(Published in Association With Theory, Culture & Society) Goran Dahl-Radical Conservatism and The Future of Politics-SAGE Publications LTD (1999)

Radical
Conservatism
and
the
Future
of
Politics
RADICAL CONSERVATISM AND
THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
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RADICAL CONSERVATISM AND
G6ran Dahl
SAGE Publications
London Thousand Oaks New Delhi
Giiran Dahl 1999
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction
PART I 'RADICAL CONSERVATISM' 13

Conservatism and politics 15
Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and the logics of
conservatism 16
The dynamics and dilemmas o f conservatism 40
2 Conservatism and radical conservatism 51
Intellectual roots: Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky 54
Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Junger:
decisionism 56
PART II THE WORLD ACCORDING TO RADICAL

CONSERVATISM 61
3 Reflexivity and spontaneity 63
Reflexivity and anti-reflexivity 63
Nietzsche and reflexivity 65
The nouvelle droite in France 67
The new culturalism 69
Technocratic conservatism 71
Proto-fascism and the conservative revolution 73
Schmittian radical conservatism 73
Sacrifice 76
Pathological hyper-modernism and hyper-reflexivity 78
Life-world or system? 79
Reflexivity 79
4 Politics and theology 81
5 The critique o f 'one-world civilization' and the nation 87
Ethnos- and Demos-freaks - some illustrations 92
On 'centrism' 93
Ethnocentrism or Demokratur? 93
vi RADICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
6 Fonns of radical conservatism - an attempt at an international

perspective 95
Gennany 98
Austria 104
Fmn 1
Russia 107
USA 1 12
Canada 117
Libya 1 18
China 1 19
7 New political constellations? 125
Retrogardism, Zivilisationskritik and radical conservatism 1 25
Nationalism and socialism 1 37
PART III CONCLUSIONS 141

8 Radical conservatism, the sociology of knowledge and the
future of politics 143
References 151
Index 161
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Most of this book was written during a six-month stay in the USA in 1997.
Being in Lawrence, Kansas, provided me with an excellent infrastructure.
The friendly people, the excellent University Library and the enthusiastic
people at the Sociology Department made the hard work feel like doing
something interesting and important. My gratitude goes to The University
of Kansas, The Fulbright Commission and The Bank of Sweden
Tercentary Foundation whom, together, made this stay possible.
Many people have read the manuscript or part of it. Among those, I
wish to say thank you especially to Robert Antonio and Mohamed El
Hodiri in Lawrence, Carl-G6ran Heidegren and Jonathan Friedman in
Lund, Frederik Stjernfelt in Copenhagen and Conny Mithander in
Karlstad. The book would have been less informative if 'radical con
servatives' like Henning Eichberg, Armin Mohler and Gunther Maschke
had been unwilling to talk to me. These three gentlemen especially showed
me respect, generosity and warmth during long talks.
Chris and Robert Rojek at Sage have been positive and enthusiastic
since the beginning of the project, and the book would not have been
written at all if Mike Featherstone, the editor of Theory, Culture & Society,
had not suggested that I do so. Thank you Mike!
Small parts of the book have been published earlier. Chapter 3 is
published in a slightly different version in Spaces of Cultures, edited by
Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1 998); pieces of my
article 'Will "the Other God" Fail Again? On the Possible Return of the
Conservative Revolution', Theory, Culture & Society ( 1 996, vol. 13: 25-50)
appear here and there in the text. I acknowledge Sage Publications for
permission to use this material in this volume.
Last but not least my deepest gratitude to Pia, my wife, and our lovely
kids Hanna and Joel who had the patience to leave me alone during long
and lonely late evenings with my thoughts, computer and gallons of coffee.
G6ran Dahl
Lund University
INTRODUCTION
In most countries in the world today, political ideologies seem on the

defensive, weak and irrelevant. Since 1 989 socialism has disappeared from
the political agenda. Of course, there are still socialist, even communist
parties, but either they have dropped the hard-core socialist agenda, or
their chances for realizing a socialist politics are very small. Even the
weaker form of socialism, that is, the social democratic project of the
welfare state, is on the defence. As a combination of economic-fiscal and
ideological causes, the question is no longer how to develop the welfare
state, but rather how much of it can be kept, and how much redistribution
of incomes there can, and should, be. What about the fate of the other two
old classical ideologies - liberalism and conservatism?
Liberalism was declared as the winner of history by Francis Fukuyama
( 1992). However, he did not foresee the counter-movements to come.
Capitalism and liberal democracy did not immediately create a paradise or
a final solution in the former communist countries. Instead, the immediate
result was a Mafioso economy, hidden forms of new totalitarianism (for
example, in Romania and Albania), large-scale unemployment, social
insecurity, growing ethnic tensions, etc. Thus, liberalism had, and has, a
hard time to establish itself as a political option in these countries. Also,
there is no evident social base for this ideology.
With conservatism, things are very different. First of all we have to be
clear on what we are talking about. I will discuss this later in detail, but one
obvious difficulty is whether we understand conservatism as an attitude - a
defensive strategy to keep the present status quo - or in the classical sense as
a 'right' -wing ideology that defends classical authorities. 1 If we look at the
latter, that is conservatism as a classical political ideology, it does not look
as if it was attracting people today. In a hypermodern society, or in
developing countries, classical conservatism is almost passe. 2 My main
thesis in this book is that this does not mean that politics is dead; on the
contrary, we see new political constellations and trends which do not easily
I In this book I sometimes use 'left' and 'right' although it is necessary to problematize this
distinction. At least 'left' and 'right' serve as provisional guidelines in the West. I use them in
the common-sense meaning, that is, 'left' is associated with justice, internationalism, equality,
etc., 'right' with nationalism, traditional values, individual freedom, etc. An interesting
discussion can be found in Bobbio (1997) and in Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1992).
2 Here I definitely agree with Panjatos Kondylis ( 1 986) who, in the concluding remarks of
his long treatise on conservatism, declares it dead.
2 RADICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
Table I Differences between liberalism, radical conservatism and

conservatism
CONSERVATISM LIBERALISM DIMENSIONS
CLASSICAL RADICAL
Organic growing Voluntarism Construct Development of

Radicalism society
Concrete humans New humans New humans Programme for
humankind
Family; Nation Volk Individuals Acting subject
History Myth, feeling Reason Legitimation
'Divine rights' Cultural relativism Universalism Rights
Elitism 'Organic' Parliamentary Democracy
'Moral economy' Planned economy Market; Welfare Economic system
The Nation Anti-US nationalism West Geopolitical
nationalism Internationalism orientation
'Roots' Room Time Fundamental
category of
orientation
Modernism Modernity
Traditionalism
Culture Politics Economy Societal 'base'
Linear Cyclic Linear Conception of time
Please note that this is only a heuristic, preliminary scheme; note also the critical issue of
modernity in both classical and radical conservatism.
fit in with the old classical political ideologies. The related thesis is that
'radical conservatism' is both a new political trend, and also that it marks a
new situation where different elements are situated in new constellations.
At this moment it is necessary to give 'radical conservatism' a pre
liminary definition, even if the whole book will deepen and also expand this
definition a little. First, for the sake of preliminary clarification, we3 have
constructed a simple table which gives an idea of the main differences
between liberalism, radical conservatism and conservatism (see Table 1).
'Radical conservatism' is basically about conservatism being radicalized,
and not the other way around. There can be basically two forms of
conservatism: structural conservatism which simply wants to save the
status quo, disregarding the contents of this status; it can also mean value
conservatism, which defends values like the importance of stability, tradi
tion, religion, authority and nation. It is this latter kind of conservatism
which is the starting point for radical conservatism. However, the present
situation might threaten these values, and two options are then at hand:
either apocalyptic cultural pessimism or a voluntarist radicalization. It
becomes necessary to use radical means to serve the value-conservative
ends. Radical conservatives see liberalism as their main enemy. First of all,
it is seen as a political expression of capitalism. Radical conservatives are
3 Carl-Goran Heidegren and Conny Mithander were the two others present when we
constructed this figure.
I NTROD UCTION 3
anti-capitalist socialists. For them 'socialism' can have basically two

meanings: either a planned economy, or simply a national community (as
the opposite of trans-national capitalism).
The traditional right and radical conservatism also differ clearly on the
question of politics. The contemporary mainstream right often wants to
minimize the role of politics, thus it can go hand in hand with neo
liberalism. Radical conservatism, however, sees the political sphere as the
most important one - since economism is criticized, politics should be used
to smash the hegemony of the economic sphere; also in politics, the true
nature of humanity can be granted.
A second reason for its anti-liberalism is its anti-universalism. Just like
mainstream conservatism, it wants to be historical and concrete. Universal
notions like 'human rights', 'liberty', etc. are, according to radical conser
vatism, only a disguised expression of a specific, that is, 'Western' civiliza
tion. 'Anti-West' is a common radical conservative metaphor, but this does
not mean that radical conservatism is absent in the West, not even in the
most Western country - the USA. In the USA the place where the West or
the USA is positioned in, for example, German, French or Russian radical
conservatism is taken up by the Federal Government or the United
Nations. Thus, radical conservatism is in a way a paradox. Radical con
servatives from different countries may want a similar form of society, but
since this society is understood as a Nation, they are potential deadly
enemies. Another common characteristic of radical conservatism is its
dislike of parliamentary democracy. Instead, radical conservatism wants an
'organic democracy' beyond class conflicts.
While radical conservatism is best understood as a radicalization of
classical conservatism, there is also an important relation and connection
to fascism. 4 The best account, so far, on the nature of fascism is probably
Roger Griffin (1991). Here, he tries to find the 'fascist minimum', that is,
the most general common denominator of different kinds of fascism. This
minimum is the 'palingenetic ultranationalism' ('palingenesis' means
'rebirth'), that is, the belief in the necessity of a national rebirth, a totally
new order based on the Nation - the 'New Germany', the 'New Italy', etc.
The best proof that this is the central idea can be found in another work by
Griffin (1995), a collection of excerpts from texts and speeches by fascists
from all over the world, where the national rebirth appears almost
everywhere. Since this is also a central theme in radical conservatism, we
have to discuss the differences between fascism and radical conservatism.
First, fascism is anti-conservative, it wants a totally new order which
breaks every connection with the past, even if it often uses traditional
symbols and rituals in order to attract ordinary conservatives. Radical
conservatism is too conservative for agreeing to this. Secondly, religion is
often regarded as a means for reaching an end in fascism; perhaps the best
example is the 'sacralization of politics' in Fascist Italy (Gentile, 1996). For
4 I use 'fascism' as the general concept, and 'Fascism' as its Italian specific form.
4 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E F U T U R E OF POLITI CS
both the conservative and the radical conservative religion is the very heart
of life. On the other hand, there are several overlappings between fascism
and radical conservatism. One is the issue of socialism. Apart from the
national bolsheviks, a heterogeneous movement in Weimar Germany, and
also a tendency in contemporary Russia, one means a planned economy
with the state owning the majority of the corporations. 'Socialism' most
often means a national community without class conflicts where the whole
people benefit from material and spiritual progress. This faith in progress is
connected to the faith in modernization, the development of technology
and science. However, there are exceptions: in fascism we have national
socialists who prefer a return to rural life, and among the radical con
servatives the relation to technology is problematized, especially by Martin
Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.
This complex relationship between conservatism, radical conservatism
and fascism can be illustrated as circles partly overlapping each other (see
Figure 1). If this is an attempt to illustrate the structure of thinking, there
are also movements and constellations which do not constitute a structure.
Some writers can in the same text move between positions in all three
circles; some can move between them at different points of time; some texts
are strategic - for example, when radical conservatives or fascists want
conservatives to listen to them.
This is easier to apply in an historical context than in a contemporary
one. If we look at the past, we can, according to Figure I , quite easily place
people within the circles. We can also see how people have moved from
radical conservatism to conservatism for example. 5 But today, not to
mention tomorrow, our knowledge is more limited. My attempt at finding
a solution is to distinguish between three forms of radical conservatism in a
contemporary perspective:
The aesthetes.
2 Neo-conservative revolutionaries.
3 National socialists.
Group I consists of writers, artists, etc. with little knowledge of politics.

They become fascinated with both radicalism (the need for something new)
and conservatism (the need to go back). They can be closer to conservatism
than to fascism - the German author Botho StrauB, whom I will discuss
later in this book, is one example. Some can be closer to fascism - one
example is Ernst Jiinger, who will appear many times later. Or they can
embrace conservatism, radical conservatism and fascism either at the same
time or at different moments. Perhaps the best example here is the
Romanian-French writer E.M. Cioran, who first was fascinated by Hitler
5 Muller (1 987) describes the post-war political development of Hans Freyer and Arnold
Gehlen as a 'de-radicalization'.
I NTRODUCTION 5
Equality
SOCIALISM
National bolshevism
FASCISM
RADICAL
Totally new
CONSERVATISM
institutions
Partly new
Sacralization of
institutions
politics
Tradition
Religiosity
Belief in institutions
CONSERVATISM
Figure 1 The complex relationship between conservatism, radical

conservatism and fascism
in 1 933 during a long stay in Germany but began to study Buddhism in

order not to be contaminated by Hitlerism (Liiceanu, 1 997: 2 1 ) . However,
when he returned to Romania in the late 1930s he became attracted by the
legendary 'Captain' - the leading charismatic fascist in Romania, Corneliu
Zelea Codreanu.
Group 2 consists of people who have studied the 'conservative
revolution' in Weimar Germany intensely. Sometimes it is just repetition,
sometimes it is a (non-monetarist) 'new right', 'nouvelle droite', 'nuove
destra', 'neue Rechte', etc. which makes a strong use of the conservative
revolution in an attempt to create a new political alternative.
The third form of 'radical conservatism' is a kind of 'optic', a way of
discovering the complexity of political movements and ideas in movements
which embrace both nationalism and some kind of 'socialism'. People in
6 RADICAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E F U T U R E OF POLITICS
this group may not know too much about the conservative revolution, but
one could say that if they did have an ideological heritage, it would be
close to the conservative revolution.
We can see some signs of the times where the third form of radical
conservatism can be said to appear. One such is the rise (although sub
sequent fall) of the Republican candidate for the US presidency Pat
Buchanan. His 'militant conservatism' can be understood as a Conservative
Republican reaction against Big Business. 6 Taken together with the recent
elections in Israel,7 where the classical pattern of the Labour party as the
working-class alternative and the conservative party (Likud) as an upper
class party to a large degree was twisted, and this demonstrates that the
'right' does not primarily represent the upper class and capital any more.
This could be regarded as a modification of the latest, but not the last,
dividing line between left and right. As Alain de Benoist ( 1 996)8 has
argued, the rise of right and left, that is the moment modern politics
emerged, was a question of pro or con vis-a-vis the French revolution. The
left supported it, the right was basically negative. However, during the
nineteenth century this divide began to disappear when even the right
acknowledged some positive characteristics of the revolution. The next,
and new dividing line rested on the judgement of religion. In the dispute
over Charles Darwin's evolution theory, where he tried to prove that Man
is not a creation but an historical result, the right supported the theory of
creation and the left the theory of evolution. However, the same thing
happened with this demarcation line as with the earlier one, that is it
became insignificant; Die soziale Frage, the social question, was the next to
come. Here I disagree with de Benoist, who suggests that the same thing
has happened to this as with the two former distinctions, that is it becomes
insignificant. According to him, an egalitarian right-winger is not more of
an anomaly than an atheist, anti-monarchist one. The social question is not
insignificant, but instead it is embedded in the new political issues of
morality, security and (inter-)nationalism. Such issues become almost
equally important as income for the poor people. For example, Politiker
verdrossenheit, neglect or dislike of politicians because they are thought of
as being corrupt, is a common phenomenon in many countries (Germany,
Sweden, Poland, Italy). When welfare is cut down people ask themselves if
they can afford to be honest, especially when more and more politicians are
corrupted and when executives in the big international companies raise
their incomes. 'Why should we trust the politicians?' is thus a more fre
quent question. One reason is a widespread corruption and amoral egoism;
another the decreasing field of possible political actions and reforms.
6 The old leftist writer Nonnan Mailer met and discussed with Buchanan in 1 995 and 1996
and they agreed on this issue.
7 This chapter was written in late summer 1 996, and the elections in Israel resulted in the
victory of the Likud party.
8 Of course, de Benoist is a controversial person. However, this specific article is
illuminating.
I NT ROD UCTION 7
Normal politics is understood as small technocratic controversies. This is

the reason for a quest for morality and ethics in politics which leaves the
field open for populism, small parties promising that they are on the
people's side against the political establishment.
One of the main reasons for corruption in politics is that politicians want
to live like the elite in private corporations: good food, good wine, etc. Big
business, that is the large global corporations, are firing people (for
example AT&T) and raising the salaries for the executives at the same time.
The new political needs, so it seems for many people today, could be
summarized as ' Honesty! Justice! Security! (which the rich can buy, but not
we)'. 9 Once again, it seems like extreme rightist parties are the only
uncorrupted option, the only saviours.
It seems as if as soon as there is a moral dimension, the right receives
support, something I believe that Tony Blair and his advisers have
understood. Morality and justice for the weak are the issues. The left
and the liberals are connected with capitalism. In Germany there are
the 'Toscanians', a wealthy middle-class group voting for the SDP or the
Green Party, and going to Tuscany in Italy for vacation every summer.
The same is true in Israel where the Labour party has a strong support
among the affluent middle class, and the Likud party receives strong
support from the oriental Jews, and the newest immigrants, Jews from
Russia, both of which are poor groups. As Laqueur ( 1 996: 8) has
mentioned recently, 'the political support for the "extreme Right" now
comes mainly from the lower classes'. This is crucial: liberalism and
capitalism are historically connected and therefore it is easy for the radical
right to appeal to potential leftists. There is certainly a structural rela
tionship between liberal democracy and capitalism, but there is more than
one form of capitalism. The forms differ depending on what nation we are
looking at - nations with a capitalist system can have more or less
redistribution and welfare, different political systems, cultural codes, etc.
The new political issues of morality, security and nationalism are clearly
related to immigration and xenophobia: 'the present period is . . . domi
nated . . . by the rise of identities and of worrying religious, nationalist and
populist movements, by the reinforcement of extreme right parties, and by
the development of racism and xenophobia' (Wieviorka, 1 996: 2 1 ) .
A good example of this i s Austria where the rightist populist party FPO
seems still to gain more and more support. When the communist system
collapsed the waves of refugees from Hungary were greeted as heroes and
brothers in the new Europe. But almost over-night they turned into a
threat, becoming pure, lousy gypsies. 10
9 Robert B. Reich (1991) and Jeremy Rifkin (1995) both predict that delivering 'security'
on the market will grow very fast in the future. Of course, this can be bought only by
corporations and by rich people.
10 l owe this information to the Austrian writer Josef Haslinger. On the FPQ, see Hans
Ake Persson ( 1 996).
8 RADICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Italy, of course, is another good example. Here we have a strong

populist and separatist party in the north, and a neo-fascist party with a
human face using the new media.
The development in Russia is interesting and relevant for a number of
reasons. 'Our country is sold out, invaded by the West' says a communist
voter. Is he on the left or the right? What was 'red' is also 'black', we
can see that today. The old issues of the left, anti-Americanism, anti
economism, anti-West, etc. are now kept alive by the right.
A good example of how 'left' becomes 'right' is that many of the leading
writers in the former GDR picked up ideas from the conservative
revolution in the mid- 1 970s. This is especially true for Heiner Muller.
Muller was almost unknown outside Germany until the rnid-1 980s when
he was translated and introduced to other countries. He is most often
described as the child of Brecht and postmodernism. 1 1 But a closer look
reveals that he saw the GDR as more true to 'Life' and 'Kultur' than West
Germany, invaded by American 'Zivilisation'. According to him, the GDR
was an historical 'emergency break', able to preserve human values
threatened by Western capitalism. This may sound a bit odd, but we
should not forget that the vitalist Zivilisationskritik in the GDR, which
dominated the cultural life in the 1 970s and the 1 980s, was functional -
when the regime discovered that the socialist utopia no longer could be
based on a superior technology, another base was necessary. Here life
philosophy offered a replacement. The GDR was a better keeper of Life,
Leben, and culture, since it was not destroyed by Western technology and
consumption (Herzinger and PreuI3er, 1 993). The DDR-Kultur stood in
absolute opposition to the BRD-Zivilisation (Herzinger, 1992).12 The same
tune can be heard from the very extreme right when Franz Schonhuber,
leader of the Republikaner party, thinks that West Germany was more
Americanized than East Germany was Russified (Domdey, 1 994: 1 2).
Thus, the new parts of Germany are more 'authentic', 'German' and
should, therefore, be more willing to listen to the radical conservative plea
,
for a change of mentality, away from the American 'Spirit . 1 3
In short, our problem here is that, especially after 1 989, we have seen,
and see, new political constellations develop. The utopias of today, where
happiness and other existential matters are articulated, are formulated
from, so it seems, the right.
We see new constellations with both radical and conservative elements:
the radicalism favoured by poverty, immigrants, nihilism, corruption, etc.
join a form of conservatism - environmentalism, anti-feminism and the
belief in a strong state. The common ground of this radical-conservative
I I For example, see the Swedish journal Res Publica, 4, 1985.

12 Thus, it should be no great surprise that Junger and Muller became friends, and that
Muller has been influenced by the thinking of Gunther Maschke (Herzinger, 1 993b).
13 Indeed, for any one who has been to Eastern Germany, it is easy to agree, without
drawing the same conclusions as Sch6nhuber.
I NTRODUCTION 9
constellation is the belief that the enemy rules, big business and politicians
only care about themselves. One slogan could be 'change in order to save',
a paradoxical formulation we remember from the conservative revolution.
In fact, this was said many times by many writers. Paul de Lagarde
considered himself as 'too conservative not to be radical'; Moeller van den
Bruck meant that 'conservative means creating things that are worth
conserving' (Muller, 1 997: 28).
I think that one important reason for radicalism moving to the 'right'
instead of moving to the 'left' is that the latter had become defensive when
trying to save the last bastions of the welfare state project. Another
important reason is the breakdown of what the British historian Norman
Davies ( 1 997: 39ff.) has called 'the allied scheme of history'. This scheme
has dominated the post-war period, and has gradually broken up only
during the last ten years or so. It has its roots in Hitler's attack on Russia,
when the latter country became an 'ally' and in the judicial aftermath of
the war - the Nuremberg trials. Then, the Soviet Union was one of the
victorious nations. The trials ended in the declaration that Germany was
the only guilty party for starting the war, and ignored the fact of the
contents of the protocol where Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to
split up Poland; that Germany alone was the only country who committed
crimes against humanity. Nothing could be compared with what Germany
had done; crimes committed by the allies were only a necessary response to
the act by nazi Germany. This became the paradigm for the allied scheme
of history, which contains at least six elements:
The heart of the Western civilization lies in the 'Atlantic Ocean-society',

and here we find the highest forms of Good.
2 The 'anti-fascism-ideology' where World War II is seen as the struggle
between the Good and the Evil.
3 The demonological fascination with Germany, and the stigma of
'collaborator' on every person or nation that in some way supported
Germany during the war.
4 A romanticized view of Russia as well as the Soviet Union.
S The silent acceptance of the division of Europe.
6 The 'studied neglect of all facts which do not add credence to the
above' (Davies, 1 997: 39-42).
This scheme gradually lost hegemony and finally, in 1 989-90, it broke

down. Archives in Eastern Europe and in Moscow were opened. Many
atrocities committed by the Soviet Union could no longer be denied - the
systematic starvation of Ukraine where millions of people died; that
the modern form of concentration camps were constructed first in the
Soviet Union; Bucharin's statement that 1 0 million Russians must be
'extincted' (Pipes, 1 997: 262); the exchange of information between SS and
the KGB, etc. Another example is the estimation of the number of victims
during the bombing of Dresden. For a long time the number was 39,773
10 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM AN D THE F U T U R E O F POLITICS
persons, but today one assumes that 300,000 is closer to the truth (H.F.
Dahl, 1 997: 6).
I could go on with a number of other examples, but what is important
here is that what had been the absolute evil and the most extreme right
(Germany) showed many parallels and similarities with an ally and the
'left' (the Soviet Union). Thus, and this is my main point here, since some
years back, being right is not any more extreme than being left. And the
breakdown of the normativity of the allied scheme of history also
strengthens the rise of new political constellations, hard to place on a left
right scale.
Of course, there are social developments that partly determine these new
political issues and constellations. For example, we have new social classes
like the 'symbol analytics'. According to Reich ( 1 99 1 : 1 77), this group
consists of people who work with 'problem-solving, problem-identifying,
and strategic brokering activities'. This growing group of people is the one
with power, access to the media, the skills to do well in the knowledge
society and the ability to sell their work-force wherever they want to. For
this reason they do not identify themselves as members of a nation; they
are true cosmopolitans. With the rise of this group we see a decline of the
more traditional groups working for the old industry, and even the service
sector. This all results in a new possible source of conflict: Multiculturalists
against Traditionalists. The former probably tend to vote for social liberal
parties, the latter for right-wing parties. This is the very case in France
where large parts of the unemployed from the working class vote for Le
Pen (Marcus, 1 995).
The new global situation is also important: the new West rising in east
Asia and the American west coast. These trends might very well lead to
support for protectionist (i.e. nationalist) preferences.
The problem discussed in this book is 'radical conservatism' and its
possible political ramifications. The most important factor is the revival of
nationalism which goes hand in hand with a new 'anti-West' attitude.
'Anti-West' is a structurally homogeneous reaction, a discontent with the
effects of globalization and universalism, but it differs in content. In the
Islamic world, China, and Russia, it simply means the 'West' as a foreign
phenomenon, but in, for example, Germany and France it means anti
Americanism, while in America itself this affect takes the expression as
both or either anti-federalism or anti-UN. In the end, it is all about a
theological entity - Anti-Christ, Satan, etc.
'Radical conservatism' is both a description of fairly distinguishable
groups and a new 'optic' that makes us sensitive for new political con
stellations. I also ask what is the future of politics, and regard different
options and scenarios.
In the first place this is an attempt in mentality history, that is, tracing
and mapping mentalities which might have or really have a social and
political significance. I also regard my method as a sociology of knowledge
in Karl Mannheim's sense, that is, a synthesis of logic and historical
I NTRO D U CTION 11
dynamics both in theoretical and practical politics. I will primarily focus on

what intellectuals do, have done, write and have written. The reason for
this is based on the assumption that they rationalize, make a discourse of
what is felt, known, etc. By the members of society. I do not propose that
the intellectuals are 'legislators', that they have much influence on the
political situation and the social development. Thus, I mainly agree with
Laqueur ( 1 996) who often repeats that the intellectuals are mere
'interpreters' of what is beyond their reach. However, they are probably
the best interpreters and thermometers that we have access to.
We will see how different positions are connected, and when arguing
with each other they share certain basic assumptions. There are no one
hundred per cent absolute positions, thus radical conservatism can never
totally escape liberal assumptions, 14 and liberalism cannot live up to its
basic criterias without the metaphysics of 'Humanity' or God. Of course,
the liberal and the radical conservative would not agree with this since they
regard each other as deadly enemies. From an analytical perspective,
however, we see that they need each other to have something to argue for
or against, that the two make both particularist and universalist claims, for
example.
* * *
In a work like this there is always a need for some empirical control in
order to avoid becoming victims of our own fantasies and paranoias. We
could, for example, use a counter-hypothesis. However, I do not intend to
'prove' anything here, rather to sketch possible scenarios; therefore the
danger is not too great.
A note on style and the research used in this book: I have conducted
many interviews with intellectual radical conservatives in Europe in order
to understand their thinking; I have read their books as well as many
others; I have used the Internet and newspapers for up-to-date infor
mation; I have discussed radical conservatism with many scholars. Thus,
my style is not homogeneous, sometimes it is somewhere between main
stream social science and journalism, sometimes social theory, sometimes
mainstream social science. If this would annoy the reader, I apologize.
However, since I regard radical conservatism as a highly relevant field of
study for philosophy, history, sociology and political science, this book just
had to be written.
My methodology is hermeneutic, and this has to be clarified for a
number of reasons. One good reason is to avoid misunderstandings. At the
end of 1 996 Conny Mithander and I started a debate in Sweden on the
need of understanding fascism. Of course, we meant 'understanding' as in
14 See, for example, Meier ( 1 995: x) who shows that '[Carl] Schmitt was no better than the
value-free liberals he condemned, for both he and they admitted any end as equally
choiceworthy with any other'.
12 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATISM AN D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
the tradition of verstehen-sociology. We were naIve, since many people

thought we meant 'tolerate' and we were depicted as proto-fascists.
Anyway, I think that it is important to understand why people, including
ourselves, can be attracted by fascism and radical conservatism. If there
were nothing in them that would attract people, why can they in that case
get any support at all? So - no, I am not a radical conservative myself, I
am a liberal but not one in despair, even if I have run the risk of becoming
one when dealing with a truly, and sometimes on the surface attractive
anti-liberal ideology. Of course, my exposition could be more critical. I
could go into detail into radical-conservative thinking on every page and
show its shortcomings and problematic postulates. However, I think that
the enlightened reader of this book would find such an exposition rather
tedious and over-pedagogic.
The book is structured in three parts: the first part is theoretical
historical with a rather long section on Karl Mannheim and his sociology
of knowledge. He lived in a time and context when and where radical
conservatism was first conceptualized in the form of the 'conservative
revolution'. This, of course, gives us a better understanding of Mannheim's
sociology of knowledge. But this is not the primary reason for giving so
much space to Mannheim. No, because in this context his relatively
homogeneous theory gives us an understanding of politics, and especially
radical conservatism.
Someone might wonder why I have put so much emphasis on German
Conservatism. The answer is that it was within this that we saw the first
modern form of radical conservatism - the so-called Conservative
Revolution. This time and context also highlight the conditions and
problems of our present situation: the clash between modernization and
traditions; the crisis of capitalism and parliamentary democracy.
The second part is focused on the contemporary situation: dominant
themes within radical conservatism; the situation in some countries, and
the possibility of new political constellations. Finally, the short third part
consists of the conclusions.
PART I
'RADICAL CON5ERVATI5M'
1
CONSERVATISM AND POLITICS
There are very few works on conservative social and political thought that
both go beyond the national context and the time of its origin (Muller,
1 995: 1 ) . There are, however, obvious reasons for this. Since conservatism
is concerned with the non-universal specificity of the period and context it
is formulated time after time; thus, the problem of generalization becomes
crucial. Another reason is its positionality: in times of social disintegration,
conservatism is defined by its enemies as such thinking that stresses the
need for tradition, stability and institutions.
My attempt in this first part of the book is to trace the origins of radical
conservatism. Then, we first have to define what we mean by 'conservatism',
define its basic characteristics and at the same time regard its specificity in
time and place, that is, be sensitive to both the logics of conservative thought
and its dynamics, how this thinking interacts with the social reality.
A discussion of conservative thought always runs the risk of starting at
an arbitrary chosen point. Since we do not have any immediate access to
such a large, and at first sight also clumsy, concept like 'conservatism', we
must have a clear approach. In order to achieve this, the most rational
thing to do is to discuss the relevancy of the major works on this topic.
However, the 'major works' must then be chosen, and the criteria of such a
choice must be discussed. One criterion is genealogical, the other recogni
tion and reliability. My main focus will be on German conservatism. The
principal reason, which I also discussed above, is that it was here that we
first saw a radical form of conservatism and intellectuals who were aware
of this, and both the logical and historical causes for this transformation.
That is, both the logic and the dynamics of contemporary radical conser
vatism can be found in the German Conservative Revolution, which in its
turn must be understood in its context - German society and history. In
the ideology of German conservatism ideas from other countries - Russia,
France, Italy - were incorporated in the emerging radical conservatism.
The other criterion - reliability - has a more arbitrary character, of
which I try to have a certain degree of control through an ongoing
dialogue with other scholars.
For both these reasons it is quite self-evident to start with Karl
Mannheim's classical study on conservatism (originally an article, but in
the 1 980s a longer version was published as a book). Another reason for
starting with this text is that it offers both an historical description and an
analysis. Also, it is an example of Wissenssozi% gie, a 'method', 'theory' or
16 RAD ICAL CO N S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE O F POLITICS
rather, an approach that I will discuss and confront with other approaches
such as hermeneutics and critical theory.
In the Wissenssoziologie of Mannheim there is often both an historical
description and an analysis, and vice versa. The two 'levels' can be hard to
separate, but it also gives us a possibility to see that there is no inde
pendent past reality such as history 'in itself' . Furthermore, Mannheim is
one of the few sociologists who also wants to learn something from the
object under study, a recognition of the fact that sociology always is a part
of its object. The section below on Mannheim is rather long, but I have
considered it necessary to give his thoughts enough space in order to see
how they can work as analytical tools and to demonstrate the richness of
his sociology of knowledge so that my application of it later will be more
comprehensive. Also, he is perhaps the best exponent of the inner logic of
political thinking.
Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and the logics of

conservatism
'Rationalizing the irrational' I this formula has been used to catch one
-
central issue in conservatism from a Mannheimian approach. This also

gives us a hint of one important dilemma in the project of conservatism.
Conservatism not only 'celebrates' irrationalism, it also emphasizes its
importance in its modification of the power of reason. On the one hand,
conservatism wants to make clear that rationalism in its political form (i.e.
the French revolution) often leads to irrational terror. On the other hand, a
recognition of the irrational makes us sensitive to the evolutionary,
unconscious and 'organic' nature of history. History is a mighty power,
and the rational person should not exaggerate his or her ability to master
this process. To do so, to think that Enlightenment should be able to
eliminate prejudices, would be the greatest prejudice. 2 As a reaction to the
Enlightenment and the French revolution and its political-discursive
expression - liberalism - conservatism has to fight or modify them on their
own ground, that is, in the political discourse. It has to 'rationalize the
irrational'. One of Mannheim's points here is also that conservatism is the
only ideology that is aware of this; liberalism also is, but does not
recognize it in its appeal to pure reason. All ideologies, and human
existence in itself, consist of a 'basic outlook' or a 'purposive direction of
the soul' (Mannheim, 1 986: 87).
What liberalism - as a metaphoric subject - did was to demonstrate a
modern form of political thinking which puts an abstract plan of reason at
I This is the title of an article by Kettler and Meja (1 990) on Mannheim's approach to
conservatism.
2 As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989: 276) puts it: The overcoming of all prejUdices, this is
the global demand of the Enlightenment, will itself prove to be a prejudice.'
CONSERVATISM A N D POL I TI CS 17
the centre of history. It was universalist, abstract, intellectualist, pro

gressivist and rationalist. Conservatism is a reaction against all this. While
liberalism is obsessed with what is possible and new, conservatism 'is at the
outset quite clearly nothing more than traditionalism become self-reflective'
(ibid. : 88). 'Traditionalism' is a pure psychological wish to keep things
stable as they have always been, and conservatism is the rational political
discursive formulation of this wish, now a collective phenomenon. Con
servatism is 'a novel, almost empathetic experience of the concrete' (ibid.:
88), a reaction against the rationalization process from Aristotle to
Descartes, the Renaissance and finally the Enlightenment.
'Roots' is the key metaphor in conservative thinking. Thus, it is a form
of 'organic' thinking, opposing 'static' thinking. Humankind is conceived
as a collection of different Volk. Thus, a plant - it can be young or old,
beautiful or ugly, in need of care, etc.
Mannheim has an approach which is often called relationist and I would
argue that he develops a non-normative (i.e. not a 'relativist') conception
of politics. The normative conception is the normal case, even in the
political field. In this latter conception there exists a 'centre' or 'middle'
position surrounded by 'left' and '-right' positions, in its turn surrounded
by 'extremism'. We cannot a priori deny that the 'middle' today could
have been 'extremist' yesterday, or that it will not be extremist tomorrow. 3
For example, the ruling Social Democratic party in Sweden adopted the
immigrant policy proposed by the proto-racist, populist party New
Democracy, which in its turn adopted it from a small right extremist
party. In France, the established parties have tried to neutralize the appeal
of Le Pen's Front National by adopting some parts of the latter's pro
posals on how to treat the problems that Le Pen at least claims are caused
by immigration.
The 'middle' is problematic since there does not exist any Archimedean
point that gives us a guarantee that this is the true balancing point. A non
normative conception also breaks the taboo of what for the moment is
politically correct. Mannheim applies Marxism at Marxism - Marx had an
important point in his theory of ideology, that groups and classes listen to
and develop systems of thought which promote their interests. However,
Marx did not discuss that even his own views and the outlook of the
proleteriat could be an ideology! This is a way to describe one important
point in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge: it means that not only your
opponents have 'interests' for which they fight, but even you are 'bound'
by interests. This also means the opposite: you have a true will and are
serious - and so are your opponents! Considering this opens up one
forgotten element in conservative thought - that it strives for freedom.
Even if it is not the liberal conception, we still have to take this claim
seriously.
3 See the contributions in the book Extremismus der Mille (edited by Hans-Martin
Lohmann, 1994).
18 RAD ICAL CON SERVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
Oswald Spengler viewed the 'West' as 'a cult of rationality'. Gadamer

later remarked that the greatest prejudice of the Enlightenment was that it
could do without prejudices. Mannheim also saw this very clearly. Our
only reference point is our Weltanschauung, which are transmitted to us,
both on the micro-level and the sociological level. It was in his article from
1 921 - 'On the interpretation of Weltanschauung' (Mannheim, 1 952a) -
that Mannheim began discussing how the Weltanschauung could be
interpreted. Here he criticizes both objectivist and subjectivist ideas by
suggesting that the meaning of a Weltanschauung can be located neither in
an intentional subject nor in the acts as such. Instead, we have to read the
social acts as 'documents' of the Weltanschauung. The social acts are both
documents of something more comprehensive, and the parts that constitute
this totality. Here Mannheim is a true hermeneutician - 'To understand
the "spirit" of an age, we have to fall back on the "spirit" of our own'
(Mannheim, 1 952a: 61).
With 'Historicism' - also the title of an essay from 1 924 - Mannheim
does not primarily refer to the neo-Kantian historical school, but adopts a
very wide meaning:
Historicism is therefore neither a mere fad nor a fashion; it is not even an
intellectual current, but the very basis on which we construct our observations of
the socio-cultural reality. It is not something artificially contrived, something like
a programme, but an organically developed basic pattern, the Weltanschauung
itself, which came into being after the religiously determined medieval picture of
the world had disintegrated and when the subsequent Enlightenment, with its
dominant idea of a supra-temporal Reason, had destroyed itself. (Mannheim,
1 952b: 84f.)
Hence, historicism is understood as modernity's way of understanding,

based on the experience that 'Everything that is solid melts into air' (Karl
Marx). The dominant way to understand history has become to emphasize
eternal movements, flux and change.
The Reason of the Enlightenment thus comes into crisis, for it becomes
difficult to maintain the idea of an abstract, universal Reason. As
Mannheim notes, the Enlightenment has a self-destructive character. What
historicism has given us is the opportunity of distance from the Enlight
enment, allowing us to avoid thinking in terms of its own categories, thus
enabling us to gain a deeper understanding. The rationalists, still believing
in a supra-temporal Reason, blame the 'relativists' for having destroyed
reason. But Mannheim wants to move beyond this opposition. On the one
hand, it is necessary to give up the idea of an absolute reason and the
'static' thought dominating the natural sciences. It seems like a hopeless
enterprise, in a time characterized by deep historical transformations, to
believe in a reason that should be situated beyond history. But on the
other hand, relativism, the historical school, and Lebensphilosophie do not
help us very much if we want to locate and construct patterns in this new
historical mess. There is, thus, a place reserved for something - a place
and function sociology later assumes. Historicism is a 'problem' but
CONSERVATISM A N D POLITICS 19
according to Mannheim there is hope: we see tendencies not only of

fragmentation, but also towards a 'synthesis'. Mannheim's essay is full of
hope, pointing to several important problems, but it ends by presenting
tasks instead of 'solutions' . The hope is to 'overcome' 'static thought' in
favour of 'dynamic thought', both a recognition of the notion of 'organic',
and an attempt to move beyond it; to locate a 'documentary meaning' in
the contemporary situation; to see it as a Gestalt instead of loose details
and unrelated parts.
Again and again Mannheim is 'trapped' between two alternatives, and like
a Hegelian he strives for a dialectical overcoming of what he sees as limited
perspectives. From his sociological mentor, Alfred Weber, he borrows the
distinction between the respective processes of Kultur and Zivilisation, the
former developing expressions and Gestalts, the latter rationalization. What
Mannheim is striving for is a third, synthesizing process:
The ultimate task in this respect is to re-interpret the phenomenon of static
thought - as exemplified by natural science and by other manifestations of the
civilizational sphere in general - from a dynamic point of view, and to ascertain
specifically to what extent logic belongs to this sphere. Although this task has by
no means been solved as yet, there is no reason for considering it as insoluble.
Similarly, the dynamic philosophy will also tackle the problem of the 'absolute'
and 'relative' as such, already treated in static philosophy - but, as we have seen,
this problem will be put in a much broader perspective in which the bearing of
temporality upon the problem will also be taken into account. Thus anything
that had been brought to light in the earlier system will still be preserved - but in
a more comprehensive context. (Mannheim, 1 952b: 1 32)
The historicist Weltanschauung is inescapable, but here we have an aspira

tion of a dialectic that is open in its nature. Here there is no given
'synthesis' which will take into consideration all thought, 'subsuming'
earlier thinking in a more 'comprehensive' context. Rather, it will consist of
an overcoming of both the Hegelian spirit and the irrational celebration of
'life', while at the same time acknowledging the worth and shortcomings of
both positions.
Conjunctive and communicative knowledge
The essay 'A sociological theory of culture and its knowability (conjunctive
and communicative thinking)' was published posthumously in 1 982, and
was most likely written in the mid- I 920s. Although the focus here is on
'culture', it connects to Mannheim's attempts towards a sociological
understanding of knowledge and politics. Here we find an important
distinction that can make us more sensible of what politics is about.
In this essay we once again find a very clear praxis-oriented aspect: if a
sociology of culture is to be a legitimate enterprise, it has to be able to say
something to those who are able to carry culture forward regarding how to
'cure' it. One important mission, then, is to clarify how our theories and
interpretations are dependent upon a more basic level of the understanding
in everyday life. This basic act of understanding consists of 'conjunctive
20 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM AN D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
knowledge',4 which is opposed to 'communicative knowledge' or thinking.

These concepts seem to make more clear what Mannheim had in mind
when he opposed 'dynamic' and 'static thinking'. The connections to
Alfred Weber's distinction between Kultur and Zivilisation , and Ferdinand
Tonnies's between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are very obvious.
Knowledge is not only 'calculation' - as the bourgeoisie and the social
scientists tend to believe - but is also founded upon the 'irrational' factors
of feelings and beliefs. Knowledge is a kind of Weltwollen, a will to under
stand and transform the world. Knowledge is thus intentional, overtly in the
conjunctive case, covertly in the communicative case where we have the
claim of 'objectivity' . Conjunctive thinking is the 'deep' source of knowledge
where we either touch or are touched; there is no neutral position here.
Viewed historically, the conjunctive thinking was quite self-evident until
the dramatic arrival of the modern world. In science, Rene Descartes was
the pioneer in the 'depersonalizing and decommunalizing of knowledge'
(Mannheim, 1 982: 1 55). His work created the possibility of making dis
courses on 'knowledge' and 'consciousness as such'. What we gained in
degree of generalization, we lost in wideness, since political and ethical
knowledge became excluded from 'knowledge'. That is, the knowledge of
the life-world and practical situations became devalued. These dimensions
were rediscovered by romanticism, which systematized everything that the
Enlightenment excluded through rationalizing the irrational. Now,
Mannheim wants to formulate 'a theory of knowing the qualitative'
(ibid . : 1 60). Here we again find a double-sided strategy: the 'qualitative' is
a practical positive value in a modern, nihilist age, and a theoretical tool
that allows us to see things that are hidden from a supra-rationalist gaze.
This can be done, according to Mannheim, by following historicism and
relativism to the end - an heroic attitude indeed.
In doing so, perhaps we can rediscover 'the whole man', as Mannheim
seems to think. 5 Seeing 'the whole man' requires a non-perspectivist per
spective, allowing us to see how knowledge is grounded in will, emotions and
beliefs. Accordingly, knowledge has an honest side: I do this because I think
it is, according to the norms I accept, the right thing to do. But it also has a
sneaky side: I do this because it is the best thing according to my interest,
which is constituted in my Weltanschauung, where I seek authenticity and
the truth. This distinction, which I call the dual nature of knowledge, was
4 'Conjunctive knowledge' could also be described as 'metic reason' (Elkana, 198 1 ). This is
always bound to situations, and plays a decisive role in the Homeric dramas (Barmark, 1 992).
Metic reason consists of 'a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and
intellectual behaviour which combines flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception,
resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills and experience acquired over the years.
It is applied to situations which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations
which do not lend themselves to precise measurements, exact calculations or vigorous logic'
(Elkana, 1 9 8 1 : 48).
5 In a way, Mannheim was waiting for Heidegger's Sein and Zeit ( 1 972), in which we find a
strong plea for a return to the pre-Socratic ontology which existed a long time before the
splitting between techne and praxis.
never made explicit by Mannheim. But he comes very close to formulating it

in his analysis of conservatism, where he emphasizes that
The conservative does not want satisfaction of his interests alone, but also his
own world, a world in which his interests are at home. The bourgeois does not
want only his demands fulfilled, but also a world shaped by his own mentality.
The proletarian is not content to secure his future; he wants a future in keeping
with his spirit. (Mannheim, 1 986: 55)
But since modern society has made it possible for us to see what has probably
always been the case - that history is the story of class struggles, conflict and
competition - the wills are recognized as tied to partial interests. 6 Knowledge
always has such a 'bias'; it can always be suspected of not telling the 'truth'.
This duality, the Janus face of knowledge, is possible to recognize thanks to
the modern suspicion and uncertainty introduced by Descartes. The duality
can also be understood as the difference between what we presuppose and
preunderstand, and what we do when we understand.
The pre-cognitive ('conjunctive') source of conservatism can be called the
'will' and the cognitive ('communicative') element in conservatism (and in
all other political ideologies) 'interest'. Interests are obviously class-based
and a class can only constitute itself as an historical actor if its members
are able to 'communicate' with each other. However, 'will' includes the
total orientation of a person or a group, community, or a generation where
also the religious and spiritual outlook is of importance.
The thesis on the duality of knowledge is also related to the double
sidedness of Mannheim's approach. Thus, we have one analytical, classical
sociological side used to describe what we have, and one dialectic, praxis
oriented side looking into what we could have. The analytical approach,
operating with two elements, could be described as follows (according to
my interpretation of Mannheim's essay):
Communicative knowledge Conjunctive knowledge
erkliiren verstehen
quantitative qualitative
repetition development, growth
the bourgeoisie anti-capitalist classes
dissection unity
abstract concepts community-bound meaning
SClence real life
artificial authentic
6 l owe this idea to Karl Marx, who in the Grundrisse says that modern political economy
is able to see the abstract side of labour, the side which creates exchange value, 'labour as
such', because the modern division of labour enables us to see it - the growth of a high
number of concrete work tasks makes it possible to see what they have in common (Marx,
1974: 2 1 ff.).
22 RAD ICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
Two features become obvious in this interpretation: the similarity with

both conservatism and classical theory, and the dualism. ? But Mannheim
wants, because of the mentioned 'double-sidedness', to gain more than a
simple irrationalist critique of 'objectivism' - this text of Mannheim's
would not exist if there were not a third, mediating term and instance. This
need for a 'synthesis' is already present in Mannheim's general approach.
When we recognize 'perspectives' we make use of a non-perspectivistic
ability, which is not a substance, but the result of a process. To identify
something as something presupposes a fundamental difference. Thus, when
we identify 'relativism' we make an 'absolute' claim. But this claim can
again be relativized. This is demonstrated very clearly in the history of
philosophy. From Nietzsche onwards we have a range of thinkers that
have claimed to have 'overcome' 'metaphysics' when they showed that
everyone else, except oneself, was bound to a perspective. Superman and
Zarathustra have thus borne several names: Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Derrida. 8 What makes Mannheim more sympathetic in this context is
that he does not make any 'strong' claims, and more generally, he does not
overestimate the role of himself and theory. He also sees a parallel to the
philosophical claim of overcoming metaphysics in the claims of particular
classes that their world, as it appears to them, is the world. Here he comes
closer to what he is still looking for, which is the main topic in Ideologie
und Utopie ( 1 985) - the new, dynamic synthesis. That is, a point of view, a
'perspective', which is 'more' than a perspective because it allows us to see
the perspectiveness of the perspectives. In this context, the third synthetic
term is Bildungskultur (Mannheim, 1 982: 1 65ff.) (see Figure 2).
As I understand Mannheim, he is here striving for a way out of what
seems to be an eternal dilemma. Since he is not an irrationalist or anti
modernist he sees no 'way back' to a pure Gemeinschaft. Accordingly, we
have matters which can be dealt with only within communicative knowl
edge. But if this becomes the only recognized way of thinking, we will no
longer have love and friendship - instrumental reason will rule com
pletely. And we will not know how to act wisely in concrete situations.
The Bildungskultur, the cultivation of civilization or the civilization of
culture, could - this is what Mannheim suggests - serve as a mediator, as
a place for developing phronesis9 and Bildung. In this case it is conjunctive
knowledge which modifies communicative knowledge. But the mediation
also takes place in the opposite direction - as a process whereby the small
community is widened, and becomes more broadly defined. In Gadamer's
( 1 989) terms a community which achieves a broader and deeper 'horizon'.
7 For example, i t i s interesting t o note the close affinity o f these distinctions and the
distinctions made by 'reactionary modernism', especially by Werner Sombart (Herf, 1 984:
1 51).
8 See Megill (1987) for a discussion of these 'prophets of extremity'.
9 Gadamer (1 989) develops this idea from Aristotle, and it means the virtue or ability to
match the general with the particular.
CONSERVATI SM A N D POL ITICS 23
Zivilisation
Gesellschaft
Communicative
thinking
Bildungsku/tur
('cultivated culture')
Ku/tur
Gemeinschaft
Conjunctive thinking
Figure 2 Exposition of Mannheim 's concepts
Another aspect o f this mediation i s the achieved Seinsverbundenheit lO

of thinking - the Bildungskultur is conjunctively determined, 'although not
,
as strictly tied to existence (as conjunctive culture) (Mannheim, 1 986:
266).
We can now apply this model to political thinking. Conjunctive culture
and thinking is closely related to just being, the sphere of reality that must
be in order for everything else to be. Conservative thinking wants to
'protect' this aspect of social and historical life, give priority to the concrete
and the organic historic development, listening to the 'roots' . Communi
cative culture and thinking wants to promote progress, universality and
equality. Then, the reason for striving for a synthesis or a mediating sphere
is that it gives more justice to both of the extreme poles of political and
cultural thinking. In terms of more clear-cut political ideologies,
Mannheim would say no to both reactionary and anti-modernist nostalgic
conservatism, and to one-dimensional, ultra-rationalist liberalism. In fact
he would be closer to both Marxism and modernist conservatism: if not a
'radical conservative', at least someone not totally opposed to its ideas!
10 It is tricky to translate this concept into English. Mannheim formulates it in contrast to

Seinsgebundenheit, which means being determined by social being in a strictly determinist
meaning. Seinsverbundenheit describes thought as being connected to (instead of 'determined'
by) being. Thought is also in 'union' or 'association' ( Verbund) with being. This was both an
analytical tool - to see how different forms of thinking were determined or connected to social
structures and cultural belonging - and a practical task - to connect the sociology of
knowledge to the surrounding social and historical situation. See also Kettler et al. (1 984: 65);
Simonds ( 1 978); Woldring, 1 986: 1 74).
24 RADICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D TH E FUTU R E OF POL ITICS
Competition and validity
So far we have not discussed at any great length the epistemological con
sequences of the sociology of knowledge. There are two interesting essays
written just before Ideologie und Utopie that give us a reason to do so.
In 'The ideological and sociological interpretation of intellectual phe
nomena' from 1 926 Mannheim is primarily considering what implications
sociological interpretation has for the question of validity. To do sociology
is to place oneself 'outside' something, in this case an idea or an ideology.
But this does not automatically mean that we 'doubt' what the idea says,
only that we relate it functionally to something outside it. Thus, Mannheim
seems to reject the perhaps most common critique against the sociology of
knowledge - that it reduces an idea to its function, thus annihilating its
validity in favour of its genesis. Mannheim first presents the possibility that
these are two separate problems, to be treated separately in different
discourses, but then, truthful to his heroic project, he implies that demon
strating an idea's function might give it a new, 'higher' meaning. This
remains an unclear point in his thought. Perhaps he wanted to replace the
traditional epistemological formulation of the problem - that is, genesis or
function versus validity - with what I earlier called the thesis on the 'dual
nature of knowledge' .
The other essay, 'Competition a s a cultural phenomenon', from 1 928, I I
seems to point in that direction. Here he says that from the viewpoint of
sociology all knowledge '(even should it prove to be Absolute Truth itself)
is clearly rooted in and carried by the desire for power and recognition of
social groups who want to make their interpretation of the world the
universal one' (Mannheim, 1 990b: 57). With such a strong claim, how can
validity be seen as something totally unaffected by the forces that produce
it? Faced with this question I think that the thesis on the dual nature of
knowledge might provide not a 'solution', but a more 'comprehensive' way
of treating the problem. If we accept this thesis, then the 'honest' will and
the 'sneaky' interest are seen as two analytical aspects of something that is
inseparable in real life. When we act we often do so both because we think
it is rational and because we reinforce our social position by doing so. The
key word of this essay is 'competition' - due to the plurality of wills and
interests in the modern world, particularly after the breakdown of the
knowledge-monopoly of the church, competition becomes more central.
'Man . . . does not exist in a world in general, but in a world of meanings,
interpreted in a particular way' (Mannheim, 1 990b: 58). Men therefore
compete with one another, and the ultimate fight concerns 'the public
I I This essay was presented at the Sixth Congress of German Sociologists in Zurich, 1 928,
and almost caused a 'scandal'. Many of the German professors regarded it as a blasphemy,
implying that not only rationality but also 'competition' and other irrational factors played a
role in academic life. See, for example, the 'Discussion of Karl Mannheim's "Competition
paper'" in Meja and Stehr ( 1 990).
interpretation of existence' (ibid. : 57). Here Heidegger makes an entrance

in Mannheim's work: it is Das Man who favours one interpretation over
another. Das Man - 'the "They'" (Heidegger, 1 972) - is the dominant
public opinion that affects most peop1e. 1 2 Competition is therefore given
an ontological status: men build groups in order to understand themselves.
In these groups there is always an Other - a group, class or generation -
that it competes with. If one group succeeds in being Das Man, then we
have the return of a monopoly situation and the end of history. The
sociology of knowledge, unlike social groups and classes, does not strive to
be Das Man - this was only a dream for Auguste Comte. Instead, it should
strive for synthesis.
But given the basic nature of competition, is there any chance for a
synthesis? Can competition create this and not only polarization?
Mannheim's answer is, of course, 'yes'. Here we have an implicit response
to Georg Lukacs, Mannheim's old friend and competitor. There must, of
course, be a social base for a 'synthesis', but Mannheim views the
proletariat as incapable of such a mission, and clings instead to his hope
for the synthesizing powers of a generation, integrated by common
experiences.
Ideology and utopia
Just like 'synthesis', Mannheim's experience of cosmopolitan marginality

plays a decisive role in Ideologie und Utopie, especially as a background to
the idea of 'relatively free-floating intellectuals'. Ideologie und Utopie (the
book published in 1 929) consists of three essays, which each address
separate problems. Apart from their cognitive and conceptual content, they
are also interesting as a document of the age and context in which they
were written, an aspect which is lost in the English version. We will mostly
discuss the former aspect here.
The first essay discusses the concept of 'ideology', the second essay
the nature of politics and the possibility of a synthesis between (social)
science and politics, and the third essay focuses on 'utopia'. Since this is
without doubt Mannheim's major work I intend to discuss these essays in
detail, tracing the major arguments and demonstrating how a reading
informed by hermeneutics makes more sense than one without such an
interpretation.
The problem of 'ideology' arises when we have a plurality of views of how
the world should be, and when we suspect our opponents of acting
irrationally in the pursuit of self-interest. This latter condition is a 'partial'
conception of ideology since it is located only at the psychological level -
the opponent's views are 'distorted' by interests. The 'total' conception of
ideology, on the other hand, views ideology from a theoretical level as the
expression of a Weltanschauung of a whole age or a class. It is no longer
12 Mannheim does not, however, share Heidegger's pessimism when elaborating this.
26 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTURE O F POLITICS
Ideology
/
partial total
/
special general
/ evaluative non-eva I uative
Figure 3 Forms of ideology according to Mannheim
simply perception, but the fundamental structures of thought that are

'ideological'. In the terms I used above, it has not only a 'sneaky' but an
'honest', constructivistic aspect. Furthermore, the general conception can be
differentiated in a 'special' and a 'general' aspect. The former is used when
we exclude ourselves from the field of ideology - when we contrast our
'rationality' with the 'ideological' nature of our opponents' views. Marxism
is a good example of a total-special conception of ideology. The total
general conception, on the other hand, includes ourselves; we have an
ideology just like our opponents. In its turn the total-general conception can
be differentiated into the non-evaluative and the evaluative aspect. When we
take different ideologies as given, analysing them without looking for the
truth or significance of them, we are using the former aspect. If, however, we
ask which ideology comes closest to the truth and is most appropriate,
we are evaluative. Thus we have the hierarchy shown in Figure 3.
At first sight we have the same old problem which Mannheim had
struggled with before - that of being evaluative without being partial or
having a total-special ideological conception. This has been discussed over
and over in the secondary literature on Mannheim. However, I think that
there is a strength in using both the non-evaluative approach - the
relationist approach where a 'middle' position does not exist a priori -
and the evaluative approach - the critical potentials of the sociology of
knowledge.
The rest of this essay tries to provide clues as to what such an answer
would look like. Once again Mannheim chooses to favour the heroic
strategy over the easy way out. He does not dissolve the problem by simply
saying that validity is a purely philosophical matter, but stresses that since
epistemology is always involved in historical-social processes, its problem
cannot be solved epistemologically. To acknowledge the social connected
ness of everything that appears in history and society is not simply a
'limitation' or a biasing factor. Rather, it is productive and widening -
'through intimate contact with this reality, [we have] a greater chance of
revealing its meaning' (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 72). For example, by including a
socialist viewpoint we can discover the ideological elements in non-socialist

viewpoints. Mannheim claims that such perspectivism allows us to arrive
at an evaluative position. And there is in fact no other way out, since,
according to Mannheim, objectivism and one-dimensional rationalism have
now become a repressive force: 'the absolute . . . has now become an
instrument used by those who profit from it, to distort, pervert, and con
ceal the meaning of the present' ( 1 99 1 : 78). This is certainly an evaluative
statement. Mannheim does have an ideological, leftist belonging, but he is
also able to recognize the present limitations of this belonging. The hunt
must go on. He emphasizes that we must learn to think 'dynamically' and
'relationally'. Only then can we 'adjust' (zurechtjinden) ourselves to the
present historical stage. This adjustment is connected to self-clarification:
We have a case of ideological distortion, therefore, when we try to resolve
conflicts and anxieties by having resource to absolutes, according to which it is
no longer possible to live. This is the case when we create 'myths', worship
'greatness in itself', avow allegiance to 'ideals', while in our actual conduct we
are following other interests which we try to mask by simulating an unconscious
righteousness, which is only too easily transparent. (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 86)
Here Mannheim, sounding almost like a Freudo-Marxist, is reusing a

theme from 'On the interpretation of Weltanschauung' ( 1 952a). There he
argued that an interpretation from the viewpoint of totality was possible by
relating the visible to latent functions and unconscious motives (Dahl,
1 994).
I think that Mannheim would have claimed to have a third position in
relation to hermeneutics and critical theory - to be able to evaluate the
critique without constructing absolute points. The 'ideological distortions'
mentioned above are not only plain 'distortions', but are of a special kind:
unhistoric and absolute standards. Thus, we need instead a non
perspectivistic perspective, with which we can have 'the broadest possible
extension of our horizon of vision' (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 95). This possibility
is dependent upon our recognition of the limited scope of every view, a
recognition that can be realized by the self-reflective act of a generation
attuned to the time it lives in.
The second essay, 'The prospects of scientific politics', is a sort of a
continuation of Max Weber's articles on objectivity in the social sciences
and on politics as a vocation. Mannheim's question concerns whether a
'scientific politics' is possible, and why it does not already exist in our
rationalized society. One reason, according to Mannheim, is that politics
has been marginalized because of its 'irrationality'. It is valued as
'irrational' since it deals with the art of 'becoming', with what we should
have in the future. But this irrational nature can threaten social stability -
precisely the problem of the Weimar Republic where Ideologie und Utopie
was written. The nature of politics is often misunderstood - the admin
istration of social affairs which strives for prediction and calculation
through rationalized routines is often understood as 'politics'. But this
deals only with what has 'become', and not with the matter of 'becoming'.
28 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE O F POLITICS
This irrational matter is characterized by struggle, domination and

competition. Thus, if we do not relate 'administration' to 'politics', we run
the risk of having a deep polarity between the 'iron cage' (Mannheim does
not use this term) and a political field where extremist movements come to
dominate. What we need is the restoration of political knowledge -
knowledge of history, social relations, the opponent's ideas, rhetoric and
how to act in different situations - phronesis. But if we want to reflect upon
'scientific politics', we have to know about the different kinds of political
thinking that exist. Towards this end, Mannheim constructs five ideal types
and demonstrates some interconnections, both logical and historical, which
imply the need for a synthesizing approach. These are 'bureaucratic con
servatism, conservative historicism, liberal-democratic bourgeois thought, the
socialist-communist conception and fascism' (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 1 04).
The first, 'bureaucratic conservatism', dominates among executives and
militaries. It arose due to the need for administrative capacities, and is
tightly connected to the power of the centralist nation state.
Another form of conservatism, 'conservative historicism', can be
regarded as in opposition to bureaucratic conservatism. 1 3 This kind of
thinking recognizes the irrational and the incalculable, and stresses the
impotence of reason. Historically, it developed as a self-conscious form of
political thought in reaction to the Enlightenment and liberal thinking - in
romanticism. Its roots, however, are in a traditional, unarticulated
irrationalism found in parts of the nobility and the mandarins. Thus, it was
also an opponent to the pre-liberal absolutist state. The rootedness in
feudal society explains how one of the leading theses of conservative
historicism - that politics cannot be taught - arose: as a legitimation of the
privileges of the nobility. But this explanation does not fully eliminate the
possible validity of the argument that knowledge and the mastery of laws is
not enough for having political knowledge. On the contrary, Mannheim
seems sympathetic to the idea that one must also have an 'instinct', gained
through long experience, in order to act wisely in different situations.
If conservative historicism is a celebration of the irrational, 'liberal
democratic bourgeois thought' is the opposite. Liberalism is, seen in an
historical light, an extreme form of intellectualism. It claims to have
knowledge of a supra-temporal reason, of how humans can act totally
rationally in society, and does not recognize will, interest, ideology, emo
tions, etc. as social phenomena. While it helped destroy certain traditional
forms of irrationalism, it also helped create new ones: 'free competition'
and new forms of class struggle. It also created a new method for solving
social problems: parliamentarism. As Carl Schmitt, a truly anti-liberal
thinker (who made a great impact on Mannheim and many of his contem-
13 In fact, these two forms of conservatism are basically the same as the two forms in the
distinction made by the German philosopher Riidiger Safranski: 'structural' and 'value
conservatism'. The former 'wants to build Autobahns, the value-conservative wants to protect
the trees that are cut down in order to build it' (Stjernfelt, 1 996: 3).
CONSERVATI SM A N D POLITICS 29
poraries), said, 'the original conception o f parliamentarism was . . . that of

a debating society in which truth is sought by theoretical methods' ( 1 99 1 :
1 1 0). But this theory left out something very important: the role of power
and interests in politics.
It was a great achievement of 'the socialist-communist conception' to
recognize this. Marx rejects the idea of a 'pure theory' (this would be
'ideology') while claiming to have a theory that is situated beyond ideo
logy. Mannheim rejects the idea of pure theories as well, but, as we have
seen, not the idea of freeing oneself from belonging to ideologies, or
'prejudices' (Gadamer, 1 989). One of the strengths in the Marxian critique
of ideology is that it assimilated previous conceptions of politics, that is,
conservatism and liberalism. By being 'dialectical' he claims to include both
liberal intellectualism and conservative irrationalism. Furthermore, Marx
and Marxism moved the place of the irrational one step further. If con
servatism was a celebration of the irrational, and liberalism helped create
new forms of irrationality, Marx moved it into the future, to the moment
of the revolution. Revolution becomes the mediating light for the contra
diction between the despair caused by the present forms of irrationality and
the hope for a rational interpretation. Marx created a rational discourse,
turning liberalism and political economy into a critique of themselves. But
this rationality had a very clear limit - the revolution which requires a
moment, and intuition and action. In its turn this irrationality would
disappear after its occurrence - if and when the proletariat seize power,
society becomes rational, liberal and democrat. Perhaps Mannheim was
quite prophetic here. In countries with a long social democrat tradition this
seems very true. But in communist countries the ruling groups became
bureaucratic conservatives.
The last ideal type that Mannheim treats is fascism. In this he traces an
overall irrationalism - the celebration of action, the 'decisive deed' (die
ausschlaggebende Tat), and the need for an elite. It is quite different from
conservative historicism, since it not only celebrates irrationalism, but also
says that the deed (die Tat) is beyond historical interpretation. Thus, it is
extremely anti-intellectual, preferring myths and intuition, becoming an
ideology for the marginalized outsiders.
The reason for Mannheim's exposition of these five ideal types is not only
to show their interconnections, but also to demonstrate their limitations
and, thus, the need for a political synthesis to which the sociology of
knowledge can make a contribution. What, then, would this synthesis look
like? Here we see a recycling of earlier theses with some new arguments
added. Above all, we would need an integration of all the perspectives into a
comprehensive one. One notices that he treats Marxism, liberalism and
conservative historicism most favourably, and even fascism is complimented
for bringing attention to the amorphous aspects of life. This relative
synthesis is to get wider and wider. But who can make this happen? Is there
a group that can serve as a 'bearer' of this 'mission'? Here we come to the
most famous thesis in Ideology and Utopia: the so-called 'free-floating
30 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE O F POLITICS
intellectuals' . I think that the interpretations and criticisms of Mannheim

have been too blinded by the term 'free-floating'. Of course the intellectuals
are not 'free' from history and society. What has not been noticed, I would
argue, is the connection between Bildungskultur as a mediating instance
between civilization and culture, between technical reason and everyday
ness, and the mission of the intellectuals. The intellectuals have a privileged
access to this possibility. They, as possible mediators of a Bildungskultur,
can perhaps inspire the politicians to listen to each other. But they can never
tell the politicians what they should think and value - 'the judgements
themselves cannot be taught but we can become more or less adequately
aware of them and we can interpret them" 4 (Mannheim, 199 1 : 146).
Once again Mannheim stresses the importance of romanticism and its
defence of the areas that rationalism and rationalization threaten - the
qualitative and the whole. He argues that the insights of romanticism are
today preserved in, for example, Gestalt theory and characterologyY This,
of course, is a retreatment from his essay on conjunctive and com
municative knowledge. The latter, reproduced by liberalism, leads to the
singularization of knowledge l 6 and to a reduction of humanity to a Homo
(Economicus. It has forgotten, using Gadamer's vocabulary, that the
prejudice against quality is just another prejudice: 'What was not noticed
was that the world of purely quantifiable and analysable was itself only
discoverable on the basis of a definite Weltanschauung' ( 1 99 1 : 1 50). This is
the blind spot of liberalism and rationalism - the prejudice of being
without prejudices. This blind spot was reproduced by Marxism when it
did not recognize itself as another ideology.
Mannheim's critique of rationalism and liberalism is not caused by an
irrationalism, but is to a large degree dependent upon the contemporary
situation: the liberals and the social democrats did not listen enough to
what was happening in society - they ignored the irrational forces. I ?
What, then, is needed is a mastery of the contemporary situation, a
rediscovery of the capabilities of political knowledge:
The person who is purposefully active will never ask how some revered leader
acted in a past situation, but rather how he would really orient himself to the
present situation. This ability to reorient oneself anew to an ever newly forming
constellation of factors constitutes the essential practical capacity of the type of
14 Please note the resemblance to both the hermeneutic openness (Gadamer, 1 989), and
Habermas's ( 1 98 1 ) minimalistic modernism (the formal character of the 'discourse ethics').
15 Probably Mannheim is thinking of the works of Ludwig Klages here, although being an
extremely reactionary philosopher and psychologist, his important influence on, for example,
Max Weber and critical theory has not been discovered until recently. See Honneth ( 1 987),
and Stauth and Turner ( 1 992).
16 By this I mean that the concepts of modern science have aimed at reducing everything
qualitative to the quantity ' 1 ' - one Science, one Method, etc. See Horkheimer and Adorno
( 1 978: I I).
17 Cf. 'by 1 9 1 8 illiberalism had become so pervasive at all levels of German society . . .
that the Weimar republic stood little, if any, chance of survival' (Jones, 1 992: 75).
CONSERVATISM A N D POL ITICS 31
mind which is constantly seeking orientation for action. To awaken this capacity,
to keep it alert, and to make it effective with reference to the material at hand is
the specific task of political education. (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 1 57)
'Political education' thus seems to be related to 'application' (Gadamer,

1 989), the ability to master a situation by using knowledge and former
experiences. But this possibility is, according to Mannheim, weakened due
to the polarization which he himself reflects in his conceptual dualities. On
the one hand, we have the tendency of homogenization. On the other, the
tendency of romanticism:
Homogenization: Romanticism:
Communicative knowledge Conjunctive knowledge

Zivilisation Kultur
Lecture Workshop
Intellect The whole person
Once again, we can trace Mannheim's fascination with the irrational pole.
But he is also very aware of its limitations and dangers. Architecture, to
use one of Mannheim's own examples, cannot be learned conjunctively: 'it
is not our task to drive intellectualism from the places where it actually
fulfils an organic need that has arisen in recent times' (Mannheim, 1 99 1 :
1 6 1 ). An alternative metaphor for describing how a political rational
mastery can rise is artistic knowledge. Neither the arts nor politics can
simply be 'taught'; knowledge must also grow for itself. On the other hand,
we do need an orientation, which is available only through rational
reflection. It is here where the sociology of knowledge might make a
contribution to political knowledge; this meeting of science and politics lets
us know 'the innermost nature of political knowledge' ( 1 99 1 : 1 66).
At this point Mannheim's scepticism of Max Weber's standpoint
becomes visible - 'his [Weber's] solution suffers from the assumption of the
separability of theory and evaluation' ( 1 99 1 : 1 45, footnote I). This is
exactly what Mannheim wishes to avoid, but he cannot give anything
except hints as to what the bridge may look like. The reason for this is
already part of his theory - only the future can tell us what was right
today. For today, all we can do is be self-reflective and self-conscious,
asking ourselves which prejudices we have, trying to avoid naivete and go
towards the end of the process of thinking. If we want to avoid the totally
'administered society' (Adorno), 18 the unpolitical society, we must ask
what the irrational elements of politics are and treat them rationally.
The last essay of the original edition addresses the 'utopian mentality',
the historical forms of utopian thought and how these forms are related.
18 This is also an important aspect of Carl Schmitt's works - the critique of politics as
technology. See McCormick ( 1997).
32 RAD ICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Having already focused on the relation between theory and practice in

different forms of political thinking, Mannheim now tries to locate their
utopian contents.
What, then, is 'utopia'? Mannheim's definition is that 'A state of mind is
utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it
occurs' ( 1 99 1 : 1 73). We must then know what we mean by 'reality' in order
to know when thinking is 'incongruent'. For a sociologist, 'reality' is that
which is concretely effective, an order which determines us as individuals.
Mannheim, like most other sociologists, is not worried about such a
definition and thus makes a stop here. But we need to ask if this 'reality' is
'reconstructed' or 'constructed'. Here I think that Gadamer, and some
post-structuralists, can make an important contribution: since we always
construct our world within the tradition to which we belong, we cannot
step outside this tradition. But this does not mean, as we have seen, that we
reduce 'reality' or 'being' to 'language'. On the contrary, language talks
about something outside it. Language is a linguistic medium which talks
about the untalked, writes the unwritten.
'Ideology' is also 'incongruent', but in an opposite manner - it wants to
prove that the utopian wishes are already fulfilled. Thus, it is most often the
case that the dominant classes tend to be 'ideological', while the oppressed
classes favour utopia. Utopias, like thinking in general, are based upon
wishes. True utopias are spatial wishes, the wish that the present room
would be another kind of room. Temporal wishes, on the other hand, like
'chiliasm' - messianic, prophetic movements - are instead wishes of another
form of time, a totally different life. Mannheim wants to locate different
forms of utopian thinking, and his method for this is truly hermeneutical -
'our first understanding of the parts comes through the whole' ( 1 99 1 : 1 89).
That is, when we locate ideologies and utopias, we presuppose them.
First of all, the drive behind utopias is not pure thinking, but energies.
That is, a volitional drive ('will') that is given. Characteristic of the first
form of utopian thinking - 'chiliasm' - is that it not only wants to be its
own symbols, but also its own present energy! It wants its own immanent
wish realized here and now - the coming of paradise and Messiah. An
example of this is the pre-modern movements among peasants during the
Middle Ages.
The first modern utopia - liberalism - can then be seen as a reaction
against chiliasm. Here the rational makes its entrance as an utopian ideal,
and the importance of having the idea of the rational is placed in the
foreground. In the idea, the rational, ideal world was constructed, and
history was seen as a process towards the realization of this. History is the
story of 'progress' and 'becoming' . This is a very intellectualist view, with
the formal character of social relations emphasized. Thus, it is critical of
the substantialist aspect of chiliasm, with its wishes for another quality and
the total overthrow of chronological time.
In its turn, conservatism is an anti-liberal reaction. It wants to restore the
worth of substantiality and our rootedness in the present - 'it gave positive
emphasis to the notion of the determinateness of our outlook and our

behaviour' ( 1 99 1 : 206). A good example of conservatism is found in Hegel's
philosophy where he criticizes the idea of a pure 'idea', a liberal conception
which reduces the idea to mere 'opinion'. Instead Hegel wants to connect the
idea to the real, to what we have here and now. For example, the Kantian
ethics is mere Moralitiit, but what really matters is the Sittlichkeit, socio
culturally rooted morality. But conservatism is more than an ideology. In
Hegel's philosophy, for example, there remain tensions between ideas that
become objectified and new ideas that might contradict this existence. The
conservative utopia is then the question of how to live better and richer in
this reality by appreciating what history has left to US. 1 9 As a consequence,
history is not thought of as something that is 'made', but as something that
'grows', in the form of an objective Geist, for example. This opens a possible
alternative interpretation of Hegel's famous statement that the real is the
rational; that if we want rationality, we have to look at reality. 2o
Another aspect of this conservatism is that it aims at having knowledge
of how to have control. The future is predictable, not because of a rational
plan, but because we can control the present and prevent drastic changes.
It is because of this that conservatism often becomes a 'reactionary',
ideological force.
Finally, we have socialism as utopia. Socialist utopia incorporates ele
ments from both liberalism - 'the idea' as a historical force - and conser
vatism - the sense for what we have now. From conservatism also comes
the suspicion that the liberal 'idea' is just an 'opinion' without roots in
history. For socialism the primary historical and reality-based force is class
struggle. This strategy was already prepared by conservatism: the concept
of Volksgeist, which today sounds like racist nonsense, was the first
attempt to describe something that was shared by individuals, and that was
developing.
It might sound like Mannheim saw socialism as nothing but a bastard
child of liberalism and conservatism, but in fact he openly, as we have seen,
acknowledges Marx for making his own project possible by being the first
to treat ideology sociologically.
Mannheim's heroic attempts in the three essays of Ideologie und Utopie
end in tragedy. The living substances of human societies are its utopias.
But they have one by one dissolved one another, and after the insight that
even Marxism is an ideology, what is left? Conservatism tends to lead to
'administration', dealing only with what has 'become', while liberalism has
a problem with defending its universalist claims. So what about socialism?
Either it turns administrative-conservative, as it did in the Kremlin, or it
develops into social liberalism and tries to build the welfare state. But then
the problem of liberalism returns - how to legitimate its universalist claims
19 Here Mannheim differs from the often repeated proposition that conservatism (and
fascism) should lack utopias.
20 'Was verniinftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist verniinftig'.
34 RAD ICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
of equality and freedom. Mannheim's essays were pleas to the politicians to

sit down and discuss how a new, synthetic utopia would appear. This was
the only way to prevent the 'conservative revolution', probably the most
vital intellectual movement in Weimar Germany, from ending as it did! -
in a catastrophe.
His other plea was directed at the intellectuals: do whatever you can to
prevent the victory of technocracy. Here Ideologie und Utopie ends, perhaps
waiting for a new Marx to appear and make a new intellectual jump
forward, opening the way for a dynamic synthesis. Another potential syn
thesis is one that could loosen the 'Gordian knot' - find the common
description that could make knowledge as broad as possible. In this case
there is a hint of the young Mannheim: the possibility of a widening of
consciousness to include the mystery and the miracle is the ambition of the
young Dostoyevsky-inspired Mannheim.
From such a close reading as I have taken here, it becomes a little too
easy to dismiss Mannheim's attempts as a gigantic mistake. But this is only
true if we look at his conclusions, where he tries to be concrete. As
diagnoses, and as an attempt to conceptualize the Zeitgeist, his essays still
have a lot to say.
First of all, evaluation is necessary - without an aspect everything
becomes meaningless. We need utopias in order to judge ideologies. At first
sight ideology (an aspect) versus utopia (a non-perspectivist point) looks
like a circle, where we move back and forth when we discover that a utopia
was just another ideology. But this overlooks one thing: Mannheim
replaced the part/whole problematic, the question of perspective and
absolute knowledge with 'Ideology' and 'Utopia'. That is, he tried to bring
in historical and social factors in order to show that epistemological
problems are practical problems, possible to solve only in history.
Although not explicitly, communication is given an important place here -
what you claim to be truly utopian can always be claimed as false/
ideological by another person or group. Thus, what Mannheim tried to
accomplish was the transformation of the circle to a spiral. The question of
truth becomes a temporal question, a process. In this way it becomes
possible to avoid the nihilist conclusions drawn from the experience of
relativity. We do not choose either foundation/evaluation or pure analysis/
deconstruction. Instead we move between the two, convinced that this
problem is going to look different tomorrow.
Against nihilism/scepticism we could, with Mannheim, say that if we
doubt everything, we are at least convinced of the worth of doubting! The
intellectuals have a special chance to reach a post-metaphysical conviction
which is based upon neither capitulation (nihilism) nor a totalitarian desire
for knowing where history is moving. This provisory conviction consists
neither of sneaky interests (we are too reflexive to do that), nor of a
moving will to change the world totally. The conviction is an expression of
the will, which cannot be explained but only given recognition as existing.
True convictions are those which are rooted in generations and traditions,
and recognized as both will and interest. They are also moving in the
ideology/utopia spiral: we have a need for both an understanding of what
reality is now (ideology), and ideas on how it can change (utopia). We have
to be utopian, while recognizing that this utopia is an ideology which is
starting a new attempt.
Since we should avoid final solutions, recognizing the provisory nature
of our convictions, we must avoid 'strong' concepts - 'objective', 'relative',
etc. Instead, the sociology of knowledge implies a weakening of concepts.
Dualities might sometimes be dissolved into a third category, but this
marks no absolute overcoming, only a social and historical possibility.
What the sociology of knowledge should aim towards is the explanation of
how strong concepts are formulated, a process which is an integral part of
the basic competition. Thus, for example, concepts like 'authenticity' or
'realism' are not part of the approach, but something that should be
explained and analysed - as slogans, markers in battles. The usefulness of
strong concepts in conflicts is that they fix something that is not fixed -
'reality', for example, has such a power, for the person using this is making
claims of having a superior knowledge. 2 1
But some dualities at the analytical level are more fundamental and
cannot be avoided. The best example of this is what I have called the dual
nature of knowledge. The two poles of knowledge are not of equal weight.
The sociology of knowledge, in its analyses, sees the objects from the
'sneaky' aspect, regarding actions and thoughts as caused by 'interests'. To
give priority to the 'evil' side, to be an 'anti-humanist', means practising
suspicion and not taking the actors' own explanations at face value. When
we as social scientists explain and analyse social phenomena we are not
simply creating replicas of the real world. We are constructing a discourse
which not only talks about social reality but is an autonomous enterprise
in itself. Therefore, when using weak concepts like 'competition', 'conflict',
'interests', etc., we construct other concepts of a non-common-sense
nature. Our concepts should not be too easily translatable into the
language of everyday life or the rhetoric of ideological competition.
What, then, about the other pole of knowledge - 'will'? This pole
represents the given, that which cannot be explained or rationalized. The
recognition of 'will' makes nihilism and relativism fruitless and self
contradictory. For example, nihilism is impossible since it always takes
something for given - the nihilist conviction or the positive value of a
nihilism. To recognize the will marks the ambition of Verbundenheit, the
wish to connect, to associate being and thinking. 'Will', like 'prejudice',
lives at the ontological level, and is a precondition of seeing something as,
for example, an expression of an 'interest'. When we identify something as
an interest we can do this because 'interest' is not the whole story.
21 I think that this thesis comes near to Pierre Bourdieu's ( 1 988) approach - that the social
scientist should avoid common-sense concepts since he otherwise would get involved in his
own object thus making it hard to maintain the very precondition of his own activity - the
necessary difference between the object and the description of it that the scientist creates.
36 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Rather, Mannheim's essays on Ideology and Utopia aim at a position

that is beyond both conservative or formal-sociological dualism, and a
purely negative dialectics where Messiah is paradoxically waiting in the
void. I prefer to call his alternative the hermeneutic spiral (not circle!), the
eternal movement between ideological bounded ness and utopian aspira
tions which might take the form of historical progress.
First of all, in conservatism Mannheim saw not only an enemy which
had to be repressed, but also a perspective that could enrich our under
standing. As the perspective of social groups not yet swept up in the
process of atomization, conservatism provides a means to view happenings
to which liberalism is blind - the concrete results of the civilization process
(Mannheim, 1 986). Conservative thinking also has a paradoxical nature: in
defending the non-rational, the particular, the gemeinschaftlich, it has to
make its appeals in a rational, almost universal and gesellschaftlich manner
if it wants to be a serious alternative to liberalism. That is, anti-modernism
and conservatism are modern phenomena.
It is from conservative thinking that Mannheim develops the idea of the
Seinsverbundenheit of thought, the idea that knowledge is always rooted
in, and connected to, social and cultural being. This description has a
normative undertone: if knowledge is to be practical then it should be
rooted in living communities. Mannheim implicitly connects conservative
thinking to his own ideas in 'Communicative and conjunctive knowledge'
(Mannheim, 1 982). Here Mannheim searches for a method in the
sociology of culture which is oriented towards genuine, that is conjunctive,
knowledge, that is practical and can be used in solving problems in
historical situations. In opposition to this, 'communicative' knowledge is
reified, formal and used by specialists. Thus, one view that Mannheim
'imports' from conservatism is the emphasis on the practical and dynamic
nature of knowledge that is a living part of human communities. If the
intellectuals are to be understood and recognized as capable agents of
change, they must be in tune with something that already exists, if not
always fully articulated, in the surrounding communities and society. If we
want to be read and heard, we must listen to and recognize the happen
ings in our native social contexts. Otherwise, our critique will end in
negativity and isolation, and in the worst case 'terrorism'. As Michael
Walzer ( 1 989: 235) puts it: 'Solitary conceptions make for cruel deliveries.'
This thesis might provide us with an understanding of why so many
people listened to and read the conservative revolutionaries - they articu
lated something that already existed as unconscious patterns of thought in
many Germans.
One could be tempted to regard Mannheim as a 'conservative', an anti
liberal intellectual, but his position is complex and quite original: 'I have
discerned that liberalism is obsolete, but my attitudes are still at a liberal
level.'22 Mannheim was certainly a liberal in the sense that he believed that
22 Mannheim, in a paper from the mid- 1930s, quoted from Kettler and Meja ( 1984).
CONSERVATI SM A N D POLITICS 37
the gap between politics and science could be bridged, that a 'synthesis'
was possible.
In his main work, Ideologie und Utopie, Mannheim accuses rationalism of
ignoring the irrational and discrediting the 'volitional' base of human
existence. This does not mean, however, that Mannheim surrenders to a
Lebensphilosophie. For example, he viewed the emphasis on Erlebnis as the
hallmark of irrationalism (Kettler et aI., 1 990: 1 463). Instead, he defended
Erfahrung as the main source of genuine, historical knowledge, as an
openness to the unknown where authentic learning becomes possible
without the necessity to postulate an absolutely 'objective' one-dimensional
reality. He defends rational analysis but, as opposed to Max Weber, does
not recognize any absolute limit between the 'ought' and the 'is' - in other
words, between politics and science. From science politics can learn to
handle matters more rationally, while from politics science can learn how to
apply general rules to specific situations. This general thesis is made more
specific for the situation in the Weimar Republic - sociology is seen as a
partner in the search for a more 'organic', non-individualist approach. 23
Mannheim is searching for an 'organic',24 'dynamic' viewpoint which might
temporarily synthesize the different political perspectives, a viewpoint
which should adjust men to the present historical stage. Such an 'adjust
ment' makes a theory 'true', and here it seems plausible to assume that
Mannheim is not blind to the conservative ideological hegemony.
Having dealt with the 'passive' side of the analysis found in Ideologie und
Utopie, we can now turn to the more 'active' side. Here Mannheim is
pleading for self-reflection among his generation. As we know from another
text - 'The problem of generations' (Mannheim, 1 952c) - he considered
'generation' to be as important a formative factor as class, status, etc.,
because people of the same generation are conditioned by similar experi
ences, especially in times of turbulence. It seems quite obvious that this
thesis is derived from Mannheim's own strong experiences of belonging to a
'generation' with a 'mission' - in his case the so-called 'Sunday Circle' in
Budapest (appr. 1 9 1 5-20) (Kanidi and Vezer, 1 985; Gluck, 1 99 1 ) . In
Ideologie und Utopie Mannheim is clearly writing for a contemporary
audience, hoping to catch the attention of people who are able to save the
constitution and the republic. Towards these ends, Mannheim provides the
useful service of informing his audience of the nature of their own
knowledge and the 'prospects of scientific politics'.
From Carl Schmitt, Mannheim takes the conservative insight that no
knowledge can be 'liberated' from irrational elements. The most important
agent is, in fact, 'Life' itself (Mannheim, 1 990b: 69), while politics aims at
transforming the world according to a structured will. However,
23 Ideology and Utopia (199 1 : 29), from Chapter I, which was written especially for the
English version, and is therefore a self-reflective statement by Mannheim.
24 This metaphor is often used in every harsh critique of the current state. We will see later
that it is also a favourite among radical conservatives.
38 RADICAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE O F POLITICS
Mannheim is far from accepting the decisionism of Schmitt (and, indirectly

Max Weber). He sees decisionism as dependent upon myth-making
abilities, and his own example which illustrates this is found in Pareto,
Sorel and Mussolini: 25 'For this activistic intuitionism, thought only clears
the way for the pure deed free from illusions' (Mannheim, 1 99 1 : 1 22). 26
This is Mannheim's understanding of fascism: the glorification of the
decisive deed, which is in need of mythological justification.
Mannheim and critical theory
In this context it is necessary to say something about Mannheim's

approach in relation to classical critical theory, since they developed at the
same time, and had partly similar focuses and ambitions. Furthermore
both had to deal with questions of totalitarianism and fascism, both
theoretically and biographically. 27 For example, I have argued that
Mannheim's approach has critical potentials.
While Theodor W. Adorno ( 1 973; 198 1 ) is satisfied with resting upon
pure 'negativity' - although he sometimes acknowledges it as 'messianic
light' - Mannheim openly describes his own partial anti-liberalism as
stemming from conservative thought. But he also wants to overcome the
eternal mirroring between both ideology/utopia and conservatism/liberal
ism by creating something 'new': a synthesis and a new epistemology. This
seems to be an alternative, perhaps impossible to realize, to the Hegelian
conception of reconciliation or synthesis. For example, in his essay on
conjunctive and communicative knowledge (Mannheim, 1 982: 1 60),
Mannheim describes his own project as 'a theory of knowing the quali
tative'. Mannheim's ambition in this project was to reach a more modern,
comprehensive and 'dynamic' understanding than was to be found in either
the rigid dualism of conservatism or the abstract consensual universality of
liberalism. Thus, his utopia must be aware of its ideological roots, and
realize that it is not possible to destroy and deny the past. Utopia must
also preserve, be un-critical, and partially accept the given. Comparatively,
the utopia of critical theory might be understood as an utopia totally freed
from ideology, too eschatological and paradoxical.
Thus, in Mannheim we have the picture of an intellectual devoted to
modernity and sociological analysis, who is willing to incorporate some
conservative, 'irrational' insights. These insights are incorporated, as I see
it, for two reasons. First, Mannheim is in a sense 'inside' such insights, since
25 These persons all emphasized the role of myth. However, Mussolini differed from the
other two in believing in the possibility of real 'progress'.
26 The 'activistic intuitionism' is a strategy dealing with nihilism and the experience of
contingency. According to Heidegren ( 1997), there are two main strategies in this dealing:
either to strive for a new stable order, or to hail pure action, that is, a form of chiliastic
immanence. I will show later how this constituted an important discussion among conservative
revolutionaries in the mid-I 920s on whether one should have a 'programme' or not.
27 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Dahl ( 1 995).
they have had a formative influence on him and his generation. Secondly,
the contemporary situation - the Weimar Republic - requires a synthesis
between, on the one hand, a rationalized society, and on the other, the
irrational, spiritual hunger and other human needs. Dostoyevsky's treatises
on 'Grace' are probably of central importance for understanding
Mannheim's eternal emphasis on the hunger and the other needs.
One of Max Horkheimer's ( 1 990) arguments against Mannheim was that
he did not differentiate between 'insight' and 'ideology'. In this case, I
think it is quite clear that Mannheim is in fact more up to date than Max
Horkheimer. Today it has become much more problematic to distinguish
between 'thought' and 'reality' - a distinction that until recently was
relatively unproblematic for Marxists and positivists. The 'linguistic turn'
(Wittgenstein, Lacan, Gadamer, Habermas and others) has shown us that
things are not that simple - 'Sein das verstanden werden kann, ist
,
Sprache 28 (Gadamer, 1 986: 478). Considering Mannheim's rootedness
in the hermeneutical tradition (Hekman, 1 986) and the absence of a dis
cussion of hermeneutics in classical critical theory, one must conclude that
Mannheim provides a more fruitful orientation than critical theory for
addressing oneself to the fundamental issues of contemporary debate in
social theory.
* * *
After having exposed and interpreted Mannheim's approach in such detail,

it is now time to sum up the most important themes for the under
standing and analysis of modern political thought. First of all, the
generation as a political factor seems to be of great importance as time
seems to travel faster and faster. If we avoid falling into the constructivist
error applied by the media, competition between generations is always the
case. Not only is 'culture' the place of battle, such 'simple' issues as getting
a job, caused by pure demographic reasons, are also made into a genera
tional issue.
Secondly, evaluation and non-evaluation are applied here. The non
evaluative aspect of analysing ideologies has the advantage of not
supposing a given scale where 'left', 'right' and the 'middle' can be placed
easily. This is important in a time like ours where we actually see new
political constellations. In other words, the non-evaluative aspect is more
sensitive for social and historical changes. However, the evaluative aspect is
also there since we never can lift ourselves out of history and society and
the normative communities to which we belong. Exactly because of this, we
are always critical of something, using the whole arsenal of our knowledge
which we, by definition, have to accept if we do not choose simply to drop
out.
28 'The form of Being that we are able to understand is language'.
40 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Thirdly, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is sensitive for both of the

extreme poles of human culture and knowledge, metaphorized as 'conjunc
tion' and 'communication'. This makes us aware that political ideologies are
always 'rooted' (sic!) in conjunctive communities. Thus, they cannot simply
be 'false' or implemented from above. For example, radical conservatism
and fascism have some 'truth' in that they express lived feelings, reactions
and a sense of community. However, ideologies can be either 'performative
contradictions' (Habermas, 1 98 1 ) - liberalism does not admit its Seins
verbundenheit, its own particularity; contradictory in the case of socialism
since it is both placing a romantic goal in the future while wanting to be
totally rational and true in the present; or, as in the case of conservatism,
torn between the necessity of rationalizing and the wish to be concrete,
particular and 'organic'.
However, there is one important critique of Mannheim that we have to
take seriously: ideologies are not only determined by their inner logics, but
also by the dynamics caused by the eternal interaction between ideologies
and the social and historical realities surrounding them. Even if Mannheim
is a historicist, he puts too much emphasis on the inner mechanisms of
thought. Therefore, my next step will be to let the sociology of knowledge
meet the main object of this book, that is radical conservatism and the
dilemmas of conservatism that cause a split between 'structural conser
vatism' and 'value-conservatism'.
The dynamics and dilemmas of conservatism
While Mannheim stressed the inner logic of political thinking, we now have
to look at how radical conservatism took form as a consequence of the
logics of conservatism and how social and historical circumstances deter
mined the outcome of this logic. The focus will be on twentieth-century
German conservatism for several reasons, some of them already
mentioned. It was here that the dynamics and 'dilemmas' of modern con
servatism were intensified and caused the first form of radical conservatism
- the so-called 'conservative revolution' . Secondly, this form of radical
conservatism had a strong influence on the political reality, ending in the
Third Reich. Thirdly, in the German Weimar Republic questions of
modernization, technology, nihilism and authenticity were at the centre
of public attention, questions that once again are highly relevant in the
Western fin-de-siecle world. My point is far from being ethno- or
Germano-centric. Rather, I will show that the thinking called the con
servative revolution today is revived in political and intellectual discussions
all over the world, and that if all the forms of radical conservatism we see
all over the world do not have an explicit ideology, the conservative
revolutionary ideology could very well serve this place.
I will start my exposition by focusing on how social factors influenced
the formation of political thought - the generational factor, masculinity,
CONSERVATI SM A N D POL ITICS 41
social strata and economic and social reality, that is, focusing the dynamics
of thought. After this I will discuss the main themes of the conservative
revolution, thus reconnecting to the logic of thinking.
The ideas of 1914 and the rise of the 'conservative revolution'
'Let it grow', that is, be true to the 'roots', to let public matters grow
according to their 'nature', was the basic idea in nineteenth-century
conservatism, the A ltkonservatismus that Mannheim analysed. 29 However,
after World War I, the dilemmas of conservatism became sharply visible.
What had begun to 'grow' was not desirable, therefore 'to make' became an
option and a radicalization and renewal among the right began. The
ideology, the content had come into conflict with itself. The values
traditionally defended by conservatism came into conflict with the ambition
of 'letting it grow'.
Originally, nineteenth-century conservatism was almost a cousin to
liberalism. Both were devoted to the questions of freedom and causes of
change ('rationalizing the irrational'). Indeed, the conservatives accepted
'evolution', a break with the status quo since there was real progress
everywhere - the promises of science, technology and social reforms. 30
The conservatives included those who had turned against the French
revolution after first having supported it (Klemperer, 1 957: 1 9). The
conservatives accepted the revolution, but also criticized it: it was based
upon an assumption that humanity could make the world in its own image.
Instead, we must discover the order and follow it, not try to create a new
order, which might lead to terror. The conservatives prefer the known to
the unknown. Organic growth is better than arbitrary rule. The con
servatives also addressed the question of freedom. They meant that it is
context-bound, not an abstract value. Social freedom means obeying the
rules of the country. 'Freedom' was thus not only a liberal project.
The old conservatism also included irrationalism and pessimism. It
agreed with romanticism in that 'Life' must be saved! The ground for
history and existence was order which can never be rationally created. It just
'is'. It also shared the pessimism of Joseph de Maistre who saw the French
revolution as God's punishment. Utopia is not on Earth, but in heaven.
Only by praying does the individual get wisdom and dignity (Lindbom,
1 996). Conservatism was, therefore, clearly intertwined with theology.
However, the dilemma of conservatism was already inherent from the
start: principles or expediency? Values or structure? The latter won in
29 The 'organic' orientation (visible in the metaphors of 'roots', 'growing', etc.) was the
common denominator among several conservative thinkers, developed through their various
reactions to the French revolution - Edmund Burke, Juan Donoso Cortes, etc.
30 This general statement has to be modified a little. On the one hand, there were the pure
reactionary thinkers who rejected every idea of 'progress'; on the other hand, there were men
like Edmund Burke who represented a more 'modern' and 'half-liberal' form of conservatism.
42 RAD ICAL CO N S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Germany, with Hegel and Bismarck as the leading figures; freedom became
the freedom to obey. The party transformed from an independent Junker
party to a vehicle of the state, devoid of ethics and religious orientation,
that is values and principles.
At the end of the century writers like Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky
appeared to be complaining about the lack of depth in modern times. They
can be read as criticizing the dominating materialism, and as defenders of
the irrational and invisible. In philosophy and social science, writers like
Vilfredo Pareto, Juan Donoso Cortes and Georges Sorel declared that
'progress' was an illusion. Pareto ( 1 980) was not normative, but considered
this as a fact shown in his historical-sociological studies; Sorel ( 1 969)
considered it as a bourgeois myth; Donoso Cortes saw the idea of progress
as a way of fooling people to believe in paradise at the end of the road,
where only real hell awaited ( 1 979; Herrera, 1 995; 1 32). Although this was
a conservative critique, it came into opposition with mainstream, old
fashioned authoritarian conservatism.
Especially in Germany, this critique had many potential listeners. The
rationalist and liberal traditions were not very strong. It was not a
homogeneous nation state like France or England. Rather, it consisted of
many regions often dominated by pre-capitalist and pre-modern structures.
The new radicalized conservative critique was, as Thomas Mann said, both
anti-nihilist and conservative; in the spirit of Nietzsche it wanted to both
destroy and preserve (Klemperer, 1 957: 38).
The year 1914 came as a blessing from above. For many the emerging war
signified a break with the old and weakened Wilhelmine Reich and a link to
a glorified past, a way to restore an imagined golden age and a modern way
at the same time - that is, modern war technology. This event is often called
'the ideas of 1 9 14', ideas which would form a whole generation.
Now, we have to distinguish between 'generation' as a descriptive and
mobilizing concept. Mannheim aimed at using it as a pure descriptive
concept, but he also hoped that his project was in tune with the times, thus
catching the ears of the young truth-seeking generation. Sadly, even if his
project had validity (Geltung) , Hitler had the actuality (Aktualitat) (Petersen,
1 996). Furthermore, Mannheim, Lukacs and other intellectuals in early
twentieth-century Budapest were looking desperately for an answer to their
cultural needs. The so-called Sunday Circle in Budapest (Karadi & Vezer,
1985; Gluck, 1 99 1 ) was informally chaired by Georg Lukacs. During the late
1 9 1 0s the members gathered on Sundays for informal talks and discussions.
The dominant influences were of a very wide range - Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy,
Simmel, Max Weber, mysticism, etc. What the members wanted was life,
vitality, renewal - needs that also formed the conservative revolutionaries
that were to appear in the 1 920s. This eclecticism expressed both the natural
search for a cultural and intellectual identity of a young generation; the
Zeitgeist; and the dilemma of Hungarian intellectuals: they were critical of
both the undeveloped, half-feudal character of the Hungarian society, and of
capitalism and the emerging modern industrial society with its alienation
and fragmentation. A speech by Mannheim from 1 9 1 8 Seele und Kultur

-
could be read as a kind of 'program' for the Sunday Circle. Here is a short
passage:
I could very well refer to many predecessors whose ways are ours: the Weltan
schauung and life-feeling of Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard's ethics, the German
Logos, the Hungarian spirit, Lask, Zalai. Furthermore, I could mention the
aesthetic attitude of Paul Ernst and Riegl, the new French poetry . . . Bartok as
our guides. (Mannheim, 1 970: 67)
Hanz Zehrer, editor of Die Tat, 3 l used 'generation' as a mobilizing tool. He

proposed a programme that should transcend left and right; the para
military groups on the left and right should join one unity since they had a
lot in common - especially as they came from the same generation (the
Frontline Spirit)! (Woods, 1 996: 89). Zehrer wrote about the struggle
between generations which the new and young generation could win, and a
member of this young generation wrote in Die Tat that 'We long for
,
dogma and certainty (Eindeutigkeit) (Klemperer, 1 957: 1 30). There had
been nothing like this in modern times. There had been nothing but
ambivalence and this was associated with the alienating and mechanical
structures created by liberal democracy and capitalism.
But where did this new generation come from? Here we have to recognize
the importance of the German Youth Movement. The Wandervogels appeared
after the turn of the century: young men leaving schools and homes to seek
the truth in the 'natural' way oflife in the forests and the countryside, praising
the Heimat and the German Volk (Mosse, 1 964: 1 7 I ff. ; Mohler, 1 989: 3 1 ff.).
They were rebels, against liberalism and modern individualism, anti
authoritarian, but in search of new authorities - men like Nietzsche, Paul de
Lagarde32 and Stefan George. 33 Their stress lay on inner freedom and
revolution. Most of them became volunteers when the war broke out. 34
Thus, most of them shared 'the ideas of 1 9 1 4' . Johann Plenge and
Rudolf Kjellen both wrote books on this subjeceS - how 1 9 1 4 differed
from 1 789 - and apart from the young men, writers and intellectuals such
as Max Scheler, Thomas Mann, Friedrich Meinecke and Ernst Troeltsch
confessed themselves to these ideas. According to these ideas, the nine
teenth century lacked faith and will, and was now finally dead. Germany
was looking for an 'idea', a Geist. The war was a German revolution and
3 1 A widely read radical-conservative journal in Weimar Germany.

32 Together with Julius Langbehn, Lagarde is regarded as the founder of German v6lkisch
thinking. As early as 1 853 he described himself in one of his angry pamphlets as 'too
conservative not to be radical' (Quoted from Klemperer, 1957: 45).
33 George was a much admired charismatic poet and the leader of the controversial
George-Kreis (see Breuer, 1 995).
34 It is interesting to note that there was also a Jewish youth movement - romantic, anti
materialist and V6lkisch (Mosse, 1 970: 8 I ff.).
35 Plenge, 1 789 und 1914, Die symbolischen Jahre in dey Geschichte des politischen Geistes
( 1 9 1 6); KjeHen, Die Ideen von 1914 ( 1 9 1 5).
44 RAD ICAL CONSE RVATI SM AN D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
Plenge wrote that it was a war against liberalism (Plenge, 1 9 1 5: 1 7 1 ) . Max

Scheler declared: 'The genius of the war is that it reestablishes the broken
contact between individual, people, nation, world and God' (Klemperer,
1 957: 5 1) ; Mann (1983) applied the distinction between Kultur and
Zivilisation; Werner Sombart wrote a book on Handler und Helden, 36 men
of action versus men of commerce, the German nation versus Britain.
This was a radicalized form of conservatism; the main difference in
relation to the old conservatism was its violent anti-Western nationalism
(Sieferle, 1 993). It criticized the 'old nationalism' and picked up Constantin
Frantz's and Lagarde's attacks on Bismark for 'prussianizing' Germany
(Lindbom, 1 996: 1 1 4ff.) . Frantz had pleaded for a federalist Germany, an
'Eastern France' and the idea of Mitteleuropa, a federation between
Germany and Austria, guaranteeing a stable Europe. Die Tat later revived
this idea.
The issue of socialism also became important for the new conservatism.
This interest reflected many experiences and views: many of the men
surviving the war had experienced 'the community of the trenches'; former
anti-socialists had experienced socialism in the form of the national
solidarity and wartime economy during the war. Conservatives, therefore,
could see that socialism could abolish the conflicts between the classes and
create a common national feeling. There was also much discussion on the
need for social and economic planning among socialists who had discovered
the strength of nationalism. The so-called Die Glocke group (Paul Lensch,
Plenge and others) is a good example of this (Sieferle, 1 995: 45ff.). Paul
Lensch was a hard-core Marxist before the war, and a pacifist when it
began. However, already in December 1 9 1 4, he wrote that the war had a
revolutionary character where Germany represented the progressive force,
and Britain the side of the ancien regime. Socialism stood against capital
ism. 37 Instead of national class-struggle, this conflict moved 'upwards'
towards a conflict between nations, 'nation' became the collective subject
instead of class. 38 It is important to note that Lensch saw this as a mere
extension of the Marxist programme (Sieferle, 1995: 71).
If the old conservatism was the child of 1 789, the new conservatism was
the child of not only 1 9 14, but also of 1 9 1 8- 1 9. Many glimpsed a chance to
fill conservatism with new energy, a new republican and aggressive con
servatism. Its impetus came from the virulence of 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 - the end of war,
a state of no constitution and leftist revolutionary activism. For example,
the influential publisher and writer Eugen Diederichs of Die Tat warmly
welcomed the revolution of 9 November 1 9 1 8 (Klemperer, 1 957: 76). The
conservative intellectuals dreamt of both 'revolution' and 'socialism', the
36 It was published in 1 9 1 5.
37 Cf. the development of Hendrik de Man during World War II - a leading Belgian social
democrat who thought that only Hitler could save the working class. See, for example,
Sternhell, Neither Left nor Right ( 1986) and Chapter 4 below.
38 Hans Freyer developed this theme in his important book Revolution von Rechts ( 1 93 1 ).
middle classes had nothing, hardly even a job. Because of their idealism,
they could not become Marxists, thus there was a chance for a Republican
conservatism. But the Versailles treaty changed this. Here 'the war-guilt
clause' made it possible to hold Germany responsible for the war and force
it to pay for the costs with both land and money (Woods, 1 996: 27).
Germans had signed the treaty and they had betrayed Germany, thus there
were enemies, the 'inner Englishmen', and the chance for a Republican
conservatism was gone.
Besides the generational factor and the social place for radical conser
vative values - the middle class - the gender aspect is so obvious that it
tends to be neglected. The radical conservatives were men. Militarism and
nationalism are, at least genealogically, masculine values (Nagel, 1 997). One
has not to accept all of Klaus Theweleit's ( 1 995) psychoanalytical argu
ments to see how the problem of nihilism was intertwined with genderized
factors - glory, heroism, etc. - in the Freikorps-literature. 39
The masculinity complexes in the Youth Movement had been observed
already by its own historian, Hans Bluher (Mosse, 1 964: 1 76ff.). In his
book Die Deutsche Wandervogelbewegung als erotisches Phiinomen, from
1 9 1 2, he wrote about an erotic energy, 'Eros', that deepened the friendship
between its members. Gymnastics and nude bathing were mechanisms for
strengthening the inner cohesion of this male society.
This male culture probably went hand in hand with a fear of the female.
Thus, already in 1933 there appeared an openly anti-feminist essay in a
national socialist journal by Julius Evola. 40
The Conservative Revolution
The concept 'conservative revolution' first appeared in the Berlin paper Die
Volksstimme in 1 848 in reference to contemporary political turbulence. The
first more frequent and serious use of the term, however, appeared among
Russian writers, among them Dostoyevsky, as a metaphor for what was to
be done in the world where God had died.
The first German to use the phrase was Thomas Mann. In an essay from
1 92 1 on Nietzsche, Mann wrote 'Conservatism needs nothing more than
spirit in order to be more revolutionary than any form of positivist-liberal
enlightenment, and Nietzsche was right from the start . . . nothing less than
a conservative revolution' (quoted from Lenk, 1 989: 1 1 1 ) . However, it was
Hugo von Hoffmansthal, in a speech in 1 927 on 'Writing as the spiritual
room of the nation', who brought the concept wider attention (Stern, 1 965;
Gay, 1 970; Broch, 1 984). Von Hoffmansthal was expressing a widespread
39 Junger and other writers, ex-soldiers who continued the life of war in the nomadizing
Freecorps, smashing bolsheviks, republicans, Jews, etc. The subject in this literature is the love
of war, its sensations, excitements, brutality, etc.
40 'Feminismus und heroische Tradition', Der Ring, 6 June 1933. Here one can read that
'der Feminismus list] ein Symptom der Entartung im strengsten Wortsinn'.
46 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
discontent with the Weimar Republic, arising from a tension between a

modernizing society and a culture not ready to accept parliamentary
democracy and industrial capitalism as an adequate environment (Peukert,
1 99 1 ). There was a search for a radical alternative, and for many that of
the left, the Soviet system, was just another form of a soulless, materialist
society. Eduard Meyer's words from 1 920 are probably representative:
'Everything which is independent, unique, national . . . everything which is
specifically German is to be eradicated and replaced with the dreadful
monotony of colourless homogeneity and dead numbers' (quoted in
Ringer, 1 969: 2 1 4). The positive value, 'German', reflects the strong
Volkish ideology in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century.
This was strengthened by the negative results of the Versailles treaty, and
modern capitalism and democracy was often interpreted as 'un-German'.
Ernst Junger's main contribution to this was his book Der Arbeiter
( 1 932). Here he presents a new planetary order, where the worker is the
central Gestalt and metaphor, the absolute opposite of the 'bourgeois'. The
'worker', however, is not simply a metaphor for the working-class. The
worker is a gigantic machine made possible and visible because of modern
technology and mass society. The worker is society as a whole, in which
modern technology is affirmed. Technology is seen as a tool, perfect for the
mission of smashing the rotten, old order. The worker is also a myth - an
image of participation in a new organic order which aggressively moves
forward. Since 'forward' is not defined, however, it has no normative
foundation. Rather, it is the movement, the energy itself, which has a
totalized aesthetic value. This was of course close to national socialist
ideology, but the aristocrat Junger was never a nazi. He viewed dictator
ship, for example, as only a preparatory step to the real goal: an order with
a planned economy, with the plan as the holy centre. But Junger, like other
conservative revolutionaries, was not without responsibility; he was tried as
a collaborator after the war. In Junger's case, the judgment was that he
was forbidden to publish anything between 1 945 and 1 949.
We could also add Oswald Spengler, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck,
Edgar Julius Jung4 1 and Hans Freyer to the list of important thinkers of
the conservative revolution. The two most complete works on the con
servative revolution are Armin Mohler's classical study Die Konservative
Revolution in Deutschland 1918-32 (1 989) and Stefan Breuer's Anatomie
der Konservative Revolution (1 993). 42 Mohler and Breuer differ on one
central point: while Mohler emphasizes the similarities between the con
servative revolutionaries, Breuer stresses their differences, suggesting that
their only common denominator is their enemy: liberalism. Mohler
41 lung is interesting since he is almost the only prominent Christian among the con
servative revolutionaries. ludaism and Christianity are blamed for having introduced the idea
of progress, and for their egalitarian components. On lung, see Struve (1 974).
42 Some other important works are: von Klemperer (1 957), Sontheimer (1 962), Lebovics
(1 969), Stern ( 1 965), Dupeux (1 985), Lenk (1 989) and Sieferle (1 995). The most well-known
work in English is probably Herf ( 1984), the most detailed work in English is Woods (1 996).
suggests that all share a central Leitfigur, a central idea and image. By using
this method he is able to see issues that are invisible from a traditional left
right perspective, and, above all, the central role of the conception of time
and history as circular, nonlinear. Thus, their favourite metaphors are the
Ring, the Circle, the eternal Return, the cycle of Life itself; the negative
metaphor, progress, is conceived as the 'arrow'. This is perhaps best
illustrated by a poem by Ernst Junger's younger brother Friedrich Georg:
Kyklos! Kyklos!
[. . .J
Wiederkehr! Wiederkehr!
[ . . .J
Heil meiner Schlange!
[. . .J
In der Mitte ruht jeder Kreis.43
(Quoted from Mohler, 1 989: 1 0 1 f.)
Mohler is a true insider. Born in Basel, Switzerland in 1 920, he volunteered

for the Waffen-SS during the war and became a close friend of Schmitt and
Junger. 44 As an insider, he is able to see a kind of poetic vision which can be
found in all conservative revolutionaries. As formulated by Ernst Junger, for
example, we are waiting for the 'magic hour of zero', a moment when linear
time stops, a vision not totally unlike Walter Benjamin's waiting for the
Messiah. The conservative revolutionaries were more poets - geistiges,
spiritual - than politicians. 'Politics' was judged as no more than a necessary
means to realize their poetic vision (Dahl and Heidegren, 1 993). 45 They were
- as Thomas Mann ( 1 983) declared himself in 1 9 1 4 - 'unpolitisch', or in the
,
words of the radical conservatives today, 'meta-political . 46
Breuer, on the other hand, is an outsider, a sociologist from Hamburg.
Instead of an ideology shared by a whole generation, he emphasizes a
generational context which sometimes resulted in convergences, sometimes
in differences. In any case, he has demonstrated that some important socio
cultural factors shaped this generation. Most of them were born in the
l 890s, and they became infected by the 'ideas of 1 9 14',47 joined the army
and found a kind of salvation in the violent war and the community of the
trenches. Most of them came from petty-bourgeois, rural homes, studied
43 'Cycle! Cycle! Return! Return! Long live my snake! Every circle rests in its middle'.
44 During 1 949-53 he was Ernst Junger's private secretary, then correspondent in Paris.
From 1964 to 1 985 he was the director for the Siemens-stiftung in Munich. Currently he is also
one of de Benoist's good friends and advises the extreme right Republikaner party in Germany.
45 This is, of course, not the whole truth: among the conservative revolutionaries we can find
full-blooded Realpolitikern like the Strasser brothers and the national bolshevik Ernst Niekisch.
46 This slogan is frequently used by the nouvelle droite in France, and by the journal Junge
Freiheit in Germany. Perhaps the most impressive attempts to write an 'un-political' cosmol
ogy which can serve the role as a 'spiritual' base for fascism and radical conservatism are the
works of the Italian philosopher Julius Evola, particularly his main work Rivolte Contro II
Mondo Moderno published in 1 969. For an introduction to Evola, see Hansen ( 1 99 1 ) and
Sheehan ( 1 98 1 ). I have consulted the German translation (Evola, 1993).
47 For a generational and international approach to the ideas of 1 9 1 4, see Wohl (1 979).
48 RADICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
the humanities and had a background in the Jugendbewegung. But their

studies in the humanities did not make them feel at home in the new world,
but educated them against that world. Unlike the fin-de-siecle thinkers, they
were not resigned, but strove for a radically new order.
Together with Junger's Der Arbeiter, Schmitt's writings and Arthur
Moeller van den Bruck's Das Dritte Reich ( 1 923),48 Hans Freyer's Revolu
tion von Rechts ( 1 93 1 ) appears as one of the most central texts of the
conservative revolution. Freyer, a sociology professor in Leipzig, wanted a
new philosophy of history, incorporating both Hegel and Marx. According
to Freyer, Marx was correct in thinking that a revolution was necessary.
But Marx was a nineteenth-century writer, and the new revolutionary
subject was not the proletariat but das Volk. The proletariat was not a
universal power, but expressed a partial interest, while today one must find
a new organic totality. The new objective Gemeinschaft, according to
Freyer, is the result of an objective historical process, where the Volksgeist
realizes itself. In revolutionary action, the pure energy, the people, will
constitute itself (Freyer, 1 9 3 1 ) .
W e should, however, b e a little careful with the label 'conservative
revolution'. First, as I mentioned above, Breuer emphasizes differences, and
Mohler is himself a participant in a movement that he both reconstructs and
tries to construct today. He is not only mapping a mentality, but also
practising a strategy. Therefore, Breuer has an important point: this
tradition is above all anti- Western and hates capitalism, liberalism (as being
of English or Jewish origin) and civilization (as opposed to 'Kultur'). This
sentiment can have different faces. For example, Junger is more a proto
fascist aestheticist, while Schmitt a concrete geopolitician and an investi
gator of the mechanisms of effective power. Furthermore, as modernists,49
they have little in common with the cultural pessimists and the so-called
vOikisch groups. 50 Thus, Junger can be seen as more representative than
Spengler; while the latter formulated an undertone of apocalyptic
fascination, the former pleads for a voluntarist overcoming of nihilism.
Thus, I think that the key concepts for understanding what the conser
vative revolution was about, and what its heritage consists of, are anti
liberalism, anti-West, and its emphasis on Kultur and aestheticism. Since
these keywords are also good at providing us with an understanding of the
48 Moeller van den Bruck's Das Dritte Reich must be one of the most furious attacks
on liberalism ever: 'Liberalism was "the terrifying power of the nineteenth century'" (von
Klemperer, 1957: 1 63, quoting Moeller, Das Dritte Reich, p. 68). Moeller van den Bruck
was also the German editor of Dostoyevsky's works, and he called him a true conservative
revolutionary in Das Recht der jungen Volker ( 1 9 1 9). The relationship between
Dostoyevsky and the conservative revolution is a long and complicated story, too long
to discuss here.
49 For a demonstration of the modernism among certain thinkers within Weimar radical
conservatism, see Herf ( 1984) and Bohrer ( 1 978).
50 Mosse ( 1964) gives a good description of this anti-modernist stream. For these groups,
Volk, blood and soil (and most often anti-Semitism) are placed in the foreground, while the
modernists treat these factors as of secondary importance.
left then and now, we must ask if there are any differences. Many writers
have emphasized the similarities. Kurt Sontheimer (1 962: 393), for example,
argues that '[t]he spiritual [seelische] dynamics of the leftist intellectuals in
their fight against war, capitalism and intellectual obscurity was similar to
the spiritual dynamics of the viilkischen irrationalists'. There might be a
point in this, but it neglects some basic differences. As I said earlier, the left
has emphasized the need for a change of 'material' structure, the right being
more interested in a 'spiritual reawakening'. There is also a slight difference
between 'anti-capitalism' and 'pro-socialism'. While the left was the latter, it
also embraced the former. But for the right, anti-capitalism did not
primarily mean being in favour of socialism. Rather, for them 'anti
capitalism' was a reaction against Britain and finance capital, to a large
degree synonymous with the Jews. But these differences do not erase their
shared anti-liberalism.
Even if the new radical conservatism of the conservative revolution was
a way to come to terms with the dilemmas of conservatism, it could not
escape from new dilemmas. A discussion in the Weimar Republic on the
goals and strategy of the New Nationalism highlights this.
As I have mentioned, the new conservatism was critical of the 'struc
tural' orientation of the old conservatism, and could be said to be wanting
to turn to a 'value-conservatism'. But then they have to formulate what
values they want to defend. That is, they need some kind of 'programme'.
However, a programme must set up some basic values, and then the
strategy for realizing them has to be formulated. Once again, an instru
mental rationality appears.
Between 1 925 and 1 929 these issues were discussed widely, and especially
by Ernst Junger (Woods, 1 996: 75ff.). Junger wrote in 1 926 that 'we' must
have a programme, an aim. But what was the aim? Most of the new
conservative intellectuals agreed on what they were against - liberalism,
Jews, Freemasons, etc. And their aim was to create a new Germany. But
what should this new nationalism contend? No one had an answer. Partly,
the rise of fascism in Italy influenced many to attack the idea of a pro
gramme, and instead to focus on acts, the deed as being the spirit of the
new nationalist revolution. The focus on the deed also reincarnated the
glorification of the experiences of World War I . Wilhelm Kleinau wrote in
1 927: 'Fascism possessed something far more valuable than a programme:
it possessed the will to act and basic principles in the form of attitude and
character' (quoted from Woods, 1 996: 85). Thus, in the end the
conservative revolution was anti-programmatic since it did not want to
play in the same arena as liberalism. It wanted a nationalist leader who, by
definition, could suspend programmes if they did not serve the Nation.
Programmes only cause splits and conflicts, things not desirable in the new
nation. There was no 'aim', but rather a 'basic attitude': unity in the
struggle for nationalism and ('German') socialism. Of course, in the end
this attitude could not resist national socialism.
2
CONSERVATISM AND RADICAL

CONSERVATISM
On a more general level, the dilemma of both old and new conservatism
can be put this way: how can we construct the living? Conservatism aims at
defending the organic state of the thing, letting it grow. But can you
construct anything that is organic? Construction better fits mechanical
matters. Ernst Junger's paradoxical formulation of this dilemma was
exactly this: 'organic construction'. Junger operates with a distinction
between the depth and the surface. l When we see reality, we see Forms of
something more essential Kraft. The problem of politics is, thus, to give
-
this Kraft a proper form, to let life, the vital force, reach a more 'authentic'
stage. This is in accordance with Heidegger's view - to use technology
(Gestell) under the right 'banner'. It reveals how the whole issue of
modernity is present in this context. The old conservatism was originally
anti-modernist, but during the rationalization of the irrational it accepted
progress. The new radical conservatism, therefore, could go in two direc
tions, and indeed it did. There was an anti-modernist critique of
civilization, big cities, modern technology etc. 2 Oswald Spengler was the
key player. But the pro-modernist 'wing' was much more important,
Junger being the big name here. We could use Dupeux's ( 1 993) distinction
between 'cultural pessimism' and 'voluntarism' here. The former said 'no'
to the new world, the latter 'yes' but only came up with the glorification of
action.
We need to go further with the distinction between conservatism and
radical conservatism. While I have been mainly occupied with the develop
ment of the distinction, we also have to summarize the theoretical differ
ences. It seems like a good idea to look at Kurt Lenk's ( 1 989: l 3ff.)
description of what is meant by 'conservatism'. A common method is to
reserve the term for the pure aristocrat-clerical reaction to the French
revolution. Thus, it has clear ties with the nobility and the old bureaucracy.
This 'historical-specific' meaning can declare that conservatism is dead. 3
However, I have already taken it as given that this interpretation is
I Cf. Hegel's and Marx's distinction between 'essence' and 'appearance'.

2 Some voices are forerunners of Pol Pot's project for Cambodia - Kurt Voermann
advocated 'letting the cities run down and taking the population back into a rural setting'
(Woods, 1 996: 69).
3 Kondylis's ( 1 986) magnificent work on conservatism ends with this declaration.
52 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM AN D TH E FUTU RE O F POL ITICS
reductionist. This is obvious if we consider the two other meanings of

'conservatism' .
Lenk calls one of them 'anthropological', that one resists change, that is
'traditionalism' in Mannheim's sense. This can be called a 'structural
conservatism' that is one says yes to progress since this is institutionalized.
This is close to what I will discuss later on 'technocratic conservatism' (in
Chapter 3). But traditionalism can also mean a defence of a 'tradition' that
has disappeared. This would be a radical, anti-modernist conservatism.
Therefore I think we have to apply a less confusing meaning for 'con
servatism', and this would be the third form that Lenk discusses - the
'situated specific' . This form of conservatism is, unlike the 'traditionalist'
form, bound to specific times and places, but is connected with a universal
event: this form of conservatism appears when social structures dissolve
and when the question of 'what should be?' is posed. It is the meaning of
conservatism that lets us unproblematically distinguish between radical
value-conservatism and mainstream structural conservatism. Perhaps the
latter is an anomaly. The reason is that most 'conservative' parties today
are structural conservative and difficult to distinguish from 'liberal' parties.
Therefore, I would argue, radical conservatism is conservatism applied to
itself. It recognizes that it actually does not want to accept the premises of
modern, rationalized conservatism. It accepts modernization, but wants
another symbolic and cultural framework that is not a mere expression of
capitalist, individualist values. This feeling appears in a world where the
presumed radical conservative does not feel at home, where radical action
is necessary. Radical conservatism is against the communicative aspects of
conservatism. It is more conjunctive, that is, built on feelings and reactions
that cannot easily be communicated outside one's own community.
Occasionally, when radical conservatism becomes communicative, when it
rationalizes the irrational, it has conjunctive aspects: when using words like
'Ethnos', 'Nation', 'Act', etc., this is not positively understood if other
people do not get the same connotations, feelings, metaphors as those who
utter them. Therefore, it is bad politics in the sense that politics deals with
common, sometimes even with global matters. Liberalism can also be bad
politics if it denies the need for conjunctive resonance. There must be
something in the local culture which says yes to the messages of liberalism
if it is going to be accepted.
'Radical', 'new', 'young' also inevitably lead to the factor of generation,
especially when we also take the rate of contemporary turbulence into
consideration. Radical conservatism has to be young, to be articulated by a
new generation in opposition to an older one, since the meaning of 'radical'
can only be grasped in relation to what is not 'radical' or 'old'.
If we equate 'conservatism' with 'traditionalism', then in order to make
sense, to talk about modern conservatism, we see that it is not universal.
As Mannheim (and, of course, many others) noted, conservatism is a
rational articulation of a suspicion that something is wrong with liberalism
and that it probably will go wrong. In a 'weak' sense, then, conservatism
CONSERVATISM A N D RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM 53
means anti-economism, an ambition to weaken the influence of the econ

omic system on the cultural and political sphere. In a 'stronger' sense,
radical conservatism also means anti-liberalism because it wants to abolish
liberalism totally.
Jerry Muller's ( 1 995) article on the differences between conservatism and
radical conservatism is also illuminating here. According to him,
conservatism does not seek the truth, but the good, thus even religious
conservatives do not believe in using theology in politics, but believe in the
power of reason. The conservative defends existing institutions because so
much wisdom is built into them; destroying them is, therefore, also a
destruction of built-in knowledge and tradition. One has to be cautious.
Due to human imperfection and the limits of human knowledge, reforms
and changes have to be left to those who know best. Of course, this is
elitist thinking, as well as the thesis on the moral imperfection: man's
unlimited drives have to be controlled and limited. Other themes in con
servative thinking, according to Muller, have already been mentioned:
history is viewed as an organic development; anti-universalism; concrete
ness - each case is specific, one has to use wisdom.
Around 1 900 something important happened to conservative thinking -
capitalism became the one thing that the conservatives wanted to preserve.
This marked a turn from 'substance' to 'function' (Muller, 1 995: 24), or in
our terms, from values to structure.
According to Muller, conservatism becomes radical if one adds the thesis
that the existing society is boring and that existing institutions are corrupt.
More heroism is wanted. There is also a desire for bringing God back into
politics.
* * *
In my view, 'radical conservatism' is neither an essentialist (as something

that can be seen above time and space) nor a relationist concept. The
former would be a theological understanding, that is to understand radical
conservatism as an expression of something eternal, like 'evil' . I am too
much an historicist to accept this. On the other hand, I do not fully accept
the relationist understanding. 'Radical conservatism' is not limited to
having a meaning only in local contexts bound by time and space. It is, as I
see it, something that can be identified when the project of modernity is
questioned. This happened in Weimar Germany and it is happening today
too. The concept generalizes some features and I put them together in
order to identify and highlight political constellations. It is not meant to
'represent' the real features but to interpret them in a more comprehensive
way. Of course, the reader could object that the conservative revolution
was a typical German (and Russian) phenomenon, buried a long time ago,
but due to the universalist aspects of civilization or rationalization, the
same ideas (the 'third way', anti-materialism, 'anti-West', etc.) are activated
all over the world today. Globalization is a tendency towards
54 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
homogenization, that is, the same signs and meanings appear all over the
world. This comes into conflict with what Benjamin Barber ( 1 995) has
called 'Jihad',4 the defence of local and cultural specifities.
As I see it, radical conservatism is not a homogeneous 'movement'.
Rather, it is a basic attitude that can take different forms. For example,
there is indeed a radical conservative critique of both fascism and nazism,
above all of their 'unspirituality' and totalitarianism. Men like Schmitt and
Junger probably saw themselves as superior beings, able to control some of
the extremism in the NSDAP party, sometimes, as in the case of Schmitt,
by being an extremist himself. The leftists within the radical conservative
movement in pre-World War II Germany were at odds with Hitler because
he betrayed the socialist ideas of the Nazi movement: some were killed
by the Nazis (e.g., Gregor Strasser), some were imprisoned (e.g., Ernst
Niekisch), and some left the country (e.g., Otto Strasser and Karl O.
Paetel). Oswald Spengler had a very different reason for distancing himself
from the Nazis - he disliked the 'democratic' and 'socialist' trends they
embodied in the form of mass politics! (Woods, 1 996: 1 28f.). Heidegger
seems to have had similar reasons - that the Nazis betrayed their original
conservative-revolutionary ideas (Bourdieu, 1 99 1 ; Safranski, 1 994).
Intellectual roots: Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky
As I have already said, the big names for the conservative revolutionaries
were Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Freidrich Nietzsche. But what were the
elements in the thinking of these two writers that gave spiritual inspiration?
An attempt to answer this question can indirectly highlight our contem
porary political and cultural situation.
Practically all of the conservative revolutionaries mention Nietzsche as
their mentor. A compliment by Ernst Junger is typical: 'the lonely
Nietzsche, whom we have to thank for practically everything that moves us
most profoundly' (quoted from Woods, 1 996: 29). Thomas Mann was
another admirer. In Nietzsche, Mann saw the genuine conservative revolu
tionary. In his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man ( 1 983), Mann finds in
Nietzsche (and also in Luther, Goethe and Schopenhauer) the idea of the
anti-democratic right of the individual. In an essay from 1 9 1 5 (on Zola) he
asks polemically: 'What is power if not the same as right?' (quoted from
Schroter, 1 968: 97f.).
We could go on for a long time. It is obvious that this generation saw
Nietzsche as an anti-democratic, anti-capitalist thinker who wanted to
defend and restore Life. Of course, this is part of Nietzsche's project.
However, Nietzsche was often ambivalent and changed his positions. Both
4 This choice of metaphor is both unhappy and incorrect: unhappy because it could
strengthen already latent anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments; incorrect because the original
meaning of Jihad is 'the obligation to extend Islam' and thus 'holy war' is only one
interpretation of this original meaning.
CONSERVATISM A N D RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM 55
Aschheim ( 1 995) and Antonio (1 995) have shown how the radical right had
to transform Nietzsche, how it emphasized Nietzsche's aristocratic attitude,
his critique of bourgeois values, capitalism and democracy, while totally
neglecting his radical individualism and anti-nationalism. Of course,
Elisabeth F6rster-Nietzsche's (his sister) well-known falsifications made
this easier. She truly helped the Nazis to depict Nietzsche as their philo
sopher. As Alfred Baeumler, the second chief ideologist of the NSDAP (the
first being Arthur Rosenberg), wrote:
If today we see German youth on the march under the banner of the swastika,
we are reminded of Nietzsche's 'untimely meditations' in which this youth was
appealed to for the first time. It is our greatest hope that the state today is wide
open for youth. And if today we shout 'Heil Hitler' to this youth, at the same
time we are also hailing Nietzsche. (Quoted from Wistrich, 1 995: 8)
Baeumler especially appreciated Nietzsche's positive valuation of the

animal nature of human instincts, although suppressing Nietzsche's view
that animality was not a goal in itself, only a step on the long way to true
individuality (Woods, 1 996: 42).
Other conservative revolutionary voices who praised Nietzsche include
Oswald Spengler who appreciated Nietzsche's thoughts about the true
aristocracy (Woods, 1 996: 52).
Dostoyevsky also played a major role in the thinking of the conservative
revolutionaries. Of course, they, like many others in their generation, were
familiar with his famous novels. Once again, let us listen to Junger. In his
book on drugs and toxication, he remembers how he and his friend,
Edmund Schultz, in their fantasies visited the places mentioned in
Dostoyevsky's novels, and how he kept records of the fictional characters
and where they were and when: 'We did not very often go to the streets of
Berlin as to the Heumarkt in St Petersburg or to that illegal bar where
Svidrigaljov spent his last night' (Junger, 1 970: 1 58).
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, the author of such influential books as
Das Recht der jungen VOlker ( 1 9 1 9) and Das Dritte Reich ( 1 923), was also
the editor of the German translations of Dostoyevsky. In the latter he
denounced Dostoyevsky as conservative and revolutionary, and this was
no coincidence. Moeller van den Bruck probably got his idea of Russians'
and Germans' common destiny as being the 'young' Volk in Europe from
the master.
Dostoyevsky's radical conservatism is at its peak in A Writer's Diary, Vol.
I ( 1 997) which consists of political articles written for a journal. Apart from
more existential matters, he discusses the historic mission of Russia, and the
relationship between Germany and Russia. He applies a Sonderweg
thinking where Germany has to join forces with Russia against the West
and Rome. Furthermore, in 'A silly man's dream' (Dostoyevsky, 1994:
2 1 6ff.), he ridicules the times in which he is living with its sensualism,
materialism, lies, etc., and complains that Science has replaced Life.
56 RAD ICAL CONSE RVATISM AN D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Of his novels The Brothers Karamazov ( 1 943) is probably the one most
read by the conservative revolutionaries. It is quite easy to understand
why. It is a gold mine of ideas: the insight that if you are an intelligent
sceptic, you are wise enough to doubt the reasons for your scepticism; 'evil'
and 'good' are relative, bound to situations. But most central is the tale of
'The Grand Inquisitor'. Here we are told a story where Jesus Christ
appears again. The secular interpreter of Christianity is the Grand
Inquisitor, who becomes furious because of the return of Christ. Christ
wants to give people inner liberty, the right to choose, but the Grand
Inquisitor knows that this is too heavy a burden for the masses. They have
to believe in revelation and authority. The weak people cannot have
freedom, as this can only end in tyranny; thus, they have to obey, believe in
authority and its definitions of good and evil. This might describe
Dostoyevsky's own two alternatives. My guess is that the conservative
revolutionaries recognized their own options here: either being members of
the elite which knew it was wrong, or being among those who had been
fooled. They probably identified themselves with the Grand Inquisitor.
Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Junger: decisionism
These three men were the master thinkers of the conservative revolution,
undoubtedly the first great ideologists of radical conservatism. I want to
highlight their common basic orientation, including an existential theme so
strong that it is more connected to their inner experiences than to social
and historical conditions. This inner experience has often been called
'decisionism' (Krockow, 1 99 1 ) and I think that this is still a viable
orientation.
Why these three men? Because they represent decisionism in different
ways, and I think that this is the most important link to the political
activism which is at the centre of what could be reconstructed as the
conservative-revolutionary ideology. Their judgement of the Weimar
Republic was that it could not decide what it wanted to be. In this context,
all three men are radical conservatives: they share what Mannheim would
have seen as a form of chiliasm - they want a unity between what they
think, do and their goals. However, in a more general context, Carl
Schmitt is not so 'radical'. He is extremely conservative, focusing more on
order, state and authority than on a need for national rebirth. My main
reason for including Schmitt among the conservative revolutionaries,
despite this fact, is that almost all positive interpretations of his works are
clearly radical conservative.
'Decisionism' means the glorification of the act of deciding and a faith in
the value of the decision in itself, totally independent from its contents.
Their ways to this attitude differed. Carl Schmitt wanted (although these
are not his own words) to bring theology and existential matters into
CONS E RVATISM A N D RAD ICAL CONS E RVATISM 57
politics. H e shared S0ren Kierkegaard's view o n the exception. 5 Here he

discovered something important: that real authentic life can be glimpsed
only in the exceptional, the abnormal moments of danger, violence,
passion, etc. It is this existential ground that Schmitt transforms into a
political and legal discourse in his Political Theology (1 985b), where he
expounds his theory of the Ausnahmezustand (state of exception). 6 This is a
dangerous project: when politics becomes mixed with art and self
realization, the individual's personal judgements become parameters for
social and political life. 7 In this context, I think that Richard Rorty (1 989)
is right when he argues that our contingent narratives should be restricted
to the private sphere, and that we must try to strengthen the liberal and
democratic traditions which have a non-contingent authority in the public,
political life.
There is a case parallel to Schmitt's in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit ( 1 972).
His project in this work is to found a fundamental ontology, to trace das
Sein which is more than das Seiendes, that which is here and now.
Accordingly, he thinks he is able to show what authentic being is, a life
richer than can be found in degenerate, liberal society. Towards the end of
this work, Heidegger demonstrates a real sociological insight - that true
being cannot be reached by a single individual but that this must be a mutual
and collective project. Thus, he first mentions a 'generation' as an acting
subject, and then a 'people' ( Volk) (Heidegger, 1 972: 384f.). From his anti
liberal point of view, 'people' cannot mean humanity, but an organic
collective sharing identical 'cultural' values. Thus, we find here the grounds
for Heidegger's revolutionary conservative which paved the way for his
connection with national socialism. Just like Schmitt, Heidegger transposes
existential and aesthetic matters into political and geopolitical projects. For
Schmitt and Heidegger there is no freedom outside organic communities, no
rational individuals free from these, and if there is opposition, it must be
crushed in the name of the true and great existence. This pattern of thought
lives on in contemporary radical conservatism. The goal is the 'organic
state'; what stands in the way is the Judeo-Christian, egalitarian civilization.
A return to a pre-Christian, pagan cosmology is proposed where the vOlkisch
identity can be glimpsed. The Volk is everything; the individual, especially as
un-homogenized, is nothing (Assheuer and Sarkowicz, 1 992: 1 7 1 f.). 8
5 See Kennedy ( 1988) and Wolin ( \ 992).

6 'Exception' corresponds more correctly to 'Ausnahme' than 'emergency'.
7 Herbert Marcuse saw this very early. In 1934 he wrote: 'On this point political
existentialism is more sensitive than its philosophical counterpart. It knows that even the
"earthy and bloody forces" of a folk become historical only in particular political forms, that
is, if a real structure of domination, the state, has been erected over the folk. Existentialism,
too, needs an explicit political theory: the doctrine of the total state.' (Marcuse, 1 968: 35,
original emphasis).
8 This image probably stems from European romanticism, and can also be found in leftist
versions: for communists the Class is everything, for (Swedish) social democrats the Folk (as
opposed to the rich) is everything.
58 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE O F POLITICS
The discussion of the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and

national socialism has been tremendous during recent years. I think that
the best analysis so far is Rudiger Safranski's ( 1 994) biography of
Heidegger. Safranski puts the moment of decision at the centre. In an
interview he summarizes his conclusion: 'Heidegger was a sort of existen
tialist anarchist . . . who in a Kierkegaardian way glorified the moment, das
Spitzenaugenblick as an ecstatic category' (Stjernfelt, 1 996). The Heidegger
who wrote Sein und Zeit was an anti-liberal but not yet a national socialist
- he had still to take a few further steps. In this book he has an idea that it
is not important what one believes or does, but it is more important that
one does it with decisiveness, Entschlossenheit. Here he still philosophizes
at an individual level. This idea, however, becomes totalitarian when
placed on a collective-political level. During the year after the publication
of this book Heidegger was often criticized for not having emphasized
historicity enough. Accepting this critique, he placed more emphasis on the
cult of the moment, and decisiveness became a political category. As a
result, he came to admire Hitler, and in national socialism he saw a
metaphysical development in the sphere of Being itself. Now, one had to be
decisive not to lose the historical chance of uniting Nation and Dasein. As
a result of his radicalism, he saw in national socialism a way for the whole
of humankind to be more in tune with Being. He really was a radical,
driven by an enormous suspicion:
What if it were possible that the human, that peoples ( VOlker) in their greatest
practices ( Umtrieben) and legacies ( Gemachten), are linked to beings (Seinden)
and yet had long fallen out of Being (Sein) without knowing it, and that this was
the innermost and most powerful source ( Grund) of their decline ( Verfalls)?
(Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, quoted from Ward, 1995: xx)
He then became disappointed when he realized that national socialism did

not represent this moment: 'The real existing National Sozialism became
for [Heidegger] more and more of a system of a betrayed revolution, which
for him was a metaphysical revolution, a revelation of Being based on a
vOlkischen Gemeinschaft' (Safranski, 1 994: 337, original emphasis).
Ernst Junger's decisionism must be understood in the context of his
experiences of World War I. He loved the war, it made him feel real, alive
when death was always present. He wished for war, and considered the
greatest happiness was to sacrifice oneself in war (Krockow, 1 99 1 : 1 25ff.).
Another aspect of decisionism is the difference between politics serving a
programme and politics as heroic deeds, as discussed above. Italian fascism
provided the model: 'What we must bring to expression is the hidden
essence of the great deed - a deed removed from all purpose - and the
solitude of the one who performs it' (Junger, Arminius, 1 926: no. 43,
quoted from Nevin, 1 996: 97).
Heidegger, Schmitt and Junger were all dealing with the problem of
nihilism which was the essential condition of modernity. Their answer was
'Act!' This assured that at least something could be done, that humanity
CONSERVATISM AN D RAD ICAL CONS E RVATISM 59
was not dead, and this was connected to their anti-liberalism since to call
for something universal, the ideas of 1 789, human rights, Reason etc.,
means to free oneself from the burden or liberty to decide.
* * *
In Part II I intend to present radical conservatism as a world-view, as a

basic outlook, and how it circles around some central themes.
PART II
THE WORLD ACCORDING TO

RADICAL CONSERVATISM
3
REFLEXIVITY AND SPONTANEITY
According to many, indeed too many to mention, the world has gone
wrong. Suffering, discontentment, protest and critique go hand in hand
with the everyday-life acceptance of taking care, earning enough money,
etc. During the last decade we have seen the return of a furious attack on
the all too 'Western' character of the West. The attack comes from a 'new
right' which deploys many ideas of the 'conservative revolution'. Most
explicitly, this attack, or counter-movement, is present in France and
Germany. This has nothing to do with the 'old right' which in these
countries, and above all in the USA, identifies itself as the true defender of
the West. Even if the old and the new right have some common views on,
for example, multiculturalism and nationalism, the new right views the
West that it belongs to as having gone too far towards commodification
and individualization, and that there is a strong need for reorientation and
a national rebirth.
In this chapter I want to attempt to grasp the 'meta-political' sources in
this kind of political thinking, the personal reactions and experiences that
drive people to a new radical right. One central feature is the fear of, and
turning against, reflexivity, which may end in a pathological hyper
reflexivity. By doing this, I think I also clarify one of the reasons why the
ideas of the new right might be attracting more and more people. I also
want to demonstrate some connections between 'conservative revolution',
'technocratic conservatism', radical conservatism and the new right, and
how the critique of reflexivity can be found in many separate discourses:
political thinking, theology and psychiatry. The connection is the stress on
anti-reflexivity, which reveals that all of these traditions of thought
together constitute a strong critique of modernity. First of all, I have to
give a preliminary definition of 'reflexivity' and 'anti-reflexivity' since their
meanings can differ.
Reflexivity and anti-reflexivity
'Reflexivity', especially nowadays, can have different meanings, so let us go

back to basics. George Herbert Mead (1 947) has a notion on 'delayed
reaction', which I think covers the same area as I do when talking about
'reflexivity'. It is worth quoting him in full:
64 RAD I CAL CONS E RVATISM A N D THE FUTU R E OF POLITICS
Our ideas of or about future conduct are our tendencies to act in several
alternative ways in the presence of a given environmental situation . . . . Ideas, as
distinct from acts, or as failing to issue in overt behaviour, are simply what we do
not do; they are possibilities of overt responses which we test out implicitly in the
central nervous system and then reject in favour of those which we do in fact act
upon or carry into effect. . . . Intelligence is largely a matter of selectivity.
Delayed reaction is necessary to intelligent conduct. The organisation, implicit
testing, and final selection by the individual of his overt responses or reactions to
the social situations which confront him and which present him with problems of
adjustment, would be impossible if his overt responses or reactions could not in
such situations be delayed until this process of organising, implicitly testing, and
finally selecting is carried out. (Mead, 1 947: 99)
Thus, delayed reaction takes place in time, where the individual can make
use of his or her social, cultural and normative competencies. He or she
can make judgements which can be rationally argued for, and also predict
possible reactions to his or her actions and propositions.
To defend reflexivity is a classic intellectual strategy. However, this does
not force us to deny and de-emphasize non-reflective activity. For example,
the abilities of playing ball-games, having sex, etc. can be destroyed by
reflection, and if one suffers from insomnia, for example, the worst thing
one can do is to start thinking about it. Ecstasy belongs to the realm of life
where thinking indeed plays a minor role. As long as we discuss individual
matters, non-reflexive activity does not cause any problems. However,
things look different when we move to the collective level.
On a collective social level there can also be reflexivity. According to
many social theorists (Giddens, 1 99 1 ; Beck, 1 992; Lash, 1 993), we now live
in the second form of modernity where institutions (governments,
corporations, etc.) have to take into account the effects of, and reactions
to, their actions. So far so good. However, what really bothers me is
collective anti-reflexivity. When, for example, the leading Russian 'national
bolshevik' Alexander Dugin ( 1 992) talks about the 'collective uncon
scious', I where the collective includes only its own ethnos, he wants to
replace modern, individual reflexivity with an irrational pre-cognitive sense
of belonging to a Nation. Not reflexivity, but pure reflex is the goal, when
Russians are supposed to form an 'organic democracy', that is a func
tioning body where the brain works without reflection. The large mass is
asked to give up subjective identities and rational capacities. When the
Nation or the State demands something, there is no room for delayed
responses, since these entities should be sacred, that is beyond reflection.
There is also the imperative of not missing the chances of the Moment, a
moment that will perhaps never appear again. This is probably one of the
strongest causes for Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazis. Hitler was a
revelation. A 'no' to him could mean that the moment could be lost
I This term stems from Carl Gustav lung, who claimed that every Volk had its specific
'collective unconscious'. Thus he distinguished between the Aryan and lewish people (Volker).
See Ramsay (I 992}.
REFLEXIVITY A N D SPONTA N E ITY 65
(Safranski, 1 994). More on this later. I now turn to Nietzsche, whose

conception of reflexivity is so sophisticated that it has been used and
interpreted in a totally contrary direction.
Nietzsche and reflexivity
In any context of discussing reflexivity and the critique of it, it is once

again impossible to avoid Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche is often ambi
valent, and can be interpreted in opposite ways. However, I think that it is
most correct to place him among those who defend reflexivity, although he
often discusses the necessity of non-reflective ecstasy. In Twilight of the
Idols ( 1 983b) he criticizes liberal institutions as being decadent, precisely
for the reason that they lack reflexivity; they are institutionalized and
reified to the extent that they fly above any reflexivity. Modern men, for
Nietzsche, live too lightly, instead of too heavily. Thus he laments: 'One
lives for today, one lives very fast - one lives very irresponsibly: it is
precisely this which one calls "freedom'" ( l 983b: 93f.). The same could
also be said when Nietzsche criticizes 'faith' in moralists, priests, and
philosophers. Nietzsche apparently treated 'conscious hypocrites' as being
higher sorts of men than 'believers', perhaps because the former still
indulge in reflexivity ( 1 983b: 96). Nietzsche's 'perspectivism' has been well
described by Antonio ( 1 995: 1 8): 'It challenges reifications, clarifies the
limits of rationality, opens multiple realities to view, and enchances par
ticularity. ' Nietzsche also dislikes 'fast' readings, and pleads for 'slow'
readings, since these give us a chance to understand better and reflect more.
To sum up, Nietzsche's vision was the wise and happy sovereign individual.
As for his rightist readers, and there were a lot of them, they became
interested because they experienced nihilism very strongly, and thought
that Nietzsche could offer a solution. Thus, they never saw his plea for true
individuality, only the fascination for the non-reflexive, and turned this
into a plea for ecstasism and combined it with Nietzsche's critique of the
bourgeoisie and its love for the abstract.
Some authors have argued that there is an undertone of the cult of the
Dionysian element in his whole authorship. For them, Nietzsche seems to
appreciate the playfulness of which only the mature Superman is capable.
This person has forgotten, in a literal sense, about seriousness, and is able
to create new values that are taken as given, not created through social
reflexive processes. Perhaps the most anti-reflexivist interpreter ever was
Ludwig Klages (Klages, 1 969; Fellman, 1 993; Aschheim, 1 994), who
wanted to go back to a pre-modern natural stage where nothing was
questioned, where humanity stood rooted in its soil with no reason for
questioning anything. For Klages, the origin of human consciousness was a
result of disturbing original forms of life and sensations. As Aschheim
( 1 994: 80f.) puts it: 'Seele . . . represented the possibility of an authentically
66 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
lived life - the overcoming of alienated intellectuality in favour of a new

found earthly rootedness.'2
To put it simply, for Nietzsche, 'intellectualism' was one of the most
striking symptoms of the sickness of the modern world, a world where
humanity is obsessed with exact observations, calculation, expectations,
etc. 3 One point that Nietzsche seems to have is the inability of modern
humanity to forget. Let us start with his famous work On the Genealogy of
Morals (Nietzsche, 1 969). Here, one of his main theses is that the basic
distinction between good and evil is not given to us by nature or by God.
Rather, humanity has to be taught it in a very cruel way. The distinction is
forced upon man, for example, by whipping him so hard that he will not be
able to forget it. This way it is incorporated, and in addition to his project
to find a new culture 'beyond good and evil', Nietzsche also finds a
terrorist aspect in memory. The noble person has been enslaved by the
slaves, he is no longer able to answer with the spontaneous 'yes' to
whatever he likes, while the 'no' comes from the slave morality, the 'evil' or
bad ( 1 924: l l ) . This inability results, for example, in a bad conscience. In
short, it is bad for life, as Nietzsche writes in his Untimely Meditations:
Thus: it is possible to live almost without memory, and to live happily moreover,
as the animal demonstrates; but it is altogether impossible to live at all without
forgetting. Or, to express my theme even more simply: there is a degree of
sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately
fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man or a people or a culture.
(Nietzsche, 1 983a: 62, original emphasis)
To emphasize what Nietzsche seems to mean here results in a one-sided

reading of him because he also defends the necessity to remember 'at the
right time'. Although Nietzsche might therefore be read as a balanced writer,
emphasizing the need of both memory and forgetfulness, I think I am hardly
exaggerating when I claim that his radical rightist readers tend to see more of
,
the 'Dionysian' pole than the 'Apollonian . 4 For example, in Twilight of the
Idols he talks of being 'true to my nature, which is affirmative and has
dealings with contradiction and criticism only indirectly' (Nietzsche, 1 983b:
64). Here, once again sophisticated, he is critical of the exaggerated serious
ness and 'objectivity' of modern people. Thinking mechanically, reflecting
too much forces humanity to repeat, creating nothing: "'We must take
things more cheerfully than they deserve; especially since we have for a long
time taken them more seriously than they deserve." - So speak brave
soldiers of knowledge' (Nietzsche, 1 983c: 227). Thus, it would be extremely
2 As Aschheim ( 1994) points out, e.G. lung has a very similar interpretation of Nietzsche
here.
3 Cf. 'Our knowledge will take its revenge on us, just as ignorance exacted its revenge
during the Middle Ages' (Nietzsche, quoted in Sass, 1992: 324).
4 The so-called 'Asconians', that is the anarchists, libertarians, feminists, etc., united in the
dance, at Monte Veritas in Ascona, Switzerland during the first two decades of this century,
can be regarded as true Dionysian Nietzscheans (see Green, 1986). On the rightist readings of
Nietzsche, and how they had to transform him, see Aschheim, 1 995.
REFLEXIVITY A N D SPONTA N E ITY 67
hard to transform him into a defender of reflexive modernity. The path that
Klages took seems to be a more reasonable option, from the intellectual
anti-intellectualist point of view.
Nietzsche is one of the founders of modern philosophy, and in what
follows I locate some of his heirs insofar as they relate to anti-reflexive
reactions, that is, radical conservatism that combines anti-bourgeosie
reactions and the critique of the homogenization of culture with anti
reflexivism, that is an attempt to create impulse-driven actions within a
nationalist, mythic framework.
The nouvelle droite in France
In France, the 'new right' has been almost synonymous with the writer and
editor Alain de Benoist. It is rather well known that he tries to apply
Antonio Gramsci's sketch of the struggle of cultural hegemony to a rightist
context. Obviously, the left was in certain aspects successful in doing this
for their purposes. Of course, it did not conquer the political power, but
nowadays it is quite dominating, at least if you believe what the new right
says, 5 in the newspapers, television, the book market and what is still left
of a 'public sphere'. The central concept in de Benoist's discourse is
'culture'. He wants to restore the value of what he sees as lost, (Indo-)
European, that is pre-ludaic-Christian culture. Culture is also the primal
battlefield of hegemony. He wants to stop 'the reduction of all cultures
,
[Kulturen] to a single "world-civilization" [ Weltzivilization] (de Benoist,
1985: 33, original emphasis). Thus, in his foregrounding of culture, its
opposite, civilization, is also hinted at. Of course, these concepts are used
in their classical German conservative sense. Culture stands for spiritual
growth, civilization for materialism, atomism, individualism and econo
mism, and, particularly important in this context, for hyper-intellectualism.
For the new right in France, universities and schools are seen as factories,
where people learn a lot, but forget why they should. This leads to a
paralysation of thinking: 'I know people who have learnt so much that it
makes them unable to write anything. . . . Today, one has doubt. And
more important, one has anxiety over doing the wrong thing' (de Benoist,
1 985: 3 1 ). Instead of bringing order to the world, intellectualization leads
to an inner chaos where nothing is possible. The domination of economy,
regarded as 'the base' in both liberalism and Marxism, strengthens this
tendency since it is the best example of reflexivity: calculations, expecta
tions, etc. De Benoist's nouvelle droite differs from the 'old' right: 'Between
5 I do not discuss the correctness of this proposition here; it is probably an exaggeration

from the new right. However, I think that there is at least some truth in it: many of the former
68-leftists nowadays have important positions, especially in the mass media and at the
universities. I can draw on my own experience. As a 'post-68', a younger person, I have
experienced censorship and authoritarian 'knowing-better' exercised by this older generation.
68 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM AN D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
the true right and the economist right, writes Julius Evola, there is no
identity, rather a total contrast' (de Benoist, 1 985: 1 43). The saviour is
culture, and the over-civilized culture has to be brought back home to its
roots, to the popular culture of a homogenized territory. Reflexivity means
reduction, one sees only the abstract, general side in a world of differences.
It is hard, if not impossible, to reflect upon the unique and concrete, that
which just 'is' and nothing more. Hence, de Benoist pleas for 'ethno
pluralism', against 'world-civilization', a world where each 'culture' (ethnic,
religious, racial, etc. belonging) has the right to develop in its safe territory
(we will get back to this in Chapter 4 below). 6 Since 'culture' is the centre
of everything, it is in this place that he anchors his form of concrete,
radical conservatism.
This strategy, 'cultural struggle', has been politically realized in Austria,
where the leader of the ultra-nationalist FPC> party, Jorg Haider, has
written a book on it (Haider, 1 993). It is striking how central 'culture' as a
point of reference and orientation has become during recent decades.
Maybe Fukuyama (1 992) is right in one respect, namely the victory of
capitalism. Even in 'socialist' countries like Vietnam and China the
economy is basically capitalist. In the Western world, social democracy is
busy cutting down welfare costs in order to make the capitalist economy
run more smoothly. Even if the class society has not disappeared, it has at
least been redefined.
Sociology has not only described, but also been part of this process.
Pierre Bourdieu ( 1 988), for example, has invested tremendous effort in
order to show how style, taste and consumption are signs and creators of
class differences. The most frequent example is Gerhard Schulze's (1 993)
concept of the Erlebnisgesellschaft, a society where everyone hunts new
sensations, illusions, play, etc. He dates the birth of this society back to
1 968 when cultural features like the length of the hair, musical taste, etc.
came into the foreground due to the end of scarcity in the Western world
and the rise of mass consumption. It now seemed like not power and
economic wealth, but taste was what made people differ from each other. I
say 'seemed' because the change was due to a new sensibility to aesthetic
matters.
Even if sociology, like every discourse, has a constructive, practical
aspect, this description of course also represents something real. During the
Cold War and the happy days of the welfare state project the role of
economy as generating action and identity was over-emphasized, and the
ideological dimensions of the political turbulence of the late 1 960s also.
Thus, aesthetic and cultural aspects were almost hidden. But as soon as
'culture' turns a central point of orientation they become visible. Of course,
6 In the end, de Benoist is a metaphysical fundamentalist: The Fatherland is the territory

of a people and the land of its fathers. The people ( Volk) is no abstract concept, the fatherland
no philosophical school. They are concrete realities' (1 985: 75). He never demonstrates why
'People ( Volk)' should be more 'concrete' than 'humanity'.
REFLEXIVITY A N D SPONTA N E I TY 69
we run the opposite risk if social and political aspects are viewed as
expressions of culture. I am not criticizing Bourdieu's and Schulze's
different approaches here. On the contrary, Schulze's work is especially
illuminating in many respects.
Schulze, a German sociologist, takes Ulrich Beck's ( 1 992) thesis on
'individualization' as given. That is, a post-industrial condition where
individuals have to construct their own biographies without being able to
use social norms which could give rise to a self-evident identity. Less and
less is 'given' or transmitted from the social and historical context.
However, Schulze shows that this does not mean the end of the social -
new communities, groups and contexts are formed due to similarities in
taste. New forms of competition might then occur where the goal is not
primarily to secure political or economic interests, but the hegemony of a
definition of what kind of taste, which sensations and what consumption
can satisfy the aesthetic needs.
On the one hand, thus, Schulze might be blinded by the culturalist light,
and on the other hand, he might be describing new central processes in
society. In this context, he is interesting because he obviously dislikes what
he sees. Individualization does not only mean freedom, but also the burden
of living without self-evidence. There is too much contingency and so
individuals have to reflect too much, worry too much about themselves. He
thinks that a revival of cyclical time might help here, that is, we can take
what was given yesterday as still valid today, recognize repetition instead
of hunting for the new. 7 Reflexivity is part of the problem, not the solution.
The new culturalism
This process of cultural ism has been strengthened by recent developments.

The waves of immigration, resulting in large ethnic minorities in most
European countries, have given rise to the problem of difference and the
'need' for understanding and translating. 8 The media, the legal system, and
what is left of the public sphere have defined the problem as 'multi
culturalism', the fact that many different ethnic groups exist in the same
place and at the same time. This condition is defined as the co-existence of
different 'cultures', and culturalism includes the reduction of the individual
to a member of a specific collective. In this way, the dialectical processes
remain hidden.
7 Cf. the Marxist fonn of cultural criticism in the 1970s. For example, Krovoza (1976)
argues that there are limits to the capital logic of production (cumulative types of process) and
the reproduction of human beings, that is socialization, which represents non-cumulative types
of process; Negt and Kluge ( 1974) call for the necessity of pre-economic, social human beings
capable of producing 'the emancipatory minimum'.
8 The need for 'understanding' and 'translation' is not 'out there'. The most recent example
of this is the creation and separation of one language (Serbocroatian) into three (Serbian,
Croatian and Bosnian) in the fonner Yugoslavia.
70 RADI CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
When people immigrate from different countries, it is, of course,

easiest to get in contact with those who speak the same language and
have a similar habitus. Due to structural facts and prejudices, resulting in
high degrees of unemployment and poverty, they start identifying with
each other. This identification is strengthened by legislation and edu
cation, and so they become defined as specific 'minorities' identified by
an essential characteristic construct: their shared 'culture'. The fact that it
is almost impossible to change anything on an individual level also
makes people from the same 'culture' stick to each other. Of course, this
development has been most visible in the USA - the step from wanting
'civil rights' to 'black power', from individual equality to the rights of a
collective.
The claims from different minorities in the USA - gays, lesbians, blacks,
women, Hispanics, etc. - are often summed up as 'identity politics' (see
Chapter 6 below). After Marxism, which reduced the individual to a
member of a class, a new reductionism appeared, in order to appoint him
or her a member of a minority collective. Since Marxism had almost
nothing to say about the effects of racism and sexism, deeply felt by their
victims, people gathered in the new social movements to change an
oppressive reality.
Identity politics paradoxically embraces both relativism and founda
tionalism at the same time. There are different truths for each minority, but
as a member of a specific group or minority, one has privileged access to its
criteria of truth. Thus, only as a member can one know the history of
oppression and the refusal of what one regards as equal rights. What we
see here is cultural relativism in new clothes. Not only the postmodernists,
but also the European new right influence the development of identity
politics.
From postmodernism comes the idea of the death of 'the grand meta
narratives' and the abandoning of the idea of a permanent and homo
geneous subject. Postmodernism has also advocated a 'standpoint epi
stemology', that is criteria of 'truth' depend on what group you belong to.
Even a sensible philosopher like Richard Rorty belongs to this group
here: 'To be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into the people to
whom one must justify one's belief and the others. The first group - one's
Ethnos - comprises those who share enough of one's belief to make
fruitful conversation possible' (Rorty, 1 99 1 : 30). Such arguments are used
both by minority groups and radical conservatives, a truly anti-liberal
argument.
From radical conservatism comes the emphasis on the fundamental
differences between 'cultures' and the impossibility of translation and the
non-desirability of a mixed 'world-civilization'. The more difference is
observed and constructed, the more fertile becomes the soil for radical
conservative ideas, with their longing for separation of the different
'cultures'. From both postmodernism and radical conservatism come what
Walter Benjamin called the 'aesthetization of politics', of turning politics
REFLEXIVITY A N D SPONTANEITY 71
into a matter of beauty, disregarding rational discourses on freedom,

solidarity and justice. Fascination thus becomes more important than
rational judgements.
Technocratic conservatism
The critique of reflexivity and the call for a more authentic culture can be
found in many discourses, and I now turn to 'technocratic conservatism',
which refers to the standpoints that three former radical conservatives -
Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schelsky and Hans Freyer - developed after
World War II. Their conservatism was 'deradicalized' (Muller, 1 987), that
is, they no longer saw any radical utopias and alternatives to a modern,
differentiated and complex society. In this context, technocratic conser
vatism is interesting, since it thought that reflexivity was a burden, and that
contemporary society had already 'solved' this problem. The solution was
that modern institutions had institutionalized the necessary minimum of
reflexivity so that ordinary people did not have to bother about complex
matters.
In his post-war works, Arnold Gehlen stresses that the insecure, unstable
human being needs institutions to secure him or her from the dangers of
reflexivity. Institutions at the same time alienate and release people, but
alienation is not only negative, it is also positive objectification, which
creates a distance from too much reflection. When one asks for 'meaning',
something is already false (Terkessidis, 1 995: 26f.), so this way people are
freed from the eternal asking and having troubles.
In a famous broadcast discussion from 1 965, Gehlen and Adorno dis
cussed the subject 'Is sociology a science of human beings?' (Adorno and
Gehlen, 1 975). Adorno's arguments make Gehlen's sociology more visible.
One dominant, underlying theme is the rise of modern institutions and the
problem of reification. Their different ideas are condensed in a short
passage:
Gehlen: Mr Adorno, you see the problem of emancipation [MiindigkeitJ here

once again, of course. Do you really believe that the burden of fundamental
problems, of extensive reflection, of errors in life that have profound and
continuing effects, all of which we have gone through because we were trying
to swim free of them - do you really believe one ought to expect everyone to
go through this? I should be very interested to know your views on this.
Adorno: I can give you a simple answer: Yes! I have a particular conception of
objective happiness and objective despair, and I would say that for as long as
people have problems taken away from them, for as long as they are not
expected to take full responsibility and full self-determination, their welfare
and happiness in this world will merely be an illusion. And it will be an
illusion that will one day burst. And when it bursts, it will have dreadful
consequences. (Adorno and Gehlen, 1 975: 249f., translation from Safranski,
1 998: 407-8)
72 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
While Adorno stresses his utopia of the possibility for humankind to

take back the authority it has built into the institutions, Gehlen sees no
problem here. The institutions protect humanity from worrying too much
about the basic conditions and reproduction of its existence. 'I also think
that the institutions protect humanity from himself [sic]. Surely this means
a reduction of freedom' (GeWen, in Adorno and Gehlen, 1 975: 245). One
conclusion Gehlen draws from this is that we should let the institutions
('secondary systems') think and worry, so that humanity only has to worry
about what is less problematic. Therefore, he has no utopia, like Adorno,
of modern humans as enlightened and reflective persons. On the contrary,
when Gehlen observes modern reflexivity, he calls it 'the new subjectivism'
(Gehlen, 1 980). This means an obsession with inner life, which is talked
about and discussed in a disciplined manner, where there is a 'relative lack
of direct, naive, general emotionality' (Gehlen, 1 980: 78). This is bad since
it leads to a pathological 'overreflectiveness'.
In Freyer's and Schelsky's 'de-radicalized' post-war writings we find very
similar themes and diagnoses. Of course, there are also differences, but in
this context I choose to ignore them. For example, in Hans Freyer's work,
Theorie des gegenwiirtigen Zeitalters ( 1 955), he writes: 'Man serves the
institutions willingly and adapts to them' (Freyer, 1955: 89). Human beings
are determined and created according to their functions and relations
within the systems. Of course, this means alienation, but Freyer sees no
problem with the system, the problem is if people do not adapt to the
system.
So, for technocratic conservatism, we have self-reproducing systems to
which people have to learn to adapt. History is no more. Instead, we now
live in 'post-history' (de Man, 1 95 1 ; Gehlen, 1 980; Jung, 1 989). Nothing
new that will surprise us will appear. Everything genuinely new has already
been or happened. 'New developments, surprises, and genuine creativity
are all still possible, but only within the area already staked out and only
on the basis of the already given fundamental premises, which are no
longer called into question' (Gehlen, 1 987: 226). This also has implications
for sociology: the mission to perform a 'diagnosis of the times' is no longer
possible (Lichtblau, 1 995). Finally, utopian thought is dead, and everyday
man may resign and relax as everyday life goes on and on.
Technocratic conservatism was shocked by the student revolt of 1 968.
Schelsky (1 975) accused the intellectuals of poisoning society, creating a
new dividing line between intellectuals and work. Today, his diagnosis is
echoed when 'the age of the elites' (Lasch, 1 995) or 'the political class' is
discussed.
The technocratic conservatives were, as I said, 'de-radicalized' and
cannot be blamed for having supported anti-democracy. Rather, they had
no illusions on the possibility of a participatory democracy. 9 Only the elite-
9 Cf. the discussions on democracy, participation and elites between John Dewey and
Walter Lippman (Westbrook, 1991).
R E FLEX IVITY A N D S PONTA N EITY 73
governed society could defend freedom. Thus, one can count them among
'The Macchiavellians' (Burnham, 1 943), to whom we can perhaps even add
Francis Fukuyama today.
Proto-fascism and the conservative revolution
The anti-reflexiveness of technocratic conservatism was something that,

even if it marked a de-radicalization, was kept from the 'conservative
revolution', to which we can at least count the inter-war Freyer. According
to Terkessidis ( 1 995: 1 69), Ernst Hinger in the 1 920s lamented that 'we' are
too 'ramosed', therefore 'the sap does not rise any longer into the tops'.
As always, Hinger's metaphors are interesting. Here, humankind, or
rather, the people, is like a tree. A tree has its roots (the favourite conser
vative metaphor) in the ground. However, the tree can be too ramosed. In
that case, the gardener (Junger himself, social engineers, leaders) has to
prune it (a modernist view). The people should not bother too much,
instead the observer/leader takes care of that.
Just like the technocrat conservatives, Junger says 'Yes' to reification
(Heidegren, 1 995). What else would there be to choose? What can be done
is to accept the historical development, not change it, but accelerate it.
Junger loves actions and deeds: these need no legitimation or reflection,
they are ends in themselves.
This aspect of Junger's writings is most obvious in his proto-fascist
works from the 1 920s. In the Weimar Republic, Junger did not feel at
home. He did not feel alive. Only feeling 'pain' (Junger, 1 995) made one
feel alive. Dostoyevsky had the same point: only when one suffers from
pain can one feel human and know the 'being-there' (Bohatec, 1 95 1 :
269ff.). Suffering is holy and magnificent since it brings us very close to life
itself.
Nothing new or exciting was happening. A total mobilization was
already going on. The only problem was to get the proper 'banner', and
here the pilot or the photographer are the ideals. Getting the right 'banner'
requires that people are similar and can base a solidarity on this similarity,
that is, the similarity has to be obvious and clear to avoid reflection and
useless discussions.
Schmittian radical conservatism
There are striking similarities between Junger's proto-fascist ideas and

those of his friend, Carl Schmitt. However, Schmitt tries to find a solution
by reading philosophy. Of most interest here is his work on, and
interpretation of, Thomas Hobbes's main work Leviathan ( 1 65 1 ).
Schmitt, the admirer of order, is extremely afraid of chaos, the state
of nature which, according to Hobbes, is the primal human condition.
74 RAD I CAL CON S ERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Therefore, there must be order, but, several hundred years after Hobbes,
how? The state must be the ordering principle. That is, of course, Schmitt's
answer. As Terkessidis ( 1 995) has pointed out, the demand for order is
caused by the fear of chaos. Chaos is, of course, that state of nature where,
according to Hobbes, everyone fights each other. Just like in Hobbes,
Schmitt calls for the state to prevent this. The state is there to fill a void,
something that is, like God, beyond questioning. But 1 789, after Hobbes,
marked the rise of reflexivity, institutionalized in the parliament. Therefore,
Schmitt is against parliamentary democracy whose purpose is to settle
arguments through discussion and compromise. The task, according to
Schmitt, is to construct and build a new state which is the organic
expression of a people, and thus cannot be called into question. The state
becomes the mythological and quasi-religious equivalent of the people. But
it depends on a people as an organic community. This community can exist
only if two premises are at hand:
A homogenized people, since then there are no reasons for different

10
opinions, parties, interests.
2 A negative, an enemy, must exist since we can only understand
ourselves in relation to this Otherness.
The first premise rests upon the will to define the essence of one's own
people and to declare minorities as strange, or enemies. Here, Schmitt is a
romanticist, postulating volkisch essences.
Schmitt's central distinction between friend and enemy as the central
dimension in politics is famous. We can only know ourselves through the
enemy, he says. The enemy has two dimensions. First, the general political
dimension, which leads to cultural relativism, people standing against other
people, and no universal principles at hand in order to judge which are
right. The second, geopolitical dimension is Schmitt's concrete enemy,
above all Britain, the Jews l l and the USA. These enemies advocate 'uni
versalism', which, according to Schmitt, means an ideological transforma
tion of a particular interest into an absolute claim. Instead, every nation is,
in its own eyes, superior to the other nation. Thus, each state should
protect its own interests (its particular culture), and thus by definition has
the right to exert influence in the surrounding territories, that is, to protect
its Groj3raum (Schmitt, 1 98 1).
10 Cf. Schmitt (1 985a: 1 3f.): 'Any real democracy depends, not only on the treatment of
that which is unequal as unequal. . . . The political power of a democracy shows itself in its
ability to eliminate or keep away that which is strange and unequal, which threatens
homogeneity.' While this is a radical-democrat standpoint in an undifferentiated society, it
becomes the opposite in a differentiated, complex society.
I I In the original 1941 edition of Land und Meer, Schmitt's anti-Semitism is obvious.
However, in the 1981 edition these passages are gone, without any mentioning of the
omissions.
R E F L EX IVITY A N D SPONTANEITY 75
Schmitt advocates 'concrete' analyses and finds that modern power and
authority, society as a whole, is abstract. Even the state and the nation
become abstract if they do not know where to go. Who are 'we' then?
According to Schmitt, only 'the enemy' can provide such an answer. Then
the state is depending on a relationship. If we know whom we might fear,
we can know what they fear of us, and during this exchange we can get
to see ourselves. To recognize the enemy also means to recognize the
possibility of war. In such a light, different kinds of 'peace project', such as
the United Nations and the European Union, become suspect. When, in the
name of peace, they attacked Iraq, this was 'the first pacifist war'
(Maschke, 1 99 1 ). War can be in the service of peace only by taking refuge
in the principle of 'humanity'. Then, according to Maschke, the enemy
becomes a criminal, punishable in a court, and not a brother with equal
rights.
Schmitt and Schmittians have a point here, at the same time as they are
totally crazy. Their point is that ideals like 'humanity' might conceal
something more fundamental. But they do not escape from the dangers of
fundamentalism this way. Logically, the state as they see it can only be
based on similarity, and the 'different' is the enemy. The step to xeno
phobia and exclusion is obviously anything but gigantic.
A Schmittian slogan could be 'liberate the state!'. The state should not
be subordinated to ideals, the parliament, etc. No, it should incarnate the
feelings - the language, culture and habits - of the people who live in
the territory controlled by it. Reflexive intellectuality can, of course,
exterminate these reactions and feelings of organic communities.
Radical conservatives are, as many have pointed out, modernists. Unlike
the old conservatives, they say 'yes' to modern technology and efficiency,
but they also differ from other modernist camps when they do not want to
say 'yes' to reflexivity. Instead, they dream of a modernized illusion, the
possibility that something - the nation and/or the state - can just 'be',
exercising its power without being questioned. The new rightists do not
seem to think that when God is dead, everything is permitted. Rather,
nothing is possible (de Benoist, 1 985: 32). There must be an 'it is', a
foundation. This foundation is not based on normativity, nor on tran
scendental criterias. 'It' is pure power and strength. It has not to be
reflected upon, for if that happens it becomes clear that 'it' is nothing. It is
real, as long as it stays (to use Jacques Lacan's concepts) real and
imaginary. 1 2
The rightists are close to the communitarian standpoint here: 'freedom'
is nothing that can exist 'outside' communities (Kaltenbrunner, 1985: 7 1 ),
freedom is the freedom to belong to something. The new and young con
servatives are of the same opinion. Like the old ones, they practise political
12 In a sense it is a matter of preventing a symbolic mediation. If so, it becomes possible to

connect being and institution, to link the question of individual freedom to what the state can
do. On these three concepts, see Lacan ( 1966).
76 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
existentialism. For example, Roland Bubik ( 1 995) mentions a fugue com

posed by Bach as a model for real freedom. The fugue has a strict structure
and strict rules. However, within this framework the composer is free, and
can therefore create real beauty.
Of course, I must make a small reservation here. There are communi
tarians and communitarians, and some of them regard themselves as
leftists. These believe that communication is possible between cultures and
communities - as opposed to what Rorty ( 1 99 1 : 30) said above (p. 70).
Not only pure communication, but also, for example, empathy might relate
people to each other. Leftist communitarians also see the small community
as the right place for the fundamental rights of citizens to develop
(Ehnmark, 1 994: 6 l f.). However, I would argue, in the European context,
right-wing communitarianism dominates.
The belonging to a community marks in what direction freedom can
move. For example, 'The Nation' is a latent strong force, able to bind
individuals together, making them members of an imaginary community.
As Erich Fromm (194 1 ) has written, there are two kinds of freedom:
negative and positive. The negative one is the 'freedom from', that is
freedom from slavery or injustice, while positive freedom is the freedom to
create and develop. In this terminology, the radical conservatives do not
plead for negative freedom, but for freedom from negative freedom, if
positive freedom is to be realized.
Sacrifice
Another feature that can be related to the cntlque of reflexivity is the

willingness to sacrifice something. The reason for this connection is, of
course, the celebration of individual freedom in liberalism. In its most
extreme form, liberalism wants the individual to have full sovereignty to do
whatever he or she prefers. Even a social liberal like John Rawls ( 1 97 1 )
stresses that nobody should be forced to sacrifice anything, even if the
majority would benefit from the sacrifice. The strongest reaction against
having to sacrifice anything, comes, according to Lasch ( 1 995: 4 1 ), from
the new class of cosmopolitans. These people do not belong to any
community or nation, only to themselves. This is one important point in
the communitarian critique of liberalism. A community rests on the
willingness of the individuals to acknowledge its positive value; in other
words, that freedom and the good demand the superiority of the com
munity, while individual autonomy and self-preservation are subordinated
values.
Although apologetic, Wolfgang Palaver ( 1 995) has demonstrated that
communitarianism and Carl Schmitt take similar standpoints here. The
most obvious point in the critique of liberalism is the case of marriage and
love - how can a marriage be possible without sacrifice? Undeniably,
communitarianism has made clear some blind spots in liberal self-
R E FL EXIVITY A N D SPONTA N EITY 77
understanding, which is not to say that its own alternative would be

without its own blind spots.
Anyway, there are clear parallels to Schmitt's thinking, and I think that
Palaver ( 1 995: 53) is quite right to argue that 'Schmitt's critique of
liberalism focuses on its anti-sacrificial attitude'. The state is everything for
Schmitt. It is for the state that the individuals must sacrifice. This is
necessary since a strong state with control of its territory needs an enemy.
Without this prerequisite the end of politics is near, a pacified one-world
civilization. And the end of politics also means the end of a meaningful life
since a privileged relationship between existence and politics is postulated
(Schmitt, 1 963).
Just like many communitarians, Schmitt's standpoint includes theo
logical matters. As a Catholic, he despises Protestantism since it is the
theological equivalent of economic and political liberalism. We could also
add that Protestantism includes a more reflexive relationship between the
individual and God.
However, the most advanced discussion of sacrifice in a theological
context is found in the works by Rene Girard. In his theory of mimetic
sociability (Girard, 1 977), he argues that the root of social cohesion in
primitive societies stems from the scapegoat mechanism. When a tribe kills
an outsider, everything that happens after is comprehended as a result of
the killing of a scapegoat and he is then worshipped as a god. This is the
way the sacred is constituted, according to Girard. It is interesting to note
that Emile Durkheim ( 1 965) defines 'the sacred' as that which just 'is' and
beyond reflection while 'the profane' is that which can be reflected upon.
The sacrifice in pre-Christian-Judaic religions was the killing of a human
being as a sacred act. However, Judaism became the first religion not to
sacrifice human beings, which could be another reason for Schmitt's anti
Semitism. 1 3 This move does not mean the end of sacrifice and the basic
social bond, according to Girard. He claims that in the Bible there is a
more human form for sacrifice than the killing of the scapegoat - the
willingness to sacrifice one's own life in order to save the life of another
person.
But today we find writers who recognize the primitive form of sacrifice
as the only act that creates stable social cohesion. The first writer I am
thinking of is Botho Strauss. In a famous essay (StrauB, 1 993), he argues
that the killing of foreigners is a degenerated form of the basic sacrifice. He
criticizes modernity for having destroyed the memory of the past and
mythical time. As Herzinger and Stein ( 1 994: 200) show, in the end this
means that if we do not want civil war, we have to accept blood sacrifice.
An alarming sign of the time we live in, indeed. This form of critique of
modernity and the Judaic-Christian civilization is also the reason for de
Benoist's ( 1 982) paganism.
\ 3 This shows that anti-Semitism cannot only have emotional, but also intellectual reasons.
78 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
To sum up: I am not discussing whether there is a real need for some
kind of sacrifice in modern society. I have just wanted to demonstrate how
the critique of reflexivity is connected to this issue. Sacrifice is beyond
reflection, and means obeying God, law or community; it is not to be
hindered by 'delayed reaction'. Reflection might lead to critical questions
about the necessity of sacrifice. Therefore, some tendencies in society today
might very well lead to a stronger anti-reflexive reaction.
Pathological hyper-modernism and hyper-reflexivity
It is tempting to say 'yes' to radical conservatism - the quest for naivete,

innocence, creativity. There seems to be too much intellect and reflexivity
around. We might want to go back to an imaginary point where there is no
reason to ask questions, but the price we would have to pay for this might
be too high.
However, there are not only political and theological critiques of reflex
ivity. Even from psychiatry there comes a critique. In Louis A. Sass's work,
Madness and Modernism ( 1 992), the author sees a clear parallel between
modernity, modernism and schizophrenia. The strong dualism charac
terizing these phenomena, for example between omnipotence and total
passivity, can be traced back to Immanuel Kant who introduced a sort of
doubling of consciousness (Sass, 1 992: Chapter 1 1 ). Here, consciousness is,
on the one hand, everything. It constitutes the world, but it is also an
object determined by, for example, the mechanism of cause and effect. This
is an indicator of the widening rift between intellect and emotion. I do not
want to make a long story too short, but Sass obviously sees modernity as
a condition bred on too much reflection, or 'hyper-reflection'. As I
understand Sass, modernity is a cul-de-sac, where reflexivity only creates
more and more reflexivity, thus deepening the rift between the two poles.
Sass is no social critic, and has little to say about the cure, but of course
modernity is a dead end, and authors like Heidegger and Wittgenstein can
give clues to a possible answer since they look for a world before the
existence of the dualistic consciousness, which might lead to the end of a
homeless mind.
If Sass has no answer, another explorer of the human psyche, Rollo May
( 1 991), has one simple and strong answer: back to the myths! In a
demythologized world which in itself, according to May, leads to an
increase in drug abuse and suicides, the only thing that can save humanity is
the myth - myths of the meaning of life, its goal and origin. If reflected
upon, they are destroyed. In certain ways, this is a wish to return to
something lost, if not paradise, so at least to pre-modern patterns of
thought, an attempt to escape 'the terror of history' (Eliade, 1 974), in which
humanity will find nothing but its historical existence, nothing mythological
or eternal. This is also roughly in line with Schulze's ( 1 993) 'cure': the
revival of cyclical time.
REFLEXIVITY A N D S PONTA N EITY 79
Life-world or system?
Is there a life-world, that is a place for mutual understanding, questions

and reflection? Of course, but does society need it in order to function?
This is the central question in the controversy between the two giants of
contemporary German sociology: Niklas Luhmann and Jiirgen Habermas.
As I see it, the similarities with the Adorno-Gehlen debate are striking.
Gehlen and Luhmann share a truly anti-utopian attitude, while the
opposite is true for Adorno and Habermas.
Adorno's 'negative dialectics' is, even if his main philosophical post-war
work bears this title, not purely negative. He wants to keep the faith alive
that everyday man can take responsibility for his own life. Habermas wants
to see possibilities in the life-world to create new political arenas, making a
democratization of what is now controlled by the system possible.
While Gehlen regards this as something negative, Luhmann does not
understand how it can be relevant for sociology. The study of society,
according to him, deals with the functioning of social systems and sub
systems. Among other mechanisms there is the 'reduction of complexity'
(Luhmann, 1 975), which transforms complex matters and problems into
manageable problems. It works on a purely societal system level, and has
nothing to do with 'understanding' on a general level. The individual as a
social being has no possibilities to reflect upon the whole. But this is
Habermas's (and Adorno's) hope. Therefore, Habermas must place the
life-world within sociological discourse, calling for a 'second modernity'
that will secure the life-world from colonization and irrationalism. Whether
Luhmann or Habermas are 'right' is an empirical question, I just wanted to
note that the defence and rejection of subjective and intersubjective
reflexivity constitutes a battle that has a long history and is still alive.
There truly seems to be a 'fascination of amorality' among many socio
logists today, as Neckel and Wolff ( 1 994) labelled the growing interest in
Luhmann's works today. What works, not what is right, should be the
object of contemporary sociology. This calls for observation and analysis,
not so much for subjective or intersubjective reflexion.
Reflexivity
Thus, scepticism against widespread, individual reflexivity can be found in

many camps. Most of us sometimes hate the lack of spontaneity, the
inability to be more authentic and true to ourselves, and complain of
lacking a safe foundation. There seems only to be reflection upon reflec
tion. My main point here has been to demonstrate that it is the new right
that has described the problem and suggested a solution to it, and due to
what I just said, there is a great potential for the new right to attract more
people than it currently does.
80 RADICAL CON S E RVATI SM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
The critique of reflexivity is as old as the recognition of its existence in

modern Western thought. Saying this, and doing what I have done, that is,
locating formations of thought where this criticism has been conceptua
lized, is rather easily done. More complicated questions are: ( 1 ) to ask what
kind of social processes, developments and situations will favour this
critique; and (2) to discuss what results this will have.
The ethnification and culturalization of society might awaken the

longing for more 'organic' communities where the burden of reflection
is annihilated. More is taken as given, having a 'sacred' nature.
2 Spontaneity might be institutionalized in post-industrial economic
corporations where the need for new ideas is acute.
There is certainly a longing for the sacred, the 'it is' . But is it possible
today to create a sacred 'state'? I think the chances are relatively small.
Rather, the market can provide sacred products - the identity industry,
identity movements, new pseudo-sacred sects and churches, etc. Indeed, the
modern world has turned into an inner world, where people go hunting
solutions to their own life traumas. The public sphere has become frag
mented and mediated by strange modes of communication where face-to
face interaction and communication become obsolete (Sennett, 1 978). But
we have learned from history that such prophecies, whose function it is to
give us security, might be radically false. 14
14 According to Max Weber (1974: 1 55), prophecies belong to the religious sphere, and the
modern, scientific man should 'bear the fate of the times like a man'.
4
POLITICS AND THEOLOGY
Both anti-conservatives and conservatives agree in that conservatism is

'religious oriented'. (Greiffenhagen, 1 986: 94)
For these pitiful creatures are so concerned not only to find what one
or the other can worship, but to find something that all can believe in
and worship; what is essential is that all may be together in it.
(Dostoyevsky, 1 943: 301)
This seems to be true, as well for the old value-conservatism as for radical
conservatism, but to a lesser degree for mainstream structural conserva
tism. In fact there is a certain connection between the first two, especially
in the link between the Spanish conservative thinker Juan Donoso Cortes
( 1 809-53) and Carl Schmitt.
Juan Donoso Cortes is a true religious conservative thinker. If one
separates politics from theology there can only be terror and chaos. His
main thesis is that God exists, and if so, the history of humankind is a
history of decline and omnipotence (Cortes, 1 979). Every revolution is a
revolution against God. The revolutions of the nineteenth century were
caused by the desire of the masses to be as rich as the upper classes. Before
the socialist revolutions, the bourgeoisie wanted to have as much as the
aristocracy; before that the aristocracy wanted what the kings had; and the
kings wanted to be God. Thus, every upheaval against the order is a denial
of God.
According to Donoso Cortes our civilization has turned from an
affirmation of God into a denial: from that God is so sublime that he
cannot do anything on earth, to that he is everything that is done on earth,
that is, that God is humanity. Then God almost ceases to have any
existence since there is no room for a divine law. However, he is an
optimist: 'Humanly speaking, Catholicism owes its success to the sound
ness of its logic, and, even if it were not led by the hand of God, its logic
would suffice to make its triumph even to the remotest corners of the
world' (Cortes, 1 979: 252). Herein lies the strength of Donoso Cortes's
analysis: while it is quite easy to show contradictions in liberal and socialist
thought, political theology is more logical. At least it is, if one believes in
Catholicism.
Carl Schmitt was a devoted reader of Donoso Cortes. Schmitt saw in the
Weimar Republic a denial of order, that God was thought to be
everywhere, and thus nowhere. To create political order there has to be real
politics, the ability to say aloud who is the enemy and who is the friend.
82 RADICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
This was not the situation in the liberal world - here one discussed instead
of decided, and the discussion was based on an idea of a universal
'humanity'. To Schmitt, 'humanity' is a liberal illusion since it conceals the
real nature of politics, and also an atheist idea - law and order are related
to 'reason' instead of the serving of God. Schmitt's Political Theology
( l 985b) is two-fold. It has a practical-political side and a theoretical
analytical side. The former emphasizes that the theological aspect of
politics should be more visible, the latter wants to show that all politics has
theological aspects: 'All significant concepts of the modern theory of the
state are secularized theological concepts' (Schmitt, 1 985b: 36). He
probably has a point here. For example, the problem of 'sovereignty' has a
theological element, and even such a secular social scientist as Max Weber
has to leave room for a theological experience in his analysis of power
(Herrschaft) 'charisma' is something other than tradition or rationality, a
-
glimpse of something divine.

But it is the practical aspect that is interesting. If the reality of politics is
obscured, politics become totally instrumental, de-personalized and
abstract. Schmitt loved the concrete, even power should be concrete,
otherwise humans become animals obeying nature-like principles and law
(Schmitt, 1 994).
As a conservative, he felt a deep contempt for liberalism, which he did
not believe to be genuinely political. It is merely an expression of interests
associated with the support of the capitalist system, as it is based upon an
atomistic and economic conception of human beings. Furthermore,
religion, that is, Catholicism, is incompatible with capitalist industrialism
(Schmitt, 1 996). On the other hand, Marxism sees humanity from, accord
ing to Schmitt, a more reasonable, collective perspective, where classes are
the primary subject. But Schmitt cannot accept the materialist and atheist
elements of Marxism. First of all, the state is the primary subject for
Schmitt, and secondly, even Marxism misunderstands the essential matter
in politics. As in the case of aesthetics and morality, politics also rests on a
fundamental distinction; in the first instance on the conceptual oppositions
beautiful/ugly, good/bad, and in a later instance on the distinction between
friend and enemy. A friend is either a person or the people ( Volk) one is
willing to give one's life for, which, translated into Schmitt's authoritarian
idea about the state, means the people to which one belongs. The enemy,
the other, does not primarily take on the role of the scapegoat, but is
primarily the political instance in relation to which one's own politics can
be created. Without an enemy, we cannot know who we are. Real politics
is foreign politics. Schmitt in this way ties his existentialism to a political
theory. According to him the enemy is a question about ourselves as a
Gestalt (Schmitt, 1 963). In the fight against the enemy, we realize who we
are and what we stand for. This is, however, not just some sort of militant
hermeneutics, but rather another attack on the liberal and universal idea of
one world where everyone is friends and the egalitarian principle is raised
to a divine status (alternatively, everyone is damned equal). To Schmitt,
POLITICS A N D TH EOLOGY 83
liberalism's celebration of the individual leads to its own negation, in that

its conception of the individual is purely quantitative: An individual is An
individual, not a Different individual.
Possibly, we find the best illustration of Schmitt's idea in the novel Sista
dagar (1 986) by Carl-Henning Wijkmark. On the surface, the novel appears
to be a type of spy thriller, where the question is in whom/what can the
main character put his faith. But this political problem is woven together
with a personal problem: the main character becomes the friend of a
Frenchman whose political sympathies he should distance himself from.
The question revolves around the main character's identity, and to what
extent this is tied to the distinction between friend and enemy. Both the
author and his alter ego early in the novel present themselves as being open
to Schmitt's ideas. The main character, Lennart, does not thrive in his
relationship with a woman who loves the mundane and the normal. He
prefers the stronger feelings of the exceptional. He therefore seeks out the
enemy Gestalt, that is to say, that which does not fit with his all too
familiar and well-known world-view. Then a foreigner comes on the scene
- Rene. Lennart and Rene take a trip, on which they become both friends
and enemies. The friendship consists of not revealing the depth of their
soul to each other: friendship is not therapy. Their friendship is strength
ened through their relationship to a third party, for example sharing the
same woman. But parallel to this, their hatred develops. When Lennart
understands Rene's fate, and that they are twin souls, he at the same time
understands that they let down and deceive each other in a never-ending
game. The meaning may be that politics is tragedy. In a personal
relationship, friendship and being enemies consists of a dialectical game.
But in politics, one is forced to make a particular choice and hold to it; a
friend can never become an enemy and vice versa.
The political wisdom, which the novel and Schmitt present, is that by
meeting the enemy, one learns about oneself. In political sociology, this
implies relationism. A political line is only understandable in relation to
what the opponent, as the enemy, does and says. Without this com
parison, one's own political position appears isolated and without content.
Even if one is not prepared to go as far as Schmitt and a number of
others in their critique of liberalism, one can derive a message from this:
sometimes the good must be saved with the help of the devil; democracy
is, to a great degree, based upon dictatorial decisions. For example,
schooling and upbringing cannot be based upon a negotiated agreement
between the parent and the child. Likewise, a political system can hardly
tolerate anti-democratic parties. What happens if the majority of the
electorate votes for a party which will abolish democracy? According to
one understanding of democracy, such a possibility should be permitted.
But such a decision is not open to revision. The idea of democracy is built
on the premise that the political majority can change. Thus, a democracy
must introduce dictatorial qualifications (inasmuch as they go against the
will of the people).
84 RADI CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D TH E F UTU R E OF POLITICS
Another aspect of political theology is the question 'How can the state
become "holy", "sacred", that is unquestionable?', which I discussed in the
previous chapter. A total State with a homogenized people must be sacred,
beyond doubt and reflexivity. This is not only a fancy theoretical point to
be found in the writings of Carl Schmitt. Far from it. One good illustration
is Italian Fascism, which in a work by Emilio Gentile ( 1 996) has been
analysed as the 'sacralization of politics'. Seen from this perspective,
fascism was a political religion. It is not too far-fetched to think about
Stalinism, Maoism, Nationalism, or, on the other hand, anti-theological
projects like cosmopolitanism and consumerism.
Anti-economism, so strong in conservative thinking, is also a part of
socialism. However, socialism and Marxism are ambivalent. On the one
hand, they say that the economy is the 'base', thus a change must begin
here. On the other hand, they criticize capitalism for reducing the worker
to a commodity, that is, a pure economic entity.
This ambivalence, or the dilemma of Marxism, is one reason for 'left'
'right' convergencies. That is, one reason why so many people labelled as
'leftists' have ended as extreme 'rightists'. One of the best examples is
perhaps Hendrik de Man, a Belgian Social Democrat who published the
widely read Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus in 1 928. ' Here, de Man
wanted to throw Marx out of socialist thinking, replacing 'economism'
with an 'ethical socialism' based on the writings of Goethe, Nietzsche,
Sorel and Bergson. Even though it was widely read, and translated into
many languages, it did not have much practical effect. During the 1 930s, de
Man developed his ethical socialism into 'plannism', a proposal for a plan
which was accepted by the Belgian social democrats, and also influenced
the French Socialists. The 'Plan' suggested a mixed economy, with support
from the middle class and a socialism within the nation. It tried to secure
that history was on the side of the socialists and not of the fascists and
nazis. De Man wrote: 'There is about our Plan an atmosphere of youth,
which is explained by our repeated and unequivocal affirmation of a
positive and decisive will to achieve' (de Man, 1 935: 39). De Man's ethical
socialism had now turned into a voluntarist, almost mythological revolu
tionary nationalism. Sternhell ( 1 986: 2 1 2) draws the following conclusion:
'However, in seeking to fight fascism with its own methods and on its own
ground, the new socialism . . . itself came to resemble fascism.' And this is
what actually happened a few years later, when many of the former French
socialists became fascists, and when de Man saw Hitler as the only one
who could save the Belgian working class. 2
I On de Man's many transitions, and the continuations within these, apart from Sternhell
( 1986), see Dodge ( 1966) and Pels (1993).
2 The rest of the story is that de Man became a minister in occupied Belgium, was
sentenced to death after the war as a collaborator, and ended his life in Switzerland in a car
crash in 1 953. He had then just published his last book, a pessimistic piece called Vermassung
und Kulturverfall ( 1 95 1 ), where he uses the concept of 'post-history', often wrongly ascribed to
Arnold Gehlen. For a critical discussion of 'post-history', see lung ( 1 989).
POLITICS A N D THEOLOGY 85
In fact, this period (the mid- 1 930s) is interesting for a number of

reasons. At this time, fascism and national socialism were often highly
respected in many camps. Also, the Italian fascists regarded the Swedish
Social Democrats as their cousins.
One interesting person here is the Swedish Social Democrat Rickard
Lindstrom ( 1 894- 1 950), the editor of the theoretic social-democrat journal
Tiden ( 1 926-29), and member of the governing board of the Social
demokratiska Arbetarpartiet (SAP) ( 1 936-50). He represented the informal
nationalist group of the party, and he, together with Nils Karleby, was of
great influence in the party's move from a class-party to a Folk-party. In
his books Socialistisk vardag ( 1 928) and En socialist ( 1 930) he develops
nationalist and racist ideas. He also supported Germany during World
War II. More interesting, however, is how he was influenced by Hendrik de
Man. In his autobiographical work En socialist, Lindstrom returns to de
Man:
Hendrik de Man found his way into the hearts of thousands of young workers .
. . . Thus, 'the socialism of personality' of the young generation has taken over in
relation that kind of socialism which is based on the belief in 'the development of
the economic society-formations as a natural-historical process'. (Lindstrom,
1 930: 1 1 8)
Here we find, besides voluntarism and a belief in the young generation, an

emphasis on cultural and psychological factors as the most important
determinants for the reproduction of class society. Interestingly, the form
of culturalism or psychologization of the class structure in Lindstrom's and
de Man's works is also found in Per Engdahl's autobiography Fribytare i
folkhemmet ( 1 979). Engdahl, the leading Swedish fascist, until his death in
1 995, also stresses the cultural barriers between the classes, emphasizing
that the classless society must be a society based on consensus, corporatism
and a shared mythology - the national myth. Engdahl also mentions
Lindstrom's work with great sympathy. Thus, there existed personal and
intellectual connections between fascists, nationalists and social democrats.
Engdahl also used to vote for the social democrats, and is said to have
been a good friend (in private contexts) of Ernst Wigforss (minister of
finance between 1 932 and 1 949) and Tage Erlander (prime minister
between 1 946 and 1 969). However, the rationalist-modernist tendency
within the party seems to have been the strongest, even if Per Albin
Hansson (prime minister between 1 932 and 1 946) put the Swedish national
banner among the red banners. This form of nationalism was, of course,
strengthened during the war.
There are also, as Lars Tragiirdh ( 1 990) has noticed, certain affinities
between the German concept Volk and the Swedish Folk. These affinities
stem from the common cultural heritage - Swedish and German roman
ticism with its emphasis on the collective as standing beyond the individual.
It seems plausible to assume that Swedish Social Democracy took over
86 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU R E OF POLITICS
figures and images stemming from conservative thinkers, 3 which is no more

remarkable than that the once anti-democratic conservatives took over
concepts like democracy and today even accept the basic features of the
welfare state. The emphasis on Folk depended upon both a common,
dominating Zeitgeist, and a conscious strategy. In fact, the distance
between the social democrats and the conservatives has often been
exaggerated. The Swedish young conservatives (Rudolf Kjellen and others)
were, if not 'radical conservatives', at least modernist conservatives.
Tage Lindbom was one of the Swedish social democrats who were
caught by de Man's ethical socialism. Like many other young members of
the party he shared the utopian idea of creating a new man, combined with
a new work ethos. But after World War II he saw that it had ended in co
operative supermarkets, television and Volvo (Lindbom, 1983). He thus
turned to conservative ideas as a way of keeping his basic anti-economist
orientation alive. This raises the question of whether there is any other
anti-economist ideology than (value-) conservatism. Probably not, I would
say.
Once again Karl Mannheim pops up. After the rise of nazism and
Mannheim's exile, he thought that the practical aspect of his sociology of
knowledge was obsolete. He then took a technocratic turn and started to
think about the need for counter-myths like Christianity, 'planning for
freedom', the welfare state as both myth and education, and socio
economic reforms. This was, as in the case of de Man, not totally on the
opposite playground compared with fascism. One reason for this was that
by then, 'history', or the 'Western occupants', as radical conservatives
would say, had not declaimed fascism and national socialism as 'rightist',
totalitarian extremism. Even to its opponents it had something to say.
One conclusion we can make after this excursion is that radical
conservatism is a 'spiritual radicalism', as a response to Leninist socialism
which could be said to be 'materialist radicalism', and that radical con
servatism is not only 'ideology' but 'utopia' as well.
3 In Germany, however, the SPD were not smart enough to do this, which left the field
open for the NSDAP to use it for its purposes (see Mosse, 1964).
5
THE CRITIQUE OF 'ONE-WORLD

CIVILIZATION' AND THE NATION
Radical conservatives are nationalists since they are conservatives believing

in the importance of belonging to one's own organic community. This
belief has a theological base, which I discussed in the previous chapter, for
what is the presupposition of Volk as a 'concrete' entity if not as a part of a
theology? Since World War II radical conservatives have become critical of
the alleged 'occupation' of their own geographical or symbolic territory by
global 'American' capitalism. ! Since they are radical, they want to defend
their conservative conviction radically.
This critique goes back to their readings of Dostoyevsky, pan-Slavism,
pan-Germanism and Volkischness. Originally it started as a reaction
against Britain and everything associated with Britain: capitalism, material
ism, parliamentary democracy, scientism and economism. This reaction
developed during World War I Britain stood for economy over politics,
-
trade before heroism, atomism instead of community. We recognize these

as parts of 'the ideas of 1 9 1 4', discussed earlier.
Speaking in theological terms, American/global capitalism/the Jews/the
United Nationslthe New World Order is simply Anti-Christ, Satan, the
Beast in the Book of Revelation.
After the war another enemy emerged: the Soviet Union with its
internationalism and materialism. An exception to the rule for the radical
conservatives in mid-war Germany was the national bolsheviks, including
mostly 'rightists', who, quite clear-sightedly, saw that the 'internationalism'
was in fact quite close to nationalism, but also to some nationalist-oriented
communists and social democrats (Dupeux, 1 985).
After World War II, the anti-Britain reaction turned into pure anti
Americanism since the USA was then the leading world power. Now that
the Soviet Union does not exist any more, the latent anti-Americanism
becomes even stronger.
What, then, is associated with 'America'? First, the big, global com
panies (mainly American, but also Japanese), big business abolishing the
possibility for the old nation states to have their own national economic
policy. This is seen as a means of smashing small business and national
sovereignty.
I In America, the term is simply 'global capitalism'.
Secondly, the 'American' mass culture - Disney, MTV, CNN, etc. is

rejected by radical conservatives for two reasons: it spreads the US view of
world politics (CNN) and it replaces domestic values, preferences and
culture. For the same reason one is critical of American eating habits -
MacDonalds and Pizza Hut deliver the same food and drinks all over the
world. The new computers (MacIntosh, IBM) and the media they serve
spread the American-English language and culture all around the globe.
Thirdly, America is associated with 'multiculturalism', which destroys
the specific patterns of the different Folk. For a long time, South Africa
was, as long as the apartheid system lasted, the ideal state for most radical
conservatives.
Fourthly, America is seen as wanting to be a world-power. An example of
this is the Kellogg Pact which gives the USA the right to invade anywhere in
the world in the name of humanity and world peace (Maschke, 1 991).
One piece of one of the master thinkers of contemporary radical con
servatism, Alain de Benoist, illustrates this world-view further. In one of his
books (de Benoist, 1 985), he talks time after time of the 'occupied Europe' -
if Russia has lost its empire, Europe is still 'occupied', at least spiritually, by
the USA. One thinks of the old leftist 'anti-colonial' discourse introduced
by Frantz Fanon ( 1 969), and in recent years, de Benoist has used the term
'post-colonial' which is a key term in the current jargon of the so-called left.
The 'main enemy' is 'the bourgeois liberalism and the Atlantic-American
"West'" (de Benoist, 1985: 1 3 3). He then pictures what the enemy stands
for, and what a 'European' 'third way' is supposed to be. According to him,
there are two ways of looking at people and society. The enemy has the
individual as the fundamental value; 'we' stands for Volker and Cultures.
Thus, the focus on the individual should be abolished, and there are three
criteria for defining if a Volk and a Culture act correctly:
1 It has to be aware of its cultural and historical origin.

2 It has to act through a common, symbolic or personal representative.
3 It has to be brave enough to define its enemy.
Apart from the VOlkischness Carl Schmitt's concept of the 'political', that
is the need for an 'enemy', pops up again. It condenses different themes:
heroism, relationism and pluralism. Here there is good ground for
conspiracy theories. Radical conservatives and open fascists have always
been good at this. Today, the United Nations and International Monetary
Fund (or Jews) are seen as agents for a conspiracy to abolish nations and
cultural differences. Even the Freemasons and the Illuminati are depicted
as the secret masters. 2
2 Julius Evola is totally obsessed with the idea of secret societies, and Umberto Eco's novel
Foucault's Pendulum (1 989) can be seen as an ironic commentary on the works of Evola. A
recent example of the revival of this idea is Pat Robertson's book, The New World Order
( 1 99 1), where he picks up fascist ideas from the I 920s.
'ON E-WORLD CIVILIZATION' A N D TH E NATION 89
Here is a crucial point: is the enemy anyone but one's own Ethnos or a
specific Nation? Are not the 'specifities', the difference that radical conser
vatives speak so warmly about, just another form of universalism - the cult
of the irrational, the local, which indeed can be quite identical? Once again,
we see how even radical conservatism has to share some of the basic
assumptions of liberalism. Of course, the reverse is also true. Liberalism
cannot do without some particularism and even decisionism: at moments
of crisis and turbulence someone has to make the decision that it is worth
defending, even militarily. A decision that could have been made by the
president in Weimar Germany before the Nazi seizure of power!
In a way, Kultur and Zivilisation are revived in their old German
meaning in the discourse of the critique of one-world civilization. This is
not a symmetric relationship. The radical conservatives want to defend
Kultur against the enemy, while the enemy, the defenders of Zivilisation, do
not admit that they should threaten Kultur, instead they claim that they
defend this as well. Benjamin Barber ( 1 995) has discussed this. The title of
his book, Jihad vs. Me World, lets us know that he is discussing the
antagonistic relationship between the defenders of two kinds of logic. The
former, Jihad, means a bloodthirsty identity politics, cultural relativism
and authoritarian nation states. 3 It understands itself as a defence against
'McWorld' - the logic of capitalism hunting for more and more profits, a
world that will end with all differences eradicated. Over the whole world
there shine the signs of MacDonalds, MacIntosh, Donald Duck, MTV,
Pepsi and Coca-Cola. 4 Barber himself does not want to defend the one
against the other; he sees both the interrelatedness between them, and the
horror of both. Thus, he proposes a 'third way', the logic of liberal
democracy. Only God knows if it has a chance. However, I will return to
this question.
Culture and Civilization are interrelated - there will be no CuIturellihad
without Civilization/McWorld and vice versa. For example, it is hard
for 'culture' to function without money or computers; it is hard for
'Civilization' to function without Culture. 5
The critique of the one-world civilization is not totally without a point.
There are many of us old enough to have experienced life in communist
countries. We noticed the absence of Western brands in clothing, cars,
culture, food, drinks, etc., even if you could get Pepsi in the Soviet Union
and listen to Roxy Music in Budapest. For example, Mickey Mouse was
absent. Instead, they had more handmade local icons and figures. But now
Mickey Mouse and the others have taken over. There are many of us that
3 As I mentioned in Chapter 2 footnote 4, this is a reductionist interpretation of Jihad, but

for the sake of simplicity I will use it.
4 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno would certainly agree with their bitter
enemies on this point.
5 That is why Francis Fukuyama had to revise his thesis on the 'End of History'. In his
recent work Trust ( 1 995), he recognizes the role of religion, culture and virtues if capitalism
and democracy are to survive.
90 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
feel ambivalent about this. The homemade icons and figures of yesterday
had more of an aura, less of pure exchange-value. Of course, they did not
grow out of self-governing communities. On the contrary. But today there
are not a few people who think that the Pizza Hut restaurant in Moscow
disturbs the soul of the city!
Once again the distinction between conjunctive and communicative
culture and thinking becomes important. Jihad favours conjunctive culture
and knowledge. The VOikisch arguments are not very communicable; in the
end it means tribalism (Bauman, 1 992). McWorld is based on communi
cative knowledge and culture. It consists of abstract and universal signs
with a low degree of Seinsverbundenheit.
This discourse of the new right and contemporary radical conservatism
can appeal to, and probably aims at attracting, old leftists who now see
their old anti-colonial discourse in new clothes. Here, possibly, is new
ground for new political constellations. Not only in Iraq is the Internet
viewed as an All-American media, the devil, serving the interests of the
USA; in France also, many think the same thing. The percentage of French
individuals having access to the Internet is about one per cent. 6
The dichotomy between Culture and Civilization is related to the oppo
sitional pair Ethnos and Demos which reflect two fundamental principles
that define, hold together, build and legitimate a nation. Speaking in terms
of ideology, radical conservatives defend the first one, liberals the second
one. The principle of Ethnos says that the basis of a nation should be the
homogenized Ethnos, the Volk; a nation should consist of only those who
share a common cultural heritage. The principle of Demos is that the
nation consists of its citizens who share the idea that anyone can be a
citizen as long as he or she respects the rights of others. Of course, these
principles do not exist in a pure form in the empirical reality. They are
conceptual constructions, sometimes used in ideological battles, that are
made to better understand the world. This conceptual construction
hopefully 'touches' the real motivations and understanding of social and
historical actors.
The linguistic origin of Ethnos and Demos is Greek: Ethnos means a
nation in Greece; Demos means the people, or rather the common people.
Thus, if you stress Ethnos you stress the ethnical aspect of a nation, if you
stress Demos, you stress the rights of all citizens, even the poor, to be a
part of the decisions made within the nation, the rights of the majority.
These two principles can be found on the mythical level, and sometimes
also at the discursive and constitutional-legal levels. Thus, I first want to
define what I mean by 'myth' in this context.
A myth consists of fragments, parts and narratives known through the
historical consciousness. Frequently, the myth is a story about the origin of
the nation and its glorious past. There are many examples: the Serbian
6 New York Times, 1 1 February 1997.
'ON E-WORLD CIVI L I ZATIO N ' A N D THE NATION 91
myth o f Kosovo as the sacred heartland o f the Serbian nation and the
absolute enemy being Turkey; the American myth of the brave men of
the Revolution; the operas of Richard Wagner and their appeal to
Germans for creating a myth of origin; the Swedish myth of the first Svea
Kings; Finland's national epos (Kalevala); the Hindu fundamentalist myth
of India as the original home of the Aryans, etc.
A myth is never 'true'. It is a simplification of historical events, and can
also consist of pure falsifications. The most important aspect of the myth is
that it works - it creates an 'imagined community', it makes the multiple
past into a unitary icon.
As we saw above, Karl Mannheim ( 1 9 82) made a clear distinction
between two forms of knowledge: 'conjunctive' and 'communicative'.
These are the extreme poles of human knowledge and exchange, and they
never appear in their pure forms in reality. All knowledge is more or less
conjunctive, more or less communicative. The most conjunctive form of
knowledge would be the shared feelings and symbols in a dyad - between
lovers or between a parent and a child. The most communicative form of
knowledge would be abstract symbols that can be understood by everyone
and everywhere, for example mathematical and formal signs. There is a
clear connection between these poles of knowledge and Ethnos and Demos:
Ethnos is constituted as the specific characteristics of an ethnic community
and is contrasted to the different - other Ethnos. Thus, it is closer to
conjunction than to communication. Demos comes near to communication
since everyone who accepts its discursive norms and regulations can
become a member. In the end, Demos is understood as universal, rational
and non-personal as communication. However, making these connections
neglects the dialectics of Ethnos and Demos, conjunction and communica
tion.
On the one hand, an Ethnos can have some degrees of communication
and can repress those members who claim the right to be different. On the
other hand, a Demos, a totally universal community, is hard to imagine: it
would at the same time be universal and void of meaning. Where, then,
could meaning come from if not from Ethnos or something similar?
The political articulation of Demos is, of course, liberalism. Liberalism
emphasizes universalism, rationalism, individual rights and parliamentary
democracy, and liberal thought sees a nation as consisting of individuals
with equal rights. Ethnos as a political principle would be best represented
by radical conservatism.
Michel Wieviorka ( 1 996: 23) has a good point when he speaks of the
Janus face of the Nation: it can be both a part of the project of modernity,
and a defender of tradition, that is anti-modern. The first is often identified
with the 'French' model, the latter with the 'German' model. But this is too
simple - a nation always has both sides, that is an Ethnos in the form
of dominating values, habits, or 'Culture' and a Demos in the form of
influence of the public will. Even the aspect of Demos, openness and
modernization, has Ethnos. For example, the nations building the modern
92 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU R E OF POLITICS
welfare state in Northern Europe were unaware of its elements of Ethnos

since there were practically no immigrants. But when the waves of immi
gration started its ethnic elements became visible. It is history and situ
ations that determine what side is dominant. Furthermore, in times of
unemployment, the traditionalist side becomes stronger than the modern
izing one - there is competition for the few jobs that exist, and there are
few resources for modernization projects.
'The globalization of the economy means a decline in the nation's
capacity to be the symbolic frame within which economic life takes place'
(Wieviorka, 1 996: 28). When the 'visible borders' of the nation disappear,
global companies and global products help break them down. This leads to
new experiences of downward mobility, while immigrants are seen as being
upwardly mobile. Then new borders, signs of identity, are constructed, for
example race. Thus, the development of Demos can lead to a stronger
Ethnos.
The open, modernizing aspect of the Nation today dominates Asia
(China, for example), while the closing aspect dominates Europe. The
response to insecurity cannot be guaranteed by the nation state since there
is no national capital to control. If economy cannot be controlled, 'culture'
can. A war against the different starts and the different can be both 'US
culture' or immigrants. Radical conservatives know the power of politics,
whether national, federal or trans-national, while liberals often tend to
overlook it except for rare cases of emergency and exception.
Ethnos- and Demos-freaks - some illustrations
Radical conservatism, therefore, both applauds and protests against the

current situation. Furthermore, it once again becomes interested in perhaps
the biggest 'root' -freak ever: Carl Gustav Jung. As Richard Noll ( 1 995) has
shown, Jung believed in the root metaphor literally. He thought that
people were affected by the very ground they stood on! Thus, Americans
became Indian-like, and Jews should return to the desert and not stay in
fertile Europe. Today, Jung has many fans among the radical conservatives
since his idea of a collective unconsciousness specific for every Volk fits
perfectly here.
The Thule-Seminar is a small proto-fascist seminar in Germany. It is very
active on the Internet. For example you can find stickers on their pages,
and some of the most frightening ask 'Ethnos or Chaos? we have chosen -
what about You?' and 'Americanism or Kultur?'.
There are Demos-freaks as well. One of them, Ian Chambers, believes
that most of our time's greatest problems have their root in the derivation
of identity from specific geographic locations. The evil is, in his own words,
'symbolically rooted cultural practices and their reproduction' (Chambers,
1 994: 1 09). He belongs to the growing group of extreme 'multi-cultis'. They
totally deny the worth of domestic culture and Ethnos. This reflects the
'ON E-WORLD CIVI LIZATION' A N D TH E NATION 93
world-view of many intellectuals and 'symbol-analytics' (Reich, 1 99 1 ) who

just like capital can feel at home anywhere on earth. Their support for
Demos is less connected with a democratic attitude and more with their
interests in the market.
On 'centrisms'
We have often heard the accusations of 'eurocentrism', 'logocentrism' and

'ethnocentrism', most often coming from 'leftist', 'post-structuralist' intel
lectuals and identity-political movements. In fact, they merge with the
radical-conservative critique of liberalism and individualism, except on the
issue of 'ethnocentrism' which radical conservatives would rather defend.
Let us ask another question: can there be a 'demo-centrism', that is, an in
some way biased defence of Demos? I would say both yes and no. Yes,
because an unreflected defence of Demos might deny the need for belonging
to a community, ethnic or not. No, because even if Demos never can be
'universal', it is the principle that comes nearest to universalism. We have
to be militant against its enemies, but first we have to learn one thing from
them: that Ethnos also has the right to exist, however not in political and
legal forms, but in cultural forms.
Ethnocentrism or Demokratur?
The radical-conservative critique of Demos is not totally without a point.

In fact, if Demos is too strong, we run the risk of a democracy without
individual rights, that the majority is always right. Therefore, the social
democratic parties, especially in Sweden where it has ruled the country
since 1 932 with only a few short-period intervals, have established a
'Sozialdemokratur' (Max Scheler). No one can criticize them for being un
democratic but collectivism has often taken anti-individualist forms. Of
course, this kind of liberal critique does not mean that we apply the
principle of Ethnos, which in its extreme form ends in totalitarian
collectivism.
* * *
My attempt so far in this section of the book has been to make clear the
dominating themes of radical conservatism. These themes might potentially
have a strong appeal today:
Anti-reflexivity can be an answer to the burden of reflexivity and

hyper-reflexivity. It makes life easier, uncomplicated and makes us
unaware of complexities.
94 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
Theology becomes more visible. Post-structuralism laid the ground for

this when it (Derrida) showed that it never can disappear. It also offers
a promise of a new order.
Anti-colonialism might appeal to old leftists and people worried about
the rights of minorities and the countries of the third world.
The principle of Ethnos goes hand in hand with anti-immigrant
responses. On the other hand, an extreme emphasis on Demos, under
stood as the rule of the majority, can be racist populism.
Furthermore, radical conservatism does not strive after a Mannheimian

synthesis between communication and conjunction, that is, a Bildungskul
tur or something similar. Instead, it assumes that the tension should not be
synthesized but eradicated: the Nation is at the same time something
universal-communicative (all people belong to a Nation); technological,
meaning if not 'progress', then at least efficiency; and something particular
conjunctive (the 'own' Nation to which only its members, through their
common historical and cultural heritage, can truly belong).
6
FORMS OF RADICAL CONSERVATISM

- AN ATTEM PT AT AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
'Radical conservatism' can be used as a description of both an intellectual

trend - what I have mostly done so far - and a collection of basic ideas
and reactions in social movements. The social movements and political
parties that show affinities with intellectual radical conservatism are some
of the parties often called 'rightist populism'. But not all parties that are
labelled as 'rightist populist' have close affinities with radical conservatism.
In addition, there are parties, movements and regimes that are not 'rightist
populist' but show affinities with radical conservatism. The criterion for
arguing for an affinity is, in the first place, that if parties, movements and
regimes had a more explicit ideology, it would be very close to radical
conservatism. It is also often the case that personal and historical
connections exist. The main criteria for labelling rightist populist parties as
radical conservative are nationalism, including a negative attitude towards
immigrants and/or immigration (this is close to the nationalism and the
Ethnos-principle of radical conservatism), and, outside the US, anti
Americanism. Another is the critique of the established political parties,
which is close to the radical-conservative critique of liberal democracy. Yet
another is the favouring of 'democracy' over rights, that is, rightist
populists argue that we should listen to the 'people', the 'silent maj ority'
and let them decide, even if this means that the rights of individuals are
denied.
The criteria for other political parties and regimes are if they show
similar ideas as radical conservatism, sometimes even having identical
ideas, such as nationalism, anti-reflexivity and anti-capitalism. Another is
the ambition to be 'beyond left and right', a classical slogan we recognize
from both fascism and the conservative revolution. Such criteria may be
criticized for being too loose and non-exclusive. However, it is not my
primary concern to show how good I am at finding radical conservatism
everywhere. Rather, I want to clarify new, emerging patterns and con
stellations in politics today and to attempt to broaden the perspective,
including countries outside Europe, thus understanding the global political
situation of today.
Geopolitics has returned both in social science and in politics. In politics,
radical conservatism considers it extremely important. I will look at how
96 RADI CAL CON S E RVATI SM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
radical conservatism uses 'geopolitics', and will seek out some real geo
political scenarios to see how radical conservatism is connected to these.
Since radical conservatism views politics as the heart of society and
emphasizes the need for enemies, foreign politics becomes the most
important forum. ' Geopolitics' is a favourite concept, a radical
conservative reply to the dangers of globalization and the situation after
the breakdown of Eastern European socialism. In order to construct a new
identity, Joachim Weber ( 1 992) argues that Germany must decide its place
in the world. He criticizes mainstream politicians for caring only about
economic matters, and consequently neglecting the fact that welfare is
dependent upon national strength. He writes: 'In the beginning there was
geography' (1992: 3 1 ) . Political categories like ideology, freedom and
democracy are only derivations of this basic fact. Here we notice the strong
constructivist aspect of geopolitics. There is, of course, a geographical
factor in politics, but the strength of this is dependent upon how politics is
conceived and practised - the cynicism of geopolitics makes ideas like
universal rights, humanity, etc., seem passe. In the longing for concrete,
down-to-earth soberness, the ideal and normative aspects of politics are
thrown out, for the latter are viewed as part of the abstract nature of
civilization.
Since 'time' and linear history, according to radical conservatism, can no
longer provide meaning and guidance, particularly in times of turbulence,
'room', space and geography become the key dimensions of orientation,
identity and security. 1 Geography is the new 'base', but the new ideologists
of geopolitics do not hesitate to link geographical territory to concepts like
Dasein, Volk or organic community. What they argue about are thus their
own constructions. Furthermore, this geopolitical, decisive, militant
attitude seems to be a strong connecting link between German and
Russian radical conservatives. 2 Their plea for a 'politization' means, in the
end, geopolitics, which can also provide an affirmation of their masculinity.
The relation to nationalism marks the complicated nexus of the radical
conservative project. While the conservative revolutionaries saw, and see,
nationalism and the myth of the great nation as no more than a means to
an end - a magic organic community - the people they address might listen
to them because they think that the restoration of the nation will solve their
problems, that the nation is itself the end, regarded as the correct
representation of the Volk. Carl Schmitt, for example, was more interested
in the nation as an efficient myth; he was only secondarily interested in a
postulated German 'essence'. Likewise, contemporary radical conservatives
I Here we find another important homology between the radical conservatives and authors
discussing 'post-history', for example Jean Baudrillard ( 1 985) and Arnold Gehlen (1 980).
2 Geopolitics as a discipline or perspective was created by Rudolf Kjellen, developed by
Karl Haushofer and practised by Rudolf Hess, and later by Henry Kissinger. Of course, it is
not per se a 'fascist doctrine'; in its more neutral form it examines the geographical factor in
world politics. The master geopolitical thinker today is Jordis von Lohausen (see especially
Lohausen ( 1 98 1 ), where the extremely constructivist nature of rightist geopolitics is striking).
AN I NTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 97
use the myth of the nation as a point of projection. Unemployment and

poverty, the emptiness of the hegemonic ideologies (neo-liberalism, the old
conservatism, the seemingly paralysed social liberalism and social
democracy), the collapse of the bipolar global order, anxiety over the
environment, moral relativism, etc., are all devalued as risks when they are
negatively projected to the point where the new and mighty Nation rises
again. Thus, the 'Nation' is not only an external order, its power and
authority are also internalized in order to recreate an organic community.
Just as in the 1 920s, this is a 'political theology'. When God is dead the only
instance that can fill the nihilist vacuum is a decisive and authoritarian ruler
who has total control over the state. In conservative-revolutionary rhetoric,
this form of dictatorship is the true democracy: an organic community
needs a homogenized population, a natural hierarchy where everyone holds
the same opinion. Here the individual disappears (since this is a bourgeois
illusion), as does the motive for disagreement. The leader, therefore, needs
only direct 'acclamation' from the people when he makes the correct
decisions, and in this identification between the leader and the mass, the
mass recognizes its own strength and greatness. As a consequence, radical
conservatism must also be in favour of cultural relativism - every nation,
Volk or culture has its own internal parameters for what is right or wrong.
Therefore, our primary interest should be to do everything possible to
defend 'our' values, even if this means destroying others.
If we move from the radical-conservative interpretation of geopolitics,
which as an ideology we can only have a partial knowledge of, to a more
synthesized and comprehensive understanding, we can start to discuss real
geopolitical scenarios, which are important because they have an impact on
the existence of radical conservatism in different countries.
Probably the most discussed and interesting works on the geopolitical
situation are Samuel P. Huntington's article 'The clash of civilizations',
published in 1 993, and the book with the same title, published in 1 996. The
collapse of communism signified the first step in the process of the West
becoming aware of itself as a civilization that may not last forever. If we
look at history, we do not have to be Spenglerians to see how civilizations
have risen, grown and fallen. There have also been a lot of conflicts and
war between different civilizations. 3 The 'West' and its distinctiveness
became even more self-reflective because of the war in Bosnia. There was a
feeling that the West and its institutions - NATO, etc. - should do some
thing because it simply 'should'. This moral obligation comes from the
imagined common roots of Western civilization - the rule of law, the free
market and trade, parliamentary democracy and the cultural heritage from
3 Huntington's criterion for distinguishing between 'civilizations' is religious. While this is

problematic and too simplistic, I use the 'clash of civilizations' as a term for describing the
conflict between liberal democracy and its opponents. I think that this serves the ambition of
recognizing that liberal democracy is institutionalized in the West, and its opponents on
a national level are mostly found in totalitarian states in the Muslim world and in Asia. For a
critique and discussion of Huntington, see, for example, Gardels (1 997).
Greece and the Renaissance (Huntington, 1 996: 307). Huntington wants to

defend the West and he pleas for a more self-conscious and militant
attitude to its potential enemies: China and the Muslim countries. He is a
true defender of the West and its values, and he is wise enough to be aware
of its contradictory nature - that universalism means imperialism ( 1 996:
3 1 0). Thus, he lays bare an insight often articulated by radical conser
vatives: behind every order, or 'civilization', there is a decision that this
order is worth defending, and that every order must act to defend its
territory and take geopolitics into consideration. Liberalism, the West,
cannot simply rely on reason. The acts of reason must also fight against,
and not only talk with, those who want to smash it. Huntington also
implicitly uses Carl Schmitt's ( 1 99 l a) arguments on GrofJraum. A civiliza
tion must make tactical agreements with other civilizations. For example,
the West should 'accept Russia as the core state of Orthodoxy and a major
regional power with legitimate interests in the security of its southern
borders' (Huntington, 1 996: 3 1 2).
I will not go into a closer discussion of whether Huntington's arguments
are correct or not. However, what is more interesting is how radical
conservatism comes in here. It is quite obvious that it does. First of all,
radical conservatism probably knows what Huntington says: if the West is
to survive, Western and Central Europe and the USA need each other
badly. Radical conservatism is against the 'West' and its values, and the first
step would be to break up the alliance between Europe and the USA. Then
there are only the 'inner' enemies to fight - Britain, Jews, Freemasons, etc.
Some radical conservatives also want to do away with Christianity, and
point to another Europe, this also having its roots in Greece, but continuing
the pagan traditions instead. This could be achieved by geopolitical alliances
with the Muslim and Orthodox civilizations. Here, however, a paradox of
radical conservatism becomes visible again: since it is anti-universalist, in
reality radical conservatives can become bitter enemies. A Russian and a
German or an English radical conservative can be enemies because they
belong to different 'organic communities'. And it is not an anomaly that
there are Israeli and Palestinian radical conservatives. The only solution, if
there is one, is probably to create a common spiritual ground. The most
perfect religion for this would probably be 'Integral Traditionalism', an
aristocratic Faith emphasizing the common origin of everything, perhaps
most closely related to Islam and articulated by Rene Guenon, a spiritual
brother of Julius Evola. I will return to these people later. Now, I will look
for forms of radical conservatism in some specific countries. I have chosen
those countries where I know forms of radical conservatism exist.
Germany
Germany, of course, has a very special relationship with radical conserva

tism, as we have already discussed. It was here that it first emerged, and
where it helped pave the way for national socialism. The question now is
whether it disappeared totally after 1 945. Probably not. The intellectuals -
Heidegger, Junger, Schmitt, Freyer and others - continued to have an
influence on later generations. Several surveys after the war have also
indicated that there are still strong sympathies for national socialism and
'rightist' radical views. However, the year 1 989 is crucial here as it saw the
reunification of Germany, the emergence of the question of national
identity and a neue Rechte, a new basis of support for extremist parties
such as the Republikaner, and a renewed intellectual interest in the con
servative revolution. The year 1 989 can stand as a symbol of all this: it
represents an important turning-point ( Wende).
The German playwright and author Botho StrauB aroused great attention
with the publication of his essay 'Anschwellender Bocksgesang' in Der
Spiegel ( 1 993). The title is rather difficult to translate. Anschwellender
roughly means 'swollen' or 'expanding' while Bocksgesang literally means
'buck song', which in turn is derived from the Greek term for 'tragedy'. The
attention StrauB received was mostly of a negative nature, as someone who
was, up to that point, regarded as a person of the 'left' but now confessed
his allegiance to the right. The essay has been re-published in a longer and
more sprawling version in the anthology Die selbstvewusste Nation (edited
by Heimo Schwilk and Ulrich Schact, 1 994), where it is the point of
departure for a number of writers grappling for the answer to the question
'On what ideas and themes should the 'new right' base itself?' The 'new
right' is no new phenomenon. The label was first applied in the 1 960s, but
only recently has it become more than a marginal political phenomenon.
What StrauB's essay, which begins the anthology, is really about is
difficult to say, but it has a mysterious power of attraction as it is thought
to contain a deep insight into the 'spirit of the times' (Zeitgeist). He
confesses, as stated above, his allegiance to the right because it is only from
there that one can best understand the tragic contemporary circumstances
in which we live, where humanity's bloody side once again routinely
confronts us. Liberal democracy's self-understanding, the 'ideas of 1 789',
are thought to be entirely inadequate. Racism and contempt for foreigners
are interpreted by StrauB as the emergence of that which has been repressed
and as religious purification rituals. He continuously appeals for a depart
ure from the 'mainstream', that is to say, the postulated liberal hegemony in
Germany. 4 He believes that liberal ideology proves deficient or fails in,
among other things, its ability to understand what ethnic war (in the former
Yugoslavia and Soviet Union) is about: the defence of one's own language
and culture, blood offering and the mystical community, that is, Ethnos and
conjunction. Furthermore, StrauB is of the opinion that the liberal is only
liberal in that he or she takes a stand against anti-liberalism. In other
words, liberalism is not a full-rounded position but partial in that it is
4 This is typical of radical conservatism - to give the impression that it is the only true
opposition to the liberal hegemonic world-view.
1 00 RADI CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
primarily defined in its negation of something else (the curbing of liberty).

To StrauB, liberal intellectuals are an object of contempt; they only go with
the flow, and their love for foreigners is only a desire to destroy that which
is 'ours' (German).
Like a prophet, he warns that modernity will not lead into post
modernism, but rather into culture-shock. This will come abruptly to put a
stop to all attempts at mediation. Today, he believes that there are only
half-hearted attempts at mediation which do not have the capacities to
understand what is in the process of occurring, media where there is only
collaboration and opinions which are not yet clear. Furthermore, he feels
that the dominant anti-authoritarian socialization process only leads to
even more indifference.
I believe that here I see a poet's despair over a totalizing alienation,
where everyone speaks about nothing. This reveals a bit about his leftist
background. In the 1 960s and 1 970s the rabid civilization criticism
(Zivilisationskritik) came from the left; guilt for the plundering and
exploitation of people and nature was ascribed to the capitalist mode of
production, and the remedy to this was to be found in the socialist
planned economy and the jettisoning of bourgeois democracy. Today's
Zivilisationskritik comes from the right. This is not as strange as it sounds.
There are, for example, many marks of resemblance between 'leftist'
critics such as Theodor W. Adorno and Ernst Bloch and 'rightist' critics
such as Martin Heidegger and Arnold Gehlen, even (as we say above)
that, for example, Gehlen and Adorno sharply disagreed on the issue of
reflexivity. The resemblance consists above all of the anti-bourgeois tone
and deep anti-economism and anti-capitalism. The conservative criticism
of liberalism also played a significant role for Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels. It is therefore easy to concur with StrauB when he points out that
today we see a new generation who are doing in principle the same thing
as the previous generation: they break taboos and thereby create their
own identity. The new right cannot therefore be understood outside such
a relationship - it is not just for something, but, in the first place, is
against something.
It is not especially puzzling that StrauB's essay was followed by an
extensive commotion in the mass media. Among other things, he was called
a 'path clearer' for dark, evil forces by the chairman of the Central Jewish
Council in Germany. If not directly guilty, he was as close as it is possible
to be. s
In the anthology, the new right attempts to conceptualize itself. In many
cases this takes the form of an irritating attempt to construct a new StrauB
derived jargon. Throughout the anthology, the importance of 'roots' and
attachment/belonging (to the nation and the family) are emphasized. The
5 See the discussion in the Introduction above - if you want to 'revise' just a tiny bit of the
'allied scheme of history', that is, to be politically incorrect, you can easily be accused of being
a full-blown 'revisionist' or even a 'proto-fascist'.
authors are thoroughly anti-economistic and emphasize that the nation

must be built upon more than mere material improvements in the standard
of living, as such a supposed reductionism builds upon a denial of the role
of community which is central to all else - the nation and the family. In
this, the new right is like the old right; it is against liberalism, and will now,
often in alliance with so-called communitarianism, re-elevate the cultural
and social bonds to their appropriate status.
The publisher advertises the anthology as 'the German Conservative
Intelligentsia's manifesto'. An important question, then, is whether or not
it lives up to this billing. Twenty-eight authors contribute to the anthology,
nine of whom are under the age of 40. Among the more well-known
contributors are Ernst Nolte, Birgitte Seebacher-Brandt (the widow of
Willy Brandt), and the Jewish historian Michael Wolfsohn. Even though
we have a great generational spread, it is especially among the younger
authors - who assert the 'ideas of 1 989' that engagement and protest
-
against the 1 968 generation are most strongly felt.

Among the younger and more significant authors is Rainer Zitelmann,
an editor at the publishing house Ullstein, editor of Geistige Welt (a
division of the daily newspaper Die Welt) and an influential actor in the
right-wing of the liberal party FDP. In his programmatic essay he points
out that the term 'right' has long been a term of abuse in Germany. A
television programme entitled 'Conversation with the Right', for example,
aroused protest. Zitelmann polemically asks whether a programme entitled
'Conversation with the Left' would have caused anyone to raise an
eyebrow. He goes on to ask whether nazism really was of the 'right'. The
left has, in the same manner, questioned whether Stalin was of the 'left'.
Despite this relativizing, Zitelmann retains the distinction between left and
right because surveys show that most citizens have a clear idea about where
left and right stand in relation to each other on various questions. It is
therefore natural to build upon the conceptions which citizens already
have. An important argument for Zitelmann is that if there is not a strong
democratic right, the entire political space on the right will be left open for
rightist extremism, a thesis that is also supported by comparative historical
research on fascism. 6
Zitelmann also calls for a new, more humble disposition towards
German history. The Third Reich is just as much a part of German history
as the Weimar and Federal Republics. The same should also be the case for
the GDR. The conclusion is that if the GDR is demonized, then the risk is
run of trivializing the Third Reich. The GDR cannot be seen as something
exclusively evil, it must remain a part of the German consciousness, as a
part of its historical inheritance, instead of being repressed. Zitelmann
undeniably has a point here, even though one could also read the reasoning
6 In Sweden it is well known that the coalition between the Social Democrats (SAP) and
the Peasants' Party (Bondeforbundet) soaked up the potential energy which could so easily
have been exploited by extreme right-wing movements.
1 02 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
unsympathetically as a relativizing of the Nazi era. Similar historical

reasoning even pervades the anthology which Zitelmann co-edited,
Westbindung, Chancen, und Risken fur Deutschland ( 1 993). Many of the
authors in this anthology feel that the rest of the world hates Germany and
this is the cause of a postulated total humiliation after the war. An exten
sion of this way of reasoning leads down dangerous roads - should the
crushing of the Third Reich be seen as a humiliation of Germany or its
liberation? And why should Germany be so different from other nations in
arousing so much hatred?
The theme is raised again by Karlheinz WeiBmann in his book Ruckruf
in die Geschichte (1 993). Yet again the thesis about Germany's Sonderweg
is proposed. But WeiBmann extends his argument, claiming that Germany
should promote the liberal-democratic ideal and that Germany, as the
'Middle Kingdom' between the USA and Russia, should be a kind of 'third
way'. The book consists of ideal variations on this theme. Among other
things, it is claimed that the Federal Republic has been some sort of
pathological interim regime. This trivializes parliamentary democracy by
setting it up alongside kaiserdom, left and right dictatorships. Neither does
WeiBmann shy away from discussing national characteristics, one of which
supposedly is a special German penchant for self-hatred which keeps
Germans from becoming a proud and united people.
To return to Zitelmann's essay, he is reflexive and conscious of the
political game in which he participates. He thus writes that 'often it is
sufficient to merely contribute an article to Mut to be considered an
accomplice' (Schwilk and Schacht, 1 994: 1 7 1). Mut is a rather repugnant
national-romantic journal, previously located on the far right, but now
thought to belong to the democratic right. What Zitelmann wants to show
is that, among other things, the so-called 'antifa-campaigns' (anti-fascist
campaigns) really are targeting the democratic right. Here we see, like the
conspiracy theories of the left, conspiracy theories conjured up by the right.
The left needs an enemy, and vice versa, naturally. If we take this seriously,
political positions are relativized. From a sober, social-scientific perspec
tive, it is difficult to discern where the truth lies. As Zitelmann here sloshes
around in murky water, it is even more difficult to strike his proposition
that while previous leftist extremists can be accepted as respectable demo
crats after making proper utterances, the same is not true for comparable
previous right-wing extremists.
Zitelmann sometimes appears to be worried that the old enemy, the left,
is about to disappear. But this is a chimera - according to Zitelmann, the
left's new utopias are now called feminism and multiculturalism. He
therefore wants to hang on to the right's classic task: criticizing all utopias,
as these good thoughts very easily can bring about evil. 7
7 Even if the right criticizes utopias, in the sense of one hundred per cent heavenly worlds,
it still has its own utopia: a break with the liberal mechanical engineering, and a beginning of
the world as an organic greenhouse.
AN I N TE R NATI ONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 03
These new-conservative ideas are potentially attractive to many intel

lectuals; after postmodernism, it isn't so much further down the road to
these ideas. The critical disposition towards faith in progress unites both of
these camps. Furthermore, it can be tempting, as a fashion or trend, to
learn a new discourse, canon and jargon, and thereby show that one is
'with it' or, even better, out in advance, on the cutting edge.
Even if one tries to read the German new right's more important works
sympathetically, it is difficult to overlook the embarrassing connections and
justifiable questions. For example, the Ullstein publishing company (which
has a number of daughter publication companies), where Zitelmann, as
already mentioned, is an editor, has been controlled since 1 986 by Herbert
Fleissner, a man out on the extreme right (Sarkowicz, 1 994).
Furthermore, it is striking that the new right reads largely the same
literature as acknowledged rightist radicals and fascists (that is to say, the
works of the conservative-revolutionary troika, Martin Heidegger, Ernst
Hinger and Carl Schmitt, as well as Julius Evola). WeiBmann is an admirer
of Evola, not the least because of Evola's strident anti-feminism. Here we see
a glimpse of what could be the German new right's religious metaphysics.
Many of the new right's intellectuals are ordinary Catholics and Protestants,
but sometimes a longing for something more genuinely German surfaces - a
desire to root the idea of the 'local community' (Heimat) not only in the
German soil but also in the respiratory atmosphere. One should be able to
feel oneself 'at home' and not be ashamed of it. This kind of reasoning can
be powerfully attractive to new right intellectuals since it correlates to their
own experiences. However, it is also sometimes self-referential nonsense
,
Heidegger style - for example, es gibt Sein, ('there is being ). 8
The German 'new right' can perhaps be labelled as 'middle-extremism'.
Whatever one thinks about the new right, it is found squarely in the centre
of Germany in all respects, and in most of the political parties. Or, as Kurt
Lenk ( 1 994: 7) puts it: 'It is precisely in the extreme positions that the
structures are discernible that impact the daily discourse of the positions of
the center.' Something has happened also in the political middle ground;
thoughts and themes which earlier had only been seen on the extreme right
have become 'normal' and 'acceptable, even in good company' ( 1 994: 7).
To reduce the new right in Germany to Republikaner sympathizers
would be wrong. Instead, it is more rewarding to localize the dominant
theme: Cultural pessimism and the tragic awareness which is most evident
in Botho StrauB. This is related to his pessimistic anthropology, in the spirit
of Thomas Hobbes, where the conclusion is that the bonds of the family
and the state must be strengthened. There is also a strong affection for the
8 In Ein Meister aus Deutschland, Heidegger und seine Zeit ( 1994), Rudiger Safranski
discusses Heidegger's preferences for such avalent verbs. Avalent verbs are verbs that take on
the characteristic of a subject, without there being a subject for them, such as 'it's raining'.
These verbs contain no information on origin, intention, etc., but rather express local and
impersonal processes more tied to 'nature' than 'culture' (Stjernfelt, 1 995).
1 04 RAD I CAL CONSERVAT I SM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POL ITICS
concept of collectivities, and there is less talk about the individual and
more in favour of the People, the Nation, Destiny and Community. The
anti-economism of the new right means that the political is seen as the
primary dimension of life - in an empty world the will to fill the world with
meaning is revered. The primacy of politics is also reflected in the new
right's cynical, power-oriented realm.
I must mark out a small reservation. The German new right is far from a
unified tendency. Up to this point I have chosen to highlight the com
monalities of a shared mentality among a number of German intellectuals.
I believe there is a widening rift emerging within the new right. Zitelmann,
WeiBmann and the group centred on the weekly journal Junge Freiheit can
be seen as a type of 'reformist' phalange which accepts (sometimes against
its will) parliamentary democracy and a mixed economy. Today they are
careful about calling themselves a part of the 'right' . Of significance is that
when I met Junge Freiheits's editor-in-chief, Dieter Stein, in 1995 and
broached the question of the currency of the 'conservative revolution', he
shrugged and said that it is just an empty slogan, far from today's reality.
This sounded odd, for only a couple of years previously Junge Freiheit was
the battleground for a new generation anxiously thirsting after the con
servative revolutionary ideas of the Weimar era. Stein and Zitelmann have
either reached, or are approaching their thirtieth year and seem to be
distancing themselves from their earlier, youthful, revolutionary excesses.
This allows them to enter into public debate.
Ironically enough, it is the previous generation in the German new right
who represent the 'revolutionary' wing. Among this generation one finds
Armin Mohler and Gunther Maschke. In common with their French
brother Alain de Benoist, they believe that they are above left/right
classification. Here we clearly see a line of descent from the conservative
revolution's left-wing movement, national bolshevism. A second important
difference is that while the 'reformists' often attack 'ecological hysteria',
the more revolutionary oriented give the environmental question central
importance and hold fast to a strong anti-capitalist perspective.
Another dividing-line among the radical conservatives, or the new right,
could be one between hard-core anti-liberals like Maschke, and 'softer'
anti-economists like Rudiger Safranski and Botho StrauB. Maschke has
even stated the aim of his vision of a new right as creating freedom, which
he says is 'a wholeness-problem, to freedom belongs the mission to con
sciously figurate one's area of life, and not only being subsumed under
uncontrollable economic processes' (Stjernfelt, 1 995).
Austria
J6rg Haider became chair of the FPO in 1986 and transformed this small,
old liberal party into a nationalist populist party. The result was that in
1986 the party increased from 1 per cent to almost 1 0 per cent of the vote
AN I NTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 05
in only 1 1 weeks (Betz, 1 994: 1 2) . In a regional election in Vienna in 1 99 1

the party got 22.6 per cent o f the vote. The trend has continued in
subsequent years and seems to have become established at almost 30 per
cent of the vote. Of course, this is a very significant effort. Haider's role
should not be underestimated - he is a radical conservative intellectual, a
charismatic personality and a strategic populist.
One reason for the success of the FPO and Haider is its anti
establishment profile. Since the war the political life of Austria has been
dominated by the two big parties, the socialists and the conservatives.
Haider has feverishly argued that they are corrupt. This is not without
ground. In practice, in a two-party system both parties can be assured of
maintaining good positions. There have also been a lot of scandals (Persson,
1 996). Haider has presented himself as being uncorrupted and honest. The
connection to radical conservatism here is that 'ordinary' politics is corrupt
and that there should be a new alternative political order.
The anti-immigration and anti-immigrant profile is also extremely
strong. The background is the geographical position of Austria as the port
to Eastern Europe, its traditions of anti-Semitism, and rising unemploy
ment. 'Foreigners' are despised for two main reasons - they take jobs away
from Austrians, and they are foreigners. This is connected to the nation
alism proposed by Haider. In his book (Haider, 1 993), he predicts that
after Soviet internationalism the future belongs to ethnic and cultural
nationalism. He is also a Pan-Germanist, and this old idea has, of course,
regained favour: if the former GDR is now a part of Germany, then why
should not Austria be a part of Germany too? Haider is also anti-Slavic
(Laqueur, 1 996: 1 1 7). In this way, he is reviving the old radical con
servative idea of a German Ethnos nation, and the role of Germany as the
'middle nation', with its Sonderweg between West and East.
Like Norway, Finland and Sweden, Austria had a referendum in 1 995
on the question of applying for membership in the European Union. The
referenda had a great impact on the reemerging nationalism in these
countries. 9 In Austria, the debates before the referendum clearly showed
who preferred Austria as a German nation, and who saw Austria as a
European nation among other nations. The eventual success of the EU
project will probably determine whether Haider's party will continue to rise
or fail.
Another important issue for the FPO is how Austrians deal with the
past. Should Austria be ashamed of the support shown after the Anschluj3
in 1 938? Haider's answer is, of course, no. Thus, he gives relief to many
Austrians.
The FPO differs from radical conservatism, as I have defined it, on one
issue: in economics it is neo-liberal, just like other rightist populist parties
9 For example, one Swedish Social Democrat, used the rhetorics of the unique nature of
the 'Nordic Volksgemeinschaft' (an old Nazi slogan) as an argument against the European
Union.
1 06 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E F U T U R E OF POL ITICS
in France and Scandinavia. The reasons for this are probably its anti
socialism and the fact that the political establishment has used neo- or
post-Keynesian models without much success. But when it comes to the
ideological core, the political vision as stated by the party ideologists
sounds very Schmittian:
The Third Republic is a Clear Concept for a Genuine Democratisation of Austria
Citizens' democracy instead of a party state.

Direct elections instead of a deputy democracy.
Restructuring of state responsibilities instead of state omnipotence.
Tax limits instead of tax pressure.
Identity between the people and their representatives.
(http://www Jpoe.or.at/englisch/third.htm)
France
In France there is both a tradition of, and an historical potential for,

radical conservatism. According to Sternhell (1 986), the French tradition of
fascism and radical conservatism has its roots in the idealism of the 1 930s
(Marcel Deat, Hendrik de Man and others) which constitutes a link back
to the earlier works by Pareto, Sorel and Robert Michels. Thus, French
radical conservatism has more in common with the 'Macchiavellians'
(Burnham, 1 943) than with the German Conservative Revolution. How
ever, in the 1 960s the nouvelle droite emerged as a conscious effort to
actualize the ideas of the conservative revolution. Alain de Benoist was its
leader, and still is, if indeed it can be said to 'exist' any more. What
interests us here are the logical and empirical connections to lean-Marie Le
Pen and the Front National.
The FN is now a major political force in France. It broke through in the
Euro-elections of 1 984 when it received 1 1 per cent of the vote. The party
usually receives between 1 0 and 20 per cent of the vote in different
elections, but surveys have shown that support for Le Pen's party has been
as great as 38 per cent (Marcus, 1 995: 67). The support is extremely strong
in suburbs with high rates of immigrants and unemployment; Le Pen's
slogan 'x million unemployed - this means x million foreigners too many'
makes many people listen to him. The FN is also the party of law and
order, answering to the need for security-politics. There are some parallels
with Austria: the FN is a one-man party and presents itself as an
alternative to the old corrupt parties. The trend of growing support for the
FN will most probably continue, and it has also caused a 'middle
extremism' just like in Sweden. That is, the ruling conservative party has
adopted some of the FNs anti-immigration policies. 1 O
10 For example, children born in France no longer become French citizens if their parents
are immigrants.
The FN is anti-Semitic, and like other anti-Semites, radical conservatives

and anti-American populists, Le Pen supports Saddam Hussein, with whom
he shook hands in Baghdad in 1991 (Laqueur, 1 996: 1 09). This is not a
typical for France where there is an old tradition of anti-Americanism:
Asterix and Tintin are better than Mickey Mouse, and there was strong
opinion against the establishment of Euro-Disney not very far from Paris.
There are personal connections between the FN and the nouvelle droite.
A new generation of new men with their background in the nouvelle droite
have joined the FN: Bruno Megret (born in 1 949) and now the second man
after Le Pen, Bruno Gollnisch (1 950) and Carl Lang ( 1 957) (Marcus, 1 995:
1 74). Megret, like de Benoist, openly rejects Judeo-Christian values, and
prefers a new paganism (Marcus, 1 995: 1 1 7). It should, however, be stated
that Le Pen is a Realpolitiker and is eager to make room also for
conservative Catholics, suppressing his real views on, for example, Jews. In
economical matters he is a neo-liberal, just like Haider. But economics has
never been the strength of radical conservatism; it remains to be seen if the
FN will go into a more mixed-economy politics.
There are also important signs of new political constellations in France. A
'red-black' example is that some communists flirted with the nouvelle droite
in 1 993 (Marcus, 1 995: 1 5 1). This is testimony to a general tendency: the old
'left', former communists and social democrats represent nationalism, while
the old 'right' parties, neo-liberals and 'structural conservatives' represent
internationalism. This has to do with the European Union which many
leftists regard as a 'capitalist' project, and the wish to strengthen the nation
state so that it can control capital on the national level. It is also connected
to new 'class interests': when the traditional working class is shrinking it is
easier to articulate its interests on the national level; at the same time, the
emerging 'symbol-analyst' group has no national loyalty.
Another possible ground for radical conservatism, or even fascism, in
France is that France feels 'threatened' culturally, both world-wide and in
Quebec. The French language is just one among many, and the Anglo
American language and culture are dominating the world. This has
provoked strong reactions globally. For example, signs in English are
forbidden in Quebec, and in France there is an attempt to replace 'imported'
words with 'real' French ones, thus guaranteeing conjunction, a language in
which one feels 'at home'.
Russia
The Soviet Union, which now belongs to the past, was initially planned as
the first socialist territory in the emerging revolution, and the working class
had, according to Marxism, no objective interests in defending a Nation. It
was the first historical agent of true internationalism and universalism.
However, the Soviet Union was very Russian in a number of senses. As
Orlando Figes (1 997) has shown, the bolsheviks had to adapt their strategy
108 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
to Russian conditions, thus Marxism became Marxism-Leninism.

Secondly, in Weimar Germany the radical conservatives who belonged to
the National Bolshevik camp clearly saw both the Russian and nationalist
elements in the early Soviet Union. Thirdly, nationalism served as not only
a legitimating, but also a mobilizing ideology in all the communist
countries in Eastern Europe (Verbery, 1 991). Fourthly, this aspect became
even stronger and more visible during the Stalin era. Elements of anti
Semitism emerged, and the theological aspects of nationalism became a
central feature in public life. The GDR is an interesting parallel here.
Recent research (Herf, 1 997) has shown how elements of radical con
servatism, like anti-Semitism and nationalism, survived better here than in
the politically reeducated West Germany.
Thus, while nationalism was strong in the Soviet Union, it was never
truly racist. Rather, Russian hegemony in the different republics was the
primary goal. This resulted in an astonishing ethnic mix in many republics.
This is very clear in, for example, Kazakstan (see Table 2). This mix is, of
course, a potentially disastrous area for future conflicts.
Theology did not cease to exist in the Soviet Union. It continued to exist in
the form of parades, person cults, iconography, etc. The Russian Orthodox
Church has regained its strong position during the last few years, and the
cult of 'community' is central to 'the Russian idea' (McDaniel, 1 996).
There should, then, be a solid ground for radical conservatism in Russia.
To the Russian heritage belong the writings of Dostoyevsky, one of the
first 'Eurasians'. There is at least one parallel with Germany and its form
of radical conservatism. According to Dostoyevsky, Russia was the
country in the 'middle' between Europe and Asia (Gebhard, 1 994) and
stood for a 'third way', a Sonderweg. Eurasianism is now being revived,
especially by radical-conservative intellectuals like Alexander Prokanov
and Alexander Dugin. Prokanov speaks openly about a Russian Ethnos
and wants this to be guaranteed by concrete geopolitics, often conceived as
a bond between Slavic and Muslim nations (Gebhard, 1 994: 36f.).
Since the breakdown of communism in Russia, new radical political
constellations have grown fast. I I Like Heiner Muller, to whom the 'red' was
also a 'black' attitude, Russian conservative revolutionaries can use some of
the old communist rhetoric to gain influence with the cultivated sections of
the middle and upper classes. We can currently find a number of journals
where anti-Americanism, Anti-westlichkeit and Zivilisationskritik are the
keywords. The central person here is Dugin. He is the editor of several
journals, and in one of them - Elementy, no. 8, 1 992 - he writes that America
and the West threaten the national existence and 'essence' of Russia. 1 2 This is
I I For an excellent overview, see Laqueur ( 1 993).

12 See Nikolaj-Klaus von Kreitor's article 'Elements (sic!) of the new Russian Nationalism'
in Telos, 95, 1993. This is, however, a very sanitized story. Kreitor mentions Dugin as simply a
'rightist', and is not eager to tell us that Dugin regards history from the perspective of 'the
metaphysics of continents', and that he thinks that Himmler's Waffen-SS was an 'intellectual
oasis' with an 'internationalist' and a true conservative revolutionary spirit (Ljunggren, 1993).
Table 2 Ethnic groups in Kazakstan

according to the 1989 census
Kazhaks 6,534,61 6
Russians 6,226,549
Germans 957,518
Ukrainians 896,240
Uzbekians 332,0 1 7
Tatars 327,892
Ujgurs 1 85,301
Belorussians 1 82,601
Koreans 103,3 1 5
Azerians 90,083
Poles 59,956
Turks 49,567
Tjetjens 49,507
Greeks 46,746
Basjkirs 4 1,847
Dunganes 30,1 65
Tadjiks 25,514
Kurds 25,425
Ingusjs 1 9,914
Armenians 1 9, 1 19
Jews 18,492
Udmurts 1 5,855
Kirgizes 14, 1 1 2
Lezgins 1 3,905
Marians 1 2,201
Lithuanians 1 0,942
Bulgars 10,426
Others 204,639
Source: Gustavsson and Svanberg, 1 992: 358.
an illustrative statement, which is repeated in different forms over and over

again. America is a dangerous 'civilization' which threatens life and the
unique nature of European Culture. It is not surprising that Alain de Benoist
has been translated in this journal.
Another greatly admired theorist in Russia is Carl Schmitt, who
developed the concept of ' Groj3raum' in 1 939-4 1 (Schmitt, 1 99 1 a). This
concept designates a territorial space which is strong enough to defend
itself and its unique character and 'essence' against the enemy. 1 3 What was
and is to be defended are 'culture' and 'authenticity', the enemies being
capitalism, liberalism and civilization. This means, of course, that the
primary enemy is the USA. It is strange that Schmitt did not draw
1 3 Schmitt loves the emphasis on room, and blames what he sees as a contempt for this
dimension as an anti-Rome affect! 'Room (Raum) is the same word as Rome (Rom). Here we
have the reason for the hate against the room, this hate is only a transfered anti-Rome affect'
(Schmitt, 1 99 1 b: 3 1 7). In a recently published book (Schmitt, 1 994) it is apparent why he loves
the 'room' - he hates the abstractifying tendency in modern civilization and wants to establish
the power of power as a relation visible and tied to a place, instead of as an abstract, general
mechanism or 'principle'.
1 10 RAD I CAL CON S ERVATI SM AN D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
the conclusion that he had to defend the German-Soviet non-aggression

pact since this could guarantee his vision of European autonomy. History
is fortunate that Hitler did not draw this same conclusion. He was foolish
enough to break the pact with the Soviet Union and therefore helped the
USA win the war, which meant not only the victory of civilization and
imperialism, but also democracy smashing totalitarianism. Other important
theorists in Russia are Julius Evola and Carl Gustav Jung. 1 4
The mission of Dugin and his friends is to create a new Groj3raum, to
save European culture from American civilization. Accordingly, their
heroes are Hitler, Stalin and de Gaulle. In the new European Groj3raum,
the 'Pax-Euroasiatica', there will be no place for Bosnian Muslims or
Jews. I S And of course Dugin, just like Zhirinovskij, strongly supports
Serbia.
Thus, it is not surprising that the conspiracy theories inspired by Schmitt
are so popular. Universalist ideals and 'international laws' are seen as mere
expressions of US imperialism. 16 One thinks in this context of the friend
ship between Vladimir Zhirinovskij and Saddam Hussein. 1 7 The support
systems for both Iraq and Serbia are, of course, paradoxical since Iraq
should be an enemy, but as we have seen, radical conservatism is a paradox
at its core.
The young writer Eduard Limonov, on I May 1 993, issues an 'Order to
establish a National Bolshevik Front' and since then he has been the leader
of the National Bolshevik party. 1 8 Dugin also joined this party, which has
run for elections. Limonov gathered 2 per cent of the vote in his district in
Moscow, Dugin 1 per cent in his district in St Petersburg. 19 Obviously, this
is not very much, but these radical conservatives do not put so much hope
on elections. Instead, they try to gain cultural hegemony. As a part of this
strategy, Dugin now has several homepages on the Internet, even one
14 See the interview with Dugin in Corriere della Serra, 1 5 February 1 994. Dugin states
here that 'Evola is in vogue in Russia. Russia returns to tradition, and traditionalism is in
polar opposition to atheism, materialism, the predominance of economism and liberalism.
Every criticism of the modern world is eagerly read by those who return to tradition after the
reign of Marxism. The fact that Evola was a "pagan" and fascist is certainly repugnant to
many, but his texts are a different matter.' The monotony of the arguments is striking! Dugin
( 1 992) uses lung's concept of 'the collective unconscious' repeatedly to support his cultural
relativism.
1 5 In the radical-conservative journals of today we find many articles eager to point out
that the first Bosnian Muslims were from the nobility that converted because they wanted to
keep their privileges (see, for example, Manousakis, 1 992).
16 This is expressed in its most extreme form in the article 'The war in Iraq is a war against
Europe', in Elementy, by the former Austrian general lordis von Lohausen. Lohausen is also a
frequent contributor in Elementy.
1 7 It is interesting to note that also Gunther Maschke (199 1 ) has declared his sympathies
with Iraq. At the bottom of this, we once again find a basic anti-Americanism: 'America is a
power foreign to the room [raumfremde Macht] . . . and its mass-culture results in de
orientation' (Maschke, in an interview in Junge Freiheit, quoted from Herzinger, 1 993a: 1 399).
18 Vasily Andreev, 'Nationalism in Russia', Jamestown Prism, 5 April 1 996.
19 Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 9. 1 996.
called 'Conservative Revolution'. Dugin has also become more and more
interested in Julius Evola (Dugin, 1 997), and this bears testimony to the
central role of political theology in radical conservatism. Evola's Tradi
tionalism is also perfect for a 'global' religion since it claims to be the Only
True Origin of Everything (see Chapter 7 below).
Among the dominant politicians there is no real radical conservative.
For example, Zhirinovskij, the 'liberal democrat', 20 is not a radical con
servative. This crazy populist is probably just a representative of himself
(Umland, 1 994). However, there are some logical connections. We have
mentioned Zhirinovskij's friendship with Saddam Hussein and his strong
nationalism. He is also a communitarian in a good Russian spirit. Another
important person is Alexander Lebed, who recently declared that '[Western
democracy] doesn't completely suit our historical experience, our
,
traditions, our national character . 2 1 No comment.
However, there is a person who has much more influence and power
than people like Zhirinovskij, Dugin and Limonov - the leader of the
Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, did not have any support
from the economic establishment and therefore did not win the presidential
election. He probably knows that the only chance for the new/old
bolsheviks to seize power again is by becoming open nationalists. There
fore, there have been many discussions on the question of whether there
are discrepancies between what he says and what he does. However, the
collection of some of his texts in English My Russia (Zyuganov, 1 997) -
-
could very well be read as a radical conservative manifesto. I will not

discuss this book in detail but will simply quote some short passages that
speak for themselves. The book begins: 'I am Russian blood and spirit and
love my native land' (Zyuganov, 1 997: 3). We know, therefore, that he is a
real nationalist, and a hard-core one ('blood and spirit'). His nationalism is
far from secular - he writes that the Russian state emerged in 988, the year
that saw the conversion of Russia to Christianity ( 1 997: 1 1 9). The leader of
a former atheist party, he now identifies himself with the Fatherland, 'The
Russian Idea' which exists thanks to the Orthodox church: 'More than
once, our statehood has been reborn thanks to [the Russian Orthodox
church's] support' ( 1 997: 1 0). This shows how hard he is tied to Ethnos,
conjunction, cultural relativism and Sonderweg-thinking. Thus, it comes as
no surprise when he demonstrates his anti-Americanism and anti
Westernism: the 'Americanization' of Russian culture leads to deprivation
of the national spirit - both in Russia and in the USA ( 1 997: 1 I f.).
Zyuganov interprets the geopolitical situation as a conflict between
sovereign nations and forces aiming at the 'New World Order'. And, of
20 The modern fascists are eager to label themselves as 'democrats': Movimento Sociale
Italiano (MS!) in Italy, 'Sverigedemokraterna' in Sweden (,Swedish democrats'), and KPD
stands not only for the German communist party, but also for the 'Kreuzberger Patriotische
Demokraten'!
2 1 Associated Press in Lawrence Journal- World, 9 March, 1997.
1 12 RAD I CAL CO N S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
course, the 'NWO is tied to the "global strategy" of the United States and
the concept of the Larger Atlantic Space' ( 1 997: 1 29). Only the Jews are
missing in his conspiracy theories; in all other aspects Zyuganov fits
perfectly into a fascist world-view. It is 'only' the Bilderberg Club, the
trilateral system, etc. that are said to be the secret agents of the NWO. 22
But in another context the Jews do appear: 'Jewish influence grows not by
the day, but by the hour. The Jewish Diaspora traditionally controlled the
financial life of the [European] continent and is becoming more and more
the owner of the controlling interest in all the stocks of Western civilization
and its socioeconomic system' (Zyuganov, quoted in Remnick, 1 997: 3 1 5).
Ironically, this is the same theory we hear from radical American right
wingers, to which I will soon turn.
Furthermore, and this shows us how close Zyuganov comes to the ideas
of the conservative revolution, he does not defend the idea of 'progress'
any longer. On the contrary, 'it is clear that history moves in a cyclical,
spiral manner' (Zyuganov, 1 997: 1 24). The primary agents in this cyclical
history are civilizations, each one based on a different Ethnos.
USA
It is extremely banal to say that the USA is different from Europe, and a
tracking of radical conservatism therefore becomes more difficult than in a
European context. One reason for this is what Seymour Martin Lipset
( 1 996) has called the 'American exceptionalism' . This consists of the
alleged fact that America is the only nation founded on a creed, with a
strong patriotism defending central values like liberty, individualism and
laissez-faire ( 1 996: 3 1 ) . The USA is also unique in the negative attitudes
against various forms of government activity. For example, only 49 per
cent of the American population agree that wearing seat belts should be
required by law, while in other Western countries over 80 per cent agree
( 1 996: 75).
When looking at American politics, therefore, patriotism, individualism
and anti-government attitudes are of great importance. Factors that gain
radical-conservative support, like the threat to the nation state, immigra
tion, unemployment and corrupt politicians, do not look the same as they
do in Europe. Of course, there are many corrupt politicians in the USA
too, but this has not resulted in the emergence of strong populist parties in
this century. Large groups of the population simply do not vote. However,
22 Organizations such as the Bilderberg Club and the Trilateral Commission system are
networks (both formal and informal) with members from different countries who are worried
about the future of the global capitalist system. In almost every conspiracy theory from the
radical right you can read the alleged truth, about the hidden, secret force behind everything,
for example on the Internet or in the international magazine, Nexus. The 'truth' is almost
always something like 'they' are the real agents behind everything - 'they' being, most often,
Jews and freemasons.
AN I NTERNATIONAL PERS PECTIVE 113
Ross Perrot and his Reform Party gained a lot of votes in the elections in
1 992. Although it is a kind of populist party, it can hardly be described as
radical conservative, since the radical aspect is virtually absent and the
Reform Party has no connections to extreme right-wing groups.
The fact that Peter Brimelow's book A lien Nation became a bestseller
shows that immigration has become a hot political issue. Illegal immi
gration, mostly from Mexico, is seen as a potential time-bomb in the light
of the widespread fear among white Americans that the Hispanics will
eventually be the largest ethnic group and that whites will become a
minority in their own country (Huntington, 1 996: 205). The USA is the
leading world power and there are no signs that this is likely to change in
the foreseeable future; therefore one ground for aggressive nationalism is
lacking. But nationalism can take an inward form, as an Ethnos-based
reaction against non-Caucasians.
However, there are elements in the USA that can be, and sometimes are,
included under a 'radical conservatism' label:
The Christian Coalition, where Pat Robertson is a leading member,

stress traditional American values, anti-feminism, anti-abortionism, and
see enemies and conspiracy theories everywhere. (In their conspiracy
theories gays and Jews are often depicted as the leaders of hidden and
powerful networks.)
2 The Republican Right talk about a 'conservative revolution' . The
Christian Coalition has strong contacts with this group, but the latter
has a more secular and neo-liberal outlook. However, Pat Buchanan, a
member of the Republican Right, comes close to radical conservatism
with his anti-Semitism, proto-fascism and his actions against US
engagement in the war with Iraq. There are also several radical
conservative and racist groups that support him (Zeskind, 1 997).
3 The Communitarians (Amitai Etzioni, Michael Sandel) are an American
phenomenon and hard to place on a left-right axis. America has always
stressed the worth of community (family, neighbourhood, church) and
Communitarians fear that there is a threat from atomist liberalism and
consumensm.
4 Intellectual conservatism (Irving Kristol, Leo Strauss, etc.) can be seen
as a theoretical expression of Republican ideology.
5 The New York-based journal Telos, for years regarded as a 'leftist'
journal, is today often considered as the opposite. The author and
historian Christopher Lasch, who criticized the 'political class' and the
liberals for destroying the American consensus (Lasch, 1 995), found
listeners among the Telos people. The journal is also famous for
publishing material by and on Carl Schmitt and Alain de Benoist.
6 Black authoritarian movements also fall under the radical conservative
umbrella. For example, Louis Farakhan's Nation of Islam has become
famous for its anti-Semitism, radical Islamism and authoritarianism.
He is not the first black leader with proto-fascist ideas. Marcus Garvey,
1 14 RAD ICAL CO N S E RVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
who founded the Universal Negro Improvement in 1 9 14, was the first
important leader of a black movement. In 1 937 he characterized his
own movement as 'fascist' (Gregor, 1 974: 361). He was a racist, a
nationalist (the 'Black Nation') a modernist and a radical. He and the
Ku Klux Klan also agreed on one issue: the need for 'repatriation', that
is, that the black people should 'return' to Africa. The relationship
between extreme Zionism and nazism is striking. 23 The more famous
Malcolm X was often contradictory, but overall he was a radical,
promoting the 'roots' of the black people; he was anti-capitalist but not
a communist. In this context, we can also see new unholy alliances, or
constellations, when we meet black people who are members of Aryan
Nations since they have one common enemy - the Jews. Some black
activists believe the Holocaust is a Jewish myth that conceals the real
problem - the black ghettos.
7 Neo-nazis and other militant and anti-federalist groups, such as the Ku
Klux Klan, are often regarded as radical conservatism.
If we consider how five fundamental radical-conservative issues (Ethnos

and nationalism, anti-reflexivity, alternatives to the established political
system, theology, and the critique of consumerism and materialism) are
linked to these groupings, we see that the 'strongest candidates' would be
the Christian fundamentalists and the black authoritarian movements,
although they are showing very different profiles. But the number one
candidate is the Republican Right, grouped around Pat Buchanan. Today
there are many people supporting him because he answers a need for
identity: what is 'America' now that the former enemy, the Soviet Union,
has ceased to exist? Large groups construct a myth of origin: the 'real'
America is the USA before the Civil War which destroyed the 'first'
American nation, - 'the Anglo-American Republic'. In the 'good old days'
we had 'organic [sic] citizens', and the blacks, who were denied the title of
'real' citizens and were called ' 14th-Amendment citizens' by the radical
right after the 14th Amendment to the constitution which concerns all men,
black and white, being equal. The radical right saw this as unconstitutional
believing that the original constitution forbade new amendments, that this
was against the will of 'the founding fathers' (Zeskind, 1 997). The parallels
between Pat Buchanan, the Republican Right, intellectual radical con
servatives and rightist populist parties are striking: anti-Semitism, racism
and Ethnos. If these are the broad streams of radical conservatism, there
are a number of smaller groups with proto-fascist values that sometimes
come close to radical conservatism. I think of what I have myself called
'radical localism' (Dahl, 1 998), groups like the Posse Commitatus, the
Common Law Courts, the Populist Party, separatists, etc., such groups are
really worried that the federal government is in the hands of Jews, the UN,
23 The two groups agreed on the need for solving the 'Jewish question' by sending all
European Jews to a place in the Middle East or north Africa (Rosenberg, 1 996).
the IMF, etc., and that action is needed to protect traditional American
values?4 Another recession will cause more unemployment and more
farmers will go bankrupt, under which circumstances the federal govern
ment may be blamed for only protecting its own interests and become once
again the target of terrorist bombers.
Like everywhere else, the future of politics in the USA is impossible to
predict. Now I will discuss the question of possible new political
constellations in the USA - radical conservatism can also appear where we
normally do not expect to find it.
* * *
There is an issue in America which cannot go unmentioned when dis

cussing the possibility of radical conservatism and new political constel
lations. I am thinking of the new form of cultural relativism that has
emerged in the USA during the last decade: the cult of 'community' and
'culture'. Sections of both the 'left' and the 'right' favour the collective
(religious, ethnic, etc.) belonging and devalue the rights of the individual.
This can be interpreted as a new political constellation united in anti
liberalism and anti-republicanism.
The so-called critique of 'euro-centrism' has been formulated and
practised as a concrete micro-politics, the so-called 'identity politics'. In
its turn, this has been criticized by conservatives (Allan Bloom, Roger
Kimball), often quite hysterically. I want to begin by sketching what these
rival camps say.
'Deconstructionism' (Jacques Derrida) and knowledge-archaeology
(Michel Foucault) are often read as a defence for the rights of minorities.
'Truth' is regarded as a relative idea, often used as an instrument when a
group in command wants to make its 'truth' into the Truth. This and other
post-structuralist 'truths' are often used as legitimations for the efforts of
different minorities - for example sexual and ethnic minorities - to make
their claims for their outlook acknowledged as equal to those of others. In
the USA this struggle has been radicalized. The Civil Rights movement
became Black Power, gays and lesbians are militant, the Hispanics are
discriminated against and perhaps comprise the most active movement
today. All of these groups have achieved cultural gains and conquered
distinctive identities. The main enemy is the WASP ideology. 25 The
struggles of the minorities have resulted in conflicts at the American
universities and colleges. Students from the minority groups have raised
demands for studying writers from their own minorities and they have
reacted against the European dominance in the literature they have to read.
In its turn, this has led to strong counter-reactions from the neo
conservatives. This means that identity politics leads to a relativization of
24 See Stern, 1 996; Dees, 1 997; Dyer, 1997; Hamm, 1997.

25 'WASP' stands for White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.
1 16 RAD ICAL CON S E RVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
the absolute and the American idea, and that political standards replace
aesthetic quality and universal values.
In practice, this can lead to discussion on whether one should read
Shakespeare or black authors. Are there absolute aesthetic criteria above
the political? The neo-conservative author Roger Kimball says 'yes' in his
book Tenured Radicals ( 1 99 1 ), and sees the main enemy as Stanley Fish,
professor of English and Law at Duke University. Fish is an extreme
relativist. His world is a world of completely incommensurable and contrary
systems of values (Fish, 1 995). Expressions are read as mere expressions of
social and cultural belonging. Thus, the world is full of enemies, not only
the WASP ideology, but also every other discourse that dares to use
universal concepts like 'reason' and 'understanding'.
Deconstructionist intellectuals like Fish view themselves as 'leftists' .
After the 'postmodern turn' the 'revolutionary' activity moved from the
political sphere to texts, and reading and writing became 'political' matters.
Thus, the neo-conservatives have a point: the differentiations of modern
society - between, for example, morality, law, politics and aesthetics - are
reduced to one, single battlefield. It is a bad reductionism to view the
qualities of a book only as a question of its social and cultural genesis. On
the other hand, the neo-conservatives go too far when they see the aesthetic
quality as totally disconnected from other surrounding and crossing fields
and they use their own power to reserve the criteria of 'beauty' for
European artists. A different way could be to replace the criteria of
'beauty' with, for example, 'experience-enriching'. This could be a way of
overcoming both neo-conservatism and identity politics.
Identity politicians and their intellectual relativist megaphones forget that
'identities' are created by the classificatory logics of modernity. When the
struggle for equal rights is transformed to the rights of a black person, a
woman, etc., then the mirror-image of its 'opposite' (the classifying Power)
rises. A Swedish literature critic, Stefan Jonsson, has swallowed the whole
ideology:
There is a kind of politicizing deconstructionism that reads Western literature
backwards and reveals how the Western knowledge subject has classified reality
and conquered it. This subject has built up self-image and outlook by placing
itself in the middle and by marginalizing other worlds. Women, coloured and
others in other ways deviant are reduced to objects for this normalizing subject
of knowledge, a subject that stands for objectivity, search for truth, universal
norms and general criteria for quality and competence. (Jonsson, 1 993: 1 59)
But this interpretation of 'universalism' is too one-dimensional. There are

other ways of understanding universalism and objectivity that cannot be
reduced to the 'Western subject of knowledge', and other aspects that can
overcome the infernal mirror-logic. Let me give some examples illustrating
this.
First, at a library at one of the departments of Lund University the
librarian hung up a home-made poster with the text 'Please be silent'. The
poster was illustrated with a picture of 'The King of Rock 'n' Roll', Little
Richard, shouting out one of his hits. An African student asked: 'There is a
picture of a black person there. Are the black people the only persons
making the noise?' He saw the poster as racist since he had never heard of
Little Richard. It was this student, who certainly had experienced real
racism, that reduced 'The King of Rock 'n' Roll' to any black person at all.
The point is that racism is an infernal game. Anti-racism can increase
racism by viewing the colour of the skin as an essential quality and in this
way it serves the mechanisms of racism.
A second example was when I showed a class Spike Lee's movie Jungle
Fever. Its theme is, above all, institutional racism and that ethnic barriers
are placed deep in the souls of people. A black girl in the class started
crying after the movie. It had constructed something - the colour of her
skin - that had never been important for her before.
These examples point to the constructivism of identity politics - they
strengthen and expand the classifications, and in the end confirm the
'Power' . Here is a parallel to an over-interpreting psychoanalysis: a dis
agreement between you and me is caused not by different logical conclu
sions but by unconscious interests!
Both of these examples point to another fact: so far it is mostly 'gender'
(in the wake of 'class') that has entered everyday life and science. We are
still waiting for sexuality (homo- or hetero-) and ethnic belonging to grow
into distinctions used for legitimation and the defence of certain views.
Here, the USA is ahead of the rest of Europe. Who knows, perhaps even
taste and eating habits (vegetarian or not?) will be upgraded into con
stituting categories? Anyway, I think that identity politics will also grow
stronger in Europe. Of course, there is something very legitimate and
understandable in identity politics. The minorities are in many ways
repressed. But its relativism and simplifying contents are hard to swallow.
Furthermore, it points to a state of the war against everyone, or pure
tribalism (Bauman, 1 992: 1 36ff.).
Speaking normatively, my point is that hermeneutic understanding is an
alternative to the one-dimensionality of both identity politics and neo
conservatism. Regarding the analytical question of new possible political
constellations, my point is that it is identity politics, not neo-conservatism
that becomes a possible partner to radical conservatism, or rather, that
constitutes a form of radical conservatism.
Canada
My knowledge of Canada is extremely limited, but I think it is worth

mentioning that there exists a party which shows many resemblances with
the European rightist populist parties - The Reform Party. It was
established in 1987 and received 1 9 per cent of the vote in the federal
elections (Laycock, 1 996: 4). More importantly, if, for obvious reasons, we
exclude Quebec, then The Reform Party received 26 per cent of the vote.
118 RADICAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Thus, it is a major political force in 'English-speaking' Canada. Like its

European brothers, anti-immigration and insecurity are key issues. The
increasing insecurity among workers and middle-class citizens are the soil
where Reform Party sympathies grow.
It is also an 'anti-party', calling for constitutional reforms and direct
democracy, since the established old parties do not listen to the 'average
people', but instead constitute a political class, alienated from the people
(Laycock, 1 994). The Reform Party also embraces traditionalist morality
and claims to be more ethical than the other parties.
This is a very familiar phenomenon, and if The Reform Party continues
its success it might very well develop into full-blown radical conservatism.
Already, we find all of the characteristics of radical conservatism here, and
if Quebec finally does separate from the federation, the Ethnos will grow
even stronger.
Libya
There are old historical ties between European fascism and radical
conservatism and movements in the Arab world. For example, the Ba'ath
Party, the governing party in both Syria and Iraq, is a pan-Arabist move
ment that emerged as a direct response to European fascism when it came
to the fore in the 1 930s (Laqueur, 1 996: 1 62). We have also noted the
sympathies for Saddam Hussein among European radical conservative
intellectuals today.
But is would be too easy to see all Arabist movements and Muslim
movements - which are far from identical - as expressions of radical
conservatism. Even if most of them are a response to the 'threat' of the
West, they cannot be seen as Ethnos movements, even if they strongly
oppose the Demos principle. Despite all intolerance and hatred, shown
in especially Shia fundamentalist Islam, their members are defined by
faith and actions, and not by Ethnos. Many of the movements are also
reactionary anti-modernist, even if they have to deal with the issues of
modernity and technology, if and when they gain power, like the mullahs in
Iran. Thus, if we can at least say that there are strong affinities between
radical conservatism and most Arabist projects, then we should be able to
look for some more obvious affinities in order to sharpen our view. The
most obvious example, as I see it, is Libya and its leader Muammar
Muhammed al-Qadaffi.
The existence of the Libyan state and its leader are hard to separate. He
is in almost absolute power, he has written down the philosophy of the
nation, he is the nation, or rather, the state. Qadaffi's 'third way' - 'the
third universal theory' - beyond capitalism and communism is codified in
his famous Green Book. On the issue of parliaments he writes:
A parliament i s a misrepresentation of the people, and parliamentary govern
ments are a misleading solution to the problem of democracy. A parliament is
originally founded to represent the people, but this in itself is undemocratic, as

democracy means the authority of the people and not an authority acting on
their behalf. (Qadaffi, 1 988: 40)
Carl Schmitt's point was roughly the same: a parliament is not 'identical'
with the people, and is therefore undemocratic.
The laws of society, including the constitution, have a divine link.
Qadaffi knows political theology: 'Religion embraces tradition, which is an
expression of the natural life of the peoples. Thus, religion, embracing
tradition, is an affirmation of natural law' (Qadaffi, 1 988: 57). Natural law
is simply either tradition or religion. Qadaffi recognizes both and here he
comes close to the romantic notion of Volk as articulated by Herder and
Rousseau, a tradition also including most radical conservatives. The nation
is 'the sense of belonging and a common destiny' (Qadaffi, 1 988: 93). Like
Hans Freyer, Qadaffi sees the nation, not a class, as the actor in history.
Although he is theological, he is too much of a secularist, and this might
explain why his ideas are rejected by more fundamentalist leaders. Qadaffi
makes an enormous, implicit claim: to be the founder of a new universalist
theory, on the same level as the Koran and the Communist Manifesto. One
of his European admirers - Henning Eichberg26 - praises him for his
suggestions on direct democracy, world revolution and socialism (Eichberg,
1 996: 1 1 8f.). He also suggests that the reason for the US declaration of
Libya being a 'terrorist state' is that Libya is the only country in the world
that supports the American Indian Movement, and that Qadaffi represents
an astonishing synthesis of socialist change and vOlkisch tradition.
Although Qadaffi's plan for a world revolution has failed, his success in
Libya proves that radical conservatism can be a real political force.
China
The countries of East and South-East Asia all prove that there is a 'second'
way to modernity. Here we find countries with authoritarian regimes,
'socialist' or not, that have successfully entered the international capitalist
system (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) and
a fully modernized country which has managed to keep the old cultural
and symbolic framework (Japan). Either there is an absence of political
democracy or of a 'one-world civilization'. What is of interest here is that
we have a number of authoritarian regimes discovering the value of the
myth of the nation. In the context of radical conservatism the question is
whether countries like Vietnam and China will walk in this direction. I
think it is a possible scenario, and I will take China as an example.
26 Eichberg is a conservative radical rather than a radical conservative German intel

lectual. In Germany he is most often identified as a 'rightist', but in Denmark, where he lives,
he is a member of a rather large 'leftist' party.
1 20 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM AN D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
China is of interest in any global context because it is the largest country

in the world in terms of the size of its popUlation. It becomes even more
interesting because, in the era of post-Maoism, it possesses a mixture of old
Leninist socialism, capitalism and nationalism. They exist side by side and
often come into conflict with each other.
The most obvious conflict is the one between Leninist socialist cultural
values and the values of modern, Western-oriented consumerism. Both old
and young members of the Communist Party have condemned excesses in
'decadent', 'Western' patterns of life and preferences, although these
campaigns have not been so successful in Vietnam. One also often hears
old communists emphasizing Confucianism as the true guiding historical
principle for China, which, then, is different from any Western model
(Friedman, 1 995: 59). The future will tell us if the Leninists will be
successful with the campaign, but 1 doubt it. The patterns of life and
preferences they criticize are too immanently connected to the boom of
Chinese capitalism. The leaders probably know this, but they have to calm
down the Leninists who in any case do not seem to have a viable
alternative; the words of Prime Minister Li Peng seem rather pathetic: 'I
am warning of the cult of money, extreme individualism and a decadent
way of life' (Leijonhufvud and Engqvist, 1 996: 2 1 6) . Rather, the com
munist leaders created a vacuum which can now be filled with meanings
that were kept alive in religious and ethnic communities (Friedman, 1 995:
60). It seems likely, therefore, that the most dominating conflicts in the
future will be between the regions, especially between the more backward,
still half-socialist northern China and the capitalist south. This could also
bring the ethnic question to the fore.
Modern Chinese history begins with the revolution in 1 9 1 1 which forced
the last emperor to abdicate. The revolution was 'inspired by a growing
Han-Chinese nationalism' (Christiansen and Rai, 1 996: 292). The Han is
the greatest of the five Chinese nations (the others are the Manchu, the
Mongolian, the Tibetan and the Muslim) and between 90 and 95 per cent
of the total population belong to the Han nation. Thus, in modern China
there has been, just like in the old Yugoslavia and in Stalinist Russia, a
recognition of ethnicity, but it has less to do with 'multiculturalism' and
more to do with the wish to control the territory and have internal peace.
The economic boom and especially the fall of the Soviet Union have
resulted in more open borders, and the ethnic minorities close to the borders
are often of the same nation as people on the other side of the border -
Turks, Mongolians, Kazaks. At the same time as this has promoted trade
and economic growth, there is also an ethnic threat against the Beijing
regime. Furthermore, it promotes a Mafioso form of capitalism. Since there
are no safe market institutions to trust, trust can only be found at the level
where an imagined cultural nationality exists.
The other important ethnic issue is the homogeneity of the vast majority
in China - the Han nation. This can in its turn be divided into three
subgroups, on the basis of language: Mandarin, Cantonese and Shanghai.
It is very hard to judge what significance they might have. Although

Mandarin represents the undeveloped and Cantonese and Shanghai the
more developed areas, there is much greater migration and social mobility
in China today. The most probable scenario is that Mandarin will develop
as a lingua franca (Christiansen and Rai, 1 996: 308) and this can only lead
to a more articulated Han-ethnic nationalism, especially if we take the
relationship to Taiwan into consideration.
Since 'socialism' has withered away, at least as an ideology, there seem
to be three options for a new common ground: Confucianism, nationalism
and religion (Leijonhufvud and Engqvist, 1996). Nationalism is probably
the answer, but then the question of Taiwan will be raised even more
sharply, and the regime will be more or less forced to invade Taiwan, even
if this will be a big-risk enterprise. Another non-ethnic form of nationalism
is also a possible scenario - that the enormous market capacity becomes a
form of national self-identity (Friedman, 1995: 60).
So, what has this to do with radical conservatism? As I see it, China will
continue to have an authoritarian regime, and in its effort to synthesize
some form of socialism with nationalism and capitalism, something like a
radical conservative state could emerge since the most important thing is
cohesion, and here theology, anti-reflexivity and mythology can support
the necessary nationalism. Perhaps this is the only option since the regime
also has to deal with the widespread corruption. China is in great need of
new ideas and a new identity.
Even if it would be misleading to take for granted that China is moving
in a radical conservative direction, it is certain that China has to move in
some kind of radical new direction. And this fact can strengthen radical
conservatism in other countries since changes in China determine the
geopolitical situation elsewhere. If geopolitics becomes an important
political issue radical conservatism is advantaged since it is familiar with
and knowledgeable about geopolitics.
* * *
My attempts to look for forms of radical conservatism in different

countries has shown that a common characteristic is an anti-Western
attitude. It can be a form of Sonderweg-thinking (Germany, Russia,
China), which is critical of Western materialism and consumerism. In the
West it is, for obvious reasons, a little different: it is hard for a Westerner
to be anti-himself. But outside the USA this attitude in the West is mani
fested as plain anti-Americanism, for example in France, and often in
conjunction with paganism (de Benoist). In the USA we see the same basic
attitude, but it cannot be anti-American. Instead the enemy is the federal
government and/or the UN which are often seen as agents of a giant
conspIracy.
This anti-Western attitude, the preference for the local in different forms,
can also be understood, to use Mannheim's term, as a reaction against
1 22 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
abstract communication, and vice versa, a preference for conjunction.

Radical conservatives emphasize the unique community of every Nation
and Volk, against internationally binding agreements.
Capitalism, or at least 'Big Business' is truly anti-national; it knows no
borders, only the laws of accumulation. This is one reason why radical
conservatives do not like capitalism. Also, their rhetorical heritage has a
strong anti-bourgeoise affect, regarding both the decadent lifestyle of this
class and its twin sympathies for liberalism and capitalism. If we limit
capitalism to 'Big Business', we can also include Pat Buchanan and other
rightist populist parties with rather neo-liberal economic agendas. This also
illustrates the point that both radical conservatism and rightist populism
often show the same profile: they both claim to be the only one rep
resenting the people against corrupt politicians!
Another reason for radical conservatism's potential credibility as the
'true opposition' is the failure of 'anti-racism'. The project of mobilizing
some kind of 'anti-racism' arises when the question of how shall, and can,
we fight the racism growing in 'multicultural societies' is addressed. The
simplest option consists of declaring oneself as an 'anti-racist'. However,
there are two factors that complicate this strategy. The first is that anti
racism is, in some respects correctly, understood as a slogan coming from
'the system'. When there are reactions against immigrants and immigra
tion, 'the system' mobilizes 'information' resources aimed at demonstrating
the irrationality of ordinary people's behaviour. The effect of this strategy
is now quite well documented: the 'anti-racist' discourse strengthens
racism; the anti-racist discourse is a child of the modernist project -
prejudices have to be exterminated! Through social engineering every
'problem' can, and must, be cured, and a truly rational humanity can be
created. This is an illustration of what Gadamer ( 1 989) called the biggest
prejudice of the Enlightenment: the prejudice against prejudices.
An excellent example of this was the referendum, held in 1988, con
cerning a county's duty to give housing to refugees in Sjobo, a small
county in southern Sweden. Resistance against housing the refugees was
rather strong in the beginning, but during the campaign it became more so.
As Fryklund and Petersson ( 1 989) have shown, resistance became much
stronger because lots of bureaucrats, experts and politicians visited Sjobo
to inform the inhabitants what the 'truth' was and to give them neutral
'information'. But the inhabitants only perceived this as the state's attempt
to tell them what they should think. The institutionalized anti-racist
discourse caused more racism than it cured. Or, to put it in another way,
anti-racism was not guided by phronesis, but by instrumental rationality.
This logic can also be seen if children have bad teachers who preach 'anti
racism' - since the teacher is stupid, racism must be the right thing!
When it comes to explaining radical conservatism at this stage we can
return to what I called the dual nature of knowledge, which consists of two
sides - 'will' and 'interest'. In this context the distinction tells us that there
is more at stake than 'class' (which is the basis of interest) when
considering how political sympathies develop. Also 'identity' and 'culture'

(which are the basis of will) have a formative influence. Both Mannheim -
who wanted to learn something from his objects - and radical conser
vatism have a point here, which both leftists and liberals tend to neglect.
In the American context Joel Dyer ( 1 997: 249) mentions a realistic
political alternative: if there is a party who is both value-conservative and
supports some kind of welfare state it could well be a majority party.
Relying on surveys, he shows that the reason people do not vote is the lack
of such a party, and if they do vote, they prefer the value-conservative
Republican party. Of course, this does not automatically mean that a
'radical-conservative' party would be a big party, but that 'radical con
servatism' serves as a metaphor for what people want in politics - both
value-conservatism and some kind of anti-capitalism. This raises the
question of whether the pattern is the same in the rest of the West. I have
no answer, but it is a possibility worth consideration.
7
NEW POLITICAL CONSTELLATIONS?
Having looked for signs of radical conservatism in different countries, I

now intend to focus on possible constellations which are not bound by
geographical location. I have already mentioned one possible new constel
lation - identity politics with its standpoint in epistemology, where the
individual disappears. My examples are few, but the lack of quantity is
hopefully compensated by the depth in the following sections.
Retrogardism, Zivilizationskritik and radical conservatism
'Retrogardism' is not a big movement in art. Those who have heard about
it probably have come in contact with it through the Slovenian artist
collective Neue Slowensiche Kunst (NSK). The most well-known members
are the music group Laibach (the German name of the capital of Slovenia
- Ljubjana). This group has often been accused of being 'totalitarian' and
'fascist'. If you have seen or heard them, this accusation is easy to under
stand, and they also admit that 'Nazi Kunst' belongs to their cultural
heritage. However, the 'leftist' Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst,
Slavoj Zisek, has defended them and argued that their main ambition is
politically radical and correct. If one goes beyond the immediate surface, it
is obvious that Laibach and NSK are not 'fascists'.
However, I have noticed that the concept of 'retrogardism' has appeared
somewhere else. It was in the promotional literature for the journal Junge
Freitheit's Summer University in 1 993, where the publishing house Arun
advertised its poetry series 'Retrogard'. The Arun publishing house
primarily produces radical conservative literature, and it is therefore not at
all remarkable that one is suspicious of their publications.
This concept also appeared recently in a Swedish book, and the authors '
were accused of being almost fascists. I Thus, I think it is a good idea to
bring retrogardism and radical conservatism together, to see if there are any
likenesses and differences. In this comparison I also construct a third ideal
type Zivilisationskritik here used as a description of post-war attempts
- -
to create a 'new humanism', a sort of depoliticized spiritual radical con

servatism. My reason for constructing this constellation is that it might
I In fact, I was one of the critics who was accused of claiming this. Since this is of marginal
interest in this book, I choose not to tell this silly story.
1 26 RAD ICAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
make us aware of possible new political and aesthetical constellations, far

beyond 'left and right'.
Retrogardism Slovenian style
No one can describe NSK better than they do themselves:

NSK began operating in 1 984 as a large collective, a union of various groups
brought together by their shared way of thinking and a similar way of expression
through different media. The main NSK groups are: Laibach, Irwin, Noordung,
New Collectivism Studio and the Department of Pure and Applied Philosophy,
while there is a number of flexible subdivisions which emerge as the need arises
and dissolve under their own inertia. Each of the groups primarily works within
its medium, nevertheless their bonds are firm and fruitful. Members of the
groups meet on a regular basis, they talk, discuss and plan major common
campaigns, test aesthetic and other preferences, exchange ideas and contexts,
travel together, etc. Laibach began working in 1 980 and was mainly oriented to
popular music, although it associated different levels of work from the beginning,
including gallery and theatre installations. The resume and chronology of
Laibach are diversified, as well as its records, while its philosophy is a complex
one. Regarding the philosophy - it may be called untranslatable, which of course
means that it is understood by those who understand it. It is a certain poetry
which is reflected in all Laibach's work, including interviews, and which can be
interpreted in a number of ways. This is entirely up to you, of course. We could
assume despite this that Laibach is the ideological foundation of NSK while the
Irwin artists group has the function of NSK biographers recording NSK
archetypes on canvas and in history. The Noordung Theatre (formerly Red Pilot,
and Scipion Nasice before that) assumes ritualistic NSK contexts and operates
through religious patterns above all. Their work is also rich in scope, but we
intend to gradually familiarise you with it as closely as possible.
Besides these three groups the most active within NSK are the New Collec
tivism Design Studio and the Department of Pure and Applied Philosophy. The
former obviously works with design (posters, record covers, books, etc.) and the
latter mainly with critical aspects of classic philosophy. The Department treats
philosophy as its subject matter and medium, which does not imply that this
philosophy is entirely relevant to other NSK groups or to NSK as a whole. In
spite of links, they are strictly separated in NSK. Each of the groups works
according to its internal logic, its rules and principles of work, whereas they are
connected by a certain contextual and formal aspect, and this aspect is what
forms NSK. (What Is NSK? Reprinted from The First NSK Bulletin, 1 994, http://
www .nsk.org!)
In 1 995 Laibach made a world-wide tour called 'Occupied Europe NATO

Tour', documented in the video-tape and the CD with the same name.
Perhaps the first feeling you get when you watch it is ambivalence - on the
one hand it seems like a leftist critique of global capitalism, on the other
hand, its proto-fascist aesthetics suggest that this has nothing to do with
the 'left'. Maybe this is their main aim - creating ambivalence. But they do
have a philosophy about what they are doing. This can be reconstructed
from interviews with the group ? However, 'reconstruction' is too strong a
2 They can be found on the Internet. The address is: http://lois.kud-fp.siHukap.embassy/

3a/exclll .html.
N EW POL ITICAL CONSTELLATIONS? 1 27
claim; rather, all you can do is to associate, but these associations are quite
obvious.
Laibach describe their purpose as: 'To provoke maximum collective
emotions and release the automatic response of masses.' The consequence
is 'the effective disciplining of the revolted and alienated audience;
awakening the feeling of total belonging and commitment to the Higher
Order'. This is the very notion presented in Junger's Der Arbeiter ( 1 932)
and in his idea of 'total mobilization'.
'Violence is a brutal force, to which we have submitted. ' This is ambi

valent. Of course, we, even liberals, must know the necessity of violence.
But to 'submit' - does this not lead us to the cult of the 'decisive deed'? Is
there, then, a place for discourse at all?
'The need for authority is stronger than the will for independence. ' This
comes very near to the 'affirmationism' of both Junger and technocratic
conservatism.
Laibach also often use the potion of the 'Organic', and one gets the feeling
that they really hail this as an essential value.
'Politics is the highest and all-embracing art'. We have discussed the issues
of the 'aesthetization of politics' and political 'existentialism' or 'expressiv
ism' as hallmarks of radical conservatism.
Furthermore, Laibach often mentions the 'exhaustion' of Europe, the

vacuum, etc., and then there has to be a new force to fill this. One tradition
that would perfectly fill this vacuum is the Integral Traditionalism I will
discuss later and its cult of the Eternal Origin.
All in all, in Laibach's aesthetics I see an attempt to get in touch with the
Kraft behind the forms.
Retrogardism Swedish style
The Swedish book, Om Retrogardism (On Retrogardism), was published in

1 995. One essay is written by Clemens Altgard and the other by Hakan
Sandell. Both of them are rather young poets, and the former at least calls
himself a 'leftist'.
,
Clemens Altgard's essay 'Back to the Future 3 is fascinating and opens
new horizons, but at the same time gives a clear, indicative demonstration
of retrogardism's deeply problematic character. What is meant by 'retro
gardism'? Altgard defines it in the following way:
3 As is well known, this is the title of a popular film trilogy in which people, with the aid of
a time machine, travel back and forth in time. In this way the purported cyclical element of
time is shown. Precisely this cyclical element is extremely important for retrogardism and, as I
will argue later, also for Zivilizationskritik.
1 28 RADICAL CONSERVATISM AN D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
Retrogardism is certainly related to post-modernism but seeks to reinstate the

lost connection or context and resurrect old language systems. Based solely on
this understanding one could conclude that it is purely conservative, but this is
not entirely true as it is an evidently syncratic phenomenon and can even take
extreme cultural radical forms. (Altgard and Sandell, 1 995: 1 8)
Retrogardism wants to incorporate history in an integral and unifying

manner, instead of disregarding aspects of it. Laibach and the other
Siovenian retrogardists want to unify Siovenian history which, to a great
extent, is imprinted by having been a part of the Hapsburg Empire (and
occupied by the Nazis) as well as having been a part of Yugoslavia. 4
Consolidating and compiling history in this way is aimed at re-discovering
an identity which has been weakened by both modernism and post
modernism.
Altgard hopes to plant this orientation in Swedish, or more precisely
Scanian (Scania being the southernmost province conquered from Denmark
in the seventeenth century), soil. In many respects the project he outlines is
admirable and important. He wants to re-conquer the use of old Norse
mysticism from the extreme right. It is only extreme cosmopolitans who
dare propose that the nation and cultural identity can and should, in its
entirety, be erased. 5
But this project contains elements that I find far more problematic. The
role of the retrogard poet, according to Altgard, should be to keep
Mnemosyne alive - the memory, the recollection of 'an earlier unconveyed,
unrecognized existence' ( 1 995: 1 2) for revivification. This situation is
strongly related to place, and in no small way is about finding 'home' . To
me, this resonates strongly of Heidegger's Sein (which ties into my other
ideal types) and in the manner in which Gerd Bergfelth uses the term
Heimat (which I discuss in the construction of my third ideal type).
I get another minor rush of disquiet when Altgard begins to pursue
purely alchemistic reasoning, touching also on other occult traditions. As I
see it, the primary and legitimate point of occultism is to experience it, not
to write about it. It should not be recreated through poetry or science, as
this is to simplify life.
Altgard is infatuated by the Norwegian author Stein Mehren. Mehren
strongly emphasizes the importance of myths. They can 'recreate an
experience of original unity' ( 1 995: 26). This may sound psychoanalytic,
but Altgard and Mehren are in pursuit of something entirely different - the
loss is compared to Atlantis, childhood, the original. Yet again Heidegger
resonates in the text.
4 As Altgiird writes, 'included are also the expressions which the Nazis under occupation
forced on Slovenia' (1995: 1 6).
5 One such extreme cosmopolitan is Ian Chambers (1 994). Chambers believes that most of
our time's greatest problems have their root in the derivation of identity from specific
geographical locations. The evil is, in his own words, 'symbolically rooted cultural practices
and their reproduction' (see above, Chapter 5).
N EW POLITICAL CONSTELLATIONS? 1 29
Later, Altgfud refers to Mehren's distinction between 'earth time' and

'sun time'. If I understand Mehren correctly, he is negative towards sun
time, the myth that leads to individualism, cosmopolitanism and root
lessness. Earth time is the myth that turns its attention to our historical
inheritance, our dreams' collectivism, the Middle Ages and the importance
of the situation. 6
While Altgard appears to be conscious of the problems of retrogardism,
and often is ironic, Hakan Sandell, in his essay 'Vid den blaa blixten, vid
den grona lind' [At the blue lightning, at the green line] comes across as
deeply serious. 'Modernism now lies dead', Sandell writes (Altgard and
Sandell, 1 995: 47). He seems quite pleased that this is the case. As evidence
of his assertion, he states that 'place', a taboo subject during modernism,
is now being thematized in poetry. As I noted above, even Altg,hd is
obsessed by place, as that is where one can find and develop roots. Post
modernism is not to Altgard's liking. It feels 'worn out', like the literature
of the 1 980s which was so often infused with the ambitions of postmodern
ism. According to Sandell, these authors and poets are 'overly intellectual,
they are afraid of the spoken language and their stories are scent- and
colorless' (Altgard and Sandell, 1 995: 50). Sandell turns therefore to the
Russian author Viktor Chlebnikov. Chlebnikov has often been described as
a 'futurist', but Sandell believes that it is more correct to see him as a
'primitivist'. He turns to the rural, the 'peasant' and the despised dialects
and proletarian jargon to find inspiration. His works are infused with
these types of spoken language. He is also interested in paganism and
shamanism.
Chlebnikov emerges as perhaps the most important master for Sandell.
Sandell loves the common, low, spoken language, the type of language
which modernity and modernism wish to eradicate. The common spoken
language offers the poet the possibility to not 'miss the seventh moment of
creation where all roads are open' ( 1 995: 64). Once again, I think of
Heidegger.
Sandell also has a burning interest in different heathen and occult
tendencies and movements. He is well versed in alchemy, and part of
the pre-nordic cultural heritage he (and Altgard) wish to reawaken is the
Runes and their supposed secrets. The old Rune stones were thought by
those who erected them to create a magical contact to the unspoken world
of things. 7 From this point it is not far to an Adamistic view of language,
that is to say the view that in the language which Adam and Eve used
6 Here I am struck by the similarity between Mehren's conceptual dichotomy and those
which the German philosopher and graphologist Ludwig Klages presents in his book Der
Geist als Widersacher der Seele (1 969). Some of Klage's dichotomies are dream/awake, picture/
concept, spirit/soul. The terms to the left in the dichotomies are those which Klage promotes,
those to the right he despises.
7 See Andersson (1 994) and Goodrick-Clarke ( 1992) who describe many interesting links
between occultists, among them persons interested in runes, and influential circles in Hitler's
Nazi party.
1 30 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
before The Fall there is a direct connection and correspondence between

word and thing, being, deed. One of the most ardent proponents of this
view of language was Walter Benjamin:
The translation of the language of things to human language is not just a

translation from the silent to the audible, but a translation from the nameless to
the named . . . . This translation's objectivity is guaranteed in the meantime by
God as God has made the thing, the created word in them are derived from the
unknown name, as God also in the end named everything after he created it.
(Benjamin, 1 980: l S I )
A different example o f the Adamistic view o f language is given b y the

American author Paul Auster in his novel, City of Glass ( 1 990), where an
old man, by collecting insignificant things like patches, scraps, broken
umbrellas, etc., believes that he can give things their 'original' name.
But let us return to Sandell's essay. It is not only the mysteries of the
Runes, but also Celtic mysticism and Tarrot cards which purportedly bear
'contents that to a great degree have been forgotten' ( 1 995: 68). An
important trait of retrogardism is the saving of what is believed to be our
cultural heritage. What rubs me the wrong way is this constant flirting with
occult traditions, a point to which I have already alluded earlier.
Altgard's concern with tradition has a common nexus with the 'civiliza
tion critical' 'Integral Traditionalists' (first and foremost Julius Evola and
Rene Guenon). They wish to return to 'tradition', which Nasr8 describes in
the following way:
In its more universal sense tradition can be considered to include the principles
which bind humanity to Heaven, and therefore religion, while from another
point of view, religion can be considered in its essential sense as those principles
which are revealed by heaven and which bind humanity to its Origin. In this case,
tradition can be considered in a more restricted sense as the application of these
principles. (Nasr, 1 98 1 : 68)
'Traditionalists' wish to re-enchant the now all too disenchanted world.

More myths, more magic, more original, more authentic. Put concisely, less
modernity and enlightenment.
Zivilisationskritik
The Italian philosopher Julius Evola and the French author Rene Guenon
are often named in the same breath as representatives of Integral Tradi
tionalism. Quite correctly, there are notable similarities between them.
8 Seyyed Hossein Nasr was born in Tehran and is currently professor of Islamic Studies at
George Washington University in Washington DC. He is probably the leading repository of
the Traditionalist ideas' heritage today. Nasr is given a thorough and excellent introduction
and interpretation in Stenberg ( 1996), who also says that 'Nasr says that Evola collaborated
with Guenon and wrote works in a similar spirit' ( 1 996: 1 07, footnote 60).
Despite the fact that both have very interesting biographical histories, I will
concentrate on their writings. 9
Evola's innumerable articles and books comprise an unusual hodge
podge of racism, aristocratism, anti-Semitism, anti-modernism and Hindu
mythology. He was not only a philosopher and author but also an artist
who was among the first Italian Dadaists, a translator (of some of the
works of Ernst Junger, among others) and an alchemist. 1O
Baron Evola was an aristocrat in both the literal and poetic meaning of
the term. He strongly despised the modern world, democracy and bour
geois culture, seeing this as leading to the Fall, where the true and eternal
spiritual disappears. His aim was to live through the inevitable apocalypse
in order to return to the era of Gold and the Sun where archaic com
munities will live with the gods and the Eternal. He saw himself as a
servant, as a kshatrya (warrior), that is, a person who is both prepared for
this age and also strong enough to survive the Fall. Evola ( 1 993) felt that
modern humanity was all too fixated on earth, Mother Earth. Man, and
Man for Evola is a man, as anti-feminism is a central aspect of his thought,
should turn his sights towards the sun, that which lies in the centre and
gives us life and power. Man did this in the Golden Age. Here Evola
follows Hindu mythology which sees history as an eternal cycle containing
four eras, in which the Golden Age (Krya yuga) is the best. We currently
live in the darkest and lowest period Kali yuga. This is the era of the
pariah, characterized by secularism, dependent and feminine individuals.
But in the twilight, the apocalypse, the smoke of Ragnar, the return to the
Golden Age is promised. An important sign of the current era's decadence
is that people think that the 'soul' should have something to do with the
'spirit'. The soul lulls us, while the spirit can awaken us. As is evident, anti-
9 I will, though, give some brief biographical details. Julius Evola lived from 1 898 to 1 974.
He became disabled and wheelchair-bound after an air raid on Vienna in 1 945. His contact
with fascists and Nazis was copious; among other things, he wrote the preface to the Italian
translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. His relationship with Mussolini was rather
ambivalent, but Mussolini was deeply impressed by Evola's work. Mussolini especially
admired Evola's 'spiritual racism' as a counterweight to the Nazi biological racism (Sheehan,
1 98 1 : 50). During the Third Reich he often resided and worked in Germany and was
frequently published in Nazi journals and magazines. He often lectured to circles within the
Waffen-SS which had occult interests. It would, though, be all too simplistic to dismiss him as
a 'fascist'. More accurately, he was an uncomfortable thinker for most people.
Rene Guenon was born in France in 1 886 and died in Cairo in 195 1 , where he resided from
1 930. He converted to Islam early on and was initiated, probably by Ivan Agueli, into the
mystic tradition of Sufism. He is now regarded as one of France's foremost authors, and as far
as I know, has never been accused of being a fascist. No, he, like Evola, was first and foremost
a Traditionalist, and the book title that is most telling about his writing is La crise du monde
moderne ( 1 927). Victor Nguyen's article (1 984), which places Guenon in the context of
France's 'counter revolutionaries', should also be mentioned.
10 Umberto Eco's novel Foucault's Pendulum ( 1989) is of great interest in this context. Eco
is quite versed in Evola's thought and the novel can be seen as a simultaneous criticism and
demonstration of Evola's writing. I wish to thank Henning Eichberg for making me aware of
this.
1 32 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E F UTU RE OF POLITICS
modernism is an important theme in Evola, and it is not for nothing that

his primary work is entitled Rivolte Contro II Mondo Moderno ( 1 993).
Much racism and anti-Semitism is found in Evola's work. Hansen' s
(1991) attempt t o rescue him from these accusations is not entirely con
vincing. Most important, though, is that readers of Evola can scarcely
interpret it as anything else. In spite of these peculiarities, Evola is far from
forgotten. In Italy he is still diligently read, in Russia he has, as we have
seen, influenced Aleksandr Dugin, in Germany his greatest admirer is
Karlheinz WeiBmann. WeiBmann admires Evola's consistent anti-femin
ism. Evola ( 1 962) has, among other things, discussed the possibility of a
'spiritual manliness', and in various religions sought after myths that break
with the feminine earth-boundedness and orient themselves towards the
sun. Possibly the most famous disciple of Evola is Alain de Benoist, who
today is ambivalent towards Evola, but appreciates his critique of parlia
mentary democracy (de Benoist, 1 994: 203).
Rene Guenon is often named in the same breath as Evola because they
are counted among the great Traditionalists. In Guenon, one finds nothing
that smacks of either racism or fascism. Let me further elaborate on the
concept of 'Tradition'. Here I cite Kurt Almqvist ( 1 977: 14), who is
probably Sweden's foremost authority on Guenon and has published the
collection I tjiinst nos det Enda [In the Service of the Only].
'Tradition' to Guenon is a whole humanity in time and space awash in a stream
of Light which has its God-given source in the Original Situation itself, in the
Garden of Eden, or the initial moment in time, the 'hyperborealic' Golden era . . . .
Tradition' is the totality of all the streams of light from the central or polar
Original situation (the 'hyperborealic' culture was, according to tradition moved
to the North Pole) streaming out to the far reaches of the world, and there this
flood becomes the artery network which throughout all time has radiated godly
Life to all cultures. I I
Guenon's Traditionalism, just like that o f Evola, is grounded in an anti

modernism and it is striking that they independently developed almost
identical ideas: the idea that 'spirit' is something entirely different from
'soul' (in this is implied a strong criticism of psychoanalysis), their critiques
of individualism, and their diagnoses of the contemporary era as Kali
Yuga.
The Romanian-American historian of religion, Mircea Eliade, is also of
interest in this context. In his important study The Myth of the Eternal
Return, he argues that human history can be described as the journey from
an archaic community, where humans and their actions only are mean
ingful if they can be seen as manifestations of mythical archetypes, to
I I Even Evola ( 1 993: 229ff.) discussed the hyperborealic Point of Origin and the North
Pole. He built his arguments on Guenon, Indian, Celtic and Scandinavian mythology.
Originally, according to Greek mythology, the hyperborealians were 'a legendary people who
lived in the far North and enjoyed long and happy lives and worshipped Apollo' (Svensk
Uppslagsbok).
modernity. On this journey we pass monotheism, where humanity is placed

in an historical epoch where it can create something new. Subsequently we
enter modernity which is characterized by contingency and linear models of
progress. The elaboration which Eliade gives of the archaic community fits
quite well with the ideas of Guenon and Evola. Eliade's book is not a
contribution to a philosophical debate, but rather a remarkable work in the
history of religion. I do think I see where his sympathies lie when I read the
final sentence in the book: 'In this respect, Christianity incontestably
proves to be the religion of "fallen man": and this to the extent to which
modern man is irremediably identified with history and progress, and to
which history and progress are a fall, both implying the final abandonment
of the paradise of archetypes and repetition' (Eliade, 1 974: 1 62). This can
perhaps most easily be read as an anti-modernism, even if this detracts a
number of Eliade's sophisticated points. He knows that we can never
return to that which is lost, but the lost archaic paradise still exists, and
can be recreated by regression backwards due to the circularity of time.
This is a point in common with our retrogardists. They also see time as
cyclical. In the booklet which accompanies Laibach's CD Kapital, there
appears a short text entitled 'Time'. An extract of this text reads as follows:
Time is like a circle which is endlessly described: The declining arc is the past, the
inclining arc is the future. . . . You cannot reverse time with a sound signal. The
past presents its future, it advances in a straight line - yet, like a serpent
swallowing its own tail, it ends by coming full circle.
What is important is the taming of 'the terror of history' which is that we

only see the future and our own lonely decay. Here retrogardism and
Traditionalism go hand in hand - as Nasr (1 979: 33) says, 'history consists
,
of cycles of decay and rejuvenation . 12
Some of Eliade's autobiographical reports support my p r opo sition that a
political-philosophical project lies at the base of his impressive masterpiece.
He was well aware of both Evola 1 3 and Guenon (Cave, 1 993). He agreed
with their diagnosis of the ailing Western countries, but was more hopeful
than the other two. He believed that it was entirely possible to recreate the
lost circumstances described in the myth of creation. He also met Carl
Schmitt a few times, and they read each other's books. Furthermore,
Eliade was a great admirer of Martin Heidegger and became a good friend
of Ernst Junger. During the 1 960s, they both edited the German magazine
Antaios. 14 The purpose of this cross-identification is not to pass judgement
12 This is close to Spengler's ( 1996) view of human history and Mohler's definition of the
leitmotif of the conservative revolution.
13 Eliade met Evola twice, once in 1937 and again in 1 950 (Eliade, 1988: 1 52f.).
14 Junger ( 1 995: 220) states that Eliade wrote his letter to him in 1952 and that prior to
this, Carl Schmitt had recommended Eliade's journal Zalmoxis to him (see Eliade, 1 988: 8ff.).
Antaios, Zeitschrift fur eine Freie Welt published six issues per year from 1959 to 1979 and in
addition to the editors, among the most diligent co-workers were Junger's younger brother
Friedrich Georg and Julius Evola.
1 34 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATISM A N D THE FUTURE OF POLITICS
via 'guilt by association', but rather to substantiate the likelihood that

there was a degree of kinship among these people. Some can be associated
with fascism, others cannot.
On to Martin Heidegger. His Zivilisationskritik is far more complex and
well known than that of the others. Back to Being, to something more
authentic which can only be seen in poetry, art, the experience of nature;
this is what is popularly taken to be the central aspect of Heidegger's
philosophy. Many, for example Bourdieu ( 1 991), Wolin ( 1 993) and Farias
( 1 990), already in Sein und Zeit ( 1 972) saw a Nazi manifesto. I believe,
especially after reading Rudiger Safranski's ( 1 994) biography of
Heidegger, that this is equally as reductionist as seeing all of Evola's
writings as fascist pamphlets. For Heidegger, as I mentioned above, 'the
moment' and 'destiny' became decisive in his writing from 1 930 onwards.
What is essential is to seize the possibilities that occasionally emerge. It is
that one can break with the 'terror of history'. According to Safranski,
Heidegger saw in National Socialism not only a political position but also
a metaphysical development of Being itself. The year 1 933 was all about
seizing the fantastic moment, where the whole of the German population
and nation were a 'Dasein'. Historic decisiveness was the order of the day,
something that encompasses an entire Yolk, not just the search for
individual authenticity (which can be seen as the message in Sein und
Zeit).
Another important aspect of Heidegger's philosophy is his love for
avalent verbs (see Chapter 6, note 8). His first avalent construction,
according to Safranski ( 1 994), was 'Es weltet' , 'it worlds' ! Better known
are his later constructions, 'Es nichtet' and 'Es gibt Sein'. In this fasci
nation lies a desire to go beyond conscious philosophy in order to present
what is prior to or beyond the conscious. If this form of poetry or
philosophy is transferred to the realm of politics it becomes dangerous, as
responsibility, consequences, rationality, compromise and norms become
secondary to politics being able to bring about 'miracles' and resist
'forgetting being' .
'Decisiveness' in the 'decisive moment', breaking with historical memory,
is not too distant from the Ragnarok and apocalypse in Evola and Guenon,
or the 'magic zero-point' in the young Ernst Junger. That which unites all
of the Zivilisationskritiker I have discussed is their strong anti-modernism
which forms a hypothetical link to retrogardism, even though the latter
does not have an expressed apocalyptic vision. Even though they appear
to share a common mentality, I believe there is a discernibly clear differ
ence between Heidegger on the one hand and Eliade and Guenon on the
other. While Heidegger never gave up his militant radical conservatism,
Eliade and Guenon represented a more humble Zivilisationskritik. Eliade's
thoughts have, among other things, been compared to a 'new humanism'
(Cave, 1 993) and they were more hopeful about the prospects for 're
enchanting' the world than Heidegger was. Evola and Junger could be said
to stand somewhere in between these two poles.
Another interesting development is the very great interest in radical

Islam (fundamentalism) for Heidegger's thinking, which might result in
new forms of radical conservatism.
Radical conservatism
For many reasons (which will be elaborated on later) the German 'meta
physician', author and translator of Baudrillard, Gerd Bergfleth, is of
interest in this context. In his essay 'Heimat und Erde' ( 1 994), he develops
figures of thought which fit in quite well with Heidegger's Sein and Evola's
and Guenon's mythical 'Place of Origin' and 'Original Being'.
The essay begins with a quote from Carl Schmitt, the message of which
is that human thought must once again be based on its earthbound Dasein.
That is, back to earth, back to 'place'. To Bergfleth, Heimat, the home, is
most comparable to childhood, that which for us adults is situated in the
past, but is lost and remains an enigma. I elect to overlook a great deal of
the nearly right-wing extremist meanderings to be found here and to
concentrate on his more philosophic reasoning. Like Carl Schmitt ( 1 98 1 ),
Bergfleth believes that there is a pervasive contempt for the earth today.
This is due to the fact that capitalistic naval powers (Britain and the USA)
seek to force all countries to be capitalistic and liberal. He sees one of the
causes of this to be Calvinism, which preaches that surplus capital must
continuously be reinvested in production instead of being consumed for the
glory of the old gods, as was the case earlier in history. 1 5 To turn our gaze
again towards earth, Bergfleth wants to make current again an inflam
matory term in German, Heimat. He declares this to be an Original
German word and posits that behind the Heimat that in happy times we
can experience, lies an Original-Heimat - comparable to hyperborealism in
Evola and Guenon and Being in Heidegger. Just as with Heidegger, the
lover of avalent verbs (see above), Bergfleth wants nothing more than to
catch a glimpse of the Original, that which just 'is', independent of our
subjectivity and our consciousness.
To Bergfleth, what matters is regaining contact with the metaphysical
Heimat, something that he believes residents of Northern Europe should
find easier than those who live further south. The metaphor for
'Northerner's' privileged closeness to the undisturbed forest is Oden (or
'Wotan'), the wanderer. This myth also popped up in a flood of books
which, during the 1 980s, tried to pinpoint 'Sweden', its spirit, its mystery,
its mentality. If I remember correctly, among others an historian of ideas
speculated that 'Swedishness' resided in the deepest recesses of a pine
forest.
Bergfleth is not any clearer in this essay, but we get the impression of the
directions in which he looks for solutions. Klaus Vondung ( 1 988) has
pointed out how strongly influenced Bergfleth is by French postmodernism.
1 5 This idea he most likely derived from Georges Bataille, on whom he wrote two books.
1 36 RAD I CAL CON S E RVATI SM A N D THE FUTU RE OF POLITI CS
Bergfieth sharpens the postmodern critique of the dictatorship of

rationality and its apocalyptic image to a 'principle of absolute evil' .
This can, though, b e turned t o something good, back t o innocence, t o the
Original Situation, cleanliness and care for the Earth and nature. Dreams,
madness and the erotic can then be returned to their rightful status.
Bergfieth's writings do not exclusively comprise romantic infatuation
with different forms of the Original. He even points out the enemy.
Previously I have named naval powers, capitalism, liberalism and
Calvinism. When it comes to Germany's destiny, he adds Jews to the list
of enemies. As Aschheim ( 1 994: 306) rightly points out, Bergfieth believes
that it was the fault of the Jewish intellectuals who returned from abroad
that phenomena foreign to Germany (such as liberalism) were imported
into and became dominant in (West) Germany.
The pagan has already appeared in a number of contexts so far. It is
quite correct that many radical-conservative intellectuals are strongly
,
critical of Judeo-Christian civilization. Instead, they look 'eastwards 1 6 , or
to the 'Germanic', and even to the 'Aryan', that is, Iran. A clear enemy is
Calvinism, which is associated with the Anglo-American civilization.
Catholicism is situated in a sort of middle position, as remnants of pagan
mysticism are to be found in it. Let me elaborate on this theme.
As I already stated, there was a certain connection between National
Socialism, especially in the Waffen-SS, and occultism. But if we turn our
attention to the situation today, there are more sophisticated constella
tions. Alain de Benoist ( 1 982, 1 983) has argued for a 'new paganism', in
particular the Scandinavian iEsir cult.
Another name that crops up again is that of Alexander Dugin ( 1 992)
who finds in the works of Carl Gustav Jung, Eliade and Guenon the seeds
of a Russian new paganism which turns to the Russian people's own
unconscious archetypes, wherein lies the possibility to re-establish contact
with their 'roots' and their origin.
* * *
Eventual connections or similarities visible here should be understood in

such a manner that a retrogard poet could well be a fascist, an anti-fascist
or a social democrat. However, I would like to go so far as to state that a
retrogardist aesthetic sense can make a person more receptive to radical
conservative ideas, and that the form of Zivilisationskritik that I have
discussed can play a facilitating role here.
The three ideal types show, by definition (they form different discourses
and contexts), noteworthy differences. In substance, we even find contrasts
between Earth celebrators like Mehren and Bergfieth and Sun celebrators
like Evola.
16 The studies of the historian of religion, Georges Dumezil, have influenced many radical
conservatives.
Similarities are found, above all, when it comes to a fundamental orien

tation: longing for the Eternal, the lost, the forgotten Origin, and often in
tragic and dogmatic seriousness. Herein lies a form of concretism: that our
existence and thought should be tied to a place and in radical conservatism.
This place is the Volk's territory. Our 'roots' are of great importance; they
tie us to concrete places. A common enemy is modernity, at least in the
existing form known to us with its linear conception of time and orien
tation towards 'progress'. 1 7
What, then, is the antidote for misery? Where do we find the Eternal,
the true Origin? 1 8 The metaphors are many: gold, the original home, the
source, the sun, the Earth, the revelation. For these metaphors to be
powerful, they must be linked to myths about our origin, and it is striking
how often the old belief in the cult of .tEsin recurs. Longing for the
authentic can also be understood as a fight against ambivalence. Bauman
(1991) has pointed out that modernity can be understood, among other
ways, as a fight for singularity and uniformity - one begins to search for
the answer to the question of what is 'Man', 'the Child', etc. (Hu1tqvist,
1 990). The normalizing search for uniformity is accomplished partially by
leaving something outside, excluded, on a type of slag-heap of modernity.
In this context one could understand postmodernism as an attempt at de
singularization, pluralizing. This can in turn strengthen the ambivalence
which modernity created in its normalizing ambition and the contingency
that both modernity and post-modernity create. One response can be a
longing for the Eternal. To use a more traditional sociological language,
one could speak of role-differentiation. In the Middle Ages (which some
radical conservatives speak of as the Golden Age) people were so rooted in
their own ground that a concept like 'role' could barely be understood:
In such a society identities are easily recognizable, objectively and subjectively.
Everybody knows who everybody is and who he is himself. A knight is a knight
and a peasant is a peasant, to others as well as to themselves. There is, therefore,
no problem of identity. (Berger and Luckmann, 1 975: 1 84)
As both retrogardism and radical conservatism are articulations of moods,

experiences, etc., or more precisely 'the spirit of the times', we are touched
by different trends, sometimes attracted and sometimes repelled.
Nationalism and socialism
Nationalism and socialism seem to appear often, not as a contradictory

conjunction, but as a pair that go well with each other. Because of the
17 It is interesting to note that Mohler ( 1989), in his book on 'the conservative revolution'
argues, that its central idea was a cyclical, nonlinear conception of time (see above, Chapter
2).
18 Cf. Chapter 6 above, on how US right-wing groups now want to create the myth of
origin - the Anglo-American Republic.
1 38 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D TH E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
horrors of German 'national socialism', this conjunction often causes

alarm. One recent example is when the Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell
described the early Labour-oriented Zionism as exactly 'national socialism'
(Rosenberg, 1 996: 1 20f.). 19 The socialism of the early Zionists went hand in
hand with traditional European nationalist ideas on ethnic and cultural
homogeneity. A secular project - socialism - was married with the
romantic notion of a correspondence between ethnicity, religion and state
which was taken for granted. Only in the back-mirror of summary of the
past is this a very problematic constellation.
With the new interpretation of German national socialism, the
Holocaust and European history we can once again meet this constellation
in a new light. Of course, I am not speaking of revisionism, denial of the
Holocaust, etc., but of new works by Zygmunt Bauman ( 1 989) and others
that have managed to see Hitler's 'national socialism' as something more
comprehensive than as simply the arrival of Evil or Anti-Christ.
Thus, nationalism and socialism have often met each other, and it is a
good guess that they will continue to do this. Let me give some probable
examples.
As I discussed above, the 'internationalism' of the Soviet Union also
contained large elements of nationalism, especially during the Stalin era.
China understands itself as 'socialist' but the cultural vacuum after
Maoism can very well be replaced by a strong nationalism, perhaps even
with strong ethnic undertones. Milosovic's mini-Yugoslavia has combined
old-style communist politics with aggressive Serbian nationalism. The
Vietnamese form of socialism also contains large doses of nationalism, for
example, the last programme shown on the only television channel is the
national hymn. 2o This list could be even longer. In short, the collapse of
the Soviet empire has led to an enormous revival of old-style nationalism,
and we know the often horrifying results.
Another new constellation can be found among the ecologists. The
Green parties in Europe often call for a 'third way' that is located 'beyond
left and right'. There are also some real 'Ecofascists', for example, in
Finland. Even if they are not the dominant faction in the multi-faceted
Green movement, they represent a real problem that can be seen here:
Nature possesses the highest value of all, and in order to save it, it would
probably be a good idea to have dictatorship that guarantees the ongoing
care of Nature.
Many people associate Green issues with 'leftist' attitudes. Historically,
this is incorrect. Environmentalism is an old conservative issue, and the
ecologists in the fascist and nazi movements and regimes were not without
influence. One interesting name here is Rudolf Bahro, the author of Die
A lternative ( 1 977), and perhaps the best known dissident in East Germany
1 9 Sternhell's text is, as far as I know, only published in Hebrew, therefore I have to trust
Rosenberg's summary of his text.
20 At least this was the case in the early 1990s.
(from where he was expelled), and one of the founders of the Green Party
in Germany. It is not incorrect to label him as an ecofascist: in an interview
from 1 990 he said that: 'Deep down in the soul of the people there is a cry
for a green Hitler' (Geden, 1 996: 23). Today, he has moved towards the
PDS, the heir to the old Communist Party (SED) in East Germany. He
argues that communism and ecology are 'identical' in their origin and
goals, and in their anti-Western attitude (Geden, 1 996: 23). Perhaps he is
right.
Another reason for increasing nationalism in Europe is the EU project.
Many people, from all over the classical political spectrum, have fears of
this project. The resistance is a mix of xenophobia ('hordes of Germans
will buy our beautiful country'), 'socialism' ('we cannot control our own
welfare state system'), and old-fashioned nationalism ('the EU is a threat
to the Nordic Volksgemeinschajt,21 ).
Another new political constellation, not identical with the ones
mentioned so far, is what Walter Laqueur (1 996) calls 'political religion'.
This receives nurture from the Sinnkrise, the crisis of Meaning, in the
world. The examples are many: Islamic fundamentalist regimes in Iran and
in Sudan, the anti-Western armed opposition in Algeria, the Christian
Fundamentalists in the USA, the Hindu fundamentalist movement in
India, and the role of the Orthodox church in the Serbian Republic in
Bosnia. Here, the church represents the real interests of the Bosnian Serbs.
Milosovic is regarded as a traitor, and the church talks of Saint Karadzic.
The monasteries and the churches are full of former soldiers, serving both
God and Saint Karadzic.22
However, the prospects for democracy as we know it are not too bad.
There seems to be an irreversibility in the process of democratization. The
number of countries moving from dictatorship to democracy clearly
outnumber countries which have moved in the opposite direction. But we
know nothing about the future, and, for example, Huntington's ( 1 996)
warnings of how 'multiculturalism' weakens the Western alliance should be
taken seriously; that is, democratic values are not only ideology or utopia,
but also institutions, and these institutions are, in the long run, guaranteed
only if the geopolitical agents are ready and willing to defend them.
2 1 See footnote 9 in Chapter 6 above.

22 New York Times, 14 March 1997.
PART III
CONCLUSIONS
8
RADICAL CONSERVATISM, THE

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND
For the purpose of summarizing my investigation, let me once again return

to the Mannheim-inspired analysis of radical conservatism:
All human knowledge has a conjunctive aspect. No communication,

except for digitalized communication of numbers in business and other
related forms of action, is pure 'communication', that is abstract
symbols totally void of meaning and not relevant to human life and
action. Scientism in the social sciences is an example of how knowledge
with both conjunctive and communicative aspects, and everything
between these poles, wants to create an image of pure communication.
Even if few still believe in this, it is very common to underestimate the
conjunctive aspect. Here is a vacuum in belief and knowledge that can
be filled with different options: New Age, other forms of religiosity, etc.,
and in politics radical conservatism. On the other hand, radical conser
vatism over-emphasizes the conjunctive aspect and hereby neglects the
possibility of understanding and co-operation across 'cultural' borders.
'Will' and not only 'interest' form the political global outlook: if there
were only interests in human affairs, everything would be pretty
predictable, everyone would act according to what serves the individual
or group; also, it would be almost impossible to judge which group,
with its explicit interests, would be most rational - in Marxism the
proletariat, in liberalism the enlightened citizen, rationally considering
options and opinions. But if we recognize 'will', we see that all political
ideologies and utopias are 'honest', everyone wants a world in which
she or he can feel at home. Of course, 'will' may at first sight seem
irrational, and to some extent it is, but it must be considered when the
classical sociological models of explanation of social and political
behaviour are not able to explain new patterns any more. While we can
wait for differentiations of 'will', we have to use it as a metaphor for
partly rational behaviour that cannot yet, and perhaps never can be
conceptualized, that is, 'rationalized'.
All political ideologies are also utopias: even the anti-utopian form of
conservatism has, as we have seen, a utopia, a contra-factual vision of
what society could be like.
1 44 RADICAL CONSE RVATISM AN D THE FUTU RE OF POLITICS
We can learn things from the objects we study. In the case of radical
conservatism I have agreed that it has some insights: the unavoidable
issues of decisionism, myth and the irrational, and the reality of geo
politics. Even if these issues are treated to an extent in other political
ideologies, they are either condemned or under-emphasized.
Is there, then, a future of politics, something other than violent radical

conservatism and dull liberalism? What is left of ideological, utopian
politics today? Is politics, except for a small number of more or less social
liberal alternatives, dead today? A German journalist recently wrote: 'In a
situation when reformism is dead the only possible form for a systematic
anti-capitalism is the volkisch one' (Elsasser, 1996: 19). He means that
there is not much left of the Left. I think that he is right. I think that the
Left is split in two parts. The first group has become pragmatic social
liberals, who want to keep at least some justice when the welfare state is
cut down. The other group remains radical, but only in the private sphere,
consisting of fundamentalists who want to totalize their values. Due to the
individualization of the Leninist-totalitarian impulse they have moved
to the private sphere or to their community where they preach anti
commercialism, moralism, etc. Many of them have become attracted by
communitarianism. If they still want mobilization on a collective level,
radical conservatism has an option, not totally unlike communism. In
some countries we in fact have some leftist parties often with a populist,
nationalist or volkisch profile - Viinsterpartiet (The Left Party) in Sweden,
PDS in Germany, Socialistisk Folkeparti (The Socialist Yolk Party) in
Denmark. Possibly, one could see a third grouping in journals like New
Left Review. These are concerned with a renewal of the left, defending
values like freedom, democracy and equality, and still have many readers.
But I fear that this attempt towards a 'third left' is not viable.
However, to view radical conservatism as the only form for true political
thinking would not be correct. The leitmotif of radical conservatism is anti
liberalism, and this means being critical of parliamentary democracy,
universal rights and ideas, Western 'civilization', mixing cultures and the
primacy of economics. Instead, it wants to restore national 'Culture' and
'essence', and put politics at the centre of the nation. Politics, according to
radical conservatism, means the ability to distinguish between 'friend' and
'enemy' - concepts, like so many others, fetched from Carl Schmitt. The
basic attitude for radical conservatism intellectuals is, I think, an experi
ence of the nihilism of the modern age, a feeling of lack of strength and the
lack of willingness to make the correct and strong decisions.
This is interesting, not at least because Mannheim himself identified
fascism as one of the five basic political orientations in modern society. As
we saw earlier, he was not totally against fascism as political thinking, since
it recognized the power of the myth, and Mannheim also recognized
Schmitt as an important thinker. But as a human and a political being he
was totally against it, and one of the reasons for his project in Ideologie und
TH E SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1 45
Utopie (1 985) was to make a synthesis possible which could save the
democratic republic. Anyway, what I want to make clear here is that
the sociology of knowledge, as I interpret it, has critical potentials in this
context. The guiding idea for radical conservatism is the centrality of
politics since liberalism, being the political arm of capitalism, means the
hegemony of purely economic individualism. Here we can raise two main
objections. Not only fascism, but also liberalism and socialism, are differ
ent forms of true political thinking since they relate the questions of what
has yet become and what might be becoming. Thus, political thinking has to
be connected to an open dialogue. This open dialogue is not, as radical
conservatism thinks, an act of avoiding decisions, but the art of securing
rational and non-barbaric decisions. Furthermore, since all knowledge
presupposes understanding, a denial of the open dialogue betrays this basic
human condition. It is the contribution by a conservative philosopher -
Gadamer - that has made us conscious of this: that when we understand
something we must already have understood it as something before, we
must have a hint what to expect.
Radical conservatism can also be criticized from the viewpoint of a
formal theory of sociability and also sociology in general. 1 This theory
makes clear that human beings are not only economic beings - as in neo
liberalism and in economic thought - or political beings, which is the
standpoint of radical conservatism. No, the individual is also a social
being, and a denial of this is both a self-contradiction and an invitation to
terrorism. To put it very succinctly, sociability is triadic: it is a relation
between at least three persons, while the dyadic relation is pre-social, a
mirroring relation between two people. This is indeed an argument against
all forms of cultural relativism and Sonderweg-thinking: social exchange
and interaction is always 'more' than pure conjunction, the almost private
interaction between two people. As soon as there is a triad, communication
is there.
If we consider the sociologists linked in one way or another with radical
conservatism, we see that Arnold Gehlen and technocratic conservatism
look strong when confronted with, for example, Theodor Adorno's
extremely strong messianic utopianism (see p. 71). But when confronted
with less extreme forms of social and political thought it is a different
matter. Since we live in a (post)modern society, existing institutions are not
always per se the perfect answer to processes of conflict, mediation of
actions, etc. Sometimes, for example, new social movements can make
people aware of the need for changing or even abolishing institutions, not
as an effect of a plan of divine historical Reason, but as a simple empirical
handling of concrete matters.
Sociologists like Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels, with their theses
on myths and elites, highlight the dark side of society, and this is a
I See Dahl ( 1 997) for a proposal for 'a formal theory of sociability'.
1 46 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM A N D T H E FUTU RE OF POLITICS
strength. However, it can serve ideological reasons, as legitimation for

social irrationality and dictatorship.
There are a number of conditions promoting an eventual success of
radical conservatism - above all nationalism, and the interplay of nation
alism in different countries. The process of the globalization of capitalism
and culture is in fact often a 'threat' to local culture, heritage, and the
'roots'. A small but interesting illustration of 'McWorld' is the inter
nationalization of ice-cream: in almost every country a Magnum is a
Magnum, a Cornetto a Cornetto, etc. Some, the global people, symbol
analysts and others, find it convenient; some, those with a mostly 'local'
attitude, find it depressing. Why can we no longer find the kind of ice
cream we bought when we were young?
Other important factors are the accelerating mass unemployment,
especially in Europe; the Politikerverdrossenheit, the political fatigue
promoting rightist populism, and the often mentioned 'crisis of liberalism'.
* * *
What I have done in this book is to show that a conceptual construction,

'radical conservatism', hopefully gives us a richer understanding of the
often confusing political reality. My point is not that a conservative
revolution will shake the world. Rather, demonstrating connections
between an intellectual constellation, the new right and empirical tenden
cies, has hopefully given us a better understanding of the political options
all over the world today. History, and therefore also politics, has not
reached its end. We are in the middle of a global transitional stage where
options polarize each other and where the National question takes a central
role. This can be done in many ways:
Ethnic metaphysics can be an answer to narcissism and nihilism, where

a myth of origin leads to exclusive ethnicity. The 'roots' or the 'collec
tive unconscious' becomes a vOikisch archetype.
2 Many dream of a nation that is easier to control. It can be caused by a
wish to keep the welfare state, disregarding the internalization of
capital, or by the continuation of a totalitarian-communist impulse to
repress the opposition.
3 The myth of the nation can be the best forum and means of controlling
economic development (China, Vietnam).
4 Nationalism can also grow because of a new class-based reaction: those
who are against 'Big Business' and against the new class of 'symbol
analytics' .
Regardless what the reason is, the result is the same - international
competition and conflict, where the national myth can be the most effective
means of promoting the national case. Thus, in the end, Carl Schmitt's
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 1 47
dream of the rebirth of politics, as he defines it, has come true. In the worst
case, Jihad, molecular war and Balkanization will be the dominant reality.
Of course, I cannot give any prescriptions on how to 'cure' conditions
favouring radical conservatism. But at least I think I can give a hint in such
a direction by using an example. The example again deals with the infernal
dialectic between 'racism' and 'anti-racism', a central political question of
our times.
The institutionalized anti-racism is a part of a great narrative which
nowadays has to respond to the problem of self-legitimation. This narra
tive is the one of the welfare state as the incarnation of the liberal ideas of
the Enlightenment and the idea of natural rights. The problems of legiti
mating these ideas was most openly shown in the Weimar Republic. The
problem can be stated very succinctly: the Right, the True, the Good, etc.
need more than to be declared as rational. Their rationality has to be
demonstrated and realized. In the context of racism, for example, we not
only need the anti-racist discourse, or abstract solidarity, we also need to
develop an extended 'we-feeling' (Rorty, 1 989). Here we have to make a
choice between two politically opposed ways of understanding and
defending solidarity: either the neo-conservative way of arguing that solid
arity and we-feeling can be reached only at the very concrete, interpersonal
level, the family being the prototype here; or the 'leftist' alternative which,
although recognizing the value of the distinctions produced in conser
vatism, wants to keep the idea of a generalized 'we' as an argument for
winning discussions which are not limited by the mechanisms dictated by
the market or the administrative context. I believe in this latter alternative
since the horizons of the family or the market are too limited to make
knowledge of a modern differentiated society possible. The 'we' is some
thing between atomized individuals or households and the abstract con
ceptions of 'humanity', 'state' or 'society'.
We can also place this problem within what I have called the hermen
eutic spiral. Racism can point to the ideological aspects of anti-racism as
being an expression of the colonization of the life-world. Anti-racism can
clarify the ideological aspects of racism as an expression of irrational fear
and its homologies with fascism. If racism and anti-racism are regarded as
a relation instead of 'standpoints' a spiral might appear which shows the
limitations of both positions.
We have another, similar problem today - the chances for universalism,
here understood as the recognition of the rights of every human being and
the idea of a global community where everyone can be integrated without
violating others' rights. This is not a new dream or utopia. Kant was one
of the pioneers in raising the question. Then came Hegel, a man with more
empirical sense than Kant, and problematized Kant's visions (Turner,
1 990). And so the story has continued - every attempt to formulate a
universalism has been deconstructed since particularity is extremely hard to
avoid. The best example is probably the attempts that go all the way back
to the Middle Ages and forwards to formulate the idea of 'Europe' as a
1 48 RAD I CAL CONSERVATISM AN D THE F U T U R E OF POLITI CS
universal community. As Derrida ( 1 989) has shown, even modern thinkers

like Edmund Husserl and Paul Celan did not succeed in avoiding the
danger of 'euro-centrism'. Apart from Derrida, such a critique of euro
centrism has been taken up by many minority groups, for example in
the USA. For instance, ethnic groups, gays and lesbians have criticized the
'WASP' -hegemony for excluding minority writers from courses at the uni
versities. But they have had to pay a high price - the consequence of their
critique is an extreme form of cultural relativism where all criteria of
judging are bound to each separate community.
Thus, the complex universalismfparticularism or cultural relativism
seems to be an infernal dialectic without any possible synthesis. However,
if it is understood as a hermeneutic spiral, it might become possible to
solve. Every form of universalism must be anchored somewhere, in a
particular place - something that Hegel understood. Thus, an empty
universalism is not possible. On the other hand, cultural relativism in the
end means war, and if we do not want to kill each other we must accept at
least one universal rule - 'Thou shall not kill'. It is possible, therefore, that
particular places become more and more like each other and, thus, we
might move towards a universalism where 'politics' become 'synthesized',
dealing with both local and global issues.
I would describe myself as a 'synthesizing liberal', inspired by Mann
heim's ambition to show that we can never live in either a pure conjunctive
culture or in a communicative civilization. We have to stay within this
modern tension and make the best of it.
Let us finally again turn to the present situation and different diagnoses
of it. During the last five years several works on the present situation have
been written. Two of the most widely read books predict totally opposite
scenarios. On the one hand, Francis Fukuyama (1 992) wrote about The
End of History, the victory of liberal democracy. Thus, the buying and
selling in an increasingly global market will go on forever. Hans-Magnus
Enzensberger ( 1 993), on the other hand, wrote a totally different story
about the end of history - the eternal violence on the streets, the
'molecular' civil war.
Thus, we should have to choose between the depersonalized rules and
mechanisms of the market or the violence in the streets. But some argue
that there could be a third way (sid). Both Jeremy Rifkin ( 1 995) and
Benjamin Barber (1 995) have argued for the necessity of a third alternative.
Barber has the clearest argument when he calls for the necessity of a
rational political discourse.
According to radical conservatism, liberalism (parliamentary democracy,
human rights) is no more than an expression of capitalism, with its indi
vidualism and negative freedom (Fromm, 1 94 1 ). Thus, there are only two
alternatives: radical conservatism or McWorld, Kultur or Zivilisation.
There is a problem with a third way - liberal democracy and capitalism are
'cousins'! However, they are not 'brothers' or 'sisters'. As Rueschemeyer et
al. ( 1 992) have shown, the historical connection between democracy and
TH E SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLE D G E 1 49
social agents is that it has mainly been the working-class struggle for rights
and democracy that has led to real parliamentary democracy.
If there can be a third way, guaranteeing the future of politics, we must
prove that there exists a form of human action that is neither work
(performed in the transactions of the market) nor violence (performed by
individuals, groups or nations and states when they are threatened).
Habermas's ( 1 98 1 ) conceptions of 'interaction' and 'communicative action'
are attempts to do exactly this, and my own arguments on sociability (see
Dahl, 1 997) come very near. This third form cannot be fully expressed in
homogenized acclamation of the decisions of the leader(s), or in class
determinated, interest-based communities, or in individualist calculation.
The third form, let us call it 'discourse', must be based on a development of
rational, public life based not on interest created in the market place, nor
on the arena where the gladiators meet and where the strongest and most
decisive wins. The third form can be seen as the democratic utopia, the
type of democracy not fully realized yet. Thurow ( 1 996: 242) has talked
about the antagonism between the principles of the market and democracy.
The former obeys the principle of the 'survival of the fittest', while the
latter rests on the principle of 'one man, one vote'. However, today it
seems as if it is the market that governs the political. An important issue
therefore is the question of how to include the economy in a democratic
institution.
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I NDEX
action, 29, 3 1 , 32, 5 1 , 67, 68, 73, 1 1 5, 1 1 8, application, 1 6, 31, 1 30

1 32, 143, 149 Der A rbeiter, 46, 48, 1 27
actuality, 42 Aristotle, 1 7
administered society, 31 Aryan Nations, 1 14
administrative-conservative, 33 Aschheim, Steven, 55, 65, 1 36
Adorno, Theodor W., 3 1 , 38, 7 1 , 79, 1 00, 145 Asia, 10, 92, 108, 1 19
aestheticism, 48 Assheuer, Thomas, 57
aesthetics, 82, 1 16, 1 26, 1 27 Atlantic Ocean-society, 9
Albania, 1 atomism, 67, 87
alchemy, 1 29 Ausnahmezustand, 57
alienation, 42, 7 1 , 72, 100 Auster, Paul, 1 30
allied scheme of history, 9, 1 0 Austria, 7, 44, 68, 1 04-6
Altgard, Clemens, 1 27-30 authenticity, 20, 35, 40, 109, 1 34
AnschlufJ, 105 authoritarian conservatism, 42
anti-abortionism, 1 1 3 authority, 2, 56, 57, 72, 75, 97, 1 1 9, 1 27,
anti-Americanism, 8, 10, 87, 95, 108, I l l , 1 2 1
anti-bourgeoise, 1 00, 1 22 Ba'th Party, 1 1 8
anti-Britain, 87 Bach, I.S., 76
anti-capitalism, 49 bad conscience, 66
Anti-Christ, 10, 87, 1 38 Baeumler, Alfred, 55
anti-colonial, 88, 90, 94 Bahro, Rudolf, 1 38
anti-democracy, 72 Barber, Benjamin, 54, 89, 148
anti-economism, 8, 53, 84, 86, 100, 1 0 1 , 104 Bartok, Bela, 43
anti-fascism, 9 Baudrillard, lean, 1 35
anti-federalism, 1 0 Bauman, Zygmunt, 90, 1 1 7, 1 37, 1 38
anti-feminism, 8, 45, 103, 1 1 3, 1 3 1 , 1 32 Beck, Ulrich, 64, 69
anti-intellectual, 29, 67 Benjamin, Walter, 47, 70, 1 30
anti-liberalism, 3, 1 2, 28, 32, 36, 38, 48, 49, de Benoist, Alain, 6, 67, 75, 77, 88, 104, 106,
53, 57-9, 70, 99, 104, 1 1 5, 144 107, 109, 1 1 3, 1 2 1 , 1 32, 136
anti-materialism, 53 Berger, Peter, 1 37
anti-modernism, 22, 23, 36, 5 1 , 52, 9 1 , 1 18, Bergfleth, Gerd, 1 28, 1 35, 1 36
1 3 1-4 Bergson, Henri, 84
anti-nationalism, 55 Betz, Hans-Georg, 105
anti-racism, 1 17, 1 22, 147 The Bible, 77
anti-reflexivism, 67 Bilderberg Club, 1 1 2
anti-reflexivity, 63, 64, 93, 95, 1 14, 1 2 1 Bildungskultur, 22, 23, 30, 94
anti-republicanism, 1 1 5 von Bismarck, Otto, 42
anti-semitism, 77, 105, 1 07, 108, 1 1 3, 1 14, Black Power, 1 1 5
1 3 1 , 1 32 blacks, 70
Anti-Slavic, 105 Blair, Tony, 7
anti-UN, 10 Bloch, Ernst, 1 00
anti-universalism, 3, 53 Bloom, Allan, 1 1 5
anti-West, 3, 8, 10, 44, 48, 53, 108, I l l , 1 2 1 , Bliiher, Hans, 45
1 39 Bosnia, 97, 1 1 0, 1 39
Antonio, Robert, 55, 65 Bourdieu, Pierre, 54, 68, 69, 1 34
apartheid, 88 Brandt, Willy, 101
Apollonian, 66 Brecht, Bertold, 8
1 62 I N DEX
Breuer, Stefan, 46, 47, 48 conservative historicism, 28, 29

Brimelow, Peter, 1 1 3 conservative revolution, 5, 6, 8, 9, 1 2, 1 5, 34,
Britain, 44, 49, 74, 87 98, 1 35 36, 40-2, 45-9, 53-6, 63, 73, 95, 96, 99,
Broch, Hermann, 45 1 04, 106, 108, 1 1 3, 146
van den Bruck, Arthur Moeller, 9, 46, 48, 55 consumerism, 84, 1 1 3, 1 14, 120, 1 2 1
Bubik, Roland, 76 corporatism, 8 5
Buchanan, Pat, 6, 1 1 3, 1 14, 1 22 Cortes, Juan Donoso, 42, 8 1
Bucharin, Nikolaj, 9 cosmology, 57
bureaucratic conservatism, 28 cosmopolitanism, 84, 1 29
Burnham, James, 73, 1 06 critical theory, 1 6, 27, 38, 39
cultural hegemony, 67, 1 10
Calvinism, 1 35, 1 36 cultural pessimism, 5 I , 103
Canada, 1 1 7 cultural relativism, 70, 74, 89, 97, 1 1 1 , 1 1 5,
capitalism, 2, 7, 8, 1 2, 42-4, 46, 48, 49, 53, 55, 145, 148
68, 84, 87, 89, 95, 100, 1 09, 1 1 8, 1 20-3, culturalism, 69, 85, 88, 102, 1 20
126, 1 36, 144-6, 1 48 culturalization, 80
Catholicism, 77, 8 1 , 103, 107, 1 36 culture, 8, 1 9, 22, 23, 30, 36, 39, 40, 46, 52,
Ce1an, Paul, 148 67, 68, 69, 70, 7 1 , 74, 75, 76, 89, 90, 92,
Chambers, Ian, 92 97, 99, 1 00, 107, 109, 1 10, I I I , 1 1 5, 1 23,
charisma, 5, 82, 105 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 44, 146, 148
chi1iasm, 32, 56
China, 10, 68, 92, 98, 1 1 9, 120, 1 2 1 , 138, 146 Dahl, Goran, 27, 47, 1 14
Chlebnikov, Viktor, 1 29 Dahl, Hans Fredrik, 1 0
Christian Coalition, 1 1 3 Darwin, Charles, 6
Christianity, 56, 86, 98, 1 1 1 , 133 Das Man, 25
Christiansen, Flemming, 1 20, 1 2 1 Davies, Norman, 9
Cioran, E.M., 4 Deat, Marcel, 1 06
Civil Rights movement, 1 1 5 decisionism, 38, 56, 58, 89, 144
civilization, 3, 9, 1 9, 22, 30, 36, 48, 5 1 , 57, 67, decisiveness, 58, 1 34
70, 77, 8 1 , 89, 96, 97, 98, 100, 109, 1 10, deconstructionism, 1 1 5
1 12, 1 19, 1 30, 1 36, 144, 148 deed, 29, 38, 49, 58, 73, 1 27, 1 30,
class society, 68, 85 delayed reaction, 63
class struggle, 21, 28, 33, 149 democracy, 1 , 3, 7, 1 2, 43, 46, 55, 68, 72, 74,
CNN, 88 83, 86, 87, 89, 9 1 , 95, 96, 97, 99, 1 00,
Codreanu, Corneliu Ze1ea, 5 102, 104, 106, 1 10, I I I , 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 3 1 ,
collective unconscious, 64, 92, 146 1 32, 1 39, 144, 148, 149
communication, communicative cu1ture/ Demos, 90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 94, 1 1 8
knowledgelthinking, 19-23, 30, 34, 3 1 , Derrida, Jacques, 22, 94, 1 1 5, 1 48
36, 38, 40, 76, 80, 90, 9 1 , 94, 1 22, 143, 145 Descartes, Rene, 17, 20, 2 1
communism, 7, 28, 29, 89, 97, 1 08, 1 1 8 Diederichs, Eugen, 44
communist parties, 1 , 1 20 Dionysian, 65, 66
communists, 87, 107 Disney, 88, 1 07
Communist Manifesto, 1 1 9 documentary meaning, 1 9
communitarianism, 75-7, 1 0 1 , I l l , 1 1 3, 144 dominant classes, 32
community, 3, 4, 2 1 , 22, 36, 39, 44, 47, 52, 57, Dostoyevsky, Fjodor, 34, 39, 42, 43, 54, 55,
74-8, 87, 90, 9 1 , 93, 96, 98, 99, 103, 1 04, 73, 81, 87, 108
1 08, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 1 20, 122, 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 44, Dresden, 9
147, 149 dual nature of knowledge, 20, 2 1 , 24, 35, 1 22,
competition, 2 1 , 24, 25, 28, 35, 39, 69, 92, 146 Dugin, Alexander, 64, 1 08, 1 1 0, I l l , 1 32, 1 36
Comte, Auguste, 25 Dupeux, Louis, 5 1 , 87
conjunction, conjunctive culture/knowledge/ Durkheim, Emile, 77
thinking, 1 9-23, 30, 3 1 , 36, 38, 40, 52, Dyer, Joel, 1 23
90, 9 1 , 94, 99, 107, I l l , 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 37,
143, 145, 148 ecologists, 1 38
conservatism/conservatives/conservative economism, 3, 8, 53, 67, 84, 87, 100, 1 04
parties, 1 -6, 1 5- 1 7, 2 1 -3, 28, 29, 32, 33, Ehnmark, Anders, 76
36, 38, 40, 4 1 , 44, 49, 5 1 -3, 75, 8 1 , 86, Eichberg, Henning, 1 19
97, 1 05-7, 1 1 3 Elementy, 108
I N DEX 1 63
Eliade, Mircea, 78, 1 32, 1 33, 1 34, 1 36 Foucault, Michel, 1 1 5

elite, 7, 29, 56, 72, 145 foundationa1ism, 70
Elsasser, Jurgen, 144 FPO, 7, 68, 104, 1 05
enemy, 2, 9, 36, 46, 74, 75, 77, 8 1 , 82, 83, 87, France, 1 0, 1 5, 17, 42, 44, 63, 67, 90, 106,
88, 89, 9 1 , 1 02, 1 09, 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 16, 1 2 1 , 107, 1 2 1
1 36, 137, 144 Frantz, Constantin, 44
Engdahl, Per, 85 freedom, 1 7, 34, 4 1 , 42, 43, 56, 57, 65, 69, 7 1 ,
Engels, Friedrich, 100 72, 73, 75, 76, 86, 96, 104, 144, 148
England, 42 free-floating intellectuals, 25
Engqvist, Agneta, 1 20, 1 2 1 Freemasons, 49, 88, 98
Enlightenment, 16, 1 7, 18, 20, 2 8 , 4 5 , 122, Freikorps-literature, 45
1 30, 147 French revolution, 6, 16, 41, 5 1
Entschlossenheit, 58 Freyer, Hans, 46, 48, 7 1 , 72, 73, 99, 1 19
environmentalism, 8, 138 Friedman, Edward, 120, 121
Enzensberger, Hans-Magnus, 148 friend, 22, 25, 45, 47, 55, 73, 74, 8 1 , 82, 83,
epistemology, 24, 26, 34, 38, 70 85, 1 10, 1 1 1 , 1 33, 144
Erfahrung, 37 Fromm, Erich, 76, 148
erkliiren, 21 Front National, 17, 106
Erlander, Tage, 85 Fryklund, Bjorn, 122
Erlebnis, 37, 68 Fukuyama, 1, 68, 73, 148
Erlebnisgesellschaft, 68 fundamentalism, 75, 1 3 5
Ernst, Paul, 43 Forster-Nietzsche, Elisabeth, 5 5
Eros, 45
eternal Return, 47 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1 8, 22, 29, 30, 3 1 , 32,
ethical socialism, 84 39, 122, 145
ethnification, 80 Garvey, Marcus, 1 13
ethnocentrism, 93 de Gaulle, Charles, 1 1 0
ethnopluralism, 68 Gay, Peter, 45
Ethnos, 52, 64, 70, 89, 90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 94, 95, gays, 70, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 148
99, 105, 108, I l l , 1 12, 1 13, 1 14, 1 1 8 GOR, 8, 101, 105, 108
Etzioni, Amitai, 1 1 3 Gebhard, Petra, 108
eurocentrism, 93, 1 1 5, 148 Geden, Oliver, 1 39
Europe, 7, 9, 1 1 , 44, 55, 67, 69, 70, 76, 88, 92, Gehlen, Oliver, 7 1 , 72, 79, 100, 145
95, 96, 98, 105, 108, 109, 1 10, 1 1 2, 1 1 5, Geist, 33, 43
1 16, 1 17, 1 18, 1 19, 1 26, 127, 135, 1 38, Gemeinschaft, 20, 22, 23, 48, 58
139, 146, 147 generation, 2 1 , 25, 27, 34, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43,
European Union, 105, 107 45, 47, 52, 54, 55, 57, 85, 99, 100, 1 0 1 ,
evaluation, 26, 3 1 , 34, 39 104, 1 07
Evola, Julius, 45, 68, 98, 103, 1 10, 1 1 1 , 1 30, Gentile, Emilio, 3, 84
1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 34, 1 35, 1 36 geopolitics, 48, 57, 74, 95-8, 108, l l l , 1 2 1 ,
existence, 1 6, 23, 25, 33, 37, 4 1 , 57, 69, 72, 77, 1 39, 144
78, 80, 8 1 , 97, 108, 1 1 8, 1 28, 1 37 George, Stefan, 43
existentialism, 58, 82, German conservatism, 12, 1 5, 40
extreme Right, 7 German nation, 44, 105, 138
Germany, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 34, 42, 43, 44,
Fanon, Frantz, 88 45, 46, 49, 53, 54, 55, 63, 85, 87, 89, 92,
Farakhan, Louis, 1 1 3 96, 98, 99, 100, 1 0 1 , 102, 103, 1 05, 108,
Farias, Victor, 1 34 1 2 1 , 132, 136, 138, 144
fascism, 3, 4, 1 1 , 28, 29, 38, 40, 49, 54, 58, 73, Gesellschaft, 20, 23
84, 86, 95, 1 0 1 , 107, 1 1 8, 1 32, 134, 144, Gestalt, 19, 30, 82
147 Giddens, Anthony, 64
FOP, 101 Gingrich, Newt, 1 13
feminism, 8, 102, 103, 1 1 3, 1 3 1 , 1 32 Girard, Rene, 77
Figes, Orlando, 107 globalization, 53
finance capital, 49 Die Glocke, 44
Finland, 9 1 , 105, 138 Gluck, Mary, 37, 42
Fish, Stanley, 1 16 God, 1 1 , 4 1 , 44, 45, 53, 74, 75, 77, 78, 8 1 , 89,
Fleissner, Herbert, 103 97, 1 30, 1 32, 1 39
1 64 I N DEX
von Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, 54, 84 incongruity, 32

Gollnisch, Bruno, 107 India, 9 1 , 92, 1 19, 1 39
Gramsci, Antonio, 67 individualism, 43, 67
Gregor, James A., 54, 1 14 individualization, 63, 69
Griffin , Roger, 3 inner Englishmen, 45
GrojJraum, 74, 98, 109, 1 10 institutions, S, 1 5, 53, 64, 65, 7 1 , 72, 97, 120,
Guenon, Rene, 98, 1 30, 1 32, 1 33, 1 34, 1 35, 1 39, 145
1 36 Integral Traditionalism, 98, 127, 1 30
intellectualism, 28, 29, 3 1 , 66, 67
Habermas, Jurgen, 39, 40, 79, 149 intellectualization, 67
Haider, Jorg, 68, 1 04, 105, 107 intellectuals, 1 1 , 1 5, 25, 30, 34, 36, 42, 43, 44,
Hansen, T.H., 1 32 49, 72, 93, 99, 100, 103, 104, 108, 1 1 6,
Hansson, Per Albin, 85 1 1 8, 1 36, 144
Hegel, G.W.F., 1 9, 33, 38, 42, 48, 147, 148 interest, 20, 2 1 , 24, 25, 28, 29, 34-6, 122, 143
Heidegger, Martin, 4, 22, 25, 5 1 , 54, 56, 57, internationalism, 6, 87, 105, 107, 1 38
58, 64, 78, 99, 100, 103, 128, 1 29, 1 33, Internet, I I , 90, 92, 1 1 0
1 34, 1 3 5 intuition, 29
Heidegren, Carl-Heidegren, 47, 73 Iraq, 75, 90, 1 10, 1 1 3, 1 1 8
Heimat, 103 irrationalism, 1 6, 28-30, 37, 4 1 , 79
Hekman, Susan, 39 Islam, 10, 98, 1 1 8, 1 35, 1 39
Herder, Johann Gottfried, 1 19 Islamism, 1 1 3
Herf, Jeffrey, 108 Israel, 6, 7, 98, 1 38
hermeneutics, I I , 16, 18, 25, 27, 32, 36, 39, Italy, 3, 6-8, IS, 49, 1 32
82, 1 1 7, 147, 148
Herrera, R.A., 42
Jesus Christ, 56
Herzinger, Richard, 8, 77
Jewish, 48, 100, 1 0 1 , 1 12, 1 1 4, 1 36
Hispanics, 70, 1 1 3, l i S
Jews, 7, 49, 74, 87, 88, 92, 98, 107, 1 09, 1 10,
historicism, 18, 20, 28, 29
1 12- 14, 1 36
history, I , 1 6, 2 1 , 26, 32-4, 47, 53, 80, 8 1 , 92,
Jihad, 54, 89, 90, 147
96, 146, 1 48
Jugendbewegung, 48
Hitler, Adolf, 4, 5, 9, 42, 54, 55, 58, 64, 84,
Jung, Carl Gustav, 92, 1 10, 1 36
1 10, 1 38, 1 39
Jung, Edgar Julius, 46
Hobbes, Thomas, 73, 103
Jung, Thomas, 72
von Hoffmansthal, Hugo, 45
Holocaust, 1 38 Junge Freiheit, 104, 1 25
homogenization, 3 1 , 54, 67 Junger, Ernst, 4, 46-9, 5 1 , 54-6, 58, 73, 99,
Horkheimer, Max, 39 103, 127, 1 3 1 , 133, 1 34
Hultqvist, Kenneth, 1 37 Junger, Friedrich Georg, 47
Hungary, 7
Huntington, Samuel, 97, 98, 1 39 Kaltenbrunner, Gerd-Klaus, 75
Husserl, Edmund, 148 Kant, Immanuel, 1 8 , 33, 78, 1 47
hyper-reflexivity, 63, 78, 93 Karadi, Eva, 37, 42
Karleby, Nils, 85
IBM, 88 Kazakstan, 108, 109
identity politics, 70, 80, 89, 93, 1 1 5- 1 7, 1 25 Kellogg Pact, 88
Ideologie und Utopie, 22, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 37 Kierkegaard, Soren, 43, 57, 58
ideologies, I , 2, 1 6, 2 1 , 23, 26, 29, 32, 34, 39, Kimball, Roger, l i S, 1 16
40, 97, 143 Kjellen, Rudolf, 43, 86
ideology, 1 , 9, 12, 1 6, 17, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, Klages, Ludwig, 65, 67
30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 4 1 , 46, 47, 56, Kleinau, Wilhelm, 49
86, 90, 95, 96, 97, 99, 108, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 1 16, von Klemperer, Klemens, 4 1 -4
1 2 1 , 1 39 Koran, 1 19
Illuminati, 88 Kosovo, 9 1
IMF, 88, 1 15 Kraft, 5 1 , 1 27
immigrants, 7, 8, 92, 95, 106, 1 1 3, 122 Kristol, Irving, 1 13
immigration, 7, 1 7, 69, 92, 105, 106, 1 1 2, 1 1 8, von Krockow, Christian Graf, 56, 58
122 Ku Klux Klan, 1 14
imperialism, 98, 1 10 Kultur, 8, 19, 20, 23, 3 1 , 44, 48, 67, 89, 92, 1 48
I N D EX 1 65
Lacan, Jacques, 39, 75 Maoism, 84, 120, 138

de Lagarde, Paul, 9, 43, 44 Marcus, Jonathan, 10, 106, 107
Laibach, 1 25-8, 1 33 Marx, Karl, 17, 18, 29, 33, 34, 48, 100,
Lang, Carl, 107 Marxism, 1 7, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 39, 44, 45, 67,
language, 32, 35, 70, 75, 84, 88, 99, 1 07, 120, 70, 82, 84, 107, 108, 143
128, 129, 1 30, 1 3 7 Marxism-Leninism, 108
Laqueur, Walter, 7, I I , 1 05, 1 07, l i 8, 1 39 Maschke, Gunther, 75, 88, 104
Lasch, Christopher, 72, 76, l i 3 masculine values, 45
Lash, Scott, 64 masculinity, 40, 45, 96
Lask, Emil, 43 mass culture, 88
Laycock, David, l i7, 1 1 8 materialism, 42, 55, 67, 87, 1 14, 121
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 10, 1 7, 1 06 May, Rollo, 68, 78, 1 10, 126
Lebed, Alexander, I I I Mead, George Herbert, 63
Lebensphilosophie, 1 8, 37 Megret, Bruno, 107
left, 6-10, 17, 39, 43, 46, 47, 49, 67, 84, 88, Mehren, Stein, 128, 136
95, 99, 1 0 1 , 102, 104, 1 07, l i 5, 126, 1 3 8, Meinecke, Friedrich, 43
144, memory, 66, 77, 128, 1 34
leftist, 27, 49, 93, 100, 1 1 3, 125, 127, 1 38, 144, Messiah, 32, 36, 47
147 metaphysics, 1 1 , 22, 103, 146
leftists, 54, 76, 84, 90, 94, 107, 1 16, 123 meta-political, 47, 63
Leijonhufvud, Goran, 1 20, 1 2 1 Meyer, Eduard, 46
Leitfigur, 47 Michels, Robert, 106, 145
Leninist socialism, 86, 120
Mickey Mouse, 89, 107
Lenk, Kurt, 45, 5 1 , 103
middle-extremism, 103, 106
Lensch, Paul, 44
militarism, 45
lesbians, 70, 1 1 5, 148
Milosevic, Siobodan, 1 38, 1 39
liberai/liberalslliberalism, 1 -3, 7, 10-12, 1 6,
minorities, 69, 70, 74, 94, 1 15, 1 17, 120
1 7, 23, 28-30, 32, 33, 36, 40-6, 48, 49,
Mithander, Conny, 1 1 , 86
52, 57, 59, 65, 67, 76, 77, 8 1 -3, 88-93,
modernism, 8, 36, 70, 78, 100, 103, 128, 129,
95, 97, 99-1 02, 104, 1 05, 107, 109, I l l ,
1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 34, 1 35, 1 37
l i 3, 122, 1 23, 127, 1 35, 1 36, 143-8
modernist conservatives, 86
Libya, l i8, l i9
modernist conservatism, 23
Lichtblau, Klaus, 72
modernists, 48, 70, 75, 1 1 8
Life, 8, 37, 4 1 , 47, 54, 55, 79, 132
life-philosophy, 8 modernity, 1 8 , 38, 5 1 , 53, 58, 63, 64, 67, 77,
life-world, 20, 79, 147 78, 79, 9 1 , 100, 1 1 6, 1 18, l i9, 129, 1 30,
Limonov, Eduard, l iO 1 33, 137
Lindbom, Tage, 4 1 , 44, 86 modernization, 4, 12, 40, 52, 91
Lindstrom, Rickard, 85 modernizing, 46, 92
linguistic turn, 39 Mohler, Armin, 43, 46, 47, 48, 104
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1 12 moment, 2, 4, 6, 17, 29, 47, 57, 58, 64, 89,
local community, 1 03 129, 1 32, 1 34
logocentrism, 93 moral, 6, 7, 53, 65, 66, 79, 97, 1 16, 1 18, 144
Luckmann, Thomas, 137 morality, 7, 33, 82
Luhmann, 79 Mora/itiit, 33
Lukacs, Georg, 25, 42 Mosse, 43, 45
Luther, Martin, 54 MTV, 88, 89
Muller, Jerry Z., 9, 15, 53, 71
McDaniel, Tim, 108 multiculturalism, 63, 69, 88, 102
MacDonalds, 88, 89 Multiculturalists, 10
MacIntosh, 88, 89 Muslim, 98, 108, l iO, l i 8, 120
McWorld, 89, 90, 146, 148 Mussolini, Benito, 38
de Maistre, Joseph, 41 Mut, 102
Malcolm X, l i4 Muller, Heiner, 8, 108
de Man, Hendrik, 84-6, 1 06 mysticism, 42, 1 28, 1 30, 1 36
Mann, Thomas, 43-5, 47, 54 myth, 27, 29, 38, 42, 46, 67, 74, 77, 78, 84, 85,
Mannheim, Karl, 10, 12, 1 5-34, 36-43, 52, 86, 90, 91, 96, 1 14, 1 19, 1 2 1 , 128, 1 30,
56, 86, 9 1 , 94, 1 2 1 , 123, 143, 144, 148 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 3 5, 1 37, 144, 145, 146
1 66 I NDEX
Nagel, 4 5 parliamentarism, 28
nation, 2, 3, 10, 44, 49, 64, 74-6, 84, 87, 88, parliamentary democracy, 3, 1 2, 46, 74, 87,
90-2, 94, 96, 97, 1 00, 1 0 1 , 104, 105, 1 12, 9 1 , 97, 102, 1 04, 1 32, 144, 1 48, 149
1 14, 1 1 8, 1 19, 128, 146, 149 Perrot, Ross, 1 1 3
Nation of Islam, 1 1 3 perspectivism, 27, 65
National Bolsheviks/national bolshevism, 4, Persson, Hans-Ake, 105
64, 87, 108, 1 10 Petersen, Lars Axel, 42
national community, 3, 4 Peterson, Thomas, 1 22
national rebirth, 3, 56, 63 Peukert, Detlev, 46
national socialism/national socialists, 4, 45, phronesis, 22, 28, 1 22
46, 49, 57, 58, 85, 86, 99, 1 34, 1 36, 1 38 Pizza Hut, 88, 90
nationalism, 2, 5-7, 10, 44, 45, 49, 63, 67, 84, planned economy, 3, 4, 46, 1 00
85, 87, 95, 96, 104, 105, 107, 108, 1 1 1 , plannism, 84
1 13, 1 14, 120, 1 2 1 , 137-9, 146 Plenge, Johann, 43, 44
NATO, 97, 126 Poland, 6, 9
nazism, 54, 86, 101, 1 14 political education, 3 1
negative dialectics, 79 political existentialism, 75, 127
negative freedom, 76, 148 political knowledge, 3 1
negativity, 36, 38 political theology, 8 1 , 84, 97, 1 1 1 , 1 1 9
neo-conservatism/neo-conservatives, 103, Politikerverdrossenheit, 6, 146
1 1 5, 1 16, 1 1 7, 147 populism, 7, 94, 95, 122, 146
neo-fascist, 8 populist, 7, 1 7, 95, 104, 1 05, 1 07, 1 1 1 , 1 12,
neo-liberalism, 3, 97, 1 13, 145 1 14, 1 17, 122, 144
neo-nazis, 1 14 positive freedom, 76
Nevin, Thomas, 58 positivists, 39, 45
New Age, 143 post-colonial, 88
new right, 5, 63, 67, 99, 103, 104 posthistory, 72
New World Order, 87, 1 1 1 , 1 12 postmodernism, 8, 70, 100, 103, 128, 1 29,
Niekisch, Ernst, 54 1 35, 1 3 7
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 22, 42, 43, 45, 54, 55, poststructuralist, 93
65, 66, 67, 84 poverty, 8, 70, 97
nihilism, 8, 34, 35, 40, 45, 48, 58, 65, 144, 146 power, 24, 29, 54, 67, 92, 97, 1 16
Noll, Richard, 92 pre-cognitive, 2 1 , 64
Nolte, Ernst, 101 prejudice, 1 6, 18, 29, 30, 3 1 , 35, 70, 1 22
Norway, 1 05 pre-modern, 32, 42, 65, 78
nouvelle droite, 1 06, 107 PreuBer, Heinz-Peter, 8
NSDAP, 54, 55 progress, 4, 23, 32, 36, 4 1 , 42, 44, 47, 5 1 , 52,
NSK, 125, 1 26 94, 103, 1 12, 133, 1 37
Prokanov, Alexander, 108
occultism, 1 28, 1 36 proletariat, 25, 29, 48
old right, 63, 67 pro-modernist, 51
ontology, 57 Protestantism, 77, 103
oppressed classes, 32 proto-fascism, 12, 48, 73, 92, 1 1 3, 1 14, 1 26
organic, 2, 16, 17, 1 8, 19, 23, 3 1 , 37, 40, 4 1 , psychiatry, 63, 78
46, 48, 5 3 , 75, 87, 1 14, 127 public opinion, 25
organic community, 57, 74, 80, 87, 96, 97, 98 public sphere, 67, 69, 80
organic construction, 51
organic democracy, 3, 64 al-Qadafi, Muammar Muhammed, 1 1 8, 1 19
organic state, 57 Quebec, 107, 1 1 7, 1 1 8
Orthodox, 98, 108, I I I , 139
racism, 7, 70, 1 14, 1 17, 1 22, 1 3 1 , 1 32, 147
Paetel, Karl 0., 54 radical conservatism, 2-6, 8, 1 0-12, 23, 40,
paganism, 77, 1 07, 121, 129, 136 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 5 1 -7, 59, 63, 67, 68,
Palaver, Wolfgang, 76, 77 70, 7 1 , 73, 75, 76, 78, 8 1 , 86-98, 104-8,
palingenetic ultranationalism, 3 1 10-1 5, 1 1 7- 19, 1 2 1 -3, 125, 127, 1 34,
pan-Germanism, 87, 1 05 137, 143-8
pan-Slavism, 87 radical localism, 1 14
Pareto, Vilfredo, 38, 42, 1 06, 145 radicalism, 4, 8, 9, 58, 86
IN DEX 1 67
Rai, Shirin, 1 0 1 , 120, 1 2 1 Schmitt, CarJ, 4, 28, 37, 47, 48, 54, 56-8,
rationalism, 1 6, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 4 1 , 79, 73-7, 8 1 -3, 88, 96, 98, 99, 103, 106, 109,
91 1 10, 1 1 3, 1 19, 133, 1 35, 144, 146
rationality, 1 8 , 26, 29, 33, 49, 65, 82, 122, 1 34, Schopenhauer, Arthur, 54
1 36, 147 Schroter, Klaus, 54
rationalization, 1 7, 1 9, 30, 5 1 , 53 Schultz, Edmund, 55
Rawls, John, 76 Schulze, Gerhard, 68, 69, 78
reason, 2, 1 6, 1 8, 22, 28, 30, 59, 82, 98, 1 16, Schwilk, Heimo, 99, 1 02
145 Schonhuber, Franz, 8
reflection, 31, 37, 64, 71, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80 science, 4, 1 1 , 18, 1 9, 20, 2 1 , 25, 27, 3 1 , 37,
reflexivity, 63, 64, 65, 67, 7 1 , 72, 74, 75, 76, 4 1 , 42, 55, 66, 7 1 , 95, 1 1 7, 128, 143
78, 79, 84, 93, 95, 1 14, 1 2 1 scientific politics, 27, 28
Reich, Robert 8., 1 0, 93, scientism, 87
reification, 65, 7 1 , 73 second modernity, 79
relationist, 1 7, 26, 53 Seebacher-Brandt, Birgitte, 1 0 1
relativism, 2, 18, 20, 22, 35, 70, 74, 89, 97, Seele, 43, 65
1 1 1, 1 1 5, 1 1 7, 145, 148 Sein und Zeit, 57, 58, 1 34
religion, 2, 3, 6, 77, 82, 84, I I I , 1 19, 1 2 1 , 1 30, Seinsverbundenheit, 23, 36, 40, 90
1 32, 1 38, 1 39 Sennett, Richard, 80
Remnick, David, 1 1 2 separatist, 8, 1 14
Renaissance, 1 7, 98 Serbia, 90, 9 1 , 1 10, 1 38, 1 39
Republican Right, 1 1 3, 1 1 4 SieferJe, Rolf Peter, 44
Republikaner, 8 , 99, 1 03 Simmel, Georg, 42
retrogardism, 125, 1 27, 1 29, 1 30, 1 33, 1 34, Sittlichkeit, 33
1 37 slave morality, 66
revolution, 29, 43, 44, 57, 58, 8 1 , 84, 103, 107, social democracy, 1 7, 68, 85, 93, 97
1 1 6, 1 19, 1 20, Social Democrats, 85, 86
Rifkin, Jeremy, 148 social liberalism, 10, 33, 76, 97, 144
rightlrightist, 3, 6, 1 0, 39, 43, 75, 86, 87, 99, social question, 6
1 0 1 , 103, 104 Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet, 85
Robertson, Pat, 1 1 3 socialism, I , 3, 5, 8, 27, 28, 29, 33, 40, 44, 68,
Romania, I , 4, 5 8 1 , 84, 96, 1 00, 105, 1 06, 1 1 9-21 , 1 37,
romanticism, 20, 28, 30, 3 1 , 41 1 39, 145
rootedness, 28, 32, 66 sociology, I I , 18, 19, 36, 37, 48, 68, 7 1 , 72,
roots, 2, 9, 17, 23, 28, 33, 38, 4 1 , 54, 68, 73, 79, 83
97, 98, 100, 106, 1 14, 1 29, 1 36, 1 37, sociology of knowledge, 10, 1 2, 1 6, 1 7, 24, 25,
146 26, 29, 3 1 , 35, 40, 86, 145
Rorty, Richard, 57, 70, 76, 147 Sombart, Werner, 44
Rosenberg, Arthur, 55 Sonderweg, 55, 102, 105, 108, 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 145
Rosenberg, Goran, 1 38 Sontheimer, Kurt, 49
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 1 19 Sorel, Georges, 38, 42, 84, 106
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, 148 South Africa, 88
Russia, 3, 4, 7-10, 1 5, 45, 53, 55, 64, 88, 96, sovereignity, 82, 87
98, 102, 1 07-9, I I I , 1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 29, 1 32, Soviet system, 46
1 36 Soviet Union, 9, 10, 87, 89, 99, 107, 108, 1 10,
1 14, 1 20, 1 38
sacred, 64, 77, 80, 84, 91 Sozialdemokratur, 93
sacrify, 58, 76, 77 Spengler, Oswald, 1 8, 46, 48, 5 1 , 54, 55, 97
Saddam Hussein, 107, 1 1 0, I I I , 1 1 8 spiritual reawakening, 49
Safranski, Rudiger, 54, 58, 65, 104, 1 34 Stalin, Josef, 84, 1 0 1 , 108, 1 10, 120, 1 38
Sandel, Michael, 1 1 3 Stalinism, 84
Sandell, Hikan, 127, 1 29, 1 30 Stein, Dieter, 104
Sarkowicz, Hans, 57, 103 Stem, Fritz, 45
Sass, Louis A., 78 Sternhell, Zeev, 84, 1 06, 1 38
Schacht, Ulrich, 99, 1 02 Strasser, Gregor, 54
Scheler, Max, 43, 93 Strasser, Otto, 54
Schelsky, Helmut, 7 1 , 72 StrauB, Botho, 4, 77, 99, 1 00, 103, 1 04
schizophrenia, 78 Srauss, Leo, 1 1 3
1 68 I N D EX
strong concepts, 35 Vietnam, 68, 1 1 9, 120, 1 38, 146

structural conservatism, 2, 40, 52, 8 1 Volk, 2, 1 7, 43, 45, 48, 55, 57, 82, 85, 87, 88,
structure, 4 , 12, 26, 37, 41, 42, 49, 52, 53, 76, 90, 92, 96, 1 1 9, 122, 1 34, 1 37, 1 39, 144
85, 103 Volksgeist, 33, 48
Sunday Circle, 37, 42 voluntarism, 5 1 , 85
Superman, 22, 65 Vondung, 135
suspicion, 2 1 , 33, 35, 52, 58 volkisch, 46, 48, 49, 57, 58, 74, 87, 88, 1 1 9,
Sweden, 6, I I, 1 7, 85, 86, 9 1 , 93, 105, 1 06, 1 44, 146
1 1 6, 1 22, 1 25, 127, 1 28, 1 32, 1 35, 144
symbol analytics, 10, 93, 107, 146 Wagner, Richard, 9 1
synthesis, 10, 1 9, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 34, 37, 38, Walzer, Michael, 36
39, 94, 1 19, 145, 148 Wandervogel, 43, 45
Weber, Alfred, 19, 20
Die Tat, 43, 44 Weber, Joachim, 96
technocracy, 34 Weber, Max, 27, 3 1 , 37, 38, 42, 82
technocratic conservatism, 52, 63, 7 1 , 72, 73, Weimar Germany, 4, 5, 34, 53, 89, 108
127, 145 Weimar republic, 27, 37, 39, 40, 46, 49, 56,
technology, 4, 8, 40, 4 1 , 42, 46, 5 1 , 75, 94, 1 1 8 73, 8 1 , 147
Telos, 1 1 3 WeiSmann, Karlheinz, 1 02, 103, 1 04, 1 32
Terkessidis, Mark, 7 1 , 73, 74 welfare state, 1 , 9, 33, 68, 86, 92, 1 23, 144,
theology, 4 1 , 53, 56, 63, 8 1 , 84, 87, 94, 97, 146, 147
1 1 1 , 1 14, 1 19, 1 2 1 Die Welt, 1 8, 19, 20, 25, 27, 30, 43, 67, 101
Theweleit, Klaus, 45 Weltanschauung, 18, 20, 25, 27, 30, 43
Third Reich, 40, 101 Weltzivilisation, 67
third way, 53, 88, 89, 102, 108, 1 1 8 Wieviorka, Michel, 7, 9 1 , 92
Thule-Seminar, 92 Wigforss, Ernst, 85
Thurow, Lester C., 149 Wijkmark, Carl-Henning, 83
Tolstoy, Leo, 42 will, 20, 2 1 , 24, 28, 32, 34, 35, 37, 43, 84, 122,
Toscanians, 7 123, 143,
total mobilization, 73, 127 Wissenssoziologie, 1 5 , 1 6
totalitarianism, I, 38, 54, 1 10 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 39, 78
traditionalism, 10, 17, 52, 1 30, 1 32 Wolfsohn, Michael, 1 0 1
tribalism, 90, 1 1 7 Wolin, Richard, 1 34
Troeltsch, Ernst, 43 women, 70
Triigardh, Lars, 85 Woods, Roger, 43, 45, 49, 54, 55
Turkey, 91 World War I, 9, 41 , 49, 54, 58, 85, 87
Turner, Bryan S., 147 World War II, 86, 87
Tonnies, Ferdinand, 20 world-civilization, 67, 68, 70
Wotan, 135
Ukraine, 9
Ullstein, 101, 103 xenophobia, 7, 75, 1 39
ultra-nationalist, 68
Umland, Andreas, I I I young conservatives, 75, 86, 1 1 5
United Nations, 10, 75, 87, 88, 1 14, 1 2 1 youth movement, 43, 45
universalism, 3, 1 0, 5 3 , 74, 89, 9 1 , 9 3 , 98, 1 07,
1 16, 147, 148 Zarathustra, 22
USA, 3, 63, 88, 90, 98, 102, 1 1 0, I I I , 1 12, Zehrer, Hans, 43
1 1 3, 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 1 7, 1 35, 1 39 Zeskind, Leonard, 1 1 3, 1 14
utopia, 8, 25, 3 1 , 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 7 1 , 72, Zhirinovskij, Vladimir, 1 10, I I I
79, 86, 102, 1 39, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149 Zionism, 1 1 4, 138
Zisek, Slavoj, 1 25
validity, 24, 26, 28, 42 Zitelmann, Rainer, 101, 102, 103, 104
value-conservatism, 2, 40, 49, 52, 8 1 , 1 23 Zivilisation, 8, 19, 20, 23, 3 1 , 44, 89, 1 00, 1 25,
Versailles treaty, 45, 46 1 30, 1 34, 148
verstehen, 21 Zivilisationskritik, 100, 108, 1 34, 1 36
verstehen-sociology, 1 2 Zola, Emile, 54
Vezer, Erzebet, 37, 42 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2

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(Published in Association With Theory, Culture & Society) Goran Dahl-Radical Conservatism and The Future of Politics-SAGE Publications LTD (1999)

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Radical

EDITOR: Mike Featherstone, Nottingham Trent University

SERIES EDITORIAL BOARD

THE TCS CENTRE

Recent volumes include:

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Published in association with Theory, Culture & Society,

First published 1999

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Typeset by Mayhew Typesetting, Rhayader, Powys

PART I 'RADICAL CONSERVATISM' 13

PART II THE WORLD ACCORDING TO RADICAL

6 Fonns of radical conservatism - an attempt at an international

PART III CONCLUSIONS 141

In most countries in the world today, political ideologies seem on the

Table I Differences between liberalism, radical conservatism and

CONSERVATISM LIBERALISM DIMENSIONS

Organic growing Voluntarism Construct Development of

anti-capitalist socialists. For them 'socialism' can have basically two

Group I consists of writers, artists, etc. with little knowledge of politics.

Figure 1 The complex relationship between conservatism, radical

in 1 933 during a long stay in Germany but began to study Buddhism in

Normal politics is understood as small technocratic controversies. This is

Italy, of course, is another good example. Here we have a strong

I I For example, see the Swedish journal Res Publica, 4, 1985.

The heart of the Western civilization lies in the 'Atlantic Ocean-society',

This scheme gradually lost hegemony and finally, in 1 989-90, it broke

dynamics both in theoretical and practical politics. I will primarily focus on

the tradition of verstehen-sociology. We were naIve, since many people

CONSERVATISM AND POLITICS

Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and the logics of

central issue in conservatism from a Mannheimian approach. This also

the centre of history. It was universalist, abstract, intellectualist, pro

Oswald Spengler viewed the 'West' as 'a cult of rationality'. Gadamer

Hence, historicism is understood as modernity's way of understanding,

according to Mannheim there is hope: we see tendencies not only of

The historicist Weltanschauung is inescapable, but here we have an aspira

Conjunctive and communicative knowledge

knowledge',4 which is opposed to 'communicative knowledge' or thinking.

never made explicit by Mannheim. But he comes very close to formulating it

Communicative knowledge Conjunctive knowledge

Two features become obvious in this interpretation: the similarity with

Figure 2 Exposition of Mannheim 's concepts

Another aspect o f this mediation i s the achieved Seinsverbundenheit lO

10 It is tricky to translate this concept into English. Mannheim formulates it in contrast to

Competition and validity

interpretation of existence' (ibid. : 57). Here Heidegger makes an entrance

Ideology and utopia

Just like 'synthesis', Mannheim's experience of cosmopolitan marginality

/ evaluative non-eva I uative

Figure 3 Forms of ideology according to Mannheim

simply perception, but the fundamental structures of thought that are

socialist viewpoint we can discover the ideological elements in non-socialist

Here Mannheim, sounding almost like a Freudo-Marxist, is reusing a

This irrational matter is characterized by struggle, domination and