Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory - 2 PDF

ZermeloFraenkel set theory
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Chapter 1
Axiom of choice
This article is about the mathematical concept. For the band named after it, see Axiom of Choice (band).
Illustration of the axiom of choice, with each S and x represented as a jar and a colored marble, respectively
In mathematics, the axiom of choice, or AC, is an axiom of set theory equivalent to the statement that the Cartesian
product of a collection of non-empty sets is non-empty. It states that for every indexed family (Si )iI of nonempty
sets there exists an indexed family (xi )iI of elements such that xi Si for every i I . The axiom of choice was
formulated in 1904 by Ernst Zermelo in order to formalize his proof of the well-ordering theorem.[1]
Informally put, the axiom of choice says that given any collection of bins, each containing at least one object, it is
possible to make a selection of exactly one object from each bin. In many cases such a selection can be made without
invoking the axiom of choice; this is in particular the case if the number of bins is nite, or if a selection rule is
available: a distinguishing property that happens to hold for exactly one object in each bin. To give an informal
example, for any (even innite) collection of pairs of shoes, one can pick out the left shoe from each pair to obtain
an appropriate selection, but for an innite collection of pairs of socks (assumed to have no distinguishing features),
such a selection can be obtained only by invoking the axiom of choice.
Although originally controversial, the axiom of choice is now used without reservation by most mathematicians,[2]
and it is included in the standard form of axiomatic set theory, ZermeloFraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice
(ZFC). One motivation for this use is that a number of generally accepted mathematical results, such as Tychonos
theorem, require the axiom of choice for their proofs. Contemporary set theorists also study axioms that are not
2
1.1. STATEMENT 3
compatible with the axiom of choice, such as the axiom of determinacy. The axiom of choice is avoided in some
varieties of constructive mathematics, although there are varieties of constructive mathematics in which the axiom of
choice is embraced.
1.1 Statement
A choice function is a function f, dened on a collection X of nonempty sets, such that for every set A in X, f(A) is
an element of A. With this concept, the axiom can be stated:
Axiom For any set X of nonempty sets, there exists a choice function f dened on X.
Formally, this may be expressed as follows:
[ ]
X
/ X = f : X X A X (f (A) A) .
Thus, the negation of the axiom of choice states that there exists a collection of nonempty sets that has no choice
function.
Each choice function on a collection X of nonempty sets is an element of the Cartesian product of the sets in X. This
is not the most general situation of a Cartesian product of a family of sets, where a given set can occur more than
once as a factor; however, one can focus on elements of such a product that select the same element every time a
given set appears as factor, and such elements correspond to an element of the Cartesian product of all distinct sets
in the family. The axiom of choice asserts the existence of such elements; it is therefore equivalent to:
Given any family of nonempty sets, their Cartesian product is a nonempty set.
1.1.1 Nomenclature ZF, AC, and ZFC

In this article and other discussions of the Axiom of Choice the following abbreviations are common:
AC the Axiom of Choice.

ZF ZermeloFraenkel set theory omitting the Axiom of Choice.
ZFC ZermeloFraenkel set theory, extended to include the Axiom of Choice.
1.1.2 Variants
There are many other equivalent statements of the axiom of choice. These are equivalent in the sense that, in the
presence of other basic axioms of set theory, they imply the axiom of choice and are implied by it.
One variation avoids the use of choice functions by, in eect, replacing each choice function with its range.
Given any set X of pairwise disjoint non-empty sets, there exists at least one set C that contains exactly
one element in common with each of the sets in X.[3]
This guarantees for any partition of a set X the existence of a subset C of X containing exactly one element from each
part of the partition.
Another equivalent axiom only considers collections X that are essentially powersets of other sets:
For any set A, the power set of A (with the empty set removed) has a choice function.
Authors who use this formulation often speak of the choice function on A, but be advised that this is a slightly dierent
notion of choice function. Its domain is the powerset of A (with the empty set removed), and so makes sense for any
set A, whereas with the denition used elsewhere in this article, the domain of a choice function on a collection of sets
is that collection, and so only makes sense for sets of sets. With this alternate notion of choice function, the axiom
of choice can be compactly stated as
4 CHAPTER 1. AXIOM OF CHOICE
Every set has a choice function.[4]
which is equivalent to
For any set A there is a function f such that for any non-empty subset B of A, f(B) lies in B.
The negation of the axiom can thus be expressed as:
There is a set A such that for all functions f (on the set of non-empty subsets of A), there is a B such that
f(B) does not lie in B.
1.1.3 Restriction to nite sets
The statement of the axiom of choice does not specify whether the collection of nonempty sets is nite or innite,
and thus implies that every nite collection of nonempty sets has a choice function. However, that particular case
is a theorem of ZermeloFraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice (ZF); it is easily proved by mathematical
induction.[5] In the even simpler case of a collection of one set, a choice function just corresponds to an element, so
this instance of the axiom of choice says that every nonempty set has an element; this holds trivially. The axiom of
choice can be seen as asserting the generalization of this property, already evident for nite collections, to arbitrary
collections.
1.2 Usage
Until the late 19th century, the axiom of choice was often used implicitly, although it had not yet been formally stated.
For example, after having established that the set X contains only non-empty sets, a mathematician might have said
let F(s) be one of the members of s for all s in X. In general, it is impossible to prove that F exists without the axiom
of choice, but this seems to have gone unnoticed until Zermelo.
Not every situation requires the axiom of choice. For nite sets X, the axiom of choice follows from the other axioms
of set theory. In that case it is equivalent to saying that if we have several (a nite number of) boxes, each containing
at least one item, then we can choose exactly one item from each box. Clearly we can do this: We start at the rst
box, choose an item; go to the second box, choose an item; and so on. The number of boxes is nite, so eventually
our choice procedure comes to an end. The result is an explicit choice function: a function that takes the rst box
to the rst element we chose, the second box to the second element we chose, and so on. (A formal proof for all
nite sets would use the principle of mathematical induction to prove for every natural number k, every family of
k nonempty sets has a choice function.) This method cannot, however, be used to show that every countable family
of nonempty sets has a choice function, as is asserted by the axiom of countable choice. If the method is applied to
an innite sequence (Xi : i) of nonempty sets, a function is obtained at each nite stage, but there is no stage at
which a choice function for the entire family is constructed, and no limiting choice function can be constructed, in
general, in ZF without the axiom of choice.
1.3 Examples
The nature of the individual nonempty sets in the collection may make it possible to avoid the axiom of choice even
for certain innite collections. For example, suppose that each member of the collection X is a nonempty subset of
the natural numbers. Every such subset has a smallest element, so to specify our choice function we can simply say
that it maps each set to the least element of that set. This gives us a denite choice of an element from each set, and
makes it unnecessary to apply the axiom of choice.
The diculty appears when there is no natural choice of elements from each set. If we cannot make explicit choices,
how do we know that our set exists? For example, suppose that X is the set of all non-empty subsets of the real
numbers. First we might try to proceed as if X were nite. If we try to choose an element from each set, then,
because X is innite, our choice procedure will never come to an end, and consequently, we shall never be able to
produce a choice function for all of X. Next we might try specifying the least element from each set. But some subsets
1.4. CRITICISM AND ACCEPTANCE 5
of the real numbers do not have least elements. For example, the open interval (0,1) does not have a least element: if
x is in (0,1), then so is x/2, and x/2 is always strictly smaller than x. So this attempt also fails.
Additionally, consider for instance the unit circle S, and the action on S by a group G consisting of all rational rotations.
Namely, these are rotations by angles which are rational multiples of . Here G is countable while S is uncountable.
Hence S breaks up into uncountably many orbits under G. Using the axiom of choice, we could pick a single point from
each orbit, obtaining an uncountable subset X of S with the property that all of its translates by G are disjoint from
X. The set of those translates partitions the circle into a countable collection of disjoint sets, which are all pairwise
congruent. Since X is not measurable for any rotation-invariant countably additive nite measure on S, nding an
algorithm to select a point in each orbit requires the axiom of choice. See non-measurable set for more details.
The reason that we are able to choose least elements from subsets of the natural numbers is the fact that the natural
numbers are well-ordered: every nonempty subset of the natural numbers has a unique least element under the natural
ordering. One might say, Even though the usual ordering of the real numbers does not work, it may be possible to
nd a dierent ordering of the real numbers which is a well-ordering. Then our choice function can choose the least
element of every set under our unusual ordering. The problem then becomes that of constructing a well-ordering,
which turns out to require the axiom of choice for its existence; every set can be well-ordered if and only if the axiom
of choice holds.
1.4 Criticism and acceptance
A proof requiring the axiom of choice may establish the existence of an object without explicitly dening the object
in the language of set theory. For example, while the axiom of choice implies that there is a well-ordering of the real
numbers, there are models of set theory with the axiom of choice in which no well-ordering of the reals is denable.
Similarly, although a subset of the real numbers that is not Lebesgue measurable can be proved to exist using the
axiom of choice, it is consistent that no such set is denable.[6]
The axiom of choice proves the existence of these intangibles (objects that are proved to exist, but which cannot
be explicitly constructed), which may conict with some philosophical principles.[7] Because there is no canonical
well-ordering of all sets, a construction that relies on a well-ordering may not produce a canonical result, even if a
canonical result is desired (as is often the case in category theory). This has been used as an argument against the use
of the axiom of choice.
Another argument against the axiom of choice is that it implies the existence of objects that may seem counterintuitive.[8]
One example is the BanachTarski paradox which says that it is possible to decompose the 3-dimensional solid unit
ball into nitely many pieces and, using only rotations and translations, reassemble the pieces into two solid balls each
with the same volume as the original. The pieces in this decomposition, constructed using the axiom of choice, are
non-measurable sets.
Despite these seemingly paradoxical facts, most mathematicians accept the axiom of choice as a valid principle
for proving new results in mathematics. The debate is interesting enough, however, that it is considered of note
when a theorem in ZFC (ZF plus AC) is logically equivalent (with just the ZF axioms) to the axiom of choice, and
mathematicians look for results that require the axiom of choice to be false, though this type of deduction is less
common than the type which requires the axiom of choice to be true.
It is possible to prove many theorems using neither the axiom of choice nor its negation; such statements will be
true in any model of ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZF), regardless of the truth or falsity of the axiom of choice
in that particular model. The restriction to ZF renders any claim that relies on either the axiom of choice or its
negation unprovable. For example, the BanachTarski paradox is neither provable nor disprovable from ZF alone:
it is impossible to construct the required decomposition of the unit ball in ZF, but also impossible to prove there
is no such decomposition. Similarly, all the statements listed below which require choice or some weaker version
thereof for their proof are unprovable in ZF, but since each is provable in ZF plus the axiom of choice, there are
models of ZF in which each statement is true. Statements such as the BanachTarski paradox can be rephrased as
conditional statements, for example, If AC holds, then the decomposition in the BanachTarski paradox exists.
Such conditional statements are provable in ZF when the original statements are provable from ZF and the axiom of
choice.
1.5 In constructive mathematics

As discussed above, in ZFC, the axiom of choice is able to provide "nonconstructive proofs" in which the existence
of an object is proved although no explicit example is constructed. ZFC, however, is still formalized in classical logic.
The axiom of choice has also been thoroughly studied in the context of constructive mathematics, where non-classical
logic is employed. The status of the axiom of choice varies between dierent varieties of constructive mathematics.
In Martin-Lf type theory and higher-order Heyting arithmetic, the appropriate statement of the axiom of choice is
(depending on approach) included as an axiom or provable as a theorem.[9] Errett Bishop argued that the axiom of
choice was constructively acceptable, saying
A choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is implied by the very meaning
of existence.[10]
In constructive set theory, however, Diaconescus theorem shows that the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded
middle (unlike in Martin-Lf type theory, where it does not). Thus the axiom of choice is not generally available
in constructive set theory. A cause for this dierence is that the axiom of choice in type theory does not have the
extensionality properties that the axiom of choice in constructive set theory does.[11]
Some results in constructive set theory use the axiom of countable choice or the axiom of dependent choice, which
do not imply the law of the excluded middle in constructive set theory. Although the axiom of countable choice in
particular is commonly used in constructive mathematics, its use has also been questioned.[12]
1.6 Independence
See also: List of statements independent of ZFC
Assuming ZF is consistent, Kurt Gdel showed that the negation of the axiom of choice is not a theorem of ZF by
constructing an inner model (the constructible universe) which satises ZFC and thus showing that ZFC is consistent.
Assuming ZF is consistent, Paul Cohen employed the technique of forcing, developed for this purpose, to show that the
axiom of choice itself is not a theorem of ZF by constructing a much more complex model which satises ZFC (ZF
with the negation of AC added as axiom) and thus showing that ZFC is consistent. Together these results establish
that the axiom of choice is logically independent of ZF. The assumption that ZF is consistent is harmless because
adding another axiom to an already inconsistent system cannot make the situation worse. Because of independence,
the decision whether to use the axiom of choice (or its negation) in a proof cannot be made by appeal to other axioms
of set theory. The decision must be made on other grounds.
One argument given in favor of using the axiom of choice is that it is convenient to use it because it allows one to
prove some simplifying propositions that otherwise could not be proved. Many theorems which are provable using
choice are of an elegant general character: every ideal in a ring is contained in a maximal ideal, every vector space
has a basis, and every product of compact spaces is compact. Without the axiom of choice, these theorems may not
hold for mathematical objects of large cardinality.
The proof of the independence result also shows that a wide class of mathematical statements, including all statements
that can be phrased in the language of Peano arithmetic, are provable in ZF if and only if they are provable in
ZFC.[13] Statements in this class include the statement that P = NP, the Riemann hypothesis, and many other unsolved
mathematical problems. When one attempts to solve problems in this class, it makes no dierence whether ZF or
ZFC is employed if the only question is the existence of a proof. It is possible, however, that there is a shorter proof
of a theorem from ZFC than from ZF.
The axiom of choice is not the only signicant statement which is independent of ZF. For example, the generalized
continuum hypothesis (GCH) is not only independent of ZF, but also independent of ZFC. However, ZF plus GCH
implies AC, making GCH a strictly stronger claim than AC, even though they are both independent of ZF.
1.7 Stronger axioms

The axiom of constructibility and the generalized continuum hypothesis each imply the axiom of choice and so are
strictly stronger than it. In class theories such as Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory and MorseKelley set
1.8. EQUIVALENTS 7
theory, there is an axiom called the axiom of global choice that is stronger than the axiom of choice for sets because
it also applies to proper classes. The axiom of global choice follows from the axiom of limitation of size.
1.8 Equivalents
There are important statements that, assuming the axioms of ZF but neither AC nor AC, are equivalent to the axiom
of choice.[14] The most important among them are Zorns lemma and the well-ordering theorem. In fact, Zermelo
initially introduced the axiom of choice in order to formalize his proof of the well-ordering theorem.
Set theory
Well-ordering theorem: Every set can be well-ordered. Consequently, every cardinal has an initial ordi-
nal.
Tarskis theorem about choice: For every innite set A, there is a bijective map between the sets A and
AA.
Trichotomy: If two sets are given, then either they have the same cardinality, or one has a smaller cardi-
nality than the other.
The Cartesian product of any family of nonempty sets is nonempty.
Knigs theorem: Colloquially, the sum of a sequence of cardinals is strictly less than the product of
a sequence of larger cardinals. (The reason for the term colloquially is that the sum or product of a
sequence of cardinals cannot be dened without some aspect of the axiom of choice.)
Every surjective function has a right inverse.
Order theory
Zorns lemma: Every non-empty partially ordered set in which every chain (i.e., totally ordered subset)
has an upper bound contains at least one maximal element.
Hausdor maximal principle: In any partially ordered set, every totally ordered subset is contained in
a maximal totally ordered subset. The restricted principle Every partially ordered set has a maximal
totally ordered subset is also equivalent to AC over ZF.
Tukeys lemma: Every non-empty collection of nite character has a maximal element with respect to
inclusion.
Antichain principle: Every partially ordered set has a maximal antichain.
Abstract algebra
Every vector space has a basis.[15]
Krulls theorem: Every unital ring other than the trivial ring contains a maximal ideal.
For every non-empty set S there is a binary operation dened on S that gives it a group structure.[16] (A
cancellative binary operation is enough, see group structure and the axiom of choice.)
Functional analysis
The closed unit ball of the dual of a normed vector space over the reals has an extreme point.
Point-set topology
Tychonos theorem: Every product of compact topological spaces is compact.
In the product topology, the closure of a product of subsets is equal to the product of the closures.
Mathematical logic
If S is a set of sentences of rst-order logic and B is a consistent subset of S, then B is included in a set that
is maximal among consistent subsets of S. The special case where S is the set of all rst-order sentences
in a given signature is weaker, equivalent to the Boolean prime ideal theorem; see the section Weaker
forms below.
Graph theory
Every connected graph has a spanning tree.[17]
1.8.1 Category theory

There are several results in category theory which invoke the axiom of choice for their proof. These results might
be weaker than, equivalent to, or stronger than the axiom of choice, depending on the strength of the technical
foundations. For example, if one denes categories in terms of sets, that is, as sets of objects and morphisms (usually
called a small category), or even locally small categories, whose hom-objects are sets, then there is no category of all
sets, and so it is dicult for a category-theoretic formulation to apply to all sets. On the other hand, other foundational
descriptions of category theory are considerably stronger, and an identical category-theoretic statement of choice may
be stronger than the standard formulation, la class theory, mentioned above.
Examples of category-theoretic statements which require choice include:
Every small category has a skeleton.

If two small categories are weakly equivalent, then they are equivalent.
Every continuous functor on a small-complete category which satises the appropriate solution set condition
has a left-adjoint (the Freyd adjoint functor theorem).
1.9 Weaker forms

There are several weaker statements that are not equivalent to the axiom of choice, but are closely related. One
example is the axiom of dependent choice (DC). A still weaker example is the axiom of countable choice (AC or
CC), which states that a choice function exists for any countable set of nonempty sets. These axioms are sucient
for many proofs in elementary mathematical analysis, and are consistent with some principles, such as the Lebesgue
measurability of all sets of reals, that are disprovable from the full axiom of choice.
Other choice axioms weaker than axiom of choice include the Boolean prime ideal theorem and the axiom of uni-
formization. The former is equivalent in ZF to the existence of an ultralter containing each given lter, proved by
Tarski in 1930.
1.9.1 Results requiring AC (or weaker forms) but weaker than it

One of the most interesting aspects of the axiom of choice is the large number of places in mathematics that it shows
up. Here are some statements that require the axiom of choice in the sense that they are not provable from ZF but
are provable from ZFC (ZF plus AC). Equivalently, these statements are true in all models of ZFC but false in some
models of ZF.
Set theory
Any union of countably many countable sets is itself countable (because it is necessary to choose a par-
ticular ordering for each of the countably many sets).
If the set A is innite, then there exists an injection from the natural numbers N to A (see Dedekind
innite).[18]
Eight denitions of a nite set are equivalent.[19]
Every innite game GS in which S is a Borel subset of Baire space is determined.
Measure theory
The Vitali theorem on the existence of non-measurable sets which states that there is a subset of the real
numbers that is not Lebesgue measurable.
The Hausdor paradox.
The BanachTarski paradox.
The Lebesgue measure of a countable disjoint union of measurable sets is equal to the sum of the measures
of the individual sets.
Algebra
1.10. STRONGER FORMS OF THE NEGATION OF AC 9
Every eld has an algebraic closure.

Every eld extension has a transcendence basis.
Stones representation theorem for Boolean algebras needs the Boolean prime ideal theorem.
The NielsenSchreier theorem, that every subgroup of a free group is free.
The additive groups of R and C are isomorphic.[20][21]
Functional analysis
The HahnBanach theorem in functional analysis, allowing the extension of linear functionals
The theorem that every Hilbert space has an orthonormal basis.
The BanachAlaoglu theorem about compactness of sets of functionals.
The Baire category theorem about complete metric spaces, and its consequences, such as the open map-
ping theorem and the closed graph theorem.
On every innite-dimensional topological vector space there is a discontinuous linear map.
General topology
A uniform space is compact if and only if it is complete and totally bounded.
Every Tychono space has a Stoneech compactication.
Mathematical logic
Gdels completeness theorem for rst-order logic: every consistent set of rst-order sentences has a
completion. That is, every consistent set of rst-order sentences can be extended to a maximal consistent
set.
1.10 Stronger forms of the negation of AC

Now, consider stronger forms of the negation of AC. For example, if we abbreviate by BP the claim that every set of
real numbers has the property of Baire, then BP is stronger than AC, which asserts the nonexistence of any choice
function on perhaps only a single set of nonempty sets. Note that strengthened negations may be compatible with
weakened forms of AC. For example, ZF + DC[22] + BP is consistent, if ZF is.
It is also consistent with ZF + DC that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable; however, this consistency result, due
to Robert M. Solovay, cannot be proved in ZFC itself, but requires a mild large cardinal assumption (the existence of
an inaccessible cardinal). The much stronger axiom of determinacy, or AD, implies that every set of reals is Lebesgue
measurable, has the property of Baire, and has the perfect set property (all three of these results are refuted by AC
itself). ZF + DC + AD is consistent provided that a suciently strong large cardinal axiom is consistent (the existence
of innitely many Woodin cardinals).
1.11 Statements consistent with the negation of AC

There are models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in which the axiom of choice is false. We shall abbreviate Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory plus the negation of the axiom of choice by ZFC. For certain models of ZFC, it is possible
to prove the negation of some standard facts. Note that any model of ZFC is also a model of ZF, so for each of the
following statements, there exists a model of ZF in which that statement is true.
There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a function f from the real numbers to the real numbers such
that f is not continuous at a, but f is sequentially continuous at a, i.e., for any sequence {xn} converging to a,
limn f(xn)=f(a).
There exists a model of ZFC which has an innite set of real numbers without a countably innite subset.
There exists a model of ZFC in which real numbers are a countable union of countable sets.[23]
There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a eld with no algebraic closure.
In all models of ZFC there is a vector space with no basis.

There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a vector space with two bases of dierent cardinalities.
There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a free complete boolean algebra on countably many generators.[24]
For proofs, see Jech (2008).
There exists a model of ZFC in which every set in Rn is measurable. Thus it is possible to exclude coun-
terintuitive results like the BanachTarski paradox which are provable in ZFC. Furthermore, this is possible
whilst assuming the Axiom of dependent choice, which is weaker than AC but sucient to develop most of
real analysis.
In all models of ZFC, the generalized continuum hypothesis does not hold.
1.12 Quotes
The Axiom of Choice is obviously true, the well-ordering principle obviously false, and who can tell
about Zorns lemma?
Jerry Bona[25]
This is a joke: although the three are all mathematically equivalent, many mathematicians nd the axiom of choice to
be intuitive, the well-ordering principle to be counterintuitive, and Zorns lemma to be too complex for any intuition.
The Axiom of Choice is necessary to select a set from an innite number of pairs of socks, but not
an innite number of pairs of shoes.
Bertrand Russell[26]
The observation here is that one can dene a function to select from an innite number of pairs of shoes by stating for
example, to choose a left shoe. Without the axiom of choice, one cannot assert that such a function exists for pairs
of socks, because left and right socks are (presumably) indistinguishable.
Tarski tried to publish his theorem [the equivalence between AC and every innite set A has the
same cardinality as AxA", see above] in Comptes Rendus, but Frchet and Lebesgue refused to present
it. Frchet wrote that an implication between two well known [true] propositions is not a new result, and
Lebesgue wrote that an implication between two false propositions is of no interest.
Polish-American mathematician Jan Mycielski relates this anecdote in a 2006 article in the Notices of the AMS.[27]
The axiom gets its name not because mathematicians prefer it to other axioms.
A. K. Dewdney
This quote comes from the famous April Fools Day article in the computer recreations column of the Scientic
American, April 1989.
1.13 Notes
[1] Zermelo 1904.
[2] Jech, 1977, p. 348; Martin-Lf 2008, p. 210. According to Mendelson 1964, p. 201:
The status of the Axiom of Choice has become less controversial in recent years. To most mathematicians it
seems quite plausible and it has so many important applications in practically all branches of mathematics that
not to accept it would seem to be a wilful hobbling of the practicing mathematician.
1.13. NOTES 11
[3] Herrlich 2006, p. 9. According to Suppes 1972, p. 243, this was the formulation of the axiom of choice which was
originally given by Zermelo 1904. See also Halmos 1960, p. 60 for this formulation.
[4] Suppes 1972, p. 240.
[5] Tourlakis (2003), pp. 209210, 215216.
[6] Fraenkel, Abraham A.; Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua; Lvy, Azriel (1973), Foundations of set theory (2nd ed.), Amsterdam-
London: North-Holland Publishing Co., pp. 6970, MR 0345816.
[7] Rosenbloom, Paul C. (2005), The Elements of Mathematical Logic, Courier Dover Publications, p. 147, ISBN 9780486446172.
[8] Dawson, J.W. (August 2006), Shaken Foundations or Groundbreaking Realignment? A Centennial Assessment of Kurt
Gdels Impact on Logic, Mathematics, and Computer Science, Proc. 21st Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer
Science (LICS 2006), pp. 339341, doi:10.1109/LICS.2006.47, The axiom of choice, though it had been employed uncon-
sciously in many arguments in analysis, became controversial once made explicit, not only because of its non-constructive
character, but because it implied such extremely unintuitive consequences as the Banach- Tarski paradox..
[9] Per Martin-Lf, Intuitionistic type theory, 1980. Anne Sjerp Troelstra, Metamathematical investigation of intuitionistic
arithmetic and analysis, Springer, 1973.
[10] Errett Bishop and Douglas S. Bridges, Constructive analysis, Springer-Verlag, 1985.
[11] Martin-Lf, Per (2006). 100 Years of Zermelos Axiom of Choice: What was the Problem with It?". The Computer
Journal. 49 (3): 345350. doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxh162.
[12] Fred Richman, Constructive mathematics without choice, in: Reuniting the AntipodesConstructive and Nonstandard
Views of the Continuum (P. Schuster et al., eds), Synthse Library 306, 199205, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amster-
dam, 2001.
[13] This is because arithmetical statements are absolute to the constructible universe L. Shoenelds absoluteness theorem gives
a more general result.
[14] See Moore 2013, pp. 330334, for a structured list of 74 equivalents. See Howard & Rubin 1998, pp. 1116, for 86
equivalents with source references.
[15] Blass, Andreas (1984). Existence of bases implies the axiom of choice. Contemporary mathematics. 31.
[16] A. Hajnal, A. Kertsz: Some new algebraic equivalents of the axiom of choice, Publ. Math. Debrecen, 19(1972), 339340,
see also H. Rubin, J. Rubin, Equivalents of the axiom of choice, II, North-Holland, 1985, p. 111.
[17] Serre, Jean-Pierre (2003), Trees, Springer Monographs in Mathematics, Springer, p. 23; Soukup, Lajos (2008), Innite
combinatorics: from nite to innite, Horizons of combinatorics, Bolyai Soc. Math. Stud., 17, Berlin: Springer, pp.
189213, MR 2432534, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-77200-2_10. See in particular Theorem 2.1, pp. 192193.
[18] It is shown by Jech 2008, pp. 119131, that the axiom of countable choice implies the equivalence of innite and Dedekind-
innite sets, but that the equivalence of innite and Dedekind-innite sets does not imply the axiom of countable choice in
ZF.
[19] It was shown by Lvy 1958 and others using Mostowski models that eight denitions of a nite set are independent in
ZF without AC, although they are equivalent when AC is assumed. The denitions are I-nite, Ia-nite, II-nite, III-
nite, IV-nite, V-nite, VI-nite and VII-nite. I-niteness is the same as normal niteness. IV-niteness is the same as
Dedekind-niteness.
[20] "[FOM] Are (C,+) and (R,+) isomorphic.
[21] http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=4931240&aid=4931232
[22] Axiom of dependent choice
[23] Jech 2008, pp. 142144, Theorem 10.6 with proof.
[24] Stavi, Jonathan (1974). A model of ZF with an innite free complete Boolean algebra (reprint). Israel Journal of
Mathematics. 20 (2): 149163. doi:10.1007/BF02757883.
[25] Krantz, Steven G. (2002), The axiom of choice, Handbook of Logic and Proof Techniques for Computer Science, Springer,
pp. 121126, doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-0115-1_9.
[26] The boots-and-socks metaphor was given in 1919 by Russell 1993, pp. 125127. He suggested that a millionaire might
have 0 pairs of boots and 0 pairs of socks. Error: Expansion loop detected at Template:Quote Russell generally used
the term multiplicative axiom for the axiom of choice. Referring to the ordering of a countably innite set of pairs of
objects, he wrote: Error: Expansion loop detected at Template:Quote Russell then suggests using the location of the centre
of mass of each sock as a selector.
[27] Mycielski, Jan (2006), A system of axioms of set theory for the rationalists (PDF), Notices of the American Mathematical
Society, 53 (2): 206213, MR 2208445.
1.14 References
Halmos, Paul R. (1960). Naive Set Theory. The University Series in Undergraduate Mathematics. Princeton,
NJ: van Nostrand Company. Zbl 0087.04403.
Herrlich, Horst (2006). Axiom of Choice. Lecture Notes in Math. 1876. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. ISBN
3-540-30989-6.
Howard, Paul; Rubin, Jean E. (1998). Consequences of the axiom of choice. Mathematical Surveys and Mono-
graphs. 59. Providence, Rhode Island: American Mathematical Society. ISBN 9780821809778.
Jech, Thomas (2008) [1973]. The axiom of choice. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 978-0-
486-46624-8.
Thomas Jech, About the Axiom of Choice. Handbook of Mathematical Logic, John Barwise, ed., 1977.
Lvy, Azriel (1958). The independence of various denitions of niteness (PDF). Fundamenta Mathemati-
cae. 46: 113.
Per Martin-Lf, 100 years of Zermelos axiom of choice: What was the problem with it?", in Logicism,
Intuitionism, and Formalism: What Has Become of Them?, Sten Lindstrm, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg,
and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, editors (2008). ISBN 1-4020-8925-2
Mendelson, Elliott (1964). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Moore, Gregory H. (1982). Zermelos axiom of choice, Its origins, development and inuence. Springer. ISBN
0-387-90670-3., available as a Dover Publications reprint, 2013, ISBN 0-486-48841-1.
Moore, Gregory H (2013) [1982]. Zermelos axiom of choice: Its origins, development & inuence. Mineola,
New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 978-0-486-48841-7.
Herman Rubin, Jean E. Rubin: Equivalents of the axiom of choice. North Holland, 1963. Reissued by Elsevier,
April 1970. ISBN 0-7204-2225-6.
Herman Rubin, Jean E. Rubin: Equivalents of the Axiom of Choice II. North Holland/Elsevier, July 1985,
ISBN 0-444-87708-8.
Russell, Bertrand (1993) [1919]. Introduction to mathematical philosophy. New York: Dover Publications.
ISBN 978-0-486-27724-0.
Suppes, Patrick (1972) [1960]. Axiomatic set theory. Mineola, New York: Dover. ISBN 978-0-486-61630-8.
George Tourlakis, Lectures in Logic and Set Theory. Vol. II: Set Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
ISBN 0-511-06659-7
Zermelo, Ernst (1904). Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann (reprint). Mathematische An-
nalen. 59 (4): 51416. doi:10.1007/BF01445300.
Ernst Zermelo, Untersuchungen ber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I, Mathematische Annalen 65: (1908)
pp. 26181. PDF download via digizeitschriften.de
Translated in: Jean van Heijenoort, 2002. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathe-
matical Logic, 1879-1931. New edition. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-32449-8
1904. Proof that every set can be well-ordered, 139-41.
1908. Investigations in the foundations of set theory I, 199-215.
1.15. EXTERNAL LINKS 13
1.15 External links

Axiom of Choice entry in the Springer Encyclopedia of Mathematics.
Axiom of Choice and Its Equivalents entry at ProvenMath. Includes formal statement of the Axiom of Choice,
Hausdors Maximal Principle, Zorns Lemma and formal proofs of their equivalence down to the nest detail.
Consequences of the Axiom of Choice, based on the book by Paul Howard and Jean Rubin.
The Axiom of Choice entry by John Lane Bell in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(Si )
S1.2 S-7 S4
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Chapter 2
Consistency
For other uses, see Consistency (disambiguation).
In classical deductive logic, a consistent theory is one that does not contain a contradiction.[1][2] The lack of contra-
diction can be dened in either semantic or syntactic terms. The semantic denition states that a theory is consistent
if and only if it has a model, i.e., there exists an interpretation under which all formulas in the theory are true. This
is the sense used in traditional Aristotelian logic, although in contemporary mathematical logic the term satisable
is used instead. The syntactic denition states a theory T is consistent if and only if there is no formula such that
both and its negation are elements of the set T . Let A be a set of closed sentences (informally axioms) and
A the set of closed sentences provable from A under some (specied, possibly implicitly) formal deductive system.
The set of axioms A is consistent when A is.[3]
If there exists a deductive system for which these semantic and syntactic denitions are equivalent for any theory
formulated in a particular deductive logic, the logic is called complete. The completeness of the sentential calculus
was proved by Paul Bernays in 1918[4] and Emil Post in 1921,[5] while the completeness of predicate calculus was
proved by Kurt Gdel in 1930,[6] and consistency proofs for arithmetics restricted with respect to the induction axiom
schema were proved by Ackermann (1924), von Neumann (1927) and Herbrand (1931).[7] Stronger logics, such as
second-order logic, are not complete.
A consistency proof is a mathematical proof that a particular theory is consistent.[8] The early development of
mathematical proof theory was driven by the desire to provide nitary consistency proofs for all of mathematics as
part of Hilberts program. Hilberts program was strongly impacted by incompleteness theorems, which showed that
suciently strong proof theories cannot prove their own consistency (provided that they are in fact consistent).
Although consistency can be proved by means of model theory, it is often done in a purely syntactical way, without any
need to reference some model of the logic. The cut-elimination (or equivalently the normalization of the underlying
calculus if there is one) implies the consistency of the calculus: since there is obviously no cut-free proof of falsity,
there is no contradiction in general.
2.1 Consistency and completeness in arithmetic and set theory

In theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, there is an intricate relationship between the consistency of the
theory and its completeness. A theory is complete if, for every formula in its language, at least one of or is a
logical consequence of the theory.
Presburger arithmetic is an axiom system for the natural numbers under addition. It is both consistent and complete.
Gdels incompleteness theorems show that any suciently strong recursively enumerable theory of arithmetic cannot
be both complete and consistent. Gdels theorem applies to the theories of Peano arithmetic (PA) and Primitive
recursive arithmetic (PRA), but not to Presburger arithmetic.
Moreover, Gdels second incompleteness theorem shows that the consistency of suciently strong recursively enu-
merable theories of arithmetic can be tested in a particular way. Such a theory is consistent if and only if it does not
prove a particular sentence, called the Gdel sentence of the theory, which is a formalized statement of the claim
that the theory is indeed consistent. Thus the consistency of a suciently strong, recursively enumerable, consistent
15
16 CHAPTER 2. CONSISTENCY
theory of arithmetic can never be proven in that system itself. The same result is true for recursively enumerable
theories that can describe a strong enough fragment of arithmeticincluding set theories such as ZermeloFraenkel
set theory. These set theories cannot prove their own Gdel sentenceprovided that they are consistent, which is
generally believed.
Because consistency of ZF is not provable in ZF, the weaker notion relative consistency is interesting in set theory
(and in other suciently expressive axiomatic systems). If T is a theory and A is an additional axiom, T + A is said
to be consistent relative to T (or simply that A is consistent with T) if it can be proved that if T is consistent then T
+ A is consistent. If both A and A are consistent with T, then A is said to be independent of T.
2.2 First-order logic
2.2.1 Notation
(Turnstile symbol) in the following context of mathematical logic, means provable from. That is, a b reads: b
is provable from a (in some specied formal system). See List of logic symbols. In other cases, the turnstile symbol
may mean implies; permits the derivation of. See: List of mathematical symbols.
2.2.2 Denition
A set of formulas in rst-order logic is consistent (written Con ) if and only if there is no formula such that
and . Otherwise is inconsistent and is written Inc .
is said to be simply consistent if and only if for no formula of , both and the negation of are theorems of
.
is said to be absolutely consistent or Post consistent if and only if at least one formula of is not a theorem of
.
is said to be maximally consistent if and only if for every formula , if Con ( ) then .
is said to contain witnesses if and only if for every formula of the form x there exists a term t such that
(x xt ) . See First-order logic.
2.2.3 Basic results

1. The following are equivalent:
(a) Inc
(b) For all , .
2. Every satisable set of formulas is consistent, where a set of formulas is satisable if and only if there exists
a model I such that I .
3. For all and :
(a) if not , then Con ( {}) ;

(b) if Con and , then Con ( {}) ;
(c) if Con , then Con ( {}) or Con ( {}) .
4. Let be a maximally consistent set of formulas and contain witnesses. For all and :
(a) if , then ,
(b) either or ,
(c) ( ) if and only if or ,
(d) if ( ) and , then ,
(e) x if and only if there is a term t such that xt .
2.3. MODEL THEORY 17
2.2.4 Henkins theorem
Let be a maximally consistent set of S -formulas containing witnesses.

Dene a binary relation on the set of S -terms such that t0 t1 if and only if t0 t1 ; and let t denote
the equivalence class of terms containing t ; and let T := { t | t T S } where T S is the set of terms based on the
symbol set S .
Dene the S -structure T over T the term-structure corresponding to by:
1. for n -ary R S , RT t0 . . . tn1 if and only if Rt0 . . . tn1 ;
2. for n -ary f S , f T (t0 . . . tn1 ) := f t0 . . . tn1 ;
3. for c S , cT := c .
Let I := (T , ) be the term interpretation associated with , where (x) := x .
For all , I if and only if .
2.2.5 Sketch of proof
There are several things to verify. First, that is an equivalence relation. Then, it needs to be veried that (1), (2),
and (3) are well dened. This falls out of the fact that is an equivalence relation and also requires a proof that
(1) and (2) are independent of the choice of t0 , . . . , tn1 class representatives. Finally, I can be veried by
induction on formulas.
2.3 Model theory

In ZFC set theory with classical rst-order logic,[9] an inconsistent theory T is one such that there exists a closed
sentence such that T contains both and its negation . A consistent theory is one such that the following
logically equivalent conditions hold
1. {, } T [10]
2. T T
2.4 See also

Equiconsistency
Hilberts problems
Hilberts second problem
Jan ukasiewicz
Paraconsistent logic
-consistency
Gentzens consistency proof
Proof by contradiction
18 CHAPTER 2. CONSISTENCY
2.5 Footnotes
[1] Tarski 1946 states it this way: A deductive theory is called CONSISTENT or NON-CONTRADICTORY if no two
asserted statements of this theory contradict each other, or in other words, if of any two contradictory sentences . . .
at least one cannot be proved, (p. 135) where Tarski denes contradictory as follows: With the help of the word not
one forms the NEGATION of any sentence; two sentences, of which the rst is a negation of the second, are called
CONTRADICTORY SENTENCES (p. 20). This denition requires a notion of proof. Gdel in his 1931 denes the
notion this way: The class of provable formulas is dened to be the smallest class of formulas that contains the axioms
and is closed under the relation immediate consequence, i.e., formula c of a and b is dened as an immediate consequence
in terms of modus ponens or substitution; cf Gdel 1931 van Heijenoort 1967:601. Tarski denes proof informally as
statements follow one another in a denite order according to certain principles . . . and accompanied by considerations
intended to establish their validity[true conclusion for all true premises -- Reichenbach 1947:68]" cf Tarski 1946:3. Kleene
1952 denes the notion with respect to either an induction or as to paraphrase) a nite sequence of formulas such that each
formula in the sequence is either an axiom or an immediate consequence of the preceding formulas; A proof is said to be
a proof of its last formula, and this formula is said to be (formally) provable or be a (formal) theorem cf Kleene 1952:83.
[2] see Paraconsistent logic
[3] Let L be a signature, T a theory in L and a sentence in L . We say that is a consequence of

T , or that T entails , in symbols T , if every model of T is a model of . (In particular if T has
no models then T entails .) Warning: we don't require that if T then there is a proof of from T
. In any case, with innitary languages its not always clear what would constitute a proof. Some writers use
T to mean that is deducible from T in some particular formal proof calculus, and they write T |=
for our notion of entailment (a notation which clashes with our A |= ). For rst-order logic the two kinds
of entailment coincide by the completeness theorem for the proof calculus in question. We say that is valid,
or is a logical theorem, in symbols , if is true in every L -structure. We say that is consistent if
is true in some L -structure. Likewise we say that a theory T is consistent if it has a model. We say that two
theories S and T in L innity omega are equivalent if they have the same models, i.e. if Mod(S) = Mod(T).
(Please note denition of Mod(T) on p. 30 ...)
A Shorter Model Theory by Wilfrid Hodges, p. 37
[4] van Heijenoort 1967:265 states that Bernays determined the independence of the axioms of Principia Mathematica, a result
not published until 1926, but he says nothing about Bernays proving their consistency.
[5] Post proves both consistency and completeness of the propositional calculus of PM, cf van Heijenoorts commentary
and Posts 1931 Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions in van Heijenoort 1967:264. Also Tarski
1946:134.
[6] cf van Heijenoorts commentary and Gdels 1930 The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic in van
Heijenoort 1967:582
[7] cf van Heijenoorts commentary and Herbrands 1930 On the consistency of arithmetic in van Heijenoort 1967:618.
[8] Informally, ZermeloFraenkel set theory is ordinarily assumed; some dialects of informal mathematics customarily assume
the axiom of choice in addition.
[9] the common case in many applications to other areas of mathematics as well as the ordinary mode of reasoning of informal
mathematics in calculus and applications to physics, chemistry, engineering
[10] according to De Morgans laws
2.6 References
Stephen Kleene, 1952 10th impression 1991, Introduction to Metamathematics, North-Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterday, New York, ISBN 0-7204-2103-9.
Hans Reichenbach, 1947, Elements of Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, Inc. New York, ISBN 0-486-24004-
5,
Alfred Tarski, 1946, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, Second Edition, Dover
Publications, Inc., New York, ISBN 0-486-28462-X.
Jean van Heijenoort, 1967, From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 (pbk.)
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, consistency
H.D. Ebbinghaus, J. Flum, W. Thomas, Mathematical Logic

Jevons, W.S., 1870, Elementary Lessons in Logic
2.7 External links

Chris Mortensen, Inconsistent Mathematics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Chapter 3
Continuum hypothesis
This article is about the hypothesis in set theory. For the assumption in uid mechanics, see Fluid mechanics.
In mathematics, the continuum hypothesis (abbreviated CH) is a hypothesis about the possible sizes of innite sets.
It states:
There is no set whose cardinality is strictly between that of the integers and the real numbers.
Whether this statement is true or false is independent of ZFC set theory, so that either the continuum hypothesis or
its negation can be added as an axiom to ZFC set theory, with the resulting theory being consistent if and only if ZFC
is consistent.
The continuum hypothesis was advanced by Georg Cantor in 1878. The name of the hypothesis comes from the term
the continuum for the real numbers.
3.1 History
Cantor believed the continuum hypothesis to be true and tried for many years to prove it, in vain (Dauben 1990). It
became the rst on David Hilberts list of important open questions that was presented at the International Congress
of Mathematicians in the year 1900 in Paris. Axiomatic set theory was at that point not yet formulated. Independence
was proved in 1963 by Paul Cohen, complementing earlier work by Kurt Gdel in 1940.
3.2 Cardinality of innite sets

Main article: Cardinal number
Two sets are said to have the same cardinality or cardinal number if there exists a bijection (a one-to-one correspon-
dence) between them. Intuitively, for two sets S and T to have the same cardinality means that it is possible to pair
o elements of S with elements of T in such a fashion that every element of S is paired o with exactly one element
of T and vice versa. Hence, the set {banana, apple, pear} has the same cardinality as {yellow, red, green}.
With innite sets such as the set of integers or rational numbers, the existence of a bijection between two sets becomes
more dicult to demonstrate. The rational numbers seemingly form a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis:
the integers form a proper subset of the rationals, which themselves form a proper subset of the reals, so intuitively,
there are more rational numbers than integers and more real numbers than rational numbers. However, this intuitive
analysis is awed; it does not take proper account of the fact that all three sets are innite. It turns out the rational
numbers can actually be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the integers, and therefore the set of rational
numbers is the same size (cardinality) as the set of integers: they are both countable sets.
Cantor gave two proofs that the cardinality of the set of integers is strictly smaller than that of the set of real numbers
(see Cantors rst uncountability proof and Cantors diagonal argument). His proofs, however, give no indication of
20
3.3. INDEPENDENCE FROM ZFC 21
the extent to which the cardinality of the integers is less than that of the real numbers. Cantor proposed the continuum
hypothesis as a possible solution to this question.
The continuum hypothesis states that the set of real numbers has minimal possible cardinality which is greater than
the cardinality of the set of integers. That is, every set, S, of real numbers can either be mapped one-to-one into the
integers or the real numbers can be mapped one-to-one into S. Using the fact that the real numbers are equinumerous
with the powerset of the integers, the continuum hypothesis says that there is no set S for which
0 < |S| < 20 .
Assuming the axiom of choice, there is a smallest cardinal number 1 greater than 0 , and the continuum hypothesis
is in turn equivalent to the equality
20 = 1 .
A consequence of the continuum hypothesis is that every innite subset of the real numbers either has the same
cardinality as the integers or the same cardinality as the entire set of the reals.
There is also a generalization of the continuum hypothesis called the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH)
which says that for all ordinals
2 = +1 .
That is, GCH asserts that the cardinality of the power set of any innite set is the smallest cardinality greater than
that of the set.
3.3 Independence from ZFC

The independence of the continuum hypothesis (CH) from ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZF) follows from combined
work of Kurt Gdel and Paul Cohen.
Gdel (1940) showed that CH cannot be disproved from ZF, even if the axiom of choice is adopted (making ZFC).
Gdels proof shows that CH and AC both hold in the constructible universe L, an inner model of ZF set theory,
assuming only the axioms of ZF. The existence of an inner model of ZF in which additional axioms hold shows that
the additional axioms are consistent with ZF, provided ZF itself is consistent. The latter condition cannot be proved
in ZF itself, due to Gdels incompleteness theorems, but is widely believed to be true and can be proved in stronger
set theories.
Cohen (1963, 1964) showed that CH cannot be proven from the ZFC axioms, completing the overall independence
proof. To prove his result, Cohen developed the method of forcing, which has become a standard tool in set theory.
Essentially, this method begins with a model of ZF in which CH holds, and constructs another model which contains
more sets than the original, in a way that CH does not hold in the new model. Cohen was awarded the Fields Medal
in 1966 for his proof.
The independence proof just described shows that CH is independent of ZFC. Further research has shown that CH
is independent of all known large cardinal axioms in the context of ZFC. (Feferman (1999)) Moreover, it has been
shown that the cardinality of the continuum can be any cardinal consistent with Knigs theorem. A result of Solovay,
proved shortly after Cohens result on the independence of the continuum hypothesis, shows that in any model of
ZFC, if is a cardinal of uncountable conality, then there is a forcing extension in which 20 = . However, per
Knigs theorem, it is not consistent to assume 20 is or 1 + or any cardinal with conality .
The continuum hypothesis is closely related to many statements in analysis, point set topology and measure theory.
As a result of its independence, many substantial conjectures in those elds have subsequently been shown to be
independent as well.
The independence from ZFC means that proving or disproving the CH within ZFC is impossible. However, Gdel and
Cohens negative results are not universally accepted as disposing of all interest in the continuum hypothesis. Hilberts
problem remains an active topic of research; see Woodin (2001a, 2001b) and Koellner (2011a) for an overview of
the current research status.
The continuum hypothesis was not the rst statement shown to be independent of ZFC. An immediate consequence
of Gdels incompleteness theorem, which was published in 1931, is that there is a formal statement (one for each
appropriate Gdel numbering scheme) expressing the consistency of ZFC that is independent of ZFC, assuming that
ZFC is consistent. The continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice were among the rst mathematical statements
shown to be independent of ZF set theory.
22 CHAPTER 3. CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
3.4 Arguments for and against the CH axiom

Gdel believed that CH is false, and that his proof that CH is consistent with ZFC only shows that the Zermelo
Fraenkel axioms do not adequately characterize the universe of sets. Gdel was a platonist and therefore had no
problems with asserting the truth and falsehood of statements independent of their provability. Cohen, though a
formalist (Goodman 1979), also tended towards rejecting CH.
Historically, mathematicians who favored a rich and large universe of sets were against CH, while those favoring
a neat and controllable universe favored CH. Parallel arguments were made for and against the axiom of con-
structibility, which implies CH. More recently, Matthew Foreman has pointed out that ontological maximalism can
actually be used to argue in favor of CH, because among models that have the same reals, models with more sets
of reals have a better chance of satisfying CH (Maddy 1988, p. 500).
Another viewpoint is that the conception of set is not specic enough to determine whether CH is true or false. This
viewpoint was advanced as early as 1923 by Skolem, even before Gdels rst incompleteness theorem. Skolem argued
on the basis of what is now known as Skolems paradox, and it was later supported by the independence of CH from
the axioms of ZFC since these axioms are enough to establish the elementary properties of sets and cardinalities. In
order to argue against this viewpoint, it would be sucient to demonstrate new axioms that are supported by intuition
and resolve CH in one direction or another. Although the axiom of constructibility does resolve CH, it is not generally
considered to be intuitively true any more than CH is generally considered to be false (Kunen 1980, p. 171).
At least two other axioms have been proposed that have implications for the continuum hypothesis, although these
axioms have not currently found wide acceptance in the mathematical community. In 1986, Chris Freiling presented
an argument against CH by showing that the negation of CH is equivalent to Freilings axiom of symmetry, a statement
about probabilities. Freiling believes this axiom is intuitively true but others have disagreed. A dicult argument
against CH developed by W. Hugh Woodin has attracted considerable attention since the year 2000 (Woodin 2001a,
2001b). Foreman (2003) does not reject Woodins argument outright but urges caution.
Solomon Feferman (2011) has made a complex philosophical argument that CH is not a denite mathematical prob-
lem. He proposes a theory of deniteness using a semi-intuitionistic subsystem of ZF that accepts classical logic
for bounded quantiers but uses intuitionistic logic for unbounded ones, and suggests that a proposition is math-
ematically denite if the semi-intuitionistic theory can prove ( ) . He conjectures that CH is not denite
according to this notion, and proposes that CH should, therefore, be considered not to have a truth value. Peter
Koellner (2011b) wrote a critical commentary on Fefermans article.
Joel David Hamkins proposes a multiverse approach to set theory and argues that the continuum hypothesis is settled
on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and, as a result, it can no
longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for. (Hamkins 2012). In a related vein, Saharon Shelah wrote that
he does not agree with the pure Platonic view that the interesting problems in set theory can be decided, that we just
have to discover the additional axiom. My mental picture is that we have many possible set theories, all conforming
to ZFC. (Shelah 2003).
3.5 The generalized continuum hypothesis

The generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) states that if an innite sets cardinality lies between that of an innite
set S and that of the power set of S, then it either has the same cardinality as the set S or the same cardinality as the
power set of S. That is, for any innite cardinal there is no cardinal such that < < 2 . GCH is equivalent to:
+1 = 2 for every ordinal . (occasionally called Cantors aleph hypothesis)
The beth numbers provide an alternate notation for this condition: = for every ordinal .
This is a generalization of the continuum hypothesis since the continuum has the same cardinality as the power set
of the integers. It was rst suggested by Jourdain (1905).
Like CH, GCH is also independent of ZFC, but Sierpiski proved that ZF + GCH implies the axiom of choice (AC)
(and therefore the negation of the axiom of determinacy, AD), so choice and GCH are not independent in ZF; there
are no models of ZF in which GCH holds and AC fails. To prove this, Sierpiski showed GCH implies that every
cardinality n is smaller than some Aleph number, and thus can be ordered. This is done by showing that n is smaller
than 20 +n which is smaller than its own Hartogs number this uses the equality 20 +n = 2 20 +n ; for the full
proof, see Gillman (2002).
3.6. SEE ALSO 23
Kurt Gdel showed that GCH is a consequence of ZF + V=L (the axiom that every set is constructible relative to the
ordinals), and is therefore consistent with ZFC. As GCH implies CH, Cohens model in which CH fails is a model
in which GCH fails, and thus GCH is not provable from ZFC. W. B. Easton used the method of forcing developed
by Cohen to prove Eastons theorem, which shows it is consistent with ZFC for arbitrarily large cardinals to
fail to satisfy 2 = +1 . Much later, Foreman and Woodin proved that (assuming the consistency of very large
cardinals) it is consistent that 2 > + holds for every innite cardinal . Later Woodin extended this by showing
the consistency of 2 = ++ for every . Carmi Merimovich (2007) showed that, for each n 1, it is consistent
with ZFC that for each , 2 is the nth successor of . On the other hand, Lszl Patai (1930) proved, that if is an
ordinal and for each innite cardinal , 2 is the th successor of , then is nite.
For any innite sets A and B, if there is an injection from A to B then there is an injection from subsets of A to subsets
of B. Thus for any innite cardinals A and B,
A < B 2A 2B .
If A and B are nite, the stronger inequality
A < B 2A < 2B
holds. GCH implies that this strict, stronger inequality holds for innite cardinals as well as nite cardinals.
3.5.1 Implications of GCH for cardinal exponentiation

Although the generalized continuum hypothesis refers directly only to cardinal exponentiation with 2 as the base, one

can deduce from it the values of cardinal exponentiation in all cases. It implies that is (see: Hayden & Kennison
(1968), page 147, exercise 76):
+1 when +1;
when +1 < and < cf( ) where cf is the conality operation; and
+1 when +1 < and cf( ) .
3.6 See also

Aleph number
Beth number
Cardinality
-logic
Wetzels problem
3.7 References
Cohen, Paul Joseph (2008) [1966]. Set theory and the continuum hypothesis. Mineola, New York: Dover
Publications. ISBN 978-0-486-46921-8.
Cohen, Paul J. (December 15, 1963). The Independence of the Continuum Hypothesis. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 50 (6): 11431148. JSTOR 71858. PMC
221287 . PMID 16578557. doi:10.1073/pnas.50.6.1143.
Cohen, Paul J. (January 15, 1964). The Independence of the Continuum Hypothesis, II. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 51 (1): 105110. JSTOR 72252. PMC 300611
. PMID 16591132. doi:10.1073/pnas.51.1.105.
24 CHAPTER 3. CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
Dales, H. G.; Woodin, W. H. (1987). An Introduction to Independence for Analysts. Cambridge.

Dauben, Joseph Warren (1990). Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Innite. Princeton
University Press. pp. 134137. ISBN 9780691024479.
Enderton, Herbert (1977). Elements of Set Theory. Academic Press.
Feferman, Solomon (February 1999). Does mathematics need new axioms?". American Mathematical Monthly.
106 (2): 99111. doi:10.2307/2589047.
Feferman, Solomon (2011). Is the Continuum Hypothesis a denite mathematical problem?" (PDF). Exploring
the Frontiers of Independence (Harvard lecture series). External link in |work= (help)
Foreman, Matt (2003). Has the Continuum Hypothesis been Settled?" (PDF). Retrieved February 25, 2006.
Freiling, Chris (1986). Axioms of Symmetry: Throwing Darts at the Real Number Line. Journal of Symbolic
Logic. Association for Symbolic Logic. 51 (1): 190200. JSTOR 2273955. doi:10.2307/2273955.
Gdel, K. (1940). The Consistency of the Continuum-Hypothesis. Princeton University Press.
Gillman, Leonard (2002). Two Classical Surprises Concerning the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum
Hypothesis (PDF). American Mathematical Monthly. 109. doi:10.2307/2695444.
Gdel, K.: What is Cantors Continuum Problem?, reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnams collection Philosophy
of Mathematics, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1983. An outline of Gdels arguments against CH.
Goodman, Nicolas D. (1979). Mathematics as an objective science. The American Mathematical Monthly.
86 (7): 540551. MR 542765. doi:10.2307/2320581. This view is often called formalism. Positions more or
less like this may be found in Haskell Curry [5], Abraham Robinson [17], and Paul Cohen [4].
Joel David Hamkins. The set-theoretic multiverse. Rev. Symb. Log. 5 (2012), no. 3, 416449.
Seymour Hayden and John F. Kennison: ZermeloFraenkel Set Theory (1968), Charles E. Merrill Publishing
Company, Columbus, Ohio.
Jourdain, Philip E. B. (1905). On transnite cardinal numbers of the exponential form. Philosophical Mag-
azine, Series 6. 9: 4256. doi:10.1080/14786440509463254.
Koellner, Peter (2011a). The Continuum Hypothesis (PDF). Exploring the Frontiers of Independence (Har-
vard lecture series).
Koellner, Peter (2011b). Feferman On the Indeniteness of CH (PDF).
Kunen, Kenneth (1980). Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
ISBN 978-0-444-85401-8.
Maddy, Penelope (June 1988). Believing the Axioms, I. Journal of Symbolic Logic. Association for Symbolic
Logic. 53 (2): 481511. JSTOR 2274520. doi:10.2307/2274520.
Martin, D. (1976). Hilberts rst problem: the continuum hypothesis, in Mathematical Developments Arising
from Hilberts Problems, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics XXVIII, F. Browder, editor. American
Mathematical Society, 1976, pp. 8192. ISBN 0-8218-1428-1
McGough, Nancy. The Continuum Hypothesis.
Merimovich, Carmi (2007). A power function with a xed nite gap everywhere. Journal of Symbolic Logic.
72 (2): 361417. MR 2320282. arXiv:math/0005179 . doi:10.2178/jsl/1185803615.
Moore, Gregory H. (2011). Early history of the generalized continuum hypothesis: 18781938. Bull. Sym-
bolic Logic. 17 (4): 489532. MR 2896574. doi:10.2178/bsl/1318855631.
Shelah, Saharon (2003). Logical dreams. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. (N.S.). 40 (2): 203228. doi:10.1090/s0273-
0979-03-00981-9.
Woodin, W. Hugh (2001a). The Continuum Hypothesis, Part I (PDF). Notices of the AMS. 48 (6): 567576.
Woodin, W. Hugh (2001b). The Continuum Hypothesis, Part II (PDF). Notices of the AMS. 48 (7): 681690.
German literature
Cantor, Georg (1878). Ein Beitrag zur Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Journal fr die Reine und Angewandte Math-
ematik. 84 (84): 242258. doi:10.1515/crll.1878.84.242.
Patai, L. (1930). Untersuchungen ber die -reihe. Mathematische und naturwissenschaftliche Berichte aus
Ungarn. 37: 127142.
3.8 External links

Szudzik, Matthew and Weisstein, Eric W. Continuum Hypothesis. MathWorld.
This article incorporates material from Generalized continuum hypothesis on PlanetMath, which is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License.
Chapter 4
Independence (mathematical logic)
In mathematical logic, independence refers to the unprovability of a sentence from other sentences.
A sentence is independent of a given rst-order theory T if T neither proves nor refutes ; that is, it is impossible
to prove from T, and it is also impossible to prove from T that is false. Sometimes, is said (synonymously) to
be undecidable from T; this is not the same meaning of "decidability" as in a decision problem.
A theory T is independent if each axiom in T is not provable from the remaining axioms in T. A theory for which
there is an independent set of axioms is independently axiomatizable.
4.1 Usage note

Some authors say that is independent of T when T simply cannot prove , and do not necessarily assert by this that
T cannot refute . These authors will sometimes say " is independent of and consistent with T" to indicate that T
can neither prove nor refute .
4.2 Independence results in set theory

Many interesting statements in set theory are independent of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). The following state-
ments in set theory are known to be independent of ZF, under the assumption that ZF is consistent:
The axiom of choice

The continuum hypothesis and the generalized continuum hypothesis
The Suslin conjecture
The following statements (none of which have been proved false) cannot be proved in ZFC (the Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory plus the axiom of choice) to be independent of ZFC, under the added hypothesis that ZFC is consistent.
The existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals

The existence of large cardinals
The non-existence of Kurepa trees
The following statements are inconsistent with the axiom of choice, and therefore with ZFC. However they are
probably independent of ZF, in a corresponding sense to the above: They cannot be proved in ZF, and few working
set theorists expect to nd a refutation in ZF. However ZF cannot prove that they are independent of ZF, even with
the added hypothesis that ZF is consistent.
The Axiom of determinacy
26
4.3. APPLICATIONS TO PHYSICAL THEORY 27
The axiom of real determinacy
AD+
4.3 Applications to physical theory

Since 2000, logical independence has become understood as having crucial signicance in the foundations of physics.[1][2]
4.4 See also

List of statements independent of ZFC
Parallel postulate for an example in geometry
4.5 Notes
[1] Paterek, T.; Koer, J.; Prevedel, R.; Klimek, P.; Aspelmeyer, M.; Zeilinger, A.; Brukner, . (2010), Logical independence
and quantum randomness, New Journal of Physics, 12: 013019, Bibcode:2010NJPh...12a3019P, arXiv:0811.4542 ,
doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/1/013019
[2] Szkely, Gergely (2013), The Existence of Superluminal Particles is Consistent with the Kinematics of Einsteins Special
Theory of Relativity, Reports on Mathematical Physics, 72 (2): 133152, Bibcode:2013RpMP...72..133S, arXiv:1202.5790
, doi:10.1016/S0034-4877(13)00021-9
4.6 References
Mendelson, Elliott (1997), An Introduction to Mathematical Logic (4th ed.), London: Chapman & Hall, ISBN
978-0-412-80830-2
Monk, J. Donald (1976), Mathematical Logic, Graduate Texts in Mathematics, Berlin, New York: Springer-
Verlag, ISBN 978-0-387-90170-1
Stabler, Edward Russell (1948), An introduction to mathematical thought, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley
Chapter 5
Innite set
In set theory, an innite set is a set that is not a nite set. Innite sets may be countable or uncountable. Some
examples are:
the set of all integers, {..., 1, 0, 1, 2, ...}, is a countably innite set; and
the set of all real numbers is an uncountably innite set.
5.1 Properties
The set of natural numbers (whose existence is postulated by the axiom of innity) is innite. It is the only set that
is directly required by the axioms to be innite. The existence of any other innite set can be proved in Zermelo
Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) only by showing that it follows from the existence of the natural numbers.
A set is innite if and only if for every natural number the set has a subset whose cardinality is that natural number.
If the axiom of choice holds, then a set is innite if and only if it includes a countable innite subset.
If a set of sets is innite or contains an innite element, then its union is innite. The powerset of an innite set is
innite. Any superset of an innite set is innite. If an innite set is partitioned into nitely many subsets, then at
least one of them must be innite. Any set which can be mapped onto an innite set is innite. The Cartesian product
of an innite set and a nonempty set is innite. The Cartesian product of an innite number of sets each containing
at least two elements is either empty or innite; if the axiom of choice holds, then it is innite.
If an innite set is a well-ordered set, then it must have a nonempty subset that has no greatest element.
In ZF, a set is innite if and only if the powerset of its powerset is a Dedekind-innite set, having a proper subset
equinumerous to itself.[1] If the axiom of choice is also true, innite sets are precisely the Dedekind-innite sets.
If an innite set is a well-orderable set, then it has many well-orderings which are non-isomorphic.
5.2 See also
Aleph number
Innity
5.3 References
[1] Boolos, George (1994), The advantages of honest toil over theft, Mathematics and mind (Amherst, MA, 1991), Logic
Comput. Philos., Oxford Univ. Press, New York, pp. 2744, MR 1373892. See in particular pp. 3233.
28
5.4 External links

Weisstein, Eric W. Innite Set. MathWorld.
Chapter 6
Power set
For the search engine developer, see Powerset (company).

In mathematics, the power set (or powerset) of any set S is the set of all subsets of S, including the empty set and S
{x,y,z}
{x,y} {x,z} {y,z}
{x} {y} {z}
The elements of the power set of the set {x, y, z} ordered with respect to inclusion.
itself, variously denoted as P(S), (S) (using the "Weierstrass p"), P(S), (S), or, identifying the powerset of S with
the set of all functions from S to a given set of two elements, 2S . In axiomatic set theory (as developed, for example,
in the ZFC axioms), the existence of the power set of any set is postulated by the axiom of power set.[1]
Any subset of P(S) is called a family of sets over S.
30
6.1. EXAMPLE 31
6.1 Example
If S is the set {x, y, z}, then the subsets of S are
{} (also denoted or , the empty set or the null set)
{x}
{y}
{z}
{x, y}
{x, z}
{y, z}
{x, y, z}
and hence the power set of S is {{}, {x}, {y}, {z}, {x, y}, {x, z}, {y, z}, {x, y, z}}.[2]
6.2 Properties
If S is a nite set with |S| = n elements, then the number of subsets of S is |P(S)| = 2n . This fact, which is the motivation
for the notation 2S , may be demonstrated simply as follows,
First, order the elements of S in any manner. We write any subset of S in the format {1 , 2 , ..., n }
where , 1 i n, can take the value of 0 or 1. If i = 1, the i-th element of S is in the subset; otherwise,
the i-th element is not in the subset. Clearly the number of distinct subsets that can be constructed this
way is 2n as i {0, 1} .
Cantors diagonal argument shows that the power set of a set (whether innite or not) always has strictly higher
cardinality than the set itself (informally the power set must be larger than the original set). In particular, Cantors
theorem shows that the power set of a countably innite set is uncountably innite. The power set of the set of natural
numbers can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of real numbers (see Cardinality of the continuum).
The power set of a set S, together with the operations of union, intersection and complement can be viewed as the
prototypical example of a Boolean algebra. In fact, one can show that any nite Boolean algebra is isomorphic to
the Boolean algebra of the power set of a nite set. For innite Boolean algebras this is no longer true, but every
innite Boolean algebra can be represented as a subalgebra of a power set Boolean algebra (see Stones representation
theorem).
The power set of a set S forms an abelian group when considered with the operation of symmetric dierence (with the
empty set as the identity element and each set being its own inverse) and a commutative monoid when considered with
the operation of intersection. It can hence be shown (by proving the distributive laws) that the power set considered
together with both of these operations forms a Boolean ring.
6.3 Representing subsets as functions

In set theory, XY is the set of all functions from Y to X. As 2 can be dened as {0,1} (see natural number), 2S (i.e.,
{0,1}S ) is the set of all functions from S to {0,1}. By identifying a function in 2S with the corresponding preimage of
1, we see that there is a bijection between 2S and P(S), where each function is the characteristic function of the subset
in P(S) with which it is identied. Hence 2S and P(S) could be considered identical set-theoretically. (Thus there
are two distinct notational motivations for denoting the power set by 2S : the fact that this function-representation of
subsets makes it a special case of the XY notation and the property, mentioned above, that |2S | = 2|S| .)
32 CHAPTER 6. POWER SET
This notion can be applied to the example above in which S = {x, y, z} to see the isomorphism with the binary
numbers from 0 to 2n 1 with n being the number of elements in the set. In S, a 1 in the position corresponding to
the location in the set indicates the presence of the element. So {x, y} = 110.
For the whole power set of S we get:
{} = 000 (Binary) = 0 (Decimal)
{x} = 100 = 4
{y} = 010 = 2
{z} = 001 = 1
{x, y} = 110 = 6
{x, z} = 101 = 5
{y, z} = 011 = 3
{x, y, z} = 111 = 7
6.4 Relation to binomial theorem

The power set is closely related to the binomial theorem. The number of subsets with k elements in the power set of
a set with n elements is given by the number of combinations, C(n, k), also called binomial coecients.
For example, the power set of a set with three elements, has:
C(3, 0) = 1 subset with 0 elements (the empty subset),
C(3, 1) = 3 subsets with 1 element (the singleton subsets),
C(3, 2) = 3 subsets with 2 elements (the complements of the singleton subsets),
C(3, 3) = 1 subset with 3 elements (the original set itself).
6.5 Algorithms
If S is a nite set, there is a recursive algorithm to calculate P(S).
Dene the operation F (e, T) = {X {e} | X T}.
In English, return the set with the element e added to each set X in T.
If S = { }, then P(S) = { { } } is returned.
Otherwise:
Let e be any single element of S.

Let T = S \ {e}, where S \ {e} denotes the relative complement of e in S.
And the result: P(S) = P(T) F (e, P(T)) is returned.
In other words, the power set of the empty set is the set containing the empty set and the power set of any other set
is all the subsets of the set containing some specic element and all the subsets of the set not containing that specic
element.
6.6. SUBSETS OF LIMITED CARDINALITY 33
6.6 Subsets of limited cardinality

The set of subsets of S of cardinality less than is denoted by P(S) or P< (S). Similarly, the set of non-empty
subsets of S might be denoted by P (S).
6.7 Power object

A set can be regarded as an algebra having no nontrivial operations or dening equations. From this perspective the
idea of the power set of X as the set of subsets of X generalizes naturally to the subalgebras of an algebraic structure
or algebra.
Now the power set of a set, when ordered by inclusion, is always a complete atomic Boolean algebra, and every
complete atomic Boolean algebra arises as the lattice of all subsets of some set. The generalization to arbitrary
algebras is that the set of subalgebras of an algebra, again ordered by inclusion, is always an algebraic lattice, and
every algebraic lattice arises as the lattice of subalgebras of some algebra. So in that regard subalgebras behave
analogously to subsets.
However, there are two important properties of subsets that do not carry over to subalgebras in general. First, although
the subsets of a set form a set (as well as a lattice), in some classes it may not be possible to organize the subalgebras
of an algebra as itself an algebra in that class, although they can always be organized as a lattice. Secondly, whereas
the subsets of a set are in bijection with the functions from that set to the set {0,1} = 2, there is no guarantee that a
class of algebras contains an algebra that can play the role of 2 in this way.
Certain classes of algebras enjoy both of these properties. The rst property is more common, the case of having
both is relatively rare. One class that does have both is that of multigraphs. Given two multigraphs G and H, a
homomorphism h: G H consists of two functions, one mapping vertices to vertices and the other mapping edges
to edges. The set H G of homomorphisms from G to H can then be organized as the graph whose vertices and edges
are respectively the vertex and edge functions appearing in that set. Furthermore, the subgraphs of a multigraph G
are in bijection with the graph homomorphisms from G to the multigraph denable as the complete directed graph
on two vertices (hence four edges, namely two self-loops and two more edges forming a cycle) augmented with a
fth edge, namely a second self-loop at one of the vertices. We can therefore organize the subgraphs of G as the
multigraph G , called the power object of G.
What is special about a multigraph as an algebra is that its operations are unary. A multigraph has two sorts of
elements forming a set V of vertices and E of edges, and has two unary operations s,t: E V giving the source
(start) and target (end) vertices of each edge. An algebra all of whose operations are unary is called a presheaf.
Every class of presheaves contains a presheaf that plays the role for subalgebras that 2 plays for subsets. Such
a class is a special case of the more general notion of elementary topos as a category that is closed (and moreover
cartesian closed) and has an object , called a subobject classier. Although the term power object is sometimes
used synonymously with exponential object Y X , in topos theory Y is required to be .
6.8 Functors and quantiers

In category theory and the theory of elementary topoi, the universal quantier can be understood as the right adjoint of
a functor between power sets, the inverse image functor of a function between sets; likewise, the existential quantier
is the left adjoint.[3]
6.9 See also

Set theory
Axiomatic set theory
Family of sets
Field of sets
34 CHAPTER 6. POWER SET
6.10 Notes
[1] Devlin 1979, p. 50
[2] Puntambekar 2007, pp. 12
[3] Saunders Mac Lane, Ieke Moerdijk, (1992) Sheaves in Geometry and Logic Springer-Verlag. ISBN 0-387-97710-4 See
page 58
6.11 References
Devlin, Keith J. (1979). Fundamentals of contemporary set theory. Universitext. Springer-Verlag. ISBN
0-387-90441-7. Zbl 0407.04003.
Halmos, Paul R. (1960). Naive set theory. The University Series in Undergraduate Mathematics. van Nostrand
Company. Zbl 0087.04403.
Puntambekar, A. A. (2007). Theory Of Automata And Formal Languages. Technical Publications. ISBN
978-81-8431-193-8.
6.12 External links

Weisstein, Eric W. Power Set. MathWorld.
Power set. PlanetMath.
Power set in nLab

Power object in nLab
Power set Algorithm in C++

Chapter 7
ZermeloFraenkel set theory
ZFC redirects here. For other uses, see ZFC (disambiguation).
In mathematics, ZermeloFraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel,
is one of several axiomatic systems that were proposed in the early twentieth century to formulate a theory of sets
free of paradoxes such as Russells paradox. ZermeloFraenkel set theory with the historically controversial axiom
of choice included is commonly abbreviated ZFC, where C stands for choice.[1] Many authors use ZF to refer to
the axioms of ZermeloFraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice excluded. Today ZFC is the standard form of
axiomatic set theory and as such is the most common foundation of mathematics.
ZFC is intended to formalize a single primitive notion, that of a hereditary well-founded set, so that all entities in
the universe of discourse are such sets. Thus the axioms of ZFC refer only to pure sets and prevent its models from
containing urelements (elements of sets that are not themselves sets). Furthermore, proper classes (collections of
mathematical objects dened by a property shared by their members which are too big to be sets) can only be treated
indirectly. Specically, ZFC does not allow for the existence of a universal set (a set containing all sets) nor for
unrestricted comprehension, thereby avoiding Russells paradox. Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (NBG)
is a commonly used conservative extension of ZFC that does allow explicit treatment of proper classes.
Formally, ZFC is a one-sorted theory in rst-order logic. The signature has equality and a single primitive binary
relation, set membership, which is usually denoted . The formula a b means that the set a is a member of the set
b (which is also read, "a is an element of b" or "a is in b").
There are many equivalent formulations of the ZFC axioms. Most of the ZFC axioms state the existence of particular
sets dened from other sets. For example, the axiom of pairing says that given any two sets a and b there is a new set
{a, b} containing exactly a and b. Other axioms describe properties of set membership. A goal of the ZFC axioms
is that each axiom should be true if interpreted as a statement about the collection of all sets in the von Neumann
universe (also known as the cumulative hierarchy).
The metamathematics of ZFC has been extensively studied. Landmark results in this area established the indepen-
dence of the continuum hypothesis from ZFC, and of the axiom of choice from the remaining ZFC axioms. The
consistency of a theory such as ZFC cannot be proved within the theory itself.
7.1 History
In 1908, Ernst Zermelo proposed the rst axiomatic set theory, Zermelo set theory. However, as rst pointed out
by Abraham Fraenkel in a 1921 letter to Zermelo, this theory was incapable of proving the existence of certain sets
and cardinal numbers whose existence was taken for granted by most set theorists of the time, notably the cardinal
number and the set {Z0 , (Z0 ), ((Z0 )),...}, where Z0 is any innite set and is the power set operation.[2]
Moreover, one of Zermelos axioms invoked a concept, that of a denite property, whose operational meaning
was not clear. In 1922, Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem independently proposed operationalizing a denite property
as one that could be formulated as a rst order theory whose atomic formulas were limited to set membership and
identity. They also independently proposed replacing the axiom schema of specication with the axiom schema of
replacement. Appending this schema, as well as the axiom of regularity (rst proposed by Dimitry Mirimano in
1917), to Zermelo set theory yields the theory denoted by ZF. Adding to ZF either the axiom of choice (AC) or a
35
36 CHAPTER 7. ZERMELOFRAENKEL SET THEORY
statement that is equivalent to it yields ZFC.
7.2 Axioms
There are many equivalent formulations of the ZFC axioms; for a discussion of this see Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel & Lvy
1973. The following particular axiom set is from Kunen (1980). The axioms per se are expressed in the symbolism
of rst order logic. The associated English prose is only intended to aid the intuition.
All formulations of ZFC imply that at least one set exists. Kunen includes an axiom that directly asserts the exis-
tence of a set, in addition to the axioms given below (although he notes that he does so only for emphasis).[3] Its
omission here can be justied in two ways. First, in the standard semantics of rst-order logic in which ZFC is typi-
cally formalized, the domain of discourse must be nonempty. Hence, it is a logical theorem of rst-order logic that
something exists usually expressed as the assertion that something is identical to itself, x(x=x). Consequently,
it is a theorem of every rst-order theory that something exists. However, as noted above, because in the intended
semantics of ZFC there are only sets, the interpretation of this logical theorem in the context of ZFC is that some
set exists. Hence, there is no need for a separate axiom asserting that a set exists. Second, however, even if ZFC is
formulated in so-called free logic, in which it is not provable from logic alone that something exists, the axiom of
innity (below) asserts that an innite set exists. This implies that a set exists and so, once again, it is superuous to
include an axiom asserting as much.
7.2.1 1. Axiom of extensionality
Main article: Axiom of extensionality
Two sets are equal (are the same set) if they have the same elements.
xy[z(z x z y) x = y].
The converse of this axiom follows from the substitution property of equality. If the background logic does not
include equality "=", x=y may be dened as an abbreviation for the following formula:[4]
z[z x z y] w[x w y w].
In this case, the axiom of extensionality can be reformulated as
xy[z(z x z y) w(x w y w)],
which says that if x and y have the same elements, then they belong to the same sets.[5]
7.2.2 2. Axiom of regularity (also called the Axiom of foundation)
Main article: Axiom of regularity
Every non-empty set x contains a member y such that x and y are disjoint sets.
x[a(a x) y(y x z(z y z x))]. [6]
This implies, for example, that no set is an element of itself and that every set has an ordinal rank.
7.2. AXIOMS 37
7.2.3 3. Axiom schema of specication (also called the axiom schema of separation or of
restricted comprehension)
Main article: Axiom schema of specication
Subsets are commonly constructed using set builder notation. For example, the even integers can be constructed as
the subset of the integers Z satisfying the congruence modulo predicate x 0 (mod 2) :
{x Z : x 0 (mod 2)}.
In general, the subset of a set z obeying a formula (x) with one free variable x may be written as:
{x z : (x)}.
The axiom schema of specication states that this subset always exists (it is an axiom schema because there is one ax-
iom for each ). Formally, let be any formula in the language of ZFC with all free variables among x, z, w1 , . . . , wn
(y is not free in ). Then:
zw1 w2 . . . wn yx[x y (x z )].
Note that the axiom schema of specication can only construct subsets, and does not allow the construction of sets
of the more general form:
{x : (x)}.
This restriction is necessary to avoid Russells paradox and its variants that accompany naive set theory with unrestricted
comprehension.
In some other axiomatizations of ZF, this axiom is redundant in that it follows from the axiom schema of replacement
and the axiom of the empty set.
On the other hand, the axiom of specication can be used to prove the existence of the empty set, denoted , once
at least one set is known to exist (see above). One way to do this is to use a property which no set has. For example,
if w is any existing set, the empty set can be constructed as
= {u w | (u u) (u u)}
Thus the axiom of the empty set is implied by the nine axioms presented here. The axiom of extensionality implies
the empty set is unique (does not depend on w). It is common to make a denitional extension that adds the symbol
to the language of ZFC.
7.2.4 4. Axiom of pairing

Main article: Axiom of pairing
If x and y are sets, then there exists a set which contains x and y as elements.
xyz(x z y z).
The axiom schema of specication must be used to reduce this to a set with exactly these two elements. The axiom
of pairing is part of Z, but is redundant in ZF because it follows from the axiom schema of replacement, if we are
given a set with at least two elements. The existence of a set with at least two elements is assured by either the axiom
of innity, or by the axiom schema of specication and the axiom of the power set applied twice to any set.
7.2.5 5. Axiom of union

Main article: Axiom of union
The union over the elements of a set exists. For example, the union over the elements of the set {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} is
{1, 2, 3} .
Formally, the axiom of union states that for any set of sets F there is a set A containing every element that is a
member of some member of F :
F A Y x[(x Y Y F ) x A].
While this doesn't directly assert the existence of F , it can be constructed from A in the above using the axiom
schema of specication:
F := {x A : Y (x Y Y F )}
f(x)
x
A B
f:AB
Axiom schema of replacement: the image of the domain set A under the denable function f (i.e. the range of f) falls inside a set B.
7.2.6 6. Axiom schema of replacement

Main article: Axiom schema of replacement
The axiom schema of replacement asserts that the image of a set under any denable function will also fall inside a
set.
7.2. AXIOMS 39
Formally, let be any formula in the language of ZFC whose free variables are among x, y, A, w1 , . . . , wn , so that
in particular B is not free in . Then:
[ ( )]
Aw1 w2 . . . wn x(x A !y ) B x x A y(y B ) .
In other words, if the relation represents a denable function f , A represents its domain, and f (x) is a set for every
x A , then the range of f is a subset of some set B . The form stated here, in which B may be larger than strictly
necessary, is sometimes called the axiom schema of collection.
7.2.7 7. Axiom of innity

Main article: Axiom of innity
Let S(w) abbreviate w {w} , where w is some set. (We can see that {w} is a valid set by applying the Axiom of
Pairing with x = y = w so that the set z is {w} ). Then there exists a set X such that the empty set is a member
of X and, whenever a set y is a member of X, then S(y) is also a member of X.
X [ X y(y X S(y) X)] .
More colloquially, there exists a set X having innitely many members. (It must be established, however, that these
members are all dierent, because if two elements are the same, the sequence will loop around in a nite cycle of
sets. The axiom of regularity prevents this from happening.) The minimal set X satisfying the axiom of innity is
the von Neumann ordinal , which can also be thought of as the set of natural numbers N .
7.2.8 8. Axiom of power set

Main article: Axiom of power set
By denition a set z is a subset of a set x if and only if every element of z is also an element of x:
(z x) (q(q z q x)).
The Axiom of Power Set states that for any set x, there is a set y that contains every subset of x:
xyz[z x z y].
The axiom schema of specication is then used to dene the power set P(x) as the subset of such a y containing the
subsets of x exactly:
P (x) = {z y : z x}
Axioms 18 dene ZF. Alternative forms of these axioms are often encountered, some of which are listed in Jech
(2003). Some ZF axiomatizations include an axiom asserting that the empty set exists. The axioms of pairing, union,
replacement, and power set are often stated so that the members of the set x whose existence is being asserted are
just those sets which the axiom asserts x must contain.
The following axiom is added to turn ZF into ZFC:
7.2.9 9. Well-ordering theorem

Main article: Well-ordering theorem
For any set X, there is a binary relation R which well-orders X. This means R is a linear order on X such that every
nonempty subset of X has a member which is minimal under R.
XR(R well-orders X).
Given axioms 18, there are many statements provably equivalent to axiom 9, the best known of which is the axiom
of choice (AC), which goes as follows. Let X be a set whose members are all non-empty. Then there exists a function
f from X to the union of the members of X, called a "choice function", such that for all Y X one has f(Y) Y.
Since the existence of a choice function when X is a nite set is easily proved from axioms 18, AC only matters for
certain innite sets. AC is characterized as nonconstructive because it asserts the existence of a choice set but says
nothing about how the choice set is to be constructed. Much research has sought to characterize the denability (or
lack thereof) of certain sets whose existence AC asserts.
7.3 Motivation via the cumulative hierarchy

One motivation for the ZFC axioms is the cumulative hierarchy of sets introduced by John von Neumann.[7] In this
viewpoint, the universe of set theory is built up in stages, with one stage for each ordinal number. At stage 0 there
are no sets yet. At each following stage, a set is added to the universe if all of its elements have been added at
previous stages. Thus the empty set is added at stage 1, and the set containing the empty set is added at stage 2.[8]
The collection of all sets that are obtained in this way, over all the stages, is known as V. The sets in V can be arranged
into a hierarchy by assigning to each set the rst stage at which that set was added to V.
It is provable that a set is in V if and only if the set is pure and well-founded; and provable that V satises all the
axioms of ZFC, if the class of ordinals has appropriate reection properties. For example, suppose that a set x is
added at stage , which means that every element of x was added at a stage earlier than . Then every subset of x is
also added at stage , because all elements of any subset of x were also added before stage . This means that any
subset of x which the axiom of separation can construct is added at stage , and that the powerset of x will be added
at the next stage after . For a complete argument that V satises ZFC see Shoeneld (1977).
The picture of the universe of sets stratied into the cumulative hierarchy is characteristic of ZFC and related ax-
iomatic set theories such as Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (often called NBG) and MorseKelley set
theory. The cumulative hierarchy is not compatible with other set theories such as New Foundations.
It is possible to change the denition of V so that at each stage, instead of adding all the subsets of the union of
the previous stages, subsets are only added if they are denable in a certain sense. This results in a more narrow
hierarchy which gives the constructible universe L, which also satises all the axioms of ZFC, including the axiom of
choice. It is independent from the ZFC axioms whether V = L. Although the structure of L is more regular and well
behaved than that of V, few mathematicians argue that V = L should be added to ZFC as an additional axiom.
7.4 Metamathematics
The axiom schemata of replacement and separation each contain innitely many instances. Montague (1961) included
a result rst proved in his 1957 Ph.D. thesis: if ZFC is consistent, it is impossible to axiomatize ZFC using only nitely
many axioms. On the other hand, Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (NBG) can be nitely axiomatized. The
ontology of NBG includes proper classes as well as sets; a set is any class that can be a member of another class.
NBG and ZFC are equivalent set theories in the sense that any theorem not mentioning classes and provable in one
theory can be proved in the other.
Gdels second incompleteness theorem says that a recursively axiomatizable system that can interpret Robinson
arithmetic can prove its own consistency only if it is inconsistent. Moreover, Robinson arithmetic can be interpreted
in general set theory, a small fragment of ZFC. Hence the consistency of ZFC cannot be proved within ZFC itself
(unless it is actually inconsistent). Thus, to the extent that ZFC is identied with ordinary mathematics, the consistency
of ZFC cannot be demonstrated in ordinary mathematics. The consistency of ZFC does follow from the existence of
a weakly inaccessible cardinal, which is unprovable in ZFC if ZFC is consistent. Nevertheless, it is deemed unlikely
that ZFC harbors an unsuspected contradiction; it is widely believed that if ZFC were inconsistent, that fact would
have been uncovered by now. This much is certain ZFC is immune to the classic paradoxes of naive set theory:
Russells paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox, and Cantors paradox.
7.4. METAMATHEMATICS 41
Abian & LaMacchia (1978) studied a subtheory of ZFC consisting of the axioms of extensionality, union, powerset,
replacement, and choice. Using models, they proved this subtheory consistent, and proved that each of the axioms
of extensionality, replacement, and power set is independent of the four remaining axioms of this subtheory. If this
subtheory is augmented with the axiom of innity, each of the axioms of union, choice, and innity is independent
of the ve remaining axioms. Because there are non-well-founded models that satisfy each axiom of ZFC except the
axiom of regularity, that axiom is independent of the other ZFC axioms.
If consistent, ZFC cannot prove the existence of the inaccessible cardinals that category theory requires. Huge sets of
this nature are possible if ZF is augmented with Tarskis axiom.[9] Assuming that axiom turns the axioms of innity,
power set, and choice (7 9 above) into theorems.
7.4.1 Independence
Many important statements are independent of ZFC (see list of statements undecidable in ZFC). The independence
is usually proved by forcing, whereby it is shown that every countable transitive model of ZFC (sometimes augmented
with large cardinal axioms) can be expanded to satisfy the statement in question. A dierent expansion is then shown
to satisfy the negation of the statement. An independence proof by forcing automatically proves independence from
arithmetical statements, other concrete statements, and large cardinal axioms. Some statements independent of ZFC
can be proven to hold in particular inner models, such as in the constructible universe. However, some statements
that are true about constructible sets are not consistent with hypothesized large cardinal axioms.
Forcing proves that the following statements are independent of ZFC:
Continuum hypothesis
Diamond principle
Suslin hypothesis
Martins axiom (which is not a ZFC axiom)
Axiom of Constructibility (V=L) (which is also not a ZFC axiom).
Remarks:
The consistency of V=L is provable by inner models but not forcing: every model of ZF can be trimmed to
become a model of ZFC + V=L.
The Diamond Principle implies the Continuum Hypothesis and the negation of the Suslin Hypothesis.
Martins axiom plus the negation of the Continuum Hypothesis implies the Suslin Hypothesis.
The constructible universe satises the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, the Diamond Principle, Martins
Axiom and the Kurepa Hypothesis.
The failure of the Kurepa hypothesis is equiconsistent with the existence of a strongly inaccessible cardinal.
A variation on the method of forcing can also be used to demonstrate the consistency and unprovability of the axiom
of choice, i.e., that the axiom of choice is independent of ZF. The consistency of choice can be (relatively) easily
veried by proving that the inner model L satises choice. (Thus every model of ZF contains a submodel of ZFC, so
that Con(ZF) implies Con(ZFC).) Since forcing preserves choice, we cannot directly produce a model contradicting
choice from a model satisfying choice. However, we can use forcing to create a model which contains a suitable
submodel, namely one satisfying ZF but not C.
Another method of proving independence results, one owing nothing to forcing, is based on Gdels second in-
completeness theorem. This approach employs the statement whose independence is being examined, to prove the
existence of a set model of ZFC, in which case Con(ZFC) is true. Since ZFC satises the conditions of Gdels
second theorem, the consistency of ZFC is unprovable in ZFC (provided that ZFC is, in fact, consistent). Hence no
statement allowing such a proof can be proved in ZFC. This method can prove that the existence of large cardinals
is not provable in ZFC, but cannot prove that assuming such cardinals, given ZFC, is free of contradiction.
7.5 Criticisms
For criticism of set theory in general, see Objections to set theory
ZFC has been criticized both for being excessively strong and for being excessively weak, as well as for its failure to
capture objects such as proper classes and the universal set.
Many mathematical theorems can be proven in much weaker systems than ZFC, such as Peano arithmetic and second-
order arithmetic (as explored by the program of reverse mathematics). Saunders Mac Lane and Solomon Feferman
have both made this point. Some of mainstream mathematics (mathematics not directly connected with axiomatic
set theory) is beyond Peano arithmetic and second-order arithmetic, but still, all such mathematics can be carried
out in ZC (Zermelo set theory with choice), another theory weaker than ZFC. Much of the power of ZFC, including
the axiom of regularity and the axiom schema of replacement, is included primarily to facilitate the study of the set
theory itself.
On the other hand, among axiomatic set theories, ZFC is comparatively weak. Unlike New Foundations, ZFC does
not admit the existence of a universal set. Hence the universe of sets under ZFC is not closed under the elementary
operations of the algebra of sets. Unlike von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (NBG) and MorseKelley set
theory (MK), ZFC does not admit the existence of proper classes. A further comparative weakness of ZFC is that
the axiom of choice included in ZFC is weaker than the axiom of global choice included in NBG and MK.
There are numerous mathematical statements undecidable in ZFC. These include the continuum hypothesis, the
Whitehead problem, and the normal Moore space conjecture. Some of these conjectures are provable with the
addition of axioms such as Martins axiom, large cardinal axioms to ZFC. Some others are decided in ZF+AD where
AD is the axiom of determinacy, a strong supposition incompatible with choice. One attraction of large cardinal
axioms is that they enable many results from ZF+AD to be established in ZFC adjoined by some large cardinal axiom
(see projective determinacy). The Mizar system and Metamath have adopted TarskiGrothendieck set theory, an
extension of ZFC, so that proofs involving Grothendieck universes (encountered in category theory and algebraic
geometry) can be formalized.
7.6 See also

Foundation of mathematics
Inner model
Large cardinal axiom
Related axiomatic set theories:
MorseKelley set theory
Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory
TarskiGrothendieck set theory
Constructive set theory
Internal set theory
7.7 Notes
[1] Ciesielski 1997.
[2] Ebbinghaus 2007, p. 136.
[3] Kunen (1980), p. 10.
[4] Hatcher 1982, p. 138, def. 1.

7.8. REFERENCES 43
[5] Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel & Lvy 1973.

[6] Shoeneld 2001, p. 239.
[7] Shoeneld 1977, section 2.
[8] Hinman 2005, p. 467.
[9] Tarski 1939.
7.8 References
Abian, Alexander (1965). The Theory of Sets and Transnite Arithmetic. W B Saunders.
; LaMacchia, Samuel (1978). On the Consistency and Independence of Some Set-Theoretical Ax-
ioms. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. 19: 15558. doi:10.1305/ndj/1093888220.
Ciesielski, Krzysztof (1997). Set Theory for the Working Mathematician. Cambridge University Press. p. 4.
ISBN 0-521-59441-3. Retrieved 12 August 2015.
Devlin, Keith (1996) [1984]. The Joy of Sets. Springer.
Ebbinghaus, Heinz-Dieter (2007). Ernst Zermelo: An Approach to His Life and Work. Springer. ISBN 978-3-
540-49551-2.
Fraenkel, Abraham; Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua; Lvy, Azriel (1973) [1958]. Foundations of Set Theory. North-
Holland. Fraenkels nal word on ZF and ZFC.
Hatcher, William (1982) [1968]. The Logical Foundations of Mathematics. Pergamon Press.
Hinman, Peter (2005). Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic. A K Peters. ISBN 978-1-56881-262-5.
Jech, Thomas (2003). Set Theory: The Third Millennium Edition, Revised and Expanded. Springer. ISBN
3-540-44085-2.
Kunen, Kenneth (1980). Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs. Elsevier. ISBN 0-444-86839-9.
Montague, Richard (1961). Semantic closure and non-nite axiomatizability. Innistic Methods. London:
Pergamon Press. pp. 4569.
Shoeneld, Joseph R. (2001) [1967]. Mathematical Logic (2nd ed.). A K Peters. ISBN 978-1-56881-135-2.
Shoeneld, Joseph R. (1977). Axioms of set theory. In Barwise, K. J. Handbook of Mathematical Logic.
ISBN 0-7204-2285-X.
Patrick Suppes, 1972 (1960). Axiomatic Set Theory. Dover reprint. Perhaps the best exposition of ZFC before
the independence of AC and the Continuum hypothesis, and the emergence of large cardinals. Includes many
theorems.
Gaisi Takeuti and Zaring, W M, 1971. Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory. Springer-Verlag.
Tarski, Alfred (1939). On well-ordered subsets of any set. Fundamenta Mathematicae. 32: 17683.
Tiles, Mary, 2004 (1989). The Philosophy of Set Theory. Dover reprint. Weak on metatheory; the author is
not a mathematician.
Tourlakis, George, 2003. Lectures in Logic and Set Theory, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.
Jean van Heijenoort, 1967. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 18791931. Harvard
University Press. Includes annotated English translations of the classic articles by Zermelo, Fraenkel, and
Skolem bearing on ZFC.
Zermelo, Ernst (1908). Untersuchungen ber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I. Mathematische Annalen.
65: 261281. doi:10.1007/BF01449999. English translation in Heijenoort, Jean van (1967). Investigations in
the foundations of set theory. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 18791931. Source
Books in the History of the Sciences. Harvard University Press. pp. 199215. ISBN 978-0-674-32449-7.
Zermelo, Ernst (1930). "ber Grenzzahlen und Mengenbereiche. Fundamenta Mathematicae. 16: 2947.
ISSN 0016-2736.
7.9 External links

Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001) [1994], ZFC, Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer Science+Business
Media B.V. / Kluwer Academic Publishers, ISBN 978-1-55608-010-4
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles by Thomas Jech:
Set Theory;
Axioms of ZermeloFraenkel Set Theory.
Metamath version of the ZFC axioms A concise and nonredundant axiomatization. The background rst
order logic is dened especially to facilitate machine verication of proofs.
A derivation in Metamath of a version of the separation schema from a version of the replacement schema.
Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms. PlanetMath.
Weisstein, Eric W. Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory. MathWorld.

7.10. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES 45
7.10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

7.10.1 Text
Axiom of choice Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice?oldid=787234272 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Matthew Wood-
craft, Derek Ross, Vicki Rosenzweig, Bryan Derksen, Zundark, The Anome, Christian List, Toby Bartels, Roadrunner, B4hand, Youandme,
Olivier, Michael Hardy, Nixdorf, Bcrowell, Chinju, Karada, Eric119, Ellywa, Den fjttrade ankan~enwiki, Victor Gijsbers, Schnee-
locke, Revolver, Charles Matthews, Timwi, John Cross, Dcoetzee, Dysprosia, Maximus Rex, Hyacinth, Saltine, Fibonacci, Pakaran,
Banno, Onebyone, Aleph4, Robbot, Josh Cherry, Fredrik, Mohan ravichandran, Altenmann, MathMartin, Bkell, Paul G, Tea2min, Tosha,
Giftlite, Dbenbenn, Mshonle~enwiki, Gene Ward Smith, Markus Krtzsch, Lethe, BalthCat, Jorend, Chad.netzer, Semprini, Elroch, Da-
narmak, Mike Rosoft, Brianjd, Xrchz, Rcog, Gadykozma, Luqui, Vsmith, Ponder, Pandemias, Paul August, Bender235, Ben Standeven,
EmilJ, Dreish, Ferkel, AshtonBenson, Obradovic Goran, Sean Kelly, Lysdexia, Elusiveneutrino, ABCD, !melquiades, BryanD, Sligocki,
Caesura, Kusma, Bookandcoee, Tbsmith, Rictus, Ralpedia, Marudubshinki, RuM, Qwertyus, Rjwilmsi, MarSch, R.e.b., Bubba73,
Dougluce, Reedbeta, Mathbot, SDaniel, Heathcli, David H Braun (1964), Chobot, Algebraist, Jarvik, YurikBot, Angus Lepper, Hairy
Dude, Splash, Ksnortum, Grubber, Sikon, CarlHewitt, Trovatore, Aldux, Obey, IvanDurak, Arthur Rubin, Georey.landis, Fractalchez,
Benandorsqueaks, GrinBot~enwiki, AndrewWTaylor, GrafZahl, Jsnx, SmackBot, Selfworm, InverseHypercube, Golbeck, SaxTeacher,
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JohnnyNyquist, Dreadstar, RandomP, Kleuske, Lambiam, Loadmaster, Bless sins, Grasyop, JDAWiseman, Md2perpe, JRSpriggs, Shi-
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Jadewang, EdJohnston, Daniel Kellis, Asmeurer, Awilley, LaForge, Coee2theorems, Magioladitis, WolfmanSF, Omicron18, David
Eppstein, Kope, Drewmutt, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Wissahickon Creek, Trumpet marietta 45750, Policron, Linkracer, Alsosaid1987,
HyDeckar, Vadik, Alan U. Kennington, LokiClock, Philip Trueman, Oshwah, Xjs, TBond, AlleborgoBot, Katzmik, Ocsenave, YohanN7,
StAnselm, ToePeu.bot, Likebox, Paolo.dL, OKBot, Cyfal, Anchor Link Bot, CBM2, Classicalecon, JP.Martin-Flatin, Mild Bill Hiccup,
Gsonnenf, Auntof6, Cool dude ragnar, Hans Adler, MilesAgain, Hugo Herbelin, JKeck, Marc van Leeuwen, Addbot, DOI bot, Mdnahas,
Unzerlegbarkeit, Tide rolls, Zorrobot, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Materialscientist, Citation bot, Taeshadow, ArthurBot,
RJGray, Godelian, GrouchoBot, Omnipaedista, VladimirReshetnikov, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Tkuvho, Swordsmankirby, RedBot,
Gopher p, EdEveridge, Raiden09, Ybungalobill, Shay Ben Moshe, Filonictios, Danielmrussell, Shhhnotsoloud, PBS-AWB, Chharvey,
Staszek Lem, CountMacula, ClueBot NG, Bbbbbbbbba, Helpful Pixie Bot, Shivsagardharam, BG19bot, Max Longint, Jimw338, Chris-
Gualtieri, Blippy1998, Jochen Burghardt, Brirush, Mark viking, Yashkes, Jose Brox, Hamoudafg, Mathmensch, Ynaamad, Leegrc, En-
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Consistency Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consistency?oldid=800295052 Contributors: Michael Hardy, Dominus, Kku, Tim
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Alexandrov, Ylem, Isnow, Jobnikon, Amorrow, NatusRoma, Jevon, Rbonvall, Intgr, Robbyslaughter, Tillmo, Gslin, SmackBot, Rada-
gast83, Jon Awbrey, Tilin, PhiJ, Lambiam, Wvbailey, Levineps, Iridescent, Zero sharp, DavidBaelde, JRSpriggs, CRGreathouse, CBM,
Myasuda, Gregbard, DumbBOT, Boemanneke, Thijs!bot, Dqd, JAnDbot, Magioladitis, Mathematrucker, MetsBot, Vinograd19, Natsirt-
guy, Regicollis, Kumioko (renamed), ClueBot, The Thing That Should Not Be, Qwfp, Bleeve, Feministo, Addbot, Maschelos, Tide rolls,
LuK3, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Vanished user rt41as76lk, Ningauble, AnomieBOT, Akhran, Galoubet, Omnipaedista, VladimirReshetnikov,
Noamz, Whassan, Antares5245, FrescoBot, RedBot, MastiBot, Gopher p, Morton Shumway, Mean as custard, EmausBot, John of Read-
ing, Shshahryari, Petersuber, Bomazi, Tijfo098, Wcherowi, JimsMaher, Masssly, Helpful Pixie Bot, Lowercase sigmabot, Justincheng12345-
bot, NC4PK, BurkeFT, Loraof, CV9933, Newkleuz, Baking Soda, Deacon Vorbis, Magic links bot, Technocreats and Anonymous: 46
Continuum hypothesis Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_hypothesis?oldid=800927422 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Archibald
Fitzchestereld, Bryan Derksen, Zundark, The Anome, Andre Engels, Hari, Miguel~enwiki, Roadrunner, Shii, Stevertigo, Spi~enwiki,
Michael Hardy, Nixdorf, MartinHarper, Gabbe, Wapcaplet, Dcljr, Karada, Eric119, Snoyes, Marco Krohn, Tim Retout, Schneelocke,
Ideyal, Charles Matthews, Timwi, Vanu, Reddi, Paul Stansifer, Doradus, .mau., Phil Boswell, Aleph4, Donarreiskoer, Fredrik, Bethenco,
Timrollpickering, Tea2min, Giftlite, Dbenbenn, Graeme Bartlett, var Arnfjr Bjarmason, Lethe, Fropu, Dratman, Eequor, Fuzzy
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Haham hanuka, Crust, Jumbuck, Keenan Pepper, Sligocki, Adrian.benko, Oleg Alexandrov, Joriki, StradivariusTV, Ruud Koot, Is-
now, Marudubshinki, Graham87, Jobnikon, Yurik, Porcher, Rjwilmsi, NatusRoma, Salix alba, R.e.b., Penumbra2000, FlaBot, John
Baez, Laubrau~enwiki, YurikBot, Hairy Dude, Open4D, Ksnortum, Gaius Cornelius, Abarry, Stassats, B-Con, CarlHewitt, SEWilcoBot,
Trovatore, Eltwarg, Doncram, Arthur Rubin, AssistantX, GrinBot~enwiki, SmackBot, Nihonjoe, InverseHypercube, SaxTeacher, Wlmg,
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ZermeloFraenkel set theory

1.1.1 Nomenclature ZF, AC, and ZFC

AC the Axiom of Choice.

Every set has a choice function.[4]

The negation of the axiom can thus be expressed as:

1.1.3 Restriction to nite sets

1.4 Criticism and acceptance

1.5 In constructive mathematics

1.7 Stronger axioms

1.8.1 Category theory

Every small category has a skeleton.

1.9 Weaker forms

1.9.1 Results requiring AC (or weaker forms) but weaker than it

Every eld has an algebraic closure.

1.10 Stronger forms of the negation of AC

1.11 Statements consistent with the negation of AC

In all models of ZFC there is a vector space with no basis.

For proofs, see Jech (2008).

[4] Suppes 1972, p. 240.

[5] Tourlakis (2003), pp. 209210, 215216.

[20] "[FOM] Are (C,+) and (R,+) isomorphic.

[22] Axiom of dependent choice

[23] Jech 2008, pp. 142144, Theorem 10.6 with proof.

1.15 External links

For other uses, see Consistency (disambiguation).

2.1 Consistency and completeness in arithmetic and set theory

2.2 First-order logic

2.2.3 Basic results

3. For all and :

(a) if not , then Con ( {}) ;

2.2.4 Henkins theorem

Let be a maximally consistent set of S -formulas containing witnesses.

1. for n -ary R S , RT t0 . . . tn1 if and only if Rt0 . . . tn1 ;

2. for n -ary f S , f T (t0 . . . tn1 ) := f t0 . . . tn1 ;

Let I := (T , ) be the term interpretation associated with , where (x) := x .

For all , I if and only if .

2.2.5 Sketch of proof

2.3 Model theory

2.4 See also

Hilberts second problem

Gentzens consistency proof

[2] see Paraconsistent logic

[3] Let L be a signature, T a theory in L and a sentence in L . We say that is a consequence of

[10] according to De Morgans laws

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, consistency

H.D. Ebbinghaus, J. Flum, W. Thomas, Mathematical Logic

2.7 External links

3.2 Cardinality of innite sets

3.3 Independence from ZFC

3.4 Arguments for and against the CH axiom

3.5 The generalized continuum hypothesis

+1 = 2 for every ordinal . (occasionally called Cantors aleph hypothesis)

If A and B are nite, the stronger inequality

3.5.1 Implications of GCH for cardinal exponentiation

3.6 See also

Dales, H. G.; Woodin, W. H. (1987). An Introduction to Independence for Analysts. Cambridge.

3.8 External links

Independence (mathematical logic)

4.1 Usage note

4.2 Independence results in set theory

The axiom of choice

The existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals

The Axiom of determinacy