4. Salcedo vs.

Bollozos

FACTS: The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ
of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a
parcel of land (disputed property) and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property is
about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay
and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property,
Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed
property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to
harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing;
and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I.
sheets, lumber and other construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police promptly responded
and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m.,
Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition on his behalf while Tanmalack
was detained by the police for employing self-help in preventing squatters from putting up improvements in
their titled property.

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and
how it came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as follows:

1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office regarding the procedure in
filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the established procedure is to assign
cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper motions. But
since the office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling will still be in the
afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for instruction and or appropriate action;

2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn
Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita
Esguerra-Lucagbo and clarified the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

3. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated in the Rule but if the
case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be willing to look at the petition;

4. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the chamber of Judge
Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped in the
petition;

5. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the case to
the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon. Ms. Lagamon then instructed Mr. Exclamador to refer
the case to the respondent judge;

6. Ms. Lagamon and Mr. Exclamador said they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the
lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and considering the
novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition if
they still discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the
case to the respondent judges sala since it sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;

7. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not motivated by any ill
motive or malice

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks representative
and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing
the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of
[the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V.
Ku.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six
oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been
unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give any ground to
warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion,
bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and
granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the
respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku
(Tanmalacks counsel) are members of the Masonic fraternity.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge erred in issuing the Write of Amparo in Tanmalacks favor making him
liable for gross ignorance of the law

HELD: We agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in
Tanmalacks favor. Had the respondent judge read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
more closely, he would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, not to concerns that are purely property
and commercial in nature. The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in
natureconcerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.

Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent
to do an injustice will be administratively sanctionederrors committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings,
but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. A judge cannot be subjected to liability (civil,
criminal, or administrative) for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith.

Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute judicial

remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinaryan inquiry into their administrative liability arising
from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled.

The fact that the respondent judge and a lawyer of a party are members of the Masonic fraternity does not
justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence; Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply
because the judgment is adverse to a party.
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. -- The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law
against the respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and
procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to
keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office
and great privilege vested in him. We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross
ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he
issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely
three months. At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on
the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo at that time cannot be
said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross
ignorance of the law.

When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, the
administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against
Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.
 5. Belen vs. Belen

FACTS: Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave abuse of
authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant, sometime in March 2004, respondent
judge filed a case for Estafa against complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack
of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman. Respondent judge filed an
Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualification) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary
investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against
Sunega-Lagman before IBP CBD. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman,
complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in
the CBD case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman
were false; that Sunega-Lagman was present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and
29 April 2004, and that she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave;
and that it was respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of several
cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a mobile phone
text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking
pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the
Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainants piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and employees,
requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry business; advising them of the alleged violations
by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local
government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to
complainants business establishment.

All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judges official government
position viz.:

From the Chamber of:

Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial Region, Calamba City

Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953.

In his Comment, respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as a landowner
and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal complaints against violators of
environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had the right, under the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6173, to secure public information from government offices, especially about the complainant who was
violating numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the courts official stationery or
letterhead in his correspondence with government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He
emphasized that the courts official letterhead should appear as:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
 4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY

Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same in his
private, not judicial capacity.

ISSUE: WON respondent judges use of his said letterhead is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

HELD:

Respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest violate Section 4 of
Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly
being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or
employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters,
respondent judges use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of
RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was from his chambers, clearly manifests that
respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and
employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other
words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest.

This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
 7. Macias vs. Macias

FACTS: This involves an administrative complaint filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her
husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the
presiding judge of Branch 28 of the RTC of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.

Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship
with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the
time of the filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses committed by respondent, to
wit:

(a) Respondent has been using court personnel, namely, Emmanuel Botiong Tenefrancia, process server, as
constant escort of his paramour in going to their appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place
where she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his mistress are together

(b) Respondent has been using another court employee in the person of Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as
contact person to his young lover and in summoning and bringing complainants witnesses to respondent to be
harassed and threatened;

(c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has been brought many times by respondent to his court in
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for
the session to start because respondent and his mistress are not yet through with each other;

(d) Respondent has not been calendaring cases nor holding court sessions nor court hearings on Mondays and
Fridays so that he can have an extended date with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service;

(e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of
respondents paramour, in Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and the people of Taway know that respondent
judge, who usually arrives in his car, has been shamelessly and immorally carrying on an illicit affair with said
Judilyn Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of their houses upon seeing respondents car parked
at the house of the aunt of respondents young mistress, and these barrio folks often watch respondent come
and go;

(f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of
court personnel

After several postponements, the scheduled hearing proceeded on March 12, 2002 after the parties failed to
reach any amicable settlement.

From a list of 7 witnesses, complainant manifested that only 4 witnesses shall be presented. The first witness,
Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by complainants son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias after
suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and
Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent
the night there together inside one bedroom. He said that he accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the
next day to the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos outside the house creating a
commotion within the neighborhood.

On cross-examination, Mutia admitted that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said
house, or whether she left that night and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also
pointed to Mutia that the spot where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by
leaves and tall trees.

The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testified that he was hired by Seranillos to drive
a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit
Seranillos on 3 occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped
once by Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos.

On cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually
owned by Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on presumption. He also admitted that he had
been residing with complainants counsel since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias.

The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after respondents counsel objected because
the intended testimony would cover an event that took place after the filing of the complaint, and Dialos
affidavit narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint. Complainant manifested
her intention to file a motion to amend the complaint.

The Investigating Justice ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias,
without prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall have been resolved.
Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified. The Investigating
Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to present further
witnesses and evidence. Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct testimony. The
Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she again refused.

The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He
said that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against him, but the same was dismissed by the
Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He believed that complainants accusations were
brought about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia.

On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation to this Court. He
recommended the DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned
that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or
that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however,
RECOMMENDED THAT JUDGE MACIAS BE REPRIMANDED for failing to exercise great care and circumspection
in his actions.

ISSUE: WON administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing
evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and WON the acts complained of warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge.

HELD:

With In re Impeachment of Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact that the case will only involve an administrative, and
not a criminal, complaint.The first case involving an administrative complaint filed against a judge in this
jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in In re Impeachment of Horrilleno. There, Justice Malcolm explained: The
procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme
Court has not yet adopted rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the
court to require that charges made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn
to; thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the
respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further annoyance for the judge; while if
the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in
conducting an inquiry into the conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-Generals
investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to determine if sufficient cause
exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in
recommending his removal to the Governor-General. Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said,
in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law
applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With
Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact
that the case will only involve an administrative, and not a criminal, complaint.

Members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as
to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than,
perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required
to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality.The Court applied substantial
evidence as the normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges.
Members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a
higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact that
because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of
integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the
commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove
substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear
preponderance of evidence to establish liability. There appears no compelling reason to require a higher
degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges.

We are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed
the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the
onus of establishing the averments of her complaint. If complainant fails to discharge this burden,
respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.

If a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent
and derived from direct knowledge.Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of ROC, a judge found guilty of
immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his
retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations. We have already ruled that if a judge is to be
disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.

Testimony to the effect that the respondent judge was seen having dinner with his alleged
paramour and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, said respondent judge
being a married mansuch behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct.

In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and
reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of
P10,000.00.