehicle assigned to an
executive officer for his personal use and the company vehicle which was supposed to be for
official use only.
Finally, Gloria Bicomong, widow of deceased Reynante Bicomong testified that she knew that
her husband was going home to Calendaria (sic), Quezon on February 25, 2003 because he
informed their daughter. He was on his way home when he met a vehicular-accident in
Alaminos. Laguna which claimed his life. She was informed about the accident involving her
husband by a high school friend who was also traveling to Quezon at that time, She filed a
criminal complaint at Alaminos, Laguna but it was dismissed for reasons unknown to her. She
likewise filed a civil complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City
docketed as Civil Case No. 2.103-135.
On cross-examination, she narrated that aside from the Toyota Corolla service of her
husband, he would use the L-300 UV whenever he had to bring bulky things home. As far as
she can recall, he used the L-300 UV about 5 times.
After an evaluation of the foregoing testimonies and documentary evidence of the parties,
the court had [sic] arrived at the following findings and conclusions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryPlaintiff has no cause of action and cannot recover from the
defendants even assuming that the direct and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the defendant's employee Renato Bicomong.
Pursuant to Article 2184 of the New Civil Code, the owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily
liable with his driver if at the time of the mishap, the owner was in the vehicle and by the use
of due diligence could have presented (sic) the misfortune; if the owner is not in the motor
vehicle, the provision of Article 2180 is applicable. The defendants being juridical persons,
the first paragraph of Article 2184 is obviously not applicable.
Under Article 2180, "employers shall be liable tor the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. "In other words, for the employer to be
liable for the damages caused by his employee, the latter must have caused the damage in
46
the course of doing his assigned tasks or in the-performance of his duties" (Yambao vs.
Zuiga, G.R. No: 146173, December 11, 2003)
In this case, it is beyond cavil that the deceased Renante Bicong [sic] was not in the
performance of his duty on that fateful day of February 25, 2003. In the first place that day
was a holiday; there was no work and it was not shown that he was working as indeed his
work assignment is operations manager of the company's plant m, Cavite while the accident
happened while he was in Alaminos, Laguna on his way home to Candelaria, Quezon.
Secondly, as an operations manager, he was issued an executive car for. Ms own use, a
Toyota Corolla vehicle and he merely preferred to use the L-300 UV when going home to his
family in Quezon. Even assuming that the company allowed or tolerated this, by itself, the
tolerance did not make, the employer liable in the absence of showing that he was using the
vehicle in the performance of a duty or within the scope of his assigned tasks. But as clearly
relayed by defendant's witnesses, defendants have no business or plant in Quezen. The L-300
vehicle was for the hauling of items between their Pasig and Cavite offices and was merely
borrowed by Bicomong in going to Candelaria, Quezon on that day.
The accident having occurred outside Remnte Bicomong's assigned tasks, defendant
employers cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs, even assuming that it is the fault of
defendants' employee that was the direct and proximate cause of their damages.
However, the question of whose fault or negligence was the direct and proximate cause of
the mishap is material to the resolution of defendants' counterclaim.
The rule is that the burden of proof lies on him who claims a fact (Federico Ledesina vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 175585, October 19,2007). Therefore, to be able to recover in their counterclaim,
the defendants must prove by preponderance of evidence that the direct and proximate
cause of their losses was the fault of the plaintiff-driver.
Defendants were not able to present any witness as to how the mishap occurred Their
witnesses were limited to proving that Renante Bicomong was not in the performance of his
assigned task when the incident happened.
A reading of their answer would reveal, that their attribution of fault to the plaintiff-driver is
based only on the point of impact of the two vehicles. Thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'4.3 Based on the damage sustained by the passenger bus, plaintiffs' claim that Renante
Bicomong swerved on the left lane and encroached on the path of the said bus moments
before the accident could not have been true. Such claim would have resulted to a head-on
collision between the vehicle driven by Mr. Bicomong and the bus; the latter would have
sustained damage on its front side. However, based on Annexes "B" and "C" of the Complaint,
the. said bus sustained damage on its left side. Clearly, it was the passenger bus that swerved
on the left lane, which was being traversed by Renante Bicomong, and while returning to the
right lane, said bus hit the vehicle being driven by Mr. Bicomong. Thus, explaining the damage
sustained by the said bus on its left side just below the driver's seat.'
The foregoing however is a mere interpretation or speculation and not supported by any
account, either by an eyewitness [or by] a explanation tracing the relative positions of the
two vehicles in relation to the road at the time of impact and the movements of the two
vehicles after the impact. For this reason, it will be unfair to make an interpretation of the
events based alone on the point of impact [on] the vehicles. The points of impact by
themselves cannot explain the positions of the vehicles on the road.
Defendants Memorandum attributed the cause of the mishap to the excessive speed of the
bus. In their Memorandum, the defendants content [sic] that if the driver had seen the L-3G0
UV meters away in front of him running along the shoulder and negotiating back to its lane,
the bus driver would have watched out and slackened his speed. Considering the damage to
both the vehicles and the fact that the L-300,UV span [sic] and w,as thrown 40 feet away
from the point of impact and its driver was thrown 14 feet away from his vehicle, defendant
argued that the bus could not be running at 60 kilometers only. But assuming the bus indeed
was running at high speed that alone does not mean that the negligence of the driver was
the direct and proximate cause, If it is true that the L-300 UV ran from the right shoulder,
climbed up to the right lane but overshoot [sic] it and occupied the bus' lane, the speed of
the bus cannot be considered the proximate and direct cause of the collision; But as stated
earlier, this were [sic] merely conjectures and surmises of the defendants and not proven by
competent evidence.
All told, defendants were not able to prove by their own evidence that the direct and
proximate cause of the collision was the fault of plaintiffs driver. Hence, they cannot hold
plaintiffs liable for the logs of their L-300 UV. As both parties failed to prove by their
respective evidence where the fault that occasioned their losses lie, they must bear their
respective losses.
Anent defendants' counterclaim for attorney's fees and exemplary damages, there is no
evidence to show that the filing, of this suit was motivated [by] malice. It cannot be denied
that plaintiffs suffered damages. The court mainly, dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action as Renante Bicomong was not performing his assigned tasks at the time of the
incident. Besides, to hold them liable to defendants for attorney's fees and exemplary
damages simply because they failed to come up with sufficient evidence will be tantamount
to putting a price on one's right to sue.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint as well as the
counterclaim.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 96961. They argued
that Bicomong's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision, as the van he was
4rjvmg swerved to the opposite lane and hit the bus which was then traveling along its
47
proper lane; that Bicomong's act of occupying the bus's lane was illegal and thus constituted
a traffic violation; that respondents are liable for damages as the registered owner of the van
and failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee,
Bicomong, Respondents, countered that the bus driven by Sayson was running at high speed
when the, collision occurred, thus indicating that Sayson was in violation of traffic rules; and
that Say-son had the last clear chance to avert collision but he failed to take the necessary
precaution under the circumstances, by reducing his speed and applying the brakes on time
to avoid collision.
On September 26, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision containing the following
pronouncement:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The present case involving an action for damages based on quasi-delict is governed by
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code, pertinent provisions of which read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'ART. 2176, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omission also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.'
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers shall be held primarily and solidarily
liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
To hold the employer liable under this provision, it must be shown that an employer-
employee relationship exists, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the act complained of was committed.
Records bear that the vehicular collision occurred on February 25, 2003 which was declared
by former Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, by order of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, as a special national holiday, per Proclamation No. 331 dated February
19, 2003. Renante Bicomong had no work on that day and at the time the accident occurred,
he was on his way home to Candelaria, Quezon. There was no showing that on that day,
Renante Bicomong was given by defendants-appellees14 an assigned task, much less
instructed to go to Quezon. As testified to by Renante Bicomong's widow Gloria Bicomong,
Renante Bicomong was on the road that day because he was going home to Candelaria,
Quezon. Thus, he was then carrying out a personal purpose and not performing work for
defendants-appellees.
Apropos is Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vicente Vasquez, Jr.,15 wherein the Supreme Court
held that the mere fact that an employee was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the
operation of said vehicle unless it appeared that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of bis employment. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
'The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a
messenger of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of
the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears mat he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the
injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle.
xxxx
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation
of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates
that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the
employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has
not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employees negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on
the doctrine of respondent superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours.
Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was
acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at Hie petitioner's
office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's
Restaurant in Fuente Osmefia, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and
Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat Moreover, prostitutes, pimps,
and drug addicts littered the place.
48
 xxx xxx xxx
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It
was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers
and addicts, had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his
duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form
of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Accordingly, in the absence of showing that Renante Bicomong was acting within the scope
of his assigned task at the time of the vehicular collision, defendants-appellees had no duty
to show that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Renante
Bicomong with a service vehicle. Thus, the trial court did not err in holding that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'Under Article 2180, 'employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. 'In other words, for the employer to be
liable for the damages caused by his employee, the latter must have caused the damage in
the course of doing his assigned tasks or. in the performance of his duties.' (Yambao vs.
Zuiga, G.R. No. 146173, December 11, 2003.)
In this case, it is.beyond cavil that the deceased Renante Bicong [sic] was not in the
performance of his duty on that fateful day of February 25, 2003. In the first place that day
was a holiday; there was no work and it was not shown that he was working as indeed his
work assignment [was as] operations manager of the company's plant in Cavite while the
accident happened while he was in Alaminos, Laguna on his way home to Candelaria,
Quezon. Secondly, as an operations manager, he was issued an executive car for his own use,
a Toyota Corolla vehicle and. he merely preferred to use the L-300 UV when going home to
his family in Quezon. Even assuming that the company allowed or tolerated this, by itself, the
tolerance did not make the employer liable in the absence of showing that he was using the
vehicle in the performance of a duty or within the scope of his assigned tasks. But as clearly
relayed by defendant's witnesses, defendants have no business or plant in Quezon. The L-300
vehicle was for the hauling of items between their Pasig and Cavite offices and was merely
borrowed by Bicomong in going to Candelaria, Quezon on that day.
The accident having occurred outside Renante Bicomong's assigned tasks, defendant
employers cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs, even assuming that it is the fault of
defendants' employee that was the direct and proximate cause of their damages.'
In sum, squarely applicable in this case is the well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment
of the trial judge as to the issue of credibility binds the appellate court because he is in a
better position to decide the issue, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, except when the trial court has plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that, if considered, might affect the result of
the case, or where the assessment is clearly shown to be arbitrary. Plaintiffs-appellants have
not shown this case to fall under the exception.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated April 4, 2011 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its subsequent
December 28, 2012 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In a July 14, 2014 Resolution,17 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which
contains the following assignment of errors:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO PETITIONERS FOR THE DAMAGES THEY
SUSTAINED CONSIDERING THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF
RENANTE BICOMONG.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING DEFENSES NOT PLEADED IN THE
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN RESPONDENTS' ANSWER.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners insist that respondents should be held liable for Bicomong's negligence under
Articles 2176, 2180, and 2185 of the Civil Code;19 that Bicomong's negligence was the direct
and proximate eause of the accident, in that he unduly occupied the opposite lane which the
bus was lawfully traversing, thus resulting in the collision with Greenstar's bus; that
Bicomong's driving on the opposite lane constituted a traffic violation, therefore giving rise to
the presumption of negligence on his part; that in view of this presumption, it became
incumbent upon respondents to rebut the same by proving that they exercised care and
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees; that in their respective answers
and motion to dismiss, respondents did not allege the defense, which they tackled only
during trial, that since February 25, 2003 was a declared national holiday, then Bicomong was
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the collision; that for failure to
plead this defense or allegation in their respective answers and pleadings, it is deemed
49
waived pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure20 (1997 Rules); that
just the same, respondents failed to prove that Bicomong was not in the official performance
of his duties or that the URC van was not officially issued to him at the time of the accident -
and for this reason, the presumption of negligence was not overturned; and that URC should
be held liable as the registered owner of the van.
In their Reply,21 petitioners add that while some of the issues raised in the Petition are
factual in nature, this Court must review the case as the CA gravely erred in its appreciation
of the evidence and in concluding that respondents are not liable. Finally, they argue that
URC should be held liable for allowing "a non-employee to use for his personal use the
vehicle owned" by it.
Respondents' Arguments
Pleading affirmance, respondents argue in their Comment22 that the issues raised in the
Petition are factual in nature; that the collision occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong
was. using the URC van for a purely personal purpose, it should be. sufficient to absolve
respondents of liability as evidently, Bicomong was not performing his official duties on that
day; that the totality of the evidence indicates that it was Sayson who was negligent in the
operation of Greenstar's bus when the collision occurred; that Bicomong was not negligent in
driving the URC van; that petitioners' objection - pertaining to their defense that the collision
occurred on a holiday, when Bicomong was not considered to be at work - was belatedly
raised; and that in any case, under Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules,23 their pleadings
should be deemed amended to conform to the evidence presented at the trial, which
includes proof that the accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was not in the
performance of his official tasks and instead going home to his family in Quezon province.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar,24 the Court made the following
relevant pronouncement:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's specification
that '[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees ... acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks [.]' Second, the operation of the registered-owner
rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
Vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the
registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment
relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the
scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of
the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo, et al. v.
Jepte,25cralawredwhere this court explained that the registration of motor vehicles, as
required by Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 41365 the and Transportation and Traffic Code,
was necessary 'not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles
is transferred, ... but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
highway[.]' Its 'main aim ... is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that
any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.'
xxxx
Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank26 recognized the seeming conflict between Article
2180 and the registered-owner rule and applied the latter.
xxxx
Preference for the registered-owner rule became more pronounced in Del Carmen, Jr. v.
Bacoy:27chanrobleslaw
xxxx
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas28 stated that the registered owner of a vehicle can no
longer use the defenses found in Article 2180:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez29 reiterated this doctrine.
However, Aguilar, Sr., Del Carmen, Filcar, and Mendoza should not be taken to mean that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be completely discarded in cases where the registered-
owner rule finds application.
As acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical statutory pronouncement in the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code stipulating the liability of a registered owner. The source of a
registered owner's liability is not a distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain
any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as
registered owner, to answer for the damages caused to Espinas' car.
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must be construed in a manner that will
harmonize them with other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of
jurisprudence. In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There,
50
this court stated that Article 2180 'should defer to' the registered-owner rule. It never stated
that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule
and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered
owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven.
As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability
under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the
actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former
that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases,
a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment
relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation
to that employment.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit
Reyes. The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not
dispute its ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption
that the requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of
any of the following: first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second,
that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision -or on February
25, 2003 - URC was the registered owner of the URC van, although it appears that it was
designated for use by NURC, as it was officially assigned to the latter's Logistics Manager,
Florante Soro-Soro (Soro-Soro); that Bicomong was the Operations Manager of NURC and
assigned to the First Cavite Industrial Estate; that there was no work as the day was declared
a national holiday; that Bicomong was on his way home to his family in Quezon province;
that the URC van was not assigned to Bicompng as well, but solely for Soro-Soro's official use;
that the company service vehicle officially assigned to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which
he left at the Cavite plant and instead, he used the URC van; and that other than the Cavite
plant, there is no other NURC plant in the provinces of Quezon, Laguna or Bicol.
Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case, it must be said
that when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were proved,
the presumption of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the registered owner of the
van. and as Bicomong's employer. Hie burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show
that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This may be done by proof of any of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; or
2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or
3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bicomong.
In denying liability, respondents claimed in their respective answers the defense of absence
of negligence on their part. During trial, they presented evidence to the effect that on the
day of the collision, which was a declared national non-working holiday, Bicomong was not
perforating Ms work, but was on his way home to Quezon on a personal undertaking, that is,
to give money to his daughter and spend the holiday with his family; and that the vehicle he
was driving was not an NURC vehicle, nor was it assigned to him, but was registered to URC
and assigned to its Logistics Manager, Soro-Soro, Petitioners object to this, claiming that this
defense was not alleged in the respondents' respective answers. The Court disagrees, The
failure to allege these facts in the answers does not preclude, respondents from proving
them during trial; these facts are precisely illustrative of their defense of absence of
negligence. Just the same, petitioners' failure to object to the respondents' presentation of
such evidence below is tantamount to a waiver; Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules - on
amendments to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence - will have to apply, but
the failure to amend the pleadings does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial
does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may
embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of
damages. Although the pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence
submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of
the issues alleged but also on the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved
in the course of trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform
to the evidence, although it had not been actually so amended, x x x30
Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having shown that
when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance of his work; that he was
in possession of a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer NURC, but to URC, and
which vehicle was not officially assigned to him, but to another employee; that his use of the
URC van was unauthorized - even if he had used the same vehicle in furtherance of a
personal undertaking in the past,31 this does not amount to implied permission; that the
accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was on his way home to his family in
Quezon province; and that Bicomong had no official business whatsoever in his hometown in
Quezon, or in Laguna where the collision occurred, his area of operations being limited to the
Cavite area.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the collision could have been avoided if
Sayson exercised care and prudence, given the circumstances and information that he had
immediately prior to the accident. From the trial court's findings and evidence on record, it
would appear that immediately prior to the collision, which took place very early in the
morning - or at around 6:50 a.m., Sayson saw that the URC van was traveling fast Quezon-
51
bound on the shoulder of the opposite lane about 250 meters away from him; that at this
point, Sayson was driving the Greenstar bus Manila-bound at 60 kilometers per hour; that
Sayson knew that the URC van was traveling fast as it was creating dust clouds from
traversing the shoulder of the opposite lane; that Sayson saw the URC van get back into its
proper lane but directly toward him; that despite being apprised of the foregoing
information, Sayson, instead of slowing down, maintained his speed and tried to swerve the
Greenstar bus, but found it difficult to do so at his speed; that the collision or point of impact
occurred right in the middle of the road;32 and that Sayson absconded from the scene
immediately after the collision.
From the foregoing facts, one might think that from the way he was driving immediately
before the collision took place, Bicomong could have fallen asleep or ill at the wheel, which
led him to gradually steer the URC van toward the shoulder of the highway; and to get back
to the road after realizing his mistake, Bicomong must have overreacted, thus
overcompensating or oversteering to the left, or toward the opposite lane and right into
Sayson's bus. Given the premise of dozing off or falling ill, this explanation is not far-fetched.
The collision occurred very early in the morning in Alaminos, Laguna. Sayson himself testified
that he found Bicomong driving on the service road or shoulder of the highway 250 meters
away, which must have been unpaved, as it caused dust clouds to rise on the heels of the
URC van. And these dust clouds stole Sayson's attention, leading him to conclude that the
van was running at high speed. At any rate, the evidence places the point of impact very near
the middle of the road or just within Sayson's lane. In other words, the collision took place
with Bicomong barely encroaching on Sayson's lane. This means that prior to and at the time
of collision, Sayson did not take any defensive maneuver to prevent the accident and
minimize the impending damage to life and property, which resulted in the collision in the
middle of the highway, where a vehicle would normally be traversing. If Sayson took
defensive measures, the point of impact should have occurred further inside his lane or not
at the front of the bus - but at its side, which should have shown that Sayson either slowed
down or swerved to the right to avoid a collision.
Despite having seen Bicomong drive the URC van in a precarious manner while the same was
still a good 250 meters away from his bus, Sayson did not take the necessary precautions, as
by reducing speed and adopting a defensive stance to avert any untoward incident that may
occur from Bicomong's manner of driving. This is precisely his testimony during trial. When
the van began to swerve toward his bus, he did not reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid
collision. Instead, he maintained his current speed and course, and for this reason., the
inevitable took place: An experienced driver who is. presented with the same facts would
have adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to preserve life and property; for common
carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest degree.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of
diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733
and 1755 of the Civil Code state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary, diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care arid
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that '[i]n case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755. xxx'33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, Sayson took no defensive maneuver whatsoever in spite of the fact that he saw
Bicomong drive his van in a precarious manner, as far as 250 meters away - or at a point in
time and space where Sayson had all the opportunity to prepare and avert a possible
collision. The collision was certainly foreseen and avoidable but Sayson took no measures to
avoid it. Rather than exhibit concern for the welfare of his passengers and the driver of the
oncoming vehicle, who might have fallen asleep or suddenly fallen ill at the wheel, Sayson
coldly and uncaringly stood his ground^ closed his eyes, and left everything to fate, without
due regard for the consequences. Such a suicidal mindset cannot be tolerated, for the grave
danger it poses to the public and passengers availing of petitioners' services. To add insult to
injury, Sayson hastily fled the scene of the collision instead of rendering assistance to the
victims - thus exhibiting a selfish, cold-blooded attitude and utter lack of concern motivated
by the self-centered desire to escape liability, inconvenience, and possible detention by the
authorities, rather than secure the well-being of the victims of his own negligent act.
x x x The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule
is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence, x x x34
Petitioners might object to the treatment of their case in the foregoing manner, what with
the additional finding that Sayson was negligent under the circumstances. But their
Petition, "once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and xxx this
Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case."35chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 26, 2012 Decision and December 28,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96961 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
52
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and
ROSALINDA TABUGO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S.
MIRANDA,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph
Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val
Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner]
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of
[petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jaysons] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his
group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles
of which hit [Jaysons] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of
his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes were chemically
G.R. No. 182353 burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and
had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower
Present: court, [Jaysons] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo
another surgery.
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
NACHURA, [Jaysons] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
PERALTA, which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from
ABAD, and November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
MENDOZA, JJ. least P40,000.00.
Promulgated: Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to [petitioners]
June 29, 2010 fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent
upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral
damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the
payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental
thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained
to file the complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise
compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses, including attorneys fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school year
1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the
class to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a science experiment
under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher,
about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these
elements in a test tube and heating the same. Before the science
experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to
look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson],
however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable
of understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher,
without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the
written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the
teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked
at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a
small particle hitting one of [Jaysons] eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center for treatment. At the
53
 hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to
his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until
the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an
eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order
to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jaysons] discharge,
Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jaysons] father, requested SJC to advance the amount
of P26,176.35 representing [Jaysons] hospital bill until his wife could arrive
from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel,
wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter
dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini
Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because the accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to comply
with the written procedure for the experiment and his teachers repeated
warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into,
the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.[3]
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jaysons father, on Jaysons behalf,
sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the
[petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the following
amount:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual
damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to reimburse
[petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount
of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to pay
[Jaysons] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative
to deduct said amount of P26,176.36 from
the P77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by
way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as
mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as
reasonable attorneys fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the CA
affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].[5]
Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the CA grievously
erred, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSONS INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF LOOKING
AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO THE
EXPERIMENT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE
RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARYS COLLEGE V. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, x x
x JAYSONS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE
WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE
PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO
SUPPORT THE SAME.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO [JAYSON].
VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS
COUNTERCLAIM.[6]
We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were
negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and
foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students.
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered
conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted
except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference from its factual
54
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the
absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[8] None of the foregoing
exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his own negligence in
disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the
test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos[9]which absolved
St. Marys Academy from liability for the untimely death of its student during a school
sanctioned activity, declaring that the negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident.
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the lower courts conclusions are borne out by the records
of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with
favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was
the proximate cause of the latters injury. We find that the immediate cause
of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously
looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which
caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
chemicals independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have
prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution
and foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled that:
All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable
for negligence because all of them are responsible for
exercising the required reasonable care, prudence,
caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to
the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons
charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before
this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their
responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance
expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the
class undertook the science experiment although
[Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the
classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to
establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the
classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It
was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that
[Jayson] was brought to the school clinic for immediate
treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is
inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher
Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the
accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why
none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to
the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story
of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands
that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson]
because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school
and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school
authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the
subject adviser or teacher in charge because she
exercised control and supervision over [petitioner]
Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her
obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and
that the science experiment would be conducted
safely and without any harm or injury to the students.
[Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable
under the doctrine of command responsibility because
the other individual [petitioners] were under her direct
control and supervision. The negligent acts of the
other individual [petitioners] were done within the
scope of their assigned tasks.
xxxx
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a
family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown
that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance
of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of
the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students. The fact that there has
never been any accident in the past during the conduct
of science experiments is not a justification to be
complacent in just preserving the status quo and do
away with creative foresight to install safety measures
55
 to protect the students. Schools should not simply
install safety reminders and distribute safety
instructional manuals. More importantly, schools
should provide protective gears and devices to shield
students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to
the school or university itself, although an educational
institution may be held liable under the principle of
RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or
negligence of its employees is primary and solidary,
direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the
insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent
employee.[10]
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the findings of the RTC,
which the CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her
students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube
before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame
for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of
the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and
caution is demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its
students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments
conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles,
to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any
event, the size of the classfifty (50) students conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the
heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St. Marys preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Marys is not in point. In that case, respondents thereat
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was a
mechanical defect and not the recklessness of the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep.
We held, thus:
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
56
 petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence
of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.[11]
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened
during the science experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This
neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the
utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and,
ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St.
Marys, for petitioner [St. Marys Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [12]
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb the lower courts
identical rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jaysons] injury was the
explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not
making sure that the science experiment was correctly conducted was the
proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and
injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is
partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to
recover damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his
own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by their negligence.[13]
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts award of actual
and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees. The denial of petitioners counterclaim is also
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA
S. INTON, on their behalf and on
behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS
S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA Promulgated:
YAMYAMIN, OP,
Respondents. January 26, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of shoving
a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat
and not move around the classroom.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas
School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who
began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion
class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his
assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed
this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to
the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior, Yamyamin approached
Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and
finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action
against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother
Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor,
holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages
of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.[1]
57
 Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).[2] They asked
the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and
Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to
increase the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this was
denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in holding
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Courts Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon
the CAs belief that the school was Yamyamins employer. Aquinas contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b)
pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the
most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether
actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and
methods by which he accomplishes the same.[4]
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send
religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was
not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing
the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who
would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that
Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted
the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold
Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be
said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the
students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school
had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching
orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.[5]
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach[6] to
ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year,
Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. [8] It
cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court
finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons
prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus cannot obtain from
this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted them in its
decision.[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School
not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well as
the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an
58
accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy before the Regional TrialCourt of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life
of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred
by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and
who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED
from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Marys
Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not
being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the
jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.[2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages
against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep.
59
 Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.Thus, such authority
and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness
of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute
the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those
given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II
to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva.It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving
the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver
or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner
St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages
in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[14] In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the
Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must
be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather
than the rule.[15] The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.[16]Thus, the grant of attorneys fees
against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was
being driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented
by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered
owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
The Fallo
60
 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since
Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
Academy, Dipolog City. institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.

No costs.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order
SO ORDERED. dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then
assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO,
ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its
vs. decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, respondents. Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from
the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned
Balgos and Perez for petitioners. authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The
law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents. value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.

Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180

PADILLA, J.:
cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case
of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational
the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) institutions, academic or vocational.
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez,
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff
for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos
liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last
was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from
to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the
outside the school.
case. 5

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the
(President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier),
complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not
Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
by resigning from his position in the school. Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been

61
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his
unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort,
not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that
liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a
similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who
allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals,
(Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded
that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article
21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that
the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to
a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the
school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of
its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the
so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding
the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be
the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage,
only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
62
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin
(RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of
the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes Branch in Manila a money market placement of PhP
1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983,[3] as evidenced by
Provisional Receipt No. 1356 dated November 14, 1983.[4]

On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of
Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans money market placement, to
issue a managers check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to
Republic of the Philippines one Deborah Dee Santos who would pick up the check.[5] Lim Sio Wan described the
SUPREME COURT appearance of Santos so that So could easily identify her.[6]
Manila
Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a managers check to be
issued.[7] The bank issued Managers Check No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the
SECOND DIVISION proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as
payee.[8] The check was cross-checked For Payees Account Only and given to Santos.[9]

ALLIED BANKING G.R. No. 133179 Thereafter, the managers check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation
CORPORATION, (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), [10] with the forged
Petitioner, Present: signature of Lim Sio Wan as indorser.[11]
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market placement for PhP 2
TINGA, million with respondent Producers Bank. Santos was the money market trader assigned to
VELASCO, JR., and handle FCCs account.[12] Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt No. 317568[13] and a
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ. Letter dated September 21, 1983 of Santos addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC, acknowledging
LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN receipt of the placement.[14] The placement matured on October 25, 1983 and was rolled-over
BANK AND TRUST CO., and Promulgated: until December 5, 1983 as evidenced by a Letter dated October 25, 1983.[15] When the
PRODUCERS BANK, placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the proceeds of the
Respondents. March 27, 2008 placement.[16] On December 5, 1983, the same date that So received the phone call instructing
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans placement, the managers check in the name of Lim Sio Wan
was deposited in the account of FCC, purportedly representing the proceeds of FCCs money
DECISION market placement with Producers Bank.[17] In other words, the Allied check was deposited with
Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its obligation to FCC.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House
To ingratiate themselves to their valued depositors, some banks at times bend over Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations, Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check,
backwards that they unwittingly expose themselves to great risks. which reads: All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed.[18]
The Case
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the Court of funded the check even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported
Appeals (CAs) Decision promulgated on March 18, 1998[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim indorsement. Thus, the amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC.[19]
Sio Wan v. Allied Banking Corporation, et al. The CA Decision modified the Decision
dated November 15, 1993[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement
in Makati City rendered in Civil Case No. 6757. to mature on January 9, 1984.[20]
The Facts
On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio
The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are as follows: Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.[21]She was then informed that the placement had been pre-
63
terminated upon her instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the
proceeds thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the banks
manager that her money would be recovered.[22]
When Lim Sio Wans second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to
ask for the latters instructions on the second placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over
the placement for another 30 days.[23] On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the
promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a demand letter to
Allied asking for the payment of the first placement.[24] Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan,
claiming that the latter had authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its
subsequent release to Santos.[25]
Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated February 13,
1984[26] docketed as Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first
money market placement. Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement
from Allied.
Allied filed a third party complaint[27] against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed
a fourth party complaint[28] against FCC. FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint[29] against
Producers Bank. Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was
no longer connected with Producers Bank.[30]
On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the check, Allied informed
Metrobank that the signature on the check was forged.[31] Thus, Metrobank withheld the
amount represented by the check from FCC. Later on, Metrobank agreed to release the
amount to FCC after the latter executed an Undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank
in case it was made to reimburse the amount.[32]
Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a party-
defendant, along with Allied.[33] The RTC admitted the amended complaint despite the
opposition of Metrobank.[34] Consequently, Allieds third party complaint against Metrobank
was converted into a cross-claim and the latters fourth party complaint against FCC was
converted into a third party complaint.[35]
After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the
amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid;
2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of
P173,792.20 by way of attorneys fees; and,
4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.
Defendant Allied Banks cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is
DISMISSED.
Likewise defendant Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas
Cement Corporation is DISMISSED.
Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers
Bank is also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[36]
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision on March 18, 1998,
modifying the RTC Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-
appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of
the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit
adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[37]
Hence, Allied filed the instant petition.
The Issues
Allied raises the following issues for our consideration:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lim Sio
Wan did not authorize [Allied] to pre-terminate the initial placement and
to deliver the check to Deborah Santos.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in absolving Producers
Bank of any liability for the reimbursement of amount adjudged
demandable.
64
 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable to
the extent of 60% of amount adjudged demandable in clear disregard to
the ultimate liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all endorsement on the
check, it being the collecting bank.[38]
The petition is partly meritorious.
A Question of Fact
Allied questions the finding of both the trial and appellate courts that Allied was not authorized
to release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market placement to Santos. Allied clearly
raises a question of fact. When the CA affirms the findings of fact of the RTC, the factual
findings of both courts are binding on this Court.[39]
We also agree with the CA when it said that it could not disturb the trial courts findings on the
credibility of witness So inasmuch as it was the trial court that heard the witness and had the
opportunity to observe closely her deportment and manner of testifying. Unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value, which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case,[40] we find it best to defer to the trial court on matters pertaining to credibility of
witnesses.
Additionally, this Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a factual
question.[41] Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the respective parties were
negligent in the exercise of their obligations is also conclusive upon this Court.
The Liability of the Parties
As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and
familiar is the doctrine that the relationship between a bank and a client is one of debtor-
creditor.
Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible
thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor
an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan.
Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the nature of a simple
loan or mutuum.[42] More succinctly, in Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v.
Sabeniano, this Court ruled that a money market placement is a simple loan or
mutuum.[43] Further, we defined a money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, as follows:
[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term
credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers
do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in
open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who
loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.
In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the
petitioner and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.[44]
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is entitled to
payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until the bank is released
from its obligation as debtor. Until any such event, the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan
remains unextinguished.
Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when obligations are
considered extinguished, thus:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as
annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, and
prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio Wan did not
authorize the release of her money market placement to Santos and the bank had been
negligent in so doing, there is no question that the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had
not been extinguished. Art. 1240 of the Code states that payment shall be made to the person
in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person
authorized to receive it. As commented by Arturo Tolentino:
Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not
extinguish the obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence
which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost
good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error
induced by the fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in
65
 fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment, is void, except as
provided in Article 1241. Such payment does not prejudice the creditor,
and accrual of interest is not suspended by it.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wans money market placement, the bank still
has an obligation to pay her at six percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment
thereof.
We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.
Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of Lim Sio Wans money. It
points out that Metrobank guaranteed all prior indorsements inscribed on the managers
check, and without Metrobanks guarantee, the present controversy would never have
occurred. According to Allied:
Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds of
the check is paid to the proper party is, aside from being an efficient
intervening cause, also the last negligent act, x x x contributory to the
injury caused in the present case, which thereby leads to the conclusion
that it is the collecting bank, Metrobank that is the proximate cause of the
alleged loss of the plaintiff in the instant case.[46]
We are not persuaded.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.[47] Thus, there is an efficient supervening event if the event breaks the sequence
leading from the cause to the ultimate result. To determine the proximate cause of a
controversy, the question that needs to be asked is: If the event did not happen, would the
injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the event is the proximate cause.
In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check payment, the money
represented by the check would still be lost because of Metrobanks negligence in indorsing
the check without verifying the genuineness of the indorsement thereon.
Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Section 66. Liability of general indorser.Every indorser who indorses
without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course;
a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a),
(b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and
b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement
valid and subsisting;
And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be
accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly
taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent
indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so
forth.Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified
indorsement, warrants:
a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be;
b) That he has a good title of it;
c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would
impair the validity of the instrument or render it
valueless.
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty
extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.
The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to
persons negotiating public or corporation securities, other than bills and
notes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The warranty that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be covers
all the defects in the instrument affecting the validity thereof, including a forged
indorsement. Thus, the last indorser will be liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable
instrument even if a previous indorsement was forged. We held in a line of cases that a
collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the
drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement itself, and
ultimately should be held liable therefor.[48]
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception is when the issuance
of the check itself was attended with negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where the
collecting bank is generally held liable, in two of the cases where the checks were negligently
issued, this Court held the institution issuing the check just as liable as or more liable than the
collecting bank.
In isolated cases where the checks were deposited in an account other than that of the payees
on the strength of forged indorsements, we held the collecting bank solely liable for the whole
amount of the checks involved for having indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v. Ebrada,[49] the
check was properly issued by the Bureau of Treasury. While in Banco de Oro Savings and
Mortgage Bank (Banco de Oro) v. Equitable Banking Corporation,[50] Banco de Oro admittedly
issued the checks in the name of the correct payees. And in Traders Royal Bank v. Radio
66
Philippines Network, Inc.,[51] the checks were issued at the request of Radio Philippines
Network, Inc. from Traders Royal Bank.
However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we said that the drawee bank is
liable for 60% of the amount on the face of the negotiable instrument and the collecting bank
is liable for 40%. We also noted the relative negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of
their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the
gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the
fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner BPIs
negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondent
CBCs negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in
encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances,
we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent
CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts. (See Phoenix Construction Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courts,
148 SCRA 353 [1987]).
Considering the comparative negligence of the two (2) banks, we
rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the
loss of P2,413,215.16 and the costs of the arbitration proceeding in the
amount of P7,250.00 and the cost of litigation on a 60-40 ratio.[52]
Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals that the issuing institution and the
collecting bank should equally share the liability for the loss of amount represented by the
checks concerned due to the negligence of both parties:
The Court finds as reasonable, the proportionate sharing of fifty percent-
fifty percent (50%-50%). Due to the negligence of the Province of Tarlac in
releasing the checks to an unauthorized person (Fausto Pangilinan), in
allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive the checks for the payee
hospital for a period close to three years and in not properly ascertaining
why the retired hospital cashier was collecting checks for the payee
hospital in addition to the hospitals real cashier, respondent Province
contributed to the loss amounting to P203,300.00 and shall be liable to the
PNB for fifty (50%) percent thereof. In effect, the Province of Tarlac can
only recover fifty percent (50%) of P203,300.00 from PNB.
The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable to PNB for
fifty (50%) percent of P203,300.00. It is liable on its warranties as indorser
of the checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan, having
guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements, including that of the
chief of the payee hospital, Dr. Adena Canlas. Associated Bank was also
remiss in its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the payees
indorsement.[53]
A reading of the facts of the two immediately preceding cases would reveal that the reason
why the bank or institution which issued the check was held partially liable for the amount of
the check was because of the negligence of these parties which resulted in the issuance of the
checks.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing the managers check
and in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization.[54] In fact, Allied did not
even ask for the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at
her residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the
whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding. Allieds negligence must be considered as the
proximate cause of the resulting loss.
To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a financial institution, the check would
not have been issued and no loss of funds would have resulted. In fact, there would have been
no issuance of indorsement had there been no check in the first place.
The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of Metrobank as the last indorser of the
check. When Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and
Regulations[55] without verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans indorsement and when it
accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to payees account
only,[56] its negligent and cavalier indorsement contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio
Wans money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative participation of Allied and
Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the
60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be upheld.
FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery of Lim Sio Wans
indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against both banks.[57]
As to Producers Bank, Allied Banks argument that Producers Bank must be held liable
as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the
vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such
provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the part of the employer for the civil aspect of
the criminal act of the employee is based on the conviction of the employee for a crime. Here,
there has been no conviction for any crime.
As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank, the
same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its petition that Producers Bank should reimburse
Allied for whatever judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil
Code, which provides: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
67

The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled that [t]here
is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when
a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.[58]
In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust enrichment, thus:
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly
benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.[59]
In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-
terminated and withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement
were deposited in Producers Banks account in Metrobank without any justification. In other
words, there is no reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans placement should be deposited
in FCCs account purportedly as payment for FCCs money market placement and interest in
Producers Bank. With such payment, Producers Banks indebtedness to FCC was extinguished,
thereby benefitting the former. Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense
of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, Producers Bank should
reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim
Sio Wan.
It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered
as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCCs money market placement
with Producers Bank was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment
thereof was justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the
indorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised against FCCwhich was not a part in any
stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.
From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the architect of the
entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons had not been served on Santos, the courts
have not acquired jurisdiction over her.[60] We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the
instant case.
Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount
of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit
which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 and the November 15, 1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED, the fallo of which is reproduced, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing defendant-
appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and
defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of
the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16,
1984 until fully paid. The moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit
adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Additionally and by way of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is hereby ordered to pay
Allied and Metrobank the aforementioned amounts. The liabilities of the parties are
concurrent and independent of each other.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed
by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years
of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment,
or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such
liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the
same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother
68
or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under
the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of
love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in
the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we
cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic
legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an
extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately
initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of
respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the
following decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby
reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and
solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the
legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which
took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his
aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second
weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation
but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the
corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted
with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of
private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same
city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of
both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective
theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun
on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed
over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third
party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a
narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused
Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court
below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs
complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for
lack of sufficient merit." 2
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of
therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against
defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for
resolution the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with
established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent
court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of
69
Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or
not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue
emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around
the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is
not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was
suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of
an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private
respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of
Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his
autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on
Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendells hands was forever
lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell
Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20)
minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor
mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect
examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he
see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he
examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he
had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and
the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and
that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot
wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct
examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black
residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that
you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that
correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the
singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own
sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim
himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point
of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is
concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired
by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the
crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi,
respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the
right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by
0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8
cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward,
upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the
brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x
1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
external auditory meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of
entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or
bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying
tissue, are absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the
wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24
inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for
Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.
70
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm
almost straight towards his head." 11
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an
apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house
adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the
gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces
the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly
the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas
station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans,
she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with
James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop.
13
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the
Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he
lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs
house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your house?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A From upstairs in my living room.
ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not
inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses observations, since the
visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation
to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso,
testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso,
were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed
the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and,
not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down
from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolos direct and
candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James
Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was
another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even
point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged
"John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die
by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial, documentary and
pictorial the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive
being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family,
hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not
borne out by the evidence on record either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of
these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag,
all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or
using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the
safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking
the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his
mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were
gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son,
despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendells
death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was
missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they
know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug
71
users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a
handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly
appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as
explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of
diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in
this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been
diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his
reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun
which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable
for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-
14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who
acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his
or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA
361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got
hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-
spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when
Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this
picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have
kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
x x x We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower
court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as
preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell
Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned
that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed."
(Emphases ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for
the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination
therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites
Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents
for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an
extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary
liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two
paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion
hereunder.chanrobles law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents
for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to
the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and
substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we
apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case
of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability
is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."cralaw
virtua1aw library
72
children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
x x x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by
. . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who
has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their
legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision
the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct
and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that
is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall
be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the
Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . .
. shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is
found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in
the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of
cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23
Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et.
Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of
parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are
not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the
issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article
2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases
hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply
only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act
involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused
with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a
regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the liability of the parents,
in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or
subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless
imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were
held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father
of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a
separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing
for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the
conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180
but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already
explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas
which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious
physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the
mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his
conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the
son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was
ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for
damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father
was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only
for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments;
28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals,
accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other
classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case,
it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents
therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision
now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the
law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization
does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing
therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court
concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence
73
submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is minor, defendants-appellees.
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed
by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to BARREDO, J.:
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in
of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31 Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental 1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified. 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata;
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony
or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
emancipation by marriage.
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite
diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners. was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
SO ORDERED.
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
vs. reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

74
 SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record
on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page
4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty.
Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result
in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
75
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
"Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code
of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it
is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law
that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text
of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article
1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-
delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
76
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura,
an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the
new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him
at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage
to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960
77
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE BALCE, defendant-appellee.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr. for appellants.
Severino Balce for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon
from July 18, 1952, plus attorney' fees and other incidental expenses.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate
their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and
not to criminal cases.
After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with
costs. Hence the present appeal.
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also
Single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos
Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00.
Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued for
the payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was
insolvent and had no property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant,
father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but
defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.
The question for determination is whether appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the
indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against
him.
In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his criminal liability and,
therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee must be determined under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only applies to
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts, the trial court made the following observation:
The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art.
100 of the Revised Penal Code). But there is no law which holds the father either
primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civiliability inccured by the son who is a minor
of 8 years. Under Art. 101 of the Penal Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son if the latter is an imbecile, or insane, or under 9 years of age
or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without discernment. Under Art. 102, only in
keepers and tavern-keepers are held subsidiarily liable and under Art. 103 of the
same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply only to
"employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees
in the discharge of their duties." By the principle of exclusio unus exclusio ulterius,
the defendant in this case cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of
Gumersindo Balce who has been convicted of homicide for the killing of the
plaintiff's son Carlos Salen.
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied by the plaintiff's, is not applicable to the case at
bar. It applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses. Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or
offenses is governed by the provisions of the Penal Code and civil liability arising
from civil negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil Code. The obligation
imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly refers to obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts. And obligations arising from quasi-delict (Commissioner's
note). And according to Art. 2177, the 'responsibility for fault of negligence under
Art. 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liabilty arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. . . .
While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be
governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that
the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should
likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the
case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment or
sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court.
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for
the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age,
over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it appears that there
is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the deliquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability,
for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which
provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may
78
stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if
the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.
A case in point is Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, the facts of which are as follows:
Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in the company of his father, Delfin
Capuno. He is a student of the Balintawak Elementary School in the City of San
Pablo and a member of the Boy Scout Organization of his school. On Marcy 31,
1949, on the occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of
San Pablo, Dante Capuno was one of those instructed by the City School Supervisor
to join the parade. From the school, Dante Capuno, together with other students,
boarded a jeep. When the jeep started to run, Dante Capuno took hold of the
wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far
when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amando Ticson and Isidro
Caperina died as a consequence. The corresponding criminal action for double
homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Dante Capuno.
During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperina,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.
Dante Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense charged against him. In line
with said reservation of Sabina Exconde, the corresponding civil action for damages
was filed against Delfin Capuno, Dante Capuno and others.
In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante Capuno arising
from the criminal act committed by the latter, this Court made the following ruling:
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieved themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art.
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove.
Another case in point is Araneta vs. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off. Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts
of this case are as follows:
On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other
students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering
the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a
former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario
and conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving
the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented
the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in
the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the
lower jaw, causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends,
the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the Singian
Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death for three days. The vigor of
youth came to his rescue; he rallied and after sometime finally recovered, the
gunshot would left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a
scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The
behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose
after leaving the hospital.
Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty, but in view of his
youth, he being only 14 years of age, the court suspended the proceedings as prescribed by
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta and his
father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario, to recover material, moral and
exemplary damages. The court of first instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay
P3,943.00 as damages and attorney's fees. From this decision, the Araneta appealed in view
of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This Court affirmed the decision but increased
the indemnity to P18,000.00. This is a typical case of parental subsidiary liability arising from
the criminal act of a minor son.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgement is hereby rendered ordering
appellee to pay appellants the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of
the complaint, and the costs.
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
79
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the
Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them,
together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus
engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly
worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment
the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from
the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who
thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first
on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three
days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts,
however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter
against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay
P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child
which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions
of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the
latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated
therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The
basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The
presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
"that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated,
and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company?
Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law
simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies
a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine
whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have
any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation
has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
80
Fernando, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of
appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law or torts.
She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found
an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was
likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he
had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her
classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is
nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the
damage caused upon plaintiff child.
# Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of
appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law or torts.
She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found
an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was
likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he
had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her
classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is
nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the
damage caused upon plaintiff child.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted
on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result
of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-
day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988.
It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned
81
at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the
time and place of hearing both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated
18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June
1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987
and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses
Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their
minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1)
whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even
through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of
adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the
biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration
filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41,
and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence
did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless
pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held
by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel
indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of
technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having
been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary
period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where
the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their
merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the
Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the
Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally
culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position
to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which
82
 adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability
with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability
can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's
own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to
the person made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the
minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody
of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which
reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency
and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that
the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests
of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall
be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was
filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to
be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time
the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents
sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their companyand under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
83
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they Manila
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the FIRST DIVISION
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732
the time the tort was committed. AGENCY, INC., and ADMER
PAJARILLO,
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article Petitioners,
35 provides as follows: Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)
unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
CALLEJO, SR., and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,
VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been Respondents. December 14, 2006
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is
hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
(Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo(Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the
Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, QuezonCity, to renew her time deposit per advise of the
banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder
with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security
guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag
to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service
shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed
Republic of the Philippines with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
Supreme Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved
84
their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.[3] On shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case
appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps
273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence simply showed that it required its guards
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law;
that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the
In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also
alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its
latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
damages and attorneys fees.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security Agency,
Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads: Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.[9]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants AdmerPajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable
said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following: provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but
the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions
damages of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged
indemnity; and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might
damages; proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is
as exemplary damages; inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their
attorneys fees; and employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
6. costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution dated October 20, 2004.

SO ORDERED. [8] Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim
that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillos bare claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper other money claims.
85

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of
damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that
petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from
any liability.[10]
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to
respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly
and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil
liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a
separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a
crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the
same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of
homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus
must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an
act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article
33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.[13]
It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature
of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15]
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned
and posted in the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was
employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence
there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly
without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco,
killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are
jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.[16]
86
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to
recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused
by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which
provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability
of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.[18] The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by
law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil
action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a
crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal
case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a
separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May
10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of
that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in
a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was
the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court
is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the
latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of
his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their
right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not
preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-
delict.[20](Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is
already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.[21] It
would have been entirely different if respondents cause of action was for damages arising from
a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[22]
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is
based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
87

We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting
Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review
on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[23] Generally, factual
findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us
to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the bank was
to renew her time deposit.[25] On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun
from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about
one meter or one arms length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and
shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such
movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could have
prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere
apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled
by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming
under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank[28] and saw her talking to a
man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached
the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that
indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior
to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his
head guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same
to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have
already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a
shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is
quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over
which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-
up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun
at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance
door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[31]
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was
actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot
her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners petition for review where they
argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her
bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a
dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing
a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against
petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he
saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is
absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even
doubtful.Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no
basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment
of Pajarillos imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she
was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment
where people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been
prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself
with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the
gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting
incident. Evangelines death was merely due to Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his
imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown
that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It
claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the
88
requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with;
that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the supervision
of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security
guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with
proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees performances; that the fact
that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure is not sufficient
basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error
to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence
in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection
of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as
may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.[36]To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the
selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological
and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no
psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course
for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt.
James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and
regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,[37] Weapons
Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson
Plan,[39] Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had also been established
during Cameros cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct examination that these
company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during
classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,[42] the records do
not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous
evaluation of the security guards performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service
training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard
of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept
of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life
of the employees.[43]
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard had
ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which
has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on
duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. [44]
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm
for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or
seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go
around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned
therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really
such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed
and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in
the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with
the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
89
 As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the
spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral
damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity
of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.[46]
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangelines
death was so sudden causing respondent Lauroto lose a wife and a mother to six children who
were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one million
pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded the amount of one
million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was
also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in
their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million
pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children as they
were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[50]
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when,
as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
OSCAR DELOS SANTOS and ELIZA DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 169498
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent. December 11, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioners spouses Oscar and Eliza delos Santos
(spouses Delos Santos), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated 28 June 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In its assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals reversed the Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99, declaring Saturnino Dy,
also known as Juanito Dy (Dy), and Dyson Surface and Coating Corporation (Dyson Corporation)
as joint employers of the accused Antonio Sagosoy (Sagosoy), who should both be held liable
solidarily with Sagosoy for the injury caused to Ferdinand delos Santos (Ferdinand).
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 18 March 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, the Isuzu forward van
driven by Sagosoy collided with a horse-drawn carriage steered by Oscar delos Santos. Oscar
delos Santos was with his four-year-old son Ferdinand who was seated in the carriage. The
collision left the horse dead and Ferdinand seriously injured with a broken spinal cord. A
surgical operation to repair the broken spinal cord could not be performed on Ferdinand
because of his tender age. Thus, Ferdinands broken spinal cord further caused irreversible
damage to his vision, speech, and motor skills.
The van driven by Sagosoy bears plate number ULP 725 registered under the name
of Dy of Dyson Corporation.
An Information[2] charging Sagosoy with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was eventually filed before the RTC, which
reads:
90
 That on or about the 18th day of March, 1998, in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Forward Van
bearing Plate No. 725, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive,
manage and operate the same along Tatalon, Ugong, this municipality, in
a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, without taking the necessary
precautions to avoid accident to person and damage to property, and so,
as a result of such carelessness, negligence and imprudence, said vehicle
driven by the accused, hit and collide with Horse-Drawn Vehicle (Tiburine)
causing said Tiburine to be damaged in the amount of P9,200.00 and
causing further the death of the horse valued at P75,000.00 to the damage
and prejudice of the owner thereof, and as further consequence,
Ferdinand delos Santos sustained physical injuries which requires medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days and incapacitated said
Ferdinand delos Santos from performing his habitual work for the same
period of time.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99.
When arraigned, Sagosoy pleaded not guilty.[3]
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision[4] on 27 September 2002 in
Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99 finding Sagosoy guilty of the crime charged, thereby sentencing
him to a straight penalty of four (4) months imprisonment and to indemnify the spouses Delos
Santos for actual and moral damages resulting from Ferdinands injury. The fallo of the said RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ANTONIO
SAGOSOY y NAMALATA guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries and
damage to property, without any attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstance and hereby sentences him to a straight penalty of FOUR (4)
MONTHS of arresto mayor. The accused is further sentenced to pay [the
Spouses Delos Santos] the amount of P85,000.00 representing the medical
expenses after deducting the amount of P150,000.00 contributed by the
employer of the accused, the amount of P9,200.00 representing the cost
of repair of the damaged tiburine, the amount of P75,000.00 representing
the value of the horse, and the amount of P300,000.00 representing the
cost of the operation to be performed on Ferdinand upon reaching the age
of 18. Finally, the accused is sentenced to pay [the Spouses Delos Santos]
the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages, to pay Ferdinand delos
Santos, through his parents [the Spouses Delos Santos], the amount
of P200,000.00 as indemnity, to pay the amount equivalent to 10% of the
amount to be collected as reasonable attorneys fees, and to pay the costs
of suit, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution,[5] which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. The First Writ of Execution[6] was
issued on 3 January 2003 commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective its 27
September 2002 Decision in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99.
An attempt to satisfy the judgment was made by the Sheriff, but he found no real or
personal properties of Sagosoy to answer for the latters civil liability to the spouses Delos
Santos. The unsatisfied Sheriffs Return[7] prompted the spouses Delos Santos to file a Motion
for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution[8] against the properties and income of Dy in light of
his subsidiary liability as the employer of Sagosoy. The motion was opposed by Dy who denied
that he was the employer of Sagosoy. According to Dy, at the time the accident occured,
Sagoysoy was merely doing an isolated and non-business related driving task for him.
After weighing the arguments of the parties, the RTC issued on 30 May 2003 an Order
directing the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution, not just against the income and properties
of Sagosoy, but also those of Dy.[9] The Alias Writ of Execution[10] was issued on 3 June 2003.
Subsequently, the RTC, in an Order dated 23 June 2003, denied Dys Motion for
Reconsideration of its Order dated 30 May 2003.
Dy filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 78005, averring that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Orders
dated 30 May 2003 and 23 June 2003. The appellate court, however, in a Decision[11] dated 28
September 2004, dismissed Dys Petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders. Said
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005 became final and executory on 20
October 2004 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment already made therein.[12]
In the interregnum, per the Sheriffs Return dated 6 October 2003, the Alias Writ of
Execution was again returned unsatisfied due to the failure of the Sheriff to locate any real or
personal property registered in the name of Dy.[13]
Unrelenting, the spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Second
Writ of Execution before the RTC, identifying Dyson Corporation as the co-employer of
Sagosoy, together with Dy. The spouses Delos Santos called the attention of the trial court to
particular pieces of evidence to establish that Sagosoy, at the time of the accident, worked for
both Dy and Dyson Corporation, namely: (1) Sagosoys testimony that Dy was doing business in
the name of Dyson Corporation; (2) Sagosoys Social Security System (SSS) record showing that
Dyson Corporation was his registered employer; and (3) the Articles of Incorporation of Dyson
Corporation establishing that Dy was one of the majority stockholders of Dyson
Corporation.[14] The spouses Delos Santos also propounded that the accident which caused
serious physical injuries to Ferdinand took place while Sagosoy was undertaking an activity in
furtherance of the business operations of Dyson Corporation.[15]
Dyson Corporation timely opposed the spouses Delos Santoss latest Motion,
underscoring the inconsistencies in the spouses Delos Santoss stand on the crucial issue of who
was the real employer of Sagosoy. Dyson Corporation averred that the spouses Delos Santos
should not be allowed to conveniently shift their position on the said issue, and now joined
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Dyson Corporation with Dy as Sagosoys employers after it turned out that Dy alone was
financially incapable of satisfying the civil liability under the RTC judgment in Criminal Case No.
1116-V-99.[16]
In an Order[17] dated 10 February 2004, the RTC granted the spouses Delos Santoss
Motion and declared Dy and Dyson Corporation as co-employers of Sagosoy. In its Order, the
RTC explained that while the van driven by Sagosoy was owned by Dy, it was being used by
Dyson Corporation in its business operations. The RTC further justified that the initial confusion
as to the identity of Sagosoys employer was understandable and did not render impossible the
conclusion that both Dy and Dyson Corporation were Sagosoys employers who should both
accordingly be held liable for the civil liability arising from the crime of which Sagosoy was
adjudged guilty.
In an Order[18] dated 1 March 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of Dyson Corporation for no sufficient merit.
For allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the RTC Orders
dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March 2004 were challenged by Dyson Corporation before the
Court of Appeals through a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83234.
On 28 June 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
83234, finding therein that the issuance by the RTC of its 10 February 2004 and 1 March
2004 Orders was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court reasoned that Dy
and Dyson Corporation could only be treated as joint employers of Sagosoy upon the piercing
of the veil of corporate fiction, which was not warranted in the instant case since it had not
been shown that Dy was hiding behind the cloak of Dyson Corporation in order to evade
liability. Thus, the fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. We hereby ANNUL and SET ASIDE the assailed
orders.Costa against [the spouses Delos Santos].[19]
The spouses Delos Santos filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 10 August
2005 explaining that the delay was caused by their counsel who did not notify them of the
receipt of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 28 June 2005. It was only upon inquiry with the
RTC on 26 July 2005 that they learned of the appellate courts decision.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[20] dated 30 August 2005, refused to give due
course to the spouses Delos Santoss Motion for Reconsideration since it was not filed within
the reglementary period. According to the appellate court, the spouses Delos Santos thru
counsel received a copy of their 28 June 2005 Decision on 26 July 2005. Hence, the spouses
Delos Santos had only until 29 July 2005 to move for the reconsideration of the judgment or
to appeal it. The Motion for Reconsideration was filed only on 10 August 2005.Resultantly, the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 became final and executory on 19
September 2005.
The spouses Delos Santos are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the Court
of Appeals disquisition on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. For the resolution of this
Court are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE INSTANT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
FOR CERTIORARI, IS PROPER IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE SPOUSES DELOSSANTOS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT DY AND DYSON CORPORATION ARE JOINT EMPLOYERS
OF SAGOSOY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE HELD SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE FOR
THE CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE CRIME COMMITTED BY SAGOSOY.
The Court first dispenses with the procedural issues raised by the parties, particularly
the propriety of the remedy they chose to avail herein.
The spouses Delos Santos justify their present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus by averring the lack of any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available
in the ordinary course of law that could compensate them for the injury caused to their son.On
the other hand, Dyson Corporation counters by highlighting the failure of the spouses Delos
Santos to timely file their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83234. Dyson Corporation argues that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be
invoked as a substitute for the remedy of appeal that was already lost, less so, when the
requisites for certiorariwere not faithfully complied with.
According to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, a petition
for certiorari may be filed under the following circumstances:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
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 A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used
for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction. [21]
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[22]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.
There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. [23]
Although the court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition
for certiorari, in general, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse
of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are
procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars. One of the
procedural errors for which the court could dismiss a petition for certiorari is the failure of the
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or decision. [24] A motion for
reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
writ of certiorari since a motion for reconsideration is still considered an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to
give an opportunity to the lower court to correct its imputed errors.[25]
In the present case, the spouses Delos Santos did file a Motion for Reconsideration
but they were only able to do so beyond the reglementary period.
Moreover, since the case at bar resonates with a piercing and urgent call for justice
for a four-year-old boy seriously crippled by the accident caused by the negligence of Sagosoy,
the Court is persuaded to excuse the procedural flaw so it could fully heed the call.Laws and
rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction, but in light
of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all. This Court is
not impervious to instances when rules of procedure must yield to the loftier demands of
substantial justice and equity. Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice; their application must be liberalized to promote public interest. [26]
In this instance, the Court has no doubt that substantial justice will be served and
patent injustice will be obviated by giving due course to this Petition in the presence of
compelling reasons to disregard the spouses Delos Santoss procedural mistake. Just as we had
ruled in Aguam v. Court of Appeals[27]:
The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal.
It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case."
Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities
that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Law suits,
unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every
party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent
course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[28]
The relaxation of procedural rules is even more imperative in the instant Petition
where there is an undeniable need for this Court to settle threshold factual issues to finally
give justice to the parties. It is true that this Court is not a trier of facts, but there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule such as when the appellate court had ignored, misunderstood,
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case; or when its findings were totally devoid of support; or when its judgment
was based on a misapprehension of facts.[29]
The Court now proceeds to the crucial substantive issue raised in this Petition:
whether Dy and the Dyson Corporation are co-employers of Sagosoy who are subsidiarily liable
for the civil liabilities arising from the crime committed by Sagosoy.
The Court of Appeals did not find Dyson Corporation as the co-employer of Sagosoy,
relying on the Decision dated 28 September 2004 of the same court in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005
which sustained the subsidiary liability of Dy as the employer of Sagosoy and which had already
93
attained finality. The appellate court also refused to adjudge Dyson Corporation to be solidarily
liable with Dy unless the veil of corporate fiction was pierced.
The Court does not agree.
The spouses Delos Santos do not controvert the pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals in its 28 September 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005 that Dy, as the employer
of Sagosoy, was subsidiarily liable for the civil obligations of his insolvent employee who caused
injury to third persons in the course of the latters employment. Indeed, the spouses Delos
Santos agree with the appellate court that Dy should not be allowed to run scot-free from his
liability in light of the fact that he was the owner of the van Sagosoy was driving at the time of
the accident. What the spouses Delos Santos are seeking from this Court is the affirmation that
in addition to Dy, Dyson Corporation is also the employer of Sagosoy, as several pieces of
evidence would show, which should likewise be made answerable for the civil liabilities
incurred by Sagosoy.
The Court notes that there was no way for the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78005 to already deduce from the pleadings and evidence presented therein that Sagosoy was
employed not just by Dy, but also by Dyson Corporation. The Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005
was filed by Dy and all arguments and evidence necessarily revolved only around his liability
as an employer. Moreover, the finding of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78005, that
Sagosoy was working for Dy, is not necessarily in conflict with a subsequent ruling in another
case that Sagosoy was employed not just by Dy, but also by Dyson Corporation. It bears to
emphasize that Dy remains to be considered an employer of Sagosoy and still subsidiarily liable
for the latters civil obligations arising from the crime.However, if Dyson Corporation is declared
a co-employer of Sagosoy together with Dy, then Dyson Corporation and Dy must now
solidarily bear the subsidiary liability.
Justice and fairness dictate that the spouses Delos Santos should be compensated
for the tragic fate of their son, and the rule of law should be enforced against those persons
who may be adjudged liable, brushing aside hornbook procedural principles which unduly
delay the dispensation of justice to an innocent and hapless boy who practically lost his life to
an accident due to the negligence of another.
Since it was duly proven that Sagosoy had no real or personal properties to satisfy
the judgment, then Sagosoys employer must answer for damages Sagosoy caused. The
statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, which read:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and
proprietors of establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment
of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding in which the award is made. This
liability attaches when the employees who are convicted of crimes committed in the
performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus unable to satisfy the civil
liability adjudged.[30]
The Court has scrupulously examined the records of this case and concluded that
Sagosoy was working for both Dy and Dyson Corporation when the van he was driving collided
with the horse-drawn carriage carrying Ferdinand. In his testimony before the RTC, Sagosoy
narrated that he was employed by Dy who was doing business under the name of Dyson
Corporation. Sagosoys testimony is validated by the Certificate of Incorporation of Dyson
Corporation showing that Dy is one of the major stockholders of Dyson Corporation. Also, the
SSS records of Sagosoy state that his employer is Dyson Corporation. These pieces of evidence
strongly prove that Sagosoy is also deemed an employee of Dyson Corporation. In contrast,
Dyson Corporation does not at all offer any controverting evidence, and vainly centers its
defense on procedural rhetoric.[31]
In addition, the records are bereft of information on any other business or industry
that Dy is engaged in and for which he personally employs Sagosoy. Sagosoy could not be the
mere private driver of Dy because when the accident occurred, Sagosoy was driving an Isuzu
Forward van, which is primarily used for the delivery of goods and effects. Taking note of the
fact that Dy is the Chief Executive Officer of Dyson Corporation, it would appear that the van
being driven by Sagosoy was only registered in Dys name, but was actually being used by Dyson
Corporation in the conduct of its business. Given these circumstances, both Dy and Dyson
Corporation should be declared the employers of Sagosoy who are both subsidiarily liable for
Sagosoys liabilities ex delicto.
Finally, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, there is no need to pierce the
veil of corporate fiction in this case, considering that Dy and Dyson Corporation are precisely
being treated as separate entities, which is the reason why they are being declared co-
employers of Sagosoy. That Dy is hiding behind the personality of Dyson Corporation in order
to escape liability is not even relevant herein. The evidence and the circumstances establish
that Dy is the registered owner of the van driven by Sagosoy in furtherance of the business of
Dyson Corporation; and that Dyson Corporation uses the van driven by Sagosoy in its business
94
operation and recognizes Sagosoy as one of its employees per the latters SSS records. Hence,
both Dy and Dyson Corporation can be deemed the employers of Sagosoy.

With the pronouncement that both Dy and Dyson Corporation are subsidiarily liable
for the damages caused to the spouses Delos Santos, let this much prolonged litigation be put
to an end. The counsels of the parties are herby warned not to employ any procedural tactics
that would further delay the execution of the RTC Decision dated 27 September
2002 in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99. Litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other.[32] In the words of Mr. Justice Malcolm, More important than anything else,
is that the court should be right and to render justice where justice is due.[33]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 28 June 2005 and Resolution dated 30 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83234 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March
2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99 are
hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

95