Digests Art 12

4D CRIM REV JUSTICE TANG 2017-2018 | 1
ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. PEOPLE vs. PUNO
FACTS: At about two oclock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney
driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. On seeing Aling
Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang
bubuyog. Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer
until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman,
and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Punos eyes were reddish.
His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to
Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: Huag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng
pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda. Or, according to Lina, Puno said: Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huag kayong tumawag
ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko.
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents house and then went to the house of his second cousin,
Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening.
How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.
Disregarding Punos threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the
killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already
dead. Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements
of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer.
Punos father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970. HE WAS CHARGED WITH
MURDER IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged
in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex.
Puno, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having
killed Aling Kikay. He believes that there are persons who are mangkukulam, mambabarang and
mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands
might swell. Puno believes that a person harmed by a mambabarang might have a headache or a
swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor. Consequently, it is necessary to kill
the mangkukulam and mambabarang.
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Punos wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Punos eyes were
reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told
Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did
not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that
cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord.
Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly
boxed the dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaidas elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that
Punos eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was
cuddling a puppy that he called Diablo. He called for Teotimos mother who invited him to eat.
Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him
to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimos father. When
told that Teotimos father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at
Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell
asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood.
Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that Puno was insane when
he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital,
to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970,
testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted
with schizophrenic reaction. Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 24, 1970 was already
cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that
hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited
certain eccentricities. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from schizophrenic
reaction, his symptoms were not socially incapacitating and that he could adjust himself to his
environment.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his
examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing
and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong. Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno
was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not
have reached third year high school.
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles
and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted that Ernesto Puno, who
previously was suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
Trial Court: Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col. The trial court convicted Puno of
murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of
P22,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ernesto Puno is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity
(schizophrenic reaction).
HELD: NO. When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on
this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence.
Insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the
accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
After evaluating counsel de oficios contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane
when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the phychiatrists reveal
that on that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisca Col, Puno, who was
armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed
septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but
exclaim Diyos ko.
Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung
to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood.
2. PEOPLE vs. TALAVERA
FACTS: By holding a young child by her feet and smashing her head on the concrete floor which
resulted in the child's death, accused-appellant, a former prisoner was charged with murder.
Three years before the fatal day, accused-appellant was a kargador who used to board in the house
of Francisco Onia at Sto. Tomas, Davao. At about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of October 10, 1996,
while Francisco Onia was having supper in their house, accused-appellant came to see him.
Francisco invited accused-appellant to supper, but instead they went out of the house to talk.
Accused-appellant told Francisco that he was looking for a job and that the police in Tagum, Davao
del Norte were looking for him for an alleged debt. Francisco then offered to help accused-appellant
settle his obligations and to talk to the police, as he did not want to be implicated in accused-
appellant's case. While the two were talking, Francisco's grandson, 4-year old Jim Louis Marc
Embalsamado, approached Francisco. When he saw the boy, accused-appellant gave him P20.00
but Francisco told him to stay away from his grandson. Without warning, accused-appellant suddenly
grabbed the child by his feet and slammed his head on the cement floor several times. As a
consequence, the young Jim Louis was rendered unconscious. When Francisco tried to take his
grandson away from accused-appellant, the latter pulled out a knife and moved towards him. Thinking
that his grandson was dead, Francisco went to seek police help.
Meanwhile, Merlyn Onia, daughter of Francisco and aunt of Jim Louis was present and saw what
accused-appellant did to the boy. She was able to stop accused-appellant from further hurting her
nephew. She then brought Jim Louis to the hospital leaving behind in their house accused-appellant
with her three-year old daughter Genelyn. From the hospital, she rushed back home and saw
accused-appellant holding Genelyn by her feet and slamming her on the ground, as he had done with
Jim Louis. Merlyn saw blood oozing from her daughter's mouth and shouted to appellant "Enough,
Nong Maning". She tried to take away her daughter from accused-appellant, but the latter grabbed
her by the neck, choked her and held her head.
Walter Bascos, a neighbor of Merlyn, heard her shouting for help. He came to her rescue and threw
stones at accused-appellant, hitting him on the nape and rendering him unconscious. Merlyn then
picked up her unconscious daughter and brought her to a clinic. The medical staff in the clinic,
however, advised her to bring Genelyn instead to the hospital. Despite undergoing surgery at the
hospital, Genelyn never recovered consciousness. The cause of her death was described as intra-
cerebral hemorrhage, a bleeding inside the brain which caused it to swell, due to a strong external
force applied to the head.
Accused-appellant does not deny culpability but simply prays for the reduction of the death penalty
to reclusion perpetua, to which the Solicitor-General agrees.
ISSUE: WON Talavera can invoke insanity as a ground.

HELD: NO. At the outset, the Court deems it essential to discuss the request of accused-appellant's
counsel for the mental examination of his client. This was not conducted allegedly because accused-
appellant's former counsel failed to follow-up the directive of the trial court.
Whenever the facts of the case show that a defendant's behavior when he committed the crime is
such that it creates doubt as to the voluntariness of his acts, the court should conduct appropriate
measures to determine the mental state of the person. Our courts are designed not merely for
purposes of establishing the commission of a crime but also to ascertain whether a "criminal mind"
was responsible for its commission. This is the rationale why our penal laws recognize certain
circumstances which exempt a person from criminal liability, among which is insanity.
Concomitant with this is the Estrada insanity test laid down by the court in People v. Estrada, which
requires determination of two distinct matters:
(1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information
necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.
The mere fact that accused-appellant's felonious acts are so bizarre does not necessarily mean that
he is insane or that he should be immediately subjected to mental examination.
In this case, accused-appellant suddenly held the feet of two very young children and smashed their
heads on the floor. He did this after giving the first child P20.00, and after the second child was left
alone with him. From accused-appellant's friendly behavior, there was a sudden violent change when
he smashed their heads for no apparent reason. But a sudden or perhaps a treacherous attack, even
for a trivial reason that the attacker allegedly "lost his mind," is not equivalent to insanity nor
does it presume an insane mind.
Accused-appellant argues that his acts constitute a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and
obfuscation. It should be noted, however, that a mitigating circumstance differs from an exempting
circumstance. The former presupposes the existence of both the crime and the criminal while the
latter recognizes only a felonious act but admits that there is no criminal offender because the
performance of the act was not attended with voluntariness on the part of the human actor.
Moreover, accused-appellant himself testified in court and there was nothing in his testimony which
would show that he is suffering from mental illness. He answered questions directly and even offered
his own version of what transpired, that in anger he threw the chair which allegedly hit the child. At no
time during the proceedings did accused-appellant invoke mental incapacity. Besides, the burden of
proving insanity lies on him who invokes it.
A review of the evidence on record sustains accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(Crime is murder and qualifying circumstances are treachery and evident premeditation)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, Branch 34, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of death imposed on appellant is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua;
Note: Penalty imposed is lowered from death to reclusion perpetua, no explanation by the Court why.
3. PEOPLE vs. OPURAN
FACTS: Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles
under separate informations.
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle
with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which
wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of

Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a
bladed weapon, locally known as pisao, thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Original defense: He denied being present at the place and time of the stabbing incidents. He
admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom he had not quarreled with. As for
Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He
asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly regarded
by his accusers.
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present
witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the
following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an
Order authorizing the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito
underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan
issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status
on that date but was "suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further
psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City.
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-
psychiatrist of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the
resumption of the hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito
three times through interviews. From her interview with Anacitos sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron,
she learned of Anacitos psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found
that Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She
confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the
crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need treatment and
monthly check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was
talking "irrelevantly." Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and
evadyne.18 They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito
was prescribed the same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up
treatments, Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the
NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito
to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was
a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same
year. Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to
examination or treatment.
Anacitos other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he
heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When
Francisco went out to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the
corner of the street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he
hugged him. Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios house. Before
the incident, he observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and
sometimes silent."
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in
disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity. He contends that he was suffering from a
psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the
victims. Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in
the Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr.
ISSUE: WON the accused should be held criminally liable.
HELD: Yes. Criminally liable. In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor,
voluntariness is an essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity,
and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon
emotional and psychological appreciation. A mans act is presumed voluntary. It is improper to
assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal presumption is
that every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. Thus, the presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that
everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which
under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability.
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of
an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. It is, therefore, incumbent upon accuseds
counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack
of insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him.
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only
be measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by
outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested
in language and conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity. As consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so." Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or
inconclusive proof of insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of
cough syrup and consuming three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; slurping the victims
blood and attempting to commit suicide after stabbing him; crying, swimming in the river with clothes
on, and jumping off a jeepney.
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment
because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr., we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the
test of cognition whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal
act" and (b) the test of volition whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of
volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he
was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that which
is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis personal perception
that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence,
and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-
minute interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he
committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental
faculties, which will not exclude imputability.
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law.
What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine
to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these
drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-
patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she
requested the confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that
Anacito was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a
recommendation for Anacitos confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the
recommendation was made, who made the recommendation, and the reason for the
recommendation.
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi, we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to
the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged
insane by the institute. Applying this principle to Anacitos case, we find another cogent reason to
reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999.
While Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990,
there was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no
intimation that he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for
Anacito only in April 2000 because he was "again noisy in the jail." It seems that it was only after the
stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
4. PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES
FACTS: From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife
Julia Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find
employment as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung which latter caused her death. When she fell on the ground the defendant
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. He
was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
His counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined.
They said that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes he would remove his clothes in
front of others, would not take a bath, and remained silent and indifferent to his surroundings. His
counsel claimed that he is an imbecile therefore exempt from criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez
told that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could
distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime.
ISSUE: WON the accused is an imbecile, hence exempt from criminal liability.
HELD: No. Accused is not an imbecile, hence liable.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old
Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and
applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he
acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or
freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously,
in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and
absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned
to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According
to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted
himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully
cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a
man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife
whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of
little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking
up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the
floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one
though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities,
still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written
statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or
repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching
him, and insuring his conviction.
5. PEOPLE vs. CELESTINO BONOAN
FACTS: On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information
charging Celestino Bonoan, with the crime of murder, committed as follows: "That on or about the
12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the
said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the
following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surface of the
right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and
lateral lumbar region, left elbow' which directly the of the Carlos Guison three days afterwards."
On the date of the arragnmeny, the defense objected on the ground that the accused was mentLly
deranged and was confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. The RTC the ordered the Director of
Hispirals to submit report regarding the mental condition of the accused. The court also ordered that
the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist on the said hospital for further
observations.
However, Dr. Fernandezreported that the defendant could be discharged from the hospital and
appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." Te accused was
arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Hence this appeal. The defense set up being that of insanity.
ISSUE: WoN accused should be held responsible on the crime committed on the ground that the
accused is said to be insane during the commission of the crime.
HELD: No. From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it
appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and
from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro
Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia prcox. His confinement during these
periods, it is' true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934.
The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very
day of the perpetration of the crime, and although were made by detectives to secure a statement
from him, he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the
commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the
mental normalcy of the accused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by
the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
Furthermore, to prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normalcy of the accused at
the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco.
Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendantappellant he inquired from the latter for the reason
for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and
would not pay; that appellant bought the knife for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days
he had been watching for Guison in order to kill him. Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and
corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof
of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney
Smith, that in the type of dementia prcox, "the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and
planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken".
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time
he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that consequently he is exempt
from criminal liability.
Additional info: THEORIES ON THE PRESSUMPTION OF INSANITY: The first view is that insanity
as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
When the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the
criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity.
The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of

evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view. The burden, to be sure, is on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the def endant committed the crime, but sanity
is presumed, and "* * * when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.
6. PEOPLE vs. POTENCIANO TANEO
FACTS: Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parent's house in the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio
and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early
that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen,
Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a
result of her wound. and also the ftus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was
sentenced by the trial court to reclusin perpetua.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come
down and fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On
the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early
in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was
then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes
was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and
left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed
to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for parricide.
HELD: No. The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but
that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or had any motive
for assaulting them.
The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in
the -sense of entailing criminal liability.
The Court is conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commi a
crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances
of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the
defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that,
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence
of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
7. PEOPLE vs. GIMENA
FACTS: The defendant Juan Gimena is charged with the crime of parricide. It appears from the
evidence that on the morning of April 9, 1930, in the municipality of Ronda Province of Cebu, the
defendant helped his father-in-law, Gregorio Diana, in cleaning bamboo. After having finished the
cleaning, he went home and upon arriving there, he found his wife Crispina Diana and a child 2
weeks of age sleeping together on the floor. Shortly afterwards Gregorio Diana heard his daughter,
the defendant's wife, cry for help. He went to the defendant's house which was close to his own and
there found the defendant attacking Crispina with a bolo. With the assistance of Teodulo Gimena,
defendants brother, Gregorio succeeded in disarming the defendant and tied him to a post of the
house.
The matter was then reported to the authorities and the justice of the peace, the chief of police, a
sanitary inspector and a policeman appeared on the scene. The justice of the peace asked the
defendant why he had attacked his wife and received the answer that it was because she had given
the sum of P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereo whom he, the defendant, suspected of illicit relations with
the wife. A few hours later on the same day Crispina Diana died and the examination subsequently
made disclosed ten wounds in different parts of her body.
After trial the court below found the defendant guilty of parricide and considering in his favor the
mitigating circumstances of obfuscationuscation and lack of instruction, sentenced him to suffer 14

years and 8 months and one day of cadena temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed by law
and to pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
The appellant's argument in his favor is that he was in a state of somnambulism when he attacked his
wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is exempt from criminal liability because he was in a state of
somnambulism when he attacked his wife.
HELD: NO. We do not think that this theory can serve as a defense in the present case. By order of
the trial court the defendant was placed under observation for some time by Dr. Luis B. Gomez, but
the doctor apparently did not discover any somnambulism on the part of the defendant. A defense of
that character must be proven and such proof is lacking in this case.
"The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused during the prevalence of or in a
state of somnambulism has been recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the effect that it
does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity."
We can find no error in the decision of the court below and the appealed judgment is therefore
affirmed with the costs against the appellant.
8. PEOPLE vs. MANCAO AND AGUILAR
FACTS: The prosecution and the defense are agreed that Hilaria Dejan, upon her death, left personal
property, cattle and real property, the latter consisting of corn fields, some of which were in the
possession of Roberto Villela who had leased them. The probate of the will of said deceased Hilaria
Dejan, wherein she bequeathed one-half of her property to her nephew Roberto Villela and her niece
Josefa Billones, having been denied and proceedings for the administration of the property left by her
having been instituted, Crispino Mancao was appointed administrator thereof on June 26, 1916.
Roberto Villela refused to deliver the lands in his possession to the administrator, alleging that the
products of the same were to go to the deceased's creditors. On January 31, 1918, Crispino Mancao,
as administrator of the property of the intestate estate of Hilaria Dejan, was cited to appear before the
Court of First Instance to explain why almost all the deceased's property did not appear in the
inventory.
The issue ensued when Crispino Mancao, accompanied by three men and several women, inquired
to Graciano Sedimo, Roberto Villelas tenant, and ordered the persons with him to begin harvesting
the corns. Roberto Villela then asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the corn. Crispino
Mancao, replied thathe was the one who ordered them to do so and started towards Roberto Villela.
The latter then asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the products. Crispino
Mancao struck him with a bamboo stick andsaid: "This is the order." Thus, Roberto Villela dodged the
blow and snatched the cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold
of his bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick he had in his
hand. Crispino Mancao continued to strike Roberto Villela inflicting but slight
wounds. Upon being attacked, Roberto Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fight
ensued. A men dressed in khaki immediately appeared after Mancao had shouted for help and struck
RobertoVillela a blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. Crispino Mancao then took
hold of RobertoVillela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him with
his sickle in the back as a result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground unconscious.
ISSUES: Whether or not Mancao acted in self-defense; Whether or not Aguilar can use the defense
of lack of free will as an epileptic to exempt him from criminal liability.
HELD: No.
Based on a careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented by bot
h parties, the antecedents given and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the criminal
act, it has been proven that the accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator and aggressor. The
evidence sufficiently proves that he carried a stick and a bolo while Roberto Villela was unarmed. The
latter refused to surrender the lands belonging to the intestate estate of the deceased Hilaria Dejan
which were in his possession. And in view of this and of the fact that it did not appear in the inventory
presented by Crispino Mancao, as administrator, that he was in possession of said lands, the court
cited him to appear and explain his side of the matter, and ordered him to take the necessary steps to
obtain possession of said lands. Crispino Mancao ordered the harvesting of the corn on said lands
without any judicial order to that effect, knowing full well that Roberto Villela would object to his doing
so. Crispino Mancao's behaviour showed that he was ready to face the consequences of his act. In
this state of mind he undoubtedly became annoyed upon being asked by Roberto Villela, on the
afternoon in question, if he had an order from the court to harvest the corn, and he replied by striking
said Roberto Villela with a stick, saying that that was the order of the court.
While it is true that the wounds which caused Roberto Villela's death were not inflicted by Crispino
Mancao but by his coaccused Ciriaco Aguilar, yet said Crispino Mancao having been the instigator
and aggressor, and having called his harvesters to his aid, among them the said Ciriaco Aguilar, he
wanted them to carry out, as in fact they did, the criminal act started by him and, therefore, he is liable
not only for his own acts, but also for the acts of those who aided him.
Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be
sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may
momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his
own life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence
of an epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after the aggression.
9. PEOPLE vs. CARLOS FERNANDO
DOCTRINE: Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible one, it must produce such an
effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as
such, incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on
whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his mind to obey. He must act not only without
will but against his will. Such a force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the
man himself; it must be a force which acts upon him from the outside and by means of a third person.
FACTS: The following are culled from the 2 confessions made by Fernando; first, a sworn written
statement made by accused after his capture in an encounter in Barrio Balibago between Dau and
Mabalacat, Pampanga, between PC troops and Huks led by HMB Commander Francisco Ronquillo
alias Commander Manly who was killed, and his 3-page testimony at the preliminary examination of
the criminal complaint for murder conducted on July 19, 1961 by Judge Pompeyo S. Tiglao of the
Municipal Court of Bamban, Tarlac, 2 as well as of his own testimony at the hearing of March 11,
1965 as the lone defense witness on his own behalf, at which he freely admitted his participation in
the murder.
On the evening of March 30, 1961, the victim Bienvenido Laxamana was inside the store of Honoraria
Atienza, just beside his house, sitting and eating peanuts. While in that position, the accused Carlos
Fernando and Mario Salonga allegedly, without warning, suddenly and unexpectedly fired at
Laxamana. The duo then departed, leaving their victim sprawled outside the store. He was placed
inside a jeep to be transported to the hospital but was brought back already dead.
According to the accused, he and accused Mario Salonga were members of Hukbalahap organization
and were within the jurisdiction of Angeles, Pampanga when they received instruction from their
superior Commander Manly to liquidate Laxamana. The reason was because Laxamana, while an
officer of the civilian guards, had ordered the killing of a relative of Commander Manly and the beating
up of the father of Salonga.
The accused argued that he did not shoot the victim but merely stood outside the store, and that his
role was only to fire three shots in the air to signal for them to depart. He also argued that he must be
punished for rebellion and not murder. The RTC rejected the accuseds contentions and found them
guilty of the crime murder, qualified by treachery.
ISSUES:
1. Whether his participation in the murder was in furtherance of the Huk movement and that he
should have been held by virtue of his Huk membership to have acted under the compulsion of
an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.
2. Whether the case should be rebellion instead of murder.
HELD:
1. NO. On this tenuous premise, he claims that by virtue of his Huk membership, his participation
in the murder of the victim should have been deemed to be an act under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury
as to exempt him from criminal liability. Justice Moreland long set the norm for the application
of these exempting circumstances: " . . . before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces
him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that,
in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and
his mind to obey. He must act not only without will but against his will. Such a force can never
consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be a force which acts
upon him from the outside and by means of a third person. In order that one may take
advantage of subdivision 10 of article 8 and allege with success that he acted under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it must appear that the threat
which caused the uncontrollable fear related to a crime of such gravity and so imminent that it
must safely be said that the ordinary run of men would have been governed by it. And the evil
threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which he is compelled to cause."
Accused dismally failed to show that he acted "not only without will but against will." The record is
devoid even of any claim of the accused that any threats were made upon him or that he acted under
uncontrollable fear. He was not under any physical or moral compulsion when according to his own
version at the trial, he freely stood on guard outside the store while his companion Salonga went
inside and shot the victim. At his preliminary examination before Judge Tiglao, he further testified that
his role as guard was to fight off any persons who might come to the aid of the victim Laxamana. And
without any physical or moral compulsion, after the killing, he and Salonga, according to his own
testimony at the same preliminary examination, returned to report the same to Commander Manly
and accept his congratulations and thanks.
Even going upon the accused's own version at the trial that he merely stood guard while his
companion Salonga went inside the store and killed the victim, and that thereafter he fired three shots
in the air as a signal for them to depart and return to their camp, the trial court correctly held this to
constitute more than adequate proof of his participation as conspirator and of his responsibility as co-
principal in the murder.
NO. The record is bereft of any evidence that the murder was committed as a necessary means to
commit rebellion or in furtherance thereof. The victim had no established connection with the
government at the time 10 YEARS NA SIYA WALA SA CIVILIAN GUARDS. Far from discharging
the burden, appellant himself revealed in his unrepudiated written confessions that the killing was
inspired by personal motives of avenging the alleged killing of a relative of Commander Manly and the
alleged maltreatment of Salonga's father, as ordered by the victim Laxamana, and cannot be deemed
absorbed by the rebellion and should be separately prosecuted.
10. PEOPLE vs. VALMORES
Sgt. Francisco Sevilleno, Cpl. Martin Cabatingan, and an informant sailed from Cebu City to
Tagbilaran City because of reports they had received that the selling of marijuana in Talibon and
Tagbilaran is rampant. Sevilleno is a bonafide member of the 7th RFO, Philippine Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), Task Force Bagong Buhay while Cabatingan is a member of the Integrated
National Police (INP) of Cebu City and Detached Service with the CANU Task Force.
Cpl. Cabatingan was introduced to appellant Romeo Valmores by the informant, saying that Valmores
was looking for buyers of marijuana, and although Valmores could not produce immediately the
marijuana because it is still in an island in Talibon, Bohol, they agreed on the price of the marijuana. 4
days later, the informant told Cpl. Cabatingan that the marijuana was already in Talibon.
Accompanied by Sgt. Sevilleno, Sgt. Quijon, and a member of the National Intelligence Service
Agency (NISA) posing as the financier, Cpl. Cabatingan left Cebu for Talibon.
Upon arrival at Talibon, appellant Romeo Valmores introduced to Cpl. Cabatingan, in the presence of
the NISA man who posed as the financier, appellant Celerino Torremocha, as the person who would
accompany them to get the marijuana. They rode in a tricycle to the place where the marijuana was
kept and they walked to a nipa hut and there they saw the marijuana. In said hut they met Rogelio
and Vicente Polo. Cpl. Cabatingan told Rogelio and Vicente that he was the representative of the
financier. Vicente got the marijuana which was contained in a nylon sack which when weighed in a
scale, registered 5 3/4 kilos. Cpl. Cabatingan told the accused that he would leave the marijuana as
he would go back to his financier to get the money. Romeo Valmores accompanied Cpl. Cabatingan
and arriving at Talibon, they went to the public market where the man posing as financier was waiting.
The other members of the team of Cpl. Cabatingan were around the place. At that juncture, Cpl.
Cabatingan gave a signal to the team by raising his left hand with clenched fist and the right hand
holding the wrist of his left arm, which means that "the transaction is over and to arrest Romeo
Valmores."
The team arrested appellant Romeo Valmores. Thereafter, the team proceeded to the nipa hut where
the marijuana was kept and arrested Vicente Polo, Rogelio Polo and Celerino Torremocha. They
were all taken to the INP station at Talibon, Bohol, together with the nylon sack containing marijuana
and the weighing scale. The marijuana inside the nylon sack was brought to the Philippine
Constabulary crime laboratory camp in Cebu City for examination by the Forensic Chemist. The
findings was it was positive for marijuana. During the investigation, Rogelio Polo told Cpl. Cabatingan
that the owner of the marijuana is a certain Cristobal Casquej, who revealed that he bought the
marijuana for P1,000.00 at Bukidnon.
An information for violation of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was filed with the CFI of
Bohol against Romeo Valmores, Cristobal Casquejo, Vicente Polo, Rogelio Polo and Celerino
Torremocha. The RTC rendered judgment finding them guilty of the crime charged. Vicente and
Rogelio Polo did not appeal. However, Romeo Valmores, Celerino Torremocha and Cristobal
Casquejo did, assigning the following errors: the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
show that Cristobal Casquejo was neither the owner nor possessor of the prohibited drugs nor a co-
conspirator and therefore should be absolved; the so-called "commission" by Romeo Valmores and
Celerino Torremocha of the crime charged was the result of an inducement which is illegal; that at
most, if ever, Valmores and Torremocha were mere possessors of the prohibited drugs complained of
and therefore can only be penalized not under PD No. 1675 but under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 8,
Art. II, RA 6425, as amended by PD No. 44; in failing to consider that all of the accused were only
charged under RA 6425, not under PD 1675 pursuant to which they are now penalized.
The evidence on record does not warrant a finding that the Casquejo's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Casquejo is acquitted. There is dearth of evidence to show that he was the owner or possessor of the
prohibited drugs in question; neither was he a co-conspirator. The only evidence against him were the
testimonies of Quijon and Cabatingan. It was Vicente Polo who told them that Casquejo was the
owner of the marijuana leaves and when they investigated Casquejo, the latter orally admitted to
them that he was the owner. The OSG admitted that "without the information given by Vicente Polo,
who unfortunately was not presented in court to be cross-examined, Casquejo would not have been
implicated. Granting without admitting that Casquejo really gave an "oral admission," before Sgt.
Quijon, still the same is not sufficient to convict him. Said oral admission was vehemently denied by
Casquejo, which denial was not refuted by the prosecution.
Valmores was really looking for buyers of marijuana. There was no inducement made by Cpl.
Cabatingan. What the peace officers did was to employ ways and means of trapping and catching in
flagrante a malefactor and this is not contrary to public policy.
Cpl. Cabatingan did not perform any act which in any way induced or influenced the appellants to sell
marijuana. When Cpl. Cabatingan and Valmores met for the first time, the latter told the former that
he could not bring with him samples of marijuana because they were in Talibon. He then made
arrangement for the transfer of the marijuana to Talibon and told Cpl. Cabatingan that the moment
the same arrives he would get in touch with him through an informer. True enough, upon arrival of the
marijuana, Cpl. Cabatingan, Valmores and Torremocha went to the place where the marijuana was
kept. Torremocha showed Cpl. Cabatingan the sack of marijuana leaves, seeds and stalks in the
presence of Vicente and Rogelio Polo. Having agreed on the price at P1,800.00 per kilo and after
weighing the marijuana, Cpl. Cabatingan and Valmores went to the public market of Talibon to get the
money from the financier. When Valmores was holding the bag containing the marked money, he was
arrested by a member of the team and turned over to the authorities, following which the team
proceeded to the nipa hut where the marijuana was kept and arrested Vicente Polo, Rogelio Polo an
Celerino Torremocha.
In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the
would be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.
Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be
acquitted.
The crime was committed in November 1980 and PD 1675 took effect in February 1980. Thus, the
penalty imposed by the lower court is in accordance with the law.
Appellants Romeo Valmores and Celerino Torremocha are sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and each to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with costs. For insufficiency of evidence,
Cristobal Casquejo is acquitted.
11. PEOPLE vs. ESTANISLAO YUTUC
The accused, 17 years old, was arrested by Narcotics Command (NARCOM) soldiers allegedly for
selling dried marijuana leaves in the amount of P50.00 to Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz. Although arrested
on December 2, 1986 and detained from that date, it was not until January 9, 1987 or more than one
month after his arrest and detention that an information was filed. The accused plead NOT GUILTY.
Appellant was charged and convicted for violation of Sec. 4, Art. 11, RA 6425.
The prosecution presented 3 witnesses: Sgts. Juanita de la Cruz and Eufronio N. Sapad, Jr., both of
the NARCOM and Marlene Salangad, Forensic Chemist.
Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz testified that at about 1:00pm of December 2, 1986, a Buy Bust Operation
team was organized in view of an informant's report of an on-going drug trafficking. He was to act as
poseur-buyer and was given marked money in the total of P50.00 consisting of 2 P20.00 and 1
P10.00 bills. The civilian informer introduced De la Cruz to the accused as a friend of said informer.
De la Cruz offered to buy P50.00 worth of marijuana from the accused. Accused went to a corner at
the back of a house and came back bringing with him the marijuana dried leaves contained in 1
plastic bag measuring foot in length and 4 inches in width and which approximately weighed 18
grams. The accused gave De la Cruz the marijuana and the latter in turn proffered the P50.00
marked bills. De la Cruz wiped his face with a handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal to his
companions to arrest the accused, which they did. Accused's companion who was with him all the
time was able to scamper and ran away but accused himself was brought to the Police Station where
the arresting team had him blottered and searched. They found the marked money in accused's
possession. The apprehending officers brought the accused to Camp Olivas where they took
accused's fingerprints and prepared a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report.
Sgt. Eufronio Sapad, Jr. who apprehended the accused corroborated Sgt. de la Cruz' statements to
the effect that he saw the accused deliver the marijuana and De la Cruz gave the P50.00 marked
bills. At Camp Olivas, the accused underwent custodial investigation without having been informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be informed of such rights and was made
to sign a Receipt of Property Confiscated/Seized consisting of the 18 grams marijuana dried leaves
and the P50.00 marked bills, a Waiver of Detention under Art. 125, RPC. The arresting officers
executed a joint affidavit in connection with the apprehension of the accused.
Marlene Salangad, Forensic Chemist confirmed that the specimen weighs approximately 13 grams of
marijuana dried leaves contained in a cellophane pack and which was wrapped with a piece of bond
paper. The specimen proved to be positive for marijuana.
The defense presented the accused Estanislao Yutuc as its lone witness. On that day, he was about
to pay P230.00 for the rice which his mother purchased at the store located near their house. The
money given to him by his mother to pay the rice consisted of (2) P50.00 bills, (5) P20.00 bills, and
(3) P10.00 bills. Prior to the intended payment, a person approached him and inquired about a person
whose name he forgot. Another person arrived and they exchanged signals to each other. Then PC
soldiers came. The first person who inquired ran away and the soldiers handcuffed him. He asked the
reason for shackling him but the officer refused to say anything. His aunt came, held him in the arms
and asked the PC soldiers why they put handcuffs on the accused; the PC soldiers did not answer
and simply drew their guns. He felt frightened and his aunt released him from her hold. He was made
to board a car and sat in the middle of 2 persons. The PC soldiers were in civilian clothes and inside
the car, he was beaten and boxed several times all over his body by said soldiers. He was subjected
to interrogation concerning the sale of marijuana where he denied having anything to do with a
marijuana. On their way to Camp Olivas, the apprehending officers asked him the name of the person
who ran away. He answered he didnt know, which prompted the officers to box him several times. At
the NARCOM Office, the officers kicked him and he was thrown by the impact of the assault. He was
made to sign exhibits "A", "B" and "D" under threats to kill him if he would not sign them. Because he
could not read the documents, he asked the soldiers to read it to him, and they replied that he was
just a "nobody' to make such a request. Fearful of his life, he gave in and involuntarily signed said
papers without having been informed of the contents thereof and without the assistance of counsel in
violation of his constitutional rights. He was detained at Camp Olivas for 1 month and 7 days. 15 days
after his detention, his mother filed a petition for habeas corpus but the same was dismissed upon
filing of the Information against him. He denied having been engaged in selling and using marijuana.
He recognized the money marked as Exhibits "I", "J" and "K" as part of the P230.00 his mother gave
him. At the time the money were taken from him, no markings appeared thereon. He saw the PC
officers placed dots on the money thereafter.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are inconsistent and the actions of the police officers
show a callous disregard of the Constitution and of the law which would amount to a mockery of
justice to impress on their actions the presumption of regularity and on their testimonies with honesty
and good faith.
The accused established that he was boxed and maltreated particularly when asked the name of the
person who ran away. At the NARCOM Office, he was kicked until he was thrown by the force and
impact of the punishment. He was threatened and intimidated into signing incriminatory admissions.
He was illegally detained. The accused's mother filed a petition for Habeas Corpus, which practically
forced the filing of the information. In view of the filing of said information, the Petition became moot
and academic and was dismissed by the RTC but not before it has noted that the detention of the
accused by the NARCOM agents was "without any legal basis."
Sgts. De la Cruz and Sapad violated Art. 125 of the RPC, if not Art. 124. Sgt. Sapad admitted in open
court that he was aware that the detention of the accused was in violation of the RPC. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed cannot, by itself, prevail against the
constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person.
The common modus operandi of narcotic agents of utilizing poseur-buyers does not always commend
itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it is susceptible to
mistake as well as to harrassment, extortion and abuse.
Sgt. Sapad was so confused that he could not even distinguish the accused from the informer.
FISCAL: Can you possibly identify this informer who reported to your office?
A: Yes, sir.
CLERK: Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom when asked, answered by the name of
Estanislao Yutuc.
ATTY. BENOZA: I just want to make it of record that the informer pinpointed to by the witness is the
very accused Estanislao Yutuc.
Sgt. De la Cruz who acted as poseur-buyer simply declared that the report came from a civilian
informant whose identity was not revealed. There appears to be no point in concealing his identity for
as Sgt. de la Cruz testified, the informer was with him when he arrested the accused and introduced
him to the latter, giving rise to another disputable presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced. As to the number of suspected drug pushers per verbal report from the
alleged informant, Sgt. de la Cruz was not even certain. At first, he said there was one and then he
said there were two. Even as to the time he acquired knowledge of the name of the accused, Sgt. de
la Cruz contradicted himself.
As to whom the verbal report of the informant was directed, both NARCOM agents' statements are at
war with each other despite their presence at the time the report was received, since Sgt. Sapad
swears that the informant reported the matter of drug trafficking to his officemates while Sgt. de la
Cruz stated that it was to Operations Officer Captain Honorio Tomas to whom the information was
relayed then amended it to Commanding Officer Col. Roberto Kalinisan.
Even the physical evidence is suspect since Sgt. Sapad who was supposed to be the seizing officer
affirmed that the marked money were returned to him and he had them xeroxed but when asked who
returned the same, he replied that the money was on file. As to who placed the dots on the marked
money, the answers of the two soldiers did not jibe. Sgt. Sapad said that all of them placed the dots
on the marked bills while Sgt. de la Cruz stated that Operations Officer Capt. Tomas placed them.
Sgt. Sapad testified that the plastic bag delivered to Sgt. de la Cruz contained five fingers, dried
marijuana leaves weighing approximately 18 grams. In contrast, the Laboratory Examination Report,
confirmed by the testimony of the Forensic Chemist shows that they consisted exclusively of
marijuana fruiting tops weighing 13 grams. This discrepancy finds no explanation in the record.
The testimony of the accused is direct, consistent and devoid of any prevarication. His testimony
remained unshaken despite rigid cross examination. Contrary to the prosecutions claim that the
defense limited itself to bare denial, the accused clearly explained that he was arrested when about to
pay for the rice his mother has bought. The marked money allegedly used to pay him was part of the
230.00 his mother gave him. His testimony remained unshaken despite rigid cross examination.
The admissions of the accused were taken without strict observance of Sec. 20, Art. IV of the
Constitution which provides that "Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence." The trial court erred in admitting the exhibits in question.
After his arrest and on the way to Camp Olivas, he was beaten, boxed, pushed and kicked. At the
NARCOM Office, without being informed of his right to silence and of his right not to incriminate
himself, he was threatened and/or intimidated to sign several documents now marked Exhibits "A",
"B", "D," "F", "I" "J" and "K". Because he could not read and understand the documents presented to
him, he requested that the said documents be read to him but his request was denied. Afraid and
thoroughly intimidated, the accused signed the documents identified as follows:
Exhibit "A" "Receipt of Property Confiscated/Seized" from him by the soldiers;
Exhibit "B" "Waiver of Detention under Article 125, R.P.C.";
Exhibit "D" "Booking Sheet and Arrest Report" to which the accused implicitly admits that he was
arrested for selling marijuana leaves;
Exhibit "F" through which the accused acknowledges that the plastic bag containing marijuana
leaves taken from him;
Exhibits "1", "I-1", "J", "J-1", "J-2", "K", "K-1" and "K-2" which the accused apparently admits that
the two twenty-peso bills and one ten-peso bill allegedly with markings, were paid to him by the
Narcom.
The narration of the accused was unrebutted by the prosecution but was admitted by Sgt. Sapad on
cross examination.
Question: When you asked him to sign this, you just asked him to sign this without informing him of
anything, is that correct?
Answer: Except for the things I said a while ago, we told him that before signing, he can have the
services of a counsel.
Question: That is all you told the accused? You did not tell him before signing that this document may
be used against him in a criminal prosecution like this very serious crime as charged in the very
information?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: Likewise, you did not inform him that he has the right to refuse signing the document?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: And again, this was signed in the presence of several officers who are armed with guns, is
that correct?
Answer: Some were armed, sir.
Question: But this was signed in Camp Olivas when he was detained?
Answer: Before we have him signed, he was not yet detained, sir.
Question: Now, let us clarify this. Do you mean to say that when you brought him to the office you
don't consider it detention yet? And the act of investigation, that is not detention yet, according to
you?
Answer: Not yet, sir.
Question: You are referring to detention as the placing behind bars.
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: But he was under your custody?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: And it was a custodial investigation that you had?
Answer: Yes, sir.
These documents were signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. He was not informed of his constitutional right to silence and obviously under threats of
violence and intimidation upon his person. He might have been informed of his right to counsel but
not that he may be provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel. If it can be assumed
that he waived said right, the waiver was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel. The written
instruments are declaration against interest and tacit admission of the crime charged, since mere
unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. These documentary evidence is in
the same category as extra-judicial confessions outlawed by the Constitution.
The rights guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated
to the suspect especially if he is unlettered, but must be explained to him so he can understand their
nature and significance. Manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be
extracted from him and render it inadmissible in evidence against him.
The evidence as to whether Yutuc participated in the sale of marijuana is not enough to convict him
beyond reasonable doubt. Assuming he did sell, the issue of whether he was induced to sell or was
merely entrapped into looking for marijuana to sell remains.
Sgt. Juanita de la Cruz narrated that he approached the accused who was with Arnel Garcia and told
him "iiscore ako ng marijuana. The accused then allegedly went inside a street at the back of a
house and came back bringing along with him the marijuana for which he paid the marked P50.00.
Sgt. Sapad admitted that because of the verbal report of the informant, he already had a pre-
conceived notion that there really was illegal sale of drugs in Tinajero and that accused was selling
marijuana. He admitted that he and his companion practically induced the suspect into the
commission of the offense.
Question: Without you having been a buyer or your companion having been a buyer, you would agree
with me that there would not have been a charge against the accused, is that correct?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: In other words, you induced practically the suspect into commission of an offense, is that
correct?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: Mr. Witness, you have been in investigation for so long. I am asking you a very important
question, which may redound to the future of this poor boy: you do not know the difference
between the instigation and entrapment, as an investigator, is that correct?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: As a matter of fact, that was not even a subject of your seminar or any other training before
you undergo raiding like this?
Answer: I do no know that, sir.
Question: In short, you instigated the commission of the crime?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Instigation and not entrapment prevailed.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the
would be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal.
Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction, while in instigation, the defendant would have to
be acquitted. In inducement or instigation, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, In
entrapment, the crime had already been committed, while in instigation, it was not and could not have
been committed were it not for the instigation of the peace officer.
Here, the accused denied having sold marijuana nor had he been engaged at any time in sale of
marijuana. This is confirmed by the fact that he has no police or criminal record. Assuming that he did
sell the drug, it would appear that when Sgt. Juanito de la Cruz approached him, the latter was not
looking for buyers of marijuana nor was he in possession of any marijuana. It was Sgt. de la Cruz
who proposed to buy marijuana from the accused after having been introduced to the latter as a user.
Without the proposal and instigation of Sgt. de la Cruz, the alleged sale of marijuana would not have
transpired. Sgt. de la Cruz suggested the commission of the crime by offering the accused P50 for
the purchase of the prohibited drug which was not even in the possession of the accused. When an
employee of the government, as in this case, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in
order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. There was instigation in the case at bar
and the defendant is entitled to acquittal.
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support conviction.
12. PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO ASPIRAS
Prosecutions Case
Sr. Inspector Valdez of Paranaque PNP Drug Enforcement Unit received a telephone call, informing
him that a certain alias Rolly, later identified as Rolando Aspiras, was peddling prohibited drugs. He
constituted PO3 Jose Soreta, Police Aides Soto and Sabino to conduct a surveillance operation on
Rolando Aspiras. Surveillance was conducted where the house of the suspected peddler was
located. Afterwards, a buy-bust operation was planned. P/A Sabino acted as the poseur-buyer while
PO3 Soreta, P/A Soto and Cruz positioned themselves approximately 10 meters away from Aspiras
house. When Sabino called for Aspiras, Rodolfo San Lorenzo aka Bukol inquired what Sabino
wanted, to which he replied he wanted to score marijuana for P50.00. He gave to San Lorenzo the
marked 5 pieces of 10.00 bills. San Lorenzo entered Aspiras house then Aspiras came out and
asked Sabino if he was the one who wanted to score. When Sabino confirmed, Aspiras handed 5
pieces of aluminum foils. Upon verifying its contents as marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions to
make the arrest. When Aspiras saw the rest of Sabinos companions, he rushed inside and the police
team sought after him. The marked money was recovered from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta seized two
bricks of marijuana flower tops wrapped in plastic bag under a table. Aspiras and San Lorenzo were
brought to the headquarters and the marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI for examination.
Charges were then filed against Aspiras and San Lorenzo.
Defenses Case
Accused Aspiras testified that he was with his wife and 5 children when PO3 Soreta, wearing a police
uniform, and his 3 companions, in civilian clothes, forcibly entered his house while 1 stayed outside.
At gunpoint, he was ordered to stand and was handcuffed by Soreta. He asked what the problem was
and the police asked him where he hid the shabu. Upon responding that there was none, the police
began searching but nothing was found. Soreta instructed him to bow his head. Thereafter, P/A
Sabino proceeded to the kitchen. Aspiras noticed that there was something bulging in P/A Sabinos
jacket as he approached the kitchen. After less than 2 minutes, Sabino came out and uttered: Sir,
meron pa lang itinatagong marijuana dito. Aspiras denied ownership of the marijuana. He was
informed that the marijuana bricks were taken from the ceiling. Afterwhich, Aspiras was brought out of
his house and walked towards Rodolfo San Lorenzos residence. Aspiras saw San Lorenzo in
handcuffs and both of them were brought to the Coastal Police Headquarters.
Accused San Lorenzo testified that while he was resting in his house with his wife and children, he
heard someone knocking at his door. When he opened the door, he saw P/A Soto who invited him to
go to the police station. Upon inquiring for the reason, P/A Soto asked if he was selling shabu. When
he told him that he has no knowledge thereof, P/A Soto pushed him inside his house and PO3 Soreta
and P/A Sabino immediately followed and forced their way in and started to search the house. While
the search ensued, P/A Sabino asked accused San Lorenzo about his source of the prohibited drugs.
San Lorenzo replied that he could not show any shabu. Thereafter, he was brought out of his house
where he saw accused Aspiras in handcuffs. They were brought to the Coastal police headquarters
and detained. They were both investigated by Chief Inspector Valdez and charges for violation of RA
6425 were filed against them.
The Paranaque RTC convicted accused Aspiras and San Lorenzo of unlawfully selling marijuana in
violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425. For violation of Sec. 8, only accused Aspiras was found guilty
of possessing prohibited drugs. There being no sufficient evidence against San Lorenzo as regards
his knowledge or participation with respect to the marijuana bricks found in the house of Aspiras, the
Court pronounces him NOT GUILTY of the crime of Violation of Section 8.
The CA affirmed the conviction of accused Aspiras for violation of Sec 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425.
There was a valid buy-bust operation.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in

flagrante delicto. It is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker. The idea to commit the crime originates from the accused; nobody induces or
prods him into committing the offense.
The testimonies of P/A Sabino and PO3 Soreta had sufficiently established how the crime was
committed. The fact that accused-appellant handed to P/A Sabino the 5 marijuana aluminum foils
amounting to P50.00 pesos constitute the illegal sale of marijuana. There is no fixed procedure for
conducting buy-bust operation and no rule of law requires the simultaneous exchange of the marked
money and the prohibited or regulated drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher or seller. The
crime of illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale transaction is consummated, whether payment
precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.
The prosecution has established that the buy-bust team was able to buy from accused 5-pieces of
aluminum foils containing dried marijuana flower tops worth P50.00 pesos.
Through the buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was caught in flagranteselling marijuana.

The RTC correctly pointed out that there is no improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to testify against accused. The buy-bust operation was formed by the police officers
precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator. The testimonies of
the apprehending officers who caught accused red-handed should be given full faith and credence
since they are presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties as police officers.
While the conviction of accused Aspiras in selling prohibited drugs is warranted, he should be liable
only for such crime and his acquittal for possessing two bricks of marijuana flower tops is called for.
The police officers justification for the seizure of the prohibited drugs was rooted from the fact that
the intrusion and search was pursuant to accuseds lawful arrest after selling marijuana to a member
of the buy-bust team. A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of one arrested and
the premises within his immediate control. Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented in evidence. The seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the
following elements:
- a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
- present in the pursuit of their official duties;
- the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
- the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
- Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
The two bricks of marijuana are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
The two bricks of marijuana flower tops with the total weight of 1.440 kg were recovered under the
table, wrapped in a plastic bag. Said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication
of its contents. Even assuming that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just
the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer. The prosecution failed to show whether the plastic bag
was transparent that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that the plain view of such plastic bag
would readily disclose that its contents are marijuana.
The accused is held liable only for the sale of marijuana.
13. PEOPLE vs. BONGALON
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: This case involves the unlawful sale of 250.70 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
(Baltazar Bongalon), not being lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor vehicle, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic bag/sachet containing brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70
grams, which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
When arraigned, the accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution: The prosecution evidence reveals that in the morning of December 7,
1994, a confidential informant reported to the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, that a certain "Baldo"
(the accused) was engaged in selling shabu, a regulated drug. Police Senior Inspector Franklin
Moises Mabanag immediately formed a buy-bust operation team with PO3 Noel Castaeto as the
poseur-buyer and PO3 Rogelio Galos and PO2 Felipe Metrillo as members.
That same day, the confidential informant contacted the accused through a mobile phone and
introduced PO3 Castaeto to him as a "friend" who wanted to buy shabu. The accused and PO3
Castaeto negotiated the terms of the "transaction" over the mobile phone. PO3 Castaeto told the
accused that he needed 250 grams of shabu. The accused pegged the cost at 1,000/gram
of shabu, for a total sum of 250,000.00. The accused then instructed PO3 Castaeto to call the
following morning to confirm the sale.
P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag briefed the buy-bust operation team members on their respective roles in the
"sting" and gave to PO3 Castaeto two (2) 500.00 bills bearing serial numbers BT423424 and
BQ352570 and five (5) bundles of "boodle money" to be used as buy-bust money. P03 Castaeto
affixed his signature at the bottom right corner of each bill for identification purposes. They placed
one genuine 500.00 bill on top, and another one at the bottom, of the "boodle" money. The bundles
were first secured with money straps with markings 50,000.00, United Coconut Planters Bank and
wrapped in a transparent plastic then placed inside a brown envelope.
At 9:00 a.m., December 8, 1994, PO3 Castaeto talked again to the accused through the mobile
phone to confirm if their transaction would push through. The appellant told him that they would meet
at 3:30 p.m. that same day, near the Burger Machine stall along Doa Soledad in Better Living,
Paraaque.
PO3 Castaetos team and the confidential informant arrived at the designated place at 3:00 p.m.
using a private vehicle. He and the confidential informant parked their car near the Burger Machine
stall and waited for the accused to arrive. P03 Galos and P02 Metrillo, on the other hand, parked just
a few meters behind the car used by PO3 Castaeto.
At 3:30 p.m., the red Nissan Sentra sedan driven by the accused, with plate No. TPL 488, parked in
front of the car of PO3 Castaeto. The accused was alone. The confidential informant and PO3
Castaeto approached the Nissan Sentra and talked to the accused. After a brief conversation, the
accused asked for the money. PO3 Castaeto showed him the buy-bust money. Satisfied, the
accused immediately handed over to PO3 Castaeto a package wrapped in a newspaper. After PO3
Castaeto had checked out that the package contained the suspected regulated substance, he gave
the pre-arranged signal to his team by waiving his hand. The back-up team members immediately
announced that they were NARCOM agents and arrested the accused. They informed the accused of
his constitutional rights and brought him to Camp Papa for investigation.
On December 9, 1995, the confiscated substance was brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Services, conducted a physical, chemical and chromatographic examination on the
substance to determine the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The result is as follows:
Findings: Qualitative examinations conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to
the tests for Methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)."
Defense: For its part, the defense presented the accused himself, Baltazar Bongalon. He tried to
refute the claim of the prosecution witnesses that he was alone when the NARCOM agents arrested
him for the alleged unlawful sale of shabu. Allegedly, the buy-bust operation was bogus and the
NARCOM agents framed him for extortion.
The accused testified that in the morning of December 8, 1994, he was cleaning his house in United
Paraaque. Just before noon that same day, his brother, Melchor Bongalon, arrived and told him that
their friend, "Boyet," rang him and asked to tell the accused to return the Sega tapes he borrowed.
Boyet, whose real name is Juancho Tangsengco, lives in Syria Street, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque. Melchor Bongalon, on the other hand, lives in Tondo, Manila. 15
As the accused had previously planned to take his then 4-year old son, Mark Anthony, to Star City, he
decided to go to Better Living at 2:00 p.m. to return the Sega tapes first. Melchor allegedly
accompanied the accused and his son to Boyets house. They used the red Nissan Sentra sedan
owned by their sister. The accused was at the drivers seat, Melchor was at the passenger side in
front and Mark Anthony was at the back. He passed via Doa Soledad and Russia Streets. While
cruising along Russia Street, he slowed down a bit because he had to turn right to United Nations
Street. Suddenly, about eight (8) men in civilian clothes bearing armalite automatic rifles
and .45 caliber firearms intercepted him. (He learned later that the armed men were NARCOM agents
led by PO3 Castaeto). The firearms were pointed at the car he was driving. He rolled down the cars
window and asked what his violation was and if they had a warrant of arrest against him. They
ignored him and instead, ordered them to get out of the car. He persisted in verifying what his
violation was but did not get any reply from them. Thereafter, they were ordered to board the car
again. Two (2) men boarded his carPO3 Galos sat at his left side, taking the drivers seat, while the
other sat at his right sideand sandwiched him. PO3 Castaeto and PO2 Metrillo also boarded the
car and sat at the back seats, beside Melchor and Mark Anthony. The rest of the arresting team
headed towards their vehicle.
The accused and his alleged companions were taken to Camp Papa for investigation. When told that
he was carrying shabu in his car, he asked if he could see the substance. Allegedly, the NARCOM
agents refused. After the investigation, P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag asked him if they could go to their house
to check if he stashed any shabu in his house. He agreed. They reached his house in United
Paraaque by 7:00 p.m. that same night. About seven (7) policemen entered his house. PO3 Galos
was left in the car to guard him and his son. His brother, Melchor, was left in the custody of NARCOM
in Camp Papa.20
Fifteen (15) minutes later, the police let the accused and his son enter their house as the NARCOM
agents continued searching his house. His wife and his son were seated beside him in the living
room. His wife asked for a search warrant which elicited a cold reply from the NARCOM agents that it
was not necessary ("hindi na uso yon"). The search lasted for two (2) hours and yielded negative
results. The NARCOM agents tried to take the wife of the accused to Camp Papa, but she became
hysterical. They left her behind and instead brought the accused and his son back to the camp.
The accused claimed that the NARCOM agents were trying to extort money from them but he told his
mother not to report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation because he feared for his life.
He also alleged that several agents had threatened him that P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag would kill if the
latter could not get what he wanted. He accused them of manhandling him. He allegedly sustained
abrasions and contusions, but the NARCOM agents denied his request for a medical treatment.
RTC: After the trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer
the death penalty and ordered to pay a fine of 1,000,000.00.
CA: The accused filed a Notice of Appeal. Hereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial
to present additional witnesses that included his 4-year old son, Mark Anthony. The motion was
denied by the trial court on the ground that the additional witnesses he offered to present were
available during the trial proper of the case.
SC: In the meantime, the accused filed a "MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" with this Court. Pursuant to
our directive, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment. After considering their pleadings,
we denied the motion for new trial for lack of merit. The accuseds motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE: 1. WON there was a valid buy-bust operation.
RULING: YES. The appeal hangs mainly on the alleged lack of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and the frame-up-for-extortion theory. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is
resorted to for trapping and capturing felons in the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is
sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers. Unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit.
We reject the frame-up theory of the appellant. It is incredible. The appellant did not offer any
satisfactory explanation on why the NARCOM agents would single him out from among the many
vehicles that passed via Doa Soledad and Russia Streets on that particular day just to frame him up
and extort money from him. The records show that there was no prior surveillance conducted against
the appellant. No evidence was presented if the NARCOM agents knew before his arrest that he
could give a huge sum of money for the agents alleged extortion activity. What was established was
that PO3 Castaeto became aware of the appellants illegal trade only a day before the buy-bust
operation. In fact, the informant had to introduce first PO3 Castaeto to the appellant before the said
poseur-buyer managed to negotiate the shabu deal with him. Even the appellant admitted that he did
not know the NARCOM agents prior to his arrest. There was, therefore, no motive for them to frame
him up. Without proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against an accused, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the appellants claim of having been framed.
14. PEOPLE vs. NIETO
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing an information for
homicide on the ground of double jeopardy. The pivotal question here is whether the accused could,
on her unqualified plea of guilty to the first information, be rightly held answerable for the offense
therein charged. She could, for the said information avers facts constituting the said offense, with
nothing therein to indicate that she, as the perpetrator thereof, was exempt from criminal liability
because of her age, and her plea of guilty to the information is an unqualified admission of all its
material averments. Indeed, even under the view taken by the trial Judge who acquitted her, that
because she was between the ages of 9 and 15although that fact does not appear in the
information to which she pleaded guiltyan allegation that she acted with discernment must be
required. That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that
she, the accused Gloria Nieto, "with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and
feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and 8 years of age, into a deep place of the
Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and
there."
This allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her
unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. To require the
addition of the ritualistic phrase "that she acted with discernment" would be superfluous.
Assuming that Gloria Nieto was, at the time of the perpetration of the crime charged, a minor "over
nine and under fifteen years old," in the absence of any showing that she did not act with
discernment, she could have been sentenced for homicide or given a suspended sentence as a
delinquent minor if still of the proper ageon her plea of guilty to the first information. It is, therefore,
regrettable that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted her despite her
plea of guilty, there has, in this case, been miscarriage of justice. Still because of the rule on double
jeopardy, the error cannot now be righted.
15. PEOPLE vs. DOQUEA
FACTS: Deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the Municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. Valenting Doquea (minor) who was also
in the said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Rajogos hitting him on the stomach.
For this act of Doquea, Ragosjos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped
him on the nape. Doquea then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for
which reason Ragojos struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place where
Rarang was in order to continue playing with him.
Doquea, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Ragojos, who was taller and mor
robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone. Funding none, he approached his cousin
Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Rarang, who had heard what Doquea had
been asking his cousin Cocal, told the latter (Cocal) not to give the accused his knife because he
might attack Ragojos with it.
Doquea, however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin
Cocals pants. Thereafter, Doquea approached Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him
another blow with his fist, to which Ragojos answered that he did not want to do so because he
(Ragojos) was bigger than the accused. Ragojos then continued playing and while he was thus
unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his 2 hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest
with the knife which he carried.
T0IAL COURT RULING (CFI of Pangasinan): Valentin Doquea was prosecuted for homicide in the
CFI of Pangasinan. The trial court held that the accused acted with discernment in committing the act
imputed to him. The trial court ordered Doquea to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain
therein until he reaches the age of majority. The trial court took into account the fact that when the
accused committed the crime in question, Valentin Doquea was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, that he was one of the brightest in the said school and
was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, that during the time he was studying therein
he always obtained excellent marks, and observed at the time said accused was testifying in his
behalf during the trial of the case; thus, the trial court is convinced that the accused acted with
discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act.
Counsel for the appellant (Doquea) argues that to determine whether or not a minor acted with
discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to
the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the
time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act,
and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
ISSUE: WON Valentin Doquea acted with discernment.
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that the appeal in the present case was absolutely unfounded. The
counsel for the appellant (Doquea) mistakes the discernment referred to in Art. 12(3) of the RPC, for
premedidation, or at least for lack of intention which, is a mitigating circumstance, is included among
other mitigating circumstances in Art. 13 of the said Code.
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
15 years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, attitude, comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial. This was done by the trial
court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.

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4D CRIM REV JUSTICE TANG 2017-2018 | 1

ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. PEOPLE vs. PUNO

2. PEOPLE vs. TALAVERA

ISSUE: WON Talavera can invoke insanity as a ground.

3. PEOPLE vs. OPURAN

Criminal Case No. 4693

Criminal Case No. 4703

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of

4. PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES

HELD: No. Accused is not an imbecile, hence liable.

5. PEOPLE vs. CELESTINO BONOAN

Hence this appeal. The defense set up being that of insanity.

The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of

6. PEOPLE vs. POTENCIANO TANEO

ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for parricide.

7. PEOPLE vs. GIMENA

mitigating circumstances of obfuscationuscation and lack of instruction, sentenced him to suffer 14

8. PEOPLE vs. MANCAO AND AGUILAR

9. PEOPLE vs. CARLOS FERNANDO

10. PEOPLE vs. VALMORES

11. PEOPLE vs. ESTANISLAO YUTUC

Instigation and not entrapment prevailed.

12. PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO ASPIRAS

There was a valid buy-bust operation.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in

Through the buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was caught in flagranteselling marijuana.

The two bricks of marijuana are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

The accused is held liable only for the sale of marijuana.

13. PEOPLE vs. BONGALON

When arraigned, the accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.

ISSUE: 1. WON there was a valid buy-bust operation.

14. PEOPLE vs. NIETO

15. PEOPLE vs. DOQUEA

ISSUE: WON Valentin Doquea acted with discernment.

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