CRIMINAL LAW

JOSE REYES Y VACIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 177105-06 August 12, 2010

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act: RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead thereto. The law enumerates the punishable
acts or omissions and provides their corresponding penalties.
Same; Same; Elements of corrupt practices of public officers: The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are
the following: (1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) He
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) His action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
Same; Revised Penal Code; Article 241: In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to
perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Belen Lopez was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of agricultural land located in
Santa Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 209298 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Belen's son, Carlos de Guia, forged a deed of sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had
sold the land to him. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 by
virtue of the forged deed of sale and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos' name.
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan who subsequently mortgaged the
land to Simeon Yangco. Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed an adverse claim in the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan and also filed in the then CFI Baliwag, Bulacan a civil action for
cancellation of sale, reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon. RTC dismissed
Belens complaint. On appeal, the IAC reversed the decision of the RTC. Such decision became final
and entry of judgment was made on November 7, 1986. The records were remanded to the RTC
Baliwag, Bulacan.
Belen filed a motion for execution vis- -vis the decision. The RTC granted her motion.
However, when the writ was about to be executed, Belen learned that Ricardo had sold the land to
the tenants through a deed of reconveyance. Thus, Belen filed in the RTC a motion to declare Ricardo
and the tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and executory judgment. The RTC
held Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court and directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey
the land to Belen and to deliver to her the share in the harvest. Ricardo and the tenants appealed to
CA which ruled that the RTC correctly ordered Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen,
but held that the RTC erred in finding Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court.
Belen then filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a
complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants. However, this was dismissed by
the petitioner as the Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB Central Office affirmed the latter's ruling.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB Central Office, and ordered
the tenants: (a) to vacate the land; (b) to deliver its possession to Belen; and (c) to pay to Belen the
rents on the land corresponding to the period from 1981 until they would have vacated. The tenants
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, the tenants appealed to this Court
which affirmed the CA's decision.
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan,
one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with usurpation
of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered
its assailed decision, finding the petitioner guilty of both charges. The Sandiganbayan denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
the DARAB case
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for violating Section
3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB Case. RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead
thereto. The law enumerates the punishable acts or omissions and provides their corresponding
penalties. The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following: (1) The accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) He must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) His action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The first element was established. The petitioner was a public officer when he rendered his
decision, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating the
conflicting claims of parties. The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which
the offense is committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under Section 3
(e). The third element of the offense - when the act of the accused caused undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or, gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of the functions of the accused - was also established. In this regard, proof of the extent
or quantum of damage was not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit
received could be perceived to be substantial enough and was not merely negligible.
Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and to incur other expenses in order
to protect and prosecute her interest in DARAB Case. Moreover, the petitioner's stubborn refusal to
recognize and obey the CAs decision forced a further but needless prejudicial delay in the prompt
termination of the cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length of time Belen has
been unduly deprived of her exclusive ownership and undisturbed possession of the land, and the fruits
thereof. The injury and prejudice surely equated to undue injury for Belen.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code
HELD: NEGATIVE. The petitioners conviction for usurpation of judicial functions under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code is reversed and set aside. In usurpation of judicial function, the accused,
who is not a judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a
judge. However, the petitioner's task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in
DARAB case was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-
judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable
under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts constitutive of
usurpation of judicial function were lacking herein.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FILOMENO MAYINGQUE, GREGORIO
MAYINGQUE, and TORIBIO MAYINGQUE
G.R. No. 179709 July 6, 2010

Criminal Law; Revised Penal Code; Self-defense: The essential elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements
of self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admitted that he was the
author of the death of the victim and his defense was anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove
the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.

Same; Same; Defense; Alibi: Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when the
crime was perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where the crime was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two places.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The appellants and one Edwin Macas were indicted for the murder of Edgardo Sumalde
Tusi. The Prosecution presented Salvacion Tusi, wife of Edgardo, who testified that she knew the
appellants because they usually had their drinking sessions on Sundays at Edwins place, which was
beside her. According to Salvacion, in one such drinking session, Edgardo, annoyed by the noise made
by the appellants and Edwin, was prompted to admonish them to tone down their voices. However,
the latter resented Edgardos admonition. While she and Edgardo were resting in front of their house
at around 5 pm on May 30, 1999, Toribio arrived and without saying anything stabbed Edgardo twice
on his side. She shouted for help but her cousin Ruben Bernal could not do anything because Edwin,
Filomeno and Gregorio had meanwhile joined Toribio in assaulting Edgardo.
The RTC found the appellants guilty of murder. The Court did not accept the defense of self-
defense by Toribio Mayingque and the denial and alibi by Gregorio Mayingque and Filomeno
Mayingque. The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: WON appellants are guilty of murder
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. First, it is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well
as great respect, if not conclusive effect.
Second, the essential elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the elements of self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction
is that when the accused admitted that he was the author of the death of the victim and his defense
was anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance
to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale for this requirement is that the accused, having admitted
the felonious wounding or killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless
he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of self-defense. Thereby, however, the burden
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it
until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi has shifted to him, because
self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence,
not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, for, even if the Prosecutions evidence is weak, it
cannot be disbelieved in view of the accuseds admission of the killing.
The evidence on self-defense was not persuasive enough, and lacked credibility. Such evidence
did not prevail over the clear showing by the prosecution that appelants had ganged up on Edgardo
with a knife and bolo while the other two had held Edgardo to render him defenseless. The plea of
self-defense was belied by the number (12) and the different sizes of the wounds inflicted on Edgardo.
The presence of a large number of wounds on the victims body negated self-defense, and indicated,
instead, a determined effort to kill the victim.
Third, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of Filomeno, whose main plea consisted
of alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime when the crime was perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime
was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two places.
SALVADOR ATIZADO AND SALVADOR MONREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010

Criminal Law; Child in Conflict with the Law: Under Republic Act No. 9344, the child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is
proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.

Same; Murder; Penalty for minors: Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death, but reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor
over 15 but under 18 years of age.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llona on
April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder, where the victim
was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. For their defense, the petitioners interposed
that they were at their family residence and drinking gin. The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal
for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court
affirmed the conviction. It is important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. Conviction was affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is
suspended. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There
being no modifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on
Atizado. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor. The
lower court did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder
probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that
Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed. His counter-affidavit, the
police blotter and trial records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission.
Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under
Republic Act No. 9344.
 CIVIL LAW

SULPICIO LINES, INC. vs DOMINGO E. CURSO, et. al.

G.R. No. 157009 March 17, 2010

Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages: Moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage
only when: (a) where death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith,
even if death does not result. Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
and surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Dr. Curso boarded at the port of Manila the MV Doa Marilyn, an inter-island vessel owned
and operated by petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc., bound for Tacloban City. Due to the inclement sea
and weather conditions brought about by Typhoon Unsan, MV Doa Marilyn sank. The body of
Dr. Curso was not recovered.

At the time of his death, Dr. Curso was 48 years old, single, parents are already dead, and
employed as a resident physician at the Naval District Hospital in Naval, Biliran. He had a basic
monthly salary of P3,940.00, and would have retired from government service by December 20,
2004 at the age of 65. Respondents, the surviving brothers and sisters of Dr. Curso, sued the petitioner
in the RTC in Naval, Biliran to claim damages based on breach of contract of carriage by sea.

Sulpicio denied liability, insisting that the sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure which
exempted a common carrier from liability. It averred that the MV Doa Marilyn was seaworthy in all
respects, and was in fact cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard for the voyage; and that after the
accident it conducted intensive search and rescue operations and extended assistance and aid to the
victims and their families.

RTC of Naval, Biliran dismissed the complaint upon its finding that the sinking of the vessel
was due to force majeure. The officers of the MV Doa Marilyn had acted with the diligence required of a
common carrier; that the sinking of the vessel and the death of its passengers, including Dr. Curso,
could not have been avoided; that there was no basis to consider the MV Doa Marilyn not seaworthy
at the time of the voyage; that the findings of the Special Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) constituted
to investigate the disaster absolved the petitioner, its officers, and crew of any negligence and
administrative liability; and that the respondents failed to prove their claim for damages.

CA reversed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint for various damages filed by
the surviving brothers and sisters of the late Dr. Cenon E. Curso upon a finding that force majeure had
caused the sinking. The CA awarded moral and other damages to the surviving brothers and sisters.
ISSUE: WON the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage
entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as common carrier

HELD: NEGATIVE. Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. However, moral damages may be awarded in
case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger, in accordance with
Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3).

The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party
to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone by reason of the tragic event. According to Villanueva v. Salvador, the conditions for
awarding moral damages are: (a) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological,
clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.

To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a right based upon law. It is true
that under Article 1003 of the Civil Code they succeeded to the entire estate of the late Dr. Curso in
the absence of the latters descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving
spouse. However, they were not included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. The
provision does not include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral
damages. The usage of the phrase analogous cases in the provision means simply that the situation must
be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in question following the ejusdem generis rule.
Hence, Article 1003 of the Civil Code is not concerned with recovery of moral damages.

In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only
when: (a) where death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and
bad faith, even if death does not result. Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR.
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Civil law; Property; Accretion: The gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion.
Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law
vests the ownership in some other person.
Same; Same; Acquisitive Prescription; The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was
not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-
interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot
4998-B.
Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Land Titles; Property Registration Decree; Under Section 14 of PD 1529, those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier may file in
the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B in the RTC Paranaque City. The property
was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079
belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River,
in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio
Ivan.
Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-
applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years. The City of Paraaque opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was
within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was
not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from
accretion.
RTC granted the application for land registration in favor of the brothers. With this, the
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed. The CA upheld the RTCs
pronouncement.
ISSUE: WON the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of
rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not
an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion,
the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should
apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where
the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room
for application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion
of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State
as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not
need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time
that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This
is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land
adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of
Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for
more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the
State as part of its public dominion.
 Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore,
that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
ISIDRO ABLAZA vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
Civil Law; Marriage; Validity: A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to
give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a
valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment
of the governing law.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, Ablaza filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and his
wife B. Ablaza alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage
license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio. The lower courts dismissed the case on the ground that Ablaza, not being a party in the
assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
ISSUE: WON Ablaza may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and
wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to
the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage
already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.
Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely
no application to the petitioner. The rule that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003. (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages)
SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010

Civil Law; Family Code; Property Relations; Alienation of Conjugal Property: Under Art. 124 of the Family Code,
the transaction without the consent of the other spouse or without any proper court order is void. In the absence of the
other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Same; Same; Retroactivity: According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.

Same; Law on Sales; Purchaser in Good Faith: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it
at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the
property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good
faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Involved in this case are two parcels of land at BF Homes, Paraaque City and registered in
the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena and Dionisio Parulan, Jr. who have been estranged
from one another. In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio offered the property to the
petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements,
but Atanacios persistence prevailed upon them.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, Ma.Elena executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of the spouses. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376,
claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hong Kong. She assured
them that the owners duplicate copy would be turned over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT
No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Ma. Elena did not
turn over the duplicate owners copy of title as promised. In due time, the spouses learned that the
duplicate owners copy had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to
hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell the lots.
Atty. Parulan, in behalf of his brother, filed an action to declare the deed of sale as null and
void from which the RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Parulan declaring the deed of sale as null and void
for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC. The petitioners now make two arguments: (1) they were buyers in
good faith; and (2) Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the
property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply
because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property.
ISSUE: WON the sale was null and void for want of the written consent of the husband
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled
that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 thereof.
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the transaction without the consent of the other spouse
or without any proper court order is void. Article 124 provides that in the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, these powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Now,
considering that the subject sale was void, it cannot be ratified.
Also, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show
any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from
the retroactive application of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON the spouses are buyers in good faith
HELD: NEGATIVE. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair
price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives
the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. The status of a buyer
in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it.
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court ruled that the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds
of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property;
and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property
in behalf of the other spouse. The spouses sufficiently proved that they had checked on the
authenticity of the title however they failed to diligently inquire into the authority of Ma. Elena to
convey the property. Hence, they cannot be deemed as buyers in good faith.
 POLITICAL LAW

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, vs JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRES. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G. R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010

Political Law; Constitution; Executive Department: The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section
15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Mandamus: For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with:
(a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d)
the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta filed special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus,
praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three
nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.

Controversy has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. JBC, in its en
banc meeting of unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to
be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato
S. Puno. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
and published for that purpose its announcement.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position. The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate on whether the
incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not. The OSG submitted its comment,
essentially stating that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement, the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under
the Constitution, and as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not
vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore,
has no discretion to withhold the list from the President.
 Oppositors argue that under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally
banned from making any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the
appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC
to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is already in
effect.

ISSUE: WON the outgoing President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice upon his retirement.

HELD: Affirmative. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict: Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department); but, the prohibition
against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in
the Judiciary.

First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers did not intend to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express
intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution a command [to the President] to fill up any
vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from its occurrence. The 90-day limitation to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for
the President as the appointing power.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article
VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold
of the appointments.

Third. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16)
concern the appointing powers of the President.

Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an
Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no
application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only
undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. The letter and spirit
of the Constitution safeguard that independence.

Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the confirmation did not
include appointments to the Judiciary.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only
to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Fourth. To hold that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines
the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the
Executive and Legislative Departments. The appointment by the incumbent President does not run
the risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Fifth. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come
from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. The provision clearly refers to an appointee
coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to
become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members
or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

Sixth. The argument that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the
next President appoint the successor has no merit.

A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of
a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is
appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The
express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief
Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so
in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to
forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the
Constitution.

The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to
having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads
of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and
proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any
appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because
the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely
significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to
make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor
of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the
retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to
and assumption of office of his successor, on the other hand.

ISSUE: WON the writ of mandamus may lie against JBC

HELD: NEGATIVE. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or
discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with:
(a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to
perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance
of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three
nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9,
Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower
courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of
the vacancy.

Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of
them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to
submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be
unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President
of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees
named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
 The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory
90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the
list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions
for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for
every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there
should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in
submitting the list to the President.

Accordingly, there are no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a
writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that
the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

ISSUE: WON the writ of prohibition may lie against the JBC

HELD: NEGATIVE. In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only
the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, the petition for prohibition is devoid of merit. The
challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional
allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number
of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners actual interest,
because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some
vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

Remedial Law; Stare Decisis: In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower
courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being
invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be
guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, directing the Judicial and Bar
Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary
and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this
decision.

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano, Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting, and Philippine Bar
Association, as well as intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a
motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was
allowed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motions for reconsiderations are meritorious

HELD: NEGATIVE. We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters
being thereby raised and argued have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.

First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.

In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower
courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not
bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as
the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it
determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.

Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the
Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Section 15, Article VII.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII,
but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism in which Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or
her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the
Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII, such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13,
Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:

Section 13. xxx

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not
apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply
many principles of statutory construction. Movants disregard the absence from Section 15, Article VII
of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary. They also read into Section 4(1)
and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII
during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon.

The Court said that construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally
constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Interpolation of words
is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the
interpolation.
MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs COMISSION ON ELECTIONS and STRIKE B.
REVILLA
G.R. No. 187231 June 22, 2010

Remedial Law; Jurisdiction: It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed
by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor conferred by any
acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or
agency of the Government.
Political Law; Election Law; Election contests; Jurisdiction and Venue: The jurisdiction over election contests involving
elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and
heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on
venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is permissive,
because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto
involving elective municipal officials.
Same; Same; Same; Appeal: The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly
regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial system. A
greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the short period of five days as the period to appeal recognizes the
essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the
winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of
the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly removed.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Minerva Gomez-Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the
RTC Bacoor Branch 19. Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was filed
in the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO)
No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus and Branch 88 of the RTC Cavite City to hear,
try and decide election contests involving municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO
No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court.
RTC Branch 19 dismissed Castillos election protest for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.
Thereafter, Castillo presented a notice of appeal which was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division
for being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period. Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of her appeal, but the COMELEC denied the motion because she did not pay the motion
fees required.
ISSUE: WON the filing of petitioner in RTC in Bacoor jurisdictional
HELD: NEGATIVE. It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction
cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission
of the parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested
in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. The Rules of
Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating the Rules of Court, the
Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts; consequently, the Rules of Court can only
determine the means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts
of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested
in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand,
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only
spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules
on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice,
and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election
protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
Castillos filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of
venue. The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly
regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our
judicial system. A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the short period of five
days as the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the
will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived
of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly
deserving winning candidate is quickly removed. Contrary to Castillos posture, the Court cannot also
presume the timeliness of her appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its
elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal
was actually tardy.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

Political Law; Election Law; Election protest: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It
is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in
the preceding elections.

Same; Same; Quo warranto: A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the
parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

Remedial Law; Forum-shopping; Test to determine: The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Political Law; Separation of powers; Administrative IRRs: To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply
with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within
the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
and 4. It must be reasonable.
Same; R.A. No. 7941: Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under
any of the three exceptions.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections. CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a
list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
required number of qualifying votes. The nominees were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang.
 Prior to the elections, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of
nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. Then CIBAC
filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales.
COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Cruz-Gonzales as
second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The
COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC
were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such. As a result, the COMELEC en banc
proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath
of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.
ISSUE: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy
Held: AFFIRMATIVE. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action
for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as
the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-
list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes,
Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to
unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto
lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the
Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to
seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and
for mandamus against the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON Lokin is guilty of forum shopping
HELD: NEGATIVE. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining
a favorable judgment. The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action,
subject matter, and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
On the one hand, Lokin filed the action for mandamus for he has insisted that the COMELEC
had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBACs second nominee; and that the
COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of
winning party-list organizations with pending disputes. On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the
petition for certiorari to assail the resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second
nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the COMELECs basis for allowing
CIBACs withdrawal of Lokins nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and
the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved
the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought
were different.

ISSUE: WON Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative
purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in
character, but is rather administrative in nature.
To be valid, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis
of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect, the challenge of Lokin against
Section 13 succeeds. The resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The
administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it
administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not
contemplated by the Legislature.
 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit
to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent
in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a
person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees
or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the
nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts
should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the
literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the
Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart. When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding
its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962 April 7, 2010

Political Law; Election Law; Election Contests; Fraud: The general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting
of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes.
Same; Same; Same; Revision of Ballots: The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and
the veracity of the counting of the ballots. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the election returns
is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the manner mandated by
law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction: COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest by reason
of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET, because its jurisdiction over
provincial election contest exists side by side with the jurisdiction of the SET, with each tribunal being supreme in its
respective areas of concern, with neither being higher than the other in terms of precedence; hence, the jurisdiction of one
must yield to the other.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: Tolentino and De Castro were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Tagaytay City, respectively. The private respondents filed election protests against the proclaimed
winning candidates for Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sanggunian Panlungsod. The protests
were raffled to the Second Division of the COMELEC. The Division required the protested ballot
boxes to be delivered to the COMELECs Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD)
in Manila.
In the Compliance Report, the Election Officer certified that 116 ballot boxes were contested;
that of the 44 ballot boxes delivered to the SET, 16 were set aside and that out of the 72 ballot boxes
delivered to the ECAD, 24 were set aside - both for the reason of apparent sealing defects or
irregularities. Then, the Division suspended the revision proceedings until all the contested ballot
boxes were already in the custody of the COMELEC but thereafter lifted the suspension of the
revision proceedings upon the private respondents manifestation.
In its orders, the Division requested the SET to allow the revision to proceed within its
premises. De Castro then filed a verified omnibus motion requesting the Division to formulate first
the mechanics, guidelines and procedure for the simultaneous revision of the ballots for the three
distinct positions protested, and to defer the revision proceedings until after all pending incidents had
been resolved. However, the Division ruled that there is no cogent reason to suspend the scheduled
revision of ballots in these cases and that there is no need for specific rules regarding the revision of
ballots. The normal procedure of revision shall be followed. De Castro now assails the said order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC Second Division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned order
HELD: NEGATIVE. In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in
the counting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of
examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the
veracity of the counting of the ballots. The only means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of
the election returns is to examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially
preserved in the manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.
The synchronized revision of ballots by the SET and the Division is allowed under Section 3
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812. According to Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, the COMELEC
does not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest by reason of the transmittal of the
provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET, because its jurisdiction over provincial
election contest exists side by side with the jurisdiction of the SET, with each tribunal being supreme
in its respective areas of concern, with neither being higher than the other in terms of precedence;
hence, the jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
Any defects in the security locks or seals of the set-aside ballot boxes, as predetermined by
the examining Election Officer, could not yet satisfy the requirement of the rule. For one, the
COMELEC was not bound by the report simply because the defects still needed to be confirmed
during the process of actual revision. Moreover, the presumption that the ballots reflected the intent
of the voters should not be done away with solely on the basis of the report of the City Election
Officer, by which said officer complied with a requirement set primarily for the transmittal of the
ballot boxes involved.
 TAXATION LAW

H. TAMBUNTING PAWNSHOP, INC. vs CIR

G.R. No. 172394 October 13, 2010

Taxation Law; Pawnshops: For purposes of determining their tax liability, pawnshops are treated as non-bank financial
intermediaries.

Same; Same; VAT: With the full implementation of the VAT system on non-bank financial intermediaries
starting January 1, 2003, pawnshops are liable for 10% VAT.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: H. Tambunting Pawnshop, Inc., a domestic corporation duly licensed to engage in the
pawnshop business, received an assessment from BIR demanding the payment of deficiency VAT and
compromise penalty for taxable year 2000.
Tambunting, disclaiming its liability, protested the assessment with the CIR arguing that a
pawnshop business was not subject to VAT and the compromise penalty. Due to the inaction of the
CIR on the protest, Tambunting filed a petition for review with the CTA pursuant to Section 228 of
the NIRC. The CTA Second Division denied the petition for review. Tambunting appealed by petition
for review to the CTA en banc. However, it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a pawnshop operator, was liable for VAT and the compromise
penalty for taxable year 2000.
HELD: NEGATIVE. It is now settled that for purposes of determining their tax liability, pawnshops
are treated as non-bank financial intermediaries. R.A. No. 9010 revised the effectivity of the VAT on
non-bank financial intermediaries by making it start on January 1, 2003. Accordingly, the deferments
of the effectivity date of the application of VAT on non-bank financial intermediaries like pawnshops
resulted in their non-liability for VAT during the affected taxable years. Consequently, the VAT
deficiency assessment and the surcharge served on Tambunting by the BIR lacked legal basis and must
be canceled. Therefore, Tambunting is entitled to a refund of any amount paid pursuant to the
settlement agreement corresponding to taxable year 2000 only.
 COMMERCIAL LAW

MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, RICHARD K.

SPENCER, CATHERINE SPENCER, AND ALEX MANCILLA, vs. RICARDO R.
COROS
G.R. No. 157802 October 13, 2010

Commercial law; Corporation Law; Regular Employee or a Corporate Officer. The criteria for distinguishing between
corporate officers who may be ousted from office at will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be
terminated for just cause, on the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of
creation of the office. The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine
whether the dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination dispute.
Same; Same; Intra-corporate Dispute: An intra-corporate dispute is the controversy which arises out of intra-corporate
or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between
such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns their individual franchise
or right to exist as such entity; or because the controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer,
or manager of such corporation, partnership, or association.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: After his dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration, the respondent Ricardo
Coros filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some of its
corporate officers (petitioners) in the NLRC Iligan City. The petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint, raising the ground, among others, that the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being intra-corporate inasmuch
as the respondent was a member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being its Vice-President
prior to his termination.
Coros opposed the motion to dismiss, insisting that his status as a member of the Board of
Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not been formally elected as such; that he did not
own a single share of stock in Matling, considering that he had been made to sign in blank an undated
indorsement of the certificate of stock he had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and
retained the certificate of stock in its custody; and that even assuming that he had been a Director of
Matling, he had been removed as the Vice President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director,
a fact that the notice of his termination dated April 10, 2000 showed.
The Labor Arbiter granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Coros was a corporate officer
because he was occupying the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration and at the
same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of Matling; and that, consequently, his removal
was a corporate act of Matling and the controversy resulting from such removal was under the
jurisdiction of the SEC.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is a corporate officer within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a
commercial court.
HELD: NEGATIVE. As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private
employer is properly cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as
amended. Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the
controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), because
the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership,
or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the controversy involves the election or
appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such corporation, partnership, or association.
Such controversy, among others, is known as an intra-corporate dispute.
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from office at
will, on one hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for just cause, on
the other hand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of creation
of the office. Here, the office of Vice President for Finance and Administration created by Matlings
President pursuant to its by-laws was an ordinary, not a corporate, office. Coros was supposedly at
once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The circumstances surrounding his
appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constituted an
intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination dispute. Also, it must be considered whether his
status as Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal
as Vice President for Finance and Administration.
SPOUSES TURNER vs. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 157479 November 24, 2010

Commercial Law; Corporation Law; Stockholders Right of Appraisal. A stockholder who dissents from certain
corporate actions has the right to demand payment of the fair value of his or her shares. This right, known as the right
of appraisal, is expressly recognized in Section 81 of the Corporation Code. However, no payment shall be made to any
dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the payment. In case
the corporation has no available unrestricted retained earnings in its books, Section 83 of the Corporation Code provides
that if the dissenting stockholder is not paid the value of his shares within 30 days after the award, his voting and
dividend rights shall immediately be restored.
Same; Same: Trust Fund Doctrine: Under the doctrine, the capital stock, property, and other assets of a corporation are
regarded as equity in trust for the payment of corporate creditors, who are preferred in the distribution of corporate assets.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The spouses Turner held 1,010,000 shares of stock of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged primarily in cargo shipping activities. In June 1999, the Corporation
decided to amend its articles of incorporation to remove the stockholders pre-emptive rights to newly
issued shares of stock. Feeling that the corporate move would be prejudicial to their interest as
stockholders, the spouses voted against the amendment and demanded payment of their shares at the
rate of P2.276/share based on the book value of the shares, or a total of P2,298,760.00.
The Corporation found the fair value of the shares demanded by the spouses unacceptable.
The disagreement on the valuation of the shares led the parties to constitute an appraisal committee.
The committee reported its valuation of P2.54/share, for an aggregate value of P2,565,400.00 for the
spouses. Subsequently, the spouses demanded payment based on the valuation of the appraisal
committee, plus 2%/month penalty from the date of their original demand for payment, as well as the
reimbursement of the amounts advanced as professional fees to the appraisers. However, the
Corporation refused the spouses demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation Code, the
dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the corporation had
unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it had no retained earnings
at the time of the spouses demand.
Aggrieved, the spouses sued the Corporation for collection and damages in the RTC in Makati.
RTC upheld the dissenting stockholders, herein spouses, and ordered the corporation to pay.
Execution was partially carried out against the Corporation. On the Corporations petition for
certiorari, however, the CA corrected the RTC and dismissed the spouses suit on the ground that
their cause of action for collection had not yet accrued due to the lack of unrestricted retained earnings
in the books of the Corporation.
ISSUE: WON CA IS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE SPOUSES SUIT ON THE
GROUND THAT THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COLLECTION HAD NOT YET
ACCRUED DUE TO THE LACK OF UNRESTRICTED RETAINED EARNINGS IN
THE BOOKS OF THE CORPORATION.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. A stockholder who dissents from certain corporate actions has the right
to demand payment of the fair value of his or her shares. This right, known as the right of appraisal,
is expressly recognized in Section 81 of the Corporation Code.
Clearly, the right of appraisal may be exercised when there is a fundamental change in the
charter or articles of incorporation substantially prejudicing the rights of the stockholders. It does not
vest unless objectionable corporate action is taken. It serves the purpose of enabling the dissenting
stockholder to have his interests purchased and to retire from the corporation. The reason underlying
the limitation of share purchases sprang from the necessity of imposing safeguards against the
depletion by a corporation of its assets and against the impairment of its capital needed for the
protection of creditors.
Now, however, a corporation can purchase its own shares, provided payment is made out of
surplus profits and the acquisition is for a legitimate corporate purpose. The Corporation Code defines
how the right of appraisal is exercised, as well as the implications of the right of appraisal, as follows:
1. The appraisal right is exercised by any stockholder who has voted against the proposed corporate
action by making a written demand on the corporation within 30 days after the date on which the vote
was taken for the payment of the fair value of his shares. The failure to make the demand within the
period is deemed a waiver of the appraisal right.
2. If the withdrawing stockholder and the corporation cannot agree on the fair value of the shares
within a period of 60 days from the date the stockholders approved the corporate action, the fair value
shall be determined and appraised by three disinterested persons, one of whom shall be named by the
stockholder, another by the corporation, and the third by the two thus chosen. The findings and award
of the majority of the appraisers shall be final, and the corporation shall pay their award within 30 days
after the award is made. Upon payment by the corporation of the agreed or awarded price, the
stockholder shall forthwith transfer his or her shares to the corporation.
3. All rights accruing to the withdrawing stockholders shares, including voting and dividend rights,
shall be suspended from the time of demand for the payment of the fair value of the shares until either
the abandonment of the corporate action involved or the purchase of the shares by the corporation,
except the right of such stockholder to receive payment of the fair value of the shares.
4. Within 10 days after demanding payment for his or her shares, a dissenting stockholder shall submit
to the corporation the certificates of stock representing his shares for notation thereon that such
shares are dissenting shares. A failure to do so shall, at the option of the corporation, terminate his
rights under this Title X of the Corporation Code. If shares represented by the certificates bearing
such notation are transferred, and the certificates are consequently canceled, the rights of the
transferor as a dissenting stockholder under this Title shall cease and the transferee shall have all the
rights of a regular stockholder; and all dividend distributions that would have accrued on such shares
shall be paid to the transferee.
5. If the proposed corporate action is implemented or effected, the corporation shall pay to such
stockholder, upon the surrender of the certificates of stock representing his shares, the fair value
thereof as of the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken, excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of such corporate action.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no payment shall be made to any dissenting stockholder unless
the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the payment. In case the
corporation has no available unrestricted retained earnings in its books, Section 83 of the Corporation
Code provides that if the dissenting stockholder is not paid the value of his shares within 30 days after
the award, his voting and dividend rights shall immediately be restored.
The trust fund doctrine backstops the requirement of unrestricted retained earnings to fund
the payment of the shares of stocks of the withdrawing stockholders. Under the doctrine, the capital
stock, property, and other assets of a corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the payment of
corporate creditors, who are preferred in the distribution of corporate assets. The creditors of a
corporation have the right to assume that the board of directors will not use the assets of the
corporation to purchase its own stock for as long as the corporation has outstanding debts and
liabilities. There can be no distribution of assets among the stockholders without first paying corporate
debts. Thus, any disposition of corporate funds and assets to the prejudice of creditors is null and
void.
 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

LOURDES B. FERRER AND PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ VS. JUDGE ROMEO A.

RABACA OF METC MANILA
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 October 6, 2010

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Gross Ignorance of the Law: Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as serious
offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondents acts not ingrained
with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo
vs. Judge Pagayatan, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held
that respondents lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but not for gross ignorance of the
law.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Complainants were the plaintiffs in an ejectment case decided by Respondent Judge Rabaca.
In the said case, the latter's decision was in favor of the complainants who then filed a motion for
immediate execution. Despite the motion for immediate execution, Judge Rabaca granted and gave
due course to the notice of appeal filed by the defendants in the ejectment case. Aggrieved by the
action of Judge Rabaca, complainants filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Complainants then filed an administrative case against Judge Rabaca.

In his defense, the latter alleged that he had honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court -which provides
that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties- once he had
given due course to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good
faith and with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and
jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so
should be considered as error of judgment on his part.

ISSUE: WON the act of respondent is an error of judgment or an error amounting to incompetence
that calls for administrative discipline.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The act of respondent is inexcusable. It is clear from the provisions of
the Rules that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in
favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires
it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during
the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative. Respondent
erred in denying the motion for immediate execution and granting the appeal without any supersedeas
bond.

Moreover, respondent's claim that he cannot act on the motion since he lost jurisdiction over
the case when all the records were forwarded to the RTC does not hold water. The court loses
jurisdiction only after an appeal was perfected and the period to appeal of both the parties had lapsed.
In this case, the motion for immediate execution was filed PRIOR to the filing of the notice of Appeal.
These acts of respondent constitute ignorance of the law.

Thus, as ruled by the SC- Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure is classified as serious offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to
dismissal. However, we find respondents acts not ingrained with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of
public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo
vs. Judge Pagayatan, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient
where it was held that respondents lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability
but not for gross ignorance of the law.
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER vs. JUDGE ALFREDO D. AMPUAN, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 33, Quezon City
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769 October 6, 2010

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Gross Inefficiency; Undue Delay In Rendering Decision: The ninety (90) day period for
deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court
requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or
upon the expiration. Respondent Judge failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose of the subject civil case.

Same; Same; Lack of TSNs: Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend
the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case
the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the
same. The respondent should have issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the complainant
had manifested that the defendants had not filed their memorandum.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: Eduardo B. Olaguer is the complainant in a civil case against Land Bank of the Philippines
being handled by the respondent Judge. When Land Bank failed to file their memorandum, Olaguer
filed an ex parte manifestation praying for its submission for decision on August 5, 2008. The
respondent judge did not render any decision despite the lapse of three months. It was only on June
2, 2009, which was way beyond the three-month reglementary period, when Judge Ampuan resolved
the civil case. According to the Branch Clerk of Court, the cause of delay had been the reconstruction
of the various transcripts of stenographic notes which, according to Olaguer, is not true considering
that the original TSNs had earlier been provided to the parties. Judge Ampuan explained that he had
inherited the civil case from two predecessors and had started handling it only on November 18, 2005,
but only for the last five hearings. He further said that the charges against him were unfair, stressing
that he conducted daily hearing in his sala as Special Court for Tax Cases, Election Court and Small
Claims Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Ampuan guilty of gross inefficiency and
recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge is guilty of gross inefficiency.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously
dispose of the civil case. In so failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 28
dated July 3, 1989, whose paragraph three provides: A case is considered submitted for decision upon
the admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) day period
for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for
decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so,
whichever is earlier.

Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding
judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same. The respondent should have forthwith issued the order
directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the complainant had manifested that the
defendants had not filed their memorandum.

Moreover, we state that the additional court assignments or designations imposed upon
respondent Judge did not make him less liable for the delay. Verily, a judge cannot by himself choose
to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Had his additional court
assignments or designations unduly prevented him from deciding the case, he could have easily sought
additional time by requesting an extension from the Court but he did not avail himself of this remedy.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the required period
constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction.
 REMEDIAL LAW

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG vs THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 153142 March 29, 2010

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res judicata: For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action.

Same; Same; Locus Standi: Under Section 7, BP Blg. 185, only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has
the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: The Coronel siblings (Coronels) executed a document entitled receipt of down payment,
stipulating that they received from respondent Ramona, through her mother, Concepcion, the sum
of P50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of P1,240,000.00 for their inherited house
and lot. The property which was originally registered in the name of the Coronels father
(Constancion) was transferred in the name of the Coronels. Thereafter, the Coronels sold the property
to petitioner Catalina for the higher price of P1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum
of P300,000.00. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her
downpayment of P50,000.00 in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.

Aggrieved, Ramona filed a complaint for specific performance and damages in her own name
in the RTC of QC against the Coronels and she subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT of the disputed property. On the other hand, Catalina had a notice of adverse claim
annotated on the tilte. Thereafter, the Coronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Catalina. The
latter moved to intervene in the civil case filed by Concepcion.

The RTC rendered decision ordering the Coronels to execute in favor of Ramona a deed of
absolute sale covering the disputed property. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. SC affirmed the
CA. Thereafter, the decision of the RTC became final and executory. Acting on the
Concepcions motion for execution, the RTC issued the said writ. Upon failure of Catalina and the
Coronels to comply with the writ of execution, the RTC approved Ramonas motion for appointment
of Branch Clerk of the RTC to execute deed.

Aggrieved, Catalina and the Coronels filed in the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the
qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the subject property due to non-citizenship. However,
CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON Catalina may assail Ramonas qualifications to own the disputed land.

HELD: NEGATIVE. First: Catalina did not raise any issue against Ramonas qualifications to own
land in the Philippines during the trial or, at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The
petitioner deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. In
every action, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses and objections
in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest before the court.
The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Verily, there must be an end to litigation.

Second: The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question of Ramonas
qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is fundamental that the judgment or final order
is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity.

Third: The present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner and her counsel
to assail the qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the subject property. For res judicata to bar
the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action. The purpose
of the doctrine is two-fold to prevent unnecessary proceedings involving expenses to the parties and
wastage of the courts time which could be used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to
enable the defendant to know the extent of the claims being made arising out of the same single
incident.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.

ISSUE: WON Catalina has capacity to institute the suit.

HELD: NEGATIVE. Catalina was not the proper party to challenge Ramonas
qualifications to acquire land.

Under Section 7, BP Blg. 185, the SG or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings
against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only the Government, through
the SG, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only
the Government, through the SG, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person
to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the
violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the
transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the
previous owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property,
the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the
benefit of Catalina. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State in accordance
with BP Blg. 185.

ISSUE: WON the Deed of absolute sale executed by Branch Clerk of Court was valid

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The fact that Catalina and her counsel maneuvered to thwart, or, at least,
to delay the inevitable execution of the judgment warranted the RTCs directing the Branch Clerk of
Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the judgment. The RTCs effort to implement
the judgment could not be stymied by Catalinas deliberate refusal to comply with the judgment. Such
deliberate refusal called for the RTC to order the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of
absolute sale in favor of Ramona, which move of the trial court was precisely authorized by Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO
and ASUNCION V. ALONSO v. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 188471 April 20, 2010

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Real party in interest: Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in interest is one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. One having
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N. Alonso had
acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government. The Director of Lands
had executed a final deed of sale in favor of Tomas N. Alonso; however it was not registered because
of lack of requirements as required by law.

Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-2 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been administratively reconstituted from the owners duplicate of TCT
No. RT-1310 in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., which was subsequently changed to
that of Cebu Country Club. Francisco demanded upon Cebu Country Club to restore the ownership
and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu Country Club denied Franciscos
demand. Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in the RTC in Cebu City an action for the
declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the
recovery of property. RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club. CA affirmed the RTC. Francisco
appealed to the Supreme Court.

On January 31, 2002, SC declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines which became final and executory. The
Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Cebu Country Club opposed the motion.

Subsequently, the Congress enacted a law to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles
covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This was Republic Act No. 9443, effective on
July 27, 2007. With this, the RTC denied the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the petitioners appeal
by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by the RTC of
the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire ownership of Lot
No. 727-D-2, and declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally belonged to the Government. This renders
beyond dispute that the non-execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners,
who now hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to derive nothing from the execution
of the judgment against Cebu Country Club.

Likewise, R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of the motion
for execution. The law expressly declares as valid (a)ll existing Transfer Certificates of Title and
Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province
and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, and recognizes the
registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold
as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of
Title.

Although Lot 727-D-2 was earlier declared to be owned by the Government, R.A. No. 9443
later validated Cebu Country Clubs registered ownership due to its holding of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-
11351) in its own name. On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443
because of their non-compliance with the express condition of holding any Transfer Certificate of
Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title respecting Lot 727-D-2 or any portion thereof.

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit. The Court declares that
Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot No.727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate,
as confirmed by Republic Act No. 9443.
IN RE: CONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 303168
AND 303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE CERTICATES OF TITLE IN
LIEU OF THE LOST
G.R. No. 156797 JULY 6, 2010

Remedial Law; Forum Shopping: Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two
or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought.
Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other, there is forum shopping.
Same; Same: For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different
orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
Same; Motion to Dismiss; Litis pendentia: For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must
be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: On December 29, 1998, Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of TCT
No. 303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and for the issuance of
owners duplicate copies of said TCTs. He alleged that he was a registered co-owner of the parcels of
land covered by the TCTs, and that he was filing the petition for the beneficial interest of all the
registered owners thereof; that the original copies of the TCTs kept in the custody of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City had been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the fire that had burned certain
portions of the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of said Registry of Deeds, on July 11, 1988;
that the originals of the owners duplicates of the TCTs kept in his custody had also been lost or
destroyed in a fire that had gutted the commercial establishments located at 250 Villalobos Street,
Quiapo, Manila on February 24, 1998; and that no co-owners, mortgages, or lessees TCTs had ever
been. The RTC dismissed Lims petition on the basis of the LRA Report stating that the subject titles
are also applied for reconstitution of titles under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings which is
tantamount to forum shopping. Lims motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this appeal directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly dismiss the petition of Lim on the ground of forum shopping.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Lim as not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual basis of his
application for the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial
reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical. Forum shopping to exist, both actions
must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
cause of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questions, two distinct causes of action and issued were raised, and two objectives were sought.
The motu proprio dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by the RTC although the
Government did not file a motion to dismiss grounded on the petitioners supposed failure to comply
with the contents of the required certification was yet another glaring error of the RTC. A violation
of the rule against forum shopping other that a wilful and deliberate forum shopping did not authorize
the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without motion and hearing. Specifically, the submission of a false
certification of non-forum shopping did not automatically warrant the dismissal of the proceeding,
even if it might have constituted contempt of court, for Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, has been clear and forthright.
Wherefore, the petition for the judicial reconstitution of the petitioners Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 303168 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City, and for the issuance of the owners duplicate copies thereof, is reinstated. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, in Quezon City is directed to forthwith resume proceedings thereon, and to render
its decision on the merits as soon as practicable.
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON, ET. AL. VS. APOLONIA LEGASPI
G.R. No. 153736 August 4, 2010

Remedial Law; Res judicata: Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age,
and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule
pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one
and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to
the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.

Same; Same: Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them in law or estate.

BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The parcel of land subject in this case was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespee,
who had had two marriages. The first marriage was with Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca
Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was with Jose Garcia, by whom she
bore respondent Apolonia Garcia, who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935,
and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased
Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles.
The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after petitioner
Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog. Cresenciana, in
turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles, who had represented that he inherited the
land from his mother-in-law. The tug-of-war over the property between the petitioners and the
respondents first led to the commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor and Rosario filed
a criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina. After trial, the CFI
found the respondents and their co-accused guilty.
Prior to the rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents in
the CFI. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, holding that the spouses were able
to establish the purchase of the land. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition where the petitioners submit that the final ruling in the
criminal case had already determined the issue of ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the
criminal case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the decision in criminal case had the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of
the land involved in civil case, considering that such land was the same land involved in the two cases.
HELD: NEGATIVE. This civil action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment is not applicable because the causes of action in the civil and
the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of
ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine whether the
act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land
constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the
land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or
innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty of
theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced
both actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing
the authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in
the civil action applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the
civil action after the CA had ruled adversely against them. Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment is subject to exceptions, such as where there is a change in the applicable legal context,
or to avoid inequitable administration of justice. Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents who have rightly relied on the civil
case, not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for recovery of
ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the property. In contrast, the
pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case was only the response to the
respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.