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E.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

1. Azajar v ardalles - Jose


AZAJAR v. ARDELLES
PADILLA, J.
DECLARATORY RELIEF

PLAINTIFF: Maria P. de Azajar


DEFENDANTS: Francisco Ardales and the Bureau of Lands

SUMMARY
Maria de Azajar, who was born in China but was the daughter of a Filipino citizen, applied to purchase a parcel
of land in Albay. The application was opposed on the ground that Azajar, being a Chinese citizen, is not entitled
to acquire lands of the public domain. The Supreme Court ruled that an action for declaratory relief was not the
proper proceeding for Azajar to obtain a judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship.

DOCTRINE
Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance may bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder. (NOTE: This provision is from the old Rules of Court)

FACTS
1. In December 1950, Maria de Azajar, also known as Maria Peck Ti Azajar, applied for the purchase of a 240 sq.
m. parcel of land belonging to the public domain located in Albay.

2. An opposition to the application was filed by Francisco Ardales on the ground that Azajar, being a Chinese
citizen, is not entitled to acquire lands of the public domain.

3. In her complaint filed in the CFI of Albay Azajar pleads the following:
a. That the opposition raises uncertainty or insecurity as to her citizenship which is prejudicial to her interest, and
unless it be judicially determined, the Bureau of Lands would likely deny her sales application;

b. That she is the daughter of a Filipino citizen named Blas Azajar; and

c. That she was born in Amoy, China on August 25, 1922 and came to the Philippines on November 9, 1926.

4. On the date set for hearing the following was submitted, among others: that Landing Certificate of Residence
No. 76920 issued in the name of Peck Ti Azajar states that she is the daughter of Blas Azajar, and it also states
that she is the daughter of a PI citizen who was born in Amoy on August 25, 1922.

5. The court rendered judgment holding that plaintiff is a Chinese citizen and as such is not entitled to acquire
lands of the public domain.
6. Azajars appeal was forwarded to the CA, and while it was pending there, the First Assistant Solicitor General
filed a motion praying that the appeal be dismissed on the ground that an action for declaratory relief is not the
proper proceedings for the purpose of securing a judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship.

ISSUE
WON an action for declaratory relief is not the proper proceeding for securing a judicial declaration of Filipino
citizenship YES

RULING
1. Azajar is not interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, nor are her rights affected by a
statute or ordinance. Thus, her grievance against Francisco Ardales who objected to her sales application for a
parcel of land of the public domain has not brought her under and within the scope of Sec. 1 of Rule 66.

2. A sales application filed with the Bureau of Lands must go through the different stages as prescribed by law
until the Director of Lands renders his decision. From a decision of the Director of Lands an appeal lies to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For that reason, until after all these administrative remedies
shall have been exhausted, no court may compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on appeal to decide one way or another any sales application as that is vested exclusively in
them.

3. Citizenship cannot, therefore, be determined in a complaint for declaratory judgment or relief. If Azajar is a
Filipino citizen as she claims, she should go ahead with the administrative proceedings in the Bureau of Lands
and submit the evidence to prove her citizenship.

2. De borja v. villadolid - Genesis

3. National denta supply v. meer - Verlin


NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. v. MEER (in his capacity as CIR)
October 26, 1951 | J. Bautista Angelo | Declaratory relief

SUMMARY: NDS filed action for declaratory relief, putting at issue whether sales of dental gold/gold alloys for
dental purposes are under Article 184, National Internal Revenue Code. The SC affirmed the dismissal of this
action, as petitions for declaratory relief are not proper where a taxpayer questions his liabilities for payment of
any tax/duty/charge already collectible under a law implemented by BIR/BOC.
DOCTRINE: See RATIO #2

FACTS
1. NDS filed an action for declaratory relief to obtain a ruling on whether sales of dental gold or gold alloys
and other metals used for dental purposes come within the purview of Article 184 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
2. Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) moved to have the case dismissed, saying that even if there were a
cause of action, relief by declaratory judgment is not proper because It will not terminate the
controversy.
3. The lower court agreed with CIR, holding that actions for declaratory relief do not apply to cases where a
taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax collectible under any law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
4. NDSposition: Rule 66 Section 1 of the Rules of Court contains no prohibition against a taxpayer filing an
action for declaratory relief to questioning the legality of a tax.

ISSUE: Is the action for declaratory relief proper? NO

RATIO
1. The Court discussed the legislative history of the law on declaratory relief, as follows:
a. Original law, Act No. 3736, Sec. 1: Any person Interested under a deed, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in CFI to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of
his rights or duties thereunder."
b. Commonwealth Act No. 55 added this proviso which stated that declaratory relief is not available
in cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge
collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal
Revenue."
c. Most recently, Rule 66, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, eliminated the proviso.
2. HOWEVER, it can be said that the proviso is still in force. Citing Chief Justice Morans commentary, the
non-incorporation of the proviso (excepting taxpayer issues from the scope of declaratory relief) in Rule
66 was done to merely make its application discretionary upon the court, such that:
a. Where the tax is already due and collectible, the taxpayer cannot prevent collection by a
declaratory action, but he should pay the tax and sue for its recovery within the period limited by
law.
b. But where the tax is not yet due, there can be no valid reason why a taxpayer cannot test its
validity (by declaratory relief).
3. The points above (in RATIO #2) are supported by Section 306, National Internal Revenue Code which
requires that the tax should first be paid before the taxpayer can question the correctness of the tax. The
underlying policy is to prevent delay in collecting taxes (upon which government depends for its very
existence).

4. Mirando v wellington ty - Phillip


MIRANDA v WELLINGTON TY
Feb. 6, 1978 | Guerrero, J. | Declaratory Relief | Cachapero
PETITIONER: Pablo Miranda, Manuel Serranilla, Magdelamo Lemos, Jesus Milla, etc.
RESPONDENT: Wellington Ty & Bros, Inc., Phil. Board of Liquidators

SUMMARY: Petitioners were squatting in Arellano University as the Second World War just ended. They were
relocated to a repossessed land in Broadway, QC, through an agreement between the Mayors of Manila
and QC. Upon the said land, the petitioners built their homes, and paid rent to PBL while applying with the
OP for the sale of the said land to them. PBL, however, with the approval of the President, bartered the
said lots to Planas, whose administrator then sold the same to the respondents. The respondents now
demanded that the petitioners leave their homes. The petitioners, on the other hand, filed a case for
Declaratory Relief, in order to have the titles in favour of the respondents cancelled. The SC, acting upon
the referral by the CA due to the fact that the questions involved were purely of law, held that the
petitioners did not comply with the requisites of an action for declaratory relief as provided in ratio #6, and
must therefore fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio #s 4 and 6.

FACTS:
1. After liberation of Manila, petitioners occupied Arellano University in Legarda from 1945 to 1950. Mayor
of Manila (de la Fuente) asked Mayor of QC (Santos Diaz) to relocate the squatters in certain
subdivisions in Broadway, QC. Such lots were once owned by a Japanese, Arata Tuitsue, and were
repossessed by the Phil. Alien Property Custodian, now the Phil. Board of Liquidators.
2. Petitioners built their homes on the said lots, and were charged rentals by the PBL. They then
applied with the OP for the sale of the said lots to them.
3. PBL, with the approval of the OP, bartered the land with another owned by Planas. The administrator
of Planas estate then sold the lots to the respondents. Respondents then demanded that the
petitioners vacate, but the latter refused, claiming a preferential right to the property. Respondents
filed an ejectment case in the City Court.
4. Petitioners then filed a petition entitled, Declaratory Relief for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction (sounds like a fob song) before the CFI, claiming that they
were bona fide occupants of the lots, including therein the assessed values of their 17 homes, ranging
from 2k 8k.
5. Respondent filed an MtoD, but was denied. They then filed their Answer to the petition, claiming
that they were purchasers for value and in good faith. PBL also filed an Answer.
6. CFI, without going to trial, ruled for the respondents. CA dismissed the appeal for failure of the
record on appeal to state the filing of an appeal bond. On the merits, however, the CA, in a subsequent
resolution, certified the issues to the SC for being purely questions of law.

ISSUE: WoN the petitioners are entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for? NO.
RULING: CFI affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners: their preferential right to buy is by authority of Sec. 1, RA 3348, which provides that the
Department of General Services shall determine the minimum size of said urban homesite or residential lots and
shall allot to the actual occupants thereof at the time of its approval. INCORRECT.
2. SC: RA 3348 came into effect only on Aug 1963, or almost 10 years after the lots were bartered to Planas
in 1953. No such irregularity in the said barter since the PBL complied with the requirements under Secs. 3 and 4
of EO 372, which empowered the PBL to sell, lease, transfer, assign, or dispose of properties transferred to the
State, with the approval of the OP.
3. In determining the preferential right of the petitioners to buy the said lots, the SC held that the applicable
law was RA 477, and not RA 3348. Pursuant to such law, the SC held that the fact that the applications to buy
were ignored by the PBL shows that the State reserved the said lots for their own use, and not for the purpose
of subdividing such to be awarded to the occupants. It has also been established by unrebutted testimony that
they were squatters and not bona fide occupants. Their occupation was by mere toleration of the State, and as
such, they had no right or interest therein.
4. Under the Rules of Court, declaratory relief is an action which any person interested under a deed will,
contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
5. The fact remains that the petitioners did not have, nor acquire any interest in the subject lands. They
enjoyed no rights that were violated, nor were they affected by the barter of the said lands to Planas and the
subsequent sale of the same to the respondent.
6. For an action for declaratory relief to be entertained, the following must concur:
a. there must be a justifiable controversy;
b. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
c. the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
d. the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
7. All these requisite facts are not present; the complaint must, therefore, fail for lack of sufficient cause of
action.

F. HABEAS CORPUS

5. Mejoff v director of prisons - Mikee


6. Co v deportation board, supra
7. Lucien tran van nghia v. liwag - Iris
LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA v LIWAG
July 13, 1989 | FERNAN, C.J | petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus | Warrants of Arrest ;
Administrative searches
PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA
RESPONDENT: HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CID

SUMMARY: CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera,
Jr accusing Lucien Tran Van Nghia of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety
and progress." Commissioner Liwag issued on a mission order to a team of 7 CID agents for them "to locate and
bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." The CID agents went to
petitioner's residence, he and his then lady companion locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to
talk to the agents. Finally, petitioner was subdued with the help of the Western Police District and immediately
taken to the CID Intelligence Office. A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner subsequently.
The warrant was supposedly based on his failure to make any investments in the Philippines despite presenting
himself to be financially capable of doing so in order to get a permanent status, his willful refusal to cooperate
with the CID, that he has made himself into an undesirable alien and that he had to be transferred from his
detention cell at the immigration office to PGH due to his injuries resulting from his arrest. The petitioners
counsel file this petition for habeas corpus to prevent the petitioner from being transferred from PGH and
question the validity of his detention. The SC dismissed the petition, stating that the issue regarding the validity
of his arrest has been rendered moot and academic by his release on bail and that even granting that the arrest
might be invalid, it was subsequently cured by the deportation proceedings initiated against him.

DOCTRINE: The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings. There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single
deportation proceeding. (Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago) What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the
assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Originally admitted to the Philippines on November 1, 1981 as a temporary visitor, his status was changed to
that of an immigrant three years after based on his representation that he is financially capable and will
invest in the Philippines. To date, however, petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in
French tutoring and practice of acupressure.
2. On May 28, 1987, respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a
certain Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner's landlord, accusing petitioner of being an undesirable
alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress."
3. Acting thereon, respondent Commissioner Liwag issued on a mission order to a team of 7 CID agents for
them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report."
4. The CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta. Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for
verification of his status but petitioner and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside
their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents.
5. The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the Western Police District. Once
again petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the
lawmen were injured. Finally, petitioner was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office.
6. A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there is nothing in the
records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension. Said
warrant was based on the following acts and circumstances:
a. That he applied for and was granted permanent status on his representation that he is financially
capable of investing in the Philippines but he made no investments but engaged in tutoring in French
and practice of acupressure; that he willfully refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents
who were sent to invite him to CID for verification of his status and physically resisted being taken in by
the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the agents; that he has thereby made himself an
undesirable alien subject to deportation.
b. By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was "brutally seized" by the CID agents,
petitioner, upon request of the French consul, was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration
office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent medical treatment.
7. On June 10, 1987, petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened
removal" of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent Commissioner. A
return of the writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on June
17,1987.
8. Petitioner, in his submitted memoranda insists that respondent official has no power, authority or
jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
ISSUE: WoN the arrest and detention of Petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to
deportation proceedings are legal YES but now moot and academic.
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
Assuming that the issue was not rendered moot by his release on bail:
The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner (par10, Facts) has been resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-
Santiago where the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
(Morano vs. Vivo, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial
and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence.
Assuming that the arrest was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his
petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest:
Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement. On June 20, 1987, petitioner was released upon the posting
and approval of a personal bailbond on June 19,1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 during the pendency of the
administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court.
In Moncupa vs. Enrile, supra, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner
Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister. In the Moncupa case,
it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel, to change his abode and to grant
interviews to members of the mass media without official permission. He was also ordered to report regularly to
the military authorities. The Court subsequently nullified said conditions and ruled:
Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is
inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus but also constitutional freedoms where restraints are not only
involuntary but also unnecessary.
Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained. The only condition in his bailbond is that ordinarily
found in any other analogous undertaking, which is to appear and answer the complaint, at all times hold himself
amenable to the orders and processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself in execution
of such judgment
Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the
Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The restraint (if any) against the petitioner's person has therefore become
legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

G. INJUNCTION AS PROVISIONAL REMEDY

8. Collector v. reyes - Lorenzo


COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V REYES & COURT OF TAX APPEALS
Jan 31, 1957 | Felix, J. | Petition for review | Injunction as provisional remedy
PETITIONER: CIR
RESPONDENTS: Aurelio Reyes and CTA
SUMMARY: CIR attempted to collect deficiency taxes from Dr. Reyes by presenting a warrant of distraint and
levy on his properties if he should fail to pay. Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review together with a
petition to restrain CIR from executing the warrant of distraint and levy. CTA ruled for Reyes. CIR contends
that CTA may not restrain it, but the SC upheld the CTA.

DOCTRINE: While Section 305 of the National Internal Revenue Code prohibits courts from granting
injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the Code,
however, Section 11 of RA 1125 authorizes the CTA to suspend at any stage of the proceedings the said
collection when, in its opinion, the same may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer,
provided the taxpayer either deposits the amount claimed or files a surety bond for not more than double
the amount with the Court. Said Section 11 must be deemed to have modified Section 305 of the Internal
Revenue Code in view of the repealing clause contained in said Act to the effect that "any law or part of law,
or any executive order, rule or regulation or part thereof, inconsistent with the provisons of this Act is hereby
repealed."

FACTS:
1. CIR demanded from Dr. Reyes payment of his alleged deficiency income taxes, surcharges, interests and
penalties for the tax years 1946 - 1950 amounting to P641,470. Together with said letter of assessment,
respondent received a warrant of distraint and levy on his properties in the event that he should fail to pay the
alleged deficiency income taxes.
2. Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review of the Collector's assessment of his alleged deficiency income
tax liabilities. This was followed by an urgent petition to restrain the CIR from executing the warrant of distraint
and levy on his properties, alleging among others, that the right of respondent to collect by summary
proceedings the tax demanded had already prescribed (section 51 (d) of the National Internal Revenue Code), as
his income tax returns for the tax years 1946 - 1950 had been filed more than three years ago; that a distraint
and levy on his properties would work injustice or irreparable injury to him and would tend to render any
judgment of the Court in the main case meaningless and ineffectual; that the requisite of Section 11 of RA 1125
for the filing of a bond or deposit before a writ of distraint and levy may be suspended is not applicable in this
case.
3. CIR opposed said petition on the ground that the CTA has no authority to restrain him from executing the
warrant of distraint and levy on the properties of respondent in connection with the collection of the latter's
deficiency income taxes; that said taxpayer has an adequate remedy in law by paying first and then seek for the
recovery thereof; and that section 51 (d) does not preclude distraint and levy. By resolution CTA upheld Reyes
and ordered the CIR to desist from collecting by administrative method the taxes allegedly due from Reyes
pending the outcome of his appeal.

ISSUE/S: WON CTA had any power to grant an injunction without requiring the filing of a bond or making a
deposit as prescribed by section 11 of RA 1125 YES

RULING: Denied.

RATIO:
1. It is mandatory that the right of the CIR to collect by the summary methods of distraint and levy be exercised
within the period of 3 years from the time the income tax return is filed, otherwise the right can only be enforced
by judicial action. Since the deficiency taxes in question were assessed and the warrants for their collection by
distraint and levy were issued after the period of 3 years from the filing of the returns, it is evident that said
warrants, as well as the steps taken in connection with the sale of the properties of the taxpayer, were issued
without authority of the law and, hence, the CTA acted properly in enjoining their enforcement as prayed for.
2. CIR relies on the National Internal Revenue Code in asserting that it may not be restrained by CTA. "SEC. 305.
INJUNCTION NOT AVAILABLE TO RESTRAIN THE COLLECTION OF TAX-No court shall have authority to grant
an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax, fee, or charge imposed by this Code.
3. However, Section 11 of RA 1125 prescribes: "Who may appeal; effect of appeal.-Any person, association or
corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CIR may file an appeal in the CTA within thirty
days after receipt of such decision or ruling. No appeal taken to the CTA from the decision of the CIR shall
suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax
liability as provided by existing law: Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the Court the collection by
the BIR may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the
proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to
file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court."
4. There may be instances when the CIR could be restrained from proceeding with the collection, levy, distraint
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer. The requirement of the bond as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the writ of injunction applies only in cases where the processes by which the collection sought to be
made by means thereof are carried out in consonance with the law for such cases provided and not when said
processes are obviously in violation of the law to the extreme that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing
the interests of the taxpayer.
5. The respondent Court issued the injunction in question on the basis of its findings that the means intended to
be used by petitioner in the collection of the alleged deficiency taxes were in violation of law. It certainly would
be an absurdity on the part of the CTA to declare that the collection by the summary methods of distraint and
levy was violative of the law, and then, on the same breath, require the petitioner to deposit or file a bond as a
prerequisite ex or the issuance of a writ of injunction.

9. Pineda v. Lantin - mary


PINEDA V LANTIN (1962) by Or
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
INJUNCTION

SUMMARY: During an investigation conducted by SEC headed by PETIs, RESPs move to quash a subpoena
duces tecum and seek to enjoin SEC from continuing with the investigation for lack of requisite procedures
pursuant to RA 1143. CFI, in taking cognizance of this case, denies PETIs MTD. SC rules that CFI has no
jurisdiction to enjoin SEC, whose ordersinterlocutory or finalare reviewable only by SC.

FACTS
1. PETI is SEC Commissioner acting upon a letter wherein 2 complainantsminority stockholders of RESP
Bacolod-Murciaallege that RESP General Manager Araneta committed various acts in violation of the
corporation laws and prejudicial to the interest of the company. PETI thus assigned co-PETIs as investigators
2. On receiving a subpoena duces tecum from PETIs, RESPs filed a "Petition to Set Aside Subpoena." They
contended that with the approval of RA 1143, "the power given by law to SEC to conduct investigations has been
made subject to the condition that such investigations must be conducted in accordance with Commission
rules." And, since SEC had not till then adopted such rules, it could not proceed with the investigation. PETI
denied this.
3. RESPs filed motion to quash the order and filed for prohibition to stop the investigation from proceeding;
reiterated that SEC should not proceed with the investigation until after it shall have promulgated the rules
required by RA 1143. PETIs MTD denied.

ISSUES
1. Was civil case for prohibition filed by RESPs proper and within jurisdiction of CFI/RTC?
--NO. CFI has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against SEC. That power is lodged exclusively with SC

RATIO
1. SEC 1 RULE 43, ROC: Within 30 days from notice of an order by the CSC or SEC, any party aggrieved
thereby may file, in the SC, a written petition for the review of such order of decision.
2. Further, SEC 35 of CA 83,[1] provides: Any person aggrieved by an order issued by [CSC] may obtain a
review of such order in SC by filing in such court within 30 days after the entry of such order a written petition
praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. . .
The 2 provisions clearly pronounce that only SC possesses the jurisdiction to review or pass upon the legality or
correctness of any order or decision of SEC
3. RESPs attempt to argue that they do not want the SEC order reviewed but the investigation stopped for
lack of jurisdiction over the same. SC disagrees: its main aim was have an order of SEC reviewed and ultimately
set aside. And assuming arguendo it was not an order to review but simply nullify, the Rules are clear that all
orders of SEC may be elevated only to SC.
4. While the GR is that interlocutory orders are not appealable, the same may be so appealed when it is
grounded upon lack of jurisdiction.

[1] As amended, creating SEC

10. Lemi v. valencia - Beatriz

LEMI VS. VALENCIA (1963)


J. Dizon

SUMMARY
Lemi holds a franchise to operate radio stations. He was served by the CFI Manila a search warrant to search
DZQR, where his transmitter was also seized, even while it was being used in the middle of a broadcast. This
was supposedly because the transmitter he used was different from the one that was approved. Hence, he
prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction against those who seized his transmitter. The SC granted the
preliminary mandatory injunction. It ruled that the Radio Control Office did not act on Lemis application for
renewal of license, and that the seizure made was one to evade the requirement of a hearing before a license
may be revoked.
DOCTRINE
While courts should exercise great care in granting preliminary mandatory injunctions because the writ operates
not merely to preserve the status quo between the parties but to compel one of them to perform a positive act;
nevertheless, we held in Meralco vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. p. 433, that in cases of extreme urgency; where
petitioner's right to the writ is clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor;
where there appears to be a willful invasion of petitioner's right, the injury inflicted upon him being a continuing
one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction would not be to create a new relation between the parties
but solely to re-establish a pre-existing relation between them recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
respondent, courts should not hesitate in granting the writ. Considering the facts obtaining in the present case,
particularly the circumstance that petitioner's inability to continue broadcasting through his radio station affects
his contractual relations with third parties, we find it justified to grant the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction
prayed for.

FACTS
1. CFI Manila issued a search warrant to search radio station DZQR in Manila, and seize the radio
transmitter. In the middle of a broadcast, the search warrant was served and the transmitter seized.
2. Lemi then filed a special civil action of mandamus with petition for the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against Sec. of Public Works and Communications Brigido Valencia, Chief of Radio
Control Office Roberto San Andres, agent of SPWH Alfedo Cargo, Radio Regulations Inspector Heraclio
San Juan, and Chairman of Presidential Anti-graft Committee Conrado Cajator.
3. Respondents were then summoned and required to show cause why the preliminary mandatory
injunction should not be issued.
ISSUE
W/N Lemi is entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction - YES

RATIO
1. RA 1553 vested a public franchise to operate a radio station to Lemi. Lemis first license expired in 1962
thus he applied for a renewal. However, the Radio Control took no action as regards his renewal. Up
until the time of the hearing of the motion for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, no
hearing was held on whether or not the renewal should be approved. Respondents admit Lemis
authority to operate, but contend that the transmitter they used was different from the transmitter that
was approved. Lemi denied this, saying that because the transmitter was secondhand, it had to be
repainted and the serial number, painted over, was not visible.
2. Section 3 of the Radio Control Act: no application for the renewal of station or operator license shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. Department Order 11, series of 1950 implements Sec.
3, providing: that a radio station license may also be revoked for violations of the radio laws and
regulations, local or international; provided, however, that no such license shall be revoked without
giving the licensee a hearing.
3. Lemis application for renewal has not been disapproved. The Court believes that the requirement of a
hearing applies not only if a radio license is to be revoked, but also before the Radio Control Office may
lawfully do any thing that, for all practical purposes, would amount to such revocation because it makes it
impossible for the radio station concerned to continue broadcasting.
4. That the seizure was made under authority of a search warrant can not obliterate the fact that such
seizure was made in violation of the law requiring a previous hearing. The application for the issuance of
the warrant amounted, in effect, to an effort to evade the law requiring said hearing.
5. While courts should exercise great care in granting preliminary mandatory injunctions because the writ
operates not merely to preserve the status quo between the parties but to compel one of them to
perform a positive act; nevertheless, we held in Meralco vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. p. 433, that in cases of
extreme urgency; where petitioner's right to the writ is clear; where considerations of relative
inconvenience are strongly in his favor; where there appears to be a willful invasion of petitioner's right,
the injury inflicted upon him being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction
would not be to create a new relation between the parties but solely to re-establish a pre-existing
relation between them recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the respondent, courts should not hesitate
in granting the writ. Considering the facts obtaining in the present case, particularly the circumstance
that petitioner's inability to continue broadcasting through his radio station affects his contractual
relations with third parties, we find it justified to grant the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction prayed
for.

WHEREFORE upon the filing by petitioner and approval by this Court of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for be issued commanding respondents to return to petitioner
the radio transmitter mentioned in the latter's verified petition. (Hence: The writ of preliminary injunction is made
permanent.)

11. Honda v. San Diego - Irish

HONDA v. SAN DIEGO


March 18, 1966 l DIZON, J. l INJUNCTION
SUMMARY: Hahn filed with the Patent Office a petition seeking the registration in his name of the trademark
HM HONDA. Honda opposed the application. During the hearing, Hahn moved to dismiss Hondas opposition
on the ground that Honda is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. The said motion was denied.
Pending the resolution of Hahns MR by the Director of Patents, Hahn filed a petition for certiorari before the CFI
of Rizal which issued a WPI restraining the Director and the Hearing Officers of the Patent Office from giving due
course to Hondas opposition pending the final determination of the petition. SC annulled CFI orders granting
and issuing the WPI on the ground that CFI, being of the same rank as the Patents Office, had no jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief against the latter.

DOCTRINE: A writ of injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by another
court superior in rank to the former.

FACTS:
1. Honda, is the manufacturer of the Honda motorcycles and the owner, among others, of the trademarks
"HONDA", "HM" and "HM with wings" used in the manufacture and sale of said Honda motorcycles.
2. Since 1959, Alfred Hahn had been importing into the Philippines Honda motorcycles bearing the
trademarks just mentioned.
3. It appears, however, that Hahn filed with the Philippine Patent Office a verified petition seeking the
registration in his name of the trademark "HM HONDA.
4. Honda opposed said application.
5. During the hearing, counsel for Hahn questioned the personality of Honda to appear before the Patent
Office and asked orally that its opposition be dismissed. The motion was was denied.
a. (NOT THAT IMPORTANT) Hahns argument: Since Honda is not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, the Patent Office could not be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
said oppositor.
b. In accordance with Sections 68 and 69 of Act 1459, as amended, and the pertinent provisions of
Act 3883, as amended, registration with the Bureau of Commerce and a license from the
Securities and Exchange Commission is sine qua non to have capacity to become a party
"applicant or oppositor" to an inter partes proceeding, in the Philippine Patent Office.
6. Hahn filed a motion for reconsideration (MR).
7. The MR notwithstanding, the Hearing Officer scheduled the reception of Hahn's evidence, but on that
date, his counsel refused to present any evidence until his MR had been resolved by the Director of
Patents. In view of this incident, the Director of Patents issued an order giving Hahn 10 days within which
to submit the necessary authorities and arguments in further support of his motion to dismiss the
opposition.
8. However, instead of complying with the order, Hahn filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) in the CFI of Rizal against the Director et al. for the annulment of the order of
the Patent Office denying his motion to dismiss Honda's opposition.
9. Honda and the Director opposed the petition for the issuance of a WPI and filed a MTD the petition on
the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief against the Philippines Patent Office.
10. CFI Judge, notwithstanding the oppositions and MTD referred to above, issued order granting the
petition for the issuance of a WPI restraining the Director and the Hearing Officers from further
proceeding pending the final determination of the petition for certiorari. Another judge, then acting as
vacation judge of the court, issued the corresponding writ.
11. Thereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed for the annulment of the order
granting the WPI upon the ground that in issuing them the CFI judge acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: WON CFI judge can issue WPI against the Director of Patents and the Patent Office NO

RATIO:
1. The CFI judges had no jurisdiction to issue the orders complained of.
2. The rule is well settled so well settled indeed that it requires no citation of authorities to support it
that a writ of injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by another
court superior in rank to the former.
3. Any order made by the (Public Service) Commission may be reviewed on the application of any person
or public service affected thereby, by certiorari in appropriate cases or by petition, to the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court is given jurisdiction to review any order of the Commission and to modify or set it
aside (Sec. 35). . . . In the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance to
grant injunctive relief against orders of the Public Service Commission, it would appear that no court,
other than the Supreme Court, possesses such jurisdiction. (Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service
Commission)
4. Under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended,
appeals from orders and decisions of the Director of the Patent Office must likewise be taken to the
Supreme Court.
5. The Philippine Patent Office is of the same rank or category as CFIs. Consequently, no one of the latter
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against the former.

12. Nocnoc v. Vera - Dawn

Nocnoc v Vera
February 27, 1979 | SANTOS, J | certiorari and prohibition | Injunction as Provisional Remedy

PETITIONER: MAXIMO NOCNOC


RESPONDENT: HON. ISIDORO A. VERA (CFI of Camarines Norte) and ERNESTO MANARANG

SUMMARY: Maximo Nocnoc filed a claim for compensation under the Workmens compensation act for the
death of his son, a bus conductor, in a vehicular accident involving the bus where he worked owned by Ernesto
Manarang. Nocnoc was awarded his claim, minus the sum he had previously received from Manarang. Upon
finality of the award, Nocnoc filed a petition for a writ of execution. Manarang then filed a petition for injunction
with the CFI of Camarines Norte presided by Judge Vera who enjoined the WCU Chief Referee and Sheriff from
executing the award.

DOCTRINE: The proper forum to thresh out the validity of the WCU's award, as well as the validity of the
ensuing writ of execution to enforce the same is the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and, on appeal, the
Supreme Court and not any other, much less respondent's court.

FACTS:
1. Petitioner-claimant filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act with the
Workmen's Compensation Unit, Regional District No. 6, at Naga City, for the death of his son, Norberto Nocnoc,
who died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in the transportation business of
private respondent, Ernest Manarang.
2. After the period to file an answer expired, private respondent moved to dismiss the claim on the ground
that petitioner had previously entered into an amicable settlement of the claim and that petitioner-claimant had
in fact received the sum of P2,330.00.
3. The WCU through its Chief Referee, Estanislao D. Sarto, denied the motion to dismiss, and instead
awarded to petitioner-claimant the sum of P6,240.00, but deducted thereform the aforesaid amount of
P2,330.00 which was deemed as advance and/or partial payment on the claim.
4. Respondent Manarang moved to have the award reconsidered, but his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit. Upon the finality of the award, claimant-petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of execution. This was opposed by respondent.
5. The writ of execution was issued by the WCU.
6. Respondent then filed a complaint for injunction with the CFI, Branch II of Camarines Norte, presided by
respondent Judge to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of execution so issued, upon his filing of a bond, to be
fixed by the Court.
7. Respondent Judge ordered defendants, WCU Chief Referee and the Provincial Sheriff to "cease and
desist from further orders
8. In their answer, with counterclaim, the Chief Referee, Provincial Sheriff and petitioner-claimant prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint. On the other hand, the private respondent in his reply prayed for the dismissal
of the counter-claim and that the injunction already issued be made permanent.

ISSUE:
WoN the CFI, as a court of general jurisdiction, can entertain a case impugning the validity of award of the
Workmen's Compensation Unit and, in the process restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution is issued by
its Chief Referee. NO

RULING: The orders of respondent Judge are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:
1. The respondent judge himself had disclaimed appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Act 3428 or the
Workmen's Compensation Act as amended by RA 772, to wit:
2. SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's Compensation Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court, in the same manner and in the same period provided by law and by Rules of Court for appeal from the
Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme Court.
3. But his assertion of jurisdiction over private respondent Manarang's complaint for injunction arising
from proceedings before the Workmen's Compensation Unit, on the ground that his court "is one of general
jurisdiction" is contrary to his admitted lack of jurisdiction.
4. The Court of First Instance is not empowered or clothed with jurisdiction to review or modify, much less,
annul an award or order of execution issued by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

VIII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION


SERAPIO DAUAN v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, respondents-appellees, SIMON ILARDE, ROMUALDO ILARDE, LORD CALANGAN, SANTOS
BAYSA and BASILIA TOMAS, Respondents-Appellants
Jan 31, 1967 | J. Regala | Law-Fact Distinction
SUMMARY: Dauan filed a homestead application (HA) of the land but there is considerable dispute as to
whether this application was approved by the Director of Lands. This point became a crucial issue between the
parties as Dauan subsequently sold his rights to various portions of the homestead to the Ilardes, Calangan,
Baysa and Tomas (Appellants) without securing the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (Secretary) and both parties took the view that, if Dauans application had been approved, then the
transfer of rights to appellants must be approved by the Secretary; otherwise, no such approval was necessary.
Thus, it appears that Dauan sold his rights to of the land to Simon Ilarde and that Dauan he sold his rights to 4
hectares to Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to appellant Basilia Tomas. Calangan and Tomas in turn sold their
rights to some part of the land to Baysa. These sales were all made without the previous approval of the
Secretary. The basis of contention of both parties is Sec 20 of the Public Land Act (SEE RULES). The Director
and the Secretary ruled that Dauans HA was not approved; hence, the transfer did not need the Secretarys
approval. Dauan then filed a petition for certiorari with the CFI (GRANTED), which ruled that the free patent
applications granted to the private respondents were null & void for not having been approved by the Secretary.
On appeal to the SC, the Court upheld Dauan (SEE HELD #2)
DOCTRINE: The conclusion drawn from facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review (Alfafara v.
Mapa)

FACTS:
1. See SUMMARY
2. The dispute arose when Dauan asked the Bureau of Lands to cancel the application for free patents
which the appellants filed, covering the portions of the homestead sold to them. Dauan questioned the
validity of the sales, claiming that the agreement was that of a loan and that at any rate the supposed
sales were void for having been made without the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. On the other hand, appellants maintained that their agreement with the appellee was
that of a sale and, that as the homestead application of appellee himself had not been approved by the
Director of Lands, no approval by the Secretary of the subsequent sales to them was necessary.
3. The Director of Lands held the transactions to be sales and sustained their validity on a finding that the
homestead application of Dauan had not been approved. His decision was subsequently affirmed on
appeal by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Secretary). Said the Secretary: The
records . . . do not reveal that appellants H.A. has ever been approved xxx Over the allegation of the
appellant (appellee herein) that his homestead application was approved but the records thereof were
lost during the war is the verity that there are no reconstituted records to point to such approval of
application nor is there any evidence to show that he has ever attempted to reconstitute the documents
relative to the said approval xxx in all these transfers none ever secured any prior approval of the
Director of Lands, required in Section 20 of the Public Land Law, as amended by RA No. 1242, but it
should be noted that the said provision of law demands such approval only when transfer of rights is
executed after the approval of a homestead application and, in the present case, there is no showing
that the homestead application of the appellant, basis of the rights so transferred, had ever been
approved at the time the transfers in question were executed.
4. Dauan filed this petition for certiorari in the CFI Nueva Vizcaya instead of appealing with the President,
charging that both Director of Lands and the Secretary gravely abused their discretion in finding that his
application had not been approved and, consequently, in ruling that prior approval of the transfers to
them was not required.
5. CFI granted petition, stating, xxx the petitioner is a holder of a perfected homestead entitled to grant
from the government, and having said petitioner remained in the possession for a period of more than
23 years, he is entitled to the protection of the law; the sales application of Romualdo Ilarde is null and
void with respect to the portion which embraces or includes a portion of the homestead of the petitioner
[the court having found no evidence at all that the portion was conveyed to Romualdo Ilarde by the
appellees; the free patent applications of the respondent Simon Ilarde, Basilia Tomas and Lord
Calangan, having not been previously approved by the Secretary are null and void, and as respondent
Santos Baysa derives his alleged rights from Basilia Tomas and Lord Calangan necessarily his
application is also null and void."
6. Appellants asked for a reconsideration of this decision and, failing to secure one, brought this matter to
SC on appeal. They contend that the decision of the Director of Lands, which was affirmed by the
Secretary became final for failure of the Dauan to appeal to the President, with the result that this
petition for certiorari should not have been entertained. It is claimed that the RTC erred in ruling that
Dauans application had been approved after it had once been found by the Director and the Secretary
that no such approval had been given.

ISSUE: Is there warrant for the lower courts conclusion that appellees application
for a homestead had been approved? YES

RULES: "Sec. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before the patent is issued, the
applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all requirements of the
law, but can not continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for
the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for purposes of
speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may
transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and
immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and
shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of
said application of the purchaser. Any person who his so transferred his rights may again apply for a new
homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent."

HELD:
1. While the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies would indeed require an appeal to be taken to
the President before resort to the courts can be made, it is equally true that the rule is not without
exception. For instance, the rule does not apply where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
2. Were the matter a simple process of ascertaining from the records whether the application had been
granted it is a question of fact. But precisely because the records of the Bureau of Lands had been
destroyed during the war that circumstantial evidence had to be introduced and it is a rule now settled
that the conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review.
3. The conveyances to the appellants, admittedly made without the previous approval of the Secretary, are
void and, consequently, that appellants return the possession of the land in question to the Dauan upon
the return to them of the purchase price they had paid to the appellee (Tinio v. Frances). A transfer of
rights without the previous approval of the Secretary "shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the
refusal of the patent" of Dauan but the cancellation is not automatic and as long as the Government has
not chosen to act, the rights of Dauan must stand.

Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.


14. Vda. de santiago v. reyes - Clyde
VDA. DE SANTIAGO v. REYES
February 29, 1960 | Labrador, J. | Review by certiorari | The Law-Fact Distinction
PETITIONERS: Trinidad de los Reyes vda de Santiago, Mamerti Santiago, Leonila Santiago, Andrea Santiago
RESPODENTS: Angela Reyes and Workmens Compensation Commission
SUMMARY: Petitioners filed a claim for compensation due to the death of Victoriano Santiago, a jeepney driver with a prescribed
route within Manila and the suburbs, who was murdered and whose body was found in Quezon. The Workmens Compensation
Commission found that his death did not arise out of was not occasioned in the course his employment since he voluntarily went
out of his route, thereby violating public service rules. SC held that the employer failed to present evidence in order to rebut the
presumption in favor of the employee.
DOCTRINE:Sec. 43 of the Workmans Compensation Act establishes a presumption that the deceased died while in the course of
his employment. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the other party to prove, based on substantial evidence, otherwise.

FACTS:
1. Victoriano Santiago was the driver of an autocalesa (jeepney) owned by Angela Reyes. He was last seen operating said jeepney at
9pm of Sept. 26, 1955. His body was found the morning after in Tayabas, Quezon, obviously a victim of murder by persons at
large and whose identities were not known. It was submitted that respondent gave specific instructions to follow the route
prescribed by the Public Service Commission (within Manila and suburbs).
2. Petitioners filed a claim for compensation before the Workmens Compensation Commission. In deciding whether Santiagos
death arose out of or was occasioned in the course of his employment, 2 members of the Commission found that the deceased
drivers act of deviating from the route prescribed for his observance constituted a positive factor in bringing about his own
demise, and found the deceased to have willfully violated public service rules and regulations, hence, the majority denied the
claim.
3. Assoc. Commissioner del Rosario dissented, stating that there are legal presumptions in favor of the employee that (a) the claim
comes within the provisions of the compensation law, and that (b) the injury is not occasioned by the willful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another. These presumptions were also established in Sec.
42 of the Workmens Compensation Act. Thus, the burden of proof shifts to the employer who must present substantial evidence
in order to overcome the presumptions, which, in this case, was not presented.

ISSUE/S: WoN the death of the deceased arose out of or was occasioned in the course of his employment YES.

HELD/RULING: Decision SET ASIDE. Respondent ordered to pay the compensation due the heirs under the law.
RATIO:
1. The Majoritys reasoning violates the presumption laid down in Sec. 69, par. (q), Rule 123 of the RoC: That the ordinary course
of business has been followed. Since there is no question that the deceased, immediately before leaving Manila, was engaged in
his employment, then the presumption is that he performed his duties legally and in accordance with the rules and regulations
because this was his regular obligation. As such, it was incumbent upon the respondent to prove that he did otherwise, or to
prove that he failed to comply with the regulations, that is, that the deceased voluntarily went out of his route and drove his
jeepney towards the province of Quezon. They failed to do so. There being no such evidence submitted by the respondent, we
must conclude that he was forced by the circumstances beyond his will to go outside of his route (threats of the malefactors who
killed him).
2. The Court cited Batangas Transportation Co. v. Josefina de Rivera, et. al, wherein the bus driver was held to have died in the
course of his employment even if there were indications that there was personal animosity between the assailant and the victim
which may have caused the assault. Since the deceased died while driving the bus, then his death must have been due to his
employment. The present case is stronger that the above-cited case, since there are no such indications present in this case.
3. The Court ruled that the decision of the majority which has been appealed from is not in consonance with the law and the express
provision of Section 43 of the Workmen's Compensation Law; and that by reason of such express provision of the law, it held
that Victoriano Santiago died by reason of and in the course of his employment and consequently his heirs are entitled to receive
the compensation provided for by law in such cases.

15. Aboutiz v pepeti - Chon

Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Pepito


Dec. 17, 1966 | Sanchez, J. | Extent of Judicial Review | Otchengco

SUMMARY: Demetrio Pepito is a crew member of m/v P. Aboitiz, a vessel which was navigating from Surigao to Tandag. Between
the night of November 30, and the early morning of December 1, 1961, Demetrio disappeared therefrom while said vessel was on
voyage. On December 26, 1961, Vivencia, Demetrios wife, notified the petitioner company that Demetrio was missing. Subsequenty,
Vivencia, for herself and in behalf of her children, filed with the Regional office of the Dept of Labor a notice and claim for
compensation. Naturally, the petitioner opposed Vivencia and contested the fact of death of Demetrio. The claims were awarded,
hence this petition by Aboitiz. Pertinent issue before the Court was WoN Aboitiz failed to controvert the claims of Vivencia that
Demetrio was already dead. The Court said that no, it did not. In this case, the mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio
Pepito is believed to be "dead" or "deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported missing", does not import an admission that the
man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing.

DOCTRINE: Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply means admission of
facts, not conclusions of law.

FACTS:

1. Between the night of November 30, and the early morning of December 1, 1961, Demetrio Pepito, a crew member of m/v P.
Aboitiz, disappeared therefrom while said vessel was on voyage.
2. On December 26, 1961, petitioner received from respondent Vivencia Ando Pepito a letter dated December 21, 1961 notifying it
that Demetrio, one of its employees, was reported missing as per record of the Deck Log Book of the M/V P. Vivencia also wrote,
Aboitiz while said vessel was navigating from Surigao to Tandag. It is our belief that Mr. Pepito is already dead. A diligent search
has been made but the same is rendered futile.
3. January 12, 1962, Vivencia Ando Pepito, for herself and in behalf of her children, the other respondents, filed with Regional
Office No. 8, Department of Labor, Cebu City, a notice and claim for compensation, asking for death benefits. Description: "While
the vessel was navigating from Surigao to Tandag, the herein deceased was lost or reported missing as per record of the deck log of
the M/V P. Aboitiz".
4. {etitioner, on February 16, 1962 controverted the claim for compensation and alleging that Demetrio Pepito was found missing
on December 1, 1961 and giving its own version of the incident as follows: "Pepito disappeared while off duty, and when the vessel
was near Bucas Grande Island while the ship was in navigation on a calm sea and good weather. We do not know if he purposely
jumped and swam ashore".
5. On March 21, 1962, without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued an award for death benefits to respondents, planted
upon the ground that "the right to compensation of the claimant has not been controverted by respondent within the period provided
for by law." Pets MR no avail.
6. Workmens Compensation Commission affirmed, hence this review on certiorari.
ISSUES and RATIO:
1. (Pertinent) WoN the petition failed to controvert the claims of the respondent? No. Petitioner did not fail to controvert the claims
of the respondent.
a. The Court first analyzed the recitals of the notice and claim for compensation, which stated:
"the herein deceased was lost or reported missing". This claim was filed on January 12, 1962, or barely 42 days after the event took
place.
b. It said that at that time, no presumption existed that Demetrio Pepito was dead. The boat was not lost. This opens up a
number of possibilities. Because nothing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to him. He could have transferred to another
vessel or watercraft. He could even have swam to safety. Or he could have died. Or worse, he could have taken his own life. Legal
implications such as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of the wife are so important that courts should not so
easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be taken as a fact.
c. Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply means
admission of facts, not conclusions of law.
d. In this case, the mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or
"deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported missing", does not import an admission that the man is actually dead, but
that he was just lost or missing.
e. Hence, petitioner's non-controversion admits but the fact that Demetrio Pepito was lost or missing, but certainly is not
an admission of the actual fact of death.

2. WoN the award is valid? No, it violated petitioners right to due process.

a. petitioner was directed to pay compensation without inquiry into the fact and circumstances of death
b. This trenches upon petitioner's right to due process enshrined in Section 1 (1) of Article Ill of the Constitution
c. The award having been made before petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard on the debatable fact and
circumstances of death, that award has no leg to stand on.
d. The report cited by the Commission by Anselmo Morales, a constabulary sergeant, does not prove death. At best, it
confirms a known fact disappearance, with the circumstance that "no one knew what happened to Demetrio Pepito". Besides, said
report was not brought up at any hearing. It was but the result of an investigation. Whatever the investigator said would not rise above
the level of hearsay twice removed.
e. Morales report was to the effect that Demetrio Pepito was "on board said boat on her maiden voyage to Tandag,
Surigao del Sur; that at about 2:00 o'clock a.m. on December 1, 1961, Francisco Ygot, a watchman on duty, noticed that Demetrio
Pepito was not in the crews' sleeping quarters; that when a thorough search of the boat failed to locate the missing crew member, the
boat's course was reversed upon instruction of its captain in order to look for him; that because no trace of Demetrio Pepito or his body
could be found, the search was abandoned and the boat then proceeded to Tandag; and that no one knew what happened to Demetrio
Pepito because he disappeared at midnight on a rough sea (big waves)."
f. Hearsay rule: "[A]ll ex parte evidence received by the Commissioner shall be reduced to writing and any party in
interest shall have the opportunity to examine and rebut the same". Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to as much as examine
or contradict this report. It thus results that said report is of no value as evidence.

3. WoN there is an employer-employee relationship? Yes.


a. The event arose out of, and took place in the course of, employment. It matters not that the disappearance occurred, as
alleged by petitioner, while Demetrio Pepito was off-duty. For, that incident happened while the boat was on a sea voyage. He had no
choice. He had to be in the vessel.

4. WoN Pepito can be presumed dead? No.


a. it cannot be gainsaid that the case of the disappearance of Demetrio Pepito could come within the coverage of paragraph
3, Article 391 of the Civil Code, which makes a presumption that a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years can be presumed death.
Conclusion: direct that the record hereof be returned to the Workmen's Compensation Commission with instructions 1. To hold a
hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine (a) whether Demetrio Pepito is alive; or (b) whether he should be presumed dead,
under the provisions of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the Civil Code; and (c) the circumstances of death if it be found or presumed that
he died.
B. QUESTIONS OF LAW

16. ORTUA v VICENTE ENCARNACION


January 30, 1934 | MALCOLM, J. | Extent of Judicial Review: Question of Law
PETITIONERS: FORTUNATO ORTUA
RESPONDENTS: VICENTE SINGSON ENCARNACION, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, ET AL.

SUMMARY: Ortua filed with the Bureau of Lands an application to buy land but his application was rejected as
he was a Chinese citizen. He filed 2 MRs but both were dismissed. On appeal to the Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, it affirmed the Director of Lands decision. Ortua sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, but the
TC dismissed his petition. The SC remanded the case holding that the Public Land Law has vested on the
Director of Lands direct executive control over land matters and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce. However, any action based upon a
misconstruction of law can be corrected by courts. While findings of fact of the director of lands are conclusive,
questions of law can still be subject to review of the Court.

DOCTRINE: Decisions upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the courts so long as
there is substantial evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. While findings of fact of the
director of lands are conclusive, questions of law can still be subject to review of the Court.

FACTS:

1. Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for the purchase of a tract of public land in
San Jose, Province of Camarines Sur.
2. Following an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Ortua's application was rejected, for the
the Director of Lands found him to be a Chinese citizen and under the Public Land Law, purchasers of
public agricultural land should be either a Philippine or US citizen.
3. He was allowed to file a sale or lease application for the portion of the land classified to be suitable for
commercial purposes, within a period of sixty days from the date of the decision and upon payment of
P3,000 for accrued rents.
4. Ortua filed 2 MRs which were denied.
5. He appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who affirmed the Director of Land's
decision, except that the sum of P3,000 was reduced to P400. Ortua filed this petition for mandamus.

ISSUES/HELD
1. Whether the Director of Lands finding that Ortua is a Chinese citizen subject to judicial review- Yes,
because it's a question of law
2. Whether Ortua is a Philippine citizen or Chinese citizen- Philippine

RATIO:
Whether the Director of Lands finding that Ortua is a Chinese citizen subject to judicial review- Yes, because
it's a question of law
1. In accordance with the Public Land Law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is made the
executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law, and he performs this
duty through the Director of Lands (sec. 3). Subject to the control of the executive head, the Director of
Lands is by law vested with direct executive control over land matters, "and his decisions as to questions
of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce." (Sec. 4).
2. SC accepted the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of facts as conclusive. The Director of
Lands has been made by law a quasi-judicial officer. As such officer he makes findings of fact, even
passes upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the qualifications of applicants
for the purchase of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in the Director of Lands which should not
be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of Lands on the construction of the Public Land Law are
entitled to great respect by the courts.
3. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the
absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake,
other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether or not it
is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the
finding in question could be made.
4. However, it was not intended by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to
review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be
done legally. Giving force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found by the Director of
Lands, yet so much of the decision of the Director of Lands as relates to a question of law is in no sense
conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review. In other words, any action of the Director of Lands
which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts.

Whether Ortua is a Philippine citizen or Chinese citizen- Philippine citizen


1. Presumptively Fortunato Ortua is a Philippine citizen. He had a sort of a dual citizenship, and had it within
his power either to elect to become a Philippine citizen or a Chinese citizen.
2. It is doubtful that Ortua has by his own acts repudiated his Philippine citizenship and chosen Chinese
citizenship. The Director of Lands gave too much prominence to two minor facts, susceptible of
explanation. When Ortua returned from China at the age of twenty-one, it was the most natural thing in
the world for him to land as a Chinese, for this would facilitate entry and obviate complications. Again,
when Ortua applied for the registration of a boat, there may have been any number of reasons why he
did not care to appeal from the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs. On the other hand, some
consideration should be given to the intention of Ortua, and he vigorously insists that it is his desire to be
considered a Philippine citizen. He has taken a Filipino name. He has gone into business and has
improved the property here in question to a great extent. There has been no implied renunciation of
citizenship, because Ortua has been domiciled in these Islands except for a short period during his
infancy when he temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the contrary, he states that he has always
considered himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to remain as a Philippine citizen.
3. It was a clear error of law resulted in not considering petitioner a Philippine citizen and so qualified under
the Public Land Law to purchase public agricultural lands

17. Mejia v Mapa - Amil


Mejia v Mapa (1954) by Amil Tamano
Extent of Judicial Review: Question of Law
Summary:
Maximo Alfafara filed a homestead application of Lot No. 741 of the Carcar cadastre, which was given due course by the
Bureau of Lands. Maximo entered into a landlord-cropper contract with Placido Mapa. Later on, Maximo transferred his
rights to his son Catalino, which eventually transferred to Mejia, Catalinos wife. Mapa claimed that he owned the subject
lot. The Director of Lands ruled in favor of Mejia. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the
decision of the Director of Lands. The SC agreed with the Director of Lands, saying that the lot was still within the forest
zone, and therefore could not be disposed of. Mejia, as the widow of Catalino was given a preferential right over the lot.

Doctrine:
As evidenced by the Ortua case, when there is a concurrence of findings of fact, the courts will not pass upon questions of
law since it will accord great respect to the factual findings of the administrative agency, as long as the findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. If there is no concurrence, but a divergence or reversal of findings of fact, these findings
will not be conclusive upon the courts and may be the subject of judicial review. That said, conclusions of law drawn from
these facts wil always be subject to judicial review.

Facts:
1. After an investigation conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of said bureau of the homestead
application, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner thereby giving course to her application and overruling the
application and protests of respondents.
2. In due course, respondents appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who reversed the decision
of the Director of Lands. And her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposed the present petition
for certiorari.
3. Respondents in their answer allege that, under section 3 of the Public Land Law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is the executive officer charged with the duty to carry out the provisions of said law relative to the
administration disposition of the lands of the public domain in the Philippines; that the decision which is now disputed by
petitioner was rendered after a formal investigation conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the basis of the evidence adduced therein and, therefore, said
Secretary has not abused his discretion in rendering it; and that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on the matter is conclusive and not subject to review by the courts, in the absence of a showing that it was
rendered in consequences of fraud, imposition, or mistake other than an error of judgment in estimating the value or effect
of the evidence presented, citing in support of this contention the case of Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion

Issue:
W/N the decision of the Secretary is subject to judicial review YES

Ratio:
1. We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in the case of (Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion) to the effect that "a
decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources, upon a
question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision
was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect
of evidence." But we hold that this doctrine does not apply here because we are not concerned with a decision of the
Director of Lands which was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but one which has been
revoked.
2. The Ortua doctrine is not available in this case for the following reasons
3. (1) The decision of the Director was not approved by the Secretary, but was reversed by the latter. It is not conclusive, and
is reviewable. (2) Even if there was a concurrence between the director and secretary, conclusions drawn by them are stil l
subject to review, being conclusions of law.
4. As evidenced by the Ortua case, when there is a concurrence of findings of fact, the courts will not pass upon
questions of law since it will accord great respect to the factual findings of the administrative agency, as long as the findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence. If not supported by substantial evidence, it is subject to judicial review.
5. If there is no concurrence, but rather a divergence or reversal of findings of fact, these findings will NOT be
conclusive upon the courts and may be the subject of judicial review.
6. That said, conclusions of law drawn from these facts will always be subject to judicial review.

18. People v Santos - Gressa


People v Santos (1936)
Extent of Judicial Review: Question of Law
Summary:
The accused was charged with fishing within 3 km of the shore lines of the island of Corregidor which was
prohibited under Sec 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Sec. of Agriculture. Act No. 4003 contains
no similar provision prohibiting fishing in those areas. The SC held that Sec 28 of AO No. 2 extends the law
which is an exercise of legislative power not conferred on the Sec. of Agriculture, and therefore Sec 28 is null
and void.

Facts:
1. The accused was charged with operating fishing boats and fishing within 3 km from the shore line of the
Island of Corregidor.
2. These acts constitute a violation of Sec 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2, which provides
that "boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish, within 3 km of the shore
line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the US, only upon receiving written permission, which may be granted by the Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned."
3. Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats from fishing within the above mentioned
areas.

Issue:
WON Sec 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid? NO (this is the question of law)

Ratio:
1. The only authority granted to the Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce under Sec 4 Act No. 4003, is to
issue instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with the Act.
2. Since Act No. 4003 contains no provision similar to the conditional clause in Sec 28 Administrative Order
No. 2, this conditional clause extends the law, equivalent to legislating which is reserved for the National
Assembly.
3. The conditional clause of Sec 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce constitutes an excess of regulatory power and an exercise of legislative power which he
does not have and therefore the conditional clause is null and void and without effect.

Ruling:
The acts Santos committed do not constitute a crime, therefore the information filed against him is dismissed.

19. Japanese War Notes v Sec. - Zedy


JAPANESE WAR NOTES CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
MAY 23, 1957 | LABRADOR, J. | QUESTIONS OF LAW

SUMMARY: The SEC rendered a decision finding that the Association made misrepresentations to the public
about the need of registering and depositing Japanese war notes, with a view to their probable redemption, for
otherwise they would be valueless.. Appealing to the SC, the Association claimed that the SEC erred in such
finding. The SC refrained from passing upon this issue because it involves a question of fact.

DOCTRINE: Only questions of law may be raised for review in the SC. (Note: Case did not mention any clear
doctrine. I just paraphrased the following statement in the ponencia: Only questions of law may be raised in this
case for review.)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Japanese War Notes Claimants Association of the Philippines, Inc., allegedly made
misrepresentations to the public about the need of registering and depositing Japanese war notes, with a view
to their probable redemption, for otherwise they would be valueless. The Association claimed that President
Magsaysay would soon make representations to the United States Government to have the war notes
redeemed.
2. The Securities and Exchange Commissioner issued an order requiring the Association to show cause why
it should not be proceeded against.
3. At the investigation, the Association tried to show that it made no misrepresentations in its publications. Its
mistake (i.e., claiming of President Magsaysays alleged representation to US Govt) was made in good faith as it
was later retracted and rectified. The Association also stated that it longed and hoped that the war notes would
be redeemed; that it is sincere and honest in its activities; and that it is entitled to its beliefs.
4. The Commissioner found that according to its articles, the Association has the privilege to work for the
redemption of the war notes of its members alone, but that it can not offer its services to the public for a
valuable consideration, because there is nothing definite and tangible about the redemption of the war notes
and its success is speculative; that any authority given to offer services can easily degenerate into a racket; that
under its articles of incorporation the petitioner is a civic and non-stock corporation and should not engage in
business for profit; that it has received war notes for deposit, upon payment of fees, without authority in its
articles to do so; that it had previously been ordered to desist from collecting fees for those registering the war
notes, but notwithstanding this prohibition it has, done so in the guise of service fees.
5. The Commissioner ordered the Association to stop immediately the registration of Japanese War Notes,
receiving the same for deposit, and charging fees therefor. It is not, however, prohibited from admitting
members, with the corresponding rights and obligations as such. The Commissioner also ordered the
Association to desist from accepting and collecting fees for reparation claims for civilians casualties and other
injuries, as it is not authorized so to do under its articles of incorporation.

ISSUES:
1. Relevant: Won the Commissioner erred in finding that the Association made misrepresentations to the
public so as to induce holders of war notes to register them with petitioner Not decided upon because it is a
question of fact.
2. Minor Issue: Won the Commissioner erred in ordering Association to stop the registration of Japanese war
notes, receiving same for deposit and charging fees therefore NO
3. Minor Issue: Won the Commissioner erred in ordering the Association to desist from accepting and
collecting fees for reparation claims for civilian casualties and injuries NO

RATIO:
First Issue
1. We are not permitted to examine the correctness of the first contention as the same involves questions of
fact; only questions of law may be raised in this case for review (section 2, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court). (Note:
This is the only relevant ratio in this case.)
Second Issue
2. The Association claimed that the order not related to the issue investigated. While it may be true that the
issue which started the investigation has been the misrepresentations made to the public by the petitioner
herein, the order is based on the findings of fact made in the course of the investigation and the prohibition
stated in the order aims at the eradication of the source of the evil of misrepresentation that was the subject of
the investigation. It can not be said, therefore, that the resultant order is not germane or related to the subject-
matter of the investigation.
3. It is also argued that the registration of war notes and the collection of fees therefor is not prohibited by
the corporation law and the authority of the petitioner to engage therein is implied from its articles of
incorporation. We do not find any merit in the contention. The articles authorize collection of fees from
members; but they do not authorize the corporation to engage in the business of registering and accepting war
notes for deposit and collecting fees from such services. This was the ruling of the Commissioner and this we
find to be correct.
Third Issue
4. We do not find any merit in the third contention that the association has authority to accept and collect
fees for reparation claims for civilian casualties and other injuries. This is beyond any of the powers of the
association as embodied in its articles and have absolutely no relation to the avowed purpose of the association
to work for the redemption of war notes.

YSMAEL v. CIR
May 30, 1960 l Concepcion, J. l Question of Law

PETITIONER: JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC.


RESPONDENT: THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

SUMMARY: The Court of Industrial Relations certified Ysmael Steel Salemens Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the salesmen of the Company, with all the rights and obligations imposed by
law. Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc (the Company) appealed from such order claiming that the CIR order is null and
void for alleged want of a clear and distinct statement of the law and facts on which it is based, in violation of
Article VIII, Section 12, of the Constitution. SC ruled that the findings of the CIR constitute a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate invoked by the Company.
DOCTRINE: Questions of law are reviewable by the Court on certiorari.
FACTS:
1. The Union is duly registered by the Department of Labor and is a legitimate labor organization. The
Company is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel equipment, machines, etc., owned and
operated by the Juan Ysmael & Company, Inc.
2. The Union filed a petition praying for certification upon the ground that:
A. It is a labor organization composed of all the salesmen working for the Ysmael Steel
Manufacturing Co.,;
B. That there are in the Company two (2) other labor unions, namely, the Ysmael Steel Labor
Organization, the membership of which is composed mainly of manual factory workers (non-
supervisors), and the Ysmael Steel Employees Union, the membership of which is composed of
supervisors, non-supervisors who are technical employees, office non-technical employees and
clerical factory workers; and
C. That the members of petitioning Union are not included in or represented by any of said two (2)
unions in their collective bargaining agreement with the Company for the economic factors
affecting the members of petitioning Union are different, and they constitute a separate and
distinct union for an appropriate bargaining unit;
3. The Company filed an answer objecting to the petition but were overruled by the Court in the order
appealed from.
4. At the time of the instant petition for certification was filed, there were twenty (20) salesmen or
commission agents working for the Company, but that as of March 26, 1958, only fourteen (14) of them
were left.
5. Neither of the two unions existing in the Company represents the members of the petitioning Union in
any of their collective bargaining agreement with the Company.
6. After a careful examination of the records, particularly the respective memoranda filed by both of the
petitioning Union and the Company, the Court held that:
A. There exists an employer-employee relationship between the members of the petitioning Union
and the Company;
B. That all the salesmen working with the Company may constitute a distinct and separate
appropriate unit for bargaining purposes with the Company;
C. That the members of the petitioning Union constitute the majority of the salesmen working for
the Company; and
D. That the certification of the petitioning Union, therefore, as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the salesmen working with the Company is in order.

ISSUE: WON members of petitioning Union do not constitute a majority of its salesmen or commission agents
(as argued by the Company and contrary to the findings of the lower court). NO.

RATIO:
1. The CIR decision, which was drawn from the facts, is reviewable by the Court on certiorari as a
question of law.
2. This argument of the company is contrary to the findings of fact of the lower court, which are borne out
by Exhibit C, a list of the salesmen or agents affiliated to petitioning Union. Said findings may not be
disturbed in this proceeding for review by certiorari.
3. Although the Company said that Exhibit C is not correct, the fact is that, in its answer, filed with the LC, it
merely averred that it is "not certain" that the members of petitioning Union constitute a majority of the
salesmen or commission agents of said Company.
4. The record shows that the same had twenty (20) salesmen or commission agents when this case was
instituted; that, at the time of the hearing in the lower court, there were only fourteen (14) of them
working for the Company; and that, with the exception of one (1) of them, the remaining thirteen (13)
salesmen or commission agents are members of petitioning Union, and there is no accuracy of the
finding to this effect in the order appealed from simply because only three (3) of these salesmen or
agents appeared at the aforementioned hearing.
5. Apart from the fact they were not required to be present at said hearing, the reluctance of employees or
agents to do anything that may antagonize the employer, or may give occasion for antagonism, is readily
understandable.
6. After a careful examination of the records, the Court believes that there exists an employer-employee
relationship between the members of the petitioning Union and the Company; that all the salesmen
working with the Company may constitute a distinct and separate appropriate unit for bargaining
purposes with the Company; and that the members of the petitioning Union constitute the majority of the
salesmen working for the Company. The certification of the petitioning Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the salesmen working with the Company is in order.
7. The findings constitute substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate invoked by the Company.
The Court held in Talabon vs. Provincial Warden: that failure to comply with said requirement of our
fundamental law does not nullify or affect the validity of the decision or order in question.
8. The difference in the manner of "selection and engagement" does not prove the absence of employer-
employee relationship. Most business enterprises have employees of different classes, necessarily
requiring different methods of selection and contracts of services of various types, without detracting
from the existence of said relationship.
9. In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that
the members of petitioning Union are employees of the Company within the purview of the terms
"employer" and "employee" as defined in the Industrial Peace Act for purposes of certification of said
union as the bargaining representative of its salesmen or commission agents.
a. The Company directs the details of the work of making sales, through a sales manager, under
whose authority commission agents are.
b. The Company exercises the power of dismissal: (a) by cutting off these allowances, when the
agent makes a misrepresentation with regards to coverage or report on daily visits made, or is
guilty of disloyalty in any form or free-lancing for any other company during his tour of duty; (b) by
withdrawing the authority to sell in case of such disloyalty or free-lanching, or when an agent fails
to make any reasonably good sale within a reasonable period; and (c) by forcing him to resign for
any compelling reason

RULING: Wherefore, the order appealed from certifying the Ysmael Steel Salemen's Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the salesmen of the Company is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner herein, Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc.

21. OLeary v. Brown - Irvette


OLEARY v BROWN PACIFIC-MAXON, INC. (1951) | The Extent of Judicial Review, Questions of Law | J.
Frankfurter

SUMMARY: John Valak dies trying to save drowning men from the dangerous channel running near the
recreation center where he is employed. His mother now files for death compensation against the employer
which the Deputy Commissioner grants, using the zone of special danger test and treating the question
[whether the particular rescue attempt described by the evidence was one of the class covered by the Act] as a
question of "fact." The CA reversed. The SC ruled in favor of the mother, acknowledging the ruling of the Deputy
Commissioner. It stated that the evidence presented, on the whole, is consistent and credible. From it, the
Deputy Commissioner could rationally infer that John acted reasonably in attempting the rescue, and that his
death may fairly be attributable to the risks of the employment.

FACTS:
1. John Valak is an employee of Brown Pacific-Maxon whose mother is now claiming for an award of compensation
under the Longshoremens and Harbor Workers Compensation Act following his accidental death.
2. Brown-Pacific maintained for its employees a recreation center near the shoreline, along which ran a channel so
dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden. Signs to that effect were erected.
3. The incident occurred when John spent the afternoon at the center and was waiting for his employer's bus to
take him from the area. There, he saw two men, standing on the reefs beyond the channel, signaling for help.
Heroically, he plunged in to effect a rescue. In his attempt, however, he drowned.
4. The Deputy Commissioner awarded the death benefit, finding as a "fact" that:
a. "At the time of his drowning and death, John was using the recreational facilities sponsored and
made available by the employer for the use of its employees,
b. Such participation by the deceased was an incident of his employment, and
c. His drowning and death arose out of and in the course of said employment. . . ."
5. Brown-Pacific petitioned the District Court to set aside the award DENIED.
6. On appeal, the CA reversed; saying,
a. The lethal currents were not a part of the recreational facilities supplied by the employer and the
swimming in them for the rescue of the unknown man was not recreation. It was an act entirely
disconnected from any use for which the recreational camp was provided, and not in the course
of Valak's employment."
b. The Act precluded an award for injuries incurred in an attempt to rescue persons not known to
be in the employer's service, undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employer's premises.

ISSUE: W/N John Valaks mother is entitled to the award of compensation? YES.

RATIO:
1. The SC reversed the CA, upholding the Deputy Commissioner, stating that the CAs view is too restricted an
interpretation of the Act. What is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone
of special danger" out of which the injury arose. As such, a reasonable rescue attempt may be "one of the risks
of the employment, an incident of the service, foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute."
2. The Deputy Commissioner recognized the standard that [findings are to be accepted unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.] It treated the question [whether the particular
rescue attempt described by the evidence was one of the class covered by the Act] as a question of "fact."
a. SC: Doing so serves to illustrate the variety of ascertainments covered by the blanket term "fact."
The blanket term does not connote a simple, external, physical event as to which there is
conflicting testimony. The conclusion concerns a combination of happenings and the inferences
drawn from them. In part, the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the
simple, external facts. Yet the standards are not so severable from the experience of industry nor
of such a nature as to be peculiarly appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment as
"questions of law."
3. When this Court determines that a CA has applied an incorrect principle of law, wise judicial administration
normally counsels remand of the cause to the Court of Appeals with instructions to reconsider the record. In this
instance, however, given the slim record and the ease of applying the relevant standard, the litigation had better
terminate now. Accordingly, the SC examined the record to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.
4. The SC finds that record supports the Deputy Commissioner's finding. The pertinent evidence was presented by
the written statements of four persons and the testimony of one witness. It is, on the whole, consistent and
credible. From it, the Deputy Commissioner could rationally infer that John acted reasonably in attempting the
rescue, and that his death may fairly be attributable to the risks of the employment.

DECISION: Ruled in favor of the mother.

DISSENT:
(MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE BURTON join, dissenting.)
1. Liability accrues in the instant case only if the death arose out of and in the course of the employment. There
must be some connection between the death and the employment. The Deputy Commissioner knew that, so he
found as a fact that, "at the time of his drowning and death, the deceased was using the recreational facilities
sponsored and made available by the employer for the use of its employees, and such participation by the
deceased was an incident of his employment."
2. This finding is false, and has no scintilla of evidence or inference to support it.
3. It is undisputed upon this record that the deceased, at the time he met his death, was outside the recreational
area in the performance of a voluntary act of attempted rescue of someone unknown to the record. There can
be no inference of liability here unless liability follows from the mere relationship of employer and employee.
4. The attempt to rescue was an isolated, voluntary act of bravery of the deceased in no manner arising out of or in
the course of his employment. The only relation his employment had with the attempted rescue and the
following death was that his employment put him on the Island of Guam.
5. In this case, the employer is liable in this case because he is an employer. I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

22. oKeeffe v. smith associates - Jose

OKEEFFE v. SMITH ASSOCIATES


PER CURIAM
QUESTION OF LAW

PETITIONER: OKeeffe, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees Compensation, US Department of Labor


RESPONDENTS: Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., et al.
SUMMARY
The Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees Compensation awarded death benefits to the wife and
child of Robert Ecker, an employee of Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates who died in a boating accident in
South Korea. In doing so, the Deputy Commissioner concluded that Eckers death arose out of and in the
course of employment. The District Court affirmed the award but the CA reversed the formers judgment. The
Court upheld the Deputy Commissioners findings on the ground that they are to be accepted unless they are
irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record.

DOCTRINE
1. See Ratio No. 2
2. See also Dissent No. 4 (NOTE: I feel the doctrine in this case is actually in the dissent)

FACTS
1. Robert C. Ecker drowned during a Saturday outing while boating on a South Korean lake. At the time of his
death he was employed at a defense base in South Korea by Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, a
government contractor. The dissent also reveals that the accident occurred when Eckers boat, which was filled
with sand, capsized.

2. Ecker had been hired in the United States under an oral contract which provided that he was to be
transported to South Korea at his employer's expense, remain there for two years, and then, at his employer's
expense, be transported back to the United States. He worked on a "365 day per year basis subject to call to
the job site at any time." He "quite often" worked on Saturdays and Sundays and at other times outside the
normal work day. The employer considered all its employees to be "in the course of regular occupation from the
time they leave the United States until their return."

3. The Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, United States Department of Labor,
determined "that the accident and the subsequent death of the decedent arose out of and in the course of
employment. He therefore awarded death benefits to Eckers widow and child in accordance with the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act).

4. The employer and its insurance carrier brought an action in the United States District Court to set aside and
enjoin the enforcement of the compensation award.

5. The District Court affirmed the compensation award. However, a panel of the CA summarily reversed and set
aside the award.

ISSUE
WON the CA erred in summarily reversing the District Courts judgment YES

RULING
1. The following provisions of the Act are relevant here:
a. Sec. 2(2) provides workmen's compensation for any "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course
of employment.
b. Sec. 19(a) specifies that the deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine
all questions in respect of such claim.

c. Sec. 21(b) provides that the Deputy Commissioner's compensation order may be suspended and set aside by
a reviewing court only "[i]f not in accordance with law."

2. In cases decided before and after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court has held that
these provisions limit the scope of judicial review of the Deputy Commissioner's determination that a "particular
injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The rule of judicial review has therefore emerged that
the inferences drawn by the Deputy Commissioner are to be accepted unless they are irrational or
"unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."

3. OLeary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. held that the standard to be applied by the Deputy Commissioner does
not require "a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the accident All
that is required is that the 'obligations or conditions' of employment create the 'zone of special danger' out of
which the injury arose.

4. It cannot be said that the Deputy Commissioners holding that Eckers death, in a zone of danger, arose out of
and in
the course of his employment is irrational or without substantial evidence on the record as a whole (see Facts
No. 2).

5. The dissent would reverse the Deputy Commissioners determination that the accidents involved were within
the zone of special danger. As Brown-Pacific-Maxon made clear, it is just this type of determination which the
statute leaves to the Deputy Commissioner subject only to limited judicial review.

DISSENT (Harlan, J.)


1. Eckers duties were restricted to Seoul where he was responsible for personnel in the employers
stenographic and clerical departments. In fact, Ecker did not live at the job site. He was subject to call at the job
site at any time, but the usual work week was 44 hours.

2. The language of Brown-Pacific-Maxon regarding the zone of special danger was intended to mean only that
where the employer had placed a facility for employees in an especially dangerous location and thus had
created a danger of accidents, a "reasonable rescue attempt" could be "one of the risks of the employment.

3. Furthermore, reliance upon Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board in Brown-Pacific-Maxon shows that the
Court was not establishing a rule that any compensation award by a Deputy Commissioner would be
automatically upheld, for it was the whole purpose of Universal Camera to effectuate congressional intent that
the courts expand their scope of review over administrative decisions.

4. Justice Harlan reads Brown-Pacific-Maxon to mean that some questions of application of "arising out of and in
the course of employment" to the facts of a case will be left to the discretion of the administrator, and review of
his decision treated as review of a finding of fact. The cases in which this limited review of the administrator's
decision is appropriate are those in which one application of the statute to the external facts of the case
effectuates the judicially recognizable purpose of the statute as well as another. Dominion over the broad or
clear purposes of the statute thus remains firmly in the courts' hands, while within the confines of such
statutory purposes, administrators are left discretion to provide the intimate particularizations of statutory
application.

5. In the present case, the injury did not take place on the actual job site, and it did not arise out of any special
danger created by the job. In no sense can it be said that Ecker's job created any "special" danger of his
drowning in a lake, or more particularly, of his loading a small boat with sand and capsizing it.

C. QUESTIONS OF FACT

23. Gonzales v Victory - Genesis

GONZALES v. VICTORY LABOR UNION (1969)


Makalintal, J. | Question of Fact

Petitioner: JOSE MA. GONZALES


Respondents: VICTORY LABOR UNION, JULIAN BELTRAN, SEVERINO APAWAN, PONCIANO SAYAN, and
QUIRICO MENDEZ

Summary: Gonzalez was charged of unfair labor practice for allegedly dismissing his employees due to their
union membership. He denies this, arguing that he dismissed them because of their pilferage. CIR en banc
rendered a 3-2 decision in favor of the employees. SC reversed, ruling that CIRs majority opinion did not meet
the standard of substantial evidence.

Doctrine: The decision was rendered by an almost evenly divided court and that the division was precisely on
the facts as borne out by the evidence. In such a situation, SC feels called upon to go over the record and, in
order to determine the substantiality of evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative but also in its qualitative
aspects. For to be substantial, evidence must first at all be credible.

Facts
Gonzalez was engaged in trawl fishing. Beltran, Apawan, Sayan, Mendez and one Virgilio Baes were
working in his fishing boat.
A complaint was lodged at the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against Gonzalez, charging him with
unfair labor practice in dismissing said employees by reason of their membership in Victory Labor
Union (VICLU), thereby interfering in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
Gonzalez counters that their dismissal was for cause, they having been found pilfering the catch of the
fishing boat.
CIR ruled against Gonzalez. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the CIR en banc, but it was
denied, with judges voting 3-2. Hence this petition for review.

Issue
WON the CIR decision complied with substantial evidence rule? NO
Ratio
Substantial evidence rule instructs that findings of fact by the CIR are not disturbed on appeal as long
as they are supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
The decision was rendered by an almost evenly divided court and that the division was precisely on the
facts as borne out by the evidence. In such a situation, SC feels called upon to go over the record and,
in order to determine the substantiality of evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative but also in its
qualitative aspects. For to be substantial, evidence must first at all be credible.
The evidence relied upon by the majority in CIR is the testimony of respondents Beltran, Apawan and
Mendez, as well as the testimony of the union president, Attorney Campos. The first three uniformly
declared that they became members of VICLU; that they had not committed any irregularity at work;
and that on February 7, 1962 they were being dismissed by reason of their union membership.
BUT there is other evidence which cannot be lightly dismissed:
The respondents and Atty. Campos testified that the actual signing of membership slip was
done in the morning of November 15, 1951. Yet the log book of the boat shows that the boat
was fishing in the sea off Bohol the whole day on that date. Between the entries in a log book,
which is required by law to be kept by every master or captain of a registrable vessel, and a
membership slip, the first is more reliable.
The complaint for unfair labor practice named Baes as one of the five complainants, all
members of VICLU. But on trial, Atty. Campos testified that Baes was not a member of the
union at all.
Petitioner was never officially notified that respondents were members of the VICLU. No
demand for check-off deductions from their wages was ever served upon him. And although all
crew members of the boat were supposedly affiliated to VICLU, no attempt was made by the
latter to secure a collective bargaining agreement or at least a certification election.
The captain of the vessel himself, who was not a member of the union, was dismissed for
complicity in the pilferage.
There were significant contradictions on the testimony of respondents. Beltran testified that the
four of them were called together to the office and told that they were dismissed. Mendez
testified that such incident happened aboard. Apawan said that he was called alone to the office
of his employer.
In view of all the considerations set forth, the bare testimony of respondents is insufficient to establish
unfair labor practice under the standard fixed by law.

GRANTED.

24. Suarnaba v wcc - Verlin

SUARNABA v. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION


October 9, 1978 | Santos | Question of fact

SUMMARY: Rosita, as widow of employee Ireneo, filed a claim for death benefits and reimbursement of
medical expenses. The WCC admitted the compensability of the claim but ultimately barred recovery of
benefits, citing that the evidence was not conclusive to establish that she was Ireneos legal wife and
dependent. The SC set aside the WCCs ruling, saying that the WCC should have considered the other
pieces of evidence presented which, together with the applicable presumption of marriage, would establish
that indeed she was Ireneos legal wife and dependent.

DOCTRINE: RATIO #2
FACTS:
1. Rosita Suarnaba filed a as widow of Ireneo Suarnaba, employee of Clavecilla Radio System. She was
awarded by the Department of Labor Regional Office P4,986.01 representing death benefits and
reimbursement of medical expenses.
2. Upon review, the WCC affirmed the compensability of the claim, but barred the recovery of any benefits
citing the insufficiency of evidence by Rosita to prove that she was Ireneos widow The WCC only
mentioned a certification by the Assistant Parish Priest attesting to the marriage. The WCC ruled that this
could only prove solemnization, not filiation.

ISSUES/HELD
Should the WCC have approved Rositas claim? YES. With a little exercise of common sense and
circumspection the WCC should have realized that Rosita was Ireneos legal wife and dependent.

RATIO:
1. Together with the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, the following establishes that Rosita is Ireneos legal
wife and thus, her claim for compensation benefits should have been approved:
a. Clavecilla Radio System itself admitted Rositas status as Ireneos legal wife, when it stated in the
"Employers Report of Accident and Sickness" that Rosita is the wife and one of the dependents
of Ireneo.
b. Rosita filed a Notice and Claim for Compensation and Death Benefits on June 14, 1969, as
Ireneos wife.
c. The Certification of Death mention her as surviving spouse of Ireneo Suarnaba.
d. During the hearing of the case, an affidavit was submitted (by one witness Dequito) to the effect
that Rosita was living with Ireneo and that she used to collect his salary from Clavecilla.
e. The Parish Certification was a proof of the solemnization of their marriage sacrament.
2. The WCC as a quasi-judicial body is invested with broad powers to hear and decide claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under its Rules "The hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or controversy in workmen's compensation cases shall be without
regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
whenever necessary, shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award."
3. IN THIS CASE, the WCC disregarded this rule by negligently failing to consider the several pieces of
evidence extant in the record of this case which clearly establish marital status. Instead, it relied on a
single piece of evidence (the Parish certification) and insisted that the proof required CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE of marriage (the "original of the marriage contract or the marriage certificate duly issued by
the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized" and in the absence thereof,
"an affdavit of the claimant and at least three witnesses to the marriage and cohabitation").
4. This is clearly violative of the fundamental precept that substantial evidence, and nothing more, is
required to support a claim for Workmen's Compensation. This is more regrettable considering the
factual backdrop of the case (preponderant evidence gave rise to the presumption of a lawful marriage
and no other person claimed to be Ireneos wife).
5. The Workmen's Compensation Act, as a social legislation intended to give relief to the workman and/or
his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury or sickness in the pursuit of
his employment, should be liberally construed to attain its laudable objectives.
25. Acting Commissioner of Customs v manila electric - Phillip
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v MERALCO
Jun 30, 1977 | Fernando, J. | Questions of Fact | Cachapero
PETITIONER: Acting Commissioner of Customs
RESPONDENT: Meralco, CTA.

SUMMARY: CTA reversed the finding of the Acting Commissioner that Meralco was not exempt from paying the
special import tax under RA 1394. The SC, in affirming the CTA, held that the findings of fact by the CTA were not
to be disturbed in light of its expertise on the matter at hand, unless there has been an abuse of its authority. The
SC also held that it is bound by the said finding of facts, and only errors of law are subject to its review.
DOCTRINE: See Ratio #s 3 and 4.
FACTS:
1. CTA reversed the determination by then Acting Commissioner of Customs, who declared that Meralco was not
exempt from paying the special import tax under RA 1394 for shipment of insulating oil.
2. Meralco claims that it is exempt from the special import tax by virtue of sec. 6, RA 1394, which exempts from
said tax equipment and spare parts for use in industries. They also claim exemption from par. 9 (2) of its
franchise which exempts its insulators from any and all taxes, in consideration of its payment of percentage tax
on its gross earnings.
3. In disposing of the issue of whether the insulating oil in question comes within the meaning of the term
insulator for it to be deemed covered by the exemption, the CTA held that since the insulating oils were used
for cooling and insulating, the said oils fell under the exception, and Meralco was thus not liable to pay the said
tax.
4.

ISSUE: WoN CTA erred in reversing the Acting Commissioners findings? NO.
RULING: CTA Affirmed.
RATIO:
1. An exemption from taxation must be justified by words too clear to be misread. Such exemption is not favored and
is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris.
2. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that
there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition
or subtraction.
3. (Balbas v. Domingo) The SC is bound by the finding of facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, only questions of law
being open to it for determination. Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable
by this Court.
4. (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) Nor as a matter of
principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax
Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax
problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless, as did not happen here, there has
been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority.
5. It would be an affront to the sense of fairness and of justice if in another case, respondent Court, in the exercise of its
discretionary authority, after determining that insulating oil comes within the term insulator, is not be upheld.

26. BANCO FILIPINO v MONETARY BOARD


December 11, 1991 | Medialdea | Questions of fact
PETITIONERS: BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
RESPONDENTS: HE MONETARY BOARD, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE: Hence, where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not
sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of
fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met.

FACTS:
January 25, 1985, the Monetary Board issued a resolution finding Banco Filipino insolvent and unable to do
business without loss to its creditors and depositors. Monetary Board of CB placed Banco Filipino under
receivership.
After a series of reports on March 22, 1985, the Monetary Board issued another resolution placing the bank
under liquidation and designating Valenzuela as liquidator.
In a resolution dated August 29, 1985, SC in G.R. No. 70054 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order,
effective during the same period of 30 days, enjoining the respondents from executing further acts of liquidation
of the bank; that acts such as receiving collectibles and receivables or paying off creditors' claims and other
transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank are not enjoined. The Central Bank is ordered to
designate a comptroller for Banco Filipino.
After debtors of Banco Filipino failed to pay, the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, et al. acting as counsel for Banco
Filipino under authority of Valenzuela as liquidator, applied for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over
Top Management's properties. Thus, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite issued a notice of
extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the properties on December 16, 1985.

Debtors filed petition for injunction and prohibition but they were all denied.

ISSUE: W/N liquidator appointed by the CB has the authority to prosecute and defend suits and to foreclose
mortgages for and in behalf of the bank while the issue on the validity of receivership and liquidationof the latter
is pending action. - Yes
Was the forclosure void -YES
RATIO:
When the issue on the validity of the closure and receivership of Banco Filipino bank was raised in G.R. No.
70054, pendency of the case did not diminish the powers and authority of the designated liquidator to
effectuate and carry on the a ministration of the bank. SC not prohibit acts such as receiving collectibles and
receivables or paying off credits claims and other transactions pertaining to normal operate of a bank.
There is no doubt that the prosecution of suits collection and the foreclosure of mortgages against
debtors the bank by the liquidator are among the usual and ordinary transactions pertaining to the
administration of a bank. their did Our order in the same resolution dated August 25, 1985 for the designation by
the Central Bank of a comptroller Banco Filipino alter the powers and functions; of the liquid insofar as the
management of the assets of the bank is concerned.
The mere duty of the comptroller is to supervise counts and finances undertaken by the liquidator and to
determmine the propriety of the latter's expenditures incurred behalf of the bank. Notwithstanding this, the
liquidator is empowered under the law to continue the functions of receiver is preserving and keeping intact the
assets of the bank in substitution of its former management, and to prevent the dissipation of its assets to the
detriment of the creditors of the bank. These powers and functions of the liquidator in directing the operations
of the bank in place of the former management or former officials of the bank include the retaining of counsel of
his choice in actions and proceedings for purposes of administration.
While SC recognizes the actual closure of Banco Filipino and the consequent legal effects thereof on its
operations, It cannot uphold the legality of its closure and thus, find the petitions in G.R. Nos. 70054, 78767 and
78894 impressed with merit. We hold that the closure and receivership of petitioner bank, which was ordered by
respondent Monetary Board on January 25, 1985, is null and void.
it is a well-recognized principle that administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or
discretion, and findings of fact. But when there is a grave abuse of discretion which is equivalent to a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, then
there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination reached
In the instant case, the basic standards of substantial due process were not observed. Time and again, We have
held in several cases, that the procedure of administrative tribunals must satisfy the fundamentals of fair play
and that their judgment should express a well-supported conclusion.
In the celebrated case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, this Court laid down several
cardinal primary rights which must be respected in a proceeding before an administrative body. However, as to
the requirement of notice and hearing, Sec. 29 of RA 265 does not require a previous hearing before the
Monetary Board implements the closure of a bank, since its action is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided for
under the same law
Notwithstanding the foregoing, administrative due process does not mean that the other important principles
may be dispensed with, namely: the decision of the administrative body must have something to support itself
and the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra).
Hence, where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently
substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness
mandated in the due process clause is not met.
There is no doubt that the Central Bank Act vests authority upon the Central Bank and Monetary Board to take
charge and administer the monetary and banking system of the country and this authority includes the power to
examine and determine the financial condition of banks for purposes provided for by law, such as for the
purpose of closure on the ground of insolvency stated in Section 29 of the Central Bank Act. But express grants
of power to public officers should be subjected to a strict interpretation, and will be construed as conferring
those powers which are expressly imposed or necessarily implied
the closure of the petitioner bank was arbitrary and committed with grave abuse of discretion. Granting in gratia
argumenti that the closure was based on justified grounds to protect the public, the fact that petitioner bank was
suffering from serious financial problems should not automatically lead to its liquidation. Section 29 of the
Central Bank provides that a closed bank may be reorganized or otherwise placed in such a condition that it
may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public.

27. Philippine Airlines v. Confessor - Iris


PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. CONFESOR
March 10, 1994 | Nocon, J. | Certiorari | Extent of Judicial Review: Question of Fact
PETITIONER: PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
RESPONDENT: Hon. Nieves R. Confesor (Sec. of DOLE), Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA)
SUMMARY: SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute b/w PAL and PALEA arising from a deadlock in CBA
negotiations. She then made an arbitral award amounting to 1/3 of her projected earnings of PAL during the 3-yr period of
the imposed CBA, using the "traditional budget-management approach". PAL questioned the award alleging GAD on
SOLEs part as the same was not supported by the evidence presented. SC ruled that SOLE committed GAD.
DOCTRINE: While factual findings of SOLE are entitled to respect by the SC, the latter is inclined to review her
findings since the fundamental issue is the survival of the company. Besides, her findings are not based on a thorough
examination of the parties' contending claims but merely on their respective position papers. There was no trial wherein
the adversarial process would ensure a better presentation and appreciation of the evidence.

FACTS:
1. PAL and Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) commenced CBA renegotiation on Sept. 30, 1992, the
same day the economic provisions of the 1989-92 CBA expired. PALEAs proposals for econ package amounted to Php
16.1B. PALs own proposal amounted to Php 1B.
2. PALEA rejected PALs proposal. Negotiations continued. On May 3, 1993, PALEA declared a deadlock and filed a
Notice of Strike w/ NCMB the following day. On May 21, 1993, PAL wrote the SOLE requesting assumption of
jurisdiction over the dispute in view of the importance of its business and to prevent PALEA from going on strike.
3. SOLE Confesor issued an assumption of jurisdiction order, and enjoined any work stoppage and ordered the parties to
desist from any act that would exacerbate the situation. She also ordered the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days to facilitate dispute resolution.
4. After reviewing the respective positions of the parties, SOLE ordered the parties to execute a CBA, to be effective Oct.
1, 1992-Sept. 30, 1995, containing the ff provisions: wage increases (Php 1400 for 1st yr; Php 1000 for 2nd yr; Php 1200
for 3rd yr); Php 400 monthly allowance starting the 3rd yr; Php 50 seniority pay with recomputation starting Jan. 1,1993;
travel benefits where service fees to be based on lowest fare rates offered by PAL; Retirement: Benefits shall be fully
vested upon employee's completion of 20 years service.
5. Both parties filed MR: PALEAs was denied; PAL granted. Wage increases now at Php 1200 for 1 st yr; Php 1200 for
2nd yr; Php 1200 for 3rd yr. In addition, SOLE ordered the inclusion of two provisions proposed by PAL: (1) seniority
factor shall be reduced by 5% and the efficiency factor correspondingly increased by 5%; (2) For the same purpose,
bidding for vacant positions shall not be limited to specific sections, but shall be opened to the entire department under
which a particular section is located.
6. PAL filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging GAD on the SOLEs part in (1) awarding Php l.268B in benefits to
PALEA based on probabilities and conjectures not supported by evidence and (2) applying the so-called "traditional
budget-management approach" and awarded 1/3 of the projected net profits to PALEA and (3) giving retroactive active to
the award starting Oct. 1, 1992. PAL argued while SOLE agreed that PALs erratic financial performance could not
sustain PALEA's demand, she held that, given the company's recent performance, PAL would experience constant
profitability over the 3-year CBA period, with net earnings of Php 3.4B.
7. PALEA alleges that questioning the validity of the award involves factual findings by SOLE not reviewable by
certiorari.

ISSUE/S: WoN SOLE committed GAD in making the arbitral award - YES

RULING: Petition granted. Case remanded to SOLE for recomputation and to award to PALEA either the recomputed
amount or the package offered by PAL, whichever may be higher.

RATIO:
1. There is GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction where respondent board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions
exercised its judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. It has also been said that grave abuse is
committed when "the lower court acted capriciously, and whimsically or the petitioner's contention appears to be clearly
tenable or the broader interest of justice or public policy [so] require x x x." Also, GAD is committed when the board,
tribunal or officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties.
2. While factual findings of SOLE are entitled to respect by the SC, the latter is inclined to review her findings since the
fundamental issue is the survival of the company. Besides, her findings are not based on a thorough examination of the
parties' contending claims but merely on their respective position papers. There was no trial wherein the adversarial
process would ensure a better presentation and appreciation of the evidence.
3. SOLE committed GAD when she based her award to PALEA on the assumption that PAL would earn Php 3.4B during
the 3-year CBA period. The assumption finds no basis on the evidence adduced before her. She proceeded w/ the award
despite recognizing PAL's unstable financial performance and the possibility that its earnings in the foreseeable future
could be held down by certain factors (shortfall in projected income; PAL in a state of transition resulting from its recent
privatization; acquisition of 10 wide-bodied aircraft; downturn in profitability of airline industry due to increased
operating costs and cut-throat competition).
4. A more realistic projection should take into account PAL's performance for the previous 10 years, during which time
PAL only experienced profit during two fiscal years, and not solely on the net earnings posted in FY 1991-1992 of Php
l,113,478,000. Relying solely on said amount would be a mistake since the profit was largely due to the privatization of
PAL wherein the National Government assumed PAL's foreign currency obligations amounting to some Php 13.5B.
5. Subsequent events have shown the error in SOLEs projections. The actual net income earned by PAL for FY 1992-
1993 was Php l,025,665, which fell short of SOLEs projection by Php 87.813M.
6. After making her projection of PAL's net profits for the 3-yr contract period, SOLE then allocated 1/3 of the projected
profits as labor costs to be paid to PALEA under the so-called "traditional budget-management approach." SC is unaware
of such approach being traditional in this jurisdiction. Given the fact that neither of the parties cited the same in their
position papers filed before her, SOLE should have explained more thoroughly her application of said "traditional
approach.
7. At any rate, to apply said formula to the instant case would be improper since PALEA does not represent PAL' s entire
labor force. PALEA accounts for only 45% of PAL's total labor force. If the one-third rule would be applied, then PALEA
should only be entitled to 45% thereof.
8. PALs offer of Php lB to PALEA is 2x the amount PALEA would be entitled to if the 1/3 rule was properly applied,
was based on its computation of its projected operational costs during the 3-year contract period and should not be so
easily waived aside. However, the SC believes that the SolGens suggestion is more appropriate: SOLE should review the
positions of the parties so that a more acceptable and practicable amount could be found. If her recomputation should turn
out to be less than the amount offered by PAL, then she should award PALEA the amount offered by PAL.
9. As to WoN the arbitral award may be made retrocative to Oct. 1, 1992, in St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres, SC
held that in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued
by the SOLE pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the SOLE is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

28. Manila Electric v. nlrc (1991) - Lorenzo


MERALCO v. NLRC
July 2, 1991 | Narvasa, J. | Petition for Review | Extent of Judicial Review: Question of Fact

PETITIONER: MERALCO
RESPONDENT: NLRC, LA Andres Lomabao, Jose M. Masaya

SUMMARY: Meralco employee Masaya was administratively charged with dishonesty for making an unauthorized electrical service
connection. He confessed to the same after rejecting the offer of counsel and a union representative. However, he later filed an illegal
dismissal complaint. The LA and NLRC ruled in Masayas favor, holding that the quantum of proof required was that beyond
reasonable doubt. The SC held that it was only substantial evidence that was necessary.
DOCTRINE: The ground for dismissal of an employee need only be established by substantial evidence, and it is absolutely of no
consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes a criminal offense. The proceedings being
administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule and not by the rule governing judgments in criminal
actions.

FACTS:
1. Antonio Sanchez was consuming electricity at his home though he had neither applied with Meralco for electric service nor made
the requisite deposit. The electricity was being supplied to his house through a clandestine and illicit connection to a Meralco service
line. Household helpers of Sanchez and the houses owner informed the Meralco investigator that it was a Meralco employee, Jose
Masaya who had made the unauthorized electrical service connection.
2. Meralcos Legal Department sent Masaya a letter charging him with violation of the Company Code on Employee Discipline, and
thereafter conducted a formal investigation of the matter. Masaya and Renato Repuyan, a Meralco field investigator, gave testimony at
the investigation. Prior to being interrogated and in response to the investigators preliminary questions, Masaya stated that he had
received the letter accusing him of misconduct, that he had a copy of the code of discipline and understood the nature of the precise
charge against him, and that he did not need the help of a lawyer or a union representative since all was he going to state was the truth.
3. He deposed that he had indeed installed the connection in question, by shunting the meter base and tapping its service drop direct to
the service wire, and that he had received P200 from Sanchez for the same. At the close of his testimony, he sought forgiveness for the
offense. Repuyan testified on the fact of the undenied and indisputable installation of the illegal electric connection and the disclosures
made to him by Sanchezs househelpers and the owner of the house.
4. After investigation and based on the results, Meralco filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment an application to terminate
Masayas services, serving a copy on Masaya whom they placed on preventive suspension. Masaya filed an illegal dismissal
complaint. The LA ruled in Masayas favor, holding that Masaya was a bill collector, not a lineman collector and did not know how to
install electrical connections, and the money he received was not in consideration of any clandestine connection but representation
expenses in following up Sanchezs application for installation of electric facilities with the Manila City Halls Engineers Office.
5. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed, ruling that while only substantial evidence was required in administrative proceedings, the instant
case was an exception since Meralco was charging Masaya with a criminal offense and thus it was incumbent upon Meralco to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the crime, failing which Masaya must be absolved from responsibility; and that Meralco
failed to do so, as Masayas alleged admission did not prove the criminal act beyond reasonable doubt, absent showing of the
opportunity to be heard by counsel or at least a representative to confront his accuser.

ISSUE: WoN the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt applies NO

RULING: Petition for certiorari granted. NLRC and LA decisions annulled and set aside. Petitioners termination of Masayas
employment authorized and approved.

RATIO:
1. The NLRC implicitly conceded that under the substantial evidence rule, the evidence would be adequate to make out a case of gross
misconduct against Masaya. But the NLRC theorized that an adjudgment to this effect was precluded by the doctrine of proof beyond
reasonable doubt and that as there was no causal connection between Masayas duties to the crime imputed to him, mere substantial
evidence was insufficient to hold him guilty, let alone deprive him of his right to labor.
2. There are two errors invalidating these conclusions. First, Masaya was asked if he wished assistance from a lawyer or union
representative, and he responded negatively. Second, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required as basis for a judgment of the legality of dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial
evidence being sufficient.
3. The LC provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the LC
that the NLRC and its members and the LAs shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Also, the SC has ruled that
the ground for an employers dismissal of an employee need only be established by substantial evidence, and it is absolutely of no
consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes a criminal offense. The proceedings being
administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule and not, as the NLRC said, by the rule governing
judgments in criminal actions.
4. It was thus serious error and GAD for the LA and NLRC, for the reasons stated, to reject and exclude from consideration Masayas
express admissions during the administrative investigation. The SC was satisfied that the evidence sufficiently proved Masayas
commission of an act of dishonesty against his employer, specifically described in Sec 7, Meralcos Code on Employee Discipline,
which is of so serious a character as to merit the penalty of dismissal.
5. Finally, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Masaya's admissions were not voluntarily made; his subsequent assertion
before the LA that he had been "starved" into signing the typewritten record of the admin investigation containing said admissions is
not persuasive, and was not in fact accepted by the LA or the NLRC.

Facts on record considered by court: (1) the reality of the illegal connection; (2) the written communication to Masaya that he was accused of that
illegal dismissal and would be subjected to a formal investigation thereon; (3) Masayas acknowledgment that, having a copy of the companys code
of discipline, he understood the nature of the accusation and declined to be assisted by a lawyer or union representative since he claimed he was only
going to state the truth; (4) his voluntary admission that he made the illegal electrical connection, describing how he made it and that he had received
P250 from Sanchez; (5) his plea for forgiveness for making the illegal connection.