EN BANC
When defendants arrived in
[G.R. No. L-15808. April 23, 1963.]
FAUSTA AGCANAS, JUAN MIGUEL, JUANITA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband ULPIANO
PASION, assisted by her husband JUAN PASCUAL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. BRUNO
MERCADO, and ANTONIO DASALLA, defendants-appellants.
Melanio T. Singson for plaintiffs-appellees.
Adriano D. Dasalla and Antonio F. Dasalla for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS WHILE MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS REMAINED PENDING; FILING OF ANSWER SUSPENDED. Upon the
denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss the reglementary period within which to file an
answer remains suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars previously filed by the
same defendant is denied or, if it is granted, until the bill is served on him.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
Appeal by defendants from the Court of First Instance of Isabela on a question of law.
On November 25, 1956 plaintiffs filed this action to recover portions of a parcel of land in
Isabela, and damages. Under date of December 4, 1956 defendants filed a motion for a
bill of particulars, with notice of hearing on December 8, but since the motion was actually
received in court only on December 12 the court set it for hearing on December 22. On
December 17, however, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, with a prayer
that consideration of their motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance pending
resolution of their motion to dismiss. On December 22, 1956, the date set by the court
for the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars and by defendants for the hearing of
their motion to dismiss, the court issued an order postponing "consideration" of both
motions to December 29. On March 7, 1957 the court denied the motion to dismiss and
ordered defendants "to answer the complaint within the reglementary period provided
for by the Rules of Court." Hearing of the case on the merits was set for October 29, 1957,
notice of which was duly received by defendants. Defendants not having filed their
answer, plaintiffs, on October 17, 1957, moved to have them declared in default. On the
same day the court issued the order of default, together with another order
commissioning the clerk of court to receive plaintiffs' evidence. On October 21, 1957
defendants moved to cancel the hearing scheduled for October 29, on two grounds, one
of which was that their motion for a bill of particulars had not yet been resolved. The
motion to cancel was set for hearing on October 26, 1957.
court on that day they learned that an order of default had been issued, so they
immediately filed a motion asking that the same be set aside, that their pending motion
for a bill of particulars be resolved and that they be given a reasonable period thereafter
within which to file their answer to the complaint. On December 13, 1957 the court
denied the motion and rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants.
On January 4, 1958 it denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.
On January 24, defendants filed their record on appeal (to this Court from the order of
December 13, 1957), but as they subsequently filed a petition for relief from the judgment
by default, they asked that consideration and approval of their record on appeal be held
in abeyance until said petition had been resolved. The request was granted. Defendant's
petition for relief, which was filed on January 28, 1958, was denied on March 21, as was
also, on September 20, 1958, their motion for reconsideration of the order of denial. On
October 4, 1958 the court denied likewise their motion for a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain execution of the judgment by default. Hence this appeal.
Appellant's eighteen assignments of error may be reduced to a single proposition:
Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the reglementary period
within which to file an answer resumes running even though the motion for a bill of
particulars of the same defendants is still pending and unresolved.
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the time to file a
responsive pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the period starts running again as
soon as the movant receives a copy of the order of denial. 1 In the case of a motion for a
bill of particulars, the suspended period shall continue to run upon service on the movant
of the bill of particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice of its denial, but in any
event he shall have not less than five days within which to file his responsive pleading. 2
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss, they requested that resolution of their
previous motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance. This was but practical,
because if the court had granted the motion to dismiss there would have been no need
for a bill of particulars. Resolution of the motion for the purpose was necessary only in
the event that court should deny, as it did, the motion to dismiss, in which case the period
to file an answer remained suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars is denied
or, it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving party.
The lower court deemed appellants to have "tacitly waived their right to push through
the hearing of the motion for bill of particulars," because of their failure to set it for
hearing or to ask the clerk of court to calendar it after denial of the motion to dismiss.
Appellants did set the motion for hearing on December 8, 1956, although it was not heard
on that day because it arrived in court only on December 12. Thereafter they did not have
to reset it, as the clerk of court scheduled it for hearing on December 22, 1956. And on
1
that day the court issued an order that "the consideration of the motion to dismiss, as
well as the bill of particulars, is hereby postponed to December 29, 1956." As to whether
or not both motions were actually heard on December 29 does not appear of record. But
heard or not, the motions should be considered submitted, and it was the clear duty of
the court to resolve the motion for a bill of particulars, as it did the motion to dismiss. No
action having been taken thereon until the present, the period to answer has not yet
expired. The lower court, therefore, erred in declaring appellants in default and in taking
all the subsequent actions it did in the case.

The order of default issued and the decision rendered by the trial court are set aside and
the case is remanded for further proceedings, pursuant to the Rules. Costs against
plaintiffs- appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon
and Regala, JJ., concur.

Labrador, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1. Sec. 4, Rules 8, Rules of Court.

2. Sec. 2, Rules 16, Rules of Court.

2
G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980
JOSE SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LORENZO J. LIWAG, Defendant-Appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated October 17, 1964,
which dismissed the, complaint filed in Civil Case No. 57282, for failure of the plaintiff to
submit a bill of particulars within 10 days from notice
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The record shows that on June 8, 1964 the appellant -Jose Santos filed a complaint against
Lorenzo J. Liwag with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 57282, seeking the annulment of certain documents, attached to the complaint and
marked as Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been executed by means of
misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means,
as well as for damages and costs. 1chanrobles virtual law library
Claiming that the allegations in the complaint are indefinite and uncertain, as well as
conflicting, the defendant filed a motion tion on July 4, 1964, asking the trial court that
the plaintiff be ordered to submit a more definite statement or bill of particulars on
certain allegations of the complaint, as well as the facts constituting the
misrepresentations, machinations, and frauds employed by the defendant in the
execution of the documents in question in order that he could be well informed of the
charges filed against him, for him to prepare an intelligent and proper pleading necessary
and appropriate in the premises. 2chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiff opposed the motion saying that the allegations in his complaint are sufficient
and contain ultimate facts con- constituting his causes of action and that the subject of
the defendant's motion is evidentiary in nature. 3chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court, however, granted the motion and directed the plaintiff "to submit a bill of
particulars with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's motion", 4 and when
the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the court, acting upon previous motion of
the defendant, 5 dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. 6 Hence, the
present appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We find no merit in the appeal. The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement
or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be
reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.
In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from
vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive
pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition
tion in the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The present action is one for the annulment of documents which have been allegedly
executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats,
and other fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation,
and threats, however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without
a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are not sufficient The
allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit,
machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a
conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought
to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on
which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it
was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and
when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the
complaint. 7chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos and De Castro, * JJ, concur.
Endnotes:
1 Record on Appeal, pp. 2-17.chanrobles virtual law library
2 Id, pp. 20-24.chanrobles virtual law library
3 Id., pp. 25-31.chanrobles virtual law library
4 Id., p. 33.chanrobles virtual law library
5 Id, pp. 33-34.chanrobles virtual law library
6 Id., pp. 39-40.chanrobles virtual law library
7 Sec. 1(c), Rule 12 and and Sec. 3, Rule 17, Revised Rules of Court; Matias de Bautista vs.
Teodoro, Jr., 101 Phil. 701.