Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HEIRS OF ALIWALAS and CA On rebuttal, Victoria adduced evidence that there is no record of the
(1988, CORTES, J.) Homestead patent in the name of Dr. Aliwalas is because the prewar
records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications
FACTS: were burned during the war.
October 12, 1933 - Lot No. 3563 (subject land) of the Arayat Cadastre TC: Victoria as true owner, cancel all certs in Tengcos names,
was originally part of the public domain. Tengcos must vacate and pays rents 5k/year since 1974 until turn over
Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for a homestead Heirs of Tengco appealed to CA CA affirmed TC, MR was
patent covering this lot. denied Hence this case.
o 1936 Application granted. Homestead Patent No. 38588 was issued in
his name. ISSUES:
o 1937 The homestead patent was duly registered and OCT No. 159 WON TC and CA had jurisdiction?
was issued. WON the claim of the heirs of Victoria will hold true and prosper
From that time on, Dr. Aliwalas declared the subject lot for tax before a proper forum; (Tengcos were claiming the Aliwalas title is
purposes and paid the corresponding land taxes thereon. As owner, Dr. defective)
Aliwalas, thru his overseer and caretaker Espiridion Manaul, had this WON the heirs of Victoria, assuming for the sake of argument, that
parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some portions. Other they have proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not
portions were dedicated to cattle raising until WWII. long lost such rights by laches and/or prescription.
After the war, tenants of Dr. Aliwalas planted crops on the subject
ON JURISDICTION
land. Manaul was still caretaker and delivered to Dr. Aliwalas the
Well-settled rule in jurisprudence: an OCT issued on the strength of a
owners share in the harvests.
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued
1962 Dr. Aliwalas died management over the subject parcel
in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of
passed to his son Jose Jr. the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible
o Subsequently, the heirs partitioned Dr. Aliwalas estate the subject land and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of
was distributed to Victoria Vda. De Aliwalas (the widow) Partition the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance
was approved by RD of Pampanga OCT in Victorias name (Nov of the patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land
1966). Also has TD and paid real estate taxes thereon. Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title.
October 31, 1973 - Ponciano Tengco representing the Heirs of
Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands. ON NON-EXHAUSTION
Among other things, he alleged that the subject parcel of land had been Already been rejected in earlier decisions. The Director of Lands
occupied and cultivated originally and continuously by has the power to review homestead patents only so long as the land
Gregorio. APPROVED + issued Free Patent No. 557692 on remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his
February 5, 1974. exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of
o The Free Patent was issued upon the assumption that the lot still formed title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and
part of the public domain and on the findings of the Public Land becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted an investigation and control nor jurisdiction.
reported that the land was possessed and occupied by the Tengcos who
had planted different kinds of trees on the land aside from rice and
corn.
ON DEFECTIVE TITLE lands which might even include private lands found within said
TENGCOS: (a) Dr. Jose Aliwalas was not qualified to be a areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of
homesteader being a rich landed person; and (b) The Aliwalas Family private landowners.
has never been in actual or physical possession of the property, unlike ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
the Tengcos who have been in continuous and open possession of the
property since 1918. (EVIDENCE: Report prepared by Librado B. HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After
deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
Luna, hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, attesting to such facts.)
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority
o SC citing the CA: Aliwalas title to the property having become
vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the
incontrovertible, CANNOT be collaterally attacked. If indeed there IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
had been any fraud or misrepresentation the proper remedy is an action public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.
for reversion instituted by the OSG.
ON LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION 38. G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
TENGCOS: The Aliwalas Family has never actually possessed the vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT andESTELITA PADILLA,
property unlike the Tengcos (same as their 2nd reason as to why the respondents.NARVASA, J.:pFACTS: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P.
Aliwalas title is defective) Cheesman weremarried on December 4, 1970 but have
beenseparated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed
o UNTENABLE Title acquired through a homestead patent registered of Sale and Transfer ofPossessory Rights was executed by Armando
under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription Altaresconveying a parcel of unregistered land and the housein favor of
cannot operate against the registered owner. Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age,Filipino citizen, married to
Citing CA: The Aliwalas Family have NOT slept on their rights. SC Thomas Cheesman, andresiding at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta.
Rita,Olongapo City . Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed,
cited the facts (having a caretaker, tenants, planting on the land, paying didnot object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Thereafter, tax
tax, partition) which they found showed that the Aliwas Family had declarations for the property purchasedwere issued in the name only of
indeed occupied, possessed and exercised rights of ownership over the Criselda Cheesmanand Criselda assumed exclusive management
subject land prior to the filing of the instant suit. andadministration of said property, leasing it totenants. This
happened without any protest fromThomas. Criselda sold the
37. 347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles and property to Estelita M. Padilla,without the knowledge or consent of
Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine Cheesman. Thedeed described Criselda as being of legal
age,married to an American citizen... Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the in the CFI againstCriselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for
validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples theannulment of the sale on the ground that thetransaction had
Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an been executed without his knowledgeand consent. During the Pre-trial,
the sale was declared void abinitio and the the delivery of the
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
property to Thomas asadministrator of the conjugal partnership property
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources wasordered. However, the judgment was set aside on a petition forrelief
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, filed by the Estrellita, grounded on "fraud,mistake and/or
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates excusable negligence" which hadseriously impaired her right to
the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which present her caseadequately. Estelita Padilla filed a
may include natural resources. supplementalpleading as her own answer to the complaint and amotion
for summary judgment. The Trial Court found that o The evidence on
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all- record satisfactorily overcame thedisputable presumption that all
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral property of themarriage belongs to the conjugal partnership andthat
the immovable in question was in truthCriseldas paraphernal containing thetestimony of witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the
property;o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not applybecause the factual findings orconclusions of the CA is subject to certain
husband-plaintiff is an American citizenand therefore disqualified under exceptions.However, none of which is present in the case at bar.Both the
the Constitution toacquire and own real properties; ando The exercise Trial Court and the IAC reached the sameconclusions on the 3 factual
by Criselda of exclusive acts ofdominion with the knowledge of her matters, after assessmentof the evidence and determination of the
husband hadled Estelita to believe that the properties were theexclusive probative value thereof and these determinations will not
properties of Criselda and on the faith ofsuch a belief she bought the bedisturbed.o The facts on record adequately proved fraud,mistake
properties from her andfor value and therefore, Thomas was estopped or excusable negligence by which EstelitaPadilla's rights had been
toimpugn the transfer. Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the substantially impaired; thatthe funds used by Criselda Cheesman was
actof the Trial Court of granting Estelitas petition forrelief and its moneyshe had earned and saved prior to her marriage toThomas
resolution of matters not subject ofsaid petition. IAC affirmed the Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla didbelieve in good faith that
Summary Judgmentand found no reversible error. Thomas Criselda Cheesman wasthe sole owner of the property in question. An
Cheesmanappealed to the Supreme Court. order of a CFI granting a petition for reliefunder Rule 38 is
interlocutory and is NOTappealable. The failure of the party who
ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of theremedy of appeal to opposedthe petition to appeal from said order, or
SC? NO hisparticipation in the proceedings subsequently had,cannot be
construed as a waiver of his objectionto the petition for relief so as
[COMMENTO: Were familiar with the Persons relatedissue The to preclude hisraising the same question on appeal from
foreigner husband has no capacity orpersonality to question the sale thejudgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat
of the property becauseit would be an indirect controversion of the his objections to thepetition for relief, or perform any act
constitutionalprohibition. Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands ofthe thereafter inorder to preserve his right to question the
public domain. sameeventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for thispurpose
that he has made of record "the actionwhich he desires the court
]RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition forrelief to take or his objection tothe action of the court and his grounds therefor."
under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is notappealable. The prayer in a petition for relief from judgmentunder Rule 38
is not necessarily the same prayer inthe petitioner's complaint, answer
QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: Theconclusions made by the or other basicpleading. Once a petition for relief is granted and
trial court were derived fromevidence adduced by the parties, the facts set thejudgment subject thereof set aside, and furtherproceedings
out inthe pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordareconclusions or are thereafter had, the Court in itsjudgment on the merits may
findings of fact. As distinguishedfrom a QUESTION OF LAWwhich properly grant the reliefsought in the petitioner's basic pleadings,
exists "when thedoubt or difference arises as to what the law is on acertain althoughdifferent from that stated in his petition for relief.WHEREFORE,
state of facts" "there is a QUESTION OFFACT when the doubt or the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,with costs against petitioner.
difference arises as to thetruth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when
the"query necessarily invites calibration of the wholeevidence 39. G.R. No. 149615 | 2006-08-29
considering mainly the credibility ofwitnesses, existence and
relevancy of specificsurrounding circumstances, their relation; to FACTS: Elena Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
eachother and to the whole and the probabilities of Germany. The couple resided in Germany ata a house owned by
thesituation." The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly Helmut's parents. In 1992, they moved to Philippines. Helmut sold the
setforth, may be raised in a petition for the review house he inherited from his parents to purchase a parcel of land in
oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appealspresented to Antipolo, Rizal. The lot costs P528,000 and the construction of the house
the Supreme Court. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is costs P2.3M. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
limited toreviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive thefactual expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that
findings of the lower court upon its ownassessment of the he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of
evidence. CA was created precisely to take away from the SCthe work of
the said prohibition. Due to incompatibilities and Helmut's alleged
examining the evidence, and confine itstask to the determination of
womanazing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
questions which do not callfor the reading and study of transcripts
separated. Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties before the FACTS:
RTC. In its ruling, although the Family Code provides that properties Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong,
acquired by gratuitous title are excluded from the conjugal property, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion
Helmut cannot recover the Antipolo property. This is because his fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the
acquisition of the property is in violation of Sec. 7, Art. XII of the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement.
Constitution. The constitution provides for the prohibition for an alien to On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option
acquire lands in the Philippines. Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that Helmut to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a
be reimbursed of the cost of acquisition of the land and the cost of the monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on
construction of the house. him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the
maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The
ISSUE: Whether or not the Helmut can be reimbursed of the cost of option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition
Antipolo property? for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner's 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine
hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. abandoned.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil
party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Invoking the principle that heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who ISSUE:
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has HELD:
done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to
40. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967 otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
Ponente: J. Castro becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
DOCTRINE: the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights the sum total of
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional
against a constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
and void. 44.
REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLEGR. No. L-6776 May registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area
21,1955FACTS: of 56.4007 hectares.
A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by
Temple, an unregistered religiousorganization that operated through CENRO and FMS-DENR
three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.
torecord the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
Consitution provides that acquisition of landis limited to Filipino citizens, opposed the
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is owned by application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the
suchcitizens. land was alienable
and disposable.
ISSUE:
Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a Issue/s:
religious organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and
Chinese citizens should be registered or not. disposable.
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. originally filed The petition represented by its Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land.
Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr. They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land, planting
OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title. copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the reasons: RTC granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
1. registration in favor of petitioner.
petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping; 2.
CA held that petitioners evidence does not satisfactorily establish the
the statement of technical description was based merely on the boundaries character and duration of possession required by law, as petitioner failed
set forth in the tax declaration; and 3. to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession by his
predecessors-in-interest. The CA also did not give evidentiary weight to the
documents
due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant
Pagpapatunay ng Pagkakaloob ng Lupa
corporation cannot push through and consequently the tax declaration is
and
still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and the land cannot be
Pagpapatunay ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa,
transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.
both prepared only in the year 2000 when the application for registration
"On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter- Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the
District Land Officer for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore Public Land Act. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
land in favor of [respondent]. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management verification should have been done only after the filing of the application.
Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands the appropriate civil Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title and the corresponding investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe
Original Certificate of Title in the name of [respondent]. Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. It must also be noted that
while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan from the defendant dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the application.
Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu
City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted
secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears
no signature. Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an performance of official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually
Roxas City covering Free Patent Application. conducted.
ISSUE I: Whether or not there was fraud in procuring the patent. Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention
that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a
HELD II: Yes. A preponderance of evidence showed manifest fraud in ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title. The invalidity of
procuring the patent. the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in
consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former. Verily,
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the Alejagas patent
procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the and title was tainted with fraud.
Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out ISSUE II: Indefeasibility of Title
in the application are true.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued,
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. Note that this patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However,
notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
of Lands. under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent was is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation
& Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State --
District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion
December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by condition. Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain,
the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in
securing the title. 56.
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be Director of Lands vs. Rivas
invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of (G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986)
fraud. Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be By: Tangonan, Julius
allowed to benefit from their misdeed. Thus, prescription and laches will not
bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through Doctrine:
fraud by private individuals. This is settled law. 1. Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the
1935 Constitution and Secs. 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE III: Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing
lands (inalienable).
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is
another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to
the public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 proscribes the 2. Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead private ownership.
within five years from its grant. The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every Facts:
application. 1. On 14 Mar 1973, the CFI granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory information
title for tract of land specifically classified as grazing land called Nottab. Lope
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title Guzman and Pacifico Vijandre now seek to have the same registered.
to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or
any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title
or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the 2. Conflicting evidence were presented by petitioner Pacifico Vijandre and
approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corp (Cavaco). Previously, the TC and CA
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than adjudicated the land to Cavaco, though it was 1,222 ha and exceeded the 1000
education, charity, or easement of way. ha limit under law.
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued on the same 3. The formers evidence depicted that that after Bunugans death, the same was
date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, sold by the heirs of Bunugans attorney to Manuel Guzman. Then Guzmans
Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan. Despite the administratrix, with the courts approval, sold it to Luis Guzman Reyes. It passed
statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free next to Luis widow, Dolores, who sold the northern portion to Saturnino, and
patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate the southern portion to Rafael. The northern portion was then sold to spouses
mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the land
Estrada. Finally, the spouses and Rafael sold their portions to Cavaco.
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely
within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land
4. While the latters evidence detailed that Bunugans sole heir, Manuela Banugan,
Act. A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the
sold to Pablo Guzman only the portion in excess of the 1000 ha. After Pablo
foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property. died, the Nottab was inherited by his son Lope Guzman Rivas. Later, Lope sold
the same to Ignacio Pascio, who then sold it to his son Fernando.
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years
from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel
land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that
5. On one hand, the SolGen contents that the CA erred in not declaring that the Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
land was part of a forest reserve and that Banugans Spanish titles werent civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
authentic.
does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
6. On the other hand, the lawyer of Pascua argued that the said land was already real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The
private land in Banugans hands and the latters titles were valid and authentic term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue,
Issue: W/N the application of registration of the said land by Lope and Vijandre such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
should be dismissed as the same is inalienable public land. or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground
Ratio: YES for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
Held: whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
The registration case herein should be dismissed since the disputed land is part of fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
the forest reserve under PD 159. Its intended for wood production watershed soil
protection and other forest uses. The same fact is proven by the way that Lope and
Pascua treated the same as pasture land or grazing land. Even under the presented
tax declarations the land was described as for pasture exclusively.
Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the Original Certificate of Title No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the petitioners alleged
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
(inalienable). Thus, lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the that they occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered
object of private ownership. by OCT No. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024 in favor of Isabel
Manahan Santiago the mother of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with
the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of
57. NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA,
respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and
EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E.
spurious and also Petitioners came by information that respondent was
COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A.
planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had
NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA
actually received notices to vacate.
TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary
Petitioners. vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses. Respondent claimed that the
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and
authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles
derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against
Principle laid down by SC: the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with
regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years Held: No. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff,
prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had
witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property
laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet
of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled title.
illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that
it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their
for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at
hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
documents he had so far submitted to the trial court. petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-
in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause
RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the of action.
lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with
PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Court the instant complaint. Defendants title especially so with the mother Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal
title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly
years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now that dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive and case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the
relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, issue of prescription of the action.
unwittingly sealed their fate.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue FACTS:
Respondent Juliet filed an action for quieting of title against
2. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically petitioner Modesto, alleging that he occupied and encroached on the
where petitioners are in possession of subject land, can be northern portion of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his
name for tax purposes. Respondent prayed to be declared the
subject of prescription.
rightful owner of the northern portion, the cancellation of petitioners
tax declaration, and the removal of petitioner and his improvements
from the property.
On the other hand, petitioner maintained that he and his ancestors or
predecessors-in-interest have openly and continuously possessed
the subject land since time immemorial. During this entire time, no fide acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the concept of
one disturbed his ownership and possession thereof. an owner.
ISSUE: Who between the parties has the better right to the subject
property?
ISSUE:
RULING:
Modesto Palali has the better right. Petitioner was able to prove his
WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly,
and his predecessors actual, open, continuous and physical
continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of
possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-war era
ownership.
(aside from petitioners tax declaration over the subject property).
Also, petitioners witnesses were long time residents of Sitio
Camambaey, they knew of the introduction of improvements made by HELD:
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.
Respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove
actual possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. But Respondents possession through their predecessors-in-interest
tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of dates back to as early as 1937 when the property had already been
ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and declared for taxation by respondents father. Respondents could have
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, the
does not prove ownership.[37] Respondents tax declaration, relevant portions of the tax records on file with the Provincial
therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire in 1997.
possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property With the tax assessments therecame next tax payments.
since before the war. Respondents receipts for tax expenditures were likewise in
therecords and in these documents the predecessors of respondents
were the named owners of the property. Tax declarations and realty
60. Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana tax payment are not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless,
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010 they are a good indication of possession in the concept of an owner.
No one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Indeed,
FACTS: respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without
interference and opposition from the government or from any private
Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 individual. Itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and
pieces of land, professing themselves to be co-owners of these lots hence, deserving of protection under the law.
having acquired them by succession from their predecessors. That
until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and 62. Tottoc vs Intermediated Appellate Court, G.R. No.
continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and 69969, December 20, 1969Facts:On April 9, 1949,
that they had consistently declared the property in their name for Antonio Tottoc applied for the lease of a pasture
purposes of real estate taxation. In support of their application, land consisting of 78.6 hectares, situated at Lacangan,
respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations, Barrio Madiangat, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, before the
together with the receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the Bureau of Forestry. By virtue of said application,
application for the reason that the tax declaration submitted to the petitioner was granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993,
court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona thereafter the petitioner occupied the pasture land and
fence the same. Private respondent, Saturnino Doctor
was aware of such occupation of the land by the
petitioner since 1949. Meanwhile the private respondent, HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have
upon verification from the Bureau of Forestry rights over the other parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as
supposedly before 1963 the pasture land in question it was not appealed for by the Director of Lands). The original tracing
was reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by
of the petitioner, filed his application for a homestead the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the
with the Bureau of Lands and entered the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory
northern portion of the land, clearing the cultivating requirement of mandatory character. While a blue print of survey Plan
an area of lessthan 4 hectares in 1963. On June 17, Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before the trial court, the same
1969 OCT No. P-3428 under Homestead Patent No. falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.
124175 was issued to the private respondent over a
parcel of land. The private respondent and the
Bureau of Forestry requested to relocate the pasture The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish title, a
land of the petitioner to determine any encroachment possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita
on his land. Issue:W/N the land in dispute is Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481
alienable by relying on the certification issued by hectares (but the actual land area being applied for (lot 1) was 7000+
District Forester?Held:Mere classification or certification sq m. But the heirs did not submit the original of the possessory
made by the Bureau of Forestry that a part of the information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy
public domain is timberland is not controlling all cases of a Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land
We agree with petitioner, but not only for the grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the original
reason that evidence-in-chief of private respondent document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
may, in point of strict law, be constitutive of was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said
hearsay. The question as to whether a particular secondary evidence questionable and dubious. PD 982 was also in
portion of land is forestall or any other class of effect which mandated Spanish titles to be registered but the heirs
land is a question of fact to be settled by the never registered the same (purpose of the law was to avoid falsified
proof in each particular case. Thus, the mere titles after the war).
classification or certification made by Bureau of
Forestry that a part of the public domain is
timberland is not controlling in all cases. Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No.
67.
65. 236 SCRA 336 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land 102858. July 28, 1997]
Registration Spanish titles
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to
register 6 parcels of land under their name. The land has an area of
15AUG
10,481 sq m. The same was inherited by them from their parents who Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
acquired the same from Spanish grant. The sisters showed FACTS:
possessory information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
awarded 4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet decided
upon as there was a separate case involving one Constancio dela square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have lots 1 & 2 be included. registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2. publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision
rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in
land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original
the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner
trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the
Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful
represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the
and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial;
Supreme Court. respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim
and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by
ISSUE: fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioners father occupied
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for
it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the
the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing
carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children
HELD: petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and
YES. Petition was granted. improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to
possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of
Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.
RATIO:
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires find out that there is already a survey plan of the said land in the
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land name of the respondents and that a title was already issued to them.
registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires Petitioner now contends that being an adjacent owner of the land in
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, question they were not notified of the survey. The Surveyors
Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
Diego Francisco (petitioners father), and Santol Creek. It is noted
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco were already dead from the
strictly be complied with. date of the notice and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory established that the petitioner and her brother and sisters who are
the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and
were not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and publication in the Official Gazette and the former mayor of Teresa
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or who is the owner of the property across the Santol Creek testified
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his
lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By
the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has
requisites shall have been duly complied with. become the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
68. Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35787, April 11,
Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the
1980 (97 SCRA 22)
land in question is insufficient in form and substance failing to
Facts: explain under what color of title she acquires ownership of the land
in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for
reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is lands by not sending them the actual notice of their application for
deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. The court
section 38 of Act 496 the applicant (1) must have an estate or cited the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with
interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary
the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not owners of the said land. The court held that the registration of land
sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith.
Registration Act. The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this Thus it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of
requisite to merit in granting of their petition. They claim that Toribio the lower court without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court
Santos, the respondents father owns the land and Alejandro Santos complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the
inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and has been in corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
possession thereof for more than 30 years.
HELD: NO. Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral
RATIO: Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from theforest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural
Section 76 of PD 1529 states: Land for disposition underthe Public Land Act.On April 26, 1967,
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to No. 19 toperfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They alleged
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or that they acquired ownership andpossession of said parcels of land by
other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the
the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the sameincluding that of the herein respondents, has always been continuous,
buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to
open, active, exclusive, public, adverseand in the concept of owners for more
vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon
registered land as against persons other than the parties than 30 years.The Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the above
thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the petition but later withdrew the same
institution of such action or proceeding and the court upon verification of findings that this portion of the timberland had already be
wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the en released from the mass of thepublic forests. Subsequently, the Acting
institution thereof, together with a reference to the number Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filedhis
of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land and as such cannot be
the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall
the subject of a landregistration proceeding under Act 496.The lower court
have been filed and registered.
adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should complied withall the terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. This
contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the decision having become final, the Commissioner ofLand Registration issued
court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A
the corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand, petitioner DL
notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the throughthe Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
land affected and its registered owner. Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition forReview, adding: that
respondents executed simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis subject parcels tothird parties for fictitious considerations in order to remove
pendens because the application was bereft of the original petition or
the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in truth, buyers are
complaint upon which this office will base its action
mere dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value.The CFI
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis denied this petition and o
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in
LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as n appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision. Petitioners
contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite
pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register Motion for Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this
of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens. petition.
ISSUE: evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
System.
WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE TH
E SUBJECT OF AJUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48
(b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDEDBY R.A. 1942.
ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are admissible as evidence of ownership.
HELD:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which wasapproved by the
In 1994, Victoria Rodriguez inherited a parcel of land from his father. She leased
trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial courtissued an order requiring
the land to Pedro Santiago and Armando Mateo for a period of 50 years. Subic
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) also claimed ownership of the same parcel
refused. Hence, petitioners filed an actionfor mandamus. The LRA revealed that
of land. SBMA alleged that they only let the Santiagos into the land as part of the
based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to beregistered by Sps. Laburada is part
employment benefits given to Santiagos wife, as she was formerly employed by
of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595has already been issued. Upon the other
SBMA. But when her employment ended in 1998, SBMA is now ousting them.
hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 iscovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
Rodriguez et al filed a petition against SBMA. Rodriguez presented a Spanish
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a
title of land to show proof of her ownership. RTC dismissed the petition for lack
transfer from TCTNo. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding
of cause of action. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,
decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
andpurpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the
Registration Act, within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16
same.
August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction toorder the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another inan earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same landwould be null and
void, since the principle behind original registration is toregister a parcel of land
only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land whichpetitioners are seeking to
register has already been registered in 1904and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will runcounter to said principle. The issuance of a
decree of registration is partof the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act whichmay be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally
proper to requirethe LRA to issue a decree
of registration.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case isRE
MANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the otherhand, is
ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining withfinality
whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.6595,
within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, theland
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue
thedecree of registration, according to the facts and the law as hereindiscussed.