DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30
blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries
to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for
damages due to the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was
guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power
plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence
and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as
he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the
explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average
boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap,
show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate
that the explosion might be dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand reparation therefor from another.

Balandan Case

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner
was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but
Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said
gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the
tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank,
only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in
the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally
is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine
thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.
Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole et al

Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault from Afialda or
any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his death. Afialdas sister, Margarita Afialda, sued
Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any
damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case,
the damage should arise fromforce majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.
HELD: No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker of the animal and he was
tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and
therefore he is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from
causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the caretakers business to
try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act
as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.
Calalas v. CA

Facts:

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck
owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga
filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva.
The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein
Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to
Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.

Issues:

(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other
hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case

(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage

(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck
liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil
Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In
case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from
the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed
that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to
give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption
of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and
(d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking
his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it
is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1)
in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the
Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case,
there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner
acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Roberto Reyes

452 SCRA 532 Civil Law Human Relations Abuse of Rights Volenti Non Fit Injuria
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was being
held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive
secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was
not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the
host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and
leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes
out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by another
party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered him in
a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he was calling for Dr.
Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that
Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask
Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more
than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the
party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so very
close to him so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear
whatever is it that shes going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know each
other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The
injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the party and
that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since
he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.
Volenti non fit iniuria (or injuria) (Latin: "to a willing person, injury is not done") is a common law doctrine which
states that if someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree
of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict.
PNR vs.Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985)

FACTS:

Winifredo Tupang, husband of respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of petitioner at Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines
Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam
Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the
alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado,
called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of
Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held
the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.

On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence
required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay
the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable as a common carrier.

HELD:

The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so
over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of
the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was
under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen
off the train at lyam Bridge.

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in
doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the
performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner
failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears that the deceased was
chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he
should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from
the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the
deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set
aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant
of exemplary damages should be discarded.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by eliminating therefrom the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No costs.

Rakes v Atlantic (Torts)

RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF
AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was
used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were
piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the
plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in
front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted
or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to
be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind
it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of
so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and
his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated
the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is
in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although
not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is,
the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not
necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with
the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of

the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating
the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not
adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
Digest No.2

7 Phil. 359 Civil Law Torts and Damages Kinds of Fault

 M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the
companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of
the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no
side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were
also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but
the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track,
and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing
it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only
before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the
rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the
tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee
who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross
nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred
from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the
Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not
formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-
contractual or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which
increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).

Jarco Marketing v. CA

Jarco Marketing, Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope, Elisa Panelo v. CA, Sps. Conrado and Criselda Aguilar
1999 / Davide, Jr. [Negligence > Standard of conduct > Children]

Facts
Jarco Marketing owns Syvels Department Store; Kong, Tiope, and Panelo are store managers; Sps. Aguilar are the
parents of daughter Zhieneth.

Criselda and Zhieneth Aguilar (6 years old) were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store. Criselda was signing her
credit card slip when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. When she looked behind her, she saw her
daughter pinned by the bulk of the stores gift wrapping counter. She asked the assistance of the people around her, and
she was immediately rushed to Makati Medical Center where she was operated. The next day, she lost her speech. She
died 14 days after the accident. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries sustained.

After her burial, Sps. Aguilar demanded the reimbursement of hospitalization, medical bills, and wake and funeral
expenses from the petitioners, but they refused to pay. Sps. Aguilar filed a complaint for damages, seeking the payment
of actual [157k~] and moral [300k] damages, attorneys fees [20k], and for loss of income and exemplary damages.

The petitioners denied any liability for Zhieneths injuries and death. They also said the complaint was malicious, so they
sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.

Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a
store with glassware and appliances
Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence for climbing the counter, thereby triggering its collapse
Counter was made of sturdy wood with strong support, and it has never fell nor collapsed for the past 15 years since its
construction
Jarco Marketing maintained that it observed due diligence of a good father of the family
Other petitioners raised due care and diligence in the performance of its duties
RTC found that the preponderance of evidence favored the store, et al, saying that the proximate cause was Zhieneths
act of clinging to the counter, and that Criseldas negligence contributed to the accident. The RTC found that the counter
 was not an attractive nuisance [something that would attract children to approach, get on or use it], since the counter was
situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor.

Here are the assertions of Sps. Aguilar:

Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below 9 is incapable of contributory negligence.
Even if she is capable of contributory negligence, it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the
counter considering her small frame, and height and weight of the counter.
The fact that a former employee of the store, Gonzales, accompanied Zhieneth to the hospital belied the theory that
Zhieneth climbed the counter.
This employee Gonzales said that when Zhieneth was asked by the doctor what she did, she said Nothing, I did not
come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. This should be accorded credit according to the spouses.
Negligence could not be imputed to Criselda since it was reasonable for her to let go of Zhieneth at that moment that
she was signing the credit card slip.
The proximate cause was petitioners negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently
nailed.
In response, here is what the petitioners have to say:

Zhieneths death was an ACCIDENT.

Nailing the counter to the ground was not necessary because it has been there for the longest time without any prior
accident and its just in a corner.
The criminal case for homicide through simple negligence filed against them was dismissed, and they were acquitted.
The CA reversed RTC, ruling in favor of Sps. Aguilar.

Petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter [its shaped like an inverted L; the top is
wider than the base; weight of the upper portion not evenly distributed nor supported by the narrow base]. Two former
employees brought this to the attention of the management but the latter ignored their concern. CA said the incident
could have been avoided had petitioners repaired this defective counter. The contention that it has been there for a
long time without a prior incident is immaterial.
Zhieneth was incapable of negligence or other tort.
Criselda was absolved of any negligence.
Testimony of Gonzales (former employee) given credit
Awarded actual damages, compensatory damages [denied award of funeral expenses for lack of proof to substantiate
it]
CA denied petitioners MfR, so they are now seeking the reversal of said decision, saying that since the action is based on
tort, any finding of negligence on the part of Sps. Aguilar would negate their claim for damages, where said negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. They also assailed the testimony of Gonzales who was already
separated from the store (tarnished by ill-feelings and all).

Issues and Holding

WON Zhieneths death was accidental or attributable to negligence. ATTRIBUTABLE TO NEGLIGENCE

WON negligence was attributable to petitioners [for maintaining a defective counter] or to Sps. Aguilar [for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store]. FAULT OF PETITIONERS

Ratio
Accident v. Negligence they are intrinsically contradictory

ACCIDENT pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to defendant (or if it happens wholly
or partly through human agency, it is an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens); there is exercise of ordinary care here

NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do

Alternatively, it is the failure to observe, for the protection of another persons interest, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury

Picart v. Smith lays down the test to determine WON negligence exists: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
he is guilty of negligence.
SC found that Zhieneth performed no act that facilitated her death. Basis is her statement to the doctor as related by
former employee Gonzales. It was made part of the res gestae since she made the statement immediately subsequent to
the startling occurrence. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. Also, the court considered the fact that Zhieneth was of
a tender age (and in so much pain!), so it would be unthinkable that she would lie.

Other findings:

Petitioners were informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter, yet they did not act on the matter, so they failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

They failed to establish that the testimonies of former employees were biased.

Conclusive presumption that children below 9 are incapable of contributory negligence is applied.

Judge Sangco [book author] says that children below 9 is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
are exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a QD, it required discernment as a condition of
liability, so therefore, said children are presumed to be incapable of negligence.

Even if contributory negligence would be attributed to Zhieneth, no injury should have occurred if petitioners theory that
the counter is stable and sturdy is to be believed.

Criselda is absolved from any contributory negligence, since it was reasonable for her to let go of her child to sign a slip.

Zhieneth was just a foot away from her mother, and the counter was just four meters away from Criselda (contrary to
statements that Zhieneth was loitering at that time).