liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY
GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY
ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR
CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or
under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years
of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21
years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such
Page 1 of 24
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However,
under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from
quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is
sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the
instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their
years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we
cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through
seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least
terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest
resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were
alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking
the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January
2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs
complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered
sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the
following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;
2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;
3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.
However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1
Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that
respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who,
at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which
she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are
the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age
living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on
the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann
Page 2 of 24
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to
be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of
January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of
Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to
13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson
revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the
contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports,
documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter,
submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed
over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that
an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or
antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-
17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered
judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing plaintiffs complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit."
2 that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and
another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as
petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution
the following issues in this case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in
accordance with established decisional laws; and
2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted
by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3
In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police
Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on
some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was
inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue
emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or
tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should
Page 3 of 24
be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be
taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.
It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact
or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound.
However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased
Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering
the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the
occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically
state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral
parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted
Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendells hands
was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.cralawnad
More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the
body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be
exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of
death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the
body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage
of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4
However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour
interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was
wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he
examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on
cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of
the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are
concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6
He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the
head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or
extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general
characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr.
Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there
would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns
because they are what we call clean?
A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.
ATTY. ORTIZ:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless,
those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the
gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a
smokeless powder.
Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you
have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the
trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that
the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself,
Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear
and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory
of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is
concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at
Page 4 of 24
the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the
Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows
that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right
temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar
widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at
the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right
external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the
left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively
along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally
making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal
region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory
meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the
gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging,
singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of
entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are
absent." 10
On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was
made of record, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the
entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the
wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the
Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill
himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.
ATTY. SENINING:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of
the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding
what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden
in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs house; and he
further gave the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).
Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your
house?

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11
A It is about 8 feet.
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to
the testimonies of defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the
Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong Q And where were you looking from?
residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate
of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom. WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she A From upstairs in my living room.
was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that
from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After
seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy.
Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Page 5 of 24

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14
Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that
the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the
witnesses observations, since the visual perceptions of both were
obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the
house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo
Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and
his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they
heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was
going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more
than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went
down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the
incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid testimony establishes and
explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan
saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is
significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any
suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John
Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell
Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence
testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence of which point
to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her
rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime
Page 6 of 24
committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record
either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box
inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to
the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which
facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell
taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night
the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly,
cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really
been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking
the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless
one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may
be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even
drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph
of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back
thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how
or why he was in possession of that firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners
civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court
waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and
had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who
may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs.
Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of
their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could
have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in
their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having
access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box,
defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence
of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This
vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by
the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of
Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which
held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their
Page 7 of 24
minor children who acted with discernment is determined under the
provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability
would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-
362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees,
Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun
was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said
gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi
had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated
this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell
Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his
supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
x x x
"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court
holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-
appellants complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence,
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely
accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether
said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the
safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases
ours.) 19
We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should
be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all
indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this
opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on
jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners,
respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly
holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by
their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,"
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case
explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for
damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out
two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the
discussion hereunder.chanrobles law library
Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary,
and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering
previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative
analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary,
then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on
the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the
parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute
a valid and substantial defense.
Page 8 of 24
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and
not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which
provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible
for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case
of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly,
such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
x x x
First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment,
shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their
part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the
foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed
by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to
the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for
such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the
former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of
the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents
or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in
an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For
civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the
third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority,
legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . .
minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with civil law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children
contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the
aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases
adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v.
Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et
Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid
cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes
committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since
Page 9 of 24
these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In
both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the
cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under
Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses
would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the
parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal
intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting
in a regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the
liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising
from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally
liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a
family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was
imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-
year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the
authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages
arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18
years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article
2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the
petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas
which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son.
On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were
adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for
homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is
likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in
Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack
of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article
2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since
the son, "although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age,
as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for
subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the
compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28
employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29
and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision
in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided
for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that
what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in
the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on
the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However,
such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision
in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta
and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court
concluded its decision in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
Page 10 of 24
basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the
criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility
is of no moment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the
parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their
legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This
was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon
the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the
Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises
relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment

of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioners.

Page 11 of 24
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
ANTONIO GARCIA & LETICIA GARCIA, A & J TRADING, AND JULIO
RECONTIQUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
[1]
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-31246 awarding damages in favor of the spouses
Antonio and Leticia Garcia for breach of contract of carriage.[2] filed by the
spouses Garcia questioning the same Court of Appeals' Decision which
reduced their award of damages. On November 13, 1995, we denied their
petition for review.
The records show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year
old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for
Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the
driver.
At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus
passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national
highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, the shoulder of the
road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp
appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning
device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala,
were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by respondent A & J
Trading.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to
notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the
road. Santiago's passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no
heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-
employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent,
the bus passengers shouted "Babangga tayo!". Santiago stepped on the
brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck. It
caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury to several
others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers.
Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. They rushed her to
the provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she was given
emergency treatment. After three days, she was transferred to the
National Orthopedic Hospital where she was confined for more than a
month.[3] She underwent an operation for partial hip prosthesis.[4]
Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given emergency
treatment at the provincial hospital.
Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J
Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan.[5] Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother
of Allan. At the time of the complaint, Allan was a minor, hence, the suit
initiated by his parents in his favor.
Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the
mishap. Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault
and negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. Baliwag
charged that Recontigue failed to place an early warning device at the
corner of the disabled cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles.[6] On the
other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was
the result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of
Baliwag.[7]
After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable, thus:
xxxxxxxxx

Page 12 of 24
"In view thereof, the Court holds that both defendants should be held
liable; the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. for having failed to deliver the
plaintiff and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of
plaintiff's and defendant Baliwag Transit's contractual relation.
The defendant A & J and Julio Recontique for failure to provide its cargo
truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law."[8]
The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay
jointly and severally the Garcia spouses the following: (1) P25,000.00
hospitalization and medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in
eight (8) years, (3) P2,000.00 for the hospitalization of their son Allan
Garcia, (4) P50,000.00 moral damages, and (5) P30,000.00 attorney's
fee.[9]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by
absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of
attorney's fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00,
respectively.[10]
Baliwag filed the present petition for review raising the following issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in absolving A & J Trading from liability and
holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered by Leticia and Allan
Garcia in the accident?
2. Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to the
Garcia spouses correct?
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
I of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
Page 13 of 24
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it
failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their
destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances.[11] In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is
injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.[12]
The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised
extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its
driver's recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a
very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The
passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was
ignored.[13] Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of
liquor.[14] She could smell him as she was seated right behind the
driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before
the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee.[15] All
these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard for the physical safety of
his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a common carrier liable for
damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope
This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or
supervision of their employees.
Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused
solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It harps on
their alleged non use of an early warning device as testified to by Col.
Demetrio dela Cruz, the station commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who
investigated the incident, and Francisco Romano, the bus conductor.
The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention. Col. dela Cruz and
Romano testified that they did not see any early warning device at the
scene of the accident.[16] They were referring to the triangular
reflectorized plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation
Office. However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a
kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of
the truck to serve as an early warning device.[17] This substantially
complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
to wit:
(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to
endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be
provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning
devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which
shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No
vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this
subsection shall be registered. (Italics supplied)
Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not
substantially comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law
Page 14 of 24
clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular
reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one
hundred meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a
kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized
plates.[18] No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and
its driver, Recontique.
Anent this factual issue, the analysis of evidence made by the Court of
Appeals deserves our concurrence, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, both the injured passengers of the Baliwag involved in
the accident testified that they saw some sort of kerosene or a torch on
the rear portion of the truck before the accident. Baliwag Transit's
conductor attempted to defeat such testimony by declaring that he
noticed no early warning device in front of the truck.
Among the testimonies offered by the witnesses who were present at the
scene of the accident, we rule to uphold the affirmative testimonies given
by the two injured passengers and give less credence to the testimony of
the bus conductor who solely testified that no such early warning device
exists.
The testimonies of injured passengers who may well be considered as
disinterested witness appear to be natural and more probable than the
testimony given by Francisco Romano who is undoubtedly interested in
the outcome of the case, being the conductor of the defendant-appellant
Baliwag Transit Inc.
It must be borne in mind that the situation then prevailing at the time of
the accident was admittedly drizzly and all dark. This being so, it would be
improbable and perhaps impossible on the part of the truck helper
without the torch nor the kerosene to remove the flat tires of the truck.
Moreover, witness including the bits conductor himself admitted that the
passengers shouted, that they are going to bump before the collision
which consequently caused the bus driver to apply the brake 3 to 4 meters
away from the truck. Again, without the kerosene nor the torch in front of
the truck, it would be improbable for the driver, more so the passengers to
notice the truck to be bumped by the bus considering the darkness of the
place at the time of the accident.
xxxxxxxxx
While it is true that the investigating officer testified that he found no
early warning device at the time of his investigation, We rule to give less
credence to such testimony insofar as he himself admitted on cross
examination that he did not notice the presence of any kerosene lamp at
the back of the truck because when he arrived at the scene of the
accident, there were already many people surrounding the place (TSN,
Aug, 22, 1989, p. 13). He further admitted that there exists a probability
that the lights of the truck may have been smashed by the bus at the time
of the accident considering the location of the truck where its rear portion
was connected with the front portion of the bus (TSN, March 29, 1985, pp.
11-13). Investigator's testimony therefore did not confirm nor deny the
existence of such warning device, making his testimony of little probative
value.[19]
II
We now review the amount of damages awarded to the Garcia spouses.
First, the propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical
fees. The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on
record. The Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits B-1 to B 42 but
their total amounted only to P5,017.74. To be sure, Leticia testified as to
Page 15 of 24
the extra amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable
evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00. To
prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party
must be presented. The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony
whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that
damages have been actually suffered[20] Thus, we reduce the actual
damages for medical and hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.
Second, we find as reasonable the award of P300,000.00 representing
Leticia's lost earnings. Before the accident, Leticia was engaged in
embroidery, earning P5,000.00 per month.[21] Her injuries forced her to
stop working. Considering the nature and extent of her injuries and the
length of time it would take her to recover,[22] we find it proper that
Baliwag should compensate her lost income for five (5) years.[23]
Third, the award of moral damages is in accord with law. In a breach of
contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier,
through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith.[24] The evidence
shows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted
to bad faith. Without doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the
accident. Leticia underwent an operation to replace her broken hip bone
with a metal plate. She was confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital
for 45 days. The young Allan was also confined in the hospital for his foot
injury. Contrary to the contention of Baliwag, the decision of the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals awarded moral damages to
Antonio and Leticia Garcia not in their capacity as parents of Allan. Leticia
was given moral damages as an injured party. Allan was also granted
moral damages as an injured party but because of his minority, the award
in his favor has to be given to his father who represented him in the suit.
Finally, we find the award of attorney's fees justified. The complaint for
damages was instituted by the Garcia spouses on December 15, 1982,
following the unjustified refusal of Baliwag to settle their claim. The
Decision was promulgated by the trial court only on January 29, 1991 or
about nine years later. Numerous pleadings were filed before the trial
court, the appellate court and to this Court. Given the complexity of the
case and the amount of damages involved,[25] the award of attorney's fee
for P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV-31246 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION reducing the
actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74. No
costs.

Page 16 of 24
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as
Public Respondent, and ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO
CATUAR respondents.
Rodolfo d. Dela Cruz for petitioner.
Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private
vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180
of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an
employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.
The facts are summarized in the contested decision, as follows:
From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, consisting of the testimonies
of witnesses Virgilio Catuar, Antonio Sarmiento, Jr., Ruperto Catuar, Jr.
and Norberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Antonio
Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number
77-99-F-I Manila, 1971, owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving
the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan, Rizal; that plaintiff's jeep, at
Page 17 of 24
the time, was running moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and
while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that
suddenly, another jeep with plate number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven
by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep on the
portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact plaintiff's
jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards; that as a result
plaintiffs jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential,
the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that
plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist
was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise
plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and
one of his legs was fractured.
Evidence also shows that the plaintiff Virgilio Catuar spent a total of
P2,464.00 for repairs of the jeep, as shown by the receipts of payment of
labor and spare parts (Exhs. H to H-7 Plaintiffs likewise tried to prove that
plaintiff Virgilio Catuar, immediately after the accident was taken to
Immaculate Concepcion Hospital, and then was transferred to the
National Orthopedic Hospital; that while plaintiff Catuar was not confined
in the hospital, his wrist was in a plaster cast for a period of one month,
and the contusions on his head were under treatment for about two (2)
weeks; that for hospitalization, medicine and allied expenses, plaintiff
Catuar spent P5,000.00.
Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident, plaintiff Antonio
Sarmiento, Sr. sustained injuries on his leg; that at first, he was taken to
the National Orthopedic Hospital (Exh. K but later he was confined at the
Makati Medical Center from July 29, to August 29, 1971 and then from
September 15 to 25, 1971; that his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of
eight (8) months; and that for hospitalization and medical attendance,
plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. spent no less than P13,785.25 as
evidenced by receipts in his possession. (Exhs. N to N-1).
Proofs were adduced also to show that plaintiff Antonio sarmiento Sr. is
employed as Assistant Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a
salary of P1,200.00 a month; that as sideline he also works as accountant
of United Haulers Inc. with a salary of P500.00 a month; and that as a
result of this incident, plaintiff Sarmiento was unable to perform his
normal work for a period of at least 8 months. On the other hand,
evidence shows that the other plaintiff Virgilio Catuar is a Chief Clerk in
Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P500.00 a month, and as a result
of the incident, he was incapacitated to work for a period of one (1)
month.
The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver,
and against Gualberto Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep
(Plate No. 99-07-F-J Manila, 1971), denied that the other defendant
(Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been
an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the present.
On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that
defendant Oscar Sabiniano was an employee of the Board of Liquidators
from November 14, 1966 up to January 4, 1973 (Annex A of Answer).
Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he
took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or
authority of the latter (TSN, September 7, 1978, p. 8). He testified further,
that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which
Duavit did not push through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to
Duavit on his behalf.
Defendant Oscar Sabiniano, on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate
himself from liability, makes it appear that he was taking all necessary
precaution while driving and the accident occurred due to the negligence
Page 18 of 24
of Virgilio Catuar. Sabiniano claims that it was plaintiffs vehicle which hit
and bumped their jeep. (Reno, pp. 21-23)
The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but
found no employer-employee relationship between him and the
petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he
took the vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner. The
petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
The private respondents appealed the case.
On January 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned
decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano.
The appellate court in part ruled:
We cannot go along with appellee's argument. It will be seen that
in Vargas v. Langcay, supra, it was held that it is immaterial whether or
not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or
registered owner, and it is even not necessary to prove who the actual
owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the driver is. When the
Supreme Court ruled, thus: 'We must hold and consider such owner-
operator of record (registered owner) as the employer in contemplation
of law, of the driver,' it cannot be construed other than that the
registered owner is the employer of the driver in contemplation of law. It
is a conclusive presumption of fact and law, and is not subject to rebuttal
of proof to the contrary. Otherwise, as stated in the decision, we quote:
The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters
will be defeated and thwarted if we entertain the argument of petitioner
that she is not liable because the actual owner and employer was
established by the evidence. . . .
Along the same vein, the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be
allowed to prove that the driver Sabiniano was not his employee at the
time of the vehicular accident.
The ruling laid down in Amar V. Soberano (1966), 63 O.G. 6850, by this
Court to the effect that the burden of proving the non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship is upon the defendant and this he must
do by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence, has to defer to the
doctrines evolved by the Supreme Court in cases of damages arising from
vehicular mishaps involving registered motor vehicle. (See Tugade v.
Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226, 230). (Rollo, pp. 26-27)
The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding him jointly and severally liable with
Sabiniano in spite of the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between them and despite the fact that the petitioner's jeep was taken
out of his garage and was driven by Sabiniano without his consent.
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be
held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was
driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed
by him. Thus, in Duquillo v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134) [1939] we said:
Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for
anything. At the time of the accident, James McGurk was driving the
truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor did he have
anything to do with the latter's business; neither the defendant nor
Father Ayson, who was in charge of her business, consented to have any
of her trucks driven on the day of the accident, as it was a holy day, and
much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge of driving it; the use of
Page 19 of 24
the defendant's truck in the circumstances indicated was done without
her consent or knowledge; it may, therefore, be said, that there was not
the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and
the defendant. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and
following of the Civil Code, cited by the appellant, have no application in
this case, and, therefore, the errors attributed to the inferior court are
without basis.
The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable
to present day circumstances.
The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v.
Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957] and Vargas v. Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962])
cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, the registered owner of the
truck which collided with a taxicab, and which resulted in the killing of
Erezo, claimed that at the time of the accident, the truck belonged to the
Port Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was
not known to the Motor Vehicles Office. This Court sustained the trial
court's ruling that since Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the
truck and the Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation,
registered the vehicle in his name, the Government and all persons
affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of
ownership and registration. Thus, even if Jepte were not the owner of the
truck at the time of the accident, he was still held liable for the death of
Erezo significantly, the driver of the truck was fully authorized to drive it.
Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred Vargas had
sold her jeepney to a third person, so that at the time of the accident she
was no longer the owner of the jeepney. This court, nevertheless,
affirmed Vargas' liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor
Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth Act No. 146. We further ruled
that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in We, therefore, find that the respondent appellate court committed
contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and as reversible error in holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with
such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operator. The Sabiniano to the private respondent.
vehicle involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution
law does not only require the surrender of the AC plates but orders the
appealed from are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a form of public
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, 8th
transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities.
Judicial District, Branch 6, dated July 30, 1981 is REINSTATED.
As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely
SO ORDERED.
different from those in the present case. Herein petitioner does not deny
ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely denies
having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the
latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's
garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by
the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee
would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen
vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In
this regard, we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken
from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking areas
and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto
repair shops using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to
them for servicing or repair.

We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts

do not jibe four square with pending cases. Every case must be
determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this
case, the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an
employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring
driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot
hold the owner liable.

Page 20 of 24
VICTORY LINER, INC. petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES
MALECDAN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Eighth Division of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 3082-R, ordering
petitioner and its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr., to pay damages to the heirs of
Andres Malecdan, who had been killed after being hit by a bus while
attempting to cross the National Highway in Barangay Nungnungan 2 in
Cauayan, Isabela.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is a common carrier. Private respondent Elena Malecdan is the
widow of the deceased, while private respondents Veronica, Virginia,
Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola, Manuel and Valentin Malecdan are their
children.
Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay
Nungnungan 2, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela.[3] On July 15,
1994, at around 7:00 p.m., while Andres was crossing the National
Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the
southbound lane stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However,
as Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory Liner,
driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing,
respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a
result, Andres Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast
toppled over.[4] The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the
Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping him.
Page 21 of 24
The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdans neighbor, Virgilio
Lorena, who was resting in a nearby waiting shed after working on his
farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on his left shoulder, from which bone
fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the
Cagayan District Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival.[5] The
carabao also died soon afterwards.[6]Lorena executed a sworn statement
before the police authorities. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was
filed against the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo Joson, Jr.[7]
On October 5, 1994, private respondents brought this suit for damages in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Baguio City,[8] which, in a decision
rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver guilty of gross negligence in
the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross
negligence in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its
driver were held liable for damages. The dispositive portion of the trial
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to
pay, jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts of:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;
c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;
d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever amount that can be
collected by the plaintiff; and
f. The costs of the suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant Victory Liner, Inc. against the plaintiffs
and the third-party complaint of the same defendant against the Zenith
Insurance Corporation are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the
modification that the award of attorneys fees was fixed at P50,000.00.[10]
Hence, this appeal raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING P200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES WHICH IS DOUBLE
THE P100,000.00 AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR COMPLAINT AND IN GRANTING ACTUAL DAMAGES NOT
SUPPORTED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPTS AND SPENT WAY BEYOND THE BURIAL
OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES WHICH WERE NOT PROVED AND CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS NO FINDING OF BAD FAITH AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, IS IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
WHICH DISREGARDED THE APPELLANTS TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS EXERCISED EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES, OR
STATED DIFFERENTLY, WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE
Page 22 of 24
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE AND EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[11]
We find the appealed decision to be in order.
First. Victory Liner, Inc. no longer questions the findings of the Regional
Trial Court that Andres Malecdan was injured as a result of the gross
negligence of its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr. What petitioner now questions
is the finding that it (petitioner) failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employee. Petitioner argues,
With all due respect, the assignment of three inspectors to check and
remind the drivers of petitioner Victory Liner of its policies in a two-and-
a-half hour driving distance, the installation of tachometers to monitor
the speed of the bus all throughout the trip, the periodic monitoring and
checking of the trips from one station to another through a trip ticket
from station to station, the regular periodic conducting of safety and
defensive driving [training sessions] for its drivers are concrete and
physical proofs of the formulated operating standards, the
implementation and monitoring of the same, designed for the exercise of
due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees.[12]
It explained that it did not present bus driver Joson, Jr. on the witness
stands because he had been dismissed from the company after the
incident, which it found was a breach in the company
regulations. Petitioner blames private respondents for the death of their
father, Andres Malecdan, who was already 75 years old, for allowing him
to plough their field by himself.[13]
The contention has no merit.
Article 2176 provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the
quasi-delict committed by an employee. The responsibility of employers
for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is
primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the
employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.[14] The
rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been explained thus:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a
rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the
torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the
conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise
itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the
basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the
innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better
able to absorb them and to distribute them, through prices, rates or
liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an
employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be
careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to
take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.[15]
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can
Page 23 of 24
show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.[16] For this purpose, they have the burden of proving
that they have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of
the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.[17]
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records.[18] With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.[19] These facts
must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.[20]
In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.s written
examination,[21] actual driving tests,[22] x-ray examination,[23]psychological
examination,[24] NBI clearance,[25] physical examination,[26] hematology
examination,[27] urinalysis,[28] student driver training,[29] shop
training,[30] birth certificate,[31] high school diploma[32] and reports from
the General Maintenance Manager and the Personnel Manager showing
that he had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to
work as a professional driver.[33] However, as the trial court noted,
petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving
experience.[34]
Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the
company were given seminars on driving safety at least twice a
year.[35] Again, however, as the trial court noted there is no record of
Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar.[36] Petitioner likewise failed to
establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to submit in
evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports of field inspectors.The
finding of the trial court that petitioners bus was running at a very fast
speed when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not
disputed by petitioner. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did
not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the supervision of its driver
Joson, Jr.
Second. To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of
the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or
burial of the victim.[37] We cannot take into account receipts showing
expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as
expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death
anniversaries.[38] In this case, the trial court awarded P88,339.00 as actual
damages. While these were duly supported by receipts, these included
the amount of P5,900.00, the cost of one pig which had been butchered
for the 9th day death anniversary of the deceased. This item cannot be
allowed. We, therefore, reduce the amount of actual damages
to P82,439.00.00. The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should
likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and children of
the deceased underwent intense moral suffering as a result of the latters
death.[39] Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate
children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased. Under the circumstances of this case an award
of P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in
allowing moral damages.[40]
On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in
accordance with current rulings of the Court.[41]
Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases
involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[42] In this case, petitioners
driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed along
Page 24 of 24
the national highway and overtaking another vehicle which had stopped
to allow a pedestrian to cross. Worse, after the accident, Joson, Jr. did not
stop the bus to help the victim. Under the circumstances, we believe that
the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is proper.
Finally, private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees. Under Art.
2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in the
instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent case
of Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[43] we held an
award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be reasonable. Hence, private
respondents are entitled to attorneys fees in that amount.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17,
2002, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Victory Liner, Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to the
respondent heirs of Andres Malecdan:
1. Death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
2. Actual damages in the amount of Eighty-Two Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty-Nine Pesos (P82,439.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00);
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
and
6. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.