109.TEODULO M. PALMA, SR., petitioner,vs.HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, as Governor of Bukidnon, and THE SANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGAN OF BUKIDNON, 107.
107. MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS
respondents.G.R.No.L-59679January 29, 1987
This is a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeking: (a)to prohibit the
respondents from continuing with the hearing and investigation of AdministrativeCase No.2filedbyrespondentGovernorof
Bukidnon againstpetitioner Mayor Teodulo M.PalmaSr.oftheMunicipality of Don Carlos,Province ofBukidnon and (b)to nullify Resolution No.82-87 passedby
respondentSangguniang PanlalawiganofBukidnon,suspendinghimfromoffice.
FACTS:
O n M a r c h 3 0 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e As s i s t a n t P r o v in c ia l F i s c a l V iv e n c io P . E s t r a d a o f B u k i d n o n , a t
t h e instance of the offended parties Nelia Arandel Clerk-typist and Susan Palamine, Clerical
Aide, both of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon, filedwith the Court of
First Instance of the same province, Criminal Cases Nos. 2795, 2796 and
2797a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r T e o d u l o M . P a l m a , S r . , t h e d u l y e l e c t e d a n d q u a l i f i e d M
a y o r o f s a i d Municipality. By virtue of the aforesaid three (3) separate cases, said offended parties in a
sworn joint letter complaint requested respondent Provincial Governor for an immediate administrativeinvestigationfor the
purpose of suspending MayorPalmafromoffice pendingfinal determinationofthese cases.(Rollo,p.6). Attached to saidletter are:three (3)copies ofthe
Information for Actsof Lasciviousness against the Mayor (Annexes "B", "C" and "D"; Petition, Rollo, pp. 7-9); thestatements of
the offended parties.
The Mayor accepted his preventive suspension from office asshown inhis Office Orderdated February15,1982.
ISSUE:
W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E F I LI N G AN D P E N D E N C Y O F T H E AF O R E S AI D T H R E E (3 )SEPARATEINFORMATION FOR
"ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS" AGAINST AN
ELECTIVEL O C AL O F F I C I AL W O U L D C O N S T I T U T E " MI S C O N D U C T I N O F F I C E " WI T H I N T H E MEANING OF
SECTION 5 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5185 WHICH MAY WARRANT
THEF I L I N G OF AN ADMI NISTRATI VE COMPLAI NT AG AINST HI M AND/OR
S SUSPENSIONFROMOFFICE.
HELD:
There appearstobe nocontroversy astothe filingofthecriminal cases againstthe petitioner.
The principal issue centers on the filing of the administrative case and consequent preventives u s p e n s io n o f p e t i t i
o n e r b a s e d s o l e l y o n t h e f il in g o f t h e a b o v e - m e n t io n e d c r i m in a l c a s e s . Petitioner contends that
"Acts of Lasciviousness" although how numerous, do not fall within thecategoryof "malfeasance andmisfeasance"or "conductin the
office" contemplated in Section5of R.A. No. 5185, and therefore cannot be the basis of the filing of a separate administrative
casea g a in s t a n e l e c t iv e o f f i c ia l a n d t h e p r e v e n t iv e s u s p e n s io n o f t h e l a t t e r . R e s p o n d e n t s ,
a l l e g in g otherwise, maintain that the lascivious acts of the petitioner constitute misconduct under ArticleXIII,Section 1of
the1973Constitution,re:"Accountability ofPublic Officers."As a general rule,dismissal ofan administrative case doesnotnecessarilyfollowthedismissal of
acriminal case, the former requiring as it does, only preponderance of evidence while the latter requires proof beyond
reasonabledoubt.Misconducthas beendefined as"such as affectshis performanceofhis duties as anofficerandnotonly asaffectshis characteras a
private individual.In such cases,it has been said at all times,it isn e c e s s a r y t o s e p a r a t e t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e m a n f r o m t h e
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o f f i c e r . " ( L a c s o n v . Roque,etal.,92Phil.456). Now, as to whether or not, such misconduct
of petitioner affects his performance of his duties asan officer and not only his character as a private individual, has
been laid to rest by the ruling of the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that while "it is true
that the charges of rapeand concubinagemay involvemoral turpitude ofwhich amunicipal official may be proceededa g a i n s t . . .
but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against
t h e m u n i c ip a l o f f i c i a l , a c o n v i c t i o n b y f in a l j u d g m e n t m u s t p r e c e d e t h e f il in g b y t h e p r o v in c ia
l governorofthe chargesandtrial bytheprovincial board."The replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-Charge Fabian
Gardones has rendered theissues of removal and suspension fromoffice,mootandacademic
Amoder Cj
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is
facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.
Facts: The Petitioner Municipality of Nueva Era seek to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) to a certain
extent that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the Municipalities of Marcos
and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon,
Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under
the independent control of a chief. In the virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated September 30, 1916 united
these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was
created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of
Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and
separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of
barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan
HI River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993,
when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an
Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province
of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and approval. In view of its claim over the
middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law required that
the land area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's northern isolated portion could no
longer be considered as its territory but that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the
middle portion of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were
within Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993. It alleged that since time
immemorial, its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It
argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected for the tinguians, it must be
preserved as part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era claimed R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras
to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. The fallo of its decision. R.A. No. 3753 expressly
named the barangays that would comprise Marcos, but none of Nueva Era's barangays were mentioned. The SP thus
construed, applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No.
3753 in creating Marcos.

Issues: Whether or not, CA erred in its appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous with the
Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory
beyond Brgys. Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-
Apayao.
Held: No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Since only the
barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by
implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based
upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind. Legislature intended other barangays from Nueva
Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Furthermore, this
conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for
the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. Where
there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and
ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law
creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges that based on the description of
its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is within its territory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
106. MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M. NAPARI vs. Hon. FORTUNITO
L. MADRONA
[G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.]
FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement,
the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner
municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC
denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government
Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out
their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that
Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
municipality and an independent component city.
HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY
DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY
URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among
local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on
the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute
was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to
above.
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city
or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly
urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units
involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of
Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but
an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary
dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT
BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a
city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region
VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions
representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines
nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss
that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE
EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law
and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the
consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds
no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable
provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of
the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs
have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers.
They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
104. bunye v. escareal
G.R. No. 110216 September 10, 1993
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME D. FRESNEDI, LUCIO B. CONSTANTINO, NOLASCO L. DIAZ, RUFINO J. JOAQUIN, ROGER S.
SMITH, ALEJANDRO L. MARTINEZ, and ROMAN E. NIEFES, petitioners,
vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, JOSE S. BALAJADIA, NARCISO T. ATIENZA, and AUGUSTO M. AMORES in
their personalities as members of the Second Division of the SANDIGANBAYAN and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents
Facts:
That on or about August 1988, in the municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro manila, Philippines, the above-named
accused all public officers being the Mayor (Ignacio R. Bunye), Vice-Mayor (Jaime D. Fresnedi), Municipal Attorney
(Victor C. Aguinaldo), Municipal Councilors (Carlos C. Tensuan, Alejandro L. Martinez, Epifanio A. Espeleta, Rey E.
Bulay, Lucio B. Constantino, Roman E. Niefes, Nemesio Q. Mozo, Rufino J. Joaquin, Nolasco L. Diaz and Roger C.
Smith), Barangay Chairman of Putatan (Rufino Ibe) and Barangay Chairman of Alabang (Nestor Santos), all in the
municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, said accused, while in the performance of their official functions, in
conspiracy with one another and taking advantage of their official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of
the new Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and
management of the aforesaid public market starting August 19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid and
subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years, between the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the former Municipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan sa
Paglilingkod and mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda for brevity), a
Cooperative represented by its General Manager then, Amado G. Perez, and despite also the warnings from COA
Chairman Domingo and MMC Governor Cruz "that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMC toward the
rescission/annulment of the contract . . . to protect the interest of the Government," and ". . . to evaluate thoroughly
and study further the case to preclude possible damages of financial liabilities which the Court may adjudge against
that municipality as an off-shoot of the case," which forcible take-over had caused undue injury to the aforesaid
Cooperative members, and gave the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused themselves,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions as aforesaid, through
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, considering that, the Cooperative members had introduced
improvements, including the construction of the "KBS" building, RR Section-Phases I and II, asphalting of the roads
surrounding the market place, and for the purpose, the cooperative had invested Thirteen Million Four Hundred
Seventy Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00) in connection therewith, which had been deposited in
trust to the Municipal Government, and in consideration thereof, the cooperative was extended the above long term
lease to manage and operate the public market and to pay a monthly rental of P35,000.00 only said offense
having been committed by the accused in their performance of official duties.
On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, and over the opposition of the accused, the Sandiganbayan issued on May
11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019.[1]
Issue:
1. Whether or not the preventive suspension is unjustified and unnecessary?
2. Whether or not the preventive suspension will sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, to the certain shattering of the peace and order thereat"?
Held:
The Court finds no merit in those arguments. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the
accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.
In Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive suspension is
mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it.
Petitioner at the outset contends that Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, is unconstitutional as the suspension
provided thereunder partake of a penalty even before a judgement of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of
her constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
We do not accept the contention because: firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer
upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory (People vs. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA
511). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. In fact, suspension particularly
under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People vs. CA, 135
SCRA 372).
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners.
There is no merit in the petitioners' argument that because they have repeatedly admitted that they had committed
the acts constituting the offense charged against them, there is no cause for apprehension that they might tamper
with the records in the offices under their control, or intimidate prospective witnesses against them. The Solicitor
General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the
prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. "The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and
prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90)
straight days from petitioners' camp" (p. 13, Solicitor General's Comment).
The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when
they (petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote. There will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as
the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, will surely
know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor and six
councilors in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code, R.A. No. 7160 (Samad vs. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 107854 and Samad vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 108642, July 16, 1993; Sanchez vs. COMELEC,
114 SCRA 454).
Camarines Norte v. Quezon | ema
October 11, 2001
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., as PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR,
petitioner, vs.
PROVINCE OF QUEZON, represented by HON. EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, as PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR,
respondent.
RE: URGENT PETITION TO CITE GOVERNOR EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ OF QUEZON PROVINCE, and
MAYOR JULIO U. LIM OF CALAUAG, QUEZON, IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
[G.R. NO. 132885]
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON, represented by GOVERNOR EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
MUNICIPALITY OF CALAUAG in the PROVINCE OF QUEZON, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, PEDRO C. INOFRE and
OSCAR F. FOLLOSO, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
SUMMARY: A 1989 SC decision settled the land boundary dispute between Camarines Norte and Quezon. As a
consequence, 9 barangays previously located in Calauag, Quezon became part of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. The
decision ordered the Government to undertake a survey in accordance with a 1922 decision of the Executive Board
which was upheld by the SC as basis for the delineation of the boundary. Upon request of Camarines Norte
Governor Padilla, DENR sent a survey team, which laid down a boundary marker. In Oct. 1991, Calauag Mayor Lim
and Quezon Governor Rodriguez ordered the bulldozing and removal of the boundary marker. Padilla responded by
filing a contempt charge against the Quezon officials. Pending resolution of that case, COMELEC and other agencies
of the Executive branch issued directives recognizing the jurisdiction of Camarines Norte over the 9 disputed
barangays. Specifically, NSO transferred jurisdiction to the civil registrar of Sta. Elena; DBM transferred the IRAs of the 9
barangays to Sta. Elena; realty tax records were also ordered transferred; and the COMELEC authorized the Sta.
Elena election officer to change the addresses of the registered voters in the 9 barangays. Quezon Government thus
filed a petition for certiorari assailing the COMELEC resolutions authorizing the transfer of the voter registration records
in the 9 barangays. This petition was consolidated with the contempt charge. CA Justice ordered to hear the
contempt case found sufficient basis to cite Rodriguez and Lim in contempt for willful disregard of the 1989 SC
decision, by contumaciously asserting their own interpretation of the boundary line and by having the DENR-installed
marker removed. SC concurred with the CA. Rodriguez was guilty of willful disregard of a final and executory SC
decision. He even said in his demurrer to the contempt charge that they would not have ordered the removal of the
marker had the SC decided the case in the way Quezon wanted it decided. Pasaway kang talaga. SC has rejected
their argument with finality and they must act accordingly. Quezon cannot invoke the plebiscite requirements under
LGC 10 and the Constitution because the boundary delineation was merely an implementation of Sec. 42, Art. II of
the RAC, as interpreted by the 1922 EB decision, which was upheld by the SC in 1989. Neither can the law creating
Sta. Elena be invoked, because the definition of Sta. Elenas territory in that law was subject to the delineation of the
Quezon-CamNor boundary, which was to be determined by the DENR by undertaking the SC-mandated survey.
Governor Rodriguez and Mayor Lim were held guilty of indirect contempt. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the transfer of the voter registration records of the 9 barangays because it was merely
complying with the SC decision. Instead of being punished, they should be commended for doing so. [Anecdote:
According to Danicon, counsel for Camarines Norte went to the Law Center, chanced upon DLC, Sereno, Labitag,
Sison, and Feliciano. They handled the case for CamNor and won. Kaya ginawa raw silang adopted sons and
daughters of Camarines Norte. ^^]
DOCTRINE [imbento lang]: The 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau did not alter or redefine or
amend an existing provincial boundary, the boundary line between Ambos Camarines and Tayabas (now Quezon
Province). All that the Chief of the Executive Bureau did was to implement, upon the authority of the Secretary of
Interior, Section 42 of Act No. 2711. Necessarily, the argument on the noncompliance with the plebiscite requirement
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, as well as Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, is misplaced.
What was involved in this case is not a setting or resetting of an existing provincial boundary but the implementation
of a decision clarifying a law which set a provincial boundary in an ambiguous or partial manner: Section 42 (Article
II, Revised Administrative Code of 1917) does set out a definition or description of the boundary line between Ambos
Camarines and Quezon Province. [However, it] does not describe or define the entirety of that line in such a manner
as to permit the whole boundary line to be located on the ground by a surveyor. Close examination of Section 42 will
show that it is not the whole boundary line that is disputed but only a segment thereof.
Where there is clear and contumacious defiance of, or refusal to obey an SC decision, it will not hesitate to exercise
the inherent power [of contempt] if only to maintain respect for the SC, for without which the administration of justice
may falter or fail.
NATURE: Petition for contempt/Petition for certiorari assailing a COMELEC Resolution
FACTS
Nov. 8, 1989 SC rendered a decision in GR No. 80796 (1989 decision) resolving the long-standing [since
the Spanish period] boundary dispute between Camarines Norte (CAMNOR) and Quezon in favor of the
former.
o The decision stated in part: Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Local
Governments and the Office of the President with the request that surveyors from the Bureau of
Lands or other appropriate government agency be forthwith designated to survey and locate, by
latitude and longitude and by metes and bounds, and to monument the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig line
described in the 16 June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau.[1922 DECISION]
o Mar. 19, 1990 - The 1989 decision became final and executory.
Pursuant to the directive of the SC, CamNor governor Roy PADILLA asked the DENR Secretary to
undertake the survey of the Quezon-Camnor boundary line based on the description in the 1922 decision.
o DENR Secretary Fulgencio FACTORAN, Jr., thus issued Special Order 1179 constituting a
technical working group for the purpose.
Jan. 31, 1991 The DENR team informed Quezon Governor Eduardo RODRIGUEZ about the upcoming
survey.
Quezon Provincial Secretary Jorge VARGAS objected to the use of the 1922 decision as the basis of the
survey, asserting that it should be done on the basis of the conditions set forth in Art. II, 42 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (Act 2711).
The DENR team proceeded with the survey anyway, using the 1922 decision as basis.
May 28, 1991 The DENR team went to Brgy. Tabugon, Calauag, Quezon and installed a monument
marker along the boundary line determined in the survey.
o The marker indicated that the area of 8,032 hectares actually falls within the jurisdiction of CamNor.
o The area comprises 9 barangays: Kagtalaba, Plaridel, Kabuluan, Don Tomas, Guitol, Tabugon,
Maualawin, Patag Ibaba, and Patag Iraya.
Oct. 14, 1991 Rodriguez and Calauag Mayor Julio LIM had the boundary marker bulldozed and removed.
The event was covered by the Manila Bulletin.
In response, Padilla filed a petition for contempt in the SC against Rodriguez and Lim for disobedience
to a SC decision, which is punishable as indirect contempt under ROC 713.
o COMMENT OF RODRIGUEZ & LIM on contempt petition: The placing of the marker is illegal as
it was installed within Calauag territory and because the DENR team lacked prior authority from the
Office of the President, as required by the 1989 decision. Their action was a reasonable use of
force under NCC 429 to protect Quezon territory from a threatened physical invasion.
SC resolved to direct CA Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy to conduct hearings, receive evidence, and submit a
report and recommendation on the contempt proceedings.
o After CamNor rested its case, Rodriguez filed a demurrer, contending that the 1989 decision cannot
be implemented in the light of RAC 42 and RA 5480 (which created the Municipality of Sta. Elena in
CamNor). The demurrer was denied.
o Upon retirement of Justice Sempio-Diy, the case was assigned to CA Justice Teodoro Regino.
Pending the contempt proceedings in the CA, the DBM transferred the Internal Revenue Allotment of the 9
barangays from Calauag to Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte starting in Fiscal Year 1994.
During the May 6, 1996 SK elections, COMELEC sent the election paraphernalia of the 9 barangays to Sta.
Elena. COMELEC also issued a resolution directing the Calauag Election Officer to refrain from exercising
supervision over political exercises in the 9 barangays.
The Civil Registrar General likewise issued a Memorandum informing the Calauag Civil Registrar that
registration of vital events occurring in the 9 barangays should now be registered with the Sta. Elena Civil
Registrar.
March 18, 1997 the Department of Finance directed the Quezon Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial
Assessor to transfer the realty tax records of the 9 barangays to CamNor.
Jul. 10, 1997 COMELEC issued a resolution authorizing the Sta. Elena Election Officer to change the
address in the voting registration records of the 9 barangays from Calauag, Quezon to Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte; and to notify the registered voters concerned of such change in address.
Sep. 12, 1997 The Sangguniang Bayan of Calauag passed a resolution opposing the Jul. 10 COMELEC
resolution.
Nov. 27, 1997 COMELEC resolved to note the Calauag SB resolution and deny it with finality.
Quezon filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was consolidated with the contempt petition.
May 3, 2000 - Justice Regino submitted his report and recommendation in the contempt case.
o Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of contempt of court and should be sentenced to maximum penalty of
6 months imprisonment and P1000 fine; and be ordered to shoulder the cost of installing a new
boundary marker to replace the one they had removed.
ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N Rodriguez and Lim are guilty of contempt of court (YES)
2) W/N COMELEC committed GAD in issuing the resolutions assailed by Quezon (NO)
RATIO
1) BULLDOZING & REMOVAL OF MARKER WAS DISOBEDIENCE OF 1989 SC DECISION; RODRIGUEZ & LIM
(RL) GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
Regino Report Findings
o RLs act of removing the monument marker amounts to contumacious conduct defined under ROC
713(b), which declares contemptuous any "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment or command of a court."
o The installation of the boundary marker was in compliance with the 1989 SC decision, which made
the 1922 decision the basis of the boundary line.
o RL have a long record of resisting CamNors claim to the disputed area.
o RLs contumacious refusal was made with full understanding that their acts would fall under
contempt, as evinced by the following statement made in their demurrer: The whole case would
have been different if factually the territory defined in the (1922) Decision of the Executive Bureau
conformed with the prescription of Section 42 (of Article II, Revised Administrative Code of 1917)
SC agrees with Justice Reginos findings.
In effect, Rodriguez was saying in the demurrer that they would not have removed the boundary marker had
the SC decided the case on the basis on RAC Art. II, Sec. 42.
This is an act of defiance of the 1989 decision, where it was ruled with finality that RAC Art. II, Sec. 42 did
not define the entirety of the CamNor-Quezon boundary line in such a manner as to permit the whole
boundary line to be located on the ground by a surveyor.
Pertinent part of the 1989 SC decision: "It is pointed out by [CamNor], firstly, that the particular point on
Basiad Bay that is the terminus of the boundary line is not specifically identified in Section 42, considering
that the eastern shore of Basiad Bay is 25 kilometers in length, more or less, such that that terminal point
could in theory be located anywhere along the 25-kilometer shore line. Secondly, the specific direction or
directions and the varying lengths (the 'metes and bounds') of the various segments of the boundary line to
be projected from the terminus point on Basiad Bay onto Mt. Cadig's peak, are similarly not specified in
Section 42. Thus, again, a surveyor on the ground would be unable to locate and monument the boundary
line from Basiad Bay to Mt. Cadig if all he had was the language found in Section 42 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
"We agree with [CamNor]'s argument. We consider that to that limited extent, the Ambos Camarines
Quezon boundary line was `undefined' and that there was thus necessity for the 16 June 22 decision of the
Chief of the Executive Bureau to provide more specific guidance that would permit the actual identification
or location of the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig portion of the boundary line between Ambos Camarines and
Quezon Province:
'[from the peak of Mt. Cadig] thence a straight line is drawn to the point of intersection of the interprovincial
road between Camarines Norte and Tayabas (now Quezon) with the Tabugon River, thence following the
course of the river to each mouth at the Basiad Bay.'"
The 1989 SC decision clearly upheld the validity and binding effect of the 1922 decision of the Executive
Bureau. Despite this, RL stubbornly insist on their own interpretation of what should be the correct boundary
line.
This willful disregard of the SC decision was demonstrated by RLs causing the removal of the boundary
marker installed by the DENR.
Counsels for Quezon have already been reprimanded by the SC for insisting on the applicability of RAC Art.
II, Sec. 42, as a tactic to delay the implementation of the 1989 SC decision.
SC said: This Court does not, as it cannot, always expect counsel of losing litigants graciously to accept the
correctness of the decisions of this Court. But when such decisions reach finality, it is the duty of such
counsel as officers of the Court and members of the Bar to obey those decisions, whatever their personal
opinion may be in respect of the merits of the decisions. It is, of course, open to the respondents herein to
seek to change those decisions they disagree with by going to the Congress of the Philippines to try to
secure the enactment of a statute changing the boundary line already declared legally binding by this Court.
Until such a statute is enacted, however, respondents owe a special duty faithfully and honestly to comply
with final decisions of this Court. The Court cannot countenance any further disregard of this duty. It is of
essence of an ordered and civilized community that the function of final resolution of disputes be located in
a particular institution. In our system, that institution is this Court.
Quezon cannot invoke RA 5480 [creating the Municipaliy of Sta. Elena] .
Sec.1 of that law, defined the territory of Sta. Elena as including Barrios Salvacion, Bulala, Rizal, San
Lorenzo, Pulong Guitguit, Santa Elena, San Vicente, Basiad and San Pedro up to the boundary of the
Province of Quezon and the Province of Camarines Norte as defined in Chapter three, Article II, Section
forty-two of the Administrative Code
Quezon: Including the 9 barangays within the disputed area in the territory of Sta. Elena would violate not
only Sec. 1 of RA 5480, but also Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution and LGC 10 which require the conducting
of a plebiscite in cases of substantial alteration of territorial boundaries.
SC: This has been resolved with finality in the 1989 decision: RA 5480 does not purport to have amended
Section 42 of the Revised Administrative Code nor Section 2 of Act No. 2809, both as implemented in the
decision dated 16 June 1922 of the Executive Bureau of the Department of Interior.
o Sec. 1 of RA 5480 extends the jurisdiction of Sta. Elena up to the Quezon-CamNor boundary,
which was defined in the 1922 EB decision; which was in turn ordered enforced by the SC in its
1989 decision. The enumeration of barangays in Sec. 1 is not a delimitation of territorial jurisdiction.
o The 1922 decision did not alter, re-define, or amend an existing provincial boundary. All it did was
implement RAC 42. The reliance on the plebiscite provisions of the Local Govenment Code and
Art. X, Constitution are therefore misplaced.
Authority of the DENR technical team comes from the President through his alter ego, the SENR
Special Order No. 1179 issued by the DENR Secretary was the basis for the DENR teams authority to
conduct the survey and place boundary markers. The DENR Secretary is the Presidents alter ego; thus the
SENRs acts are presumed to be acts of the President, unless expressly repudiated by the latter. The
argument that the survey was conducted without Presidential authority is therefore baseless.
RL liable for indirect contempt unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which

RL thus openly disobeyed the 1989 Decision when they caused the removal of the monument marker
resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the
installed by the DENR. The significance of the monument marker cannot simply be disregarded. As aptly
explained by Engr. Mamerto Infante, it has a technical purpose of preserving the survey conducted by his Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this
team. In fact the 1989 Decision mandates "...to monument the Basiad Bay-Mt. Cadig line described in the 16
June 1922 decision of the Chief of the Executive Bureau." case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting
That RL understood the 1989 Decision is fully borne by the records in these cases and well attested by their
Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the
valiant effort in re-litigating issues already settled by this Court. That same effort, however, highlighted by
their contumacious destruction of the monument, worked adversely to their cause. It renders them liable for
Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors
indirect contempt.
2) NO GAD COMMITTED IN ISSUING ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS; COMELEC & OTHER AGENCIES and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter
COMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTING 1989 DECISION
Quezon: The assailed COMELEC resolutions recognizing CamNors jurisdiction over the 9 disputed refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council,
barangays were issued with grave abuse of discretion, being violative of RA 5480, Art. X, Sec. 10 of the
the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
Constitution and LGC 10.
COMELEC: The assailed Resolutions were issued in deference to the 1989 decision, and only after the land
boundary dispute between the two provinces had been settled. The resolutions were mere compliance with
the SC resolution dated Aug. 4, 1994 in the same case. ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
SC fully agrees COMELEC.
For showing high regard to the SC's Decision and Orders, we commend not only the COMELEC but also the
Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Finance, the Department of Environment and
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the
Natural Resources, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the National Statistics Office.
These government offices and agencies have collectively recognized the subject 9 barangays as part of
sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The
Camarines Norte's jurisdiction (bigyan ng jacket).
It is only Quezon Province and its officials who ignore the finality of the Decision and Resolutions of the SC. attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in
Their present petition attempts to re-litigate the same issues judiciously passed upon by the SC with finality.
It is but imperative for the SC to write finis to these cases. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end; accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage

otherwise, it would become even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to correct.
recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will
DISPOSTION: Petition for contempt granted. Rodriguez and Lim fined P1,000. Petition for certiorari denied.

immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the

Javellana vs Tayo
Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)

100. G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962

We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he

ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in
(Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official

their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the

vs.
session in question.

SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.

DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.

FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of
98. Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta (members of SP) Facts: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner

Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental

Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated
is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council)
petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return. When the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of

therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum

to do so. In another session, 7 members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.

against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In

the meantime, the Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner

as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting

Governor. Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for

having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local officials

involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel issue under the

existing laws on local government. Issue: WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily

relinquished the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside

over the sessions of the SP Held: YES Ratio Decidendi: What the LGC provides: The LGC provides that the Vice-

Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the Governor and assumes

the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. When the

vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to

certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in

case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. Vice-Governor as Acting Governor: When the Vice-

Governor exercises the powers and duties of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as

the Governor but does not become the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the

provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.

Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an

Acting Governor or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. A Vice-Governor who is

concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his

legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the

offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of

the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by

law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. This is clear from

the law, when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP, which is the legislative body of the

province, and enumerates therein its membership consisting of the: 1) Vice Governor as presiding officer 2) regular

elective SP members 3) 3 elective sectoral representatives 4) ex-officio members namely: a) president of the

provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay b) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga

sangguniang kabataan c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and

component cities Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded and thus, local

executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor. Consequently, the union of legislative-executive

powers in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded. Being the Acting

Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the

nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Conclusion: To repeat,

the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in

the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event

constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions,

which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the

election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding