Supreme Court of the Philippines

504 Phil. 94

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 153667, August 11, 2005
AYALA LAND, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-IMUS, BRANCH 20, ASB
REALTY CORP., AND E. M. RAMOS & SONS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Civil Case No. 931-94 for nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties,
Cancellation of Annotations on Transfer Certificates of Title and Damages was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite City, by ASB Realty
Corporation (ASB) and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) against Ayala
Land, Inc. (ALI), Emerito B. Ramos, Jr., et al.[1]

In its complaint, ASB alleged that on 21 May 1994, EMRASON, a real estate
company which owns real estate properties in Dasmarias, Cavite City, with a
total area of 372 hectares, whose chairman and president is Emerito M. Ramos,
Sr., with his wife, Susana B. Ramos, and children as stockholders, entered into a
Letter-Agreement with ASB for the conditional sale of sixty-five percent (65%)
of the said land for a consideration of P400,000,000.00 payable in five
installments. However, ASB, through its president, Mr. Luke C. Roxas, received
a letter from the children of Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing him that on 18 May
1994, they entered into a Contract to Sell said real estate properties with ALI.[2]
ASB confirmed the contract of the Ramos children with ALI when it found out
that the same was annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title of the real
estate properties in dispute. This prompted ASB to file the Complaint dated 13
June 1994 before the trial court.[3] ALI, thereafter, filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim.[4]
Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion[5] for Leave to take testimony by
deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., citing Section 4(c),
Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was
already 87 years old and although he was of sound mind there is always the
possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff's behalf in the course of
the trial on the merits. In the Omnibus Order[6] of the trial court dated 17
October 1994, plaintiff's motion was granted. ASB then obtained the deposition
upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. on six different occasions, to wit:
22 and 24 November 1994, 5, 8 and 16 December 1994, and 26 January 1995.
Upon termination of Emerito Ramos, Sr.'s direct testimony by deposition, both
plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the cross-examination be scheduled on 02,
10 and 15 February 1995.[7] These dates were reset to 15 February 1995.
However, on 30 January 1995, ALI filed a "Motion[8] to Resolve Objections (In
deposition proceedings with Omnibus Motion)" on the propriety, admissibility
and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the Rules. Specifically, ALI
sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the best-
evidence rule, rule on presentation of secondary evidence, incompetence of the
deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation of evidence, and testimonies
not forming part of the offer.[9] As a consequence, the trial court, in an Order
dated 14 February 1995, cancelled the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos,
Sr.'s deposition scheduled on 15 February 1995.

On 05 May 1995,[10] the trial court ruled on the objections of ALI sustaining
some of its objections, overruling the others and upholding the propriety of the
presentation of evidence made by plaintiff through deposition. In the same
Order, the trial court directed the setting of the cross-examination of the
deponent. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order setting the
hearing of the case for cross-examination, which the trial court denied on 07
September 1995.[11] The trial court again directed that the cross-examination of
Emerito Ramos, Sr., be scheduled. The same was thus set on 06 October 1995.
Before this date, however, ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 02
October 1995 praying that the date set be cancelled and re-scheduled to another
date.[12] The trial court reset the hearing on 27 October 1995.

Thereafter, ALI filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction[13] to restrain the public respondent, Judge Lucenito
Tagle, from implementing the Order dated 07 September 1995 and to declare
null and void and expunging the entire deposition proceedings taken in
connection with Civil Case No. 931-94.[14]

The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 04 October

1995[15] and later on, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 14 November
1995[16] pending resolution of the petition.

On 29 October 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision[17] denying due
course and dismissing the petition of ALI. The Court of Appeals held:
In the instant case, Atty. Emerito Ramos, Sr. testified on matters of his personal
knowledge, even if in the course of his testimony, he referred to certain
documents in court, being the President and Chairman of EMRASON. In that
capacity, he carried on negotiations relative to the sale of the Dasmarias
property. Indeed, "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses" (Sec. 20, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).

Sec. 16, Rule 132, as contended by petitioner, is not applicable to the case at
bench as Atty. Ramos was not refreshing his memory on a fact or transaction
with the aid of memoranda. Rather, he was freely recollecting and testifying on
matters within the ambit of his own personal competence, and merely referring
to the letter that he received from Mr. Fernando Ayala, and another letter
written by a Victor Manarang to his son, Emerito Ramos, Jr., both letters being
now in his possession by reason of his duties as President and Chairman of
EMRASON. (TSN, 05 December 1994, pp. 70-85)[18]
ALI's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

On 10 June 1999, Emerito Ramos, Sr. died at the age of 92 years old. Plaintiff
then filed before the trial court a motion to introduce in evidence the deposition
of Emerito Ramos, Sr.[19] The motion was opposed by ALI.[20] ASB filed its
Reply.[21] ALI thereafter filed its Rejoinder[22] and ASB its Sur-rejoinder.[23]

On 28 September 1999, the trial court issued its Order setting aside the
opposition of ALI and admitting in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos,
Sr.[24] Motion for Reconsideration filed by ALI was denied in an Order dated 24
December 1999. [25] ALI again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way
of Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a decision[27] dated 31 January 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which was
opposed[29] by private respondents ASB and EMRASON. The motion was
denied in a resolution dated 23 May 2002.[30]

Hence this Petition.

The issues raised in the instant petition are the following:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEPOSITION OF

THE WITNESS EMERITO M. RAMOS, SR. IS ADMISSIBLE
UNDER THE RULES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAD WAIVED ITS

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE DEPONENT, EMERITO
M. RAMOS, SR.

III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT IN FINDING THE DEPOSITION OF WITNESS
EMERITO M. RAMOS, SR. AS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.[31]

The first issue is not novel. The same has been in fact passed upon twice by the
Court of Appeals.

As defined, the term "deposition" is sometimes used in a broad sense to

describe any written statement verified by oath. In its more technical and
appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or
hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put
or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before a commissioner, examiner
or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross-interlocutory, and
usually subscribed by the witnesses.[32]
[A]nd the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1) Give greater assistance to the
parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2)
Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims
and defenses; 3) Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4)
Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5) Expedite litigation; 6) Safeguard
against surprise; 7) Prevent delay; 8) Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9)
Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.[33]
In the case of Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, this Court
instructs:[34]
. . . Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is
to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of
dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an
attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of the law."
Depositions maybe taken at anytime after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient.[35]

In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.'s
deposition chiefly because of his advance age which ground is considered valid
and justified under the Rules of Court.[36]

ALI contends that the prerequisites of a valid deposition were disregarded. It

repeatedly insists that what transpired from 22 November 1994 to 26 January
1995 was simply a recordation of testimony of Emerito Ramos, Sr. intended to
form part of a deposition for submission to the trial court but not a deposition
itself considering that it never underwent the process of a valid deposition taken
under Rules 23 and 132 of the Rules of Court, as the deposition was not
completed, signed, certified, filed or offered before the court a quo, hence, under
the Rules, considered incompetent evidence.[37]

It must be noted that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., taken on the dates
earlier mentioned, were substantially made in accordance with the requirements
of the Rules. In fact, in its Petition before the Court of Appeals, ALI confirmed
the taking of deposition on said dates and that it was duly represented by its
counsel during the proceedings. As to whether the manner by which the
deposition was taken faithfully complied with the requirements under the Rules
of Court, it is not disputed that the deposition was taken inside the courtroom
of the trial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer was present, tape
recorders and a video camera were even utilized to record the proceedings, in
the presence of all the opposing counsels of record including ALI's.[38] The
following factual findings remain uncontroverted:
To reiterate, the deposition of the late Emerito Ramos, Sr. was taken inside the
courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the parties and their lawyers,
and the entire proceedings was transcribed by the stenographers of the Court.
Thus, the requirements that the deposition has to be sealed, examined and
signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the deposition
officer would be, to the mind of the court, already superfluous. Strict
compliance with the formal requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of
depositions taken outside the Court. As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery
should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal
discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of
litigation would be defeated. Be that as it may, the motion for reconsideration
filed by defendant Ayala Land, Inc. is DENIED.[39]
On the objection of ALI owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it
should be noted that a deposition not signed does not preclude its use during
the trial. A deponent's signature to the deposition is not in all events
indispensable since the presence of signature goes primarily to the form of
deposition. The requirement that the deposition must be examined and signed
by the witness is only to ensure that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to
correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy.[40] In any event,
the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its
probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on
its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[41]

This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every
objection of ALI contained in its Motion dated 30 January 1995 and ruled on
every single objection in the Order dated 05 May 1995 and these objections
were again taken up in the Order of the trial court dated 07 September 1995. On
this point, we find no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by
the trial court.

It has been repeatedly held that the deposition - discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law,[42] as in the case at bar.

The second and third issues raised by ALI are that it was denied an opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent consequently resulting in its denial of due
process. The records reveal that ALI was given more than enough opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent and its failure to exercise such right is solely
attributable to its own inaction. At this instance, ALI cannot feign prejudice and
denial of due process. As echoed in several cases,[43] due process is, in essence,
simply an opportunity to be heard. The right to cross-examine is not an absolute
one which a party can demand at all times. The right is a personal one which
may be waived by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination, thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-
examine.[44] As rightly observed by the Court of Appeals:
Applying the foregoing precept in the light of the facts obtaining in the instant
case, We are not inclined to indulge the PETITIONER in its argument that it
was deprived of its constitutional right to due process. Verily, as may be readily
gleaned from the records, the PETITIONER was afforded several
opportunities to cross-examine the deponent ATTY. RAMOS. However,
despite its knowledge of deponent's old age and frail health, PETITIONER
chose to squander its right to subject under appropriate test the assertions raised
by the witness in his deposition. It is worth noting that the PETITIONER,
following the termination of the direct examination of the deceased ATTY.
RAMOS, requested for a setting of the cross-examination. During the supposed
date of cross-examination, however, instead of seizing the chance to exercise the
right which they now all too belatedly invoke, PETITIONER moved for the
postponement of the proceedings. After this Court ruled on its Motion to
Resolve objections, the PETITIONER again moved for several times for the
resetting of the cross-examination to future dates.[45]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2002 and its
Resolution dated 23 May 2002 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

[1] Vol. 1, Records, pp. 1-4.

[2] Annex C; Vol. 1, Records, p. 40.

[3] Annex B; CA Rollo, pp. 27-40.

[4] Annex B-1; CA Rollo, pp. 41-48.

[5] Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 51.

[6] Annex D; CA Rollo, pp. 55-60.

[7] Vol. II, Records, p. 326.

[8] Annex E; CA Rollo, p. 60.

[9] CA Rollo, p. 95.

[10] Annex G; CA Rollo, pp. 72-86.

[11] Annex J; Rollo, pp. 130-134.

[12] Annex K; CA Rollo, p. 135.

[13] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38541.

[14] Annex J; CA Rollo, pp. 92-104.

Per Justice Hector L. Hofilena with Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Oswaldo D.
[15]

Agcaoili, concurring. Annex L; CA Rollo, p. 106.

[16] Annex M; CA Rollo, p. 107.

 Penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez with Associate Justices Ricardo P.
[17]

Galvez and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring. Annex N; CA Rollo, pp. 109-114.

[18] CA Rollo, pp. 113-114.

[19] CA Rollo, pp. 115-133.

[20] CA Rollo, pp. 135-139.

[21] Rollo, pp. 504-512.

[22] Rollo, p. 513.

[23] Rollo, p. 517.

[24] Annex P; Rollo, p. 523.

[25] Annex Q-1; Rollo, p. 221.

[26] CA-G.R. SP No. 57325.

Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Justices Alicia Austria

[27]

Martinez and Roberto A. Barrios, concurring. CA Rollo, pp. 267-276.

[28] CA Rollo, p. 283.

[29] CA Rollo, p. 298.

[30] CA Rollo, p. 314.

[31] Rollo, p. 713.

Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984, 128 SCRA 388, citing 16
[32]

Am Jur. 699.

[33] People v. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, 17 August 1999, 312 SCRA 573, 585-586.

[34] G.R. No. 155010, 16 August 2004, 436 SCRA 559, 573, reiterating the earlier
case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, 21 November 1991, 204
SCRA 212.

Dasmarias Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, 24 August 1993, 225
[35]

SCRA 622.

[36] Rule 23, Section 4(c)(3) of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. - . . .

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; . . .
See also Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, 30 May 2001, 358 SCRA
284.

[37] Memorandum, p. 16; Rollo, p. 718.

[38] Vol. V, Records, p. 1216.

[39] CA Rollo, pp. 271-272.

Will Docter Meat Co. v. Hotel Kingsway, 232 S. W. 2d 821; Ikerd v.

[40]

Lapworth, 435 F., 2d 197; Smith v. Henwood, 349 Mo. 396, 161 S. W.2d 232;
Hoyberg v. Henshe, 153 Mo. 63, 55 S.W. 83.

Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, 23

[41]

September 2004, 439 SCRA 1; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107518, 08 October 1998, 297 SCRA 402 ; De la
Torre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102786, 14 August 1998, 294 SCRA 196.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No 90478, 21 November

[42]

1991, 204 SCRA 212.

BLTB v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 137934, 10 August 2001, 362 SCRA 635;
[43]

Tubiano v. Razo, G.R. No. 132598, 13 July 2000, 335 SCRA 531; Orola v.
Alovera, G.R. No. 111074, 14 July 2000, 335 SCRA 609; Central Pangasinan
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 145800, 22 January 2003, 395
SCRA 720.
 De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-71537, 17 September
[44]

1987, 154 SCRA 65.

[45] CA Rollo, p. 273.

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