OKABE VS GUTIERREZ by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of the Court that an
application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused
shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the
warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or
irregularities thereon; Curative statutes are by their
essence retroactive in application.We agree with the
contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred in not
applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, viz.: SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal
arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation.An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused
from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. It
bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous
rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission
to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his
right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities
or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling
of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb
evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative
statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general
rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to
that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in
other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on
January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
was already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to have
applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for
certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Warrants of Arrest; There must be clear and convincing
proof that the accused had an actual intention to relinquish
her right to question the existence of probable cause.
Considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her
personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right
to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the
warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had
an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other
explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records
show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in
Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance
of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her
arrest and secure her provisional liberty Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and
issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter
of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not
be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such patent and
gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
reason of passion or personal hostility; When the court has
jurisdiction over the case, its questioned acts, even if its
findings are not correct, would at most constitute errors of
law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing his August
25, 2000 Order. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reasons of
passion or personal hostility. Hence, when the court has
jurisdiction over the case, its questioned acts, even if its findings
are not correct, would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari.
Warrants of Arrest; The duty to make a determination of the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused is personal and exclusive to the issuing
judge. We agree with the petitioner that before the RTC judge
issues a warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused. The duty to make such determination is personal
and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty
and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that
he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with
law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable
cause for the filing of the Information.
Preliminary Investigations; A preliminary investigation is
for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.Under
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. A preliminary investigation is for the purpose of securing
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of
a public trial. If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause
for the filing of the Information against the respondent, he
executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that from
the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe
that the offense charged has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the
investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding
on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification
as basis for a finding of the existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.
Warrants of Arrest; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge; Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicionit requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction; The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.In
contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is
filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The purpose of the
mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the
arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial.
It is not required that the complete or entire records of the
case during preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judgewhat is required is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to
make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.In determining the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused,
the RTC judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause
for the filing of the Information. After all, as the Court held in
Webb v. De Leon, the judge just personally reviews the initial
determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. However,
in determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause
for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on
the said report. The judge should consider not only the report of
the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and
the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of
the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if
any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information. Indeed, in Ho v. People this Court
held that: Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire
records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to
unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic
notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or,
at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is:
he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally
determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.
If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause on the basis of the records
submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no
longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the
records of the case.If the judge is able to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause on the basis of the
records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would
no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the
records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records
and/or evidence submitted by the investigating prosecutor to be
insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct the
investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to
submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, to
enable him to discharge his duty. The judge may even call the
complainant and his witness to themselves answer the courts
probing questions to determine the existence of probable cause.
The rulings of this Court in Soliven v. Makasiar and Lim v. Felix
are now embodied in Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, with modifications, viz.: SEC. 6. When
warrant of arrest may issue.(a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint
of information.
COMENDADOR VS DE VILLA
Constitution; Bail; Constitution grants the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception
is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-
Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the
mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner,
interve-nors and which may as well include other persons facing
charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Bill of Rights; Due Process; Due process is satisfied as long
as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is
not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation
of the Bill of Rights.
Criminal Procedure; Pre-trial; Jurisdiction; Pre-trial
investigation is directory, not mandatory, and in no way
affects the jurisdiction of a court martial.There was in our
view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI
Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that even a failure to conduct,
a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction. But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial
investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way
affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial.
Statutory Construction; It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases;
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.It is a basic canon
of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est
anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Jurisdiction; Certiorari; Habeas Corpus, Quo warranto;
Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior court
and other bodies and on petition for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto. In the absence of a law providing that the decisions,
orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.
Constitution; Bill of Rights; Bail; Equal Protection; That
denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable.The argument
that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment
is substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the
military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; Appeal; A petition
for certiorari in order to prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as respondent
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal.Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well
to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula: The
referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in
order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount
to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
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JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the
accuseds presence at trial.Bail, the security given by an
accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,
is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question:
what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet
been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between
arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in
pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds
presence at trial.
An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses
his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed;
Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests
of society and those of the accused; In the exercise of
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised
not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been
sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time
immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. An
accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. Even if the
conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial
review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has
a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating
an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Other recognized
societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the
protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment. Under what circumstances
an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate
balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused. Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise
of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been
in fact convicted by the trial court.
Judgments; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words
and Phrases; Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an
error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of
jurisdictionordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed
resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending
appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be
discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the
rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal. Neither can it be correctly
claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in
judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary
abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must
be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice
and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
Appeals; The extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous
conclusions of law or fact.Petitioner only points out the
Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. In this
connection, Lee v. People, 393 SCRA 397 (2002) is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the
respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the
case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
Penalties; The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
yearsthe first scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated in the said paragraph, and the second scenario
contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the
appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in
the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions
of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at
least one of the said circumstances. The implications of this
distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, an authority in remedial law: Under the present
revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules: x x x x x x x x x e. After
conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is
imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a
matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the Regional
Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x.
Judicial Discretion; Words and Phrases; Judicial discretion
has been defined as choicechoice occurs where,
between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options), there is more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker; The establishment of a clearly defined
rule of action is the end of discretion.Petitioners theory
therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding
body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of
the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion
into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners
interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court
by requiring it to determine a singular factual issuewhether
any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. However,
judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs
where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome,
with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. On
the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of
action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the
appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all
instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners
theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary.
Statutory Construction; Laws and rules should not be
interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences.Laws and rules should not be
interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years,
bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating
circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed is more than six years of
imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more
than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the
five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years
imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Legal Research; The development over time of the rules
reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach
to bail pending appealbail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.The development over time of these rules
reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to
bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed
not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
Penalties; Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonmentpursuant to the tough on bail pending
appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions
mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal
such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave
as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is
prohibited.A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has
authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under
certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly,
it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended
Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy,
the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances
are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws.
This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate
review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused
faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to
flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous
and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our
criminal justice system and court processes

Legal Research; The present inclination of the rules on

criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where
our original constitutional and procedural provisions on
bail emanated.The present inclination of the rules on criminal
procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the
approach adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.
While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless
shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different
from that in other democratic societies. In our jurisdiction, the
trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial
discretionparticularly with respect to extending bailshould
be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution
that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail
to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section
5.

Presumption of Innocence; The importance attached to

conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally
speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.This Court has been
guided by the following: The importance attached to conviction
is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,
and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction
it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly
argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely
to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of

innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail endsfrom then on, the grant of bail is subject
to judicial discretion.After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail
is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious,
such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This
judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial