36.HEIRS OF TENGCO vs.
HEIRS OF ALIWALAS and CA On rebuttal, Victoria adduced evidence that there is no record of the
(1988, CORTES, J.)
FACTS:
October 12, 1933 - Lot No. 3563 (subject land) of the Arayat Cadastre
was originally part of the public domain.
Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for a homestead
patent covering this lot.
o 1936 Application granted. Homestead Patent No. 38588 was issued in
his name.
o 1937 The homestead patent was duly registered and OCT No. 159
was issued.
From that time on, Dr. Aliwalas declared the subject lot for tax
purposes and paid the corresponding land taxes thereon. As owner, Dr.
Aliwalas, thru his overseer and caretaker Espiridion Manaul, had this
parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some portions. Other
portions were dedicated to cattle raising until WWII.
After the war, tenants of Dr. Aliwalas planted crops on the subject
land. Manaul was still caretaker and delivered to Dr. Aliwalas the
owners share in the harvests.
1962 Dr. Aliwalas died management over the subject parcel
passed to his son Jose Jr.
o Subsequently, the heirs partitioned Dr. Aliwalas estate the subject land
was distributed to Victoria Vda. De Aliwalas (the widow) Partition
was approved by RD of Pampanga OCT in Victorias name (Nov
1966). Also has TD and paid real estate taxes thereon.
October 31, 1973 - Ponciano Tengco representing the Heirs of
Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands.
Among other things, he alleged that the subject parcel of land had been
occupied and cultivated originally and continuously by
Gregorio. APPROVED + issued Free Patent No. 557692 on
February 5, 1974.
o The Free Patent was issued upon the assumption that the lot still formed
part of the public domain and on the findings of the Public Land
Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted an investigation and
reported that the land was possessed and occupied by the Tengcos who
had planted different kinds of trees on the land aside from rice and
corn.
Homestead patent in the name of Dr. Aliwalas is because the prewar
records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications
were burned during the war.
TC: Victoria as true owner, cancel all certs in Tengcos names,
Tengcos must vacate and pays rents 5k/year since 1974 until turn over
Heirs of Tengco appealed to CA CA affirmed TC, MR was
denied Hence this case.
ISSUES:
WON TC and CA had jurisdiction?
WON the claim of the heirs of Victoria will hold true and prosper
before a proper forum; (Tengcos were claiming the Aliwalas title is
defective)
WON the heirs of Victoria, assuming for the sake of argument, that
they have proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not
long lost such rights by laches and/or prescription.
ON JURISDICTION
Well-settled rule in jurisprudence: an OCT issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued
in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of
the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible
and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of
the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance
of the patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land
Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title.
ON NON-EXHAUSTION
Already been rejected in earlier decisions. The Director of Lands
has the power to review homestead patents only so long as the land
remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his
exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of
title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and
becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction.
 ON DEFECTIVE TITLE
TENGCOS: (a) Dr. Jose Aliwalas was not qualified to be a
homesteader being a rich landed person; and (b) The Aliwalas Family
has never been in actual or physical possession of the property, unlike
the Tengcos who have been in continuous and open possession of the
property since 1918. (EVIDENCE: Report prepared by Librado B.
Luna, hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, attesting to such facts.)
o SC citing the CA: Aliwalas title to the property having become
incontrovertible, CANNOT be collaterally attacked. If indeed there
had been any fraud or misrepresentation the proper remedy is an action
for reversion instituted by the OSG.
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of
private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority
vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the
IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

ON LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION 38. G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
TENGCOS: The Aliwalas Family has never actually possessed the vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT andESTELITA PADILLA,
property unlike the Tengcos (same as their 2nd reason as to why the respondents.NARVASA, J.:pFACTS: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P.
Cheesman weremarried on December 4, 1970 but have
Aliwalas title is defective)
beenseparated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed
o UNTENABLE Title acquired through a homestead patent registered of Sale and Transfer ofPossessory Rights was executed by Armando
under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription Altaresconveying a parcel of unregistered land and the housein favor of
cannot operate against the registered owner. Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age,Filipino citizen, married to
Citing CA: The Aliwalas Family have NOT slept on their rights. SC Thomas Cheesman, andresiding at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta.
Rita,Olongapo City . Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed,
cited the facts (having a caretaker, tenants, planting on the land, paying didnot object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Thereafter, tax
tax, partition) which they found showed that the Aliwas Family had declarations for the property purchasedwere issued in the name only of
indeed occupied, possessed and exercised rights of ownership over the Criselda Cheesmanand Criselda assumed exclusive management
subject land prior to the filing of the instant suit. andadministration of said property, leasing it totenants. This
happened without any protest fromThomas. Criselda sold the
37. 347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles and property to Estelita M. Padilla,without the knowledge or consent of
Cheesman. Thedeed described Criselda as being of legal
Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
age,married to an American citizen... Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the in the CFI againstCriselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for
validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples theannulment of the sale on the ground that thetransaction had
Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an been executed without his knowledgeand consent. During the Pre-trial,
the sale was declared void abinitio and the the delivery of the
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the property to Thomas asadministrator of the conjugal partnership property
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources wasordered. However, the judgment was set aside on a petition forrelief
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, filed by the Estrellita, grounded on "fraud,mistake and/or
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates excusable negligence" which hadseriously impaired her right to
the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which present her caseadequately. Estelita Padilla filed a
may include natural resources. supplementalpleading as her own answer to the complaint and amotion
for summary judgment. The Trial Court found that o The evidence on
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all- record satisfactorily overcame thedisputable presumption that all
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral property of themarriage belongs to the conjugal partnership andthat
the immovable in question was in truthCriseldas paraphernal
property;o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not applybecause the
husband-plaintiff is an American citizenand therefore disqualified under
the Constitution toacquire and own real properties; ando The exercise
by Criselda of exclusive acts ofdominion with the knowledge of her
husband hadled Estelita to believe that the properties were theexclusive
properties of Criselda and on the faith ofsuch a belief she bought the
properties from her andfor value and therefore, Thomas was estopped
toimpugn the transfer. Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the
actof the Trial Court of granting Estelitas petition forrelief and its
resolution of matters not subject ofsaid petition. IAC affirmed the
Summary Judgmentand found no reversible error. Thomas
Cheesmanappealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of theremedy of appeal to
SC? NO
[COMMENTO: Were familiar with the Persons relatedissue The to preclude hisraising the same question on appeal from
foreigner husband has no capacity orpersonality to question the sale
of the property becauseit would be an indirect controversion of the
constitutionalprohibition. Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands ofthe
public domain.
]RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition forrelief
under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is notappealable.
QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: Theconclusions made by the
trial court were derived fromevidence adduced by the parties, the facts set
out inthe pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordareconclusions or
findings of fact. As distinguishedfrom a QUESTION OF LAWwhich
exists "when thedoubt or difference arises as to what the law is on acertain
state of facts" "there is a QUESTION OFFACT when the doubt or
difference arises as to thetruth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when
the"query necessarily invites calibration of the wholeevidence
considering mainly the credibility ofwitnesses, existence and
relevancy of specificsurrounding circumstances, their relation; to
eachother and to the whole and the probabilities of
thesituation." The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly
setforth, may be raised in a petition for the review
oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appealspresented to
the Supreme Court. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is
limited toreviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive thefactual
findings of the lower court upon its ownassessment of the
evidence. CA was created precisely to take away from the SCthe work of
examining the evidence, and confine itstask to the determination of
questions which do not callfor the reading and study of transcripts
containing thetestimony of witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the
factual findings orconclusions of the CA is subject to certain
exceptions.However, none of which is present in the case at bar. Both the
Trial Court and the IAC reached the sameconclusions on the 3 factual
matters, after assessmentof the evidence and determination of the
probative value thereof and these determinations will not
bedisturbed.o The facts on record adequately proved fraud,mistake
or excusable negligence by which EstelitaPadilla's rights had been
substantially impaired; thatthe funds used by Criselda Cheesman was
moneyshe had earned and saved prior to her marriage toThomas
Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla didbelieve in good faith that
Criselda Cheesman wasthe sole owner of the property in question. An
order of a CFI granting a petition for reliefunder Rule 38 is
interlocutory and is NOTappealable. The failure of the party who
opposedthe petition to appeal from said order, or
hisparticipation in the proceedings subsequently had,cannot be
construed as a waiver of his objectionto the petition for relief so as
thejudgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat
his objections to thepetition for relief, or perform any act
thereafter inorder to preserve his right to question the
sameeventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for thispurpose
that he has made of record "the actionwhich he desires the court
to take or his objection tothe action of the court and his grounds therefor."
The prayer in a petition for relief from judgmentunder Rule 38
is not necessarily the same prayer inthe petitioner's complaint, answer
or other basicpleading. Once a petition for relief is granted and
thejudgment subject thereof set aside, and furtherproceedings
are thereafter had, the Court in itsjudgment on the merits may
properly grant the reliefsought in the petitioner's basic pleadings,
althoughdifferent from that stated in his petition for relief.WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,with costs against petitioner.
39. G.R. No. 149615 | 2006-08-29
FACTS: Elena Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany. The couple resided in Germany ata a house owned by
Helmut's parents. In 1992, they moved to Philippines. Helmut sold the
house he inherited from his parents to purchase a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal. The lot costs P528,000 and the construction of the house
costs P2.3M. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that
he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of
the said prohibition. Due to incompatibilities and Helmut's alleged
womanazing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated. Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties before the
RTC. In its ruling, although the Family Code provides that properties
acquired by gratuitous title are excluded from the conjugal property,
Helmut cannot recover the Antipolo property. This is because his
acquisition of the property is in violation of Sec. 7, Art. XII of the
Constitution. The constitution provides for the prohibition for an alien to
acquire lands in the Philippines. Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that Helmut
be reimbursed of the cost of acquisition of the land and the cost of the
construction of the house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Helmut can be reimbursed of the cost of
Antipolo property?
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner's
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Invoking the principle that
a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a
frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he
who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may
be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to
the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
40. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE
G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967
Ponente: J. Castro
DOCTRINE:
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is
against a constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null
and void.
FACTS:
Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong,
covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion
fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although
the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the
agreement.
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option
to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a
monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed
on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of
the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month.
The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a
petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn
when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October
28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine
citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were
abandoned.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees
to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil
of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of
heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
HELD:
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but
considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by
indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien
the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to
buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights the sum total of
which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional
ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
44.
REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLEGR. No. L-6776 May
21,1955FACTS:
A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si
Temple, an unregistered religiousorganization that operated through
three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused
torecord the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the
Consitution provides that acquisition of landis limited to Filipino citizens,
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is owned by
suchcitizens.
registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area
of 56.4007 hectares.
To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by
CENRO and FMS-DENR
and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
opposed the
application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the
land was alienable
and disposable.

ISSUE: Issue/s:
Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and
religious organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are disposable.
Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
Ruling:
RULING:Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of No.
hereditary succession, no privateagricultural land shall be transferred or It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to registration is
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the
not make anyexception in favor of religious associations DENR Secretary had
.The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the approved the land classification and released the land of the public
Constitutional inhibition, since itsmember are of foreign nationality. The domain as alienable and
purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or disposable.
associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed
resources shall be controlled byFilipinos; and proof. For the
the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR
controllingmembership should be composed of Filipino citizens. Administrative Order No. 20
As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has
Constitution violated the freedom of religion,the Court was not convinced no authority to issue
that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO
religious profession or worship. No. 38 provides that
CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a
45. maximum area of 50
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc. (555 SCRA 477) hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, hectares, thus CENRO has
vs. no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAOs
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent. that the documents
G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008 submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.

Facts: 46. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. LRC

In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an (1957)G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
application for the
FACTS: October 4, 1954:
Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman
Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr.
Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a
previous resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to
prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp.
were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their
congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit
a
similar affidavit declaring the same.
June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an
affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had
five incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was
ownership through donation and this was purchased
As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds
has some doubts as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the
Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1151)
LRC:o In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private
lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per
centum
of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the
corporation sole was a Canadian citizeno ordered the Registered Deeds
of
Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of
compliance with such condition action for mandamus was instituted by
Roman alleging the land is held in true for the benefit of the Catholic
population of a place .
ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the
Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution
HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register
the deed of sale A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his
successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station,
who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities
and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had.
o In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens,
distinct from their several chapters corporation sole
1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever
2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in
the territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are
administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or
territory of the corporation sole
3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has
nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the
corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with
their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of
Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith
within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizenso presented
evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully
covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution
fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to
receive
bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the
friars
had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear
indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for
charitable,
benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators,
considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of
religious landholdings.
as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they
stand in
position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as
in
other cases of trust.
47. Petitioner:
RAMON ARANDA
Respondent:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Promulgated: August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 172331
FACTS:
Subject of a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of
land situated in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of 9,103 square
meters and designated as Lot 3730, Psc 47, Malvar Cadastre.
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. originally filed The petition represented by its
Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr.
OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the reasons:
1.
petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping; 2.
the statement of technical description was based merely on the boundaries
set forth in the tax declaration; and 3.
due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant
corporation cannot push through and consequently the tax declaration is
still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and the land cannot be
transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.
RTC admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title
this time filed in the name of Ramon Aranda.
Petitioner prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable
to this case, he invokes the liberal provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, having been in continuous
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly, openly
and adversely for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application.
petitioners sister Merlita A. Enriquez testified that in 1965 her father
Anatalio Aranda donated the subject land to his brother, as evidenced by
documents
Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa
executed on June 7, 2000. As to the donation made by his father to his
brother Ramon, she recalled there was such a document but it was eaten
by rats.
Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land.
They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land, planting
it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any
copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.
RTC granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of petitioner.
CA held that petitioners evidence does not satisfactorily establish the
character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed
to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight to the
documents
Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa
and
Pagpapatunay ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa,
both prepared only in the year 2000 when the application for registration
was filed, as factual proof of ownership by the parties to the compromise
agreement.
ISSUE:
WON the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio Aranda
and the 1965 donation to petitioner are competent proof of transfer of
ownership
HELD:
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original
registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section
14(1)
[14]
thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the following
requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Under the
Regalian doctrine
which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
[15]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
[16]
The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that
the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
48. HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, GR NO. 179987, 29 APR. 2009
HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, GR NO. 179987, 29 APR. 2009FACTS:
On Feb 20, 1998 Malabanan fled an applicaton or land regisraton,
covering a parcel o land inSilang Cavie. He bough he land rom one
Velasco and had been in open, noorious, contnuous andadverse and
peaceul possession or more han 30 years. He also presened ax
declaraton since 1948.ISSUE: Wheher Malabanans possession o he land
had already ripened o ownership.RULING:There are wo ways how
Malabanan can acquire he propery:(A) Under SEC 14(1) o PD1529, which
saes ha hose who by hemselves or hrough heirpredecessors-in-
ineres have been in open, contnuous, exclusive and noorious possession
andoccupaton o alienable and disposable lands o public domain under a
bona fde claim o acquisiton oownership since June 12, 1945. Under his,
he land need no o be alienable and disposable during heentre period o
possession. One can secure judicial confrmaton as soon as i is declared
alienable anddisposable.(B) Under SEC 14(2) o PD1529, which perains o
prescripton as a mode o acquiring ownership overPATRIMONIAL
PROPERTY o he sae bu here mus be an express declaraton ha
such propery isalready parimonial. The prescriptve period is 10 years i
wih jus tle and 30 years i no jus tle.Petton was denied because
Malabanan is no qualifed under he wo circumsances. In he frs, hereis
no evidence o possession since June 12, 1945 since his ax declaraton is
only since 1948. While underhe second circumsance, he propery
becomes parimonial only since 1982 and he 30-year period of prescripton
is not yet met.
Ang 2 jan ay T tas o of hehe
49. Martinez vs CA (56 SCRA 647)
GR No. L- 31271, April 29 1974
Esguerra, J.:
Facts:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered
owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Lubao, Pampanga. The
disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino
Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883.
After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to
his successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata
Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a
certain Potenciano Garcia.
Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then municipal
president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from restoring the dikes
constructed on the contested property, Garcia filed a civil case
with the Court of First Instance against Beltran to restrain the
latter in his official capacity from molesting him in the possession
of said second parcel, and on even date, applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was issued against said municipal
president. The Court declared permanent the preliminary
injunction.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of
both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the
registration.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until
eventually they were acquired by the spouses.
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the
matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, which, after
conducting an ocular inspection, reported that the parcel was not a
public river but a private fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered
another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the
spouses to remove the dikes they had constructed, threatening that
the dikes would be demolished should the spouses fail to comply
therewith within 30 days.
Issue:
Whether the spouses are purchasers for value and in good faith on
the parcel alleged to be a public river.
Held:
 No, they are not.
There is no weight in the spouses' argument that, being a purchaser
for value and in good faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its
registration would be contrary to the law and to the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court as it would destroy the stability of
the title which is the core of the system of registration. Appellants
cannot be deemed purchasers for value and in good faith as in the
deed of absolute conveyance executed in their favor.
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the
spouses did not know exactly the condition of the land that they
were buying and the obstacles or restrictions thereon that may be
put up by the government in connection with their project of
converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they
willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks attendant to the sale of
said lot. One who buys something with knowledge of defect or lack
of title in his vendor cannot claim that he acquired it in good faith.
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond the
record to make inquiries as to the legality of the title of the registered
owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is no lien or
encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as against the law and
the accepted principle that rivers are parts of the public domain for public
use and not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription.
51. BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987 FACTS: In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied
for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo
containing an approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied
said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of the late Jose
Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto
Gustilo in 1934. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have
sufcient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under
the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years. The
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the
lands, with an area of approximately 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps
and are within a Timberland Block. In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the
subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted
in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title. Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to
substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and
control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry
to the PFC. In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the
registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno Gallo. It ruled
that although the controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and
nipa swamps within a Timberland Block, petitioners failed to submit
convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for
agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural
lands.
ISSUE: WON the classifcation of lands of public domain by the Executive
Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be
changed or varied by the court.
NO HELD: Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block
classifed and certifed as such by the Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands
are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly
therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for
forest purposes than for agriculture. As provided for under Sec. 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classifcation or reclassifcation of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classifcation of lands of the public domain but the
Executive Branch, through the Ofce of the President. Furthermore,
respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since
the application fled by them necessarily implied an admission that the
portions applied for are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired
by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
52. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA
SR
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
FACTS:
On December 28, 1978, [Respondent] Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed with the
District Land Office, Roxas City, a Free Patent Application covering a parcel
of land. It appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was
executed under oath, Efren L. Recio, Land Inspector, submitted a report of
his investigation and verification of the land to the District Land Office,
Bureau of Lands, City of Roxas. On March 14, 1979, the District Land Officer
of Roxas City approved the application and the issuance of [a] Free Patent to
the applicant. On March 16, 1979, the patent was also ordered to be issued
and the patent was forwarded to defendant Register of Deeds, City of Roxas,
for registration and issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Title.
Thereafter, an Original Certificate of was issued to [respondent] by defendant
Register of Deeds.
"On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter-
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the
District Land Officer for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore
land in favor of [respondent]. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management
Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands the appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title in the name of [respondent].
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan from the defendant
Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu
City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of
Roxas City covering Free Patent Application.
ISSUE I: Whether or not there was fraud in procuring the patent.
HELD II: Yes. A preponderance of evidence showed manifest fraud in
procuring the patent.
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the
procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out
in the application are true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to
the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give
adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. Note that this
notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be
conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau
of Lands.
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent was
dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation
& Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the
District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated
December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the
"necessary investigation and verification in the presence of the applicant."
Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule
cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required notice to adverse
claimants was not served.
Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation
allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the
Public Land Act. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
verification should have been done only after the filing of the application.
Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe
Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. It must also be noted that
while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not
dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the application.
Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted
is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears
no signature. Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does
not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption
that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually
conducted.
Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention
that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a
ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title. The invalidity of
the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in
consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the
former. Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the
Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud.
ISSUE II: Indefeasibility of Title
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued,
the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However,
this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens
System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State --
even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion
to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by
the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in
securing the title.
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be
invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of
fraud. Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be
allowed to benefit from their misdeed. Thus, prescription and laches will not
bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through
fraud by private individuals. This is settled law.
ISSUE III: Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is
another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to
the public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 proscribes the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead
within five years from its grant. The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application.
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title
to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or
any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title
or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than
education, charity, or easement of way.
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued on the same
date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent,
Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan. Despite the
statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free
patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate
mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the land
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls
squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the
Public Land Act. A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and
the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property.
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years
from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel
land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that
condition. Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain,
pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
56.
Director of Lands vs. Rivas
(G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986)
By: Tangonan, Julius
Doctrine:
1. Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the
1935 Constitution and Secs. 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing
lands (inalienable).
2. Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of
private ownership.
Facts:
1. On 14 Mar 1973, the CFI granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
information title for tract of land specifically classified as grazing land called
Nottab. Lope Guzman and Pacifico Vijandre now seek to have the same
registered.
2. Conflicting evidence were presented by petitioner Pacifico Vijandre and
oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corp (Cavaco). Previously, the TC and CA
adjudicated the land to Cavaco, though it was 1,222 ha and exceeded the 1000
ha limit under law.
3. The formers evidence depicted that that after Bunugans death, the same was
sold by the heirs of Bunugans attorney to Manuel Guzman. Then Guzmans
administratrix, with the courts approval, sold it to Luis Guzman Reyes. It
passed next to Luis widow, Dolores, who sold the northern portion to
Saturnino, and the southern portion to Rafael. The northern portion was then
sold to spouses Estrada. Finally, the spouses and Rafael sold their portions to
Cavaco.
4. While the latters evidence detailed that Bunugans sole heir, Manuela
Banugan, sold to Pablo Guzman only the portion in excess of the 1000 ha. After
Pablo died, the Nottab was inherited by his son Lope Guzman Rivas. Later, Lope
sold the same to Ignacio Pascio, who then sold it to his son Fernando.
5. On one hand, the SolGen contents that the CA erred in not declaring that the
land was part of a forest reserve and that Banugans Spanish titles werent
authentic.
6. On the other hand, the lawyer of Pascua argued that the said land was already
private land in Banugans hands and the latters titles were valid and authentic
Issue: W/N the application of registration of the said land by Lope and Vijandre
should be dismissed as the same is inalienable public land.
Ratio: YES
Held:
The registration case herein should be dismissed since the disputed land is part of
the forest reserve under PD 159. Its intended for wood production watershed soil
protection and other forest uses. The same fact is proven by the way that Lope and
Pascua treated the same as pasture land or grazing land. Even under the presented
tax declarations the land was described as for pasture exclusively.
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable). Thus, lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the
object of private ownership.
57. NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA,
EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E.
COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A.
NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA
TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS,
Petitioners. vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
Principle laid down by SC:
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The
term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue,
such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground
for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas
the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that
the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the petitioners alleged
that they occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered
by OCT No. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024 in favor of Isabel
Manahan Santiago the mother of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with
the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of
respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and
spurious and also Petitioners came by information that respondent was
planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners
had actually received notices to vacate.
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary
Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses. Respondent claimed that the
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the
Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and
authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles
derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against
the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with
regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years
prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners.
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone
witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration
laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez
of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled
illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that
it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file
for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other
hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and
documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.
RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the
lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with
PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this
Court the instant complaint. Defendants title especially so with the mother
title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83)
years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now
that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the
offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their
case, unwittingly sealed their fate.
The MR of the petitioner are likewise dismissed. The CA
affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence the reason of this petition.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue
2. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically
where petitioners are in possession of subject land, can be
subject of prescription.
Held: No. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff,
in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that
they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject
Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or
to quiet title.
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their
action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at
the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-
in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause
of action.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal
of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly
dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the
issue of prescription of the action.
58. MODESTO PALALI VS. JULIET AWISAN
GR No. 158385
FACTS:
Respondent Juliet filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner Modesto,
alleging that he occupied and encroached on the northern portion of her property and
surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes. Respondent prayed to be
declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, the cancellation of petitioners tax
declaration, and the removal of petitioner and his improvements from the property.
On the other hand, petitioner maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-
in-interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time
immemorial. During this entire time, no one disturbed his ownership and possession
thereof.
ISSUE: Who between the parties has the better right to the subject property?
RULING:
Modesto Palali has the better right. Petitioner was able to prove his and his
predecessors actual, open, continuous and physical possession of the subject
property dating at least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioners tax declaration over
the subject property). Also, petitioners witnesses were long time residents of Sitio
Camambaey, they knew of the introduction of improvements made by petitioner and
his predecessors-in-interest.
Respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove actual
possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. But tax declarations, by
themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In the
absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.[37] Respondents tax declaration, therefore,
cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and
his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.
60. Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land,
professing themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by
succession from their predecessors. That until the time of the application, they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive
and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had
consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax
declarations, together with the receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the
application for the reason that the tax declaration submitted to the court did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or
of prior possession in the concept of an owner.
ISSUE:
WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously,
exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.
HELD:
Respondents possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as
early as 1937 when the property had already been declared for taxation by
respondents father. Respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it
not been for the fact that, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with the
Provincial Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire in 1997. With
the tax assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents receipts for tax
expenditures were likewise in therecords and in these documents the predecessors of
respondents were the named owners of the property. Tax declarations and realty tax
payment are not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a good
indication of possession in the concept of an owner. No one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
Indeed, respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the
government or from any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto
unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of protection under the law.
62. Tottoc vs Intermediated Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69969,
December 20, 1969Facts:On April 9, 1949, Antonio Tottoc applied
for the lease of a pasture land consisting of 78.6 hectares,
situated at Lacangan, Barrio Madiangat, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
before the Bureau of Forestry. By virtue of said application,
petitioner was granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps--993, thereafter
the petitioner occupied the pasture land and fence the same.
Private respondent, Saturnino Doctor was aware of such
occupation of the land by the petitioner since 1949. Meanwhile the
private respondent, upon verification from the Bureau of Forestry
supposedly before 1963 the pasture land in question was reportedly
untouched and outside the pasture land of the petitioner, filed his
application for a homestead with the Bureau of Lands and
entered the northern portion of the land, clearing the cultivating
an area of lessthan 4 hectares in 1963. On June 17, 1969 OCT
No. P--3428 under Homestead Patent No. 124175 was issued to
the private respondent over a parcel of land. The private
respondent and the Bureau of Forestry requested to relocate the
pasture land of the petitioner to determine any encroachment on
his land. Issue:W/N the land in dispute is alienable by relying on
the certification issued by District Forester?Held:Mere classification or
certification made by the Bureau of Forestry that a part of the
public domain is timberland is not controlling all cases We agree
with petitioner, but not only for the reason that evidence--in--
chief of private respondent may, in point of strict law, be
constitutive of hearsay. The question as to whether a particular
portion of land is forestall or any other class of land is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. Thus, the mere classification or certification made by
Bureau of Forestry that a part of the public domain is
timberland is not controlling in all cases.
65. 236 SCRA 336 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land Registration
Spanish titles
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to register 6 parcels of
land under their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The same was inherited
by them from their parents who acquired the same from Spanish grant. The sisters
showed possessory information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only awarded
4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet decided upon as there was a
separate case involving one Constancio dela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have
lots 1 & 2 be included.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have rights over the other
parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed for by the Director
of Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in
evidence by the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of
the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. While
a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before the trial court, the
same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish title, a possessory
information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares (but the actual land area
being applied for (lot 1) was 7000+ sq m. But the heirs did not submit the original of
the possessory information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of
a Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896.
Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the original document as required by
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering
admissibility of the said secondary evidence questionable and dubious. PD 982 was
also in effect which mandated Spanish titles to be registered but the heirs never
registered the same (purpose of the law was to avoid falsified titles after the war).
Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No.
67.
102858. July 28, 1997]
15AUG
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in
the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the
trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands
represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of
the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land
registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must
strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus,
the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.
68. Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97
SCRA 22)
Facts:
This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA
reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the
issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and
Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the
land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that
she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the
land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land
as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by
fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioners father occupied the land in dispute
since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some
improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango
trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his
children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and
when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not
embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that
there is already a survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and
that a title was already issued to them. Petitioner now contends that being an
adjacent owner of the land in question they were not notified of the survey. The
Surveyors Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego
Francisco (petitioners father), and Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and
Diego Francisco were already dead from the date of the notice and Santol Creek is
not a person or entity. It was established that the petitioner and her brother and
sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question were
not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication in the Official Gazette
and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol
Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his
lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this
continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47)
years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the land in question
is insufficient in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she
acquires ownership of the land in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid
petition for reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is
deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act
496 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show
fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is
not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.
The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this requisite to merit in granting of
their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos, the respondents father owns the land
and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and has
been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
2. Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
Ruling:
It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice
was served and that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a
person. The court finds it absurd that the respondent claims that they complied with
the requisite of serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is clear
that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the
adjacent lots were not notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the
petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the
land in question allowing the respondents to successfully register the land in their
name. It was also established that respondents did not state the true adjoining
owners of the North, East and West of the land in question. On the North side it is no
longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is the petitioner by virtue of
transfer of the homestead patent of their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it is
no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already by a different person after
his death. On the West, it is no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it is
Paula Francisco, petitioners sister who is in actual possession of the land.
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for
registration from the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual
notice of their application for registration to prevent them from filing their opposition.
The court cited the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with the
requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners of the said
land. The court held that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle
to cover and shelter bad faith. Thus it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed
the decision of the lower court without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court
complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title
in favor of petitioner.
69. REPUBLIC VS. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO G. R. NO.
156117 MAY 26, 2005 CHICO-NAZARIO, J. FACTS: Before this Court is
a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in a case which affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court of Consolacion, Cebu, granting the application for
land registration of the respondents. Respondents filed with the MTC a
single application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to
be owners in fee simple of the subject lots, which they purchased from
their parents on June 25, 1976. The petitioner filed an opposition to the
respondent s application for registration of the subject lots arguing
that : (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the subject lots required by law; (2) Respondents title
were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the subject lots and (3) The subject
lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were
not subject to private appropriation. ISSUES: 1. WON MTC has
jurisdiction over the case at bar. 2. WON the subject lots are part of the
public domain and thus cannot be subject to private appropriation. HELD:
1. No. Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents. 2. Yes. Respondents failed to
comply with the required period of possession of the subject lots for the
juridical confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete file.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the subject lots. They only alleged therein
that they obtained title to the subject lots by purchase from their parents.
Respondent Jeremias in his testimony claimed that his parents had been
in possession of the lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. Yet,
according to DENR-CENRO Certification, the subject lots are within
alienable and disposable. The subject lots are thus clearly part of the
public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of June 25,
1963. Under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, any period of possession
prior to the date when the subject lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be executed from the
computation of the period of possession, such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless they had been classified as alienable
and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto. Hence, respondents application for registration of the
subject lots mush have complied with the substantial requirements under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
under the Property Registration Decree. Wherefore, the petition is
granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
 72.
Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 146262. January 21, 2005
TOPIC: Notice of Lis Pendens
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application for registration of title
before the RTC of Pasig City (LRC No. N-18887).The land
registration court granted the application. The decision became final
and executory.
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA)
issued Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of
Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma.
Salome Lao.[5]
Petitioners, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC No. N-
18887 alleging that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners prayed that the
court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their
respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section
22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), petitioners also
prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their names
as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
18 August 1998: The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the
corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval
and Ozaeta and their spouses.
Petitioners filed another motion to declare void Decree Nos. N-
217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. O-
1603 and O-1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that
incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on
20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998.
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and
requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator
denied the request and explained that the inconsistencies in the date
was due to oversight and that the decrees were actually issued
sometime between August 8 and 13 1998.
Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed
with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 void.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens.
Three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial
in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No.
2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
o The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of
lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on
Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that
only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a
notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
o The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No.
N-18887. Since a land registration case is a proceeding in
rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a
party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose
personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26
of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed
a motion to lift the order of general default.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and reiterated the
LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a
notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they
failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration
case.
ISSUE(S): Whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion
to declare void the decrees and titles
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
 remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition
or other proceedings of any kind in court directly
affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof
or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no
proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have
any effect upon registered land as against persons other
than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice
stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of
the institution thereof, together with a reference to the
number of the certificate of title, and an adequate
description of the land affected and the registered owner
thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should
contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the
court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A
notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the
land affected and its registered owner.
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis
pendens because the application was bereft of the original petition or
complaint upon which this office will base its action
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in
LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as
contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite
pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register
of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.
78. REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE
G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 1987; Paras, J.:
FACTS:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from theforest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural
Land for disposition underthe Public Land Act.On April 26, 1967,
Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19 toperfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged
that they acquired ownership andpossession of said parcels of land by
purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the
sameincluding that of the herein respondents, has always been continuous,
open, active, exclusive, public, adverseand in the concept of owners for more
than 30 years.The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above
petition but later withdrew the same
upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland had already be
en released from the mass of thepublic forests. Subsequently, the Acting
Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filedhis
opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land and as such cannot be
the subject of a landregistration proceeding under Act 496.The lower court
adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have
complied withall the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. This
decision having become final, the Commissioner ofLand Registration issued
the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL
throughthe Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition forReview, adding: that
respondents executed simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the
subject parcels tothird parties for fictitious considerations in order to remove
the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are
mere dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value.The CFI
denied this petition and o
n appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE TH
E SUBJECT OF AJUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48
(b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDEDBY R.A. 1942.
HELD:
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended, applies exclusively topublic lands. Forest lands or areas covered
with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest lands, howeverlong
cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of theBureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the TorrensSystem.Thus,
even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private
respondents havenot qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141.
They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20days of possession and
occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots
involved had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF
as an agricultural land for disposition under thePublic Land Act. As such,
respondents and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the
lots forthe required period of 30 years as disposable agricultural land.
79. 507 SCRA 283 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Spanish Titles [G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998]
Inadmissible as Evidence
In 1994, Victoria Rodriguez inherited a parcel of land from his father. She leased
the land to Pedro Santiago and Armando Mateo for a period of 50 years. Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) also claimed ownership of the same parcel
of land. SBMA alleged that they only let the Santiagos into the land as part of the
employment benefits given to Santiagos wife, as she was formerly employed by
SBMA. But when her employment ended in 1998, SBMA is now ousting them.
Rodriguez et al filed a petition against SBMA. Rodriguez presented a Spanish
title of land to show proof of her ownership. RTC dismissed the petition for lack
of cause of action. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,
which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of
their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16
August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
System.
ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are admissible as evidence of ownership.
HELD: No. Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, cannot be considered a
right in esse. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. And, without legal or equitable title to the subject
property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo, and Pedro R. Santiago
lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to
real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of
the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can
maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and
enjoyment of the property. Rodriguez should have registered the land before
August 16, 1976.
80.
LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which wasapproved by the
trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial courtissued an order requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
refused. Hence, petitioners filed an actionfor mandamus. The LRA revealed that
based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to beregistered by Sps. Laburada is part
of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595has already been issued. Upon the other
hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 iscovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a
transfer from TCTNo. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
andpurpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue adecree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may alreadybe included in
an existing Torrens certificate of title?
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction toorder the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another inan earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same landwould be null and
void, since the principle behind original registration is toregister a parcel of
land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land whichpetitioners are seeking to
register has already been registered in 1904and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will runcounter to said principle. The issuance of a
decree of registration is partof the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act whichmay be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally
proper to requirethe LRA to issue a decree
of registration.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case isRE
MANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the otherhand, is
ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining withfinality
whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.6595,
within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, theland
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue
thedecree of registration, according to the facts and the law as hereindiscussed.