Ramos v.
CA Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach the petitioners then legal
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her
experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall
bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The
results in the examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the
operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one of the
defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy.
Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist.
At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center,
Herminda Cruz, Erlindas sister-in-law and the dean of the College of
Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide moral support.
Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived
only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and
heard the latter say Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan.
Herminda saw bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard
Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon.
The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg position, wherein
the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a
decrease of blood supply in the brain.
Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr.
Calderon was able to intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and
became comatose.
Rogelio filed a civil case for damages.
The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital,
guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that the notice of
the decision was never sent to the petitioners counsel. Rather, it was sent to the
petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel.
The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the procedural issue, the
counsel, the motion was filed on time.
Issue: Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made
liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for
cholecystectomy
Held:
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of
care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. However, much has been said that res ipsa
loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability. Mere invocation and application of the
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a
step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the
proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the
defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the
doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown.
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res
ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause
of that harm. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed
with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where
the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert
medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is
allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which
the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule
to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real
question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is
beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations,
which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the
negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda
submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be
performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to
the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and
exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically
sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and
body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance
of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without
undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and
totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury
which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this
kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube,
were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-
charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her
unconscious.
Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is
universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respondent
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the
scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and
professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore,
a clear indicia of her negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to
respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation
of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she
never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen
petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the
cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important
opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Opinion of Expert Witness
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls
within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology.
The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While
admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the
expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced,
allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of
anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing
transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about
the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving
weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental
Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study
of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr.
Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since he
lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology.
Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private
respondents' intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent
experts in the proper areas.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused
by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that
the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the
injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a
reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended
endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation.
During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal
tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the
esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the
tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been
observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting
the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt)
was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis.
Responsibility of the Surgeon
As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that
those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's
negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no
evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent
Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that
respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss
in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for
the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
Responsibility of the Hospital
Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its
employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the
former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility
ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the instant case,
respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce
evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its
physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent
hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article
2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Damages
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time
of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based
care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by
looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected were
the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to
bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose
patient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the
care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to
meet minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual
damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the
correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually
compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been
completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to
take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while
certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable -
and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in
such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages
are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent
speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case,
petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient
who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for
compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of
litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value
awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for
their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not
be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the
aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has
been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far
been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening
years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual
physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually
impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be
inadequate if petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The
husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to
day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil.
They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering
their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not
the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.
The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the
foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are
hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the
opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are
hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the
date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the
time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00
as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each
as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
GABETO VS. ARANETA
primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be
charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made
was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the
defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the
horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded
to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the
horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

FACTS:

In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to
going to a cockpit.
When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the
defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting
to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first.
The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of
Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on.
Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness
of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth;
and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other,
Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse
had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so
doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by
Araneta.

RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.

RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that
presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by
getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC vs COURT OF APPEALS maneuverability. However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to
discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
FACTS:
contributing cause of the injury. Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case,
there was no way either driver could have avoided the collision.
on August 31, 1980, a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary
Steam Laundry collided with a Cimarron which caused the death of three
persons and the injuries of several others.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project
Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI).
The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the
employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez.
The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly
stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and
that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of
the opposite lane.
As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound
lane.

RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the driver of Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence.

SC: First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron
driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the
burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the
statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.

Petitioner says that driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight
during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the Cimarron
had only one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased [its]
K. CASUALITY
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina
102 Phil 181 Civil Law Torts and Damages Proximate Cause
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by
Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay.
While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied
the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned.
The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free
themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others.
The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the
villagers brought torch with them.
The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact
that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued
which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It
was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their
burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by
the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already
advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the
overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be
blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the
natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place
yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the
villagers.
WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
Phoenix Construction v. IAC
Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his
boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford
dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with
no lights or early warning reflector devices.
The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the
petitioner company.
Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered
some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for
damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own
negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and
while intoxicated.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue: Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or
by respondents own negligence
Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a
valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of
evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the
petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he
reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection.
We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered
by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the
crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and
gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split
seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is
sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to
constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The
conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the
road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was
the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump
truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us
adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created
only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is
said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it
is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which
the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases,
it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original
risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed
that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy
traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical
terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of
the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are
the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on
quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of
the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent
Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no
sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the
respondent appellate court.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal.
Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he
saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he
was the one who opened the canal.
A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and
again on the leg with the back of the bolo.
On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had
lockjaw and convulsions.
The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected
the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.
Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5.
The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of
the latters death
Held: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that
killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to
the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
Calalas v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas.
As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco
Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney.
As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for
violation of contract of carriage.
Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva.
The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another
civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation
of contract of carriage.
Issues:
1. Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this case
2. Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the
contract of carriage
3. Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the highway.
Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art.
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases
common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing
the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that
petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's
will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen
CONCURRENT CAUSE
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict
is solidary.
TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE,
INC., and NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., LTD., vs.NORTH FRONT SHIPPING
SERVICES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 119197. May 16, 1997
Facts:
Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping
(common carrier); the consignee: Republic Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by
representatives of the shipper prior to the transport and was found fitting to carry the
cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were successfully delivered but
it was not immediately unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of 23.666
metric tons and some of the merchandise was already moldy and deteriorating.
Hence, the consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages
from the common carrier. Upon refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were
obliged to pay. Petitioners now allege that there was negligence on the part of the
carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required since the
charter-party agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier.
Issues:
WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the
required diligence and thus should be held liable?
Held:
North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it
observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.
The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and
Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a
private carrier. A charter-party is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or
some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time
or usex x x
Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at
the outset that corn grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually
deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of a ship.
Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his crew should have
undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen the cargos possible
deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable about the nature of such cargo.
But none of such measures was taken.
It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods was due to the following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international
or civil; act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of
the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent
public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is
other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable therefor.
However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely
to the carrier. The consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory
negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not
immediately start the unloading operations.
National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Noble Casionan [Parents of Noble]
FACTS
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts
traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby
reducing their distance from the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat
to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the
leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute
safety measures to protect trail users from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr.
Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9
additional poles, and they identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the
distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.
19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-
pocket miner Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and they
carried one pole horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble carrying the shorter pole.
Noble walked ahead as they passed through the trail underneath the NPC high-
tension lines on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning
left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the
dangling high-tension wires. Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only
about a second or two, then he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him
and shook him, but Noble was already dead.
A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer determined the
cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to
electrocution. There was a small burned area in the middle right finger of Noble.
Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the wires above
the trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass
directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was the only viable way since the
other side was a precipice. They did not see any danger warning signs installed. After
the GM of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put
up warning signs around the area.
Nobles parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being
negligent in maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were installed but
they were stolen by children, and that excavations were made to increase the
clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area.
NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution
since Noble did not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by
electrocution, it was due to his own negligence.
RTC decided in favor of Nobles parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were
biased because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not actually
present at the time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since the company has
not acted upon the requests and demands made by the community leaders since
1991. CA affirmed RTC with modificationaward of moral damages was reduced from
100k to 50k, and award of attorney fees was disallowed since the reason for the
award was not expressly stated in the decision.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Noble. NO; hence, NPC is not
entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
RATIO
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the
part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of
ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate
causeof the injury.
The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that liability will be mitigated in consideration
of the injured partys contributory negligence.
Precedents + [non-]application to the case at hand
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. In this
case, there were no warning signs, and the trail was regularly used by people since it
was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted
for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
 NPC faults Noble in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by DENR in the
area. In Aonuevo v. CA, the Court held that the violation of a statute is not sufficient
to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury
that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. The
fact that pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for NPC to leave their
transmission lines dangling.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occassion.

Damages awarded

Nobles unearned income of 720k [loss of earning capacity formula: Net Earning
Capacity = 2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and
necessary living expenses)]

Exemplary damages of 50k [since there is gross negligence]

Moral damages of 50k

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.

Facts:

Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-
law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding
came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co.
strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was
electrocuted and died as a result thereof.
In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila
Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the
company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric
wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric
company did not exercise due diligence.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.

Solidum vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 192123 March 10, 2014
Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus.
Two days after his birth, Gerald under went colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring
one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal walls, enabling him to
excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995,
Gerald was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr.
Leandro Resurreccionheaded the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito
Lucerio, Dr.Donatella Valeria and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included
Drs. Abella, Razon and Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks , but he regained
consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear, or move. A
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries were filed by
Geralds parents against the team of doctors alleging that there was failure in
monitoring the anesthesia administered to Gerald.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical negligence.
Whether or not res ipsa liquitor can be resorted to in medical negligence cases.
Held: No. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person to perform or failing to perform such act.
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence no matter
in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls
for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements
namely: a.) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; b.) the breach of the duty by the physicians failing to
act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; c.) the causation, is, there
must be a reasonably close and casual connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and d.) the damages suffered by the patient.
In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of
the physician in respect of the patient. The standard of care is an objective standard
which conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured,
and it does not depend therefore, on any individuals physicians own knowledge
either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required.
The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor means that where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by defendant
that the accident arose from want of care.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice
cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would
ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made
between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual
and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce
the desired results. Thus, res ipsa liquitor is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the
operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside the routine performance
occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average
man as the negligent case or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor may be utilized and the
dependent is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.