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TAGOLINO V HRET AND LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ (MARCH 19, 2013)

FACTS:
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering
this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondents own qualification
to office. Opposing candidate Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office.
In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richards CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. 5 On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez
(private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as
the partys official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post.

HELD:
NO PROPER SUBSTITUTION.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates bid for public office. Among these
which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due
course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidates possession of a permanent
resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts
under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. 25 In particular, these are: (1) giving
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance ones candidacy; (3) spending in ones election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed
by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5)
violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the
same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. 35

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or
her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidates compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such
as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal
sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC 36 is
premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not
enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. XXX
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents
and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution


Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified.

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates
of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus,
whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only
an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. 43

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with
the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position
of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.
Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondents own
qualification to office.

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JAPZON V COMELEC (JAN 19, 2009)

Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to
run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:


SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

XXX

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the
same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not
retroact to the time of his birth.

XXX

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the
Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.

MERCADO V MANZANO (MAY 26, 1999)


WON private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor
of Makati City

HELD:
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in
a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both statesS. XXX
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law." XXX
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

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MAQUILING V COMELEC (APRIL 16, 2013)
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen
of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To
further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The
said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

HELD:
- The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
- An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could
not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his
favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public
office. XXX

The popular vote does not cure theineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons
desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon
and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective
positions in our republic.

- Maquiling is not a second-placer ashe obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the
rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to
the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer
among the qualified candidates.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.

VIDAL V COMELEC (JAN 21, 2015; LEONARDO-DE CASTRO)


FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
XXX Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:

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MALACAAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.

Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)


By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5

On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted" 6 the pardon by affixing his signature
beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy7 for the position of President.

ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo

HELD:
NO. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of
the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." 40 Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 41 In this case,
the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of
the pardon.

GRACE POE
GPL born on September 3, 1968 in Iloilo. Foundling. Adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces. Married American husband, moved to US and
got naturalized as American. After FPJs death, returned to Philippines. Became dual citizen by filing her application (July 7, 2006) and
reacquiring Filipino citizenship through RA 9225. Became MTRCB Chair. Run for Senate. Running for President.

ISSUES:
1. Given foundling, WON Filipino
a. WON natural born citizen
2. WON complied with residency requirement

VIEWS:
(From CJ Panganiban, INQ)
Question 1: Why is natural-born citizenship important? Answer: Because only natural-born citizens are qualified to be president, vice
president, senator, congressman or Supreme Court justice.
Consequently, if a final decision decrees that Senator Poe is NOT a natural-born citizen, she would be removed from her office
as senator, barred from running for the presidency and, if elected, prohibited from serving her mandate.

Question 2: What tribunals are authorized to pass judgment on her citizenship? Answer: The Senate Electoral Tribunal has
jurisdiction over cases questioning her qualifications as a senator. Also, the Commission on Elections is authorized to hear and
decide petitions challenging her qualifications for the presidency but only after she has filed her certificate of candidacy for the post. The

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decisions of these tribunals may be elevated to the Supreme Court later.

Question 3: Which Constitution governs her citizenship? Answer: The 1935 Constitution because this was our basic law in 1968
when she was born. Under this Constitution, The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
In addition, the 1935 Constitution (as well as the current one) states that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation. Thus, by this doctrine of incorporation, customary
international laws are given the same force and effect as statutes passed by Congress.

Question 4. What are the international laws that govern the citizenship of foundlings?
Answer: Mainly, (a) the 1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, (b) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and (c) the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In international law, nationality is synonymous with
citizenship.

Question 5: Specifically, what provision of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is relevant to Senator Poe?
Answer: Article 2 which states: A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
be considered to have been born in the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

Question 6: The Philippines is not a signatory to this 1961 Convention. Why are we bound by its provisions? Answer: Because they
have become generally accepted principles of international law which, as earlier stated, are as binding as statutes passed by
Congress.

Question 7: Who are natural-born citizens? Answer: Under the 1987 Constitution, they are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

Question 8: Why is Grace Poe a natural-born citizen? Answer: Because under Article 2 of the 1961 Convention quoted above, shea
foundling who was found in Iloilo, Philippinesis deemed to have Filipino parents. Perforce, she is natural-born since her presumed
parents, specifically her father, are accorded Philippine citizenship.

Question 9: Is she not a naturalized Filipino falling under item 5 in the answer to Question 3 that she was naturalized in accordance
with (international) law? Answer: No, it was her parents who acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to international law. But
she derived her citizenship from her presumed Filipino father; thus, she is a citizen from birth without having to do anything
to acquire or perfect her Philippine citizenship.

Question 10. May her biological father be proven to be actually an alien? Answer: Yes, but the burden of proof belongs to those
who challenge her natural-born status. Unless such proof is presented, her parents continue to be presumed Filipinos. Thus, she
retains her natural-born citizenship.

Question 11: Grace Poe became a US citizen after she got married and moved to the United States, how did she reacquire her
natural-born citizenship? Answer: By taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines pursuant to the Dual Citizenship Law (Republic Act
No. 9225) and by renouncing her American citizenship pursuant to American law.

Question 12. Aside from invoking the interaction between our Constitution and customary international law, may Senator Poe prove
her natural-born citizenship by other methods? Answer: Yes, by undergoing a DNA test showing that her biological father is a Filipino.
Our Supreme Court has issued many decisions affirming the binding force of DNA tests.

Question 13. How are DNA tests conducted and can such tests conclusively prove who her biological father and mother are? Answer:
Yes, if done according to the protocols laid down by the Supreme Court. More on this in a future column.

(Atty. Jack)
International standard is that the foundling is a citizen of the state where found; and residence in election law is domicile, i.e. animus
manendi, animus non revertendi

NOTE Japzon v Ty on residency (The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.), BERNAS, 194 citing J v T: Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile? No. To reacquire domicile he must provide proof of intent
to stay in the Philippines) (me: so you start counting again)

ALSO views on application of MARCOS V COMELEC [Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose. Animus manendi + non
revertendi. ] (1) Not applicable to GPL, because Marcos never lost her domicile in the Philippines, Agabin + Valdez; (2) GPLs
intention to return to Philippines outweighs actual residency. Constitution demands legal domicile not actual period of
residence, La Vina + Brillantes other issues are factual.

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LIANG V PEOPLE
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution,
the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution
evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity
clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the
Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is
therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even
the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

JURISDICTION OF ICJ
The International Court of Justice acts as a world court. The Court has a dual jurisdiction: it decides, in accordance with international
law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to it by States (jurisdiction in contentious cases); and it gives advisory opinions on
legal questions at the request of the organs of the United Nations or specialized agencies authorized to make such a request (advisory
jurisdiction).

Contentious cases
ONLY States (States Members of the United Nations and other States which have become PARTIES to the Statute of the
Court or which have ACCEPTED its jurisdiction under certain conditions) may be parties to contentious cases.
The Court is competent to entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction in one or more of the
following ways:
- by entering into a special agreement to submit the dispute to the Court;
- by virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event
of a dispute of a given type or disagreement over the interpretation or application of the treaty, one of them may refer the
dispute to the Court;
- through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the Statute whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another State having made a similar declaration. A number of these
declarations, which must be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, contain reservations excluding certain
categories of dispute.

Advisory proceedings
The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council may request advisory opinions on any legal question. Other United
Nations organs and specialized agencies which have been authorized to seek advisory opinions can only do so with respect to legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.

JURISDICTION OF ICC
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined in the Rome Statute.
The Court has jurisdiction over individuals accused of these crimes. This includes those directly responsible for committing
the crimes as well as others who may be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission
of a crime. The latter group also includes military commanders or other superiors whose responsibility is defined in the Statute.
The Court does NOT have universal jurisdiction. The Court may only exercise jurisdiction if:
The accused is a national of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting the jurisdiction of the Court;
The crime took place on the territory of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting the jurisdiction of the Court; or
The United Nations Security Council has referred the situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the
accused or the location of the crime.

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The Courts jurisdiction is further limited to events taking place since 1 July 2002. In addition, if a State joins the Court
after 1 July 2002, the Court only has jurisdiction after the Statute entered into force for that State. Such a State may nonetheless
accept the jurisdiction of the Court for the period before the Statutes entry into force. However, in no case can the Court exercise
jurisdiction over events before 1 July 2002.
Even where the Court has jurisdiction, it will not necessarily act. The principle of complementarity provides that certain cases
will be inadmissible even though the Court has jurisdiction. In general, a case will be inadmissible if it has been or is being investigated
or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction. However, a case may be admissible if the investigating or prosecuting State is unwilling or
unable to genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. For example, a case would be admissible if national proceedings were
undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility. In addition, a case will be inadmissible if it is not of
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.

PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY

The complementarity principle on which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based entails that the ICC can only investigate and
prosecute core international crimes when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so genuinely.

BBL ART X BANGSAMORO JUSTICE SYSTEM

Section 1. Justice System in the Bangsamoro. -- The justice system in the Bangsamoro shall consist of Shari'ah law which shall have
supremacy and application over Muslims only; the traditional or tribal justice system, for the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro;
the local courts; and alternative dispute resolution systems.

For Muslims, the justice system in the Bangsamoro shall give primary consideration to 10 Shari'ah, and customary rights and traditions
of the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro.

Nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of non-Muslims and non- indigenous peoples.

Section 15. Special Bar Examinations for Shari'ah. - The Supreme Court shall continue to administer Shari'ah Bar examinations for
admission of applicants to the Philippine Bar as special members thereof, with due consideration for the special nature of the Shari'ah
system and utmost regard to the proposals of the Bangsamoro Shari'ah High Court on this matter.

Section 18. Shari'ah Public Assistance Office. To provide free legal assistance to indigent party litigants, the Bangsamoro Parliament
shall create a Shari'ah Public Assistance Office for the different Shari'ah courts in the Bangsamoro.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP (OCT 14, 2008)

The "associative" relationship


between the Central Government
and the BJE

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
XXX
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and
banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details
of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
XXX
HELD:
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those
of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful
to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept
of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it
in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in
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a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its
inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be
brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of
the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association.
The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents,
which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their
admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign
affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking,
postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the
governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either
government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation
to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military
areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access
to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association
between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution,
and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the
U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an
underlying status of independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies
on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase
are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official
missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution


No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment
of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful


entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating

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it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary
to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers
of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
"autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte
which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in
the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001,
however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was
their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

UNCLOS
The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world's oceans,
establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources.

Article47
Archipelagic baselines
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio
of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are
permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance
not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.
5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas
or the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea of another State.
6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring
State, existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised in such waters and all
rights stipulated by agreement between those States shall continue and be respected.
7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under paragraph l, land areas may include waters lying within the
fringing reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by
a chain of limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau.
8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining
their position. Alternatively, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted.
9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of
each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article48
Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be
measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Article49
Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with
article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. xxx

Art 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
a. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the
water, currents and winds;
b. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to
i. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
ii. marine scientific research;

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iii. the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c. other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this
Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI.

Article57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured.

Article60
Artificial islands, installations and structures
in the exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use of:
a) artificial islands;
b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes;
c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction
with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. xxx

ANNEX VII. ARBITRATION (Arbitral Tribunal of the PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, The Hague)
Article 1
Institution of proceedings

Subject to the provisions of Part XV, any party to a dispute may submit the dispute to the arbitral procedure provided for in this Annex
by written notification addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute. The notification shall be accompanied by a statement of the
claim and the grounds on which it is based.

Article 2
List of arbitrators

l. A list of arbitrators shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Every State Party shall be
entitled to nominate four arbitrators, each of whom shall be a person experienced in maritime affairs and enjoying the highest
reputation for fairness, competence and integrity. The names of the persons so nominated shall constitute the list.
2. If at any time the arbitrators nominated by a State Party in the list so constituted shall be fewer than four, that State Party shall be
entitled to make further nominations as necessary.
3. The name of an arbitrator shall remain on the list until withdrawn by the State Party which made the nomination, provided that such
arbitrator shall continue to serve on any arbitral tribunal to which that arbitrator has been appointed until the completion of the
proceedings before that arbitral tribunal.

Article 3
Constitution of arbitral tribunal

For the purpose of proceedings under this Annex, the arbitral tribunal shall, unless the parties otherwise agree, be constituted as
follows:
a. Subject to subparagraph (g), the arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members.
b. The party instituting the proceedings shall appoint one member to be chosen preferably from the list referred to in article 2 of this
Annex, who may be its national. The appointment shall be included in the notification referred to in article l of this Annex.
c. The other party to the dispute shall, within 30 days of receipt of the notification referred to in article l of this Annex, appoint one
member to be chosen preferably from the list, who may be its national. If the appointment is not made within that period, the
party instituting the proceedings may, within two weeks of the expiration of that period, request that the appointment be made in
accordance with subparagraph (e).
d. The other three members shall be appointed by agreement between the parties. They shall be chosen preferably from the list
and shall be nationals of third States unless the parties otherwise agree. The parties to the dispute shall appoint the President of
the arbitral tribunal from among those three members. If, within 60 days of receipt of the notification referred to in article l of this
Annex, the parties are unable to reach agreement on the appointment of one or more of the members of the tribunal to be
appointed by agreement, or on the appointment of the President, the remaining appointment or appointments shall be made in
accordance with subparagraph (e), at the request of a party to the dispute. Such request shall be made within two weeks of the
expiration of the aforementioned 60-day period.
e. Unless the parties agree that any appointment under subparagraphs (c) and (d) be made by a person or a third State chosen by
the parties, the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea shall make the necessary appointments. If the
President is unable to act under this subparagraph or is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the appointment shall be
made by the next senior member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea who is available and is not a national of one

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of the parties. The appointments referred to in this subparagraph shall be made from the list referred to in article 2 of this Annex
within a period of 30 days of the receipt of the request and in consultation with the parties. The members so appointed shall be
of different nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinarily resident in the territory of, or nationals of, any of the parties
to the dispute.
f. Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.
g. Parties in the same interest shall appoint one member of the tribunal jointly by agreement. Where there are several parties
having separate interests or where there is disagreement as to whether they are of the same interest, each of them shall appoint
one member of the tribunal. The number of members of the tribunal appointed separately by the parties shall always be smaller
by one than the number of members of the tribunal to be appointed jointly by the parties.
h. In disputes involving more than two parties, the provisions of subparagraphs (a) to (f) shall apply to the maximum extent
possible.

Article 4
Functions of arbitral tribunal

An arbitral tribunal constituted under article 3 of this Annex shall function in accordance with this Annex and the other provisions of this
Convention.

Article 5
Procedure

Article 6
Duties of parties to a dispute

The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, in accordance with their law and using all
means at their disposal, shall:
(a) provide it with all relevant documents, facilities and information; and
(b) enable it when necessary to call witnesses or experts and receive their evidence and to visit the localities to which the case relates.

Article 7
Expenses

Article 8
Required majority for decisions

Decisions of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of its members. The absence or abstention of less than half of the
members shall not constitute a bar to the tribunal reaching a decision. In the event of an equality of votes, the President shall have a
casting vote.

Article 9
Default of appearance

If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request
the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over
the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.

Article 10
Award

The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject-matter of the dispute and state the reasons on which it is based. It
shall contain the names of the members who have participated and the date of the award. Any member of the tribunal may attach a
separate or dissenting opinion to the award.

Article 11
Finality of award

The award shall be final and without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure. It
shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute.

Article 12
Interpretation or implementation of award

1. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the
award may be submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which made the award. For this purpose, any vacancy in the
tribunal shall be filled in the manner provided for in the original appointments of the members of the tribunal.
2. Any such controversy may be submitted to another court or tribunal under article 287 by agreement of all the parties to the dispute.

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Article 13
Application to entities other than States Parties

The provisions of this Annex shall apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute involving entities other than States Parties.

ITLOS JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with the Convention. It
also includes all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal (Statute, article 21).
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with disputes (contentious jurisdiction) and legal questions (advisory jurisdiction) submitted to
it.

RES COMMUNES
A thing common to all; something enjoyed by everyone NOT subject to exclusive acquisition

MODES OF ACQUIRING TERRITORY


1. Prescription acquisition of territory subject to the supreme power of another sovereign through continuous and undisturbed
exercise of that supreme power during such period as is necessary to create conviction that the present condition of things is in
accord with international order
2. Accretion increase in existing land masses by new geological changes
3. Cession when acquiring sovereign derives its title to anew territory by the ceding sovereigns transferring to it the supreme power
over that territory; effected only by treaty
4. Occupation (Discovery and Effective Occupation) act of appropriation of a territory NOT unde the supreme power of another
sovereign, i.e. terra nullius or unoccupied land; Possession (Presence of Settlement + Formal Act), Sufficient Administration
5. Subjugation a sovereign firmly establishes a conquest and follows this by formal annexation (to be effective, must end with peace
treaty or cessation of hostilities)
Note: MAGALLONA V ERMITA (JULY 16, 2011)
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans
and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS
III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 NOT by executing multilateral treaties
on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26

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TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

IF SCARBOROUGH SHOAL IS AN ISLAND with OWN 200 nm EEZ


IF SS IS A ROCK 12NM

CLAIMS:
China its an island that grants EEZ to country that can claim
sovereignty [naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which
is above water at high tide, Art 121(1) UNCLOS]
Philippines its a rock [test: CANNOT sustain human habitation or
economic life, Art 121 (3) UNCLOS]
INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINITIONS

Rebus sic stantibus FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty, and which was NOT FORESEEN by the parties NOT valid ground for terminating/withdrawing from treaty unless 1) existence of those
circumstances constituted ESSENTIAL basis of consent of parties to be bound to treaty; 2) effect of change is RADICALLY TO TRANSFORM the extent
of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty

Opinio Juris Sive Necessitates compelling law; States observe a practice or norm out of A SENSE OF LEGAL OBLIGATION or belief of its juridical
necessity,

Ex aequo et bono on what is fair and good; application of equity in international law

Obligation erga omnes in relation to everyone; obligations owed by States towards the international community (ex. Prohibition of genocide, piracy,
slavery, etc)

Jus Cogens - norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole from which no derogation is permitted and can be
modified only by subsequent norms of general international law having the same character (e.g. prohibition of use of force, prohibition against genocide,
right of self-determination, sovereign equality of States and freedom of the high seas)

Pacta sunt servanda agreements must be kept

Principle of auto-limitation any State may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights

Perfidy acts of inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
International Law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray confidence (ex. Feigning to intent to negotiate under flag of surrender VERSUS
Ruses of War acts intended to mislead an adversary to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe NO rule of international law applicable in armed
conflict and which are NOT PERFIDIOUS (read: deceitful) because they do not invite adversarys confidence with respect to protection under that law
(ex. Camouflage, decoys)

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Command Responsibility renders a military or person effectively acting as military commander CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE for crimes committed
by forces under his effective command and control, oras a a result of his failure to exercise control properly over such forces

TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES

Archipelagic doctrine INTEGRATION OF A GROUP OF ISLANDS TO THE SEA and their oneness so that together they can constitute ONE UNIT,
one country and one state
Baseline low water mark along the coast from which the belt of the territorial sea is measured
Normal Baseline territorial sea is drawn from the LOW-WATER MARK OF THE COAST, to the breadth claimed, FOLLOWING ITS SINUOSITIES AND
CURVATURES but excluding the internal waters in bays and gulfs
Straight Baseline STRAIGHT baselines are made to CONNECT OUTERMOST POINTS on the coast WITHOUT departing to any APPRECIABLE
EXTENT from the general direction of the coast

Internal waters waters landward of the baseline; NO right of innocent passage


Archipelagic waters w/ right of innocent passage

Territorial Sea/Waters 12NM from BL exercise of sovereign right; with right of innocent passage
Contiguous Zone 12+12 (24NM from BL) PREVENT infringement of Customs, Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitary Laws + PUNISH infringement of CFIS
laws
EEZ 200 NM from BL special rights over exploration and utilization of marine resources; subject to freedom of NAVigation and OverFlight, lay
SUBmarine cables and PIPES, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea of OTHER states; coastal state has right to explore, exploit, conserve,
manage all living & non-living natural resources, production of energy, establishment of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific
research; protection and preservation marine environment

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Continental Shelf 200NM (Extended Continental Shelf not >350NM) coastal state has exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources of
continental shelf
High Seas all parts of the sea that are NOT included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of any state; NAV, OF, SUB/PIPES, ART ISL, F, RES

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